MEDIA, GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONALISM: THE CASE OF SEPARATE TELANGANA

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ABSTRACT

Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Advisor

Theorists of globalization tend to presume the declining centrality of nationalism as an explanatory focus for understanding global power relations. This dissertation argues that far from declining in significance, nationalism encompasses both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic, mediatized processes of power struggle, processes that draw increasingly from resources that are both internal and external to geographic domains of conflict, and in a manner that re-patterns power relations at the local, national, regional and global levels. This project examines the relationship between media, nationalism and globalization in Telangana and its relationship with marginalized groups in the region, with a particular focus on the media practices of Telangana activists such as production of pamphlets, use of online forums and access to mainstream television, radio, print media and social communication. This dissertation argues that despite not having a media of its own, and in spite of hostility of established Telugu media, the Telangana movement furthered its goals to strategic use of one-to-one and one-to-many media that operated in an oral culture. The success of the movement can be credited as much if not more, to bringing sections of Telangana society disaffected by globalization through nationalist mobilization since the mid-1990s as it could be the politically opportune moment in 2013 when the Telangana Bill was passed by the parliament. The movement is noted for being largely peaceful and employed non-violent strategies, although it can be argued that the suicides by young people were instances of self-inflicted violence.
To my parents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge my parents for their undying love and support. I want to thank my mother for her daily pep talks, over Skype and in person during my field visit, which kept me going. This dissertation would not have been possible without my father’s commitment and contribution towards the Telangana cause. In addition, I am inspired by my father’s example of the pursuit of scholarship for resolving social problems.

I was very fortunate to have the rare privilege of working with my advisor, Prof. Oliver Boyd-Barrett. It was largely due to his guidance that I could conceptualize the Telangana movement as a case of mediatized nationalism in the age of globalization, while several such studies continue to be understood more narrowly in terms of use of media for resistance. I would also want to thank him for his patience and kindness with which he has guided me over the past four years. I want to thank my committee, Prof. Gajjala, Prof. Lengel and Dr. Frisch for their enthusiastic contributions. Further, I thank my friend Anthony Frampton, Prof. Robin Mansell, Prof. Gonzalez, Dr. Hanasono, and Prof. Melkote for their interest in my academic development.

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Overview

This research project re-examines the significance of nationalism in the contemporary political life of globalized India. The advent of globalization has been associated with the reconfiguration of power blocs across local, national and international domains with some scholars having gone to the extent of putting a question mark on the relevance of the nation-state (Appadurai, 2000). More recent accounts of globalization, especially after financial crisis of 2008, tend to avoid the hyperbole associated with earlier theories providing a more nuanced assessments of the role of the nation-state in contemporary times (Ferguson & Mansbach, 2012).

This study seeks to contextualize the social and cultural implications of mediated nationalism within the changing political economic context of nation-state. The processes of globalization, including the formation of intra-national and international diasporas, simultaneously works to situate political power centrally and, through various counterhegemonic uprisings that also lay claim to discourses of nationalism, locally. In the instances of the “Arab Spring,” or the current unrest in Thailand, Ukraine and Venezuela, we are perhaps encountering issues of contested ideas of the nation in which some of the players are exogenous, ranging from diasporic groups to big powers who seek to influence changes to ideas of the nation, ones that may better serve their own interests.

Table 1: Working definitions

<p>| State | A human community that (successfully) claims monopoly of the physical force within a given territory. (Weber, 1919/2004) |</p>
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<th>Nation-State:</th>
<th>the political community (Siapera, 2010) that claims sovereignty, among other things, over territory.</th>
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<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>The ideological proposition that the ethnic and political community should always coincide (Gellner, 1983). Here ethnic refers to historical, cultural, and/or linguistic basis of the nation (Smith, 1986).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>The transcendence of nation-state with transnational (usually asymmetric) flows of economy, influence, ideas and people consequently “bringing self and other into newly reflexive if often unequal relations” (Livingstone, 2010, p.2).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mediatization</td>
<td>A gradual reshaping of institutional and individual realities to accord them with the (prevailing) logic of media forms/systems (Livingstone, 2010). Here the logic of media systems refers to holistic understanding of the various intersecting societal forces at work at the same time as we develop a particular perspective on the role of media within these processes (Hepp, Hjarvard, Lundby; 2015).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imperialism</td>
<td>The idea of power and unequal relations of power, particularly in the context of power excercised by some tribes, communities, and nations over others. (Boyd-Barrett, 2015, pp. 5-6)</td>
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The case of Telangana is based on a regional separatist movement. The Telangana movement identifies itself with a geographic region of the same name in India. With the emerging interest in the study of protests (such as Occupy), resistance, and social movements as
agents of social change, there is a greater need to investigate media and communication practices. The changing media environment, including digitization and social media, is actively reshaping the nature of resistance and social movements. This study of the process of mediation integrates a focus on activist agency through media performance while also taking account of the structural constraints imposed by media political economy. This dissertation analyzes the relationship between media, nationalism and globalization in Telangana from the perspective of the marginalized groups in the region. It examines the media practices of Telangana activists with reference to the production of pamphlets, use of online forums, and access to mainstream television, radio and print media.

**Purpose of the Study**

Globalization theorists since early 1990s have sought to understand the growing importance of nationalism even as some of them underplayed the importance of nation-state though this has changed to an extent after 2008 economic recession. Yael Tamir noted, “[n]ational movements are regaining popularity, and nations that had once assimilated and ‘vanished’ have now reappeared” (p. 3, 1993). Nation and ethnicity do not always overlap with nation-state, presence of ethnic minorities within nation-state and influential diasporas living away from homeland are some examples of this disjuncture. With increased flow of people and ideas along with goods and capital across borders, the disjuncture between nation and state becomes apparent. Urry observes, “nation has become something of a free-floating signifier relatively detached from the ‘state’ within the swirling contours of the new global order” (pp.87, 2002). Nationalism in the age of mediated globalization has been noted for the fluid nature of its borders that creates both disjunctures and a greater awareness of dissident marginalized voices (Appadurai, 1990; Bhabha, 1994).
This study is invested in examining the relationships between nationalism and nation-state. The modern system of autonomous/sovereign nation-states, by most accounts, emerged after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. The treaty brought to a close the Thirty Years War, which had already undermined the authority of the transnational Holy Roman Empire. Since then through the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries nation-states emerged around the world. Historians Hans Kohn (1955), Liah Greenfield (1992), Philip White (2006) and others have argued that in some nations like Germany and Italy cultural unification preceded state formation, while state driven national unification is more likely in multiethnic societies like France, England and China. Some conceptions (a discussion of such conceptualizations will ensue in the next chapter) of nationalism reject associating the birth of the nation with that of the nation-state (Siapera, 2010).

The ideas and structures of the nation-state that emerged in Europe impaled the histories of colonies. The conceptualization of both the nation-state and media emerged from the sites of imaginative and structural contestation in the colonies. Anti-colonial nationalism challenged imperialism by demanding that the rights of citizenship be extended to the colonized, and eventually such challenges brought about a shift of power from Western elites to the Indian (or, more broadly, postcolonial) elites (Spivak, 2010). Post-colonial nationalism typically faced the processes of contestation, even fragmentation, arising from the demands of subaltern groups that became more familiar with the institutional politics of the elite domain (Chatterjee, 1994). Despite such fragmentations and contestations, nationalism is also a force of cohesion in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural India. Martin Jacques (2012) and Gayatri Spivak (2010) have argued that civilizational ethos in China and India respectively is more ancient than the nation-state.
formation. Nationalism in China and India draws from ancient civilizational history rather than the modern history of the nation-state.

The media plays an important role in helping form the ideas and imaginings of a nation. For instance, Anderson (1992) links nationalist imagination to print capitalism. Rajagopal (2010), on the other hand, argues against the reduction of communicational contexts to a specific technology; rather he calls for an accounting of historical and political conditions as well as the material and cultural practices which render shape to such imaginings. National imaginations in contemporary India include the older forms of oral communication in the communal context, and the new communication context of cell telephony, as well as mediatized relationships between politics, caste and commerce.

Globalization is characterized by multiple contestations at local, regional, national, and global levels. Tunstall (2008) notes that the conflicts between big, regional and national media might be of primary importance in larger nations like India, where linguistic groups have complained against the media imperialism exerted by (often) English/Hindi language national media. The structural struggles are also associated with nationalist imagination within India’s diverse states. Reddy (2010) argues that in the case of Andhra Pradesh, the contestations between the local and regional press have had a determining impact on regional politics. Regional media have been restructured around local issues, by moving towards decentralized productions. This has had a far-reaching impact on the agenda of regional politics, and inter/intra-regional conflicts such as Telangana.

Castells (2007) presents a set of grounded hypotheses on the interplay of communication and power in the context of network society. Castells (2007) argues that media have become central to questions about how “power is decided” (p. 238). Couldry and Curran (2003) reject the
notion that media serves merely as a neutral turf whereupon social forces operate and interact, and instead argue that the media domain itself is a social force bounded by the market. This leads to an understanding of media power not merely as a form of power that is exercised by the elite over media or the power exercised by media on political and economic elite as a fourth estate, but rather in terms of the relationships between wider social forces (including *civil society*) and media output (Couldry & Curran, 2003).

The rise of online platforms and the expansion of telecommunication networks increased the ability to communicate one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many (Cammaerts, Mattoni, McCurdy, 2013). Castells (2007) argues that under these conditions of the development of interactive and horizontal communication networks, social movements are able to intervene more decisively in the communication space. Corporate media and mainstream politics have also invested immensely in “this new communication space” (p. 238). As a result of these complementary or oppositional processes, a new communication space that includes mass media and horizontal networks is marching towards convergence.

Much of the discussion on “internal colonialism,” Weiner (1978) notes, is focused on labor from the periphery that is drawn to the core. Polish workers moving to London or Bihari workers moving to Mumbai can be viewed as a type of migration pattern falling into this primary core-periphery relationship. Anti-immigrant sentiment is often directed towards workers from other regions or belonging to other ethnicities. In addition to this pattern of immigration, Weiner (1978) also notes another less prevalent mode where migrants, owing to advanced education and skills, take up positions that locals cannot. The former situates migrants in a position that is subordinate to the locals, and the latter positions them over the locals. The early movement of
Andhras to Hyderabad is of the second kind. While the conflict has not resulted in widespread clashes between communities, the tensions have become part of the intensely mediatized milieu.

Between 2006 and 2011, more than 200 million hectares of land are estimated to have been acquired by foreign firms and governments (Sassen, 2014). Much of this land is in the Africa, with a growing share in Latin America, Asia and Europe but the buyers are increasingly diverse ranging from China to Sweden and represent sectors ranging from mining and industrial crops to biotechnology and finance (Sassen, 2014).

It is marked by a vast number of microexpulsions of small farmers and villages, and by rising levels of toxicity in the land and water surrounding…the acquired land. There are growing numbers of displaced people, rural migrants moving to slums in cities, destroyed villages and smallholder economies, and, in the long run, much dead land. (Sassen, 2014, p. 81)

The insertion of global capital in the areas around Hyderabad, coupled with severe environmental degradation, and the consequent processes of dispossession and marginalization in the districts of Telangana, are symptomatic of the problem. In this study, the focus is on the role the media plays in bringing these issues into the public domain—or preventing these issues from coming into the public gas—and the processes that constitute such media.

Research Questions

The broader purpose of the study is to re-examine nationalism in the age of mediated globalization. This raises questions regarding the generalizability of the study that is based in a specific region, and includes the consideration of structural variables and cultural factors specific to India/Telangana. The in-depth understanding of the relationship between marginalized media and politics that can be gained by a focused study located in Telangana, can lead to insights into
such relationships elsewhere. By examining how specific marginalized groups understand and use media and communication to participate in political processes would lead to a better understanding of the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic aspects of Telangana nationalism. The study asks the following questions:

1. How can the Telangana nationalism be interpreted in terms of its evolving shape, form, function and imagining?
2. What are the political, economic and cultural implications of the Telangana movement for the media and *vice versa*?
3. What are the media practices of the activists and marginalized groups in Telangana?
4. What does nationalism mean in a post-colonial and globalized world and for whom?

**Relevance to the Field of Media and Communication**

This study conceptualizes the Telangana struggle as a case of nationalism in the age of globalization. The context of globalization calls for an assessment of the transformations in relationships between politics, economy, culture and the nation-state. The impact of globalization on media, culture, economy and nation-state needs to be assessed. Appadurai (1990) has argued that globalization, among other outcomes, creates disjunctures between media and other spheres, such as technology, politics and economy—each of which seems to have a life of its own. The intensified movements of media, technology ideas and people that Appadurai (1996) called mediascapes, technoscapes, ideascapes and ethnoscapes undermines sovereignty of nation-states. Nation-states control territorial borders, “global media and transnational communication operate beyond borders, while increased mobility transforms borders into porus formations” (Siapera, 2010, p.26). Emergence of mediascapes, ideascapes and ethnoscapes offers alternative means to construct identity that undermine singular national identity.
Disjuncture highlights the multiple interactions “between the cultures of the world: political economic, technological, cultural production, content, content flows, and reception of culture” (cited in Straubhaar, 2007, p. 22). Appadurai’s (1990, 1996) cultural analysis in terms of disjunctures, while insightful, is questioned by scholars according primacy to structural factors. Straubhaar (2007) argues that while disjunctures broaden the scope of inquiry, they may also be overestimating the separation between various levels of interactions. There are relationships between “political and economic systems, technologies, cultural producers and media institutions, and receivers of cultural and media products” (p. 22). Correspondingly, there are different levels of causations associated with structural and cultural issues.

In order to critique frameworks of studying globalization such as the various scapes discussed above, we need to remember that despite multiple and oppositional flows in such scapes the flows are unequal. Inequality of economic, military and soft (including media and education) power, tilts the various scapes in favor of global north, reinforcing domination in one sector to expand into others. In the context of weakening of nation-states, a glaring example is that of failed states—weakend and devastated states. Saskia Sassen (2014) argues the language of failed states represents the states’ weakness as endogenous, a function of their own corruption. But it is important to remember that it often is and was the vested interests of foreign governments and firms that enabled the corruption and weakening of these states. And good leaders who resisted Western interests did not always survive; consider, notably, the now-recognized murder of the Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba by the United States government. (Sassen, 2014, p. 86)

Boyd-Barrett (2015) argues that these kinds of US interventions in sovereign affairs of foreign nations can best be understood as continuation of classic imperialism in a contemporary context.
The goal of imperialism in the current context of globalization is not always about territorial acquisition (though it continues to be one of the motivations), it is to secure—“by any means possible, including violent coercion, provocation, bribery, threat, subterfuge—the foreign policy goals of the USA” (Boyd-Barrett, 2015, p. 7). These goals often represent the interests of the multinational corporations based in the USA and its other powerful allies who have had the access to shape these policies.

The USA and other powerful nations of the global north, by virtue of holding controlling stakes in the Bretton Woods organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank also help shape their policies. Sassen (2014) argues that debt restructuring programs sponsored by they IMF, the World Bank and the WTO since the 1980s, as part of globalized economic liberalization policy, resulted in “massive indebtedness to foreign lenders and a sharp shrinkage in government funds for education, health, and infrastructure” (p. 85). Furthermore, the extensive land grabbing “now under way, with the expulsion of small farmers and poisoning of land they are causing” points to imperialistic power relations between nations rather than merely a culture of corruption plaguing Global South (p.86).

Imperialism has historically inspired resistant national movements. The possibility of national movement as response to British Colonialism in India was noted by Karl Marx

The Indians will not reap the fruits of the new elements of society scattered among them by the British bourgeois, till in Great Britain itself the now ruling classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or till the Hindoos themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether. (Cited in Anderson, 2010, p. 23)
Marx writing in 1853, four years before the first war of independence, could see colonized Indians as perfectly capable of running their own country (Kiernan, 1967). Firstly, this offers a contrast to the prevailing thinking behind terms like failed states which portrays people living in such countries as incapable of running their own affairs. Secondly, the academic critique of imperialism is an old and established tradition, recognizing the influence of empire building on social, economic and cultural lives of subjected people. Boyd-Barrett (2015) argues that research of media imperialism is itself half a century old. Media imperialism is not a single theory but a framework to analyze many ways, including support and resistance, in which media and communication relate to various systems of dominations by local and global hegemons.

Taking a similar political economy approach to cultural and structural factors—an approach that includes an assessment of historical material relationships—this study will contribute to the understanding of postcolonial nationalism in the age of mediated globalization. This approach recognizes that imperialism and resistance to it shapes commerce, culture and society. The case study of the relationship between social movements and media is analyzed with reference to studies of mainstream and alternative media, public sphere and radical conceptions of democracy, as well as conceptions of postcolonial nationalism and its relationship with ethnicity (including caste) and territory. Focusing on a single region gives this research the opportunity to explore in depth how these mediatized processes operate, and to consider some of the alternative ways in which government policy makers (if they chose to), social movement actors, as well as journalists and intellectuals might attempt to restructure the regional divisions of labor in order to achieve greater equality among ethnic groups, without xenophobic restrictions on mobility and intermingling (Weiner, 1978).
The in-depth focus of the study on the Telangana region will further the understanding of relationships between media and social movements. Previous analyses of media systems (such as Hallin and Mancini, 2004) have focused on the structural ties between media and politics, with specific emphasis on notions of professionalism and corruption. Another significant research endeavor has been the examination of relationships between various media, alternative, radical, mainstream and social movements. This study could bridge the gaps in our understanding of the organization of media industries and social movements, and throw new light upon, or problematize the existing understandings of, professionalization.

History of the Telangana Movement

Telangana is a region in the State of Andhra Pradesh in India that was formerly part of Hyderabad State. Hyderabad State was a suzerain princely state in British India. The Nizam was the royal monarch of Hyderabad and Urdu was its official language. Following decolonization, the princely Indian states were annexed into India and Pakistan. The Indian union was created through the annexation; states do not have the right to secede now. The Hyderabad State comprised the Telugu-speaking Telangana region, and the Kannada- and Marathi-speaking Dharwad and Berar regions. Apart from these groups, Hyderabad has had a sizable Urdu- and Telugu-speaking Muslim population. The Nizam was not in favor of joining the Indian union and wanted an independent state. The newly independent Indian union annexed Hyderabad in 1948 through military action. Between 1946 and 1951, Telangana was the site of a peasant rebellion. Most accounts of the Telangana struggle do not pay adequate attention to the peasant rebellion, which displayed a class-based cleavage in the society; most scholars focus on the ethnic or regional dimensions of the subsequent conflict (Horowitz, 1985; Weiner; 1978). The local peasants had spontaneously erupted against their oppressive landlords. The rebellion mutated
into armed communist insurgency when the Communist Party of India (CPI) armed the movement. This arming of the movement led to the usurpation of the leadership by the communists.

The military action that had seized the Hyderabad State and annexed it into the Indian union continued to quell the rebellion and fight communist influence in the region. In 1953, the States Reorganization Committee (SRC) was established by the Government of India recommended that states be constituted on linguistic basis. This would have meant that the Hyderabad State (in existence from 1952 to 1956) would be broken up and its various linguistic regions would join the adjoining states of Bombay, Mysore and Andhra. It is this merger of Telangana with Telugu-speaking Andhra that was the bone of contention. The Andhra region is composed of the fertile Krishna-Godavari delta that is known for high agricultural productivity. Also, as the region was under direct British rule for many years, it benefitted from English-medium education. The SRC cautioned against the hasty merger of the two Telugu-speaking regions due to their wide disparities. It is known that then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was unfavorably disposed to the idea of merger and likened it to the imperialist expansion of Andhra, detrimental to Telangana. Nevertheless, the issue was left to the two states to sort out.

There were significant inequities between the regions. With a literacy rate that was almost 50% less than the rest of the state, Telangana joined Andhra Pradesh (AP), a merger that was subject to a series of safeguards called “Gentleman’s Agreement” (Horowitz, 1985). As per the agreement, only mulkis (Telanganas or those residing in the region for at least 15 years) were, with a few exceptions, eligible for government jobs. Further, there were provisions restricting the entry of non-mulkis to Telangana educational institutions, the state cabinet was mandated to contain specific proportional representation, and the region was apportioned a fixed revenue.
After the unification of the state with its capital at Hyderabad, the Andhras migrated there. Soon, exceptions were made to the *mulki* rules, based on the alleged inadequacy of qualified locals. Additionally, the procuring of false *mulki* certificates was rampant. The Andhras were favored in perks and promotions; the Telangana proportionality requirements were left unfulfilled. Disparities in land prices allowed the Andhras to sell a few acres of land in their home region and procure large swaths of land in Telangana, again in violation of the Gentleman’s Agreement. The widespread nature of these developments confirmed the apprehensions of the Telanganas of being swamped by the more advanced people of Andhra (Horowitz, 1985).

**Figure 1: Andhra Pradesh Map**
In 1969 students and, later, non-gazetted employees (government officers in India are generally classified as either gazetted or non-gazetted officers, the former being higher-ranked government officials. Most gazetted officers in Telangana hail from Andhra) agitated for jobs and eventually, separation from Andhra. Police firing on the protesting students killed around 400 students that same year. The movement crystallized around a political party, the Telangana Praja Samiti (TPS) that went on to win 11 out of the 14 parliamentary seats in the region in 1971. This figure is particularly significant because it was the same year when Indira Gandhi was at the height of her popularity following the nationalization of banks, abolition of privy purses, and the recent victory in the Indo-Pak war which liberated Bangladesh; her party went on to win the national elections by a landslide. Horowitz (1985) argues that the primary cause for the Telangana movement was the perceived failure of preferential policies that had been designed to protect the Telanganas from the Andhras. The separate Telangana movement led to the internal displacement of people from Andhra and was eventually suppressed when the TPS merged with Mrs. Gandhi’s Indian National Congress (R).

Horowitz (1985) attributes the death of the movement to two causes. First, it may be attributed to the politics of Indian federalism; TPS continued to negotiate with the Congress federal government and worked for factional gains by unseating the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh and when this was accomplished, TPS merged with Congress (Horowitz, 1985). In January, 1969, the Andhra Pradesh High Court ruled that mulki rules did not apply to jobs in the AP State Electricity Board, a decision that triggered student agitations (Weiner, 1978). Second, according to Horowitz (1985), the subsumption of the movement was due to the gains made by the agitations. The movement succeeded in granting concessions such as the setting up of a
regional committee, one with an explicit mandate to increase employment opportunities for mulkis. Moreover, the Supreme Court in 1972 decided that the mulki rules were valid after all.

The 1972 decision led to a new separatist movement by the Andhras in the Andhra region. Andhra ministers resigned, government servants went on strike, and the law and order deteriorated. Moreover, the Telangana movement produced a stream of migrant Andhras, returning to tell tales of hardship and insults suffered at the hands of Telanganas (Horowitz, 1985). Horowitz (1985) argues that in an independent state, these movements would have led to armed secessionist warfare. In the end, the Andhra agitations were brought under control by watering down the mulki concept. Mrs. Gandhi proposed a compromise that restricted the application of mulki rules slightly. Horowitz (1985) argues that if the two regions had agitated simultaneously, it would have led to partitioning, as in the case of Punjab in 1966. The Telangana-Andhra conflict has been characterized by complementary secessionism that are likely to be sequential because of the opposite grievances (the cycles of perceived oppression and reaction to oppression) that bring them about. The enforcement of preferential quotas breeds separatism in population exporting groups, while the withdrawal of quotas breeds separatism in the backward groups (Horowitz, 1985). Horowitz (1985) and Weiner (1978) predicted the end of the Telangana movement based on the assumptions of the ability of the state to assimilate ethnic groups in conflict, both through expansion of opportunity and through repression of the agitations. This assessment is also supported by rational arguments that indicate division of states would not yield substantially different outcomes, such as increased rate of economic growth and employment (Weiner, 1978).

Again, in 2001, another political party Telangana Rastra Samiti (TRS) came into being to fight for the cause of a separate state. As noted earlier, statehood does not in this case imply
separation from the Indian union but from AP. There are, however, some calls for independence from India as well, but these discourses are marginal and viewed generally within the agitation as extremist. The Indian constitution grants the federal parliament the authority to create new states. Some of the conditions for the resurgence of the movement will be discussed in the section on Indian media. A brief summary of these conditions is as follows: The severe drought in 2000 lead to the impoverishment, starvation, and suicides of peasants and weavers in many districts (especially the southern districts) of Telangana. The Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu’s lackadaisical response to these problems, and an investor-friendly attitude towards American IT conglomerates, resulted in a widespread feeling of dissent (Thomas, 2010). There are other political factors such as the creation of new states in the 1990s and regional political equations. Since 2011, the Telangana movement has moved into an intense phase. Following massive unrest in the region triggered by a TRS-led agitation, the federal government on December 9, 2011 agreed to grant statehood to Telangana. The celebrations were short-lived as 20 days later the federal government reversed its stand. On October 3, 2013 the Union cabinet approved the proposal to bifurcate Telangana and Andhra. On March 1, 2014 the President of India signed the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Bill, paving the way for the formation of Telangana State.

The role of the media in the various Telangana struggles over the years needs to be investigated. This dissertation is focused on the contemporary Telangana movement and, hence, on the role of the media during the recent agitations for statehood. However, historical development/underdevelopment of media in Telangana would inform the study. Media in Andhra Pradesh needs to be analyzed in terms of ownership, content and discourse. Furthermore, media could be seen as a turf where imperialism and resistance are played out, including behaviors within media organizations that could involve malpractices of ethnic discrimination.
Ownership concentration opens up the possibility of the role of alternative media and communication practices.

Organization of the Study

Chapter two reviews the literature relevant to the proposal. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section identifies the key contestations in the idea of nationalism since the emergence of the nation-state, and its relation to imperialism and globalization. The assessment of post-colonial conflicts over resources includes considerations of “sons of soil conflicts”, which is directly related to the issue of Telangana. This section also reviews the literature on the globalization of the media, South Asian diaspora and approaches to online research. In the second section, specific attention is given to the issues of contemporary relevance in the Indian media space. It contrasts trends of research, which accentuate the different contestations between local, regional, national and global media. This section also finds evidence for competing discourses of globalization and imperialism in the Indian media space. The different views on relationships between caste, media and politics are examined. A case study of Eenadu is presented to detail the influence of regional media on regional politics. The section ends with the consideration of the Indian public sphere. The last section reviews the literature on various re-imaginations of the notion of public sphere, social movements, alternative media and media framing, political communication, and the role of intellectuals in social movements. The final section of the literature review includes the conceptual framework for research questions and the research questions.

Chapter three lays out the methodological framework of the study. It explains the epistemic concerns of the researcher which guide him to the conceptual framework that privileges the notions of excluded voices, shrinking space for social movements under
neoliberalism and connecting the micro (agency) with the macro (structural change). The research project follows a triangulated approach based on the Grounded Theory, but also draws from discourse analysis and ethnography. The researcher argues that the application of the Grounded Theory methodology to political economy approach allows for the inclusion of political-economic conditions. Complementing the Grounded Theory method with discourse analysis and ethnography helps in a better understanding of these conditions. Data collection protocols, limitations and ethics are discussed at the end.

Chapter four reports the findings of the fieldwork. Chapter five discusses the implication of this research to the advancement of research on media, communication, globalization and nationalism.
CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Nationalism in the Age of Globalization


Rosenau (2003), for instance, argues that we live in an emergent epoch of ‘Fragmengration.’ This term suggests a “pervasive interacation between fragmenting and integrating dynamics unfolding at every level of community” (p. 11). Globalization is only one component of this emergent epoch. Thus, according to this view, critiquing globalization in a limited strict economic terms—advancing power of corporations, widening rich-poor gap, integration of markets tends to be simplistic as it doesn’t take into account cultural, social, political and ecological processes. The interaction between local and the global in various spheres including economic and cultural is both fragmenting and integrating.
As discussed in the previous chapter, Appadurai (1990) envisages disjunctures between different levels of organization within the global cultural economy. Post-structural analysis of globalization highlights the disjunctures between various levels or spheres of societal organization. Appadurai (1990) identifies some psychological tensions related to dealing with disjunctures, specifically an accentuation of nationalism within diasporic communities. Giddens (1991) offers a broader conceptualization of the insecurities of globalization. In this analysis globalization is credited with the creation of ontological insecurity. The advent of the Internet exemplified the network character of globalization. As people, money, and information move across borders, the channels of transport assume significance. The sense of security derived from a community is eroded. The structures and networks of globalizations negate the relational ties of traditional communities (Kinnvall, 2004). Intimate social ties forged through communal ties are broken down, as is

[T]he protective framework of the small community and of tradition replacing these with many larger, impersonal organizations. The individual feels bereft and alone in a world in which she or he lacks the psychological support and the sense of security provided by more traditional settings. (Giddens, 1991, p. 33)

Networked ties replace the social ties in a globalized world. A sense of security derived from social ties, therefore, is instead directed towards impersonal organizations. People are increasingly asked to report suspicious behaviours in their vicinity to the authorities, and authorities are contacted through telecommunication networks, rather than in person.

While the persistence of social ties is essential for national movements that identify themselves with a territory, one would be remiss to insist that social ties remain static. Rather we must move towards understanding transformation in social ties within
the social context of globalization. In order to conceptualize social ties in the network age, I will now begin analysing theories about the emergence of the nation state. Specifically, the next two sections examine imaginaries and discourses of the nation. Finally, I present a discussion of structural conflicts and political actions around the nation-state.

**Imagining Nation.**

Benedict Anderson (1991) defines *nation* as “an imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (p.6). The nation is imagined because even members of the smallest nations do not know other fellow-members, yet they nonetheless imagine themselves as belonging to a community. It is imagined as limited because it has finite boundaries beyond which live other nations. No nation conflates itself with all of humanity. The nation-state is imagined as sovereign because it was seen as a product of the Enlightenment and Reformation¹ that destroyed the legitimacy of “divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm” (p.7). Finally, the nation is imagined as a fraternal community despite inequality and exploitation that may prevail with in each nation. This fraternity made it possible, in the past two hundred years, “for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, but willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (p. 7).

Anderson (1991) argues that nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with consciously held political ideologies, “but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of

¹ Anderson’s (1991) allusion to Enlightenment is informed by the contemporary consensus that the notion of nations as sovereign is tied to “1648 Peace of Westphalia (actually two separate treaties, Munster and Osnabruck)…that created the modern system of autonomous states” (Krasner, 2003, p.141). This consensuses holds that Thirty Year’s war against the hegemonic power of Holy Roman Empire delegitimized the transnational authority of Catholic Church bringing about the nation-state (Krasner, 2003).
which-as well as against which—it came into being” (p.12). In Europe, two relevant cultural systems include the religious community and the dynastic realm. At their peak, both of these cultural systems were presented in taken-for-granted frames, as nationalism is today. Religious communities display a greater power of absorption or assimilation through conversion (than nations which are limited). Thus religious communities were global communities conceived through the media of “sacred silent language” (p. 14).

The notion of imagined communities has been expanded to address how customs of pre-industrial societies are “invented as traditions” in industrial Western nations (Hobsbawm, 2012, p. 2). Such customs have social meanings and associated iconography in rituals and festivities. However, unlike customs “invented traditions” are crafted as willful creations aimed at performing effective applications of power. These invented traditions provide a sense of identity to communities that have been “pulled into a political or cultural orbit of a more powerful society” (Nye, 1985) and, in Western nations, invented traditions pay obeisance to older performed customs comforting the communities that have joined the nation while also signifying important changes in power relations within a nation (Hobsbawm, 1997, 2012).

Eugenia Siapera (2010) argues there are two basic approaches to understanding nationalism. One advocates the primordial and perennial character of the nation, and the other views the nation as a construct. The first approach is divided between the primordial and perennial camps. The primordial camp sees the nation as germane to biological, cultural, or primordial attachments that ultimately cast the nation as natural. For perennialists, nations have been around since time immemorial; the nation is fundamental as a form of organization; particular nations come and go but the form of association is perennial. Siapera (2010) argues
that both primordial and perennial approaches tend to ignore the role of history and the contingent nature of nations.

In the second approach to understanding nationalism—the construct approach—both the nation and nationalism are held to be thoroughly modern concepts, associated with the rise of the media, industrialism, bureaucracy, urbanization and so on, developments which enabled an unprecedented form of organization, that of the nation-state. Nationalism often fails in its quest, arising from barriers to communication (the failure to achieve adoption of a standardized language, for example), and from "inhibitors" to standardization such as skin pigmentation and religion. Siapera (2010) offers a critique of the construct approach as well, arguing that it wrongly presumes that nationalism must involve urbanization (a development that, she says, did not apply in the case of an agricultural country like Greece in the 1800s, for example). Another important consideration is the role of media in conceptualization of nation: both primordial and perennial approaches reduce the role of media to transparent expressions of singular national will. These two approaches fail to explain "particular manifestations of nation, and their organization into political communities," changes in national expressions over time, "shifts in loyalty and allegiances, the variation in the intensity of feeling they generate" (p. 16). These approaches also underline an assumption that homogeneity is essential to avoid internal conflict.

Another approach to understanding nationalism is ethnosymbolism (Siapera, 2010). Anthony Smith (1986, 1998), an important proponent of this approach, considers nations as simultaneously both modern and premordial. According to this approach nation is a modern form of political organization, which relies on ancient myths and traditions for social cohesion. Not only does this approach speak to persistence of nation, it also explains nationalist mobilization. The myth of nation includes histories of golden age. Nations mobilize, if necessary, in search of
glorious history. Intellectuals including poets and writers play an important role in communicating these myths to the members of the nation. Smith (1998) therefore limits the agenda of a nationalist to bridging past and present, ignoring contemporary social dynamics behind renewal of nation.

According to Hardt and Negri (2011), nationalism in the contemporary mediatized world is popularly being associated with fascisms. These fascisms include the U.S. government’s detention facilities in Abu Gharib, Guantanamo; the Israeli government’s occupation of Gaza and West Bank; the theocratic governments and mobilization of the Muslim world. The more scholarly versions of these apocalyptic articulations are “characterized by excessive focus on the concept of sovereignty” (p. 4). These intellectual trends posit modern power as theological, “not so much in the sense that divine notions of authority have been secularized, but rather in that sovereign power occupies a transcendent position, above society and outside its structures” (p.4). This debate signals a return to the Thomas Hobbes and the “European debates of 1930s” (p.4). This emphasis on abstract notions of sovereignty pushes economic and legal structures into the shadows. The contemporary form of sovereignty is completely embedded in the “legal systems and institutions of governance, a republican form characterized not only by the rule of law but also equally by the rule of property” (p.5). The political is not autonomous; rather it is dependent on economic and legal structures. Thus, in this age of globalization research should examine the relations between sovereignty, law, and capital (Hardt & Negri, 2004; 2011).

Postcolonial Nationalism

Scholars examining the nationalisms of large nations with ancient histories, such as India and China, draw attention to continuities in socio-cultural factors (Jacques, 2012; Spivak, 2010). Spivak, for example, does not locate the emergence of nation in the Westphalian system,
suggesting instead that “state formations change but the nation thing moves through historical displacements” (2010, p.14). Spivak warns against transposing European ideas of nationalism onto India contending that India is a multilayered society where nationalism “doesn’t work right though” (2010, p. 17). Whereas European nationalism operates in the public sphere, “the subaltern affect where it [Indian nationalism] finds its mobilizing is private” (p.17). Spivak (2010) characterizes nationalism as “a recoding of this underived private” (p. 17-18).

Nationalism in this sense is a desire (especially of the subaltern) to control the workings of the public sphere. Further, the idea of a the nation as a community is problematic, in Spivak’s (2010) view, “especially as a feminist, that even liberationist nationalism should treat a seamless identity as something thrust upon them by the opposition” (p. 53). Spivak (2010) argues that Indian nationalism is based on political consciousness, not just because it was a product of anti-imperialist mobilization, but also because the Indian partition “was a politically mobilized violence-the country was going to be divided and so, people with whom we had lived forever, for centuries, in conflictual coexistence, suddenly became enemies” (p.7). It was the “working-class people, the underclass people who were mobilized” through nationalism, “because the British and the upper-class folks had made a pact to separate the land” (p.8).

The discourses associated with the colonial control of resources inform the historical context of postcolonial conditions. The colonial state used enlightenment narratives to justify its rule while simultaneously denying the same to colonies (Chatterjee, 1994). This is a recurring theme in post-colonial studies which highlights the exclusion of the colonized from citizenship rights (Chakravarty, 2000). The enlightenment narratives were aimed at reinforcing the view that Europeans were superior. These narratives separated the rulers from the ruled. Nationalism’s task was to “overcome the subordination of the colonized middle classes” by challenging the “rule of
colonial difference” (Chatterjee, 1994, p. 10). The resistance to colonialism consolidated its own sets of differences. The challenge to the rule of difference in the domain of the state was coupled with the proclaimed sovereignty in the inner domain. In accordance with liberalism, the domain of the inviolable private was separated from the contested public space. This distinction gave rise to several binaries such as spiritual-versus-material, inner-versus-outer, essential-versus-inessential, and private-versus-public. Over a period of time with the growing strength of nationalist politics the domain of state too became internally differentiated.

Chaterjee (1994) argues that scholars have been mistaken in equating political nationalism with nationalism. Anticolonialist nationalism produced a domain of sovereignty before beginning imperial battle with the colonial power. The contested field over which nationalism had claimed its sovereignty did not seamlessly fit the public-private divide. As with any bourgeois hegemonic project, cultural normalization was used in India as a method to settle the contestations over nationalism. According to Chaterjee (1994) a peculiar problem confronting Indian nationalism was that it had to choose its site of “autonomy from a position of subordination” to a colonial regime that “had on its side the most universalist justificatory resources produced by post-Enlightenment social thought” (p. 11). This has led to several autonomous forms of imagination of the community, forms that continue to overwhelm the post-colonial state. The post-colonial misery is centered on the inability to construct modern community and instead succumbing to the modern state (Chatterjee, 1994). Theoretical language must understand that nation is an imagined community that simultaneously takes the form of the state.

Despite individual claims being internally differentiated within a community, claims of community precede those of the individuals (Chatterjee, 1994). Chatterjee (1994) calls for
recognizing the communitarian activities through the domain of subaltern politics. Terms like *communitarian*, *elite*, and *subaltern* help conceptualize a new theoretical language to understand post-colonial nationalism in India.

To understand the subaltern, it is important to investigate the origin of the term within colonial context. Guha (1982) defines subaltern as the bottom strata of colonial social production that includes:

1. Colonial elite
2. Indigenous elite
3. Regional or local elite
4. Subaltern classes

Taken as a class subaltern was “heterogenous in its composition and thanks to the uneven character of regional economic and social developments, different from area to area” (p. 8). Guha (1982) notes ambiguous and uncertain relations between lower strata of rural gentry. The varying attitudes of rich and poor peasants, both of whom belong to subaltern class, makes it hard to conceptualize subaltern as a whole.

As seen in this definition, the term *subaltern* does not necessarily represent an opposition to the elite. The presence of populist elements in Indian politics is not a disingenuous ploy by the political elites; rather, it is based on elite recognition of a subaltern that must be dominated by negotiating on its own terms. The domain of subaltern politics has increasingly become familiar with institutional politics of the elite domain. Thus, it is difficult to separate or demarcate the two domains. The task is, instead, to understand the “mutually conditioned historicities” of the two domains that have been conditioned by “the hegemonic project of nationalist modernity,” on one hand, and the “numerous fragmented resistances to that
normalizing project” on the other (p. 13). The “fragmentary discourse” recognizes the limits of Western social philosophy and allows for the possibility to think of new forms of modern community and a new state (Chatterjee, 1994). The two previous sections discussed imaginaries or discourses of nationalism in the general Western sense and within a specific postcolonial context. The next section explores theoretical developments regarding the structural implications of nationalism in post-colonial societies.

_Nation- State Transformations in India_

As discussed above, the knowledge about nation and nation-state received from the Western experience is different from the experience of South Asia (Sharma, 2002; Spivak, 2010). Oommen (2002) identifies seven ways in which nation has been defined in the Indian subcontinent: ancient civilizational entity, (Hindu-Muslim) composite culture, political entity, religious entity, geographical/territorial entity with a specific cultural ethos, a collection of linguistic entities, and a unity of great and little nations. In the context of prevalence of linguistic states in India, Oommen (2002) suggest, that the sixth definition of linguistic nationalism within India is closest to the social reality. However, the view of nation as mainly a “territorial cultural entity” finds wider resonance among other South Asian scholars (Karna, 2002; Fazal, 2002).

Dipankar Gupta (2002) argues that as societies move from feudal to capitalist modes of production caste based cleavages weaken and nationalistic solidarities strengthen instead. This does not mean social equality is achieved in the citizenry rather it signifies emergence of overarching new reality of nationalism within which issues of injustice are addressed. Nationalist movements assert their rights over a region and demand statehood. Such demands have been prevalent in India since Independence. The Consitution of India has set in place legislative mechanisms to deal with demands of statehood. The linguistic state were first carved out in
through States Reorganization Act, 1956. In the recent times, India seems to be moving away from the linguistic state principle.

Tillin (2013) identifies some of the widely cited reasons for emergence of new states in India in 2000. The first is growing strength of the statehood movement that are articulated in terms of “cultural identity and regional deprivation.” The next has to do with the era of coalition politics that dawned in 1989. Between 1989 and 2014, no single political party could get the minimum required seats to govern on its own. This phase is characterized by a quest for stable governing coalitions. After series of unstable and ‘minority’ governments, towards the end of 1990s political parties coalesced around the Congress and BJP. While the former appealed to secular ideology to build alliance with powerful socialist satraps, the latter sought to build new alliances by supporting regional demands for smaller states claiming smaller states would improve governance. Both parties were uncomfortable sharing power with powerful regional allies some of whom would switch sides to stay in power and sought to accommodate emerging regional forces through accommodation which in case of Uttarakhand and Jharkhand resulted in new states.

Third explanation of smaller states is that the process is driven by capitalist expansion (Tillin, 2013). The desire to intensify extraction of natural resources within the context of economic liberalization has led to a search for viable states that posses natural resources like coal, iron ore, bauxite etc. This explanation is interesting because it notes the impact of economic globalization. However, evidence presented in fourth chapter does not suggest any causal linkages between new states and capitalist expansion as suggested by this explanation. The fourth explanation is an older argument that smaller states lead to better administration.
Tillin (2013) notes that the four explanations “overstates the extent to which the act of state creation served the interests of any one group or set of actors” (pp. 4-5). In order to understand the realigning of social forces in support of new states long term social and political processes need to be analyzed. Tilling (2013), breaks down the social and political processes into three components. The first component is the changing relation during the 1970s between social movements especially in Jharkhand and the Congress Party. The second component is the challenge to upper caste political domination in Hindi heartland by lower castes particularly ‘Other Backward Classes’ or OBCs. The third and last factor, BJP’s emergence as a challenger to Congress at the national level with its approach towards federalism which strikes a balance between ideological commitment to Hindu nationalism and accommodation of regional identity mobilizations.

*Sons of the Soil Conflict*

Frantz Fanon (1963) argues that nationalism in the third world is a vestige of colonialism. Colonial elites are replaced by bourgeoisie neocolonial elites while the social and economic structures remain intact. This form of government frequently inspires discourses of territorialism, separatism, and tribal or regional rule as it reproduces the structures of cultural dominations. Regional disparities privilege those from rich regions to “look upon others with hatred, and find in them envy and covetousness, and homicidal impulses” (p. 159). Fanon’s arguments regarding tensions between ethnic and regional groups stemming from uneven development in the third world extend beyond the immediate contexts of post-colonization, and invite deeper investigation into the material conditions of development after decolonization. This section discusses one particularly prevalent form of conflict in post-colonial societies.
Weiner (1978), for example, associates modernization with social conflicts in low-income countries. Modernization is assumed to cause internal migration and foster ethnic identification. Through processes of modernization and migration, interethnic tensions in multiethnic developing countries fluxuate. The intensification of ethnic tensions has given rise to sons of the soil or autochthon conflicts, which pit the native groups against immigrants (Alonso, 1990; Dunn, 2009; Jackson, 2006; Laurax, 1993; Tanabe, 1993; Vandekerckhove, 2009, Weiner 1978). After economic globalization there has been an increase in instances—especially in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America—of conflicts fueled by autochthony, or the belief that a group is indigenous to a territory (Jackson, 2006; Boas & Dunn, 2013; Dunn, 2009; Fearon & Laitin, 2011; Geschiere, 2009; Vandekerckhove, 2009). Autochthony/sons of soil conflict is currently amongst the most contested issues in regional politics, ultimately raising questions about identity, place, belonging, and the crisis in citizenship.

Rodriguez (2003) argues that the deteriorating conditions of Latin America can be blamed on external domination, exploitation, and forms of internal colonization, including “sons of the soil” conflicts. Such conflicts frequently occur in Latin America, for example, in regions where multinational mining companies ally with national bourgeois governments in order to exploit resources in territories that have been home to indigenous populations. Researchers studying transnational social movements, in the context of globalization, have examined the ties between grassroots movements and international actors, including diasporic communities and foreign donors (Clifford, 2002). This dissertation argues that the issues identified above lead us to accord primacy to the study of the conflicts over resources in developing countries after the imposition of neoliberal globalized market economy.
The Telengana conflict has been characterized as a ‘sons of the soil’ conflict in political science literature. Weiner (1978) notes that antimigrant political movements started emerging in the 1960s. As a response to these movements, government leaders including Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared that local people should be granted preference in employment. Local people are called the “sons of soil” in India, a characterization not limited to postcolonial India. Similarly, the Malays in Malaysia claim to be Bhumiputra (sons of the soil) in relation to migrant Chinese (Weiner, 1978). The term Bhumiputra is a Sanskrit term that literally translates as the son of the soil. Bhumi is earth or land and Putra is son. This term (Bhumiputra) in most modern Indian languages also translates to son of the soil. In the sense that Weiner (1978) uses it, Bhumiputra signifies a first claim on the resources by the locals. Alternatively, Bhumiputra could also be thought of as signifying the “grounded” nature of the local people who make a living out of the land. Bhumiputra in this sense seeks not to separate man from nature as its exploiter or custodian but rather as an assertion of oneness between the population and nature. As Feron and Laitin (2011) explain,

A sons-of-the-soil (SoS) conflict has the following core features. First, it involves conflict between members of a minority ethnic group concentrated in some region of a country, and relatively recent, ethnically distinct migrants to this region from other parts of the same country. Second, the members of the minority group think of their group as indigenous, and as rightfully possessing the area as their group’s ancestral (or at least very long-standing) home. By “conflict” we mean competition and dispute over scarce resources such as land, jobs, educational quotas, government services, or natural resources. A SoS conflict may be violent, but it need not be. (p. 200)
Fearon and Laitin (2011) studied 31 sons-of-the-soil violent conflicts around the world from 1945 to 2008, of which more than half occurred in Asia (the next most common location for SoS war is Sub Saharan Africa with 26% cases including anti-colonial struggles). In India, ethnicity has a territorial base insofar as the language and tribe are concerned (Fearon and Laitin, 2011; Weiner, 1978). Weiner (1978) argues that migration and the resultant ethnic division of labor are challenging this homogeneity. Even as territorial homogeneity masks the differences of caste and religion, migrations have further complicated the relationship between region and population. While Weiner (1978) notes the conflicts arising out of migrations, one might also keep labor relations at the center of analysis, a focus that would point to disruptions in the relationship between community and its means of livelihood as the primary cause for unrest.

Weiner (1978) documents the traditional lifestyle in rural India. Most people live and die in the village in which they are born. Only women move between regions, districts, or villages due to marriage. The traditional community in India is also diverse in terms of caste and religion. The key problem with mass migrations is it imposes new relations of labor (Weiner, 1978). Caste based division of labor in traditional India can also be seen as ethnic divisions of labor. As such, it may not be an ethnic division of labor per se which causes conflict. Weiner (1978) pins the blame of conflict on competition. The turf of resources, however, is not static, but rather is continually pushed toward the ever-increasing scarcity germane to processes of capitalism. Competition for resources in such a case may not be a separate step but rather an assumed consequence of modernization or its latest incarnation globalization.

*Imperialism and Globalization*

Discourses of globalization, attending to interdependencies, networks, transformations of space and time, transnational corporate networks, the seduction and utility of corporate
products, constant assurances of goodwill for mankind and a better future, stand in sharp opposition to the discourses of imperialism, with their attention to hubris and control, victimage and justice, and the critical interrogation of media as vehicles of product promotion, distraction...(Boyd-Barrett, 2007, p. 2)

Globalization has created a narrative of affluence. Hence, the question that deserves attention regards whether or not such narratives are leading to the enhanced safety and happiness of the people (Boyd-Barrett, 2007). If not, are they merely covering up the many recent conflicts, such as the conflicts between corporate and environmental interests, or conflicts for resources between nations and between communities? While it is unlikely that there is a simple answer to this question, seeking an answer demands attention to how people might organize and use media tools to counter the narratives of globalization. What role, if any, would nationalism play in such a mobilization? The various discourses need to assess the processes of marginalization and the impact of constant efforts made by the marginalized to enhance their material and cultural conditions. As Said (1994) contends,

> The main battle in imperialism is over land, of course, but when it came to who owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won it back, and who now plans its future-these issues were reflected, contested, and even for a time decided in narrative (Said, 1994, p. xiii).

Hence, for Said, the power to narrate, or to hinder the emergence of oppositional narratives, is an important aspect for understanding the connections between culture and imperialism. Grand narratives of emancipation can mobilize colonial subjects to overthrow imperial powers. These grand narratives can also impress many Europeans and Americans striving toward the enhancement of civil liberties.
Reclaiming tradition follows the exhaustion of modernism and advent of post-modernism as the power of Western narratives of emancipation in the formerly colonized world waned, a narrative-weakening that leads to resistance movements based on age-old traditions (Said, 1994). Terms like “imperialism,” however, have a generalized quality that masks the heterogeneity of Western culture (Said, 1994). As such, Said (1994) wants to explore “how it was that the imperialist European would not or could not see that he or she was an imperialist” and contrastingly under the same circumstances how the native saw the European “only as imperial” (p. 162). It is important to discriminate between various kinds of cultural works with regards to imperialist involvement. Any objection that culture should not be considered part of imperialism is a tactic to prevent unearthing associations between the two. By studying the imprints of imperialism on culture, however, we open ourselves to a profitable endeavor that could lead to a sharper reading of major cultural texts. Culture is not limited to art and literature; even the more scientific pursuits of knowledge and policy are colored by imperialism.

Ongoing globalization is based on historical continuities of imperialism that take western cultural forms out of their enclosures (of “us” versus “them”) and place them in a world order that is framed as a contest between the north and south (Said, 1994). For the colonized people, acclamations of European objectivity functioned against them. In writings oriented toward an imperialist perspective of world history, the native point of view is rendered invisible by the objective perspectives (Said, 1994). As Thaper explains,

The history of India became one of the means of propagating those interests. Traditional Indian historical writing, with its emphasis on historical biographies and chronicles, was largely ignored. European writing on Indian history was an attempt to create a fresh historical tradition. The historiographical pattern of the Indian past which took shape
during the colonial period in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was probably similar to the patterns which emerged in the histories of colonial societies. (qtd. in Said, 1994, p. 168)

The discourse of Orientalism dictated the epistemic shifts in recording and documenting India history. Chakravarty (2000) notes that Asian groups who came in contact with Western colonizers had their worldview transformed as a result. Tensions began to develop between the two groups as European colonizers preached enlightenment and actively prevented the practice of enlightenment by the Bengali Middle Class. Historicism is a nineteenth-century European ideal that interprets knowledge as a unity in its historical development. The critiques of historicism such as characterizing contemporary history as “late capitalism” overlook the ties between European thought and the formation of political modernity in the former colonies (Chakravarty, 2000). Historicism enabled European domination since the nineteenth-century by normalizing imperialism through the narratives of progress or development. Chakravarty (2000) argues that historicism frames capitalism or modernity as truly global rather than as a system that originated in Europe and grew over time to encapsulate the whole world. The discourses of modernization posit historical development as a measure of cultural distance between the West and the rest.

Role of institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and increased capital flows, constitute some defining aspects of the new world order. Jacques (2012) notes that the IMF, along with the World Bank, has historically been an American-dominated institution. The structural adjustment policies of the IMF have been widely criticized for their detrimental effect on developing nations (Dash, 2003; Goddard, 2003). In order to interpret the politics of IMF-decision-making, it is essential to understand the
organizational structure of the IMF. The Articles of Agreement, which brought IMF into existence in 1945, also specify its organizational structure. Since 1945 the organizational structure has in fact remained largely unchanged (Goddard, 2003). It is interesting to note, however, that IMF policies have changed overtime. The newest source of additional funding, the New Agreement to Borrow, was created in 1998 in response to the “contagious effects of currency and balance-of payment crisis” that struck East Asian economies (Goddard, 2003, p. 250).

The orthodox liberal views started countering interventionist liberal doctrines of economic development in force since the Great Depression after the 1973 oil crisis. Shifts to the right by the Thatcher and Reagan administrations in the late 1970s and early 1980s led to an increased attack on realist and statist developmental strategies for the development of south (Kohli, 2004). Thus, the Reagan administration, U.S. treasury, Federal Reserve, and international financial institutions responded to the 1980s foreign debt crisis by advocating what has come to be known as Washington consensus—an ideological position that emphasizes the need of a democratic state, a dominant private sector with free markets and openness to international trade as recipe for prosperity (Cohn, 2012; Held, 1999, 2013; Held & McGrew, 2007; Stiglitz, 1998, 2001; Williamson, 2002, 2009). Pushed forward through the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) of the IMF and World Bank, this has been the dominant approach to development from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. As Gore (2003) explains, in order to adhere to the Washington consensus, governments should reform their policies to “(a) pursue macroeconomic stability by controlling inflation and reducing fiscal deficits: (b) open their economies to the rest of the world through trade and capital account liberalization: and (c) liberalize domestic product and factor markets through privatization and deregulation” (p. 318). Following the devaluation of the Peso
and the Asian Contagion of the mid-1990s there has been some rethinking about the Washington consensus on part of the World Bank. Orthodox liberal views, however, continue to be the overarching frameworks in the operations of the Bank and IMF.

Went (2003) substantiates historical materialist claims that capitalist globalization is doomed to be ridden with crisis. However, as he claims, there is an alternative to this. A system where social priorities take precedence over economic priorities is the way forward. Approaching the situation from a structural Marxist position, Went argues that state can use its power to further social goals.

Cohen (2003) cites an empiricist argument contending that with the decreased control of the state in monetary policy, fiscal policy becomes an area where governments can exercise their power. Cohen (2003) argues that the expansion of mobility of international capital systematically constrains state behavior. In fact, financial globalization is a “direct consequence of decisions taken at the national level to promote competition and deregulate markets” (Cohen, 2003, p. 217). The capital mobility hypothesis championed by the IMF is a misrepresentation of the severity of the challenge to the modern state and its sovereignty (Cohen, 2003). For a currency to be purely territorial its functional domain must coincide with its political jurisdiction. Currencies today have become widely employed outside the country of origin for “transactions either between nations or within foreign states” (Cohen, 2003, p. 219). Hence, local currencies are in a situation where they face increased rivalry from currencies abroad.

Some critics have prophesized that several world currencies would die over the course of time. Zimbabwe is a nation, for example, which faced severe devaluation of its currency to the extent of losing its value. A currency crisis of this sort cannot be resolved simply by substituting it with a foreign currency. Doing so would, in fact, compromise the government’s sovereignty.
Cohen (2003) argues that territorial currency helps governments augment public spending at will. Since the Great Depression public spending has been used as a catalyst for economic recovery. Hence, increased capital mobility undermines the state response to economic crisis and limits its options.

While the increased movement of capital and goods has attracted attention of scholars investigating globalization, the movement of people remains underexplored in political sciences (Kapur & Mc Hale, 2005; Kapur, 2010). Kapur (2010) argues that people are the missing leg of the globalization triad. Globalization is, thus, a process that increases the movement of capital, goods, and people across national borders. Globalization has renewed interest in mediated diasporas and the public sphere.

*Globalization and South Asian Diaspora*

Spivak (1995) criticizes subaltern formulations of colonial and post-colonial order for being essentialist and calls for embracing in-betweenness. The taxonomic categorization of people leads to a methodological approach bent on measuring deviation from the ideal type. The subaltern approach reinvents Marxist conclusions about society that do not allow the subaltern to speak. The in-betweenness of experience finds its voice with in the fluid boundaries of social hierarchies.

The diasporic movement is being constructed as an east-to-west contra-flow (Thussu, 2007). A new rendering of contra-flows calls for shifting the focus from “economic structuration” to “cultural negotiations and identity politics” (Kavoori, 2007, p. 58). Both *diaspora* and *hybridity* are the key concepts in postcolonial and transnational cultural studies. Diaspora that is based on Appadurai’s (1990) notion of deterritorialization and hybridity challenges the essentializing tendencies of notions such as nationalism. These formulations draw
from and lead to Bhaba’s (1994) notion of the inbetweenness of spaces. The in-betweenness rejects any totalizing explanations of cultural reality such as cultural imperialism and nationalism (Kavoori, 2007). The hyphenated identities do not necessarily lead to cosmopolitanism but also to problems such as terrorist violence (Kavoori, 2007).

Bhaba (1990) draws an analogy between nation and narrative. Nations, like narratives, have uncertain historical origins. They draw strength not from certainty about their historical origins but through the mythical resonance that they have within a society. The power of nation as a historical idea is a result of political and literary tradition. This suggests that nation’s emergence as a symbolic force is necessitated by cultural compulsions. The nation is constantly renewed through narratives of progress and narcissism. The persistence of nation in the context of globalization (internationalism, late capitalism, multinationalism) suggests that the rhetoric of global presupposes the power of nation within its area of influence.

Nationalism opens up a whole range of possibilities from totalitarian closures to critical oppositional pluralism. While the textual closure of national culture leads to problematic totalization, its progressive potential lies in the wide dissemination of its associated symbols and meanings (Bhaba, 1990). From the “recess of national culture…alternative constituencies of people…emerge—youth, the everyday, nostalgia, new ‘ethnicities’, new social movements, ‘the politics of difference’” (Bhaba, 1990, p. 3). Bhaba (1990) argues that the rigid boundaries of inside and outside leave out interstices from where the new international culture is born. The exploration of interstices to problematize inside and outside continues with the examination of online discourses of diverse phenomena ranging from illegal South Asian migrants to basketball and desi hip hop (Mallapragada, 2013; Thangarajan, 2010).
Mallapragada (2006) argues that changing notions of citizenship are “absolutely critical to understanding the contemporary cultural practices shaping the discourses of identity and belonging within the ‘Indian diaspora’ in the US” (p. 209). Between 1970 and 1990 the Indian state had ambivalent and contradictory relations with the diaspora (Mallapragada, 2006). For instance, the flight of highly skilled scientific and technological labor was framed within the narrative of brain drain. There have been considerable anxieties regarding the loss of investment in highly skilled expatriates whose education was subsidized by the state. In 1975, the Indian state allowed Indians living abroad to open non-resident accounts in US dollars or UK sterling (Mallapragada, 2006). It was hoped that creating a category of non-resident Indian (NRI) would bolster foreign exchange reserves. By the end of the 1990s virtually every sector of the economy was opened to NRI investment (Mallapragada, 2006).

Starting with the mid-1990s new discourses of diaspora began to emerge with the success of Bollywood in the West. These discourses were framed within the sentiment of nostalgia of the homeland. In the context of increased cultural flows from India to the West, the Indian state sought to re-define its relations with the diaspora (Govil, 2006; Punathambekar, 2013; Thussu, 2009). In 1999, India introduced the Person of Indian Origin (PIO) card extended to second, third and fourth generation Indians with foreign passports.

Hybridized cultural formations necessitated by the success of Bollywood and yoga in the West have led to a wide-ranging academic literature. Mannur (2005) finds the terms at which the cuisine is hybridized problematic. Fusion cuisine usually includes a selection of Asian spices to suit western tastes of upwardly mobile American middle classes. The Asian food sold on the street corners in New York City is not considered fusion. The classed nature of consumption is also evident from Maira’s (2000) arguments on hip-hop and henna. White middle class women
typically spend almost twenty times more than women in South Asia to have henna tattoos.

Black cultural symbols like hip-hop are commoditized and sold overseas to an aspiring global middle class as fashion gear. Authenticity has acquired a commodity fetish (Maira, 2000).

Possession of authenticity is desirable and comes at a cost. Bollywood movies represent another dimension of the negotiation of hybrid identities. These movies are produced for Indian and Diasporic audiences. It is interesting to observe that the West has transformed from being the primary source of evil in old Hindi films to being a mere locale in contemporary Bollywood (Desai, 2004, 2005). Contemporary Indian cinema often uses a western setting to reveal a story of Indians falling in love with Indians. While the toxicity of the colonial west has been replaced by an innocuous globalized west, culture serves as the constant private sphere of Indianness that needs to be pure and preserved.

Recent scholarship on the South Asian diaspora highlights the diversity of the mobilization of the group to foreground race, class, sexuality and religion to problematize middle class heteronormative representations (Mallapragada, 2013; Nair & Balaji, 2008; Sharma, 2010; Thangaraj 2012). These trends problematize a model minority framework by bringing out the issues of illegal South Asian immigrants, many of whom faced incarcerations and deportations after 9/11 (Mallapragada, 2013).

First-generation Asian Americans are noted to be more involved in the politics back home than in politics here (Li & Skop, 2007). This tendency has been primarily attributed to the lack of understanding of American politics and the geographically dispersed nature of new immigrant settlements. Asian Indians in the U.S. have been noted to be particularly active in the nationalist politics of their homeland. Cultural reproduction for Hindus abroad has become tied to the politics of Hindu nationalism at home (Appadurai, 1990).
In a technologically-mediated world, local is inserted into a rapidly globalizing web of interconnections. Interconnections between media, capital flows and migrations add to a sense of pliability. Cross-border linkages have been noted for creating a sense of fluidity around the notions of identity, nation and culture. The diasporas have an influential role in promoting nationalism both discursively and materially. As we understand the narratives of diaspora, technological and cultural shifts mandated by the emergence of online media become increasingly important. The discourses of online media emphasize the destabilization of producer and consumer relations, and the nationalist optics of television and cinema stand challenged online as underrepresented groups begin to articulate themselves (Mallapragada, 2013). The role of mediatized diaspora in contributing to nation building needs to be explored by media and communication research. This includes diasporic interest in narratives of nation, and in articulating voice of marginalized sections of nation.

**Media and Globalization.**

Hardt and Negri (2011) argue that globalization denies the existence of any alternative visions of human society. The marginalized communities in the global society are not excluded but rather subordinated to the political economy of globalization. Neoliberal governmental policies have sought to privatize “the common,” turning cultural products into private property (p.89). Privatization has been the dominant mode of expansion of globalization.

The globalization of cultural goods and services, which in itself is a by-product of economic liberalization, has been accompanied by the removal of trade barriers, deregulation and privatization and hastened by convergence. (Thomas, 2010, p. 6)

Globalization has led to transformation of relations between global, regional, national and local markets (Thomas, 2010). This relationship between cultural markets is being intensified as
a result of globalization. Increasing complexity in the production-distribution-consumption and inter-sectoral flows has led liberal theorist to argue for overhauling the media and cultural imperialism framework that informed the debates of the New World Information and Communications Order (NWICO). A reconsideration of the ideas of media/cultural imperialism is beneficial because they continue to be relevant in explaining macro-level realities of dominant flows from developed nations to Third World, production and reproduction of consumer culture etc. (Straubhaar, 2007).

Boyd-Barrett (1977, 1998, 2006) argued for a media imperialism framework (a primary concern of the discipline of political economy of communication especially in the U.S.) to understand the relationship between media and imperialism. The top tier of news making that defines the public discourse in mainstream media consists of government, authoritative, official news sources and news agencies (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The emerging media industries of public relations/press relations can be added to this list. Specifically, the news agencies Reuters, Havas and Wolf were among the first multinational enterprises. These news agencies operated by dividing the world market into monopoly zones to avoid mutual competition. Herman and Chomsky (1988) find that four big news agencies accounted for 80% of international news circulating in the world. Historically the news agencies have served the interests of governments. During World War I the resources of news agencies were used for government propaganda (Boyd-Barrett & Rantanen, 1997). Today, the world political hegemony (for example, the power to frame conflicts in the periphery to the advantage of the global elites) continues to rest on a “pliable global media system with news agencies and mainstream news media as its bed rock” (Boyd-Barrett & Rantanen, 1997, p. 10).
On the other hand, there are others who believe that television flows in the world cannot be comprehensively understood within a media imperialism context. For example, Tunstall (2008) preferred models based on market size; Straubhaar (2007) is interested in linguistic and cultural affinities, or the development of third world “media capitals,” that try to explain contra-flows from the south to the industrialized north. However, assessing contra-flows of Bollywood, Thussu (2007) reveals that it accounts for only 2% of total global cinema revenues.

In 2000, only ten media conglomerates – AT&T, Sony, AOL/Time Warner, Bertelsmann, Liberty Media, Vivendi Universal, Viacom, General Electric, Disney, and News Corporation- accounted for more than two-thirds of the $250-275 billion in annual worldwide revenues generated by the communications industry. (Steger, 2003, p. 76)

Steger’s (2003) statistic reveals disproportionate control exerted by a few of the media companies. Boyd-Barrett (2006a) argues that earlier models of media imperialism when applied to television insufficiently considered ‘covert influences’ such as content, audiences and ownership, leading to the discounting of the model. Opponents of political economy approaches are criticized for offering “little insight into processes determining which cultural significations were magnified for mass dissemination” and that these approaches foregrounded in presentation of local identities “may obscure penetration of local structures by corporate and regulatory agencies….of the global economy” (Boyd-Barrett, 2006a, p. 22).

It is the terms of cultural hybridization in deregulated markets that need to be problematized (Mannur, 2005), especially those aspects of hybridized cultures that are effectively commoditized by media majors. Global media conglomerates faced language and cultural barriers in their efforts to expand into newer markets. We can clearly see two simultaneous, trends here–one is local producers filling in and using the means of globalization to
infiltrate new markets both in developed and developing world including their own countries, the
other is the impact of commoditization brought in by neo-liberal regulatory apparatus to all these
new markets through flows and contra-flows. For instance, several scholars have pointed out that
India’s participation in globalization is based on consumption (Fernandes, 2000; Kavoori, 2009;
Moorti, 2010; Rajagopal, 1999). While the content might seem to be diverse, it is fostering
homogenous consumption-based attitudes. Further, the dominant local markets offer sites of
consumption. In the de-regulated market this leads the producers to identify significant
demographic groups with disposable income to foster consumption. They have little interest in
the culturally-inclusive mandate of the public service broadcasters or serving the remote
geographies. Self-regulation can foster market failure by excluding marginal voices or by
monetizing marginal cultures.

Post-colonialism can be constructed as a stance that studies “communicative transference
in the non-western world” (Kavoori, 2009, p.6). Communicative transference is a product of both
Western control over global media resources, as pointed out by the perspective of media
imperialism and the mechanism of flows occurring due to deterritorialization of people in the
developing countries as they move in search of livelihoods and due to the influx of information
technologies that make mediated articulations of identity possible through access to the internet.

Hardt and Negri (2001) elucidate the processes through which a global elite, including the
owners and CEOs of large corporations, use nation states as vehicles for the realization of private
capital accumulation. Tunstall (1977) argued that if American media corporations have to be
seen as instruments of neo-imperialism, RCA-NBA, which were also defense contractors with
tactics of persuasion that could influence foreign governments, can be counted among them. We
need to understand that media imperialism means nothing if it is not focused on the relationships
– and there can be many kinds of relationships between media, state and commerce. Media imperialism does not suggest that media themselves are imperialists. Media is shaped by policies such as constitutional values, taxes, censorship, subsidies and revenues that can be generated in specific markets through advertising (Tunstall, 1977). The business models of these advertising-driven media are such that it is in their interests to support power, and in particular commercial power; their relationship to political and commercial power and their own self-interest, as Herman and Chomsky (1988) suggest, creates a form of control, silence and deception that is more subtle than in formally autocratic regimes. The relationships between structural ownership arrangement, internal mediatized imaginaries and actual conflict need to be explored. This requires analyzing who has come to own media through what means, who then works within such media establishments, what narratives such media prescribe to vis-à-vis the Telangana conflict, and how these imaginaries measure up to actual ground realities.

*Online Inquiry.*

With the emergence of the internet as a new media, qualitative researchers are examining methodological issues needed to account for online interactions and narratives and their relation to personal and political identity (Bakardjieva & Smith, 2001; Baym, 2002; Hine, 2000; Kivits, 2005; Mackay, 2005; Markham, 2004; Orgad, 2005, 2007, 2009; Reid, 1999; Schaap, 2002; Slater, 2002; Turkle, 1996). Orgad (2009) defines internet research as an exploration of meanings that emerges around the internet within a given context of use and/or context of production.

[B]y discourse, I intend to rather extend the meaning-a network that includes not only texts and cultural documents but social practices, formal and informal laws, politics of inclusion and exclusion, and institutional forms of organization, for example, all of which constitute
and regulate knowledge about the object of that discourse, Asian America. (Lowe, 2007, p. 514)

Lowe (2007) emphasizes the importance of context of production in understanding the texts generated by Asian America. Thus, a study of discourse is not limited to a particular set of documents and should explore the power relations under which the text is generated. Lowe’s (2007) argument provides a framework to interrogate power relations that could be applied to study relations between online and offline politics.

The various visions of cyberspace and online technologies need to recognize that the individual is embedded in the cultural practices, power hierarchies, and discourses of awareness that constitute the community (Gajjala, 2008). Thus, shifting of political discussions online does not necessitate any ontological transformations (Dahlgren, 2005). These discourses of awareness span both the public and the private. With diasporic communities these discursive practices assume further complexity due to their position in both host and imagined communities (Gajjala, 2008). It is thus pertinent to ask how their position as racial and ethnic minorities in “Western nations interact with the caste, class, and immigrant status of diasporic Indians” (Gajjala, 2008, p. 37). A related question that has consumed most scholarship invested in Asian American studies is how being embedded in the U.S. impacts Asian Americans (Kim, 2007; Zhou, 2007).

Globalization relies on layered discourses of globalizing consumer cultures and apparent contradictory invocations of identity aided and transformed by advances in information technology (Gajjala, 2008). Imagining communities online breaks the false binary of virtual and real. ‘Virtual community’ seems to suggest it is not an actual community. Communities both online and offline are formed based on group practices and group discourses.
Hence, even as diasporas are separated from homelands through online practices, they continue to reinvent the structures and discourses of home (Gajjala, 2008). While it is true that the mainstream ideology behind the “global information highway” envisages the formation of virtual communities that are cut off from their backward hinterlands and brought into an advanced virtual world, it is also a fact that “social relations and interpersonal exchanges” of online diasporic imagination cannot “escape their connection with real-life political, economic, social and cultural material practices” (Gajjala, 2008, p. 41).

The relationship between online and offline politics highlights the fact that hierarchies of the real world permeate the virtual world. Denzin (2004) points out that online interpretative work provides the basis for criticism and social action (see also Denzin, Dickens, & Fontana, 2004). The nature of narratives in online public spheres is another area of academic interest. Despite the progressive theoretical possibilities associated with online public spheres, Dahlgren (2005) laments, they have not displayed the “high ideals set for deliberative democracy” (p. 156). Several studies have indicated the presence of aggressive discourses in cyberspace (Mitra, 2001). At the same time, cyberspace can also facilitate progressive community action by allowing for insertion of alternative or marginalized collectives (Kumar, 2001). It is also important for the studies on diaspora to investigate conflicts over resources that influence their online narratives. These conflicts in the homeland highlight the conditions of scarcity.

The notion of scarcity is relevant in discussions on the digital divide, referring to barriers of access and language that restrict online participation. The digital divide should be a consideration in nation-states like India where internet penetration is low. In the context of the information age Robin Mansell (2004) argues that scarcity is usually in relation to the way scarcity conditions are imposed institutionally on the immaterial/informational environment.
Distinctions between the older and newer media relate to how and why scarcity conditions emerge and the extent to which they contribute to the reproduction of unequal social conditions. Without research that gives a central place to power as a headline issue in new media studies, we can only speculate about how inequality may be reproduced and then seen as the ‘natural’ outcome of innovations in new media technologies. (Mansell 2004, p. 97)

Hence, new media could also perpetuate inequities. As Boyd-Barrett points out, in the early years of the internet, “96% of all Internet sites were located within the rich twenty-seven-nation OECD area with English as its lingua franca” (Boyd-Barrett, 1998, p. 161). To assume that new technologies have the unbridled potential to usher in an egalitarian age ignores historically evolving social power hierarchies. The next section reviews the literature of media political economy, followed by its application to India since the 1990s.

*Political Economy of Media and communication.*

The study of classical political economy blossomed in the nineteenth century with contributions from figures like David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith and most importantly Karl Marx (McChesney, 1998). Adam Smith, David Ricardo and others considered the study of economic issues of their times as political economy. Smith (1776) identifies political economy’s primary concern as “how mankind arranges to allocate scarce resources with a view toward satisfying certain needs and not others” (cited in Wasko, 1999) Karl Marx (1992 [1867], 1983) critiques the political economy of his time when he notes that western societies have moved from primitive accumulation to capitalist accumulation, leading to a reorganization of social relations based on ever-expanding inequity between bourgeois and proletariat classes. With the quest for colonies in search of raw materials for industry, the capitalist system acquired global dimensions.
In the twentieth century, Marxist analysis of culture and media moved in the direction of the study of the role of ideas—and, later, hegemony—in sustaining capitalist relations (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1972[1944]; Benjamin, 1973). Critical political economy continues to derive its inspiration from this notion of control of society not only through institutional coercion, but hegemonic power of ideas and beliefs. Since Marx, the institutional perspective developed by Weber can be regarded as a major influence on political economy. Thompson, in his study on ideology in modern societies says the ideas of Marx and Weber “constitute a general theoretical account of the cultural transformations associated with modern industrial societies” (1990, p. 75). This theoretical account provides the framework within which culture industries can be studied. Marx applied his formulations on political economy to study institutions of industrial production and distribution. The major ‘modern communication systems,’ as Raymond Williams argued, “are now so evidently key institutions in advanced capitalist societies that they require the same kind of attention” (Garnham, 1986b, p. 9).

The study of media and communication sectors is of great importance to the political economy approach. Not only are the media industries generators of revenue, they are “crucially involved in production and circulation of symbolic goods and services” (Thomas, 2010, p. 3). By influencing our beliefs, media, for instance, hold sway from the toothpaste brand we purchase to how to interpret right and wrong in the war in Afghanistan or the drone attacks in the Af-Pak region. Dallas Smythe, who was one of the founders of this tradition along with Schiller and later Mattelart, concerned himself with research on all aspects of “the power processes within society” (Smythe, 1960, p. 563). Through the 1970s, political economy evolved from a primary focus on production or construction (Golding & Murdock, 1974), to other aspects including culture that influence access to media and consumption of media (Golding & Murdock, 1978, 1996;
However, the study of media consumption and issues of agency (watching television, reading newspapers) belongs to the realm of cultural studies, audience/reception studies and media ethnography (Fenton, 2007; Hall 1974, 1980, 1993). Studies in the critical tradition lament mainstream media research that is overtly concerned with pluralism and individual behaviours (Golding & Murdock, 1978; Lash & Lury, 2007; Mansell, 2003). Critical political economy is distinguished from mainstream economics as a holistic and historical field of study that is concerned not just with market efficiency but social justice (Golding & Murdock, 1996; Mosco, 2006; Wasko, 2003). The tradition is suspicious of presumptions of plurality of power structures, not because it rejects the idea of multiple centers of power, but because it does not consider that these are equal. The structural and discursive inequality informs political economy’s objection to a focus on individual media behaviors. First, that the significance of media goes far beyond focus of the “media effects” tradition on what individuals do with media and second, that individuals are members of cultures and their media behaviors and interpretations will be influenced by cultural membership.

Cultural studies, especially Stuart Hall’s work, is often credited with opening up possibilities of resistant readings by consumers. Political economy of communication is not unconcerned about content, meanings and resistance. Although the two traditions are continually moving towards reconciling with each other, there are some basic differences. For political economy production is seen as ‘logically and temporally prior to consumption’ and hence the right place to start (Golding & Murdoch, 1996, pp. 63). Though efforts are being made to incorporate “various moments in what might be called the ‘commodity’ cycle in mass media which include production, distribution, consumption and exchange” in the political economy,
production bias continues to be discernable (Graham 2007, p. 22). Both political economy and
cultural studies reject effects tradition and argue for a theoretically grounded approach to the
understanding of social hierarchy that produces culture and communication (Murdoch &
Golding, 1996; Boyd-Barrett, 2006). Concerns about inhibiting social justice lead political
economists to criticize the corporatization of communications industry.

Issues in Indian Media Systems

Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization.

Far-reaching structural changes were unleashed in India in the early 1990s. In the late
1980s, India began slowly opening its predominantly public sector economy. This process
received a shot in the arm due to a serious balance of payment crisis in the early 1990s. The
situation was precipitated by Gulf War that increased the oil import bill so much that foreign
exchange reserves dried up. India mortgaged its gold reserves (airlifting them) to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to get a $2.1bn loan (Thomas, 2010). The structural
adjustment conditions of the IMF led to the process of liberalization that continues to this day.

Media was opened up to domestic and foreign capital, and the state receded into a role of
regulator and increased concerns regarding trivialization of news and conspicuous consumption
(Karlekar, 2002, Thomas, 2010, Tunstall, 2008). It also opened up opportunities for media
industries to expand and helped spur economic growth in the media sector (Punathambekar,
2013). The newspaper sector, traditionally run by the domestic private sector, has not been
opened to foreign investment. The broadcast sector witnessed structural changes as it was
privatized. The Zee TV, owned by Subhash Chandra, a Haryana oil merchant with strong
connections with the government, was instantly successful with its Hindi daily soap operas like
Tara, which ran from 1993 to 1997. Rupert Murdoch-owned Star TV’s (now Star) initial
offerings in English language limited its penetration. By the late 1990s Star TV began programming in Hindi. The private satellite channel programming depicted aspirational lifestyles of the emerging Indian middle class (Pathania-Jain, 2006).

Current ownership patterns of major television, radio and film studios reveal an interesting mix of global and national capital. Rupert Murdoch has bought 49.9% in the Zee TV network (Tunstall, 2008). Japanese-owned Sony TV completes the triumvirate of major national private satellite broadcasters. The Walt Disney Company has acquired 60% of major television and film production house UTV (Thomas, 2010). Disney is also a major producer of animation in Indian languages. Warner Bros is involved in movie production in India. There is also evidence of Indian media majors acquiring foreign firms; Reliance Anil Dhirubhai Ambani Group (Reliance ADA), an Indian telecommunications and gas company, acquired 50% in Spielberg’s Dreamworks co-production; Bennett Coleman Group, publisher of Times of India, acquired Virgin Radio Holdings (Thomas, 2010).

In the India after globalization, Thomas (2010) argues, Media regulation has been a failure. Single regulatory authority such as the Office of Communication (OFCOM) in the U.K. has not materialized in India largely due to the rivalry between the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). The proposed Communication Convergence Bill (2001) was allowed to lapse; and the proposed Broadcasting Services Regulation Bill (2007) remains in abeyance. While civil society and business groups have argued that the Regulation Bill is flawed, “what needs to be highlighted once again is the near impossibility of implementing retroactive sanctions against economic interests that enjoy the backing of dominant politics in India” (Thomas, 2010, p.107). It can be inferred that the
political class is acting to preserve its ‘clientalist’ relationship with media (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 58).

**The Discourse of Globalization**

Depending on whether one regards localization as merely a minimal, strategic, revenue-optimizing gesture, or as a refined and respectful assessment of local cultural preferences that must be served in order to attract viable audience, one may find in India evidence either of a barely disguised media imperialism or a carefully nuanced and diversified accommodation to complex cultural formations. (Boyd-Barrett, 2006b, p. 9)

Tunstall’s (2008) analysis of Indian media after globalization finds evidence of a carefully nuanced and diversified accommodation of Indian cultural formations. As India does not allow foreign ownership of news dailies most of the discussion regarding foreign ownership centers around television, radio and the growing influence of Hollywood in Hindi cinema. The success of Murdoch’s television empire in India can be attributed to successful ‘Indianization’ (Tunstall, 2008, p. 179). For instance, the success of Star’s Indian adaptation of *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?* Can be attributed to its super-star host Amitabh Bachchan (Tunstall, 2008). Bachchan was a “competent and sympathetic host” who read questions, both in “exemplary Hindi and impeccable English” (p. 178). Such accommodations have led to a perception of cable-satellite operators like Sony and Star not as “American or Japanese but as 100 percent Indian” (p. 188). In the mid-1990s, Hindi cinema dropped the pretense of national cinema and rebranded itself as Bollywood to make inroads into Diasporic markets in the US and UK (Punathambeka, 2013). The Indian state recognized the importance of Bollywood not just in terms of economics but also as a means of redefining the relation between nation and diaspora. The discourse of corporatization gained wider credibility after neoliberal reforms; its success in
unleashing the Indian IT industry was the means through which the state started to define its relationship with the media and entertainment industry. In 1998, the Government of India accorded industry status to Indian cinema. Punathambekar (2013) argues that the Industrial Development Bank Act of 2000 paved the way for clean money to enter the film industry. With the discourse of corporatization the decisions were “framed as an attempt to rid the film business of ‘blackmoney’ (untaxed and unaccounted) as well as the involvement of the mafia/underworld” (p. 40). Within a few years several corporate entities such as TV networks and production houses entered film financing. A vision of Bollywood at the center of media and entertainment industries open to welcome global capital takes effect (Punathambekar, 2013). This vision is complemented with the forces of commerce and free market competition that create narrative similarities between media and film industries. However, recent evidence from newspaper reports on the spectacular growth of mafia-owned corporate houses in cricket betting and film distribution tell a different story.

The impact of commercialization on news formats leading to sensationalization (and hence trivialization) has been noted in India and abroad (Giltin, 1991; Karlekar, 2002; Thussu, 2003). Thussu (2009) argues that with the advent of private news channels in India there has been a narrative continuum between the news media and cinema. Journalism based on sensationalisation has taken root in India. Thussu (2009) argues, “in the world’s largest democracy, what I have described as the three Cs—Cinema, crime and cricket—encapsulate most of the content on television” (p.17). This is bound to have implications for public opinion formation as English and Indian language media are increasing coverage for crime and glamour at the expense of political coverage (Ninan, 2007). Thomas (2010) argues that cable-satellite TV caters predominantly to “chattering middle classes” with reality television “along with endless
Bollywood derivatives—at the expense of difficult stories and issues such as poverty, exploitation and the dark sides of globalization” (Thomas, 2010, p.102).

The television news channels paid little attention to the agrarian crisis; “the structural problems in television’s political economy, focused exclusively on urban India, were a major reason why the problems of rural India were unlikely to be the subject of sustained and focused news coverage” (Mehta, 2008, p. 185). In 2000, the optimism generated by discourses of globalization gripped the news media and government leaders like PM Vajpayee and Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu when the country was in the grip of severe drought. Media-savvy Naidu responded aggressively with media management to drive home the point that his administration was aggressively dealing with the agricultural crisis (Thomas, 2010).

The media were inundated with a flood of statistics at regular press conferences and Chandra Babu Naidu himself held weekly video conferences sessions with his District collectors that are open to the public and the press to watch. Government handouts list(ed) the many ‘action plans’ that are in the pipeline and endless lists of the quantum of money spent under different heads of expenditure and drought relief. (Menon qtd in Thomas, 2010, p.103)

Media regurgitated official statistics as farmers and weavers in Telengana continued to commit suicide due to their debt burden. Starvation deaths were also going unreported during this time. Few journalists bothered to verify official figures “that out of the 280,000 bore wells in Andhra Pradesh, close to 100,000 are defunct or that most of the 25,000 protected water supply schemes are non-functional” (Thomas, 2010, p.103). In this period, one of the better-known journalists, P. Sainath, was reporting regularly in The Hindu regarding the situation in rural Andhra Pradesh,
covering suicides by cotton farmers and weavers. Sainath reflected on the priorities of post-
globalization journalism in India:

We have full-time fashion correspondents, glamour correspondents and design
 correspondents…11 correspondents covering business in a non-financial daily in a society
where less than 2% of the population have investments of any kind. But in all of these
beats, you do not have a single full-time correspondent covering poverty. (Cited in

As the mainstream discourse fully embraced globalization, very few reported “on the reasons of
drought—environmental degradation, poor life support systems, the destruction of common
property resources and the political economy of globalization as it affects the hinterlands”
(Thomas, 2010, p. 104).

Telangana was one such hinterland marred with peasant suicides driven by desperation. It
was a breeding ground for the revival of the separatist movement with the emergence of the TRS
in 2001. Reporting from Gairangadda, a tribal hamlet in the Telangana district of Mahboobnagar,
Parvati Menon writes in Frontline,

The drying up of water sources, both for drinking and agriculture has led to crop losses,
loss of jobs, increasing levels of indebtedness, distress sale of cattle and other assets,
increase in out migration, a sharp drop in purchasing power, which the recent hike in
administered prices has added to, and a growing population of the undernourished and the
hungry. (2000, p. 130)

The report paints a stark picture of reality less than 100km from the Hyderabad (or
Cyberabad) that CM Naidu claims is India’s gateway to infotech-led prosperity (Menon, 2000).
The world fed on the diet of rising India is not going to hear about the stories of distressed
suicides by cotton farmers or the instances of farmers selling their kidneys to repay debt (Menon et al., cited in Thomas, 2010). These stories point to the fact the real problems of India cannot be wished away through increased focus on new technologies (Thomas, 2010). Andhra Pradesh’s official discourse of globalization and information technologies stands in stark contrast to the ground realities that include a Maoist movement in Telangana which is in “itself a consequence of poverty” (Thomas, 2010, p.205).

A broader picture of structural inequities in India can be found in the academic literature on development:

The growth rates of GNP and GDP can, quite possibly, increase further than they have already done in the 1990s but the country remains handicapped economically and socially by its overwhelming illiteracy, backwardness in health, debilitating social inequalities and other crucial failures. (Dreze & Sen, 2002, p. 308)

Dreze and Sen (2002) make a case against failures due to the low priority accorded to the primary health and primary education sectors by the government of India since independence. Another import of the argument is concerning the importance of the role of the State in development. Kohli (2012) argues that since the 1980s, the government’s pro-business approach has generated economic growth at the apex of the political economy in India but not in the bottom half.

*Region, Media and Politics.*

The political economy approach recognizes that media is by no means an independent variable; rather it linked to political and economic processes, and contestations at local, national and international levels (Thomas, 2010). In countries with larger populations many contestations exist between national and big regional media (Tunstall, 2008). Tunstall (2008) describes four
levels of domestic media: first are national media located in the largest city and using the main national language. Second are big regional media located in the region using the dominant regional language and reflecting on local politics. Third are smaller local media comprising newspapers and radio that cater to smaller populations distinct from national and regional media. Fourth are the media from neighboring nation-states, where a language group exists across borders.

In India we find evidence for English and Hindi language-based national media originating from Delhi and Mumbai such as the Times of India, NDTV, CNNIBN, Zee TV, Sony and Star. The Chennai-based newspaper group The Hindu can also be considered national media. Big regional media catering to major linguistic groups such as Hindi, Telugu, Tamil and Marathi includes Dainik Bhaskar, Sun Network, and Eenadu (including ETV). Local media can include various newspapers like Mid-Day, FM radio broadcasters such as Radio City, and also community media. These local media broadcast in English, regional or local languages. Interestingly, regional and national media players often own these local media establishments.

With regards to possible conflicts between national and regional levels, Tunstall (2008) argues, “‘Media imperialism’ might well be used by southerners objecting to the attempted invasion of the south by Bollywood and other northern Indian and Hindi media” (p. 142). For instance, although Prime Minister Nehru was against forcing Hindi on southern states that did not want it, after Nehru’s death in 1964, some Congress politicians tried to push Hindi as a national language. ‘Language riots’ began in Tamil Nadu “in early 1965 with police killing 66 people while several young men committed suicides” (p.182). The motive was against Hindi’s imposition on the native Tamils who did not want to have to compete for jobs in the Hindi language.
A new political party Dravida Munetra Kadagam (DMK) challenged the Congress party’s monopoly in Tamil Nadu. The DMK was the political front of the wider anti-caste (later anti-Brahmin) and nativist Dravidian movement. The DMK supported the anti-Hindi agitations and defeated Congress in 1967, after which Congress never recovered in Tamil Nadu. The DMK successfully rallied the rural and urban poor, and women, “without alienating the professional and upper castes” (p.182). The Dravidian movement had considerable impact on Tamil literature, art and cinema. The DMK, and its breakaways (most significantly its chief competitor AIADMK) were connected to the Chennai-based film Industry. Between 1967 and 2013, out of the seven chief ministers of Tamil Nadu, six were film industry personalities. The most remarkable of these was “all-time superstar” M. G. Ramachandran (known as MGR) who often played “a fisherman, a road sweeper, a gardener, and other modest (low caste) roles…his films (and his politics) supported education and motherhood while opposing alcohol and alcohol-induced violence against women” (p.182).

Though Telugu is spoken in both the Telangana and Andhra regions there are differences in the dialects. Several dialects of Telugu are spoken across the two regions; however, the dialects of Telangana can be differentiated from those of Andhra. Even in the case of Hindi, Tunstall (2008) has shown that different dialects were promoted by the three main media—newspapers, cinema and radio. Hindi cinema chose a dialect of Hindustani that is closer to Urdu, Hindi newspapers picked “modern, school Hindi,” and radio favored a “classical, traditional (and archaic) for of Hindi” (p.160). Government, business and cinema elite in Andhra Pradesh privileged Andhra dialects—especially those from the Andhra delta. For instance, Padmaja Shaw (2008) has argued that five oligopolistic families from rich peasant castes in Andhra control the Telugu film industry. Telugu cinema is particularly notorious for promoting Andhra dialects and
ridiculing Telangana dialects which are usually reserved for the villain. Weiner (1978) has argued that jobs were one of the primary reasons behind the Telangana movement. Telangana students do not want to compete for jobs with Andhra students as in many ways this is an unequal competition (Thirumali, 2013). Andhra Pradesh class X passing marks in English and Hindi are 35 and 18 respectively (Thirumali, 2013). These marks are better suited to the Andhra region, which under the British Raj was used to English as the official language, than Telangana, which was ruled by Nizam and in which Urdu (a dialect of Hindi) was the official language. Andhra students are better at English and Telangana students are better at Hindi. Since 2010, three hundred students have reportedly committed suicide protesting the delay in formation of Telangana.

The relations between politics and cinema in Andhra Pradesh also have some interesting parallels with Tamil Nadu. The Telugu cinema’s “reigning super star” N. T. Rama Rao (NTR) came to power in 1983 with his Telugu Desam Party which was formed just nine months before the election (Tunstall, 2008, p. 183). NTR was re-elected in 1994, after an election campaign that opposed alcohol and alcohol-induced violence against women. In 1995, NTR was deposed by his son-in-law N. Chandrababu Naidu. Naidu was a “high profile regional politician who claimed that he was the CEO” of Andhra Pradesh and “who campaigned tirelessly to make Hyderabad and Andhra Pradesh the cybercapital of India” (pp. 183-184). Although the urban voters like Naidu, the rural majority did not, resulting in a massive electoral defeat in 2004. Some of the major rural issues of Andhra and Telangana during Naidu’s tenure are explained in the next section.
Caste, Media and Politics.

Tunstall (2008) analyses an extremely important factor at play in India that works at national, regional and local levels—caste. Caste is related to work, employment and landholding. Anthropologist M. N. Srinivas (1952, 1956) has brought to light the fluidity in caste positions. Caste position is far from fixed; acquiring wealth and changing food habits (especially in areas where vegetarianism is considered an upper-caste habit) are some means of moving up the caste hierarchy. Caste inequality is based on the domination of landless and marginal peasants by landlords and rich peasants (Tunstall, 2008). Lower castes have broken through into political power, first in the south and more recently in the north. Yet, caste differences are reflected in many ways, including the dynamic mass media of south India.

Tunstall (2008) examines the association between the decline in upper-caste domination starting in the 1970s with increase in corruption. Increasing commercialization of elections involved bribery and consequently required substantial amounts of cash for contesting. Criminals earlier operated behind the scenes in the political arena, but “in recent times have been directly elected in significant numbers to state and national legislatures” (p. 162). Indian media are inevitably involved in caste and corruption. The vision of planned economy was reduced to license raj- government micromanagement of private enterprise through a nepotistic licensing system that facilitated a corrupt nexus of politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. Tunstall (2008) contextualizes corruption in the post-colonial era within the domestic political economy. In 2010, the multi-billion-dollar 2G spectrum scam led to public protests and renewed demands for an anti-corruption ombudsman. Scrutiny of corruption exposes the crony capitalist relationship between politicians, bureaucrats, media moguls and intermediaries.
Upper castes dominate newsrooms in India (Tunstall, 2008). Given that India has a large section of the population that is non-literate and poor “media readership and audiences are heavily skewed toward the upper castes” (pp. 162-163).

Even though this Brahmin domination has weakened since the 1980s there is still a critique that sees Brahmin political leaders (however corrupt) as supported by Brahmin owned-and-operated media; however, the critique continues, when lower- caste, more populist, politicians do achieve power, they tend to be labeled as “corrupt” by the major media and some of them end up in prison.

In 2013, former Bihar CM Lalu Prasad Yadav, associated with lower-caste mobilization, was sentenced to 5 years in prison over a corruption case.

Thomas (2010) examines another important consequence of the rise of a caste based regional political elite. Lower-caste (and intermediate caste) political leadership at the regional level has broken the monopoly control of the Congress Party over national and regional politics. The hegemony of Congress carried forward a model of centralized control driven dirigiste mixed economy. This model was based on state intervention in a range of productive sectors including broadcasting. Congress enjoyed a near-monopoly at the federal level for almost 45 years after independence. Its rule has some important features; commitment to non-alignment, welfare state, nationalization of key industries including banking (based on the ideal of national self-reliance), secular polity, a range of economic programs regarding poverty, green revolution, impetus to science and technology education and research and the much maligned bureaucratic “license raj”.

Thomas (2010) argues, starting in the 1970s, Mrs. Gandhi pursued a relentless quest of centralizing power in herself and her office. This drive undercut the party hierarchy and regional
leaders. Mrs. Gandhi (and her syndicate) cherry picked loyalists right from the district levels and ran the administration through bureaucrats. The diffused power structure of Congress prevented local problems from being escalated to the national level. The restructuring of power “marked the end of value-based rule in India” (p. 59) and introduced a populist and personalized style of leadership. The crisis faced by the Congress Party became the crisis of the state. Regional assertions marked the decline of Congress hegemony at state and central levels. These processes brought in a whole range of social forces including intermediate landed communities, Dalits, tribes and religious minorites into the political arena.

The strong secessionist sentiment in the North East and secessionist terrorism in Punjab in the 1980s (before Indira Gandhi’s assassination) were symptomatic of excessive centralization. After the BJP came to power in 1998 it announced the formation of three new states, symbolizing an accommodation of regional aspiration and the non-tenability of excessive centralization. This announcement was an important trigger for the formation of Telangana Rastra Samiti (TRS) in 2001. Another important argument can be made about the commercialization of broadcasting and the rise of symbolic politics. In the mid 1980s, as the economy was being slowly opened to private capital, Doordarshan invited private producers. Movie producers Ramanand Sagar and B. R. Chopra entered the fray with the ancient epics *Ramayan* and *Mahabharat* respectively. Trying to maintain a public service ethos, *Ramayan* made “references to regional variations of the ancient epic… in order to demonstrate sensitivity to regions” (Chatterjee, 2007, p.152). The *Mahabharata* adapted to public service television offered contextualization in terms of contemporary politics through voice over. These references were made to emphasize the diversity of interpretations. In a way the ancient epics were reinterpreted to fit with the post-independence democratic India. These television serials, along
with earlier social dramas like *Hum Log* and *Buniyaad*, were commercially successful and nationally relevant “consensual representations of culture” (Boyd-Barrett, 2007, p. 9). However, serials like *Ramayan* (1987) and *Mahabharat* (1988) have arguably initiated a new era of symbolic politics manifested by the subsequent rise of religious nationalism (Boyd-Barrett, 2007; Rajagopal, 2001).

*Evolution of Journalistic Social Responsibility*

State intervention in media has been a feature of colonial rule that continued after decolonization. For instance, in 1878, the Vernacular Press Act gave powers to the police to confiscate presses publishing seditious literature. The Bengali newspaper *Amrita Bazar Patrika* became an English weekly overnight to escape the Act (Chandra et al., 1987; Karlekar, 2002). The wider history of press development in India proceeded from cultural to political (Karlekar, 2002). In 1818, Baptist missionaries that launched the first newspapers in Bengali (Digdarshan and Samachar Darpan) aimed at mass circulation. Social reformer Raja Rammohun Roy launched Sanghbad Kaumudi and Brahman Sebadi in 1821, marking the beginning of the Bengal renaissance. Such reformers were typically middle class and exposed to Western culture and Enlightenment traditions (Chakrabarty, 2000). Though this class did not participate directly in the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny, it had started articulating anti-imperial political positions from the early 1850s, as we shall note at considerable risk.

Media scholars have questioned the relevance of transplanting notions of professionalism into India (Golding, 1977). Journalism developed in the colonial period to further political and social goals. Writing was an act of discharging social responsibility:

Newspapers were not in those days business enterprises, nor were editors and journalists professionals. Newspapers were published as national or public service. They were often
financed as philanthropy. To be a journalist was often to be a political worker and an agitator at considerable self-sacrifice. (Chandra et. al, 1987, p. 103)

As Chandra et. al. (1987) argue, political journalism has been vibrant in the subcontinent since the beginning of the independence movement. The courageous tradition of speaking against the imperial state came to define social responsibility of the press (Chandra et al, 1987; Karlekar, 2002). Raja Rammohun Roy protested against regulatory infringement on freedom of press as early as 1824 (Chandra et. al, 1987). One of the prominent early nationalist leaders, Surendranath Benerjea, was the first Indian to serve a sentence for a journalistic offence (Chandra et. al, 1987). In 1905, Congress split between moderates seeking self-rule under the British Empire and hardliners wanting complete independence. Tilak, the leader of the hardliners and editor of *Maratha* and *Kesri*, was imprisoned for six years on charges of provoking sedition through editorials.

Karlekar (2002) argues that the freedom of the nation was tied with the freedom of the press, and journalistic social responsibility shaped in the colonial period continued in the post colonial period. Following independence, freedom of the press was enshrined in the constitution. This freedom was suspended during the controversial period of internal emergency between 1975 and 1977. The then Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, feared losing elections and imposed a regime of strict censorship. In an infamous incident reflecting the attitude of emergency, *The Indian Express* building was gutted for its acts of journalistic defiance. The proposed anti-defamation law in 1988 was another attempt to curtail press freedom. The resistance by the journalistic fraternity helped prevent this law from being passed by the parliament (Karlekar, 2002). Karlekar (2002) argues that growing commercialization, trivialization and instrumentalization are changing the notion of social responsibility of the press.
From 14 in 1939-40, the total number of advertising agencies accredited to the INS rose to 168 in 1979-80, 310 in 1983-84, 568 in 1990-91, 702 in 1996-97 and 750 in 1999-200. There has also been a phenomenal increase in their revenue earnings. (Karlekar, 2002, p.246)

The perceptual change in media as business, and newspapers as brands, have asserted the role of the proprietor over that of the editor. Editorial content is increasingly tailored to maximize the revenues of the press. Another characteristic of this trend is the use of media as an instrument of power rather than information. Senior editorial positions in such publications go not to “competent journalists of integrity” but rather to “operators and influence peddlers of dubious professional standing and skill” (p. 259). This trend is not restricted to tabloids but applies also to “some of the leading publications” (p. 259).

**Media and Political Patronage**

There is a high degree of “political parallelism” in Indian media systems leading to instrumentalization of the media (Hallin & Mancini, 2010, p. 26). Hallin and Mancini (2010) define instrumentalization as “control of the media by outside actors—parties, politicians, social groups or movements, or economic actors seeking political influence- who use them to intervene in the world of politics” (p. 37). These include political party papers as well as privately-owned papers that have been established to serve at least partly as a means of political intervention. It is further assumed that professionalization in such organizations will be low: “journalists will lack autonomy, political rather than distinctly journalistic criteria will guide the practice of journalism, and the media will serve particular interests rather than functioning as a ‘public trust’” (p. 37).
Another important variable in such (polarized-plural) systems marked by high instrumentalization and low professionalism is “Clientalism” (p. 58). Clientalism can be found in instances of instrumentalization of private and public media, though it is usually found in the case of private media. In the case of public media, appointments tend to be made on the basis of political loyalty rather than professional criteria. Private owners typically need political connections to obtain concessions such as broadcast licenses which are required for continuing business operations. These owners will use media to negotiate with other elites and intervene in politics. This is the primary purpose behind media ownership in systems where “political parallelism is high” and consequently “the tradition of clientalism is strong” (p. 58). Adherence to legal norms is weak where clientalism is strong, resulting in widespread corruption. Actors will use their connections to avoid “inconvenient regulations” (p. 59). Politicians can pressure media owners by selectively imposing taxes or selectively enforcing laws. Media owners and perhaps journalists can exert pressures on politicians by threatening to expose their wrongdoings.

Kohli (1990) argues that with the exception of Communists, the Indian party system relies more on charismatic individuals rather than party organization. The family and individual domination over the political and business (including media business) terrain has important implications. In the southern states of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, often it is the same family that controls media business and political parties, further underlining the need for a model to differentiate between different kinds of party systems and different kinds of political parallelism. For instance, in Tamil Nadu the DMK-Sun nexus and the AIADMK-Jaya TV nexus all point to this peculiar phenomenon. In the 2004 election campaign the DMK promised one TV set to every household if voted to power—a promise they have strived to fulfill (Thomas, 2010). Thomas (2010) argues that this not only a case of political populism, it is also a case of “politics
that understands the role of media in shaping attitudes, identities, choices and aspirations” (p. 5). Further, this underlines the monopoly of Sun TV in cable and satellite broadcasting in Tamil Nadu.

Thomas (2010) argues that while News Corp and Sun TV are different in terms of scale of operations they are similar in mixing politics with business. Both are “rent-seeking monopolies” that have used political connections to maximize media revenues (p.4). One of the “scions of the Sun TV dynasty”, Dayanidhi Maran, and later another DMK Member of Parliament, A. Raja, were Union Ministers for communication policy, indicating that “there have been substantive political investments in assuring Sun TV’s corporate, inter-sectoral media dominance” (p. 4). Both are being investigated for their involvement in the massive ‘2G spectrum scam’, where Raja is the prime accused. Maran is under investigation for misusing ministerial powers to promote Sun TV, for demanding Tata’s 33.33% share in the Tata-Rupert Murdoch DTH service.

*Eenadu: A Case Study*

In Andhra Pradesh (AP) politics a very strong party-media nexus is that of the TDP and *Eenadu* where caste plays that least common denominator for political understanding. A recent addition to the party-media nexus in AP is YSR Congress-Sakshi TV channel. Reddy (2010) argues that the case of *Eenadu* presents a pioneering effort of the regional language press to forge constitutive relations with regional politics in India. The Telugu language press is actively involved in the politics of the state, it functions in an extremely competitive environment, and the notion of non-partisan reporting "has become a suspect especially since the 1990s" (p. 233). It has been noted that the Hindi press replaced the English press as the largest in terms of circulation in the 1970s (Rajagopal, 2010). Reddy (2010) argues there are two reasons for the
enormous growth of the (regional) language press in India in the 70s; first, the rise of political consciousness in different sections of the society and the concomitant rise of regional forces in the political arena. Second, technological advancements in the field of communication. In AP there has been a rise in newspaper readership from 4 in 1000 in 1961 to 10 in 1000 in 1991 (Jeffery cited in Reddy, 2010). In both respects Eenadu started a trend that the language press in India followed.

Reddy (2010) argues that the formation of AP on the basis of language represents an assertion of regional elites. These elites were challenged later by the rich peasants who benifitted from the green revolution. However, these assertions and counter-assertions subdued under the centralized authority of Mrs. Gandhi. The new agrarian elite, particularly the Kammas of Andhra, started investing in industry, cinema and the press. As part of this trend Eenadu was launched in 1974. Eenadu had a massive network of electronic teleprinters in all districts and a wide network of reporters in every region of AP. It departed from the model of traditional newspapers by introducing local editions to increase the coverage of local news. Another innovation of Eenadu was that it had its own distribution and transportation network which helped the newspaper reach all parts of the state sooner than the competition. By 1980, Eenadu was the largest Telugu daily with a circulation of 200,000.

Reddy (2010) argues that there are "atleast three instances" where Eenadu took an openly partisan stand in favor of the TDP and yet remained "legitimate in its anti-establishment position" (p. 234). First, the social composition of Eenadu's readership was identical to TDP's social base; both were part of the political and economic emergence of rich peasants. Leaders of these organizations, Ramoji Rao and cinestar NTR, respectively, were Kammas from Andhra. Second, it crusaded in support of NTR when he was unlawfully removed from office by
Governor Ramlal in 1984 and was instrumental in reinstating the popular leader. Thirdly, it spearheaded the anti-alcohol movement beginning in 1993, which was taken up by NTR as a central theme in his election campaign a year later. In 1994, NTR was back as chief minister of AP and he made prohibition an official policy. A year later NTR was deposed by Naidu, who reintroduced alcohol. Eenadu, which was now supporting Naidu, framed the decision as a major relief for tax payers. The State was earning around 800 for crore by taxing alcohol. The Sanghi Group, originally from Gujarat, posed a challenge to Eenadu in the Telangana region. The Sanghi Group’s newspaper Vaarta mimicked Eenadu’s successful strategies with a pro-Telangana agenda to carve a space for itself against the pro-Andhra Eenadu.

The Indian Public Sphere

Oral cultures and visual signs play an important part in Indian society. C.A. Bayly (2000) uses the word ecumene to describe a public sphere of formal and informal exchanges involving wider range of channels of communication that include both oral and print. This ecumene of literate and non-literate played a defining role in the imagination of a nation and the formation of anti-colonial public opinion. In medieval India, written manuscripts had strategic functions within a powerful tradition of oral culture (Bayly, 2000). Through the notion of ecumene Bayly (2000) seeks to understand institutions, discourses and the scope of political, religious and aesthetic controversies that existed in North India in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The relationship of the ecumene with later print nationalism must be examined with greater care.

Traditional Indian society was organized in terms of caste, with associations of castes regulating social life (Kaviraj, 2012). Kaviraj (2012) argues that with the advent of colonial rule there was a reordering of power which left regulating the social order with castes. An important body of literature discussed below calls for questioning sharp contrasts “between tradition and
nationalist modernity, and between East and West” in nineteenth century India (Bayly, 2009, p. 50). The evidence from recent sociological enquiries suggests that such caste-based associations, were meant not to mobilize caste or religious identities but to debate, test opinions and to build the reputations of local elite, in a manner not completely inconsistent with Western-style rational critical debate (Dumont, 1970; Heesterman, 1985; Mines, 1992). Mines (1992) argues that these caste-based associations often were sites of individual agency and individualism. Inequalities and asymmetries in participation, especially based on religion witnessed in ecumene are also witnessed in the development of public sphere. The modes of communication in the ecumene were either face-to-face or pen-to-pen. When the critical public sphere of newspapers finally emerged these inequalities were reinforced due to editors’ desire to carve out constituencies reader’s opinions (Bayly, 2000).

These cultures were deemed as threatening by early colonizers, leading to measures such as banning drumming and imprisoning folk singers (Bayly, 2000; Rajagopal, 2009). During the East India Company’s rule, Indian rulers actively sabotaged the growth of the press. The already-fragile Indian rulers feared the press could lead to ‘dissemination of ridicule’; in a telling example the nawab of Awadh destroyed Lucknow presses in 1849 (Bayly, 2000, p. 189). During the First War of Independence, in 1848, oral culture (including rumor) played an important role in spreading the rebellion. Even as we build analysis around technologically-mediated experiences, we continue to see the persistence of older forms of communication with varied implications. For instance, it has been noted that rumor has played an important role during the 2002 Gujarat riots (Rajagopal, 2009). Rajagopal (2009) argues that it is around these old communication practices that nation continues to be re-imagined.
Ninan (2007) argued that the reach of media is near universal; the media operate in a tea-
shop public sphere culture where a paper is read by several people, radio and TV are watched by communities, and issues are discussed collectively. In terms of numbers, media expansion particularly of private broadcasting in the last twenty years has been geometric, newspaper circulation is around 78 million, and sixty percent of India’s households now have TV (Rajagopal, 2011). The Times of India (now controlled by a prominent Indian business family) is the most widely-read English daily in the world with a daily circulation of 7.5 million. The clout that the Times groups exerts through the Times of India, Times Now (TV) and Nav Bharat Times (Hindi Daily) allows it to set the agenda for the split publics (Rajagopal, 2011). However, there are discrepancies between the role of the English press in formulating nationwide discourses at the national level as distinct from the role of the vernacular press at the local or regional level. Growth in literacy has shifted the numbers in favor of the linguistic press from that of the English language press. Large Hindi dailies Dainik Bhaskar and Dainik Jagaran sell twice as many copies as the Times. Considering that the Indian population is over 1.2 billion these figures do not appear to be very impressive. This has some correspondence to an extent with Hallin and Mancini’s contention that press markets did not develop significantly with the growth of literacy in Polarized Plural countries of southern Europe (2004). Perhaps, the historically lower levels of literacy in southern Europe, which in part explain the smaller circulations of newspapers in those countries and their more elitist orientations corresponds with the development of the English Press in India. Mobile communication has very extensive reach in India, with 950 million handsets, including 67 million smartphones, which is important because the media function in a communal context. The experience of media in India is existentially
different from that in the West while raising questions about Habermasian public sphere theory. A critical evaluation of public sphere would follow below.

*Media and Social Movements*

*Reimagining Public Sphere*

Jurgen Habermas’s (1974) work on public sphere is one of the most fiercely contested notions in academia. Habermas starts his essay by elaborating the concept: “By ‘the public sphere’ we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed” (Habermas, 1974, p. 50). Such a formulation is essential to the deliberative model of democracy that Habermas tries to champion. Calhoun (1992) further explains that Habermas’s motivation lies in reviving ”the progressive potential in formal democracy” which Marxist tradition and more particularly Frankfurt school analysis neglected (p.5). This quest led Habermas to “develop an account of intersubjective communicative process and their emancipatory potential in place of any philosophy” (Calhoun, 1992, p.5). It is in this role that media becomes a vehicle of empowerment. Habermas looks for emancipation in the communicative process of rational critical debate.

*Citizenship and identity*

Habermas (1974) asserts that ‘Access’ to the public sphere ‘is guaranteed to all citizens’ (p. 50) thus, intertwining with the concept with citizenship. With notions of citizenship undergoing transformations in recent times its implications on public sphere are multifarious. Habermas sets out rules for discussions by making freedom of assembly and expression crucial to foundations of public sphere. As upholders of free speech he considers “newspapers, and magazines, radio and television as the media of the public sphere”. (Habermas, 1974, p. 50) He lays special emphasis on a rational-critical debate. So, what determines decision is not power (or
status) but the validity of the arguments. Warner (1992) suggests that since its “classical”
heyday, the notion of public sphere has been problematized by an increasing prominence identity
issues. The very emphasis on rational-critical debate implies an incapacity to deal fairly with
“identity politics” and concerns for difference (Calhoun, 1992, p. 3). Calhoun argues, “when
Habermas treats identities and interests as settled within the private world and then brought fully
formed into the public sphere, he impoverishes his own theory” (p. 35). In Habermasian universe
identities are assumed as static. Political and social process that redefine the notions of identities
“like nationalism, feminism, and gay, ethnic, or youth consciousness” (p. 35) are left out.

The absence of social movements from Habermas’s account thus also “reflects an
inattention to agency; to the struggles by which the both public sphere and its participants are
actively made and remade” (Dahlgren, 2003, p. 37). Dahlgren seeks to define citizenship as a
social agency in the wake of contemporary changes. He writes,

My stating point is the notion of political agency, to see citizenship as a mode of
individual and collective action, and to begin to probe the cultural conditions of such
agency. Further, my approach emphasizes the relevance of the media in shaping and
maintaining this culture, yielding a sort of cultural turn within the domain of political
communication. (Dahlgren 2003, p. 2)

Understanding democracy in broader terms rather than merely an electoral process redefines
citizenship. Dalhgren (2003) elaborates, citizenship thus “becomes an ongoing collective
accomplishment based in group practices, rather than a static category of placement” (p. 2). This
is the notion of Citizenship as identity. Group practices like social movements and cultural
currents shape and reshape identities.
How we understand democracy determines our definition of citizenship. To understand citizenship and democracy in contemporary context Dahlgren (2003) introduces the concept of civic culture. The civic culture is shaped and depends on an array of factors such as legal, economic, social, political, educational cultures. Not least of these factors is media. In our “intensely mediatized society” all forms of media “traditional and new” via “form and content” contribute to the development of civic cultures (p. 3). Civic cultures are either conductive or inhibiting to the progress of democracy. Thus, ‘viable’ civic culture is seen as a “prerequisite for a functioning democracy” (p. 3).

*Pluralism and Multiple Public Spheres*

Habermas’s treatment of culture and identity leaves many questions unanswered. Through the concept of ‘refeudalization’ Habermas introduces a dichotomy of public and private. Role of public sphere is envisaged by Habermas as that of mediation between society and state. Habermas’s tendency to “dichotomize public and private…is matched up with similar dichotomy between state and civil society, which engenders the assumption that for any state there must be one public” (Calhoun, 1992, p. 37). This assumption faces many problems in understanding contemporary citizenship. Diasporas, for instance, belong politically to state and long culturally for another nation (Appadurai, 1990). The models of deliberative democracy call for revision to accommodate conflicts of identity.

In her efforts to address inadequacy of public sphere Chantal Mouffe (1999, 2013) puts a model of “agonistic pluralism” which questions individualist, universalistic, and rationalistic framework of the liberal democratic theory. Habermas’s belief is based on “the conception that conceives political questions as being of a moral nature and therefore susceptible of being decided rationally” (Mouffe, 1999, p. 746). Habermas’s rational critical debate disregards the
fact that power relations operate in the decision making, “to accept the position of the adversary
is to undergo a radical change in political identity” (p. 755). This is a rather unlikely event in
political life where people struggle to maintain their identities. Instead, Mouffe (1999) calls for
“acknowledgement of power and antagonism” (p. 752) as a basis for citizenship. The idea of
radical democracy based on agonisms or constant contestations does not require rational
consensus as a necessary condition (also see Downing, 2002). When we accept “power relations
as a constitutive of the social” then we start working towards empowerment, our aim is not to
‘eliminate power’ but to constitute power which is “compatible with democratic values” (p. 753).

Feminist and Marxist criticism reveal a gendered and class based nature of public sphere.
They argue, respectively, for a feminist or proletarian public sphere outside the bourgeoisies
public sphere. So, the question that needs some consideration is—is there a singular public
sphere? This brings us to a “notion of multiple, sometimes overlapping or contending, public
spheres” (Calhoun, 1992, p. 37). These ideas challenge the bourgeoisies public sphere by
proposing several other counter public spheres even as some of these ideas suggest a
fragmentation of the public sphere. There is another problem; the multiple public sphere “leave
us groping for a new term to describe the communicative relationships among them” (p. 37). The
scheme of interconnected and oppositional ‘sphericules’ can be used to overcome this problem.
As Cammaerts writes,

Fragmented sphericules that operate sometimes outside, other times in partial overlap with
the dominant mainstream public sphere, and where new ideas of citizenship and
participation are deepened, debated and consulted are in themselves not to the detriment of
democracy, providing these ideas permeate into the dominant public sphere to a wider
audience of citizens at some moment in time. (2007, p. 16)
The idea of counterpublic, an American counterpart of oppositional public spheres, which draws from another feminist scholar Nancy Frazer (1992) who theorizes constitution of an oppositional discursive formation. Counterpublic finds use in critical, interpretivist and rhetocial traditions in the field of communication studies. While counterpublic might imply a retreat from engagement in politics, its communication dimension resituates counterpublic within a larger constellation of marginal publics (Brouwer, 2006). The idea does not exempt the possibility of counterpublics interacting with the dominant public. This is where the ideas of public sphere, agonism and counterpublic could be of use to the study of the Telengana movement. The movement is marked by interactions between marginal publics and mainstream elite and symbiosis between alternative and mainstream media. The counter public also advances communication theory by suggesting that human beings participate in multiple publics. The idea of counter public traces its history to the critiques of Habermas who studied the proletariat public sphere formations (Hansen, 1993; Koivisto & Valiverronen, 1996; Knödler-Bunte, Lennox & Lennox, 1975; Negt & Kluge; 1993; Negt, Kluge & Labayni, 1988; Jameson, 1988). Whereas today, perhaps, we don’t really have a proletariat in this classic sense, even if we have a working class – so how can working classes be best articulated in conditions of globalized post-colonialism? Activism through alternative media is seen as a site to further interests of counter-publics (Downing, 1988; Downey & Fenton, 2003; Sholette, 2007; Sholle, 1995).

Approaches to Studying Social Movements

Early sociologists studying social movements were concerned with various stages and actors involved in social movements. These approaches are rooted in social scientific analysis based on empirical observation, can be placed under, though not exclusively in post-positivist paradigms. Griffin’s (1952) study of rhetoric is also reminiscent of a similar approach based on
the functionalist paradigm. These studies went on to demonstrate a linear process of evolution of social movement and causal explanations and relationships between the perceived stages of the movements. Smelser’s (1962) study of collective behavior ‘unearths’ mob psychology and panics. Touraine (1978) traces a linear history of transformation of old social movements into new social movements.

Rhetorical studies of social movements have been influenced by both social scientific and humanist paradigms. Rhetorical scholars assuming a humanist/critical standpoint have developed detailed criticism of social scientific approaches since the 1980s. Micheal McGee (1980b) argues that social movements are meanings and not phenomena. Humanist scholars research meanings that drive (and precede) the social movement. Social scientists study socially occurring phenomenon. These phenomenon “present themselves equally to all human beings” (McGee, 1980b, p. 116). Thus the job of a social scientist is to unearth the truth about phenomenon that is, in a heuristic sense, valid. Often this leads to framing of social movements within a prism of singular ‘intent’. McGee (1980b) argues that meanings are multiple and are susceptible to change. Another trap for a researcher of social movements could be seeing them essentially as moral and purposeful (McGee, 1980b).

The Network Turn: While communication scholars in the United States study social movements from the standpoint of rhetoric, media scholars have been analyzing linkages between the various media and social movement phenomenon. New social movements have inspired a whole new paradigm of research. Media and communications scholars invoke the network model to conceptualize new social movements as small and decentralized networks (Atkinson, 2010). Gerlach (2001) has developed segmentary, polycentric integrated network (SPIN) model to understand new social movements. In this model, social movements are
Segmentary (composed of many diverse groups, which grow and die, divide and fuse, proliferate and contract); polycentric (having multiple, often temporary, and sometimes-competing leaders or centers of influence); network (forming a loose, reticulate, integrated network with multiple linkages through travellers, overlapping membership, joint activities, common readings matter and shared ideals and opponents). (Gerlach, 2001, pp. 289-290)

This sort of model is applicable to describe the actions of environmental groups such as greenpeace. Network organization has been noted for being more adept at challenging and changing society than centralized resistance (Gerlach, 2001). The cloud configuration of the internet was designed to effectively decentralize authority so as to survive a nuclear war. Alternative media researchers note that internet’s network architecture is aiding activism. The coming together of those opposed to corporate globalization from geographically dispersed locations to Seattle in 1999 can be construed as an example of globalization from below.

It is also important to relate social movement with state within a post-colonial context in the age of globalization. Rajni Kothari (2005) argues that social movements challenge narrow conceptions of democracy and have the potential for emancipation. In the early decades of Independence, Indian state operated with autonomy in socioeconomic spheres with its own agenda of social change independent of the class, caste and communal influences (Kothari, 2005). Between 1967 and 1977, when Mrs Gandhi was ruling the country, there was a greater centralization of power in India.

Ironically, the greater centralization of power has made state less autonomous; where as distancing itself from lower tiers of the federal structure, and from party bureaucratic
institutions, has made it dependent on dominant structures of national and international power and privilege. (Kothari, 2005, p. 56)

During this time and there after, Indian elites developed pro market attitudes, with the market, rather than the state, being viewed as the agent of national development. With his shift “The marginalization of the masses, the destitution of the poor and the exploitation of natural resources for private industrial needs” are believed as necessary “for achieving national power, and for attempting to catch up with the developed countries”. (p. 58)

Since the 1990s, the widespread use of new information and communication technologies and the mass media tended homogenize lifestyles and cultures. In this context social movements “should work towards transformation of society, including polity through “politicization that goes to the roots of culture and civilization” (p. 155). Such a movement reaches both individuals and communities, and local and provincial structures of government which were weaken during previous generations. .

Interrogating Alternative Media

Some authors have attributed to alternative media a unique capacity to instigate social change (Atton, 2002; Downing, 2002). According to this perspective there are significant differences between alternative and mainstream media in terms of content, interpretation and economics of production, distribution and consumption (Atton, 2002; Atkinson, 2010). Alternative print media can be defined in terms of economics of production as publishing houses concerned more with social responsibility and commitment to ideas rather than profits (alternatives in print cited in Atton, 2001). Some of these formulations situate alternative media as media produced outside the mainstream concentration of power (Atton, 2001; Couldry & Curran, 2003). Countering these ideas about alternative media that draw from anarchist
perspectives and emphasize self-organization practices for idealizing small-scale production, Fuchs (2012) argues for a Marxist theory of alternative media. This sort of critical media challenges the dominative society and seeks to challenge counter-publics (Fuchs, 2012).

Another definition of alternative media is based on the notion of prefigurative politics or the attempt to practice socialist ideals in the present (Downing, 1984). Downing’s (2001) definition of radical media focuses specifically on alternative media on the left of political spectrum committed to social justice and empowerment of the marginalized. Rodriguez’s (2001, 2003) development of citizen media develops Downing’s definition in a peculiar direction to include community-based media with ties to the Catholic Church in Latin America. In view of rising identity movements around the world, it is important to keep track of media produced by such groups. Several such groups deliberately or inadvertently work towards seeking social justice for their constituents. To such an extent they may be considered as being engaged in prefigurative politics. Hence, it is possible to argue that both radical media and community media have a role in resisting marginalization. The printing presses publishing pamphlets, booklets and leaflets to mobilize support for Telangana can be understood as alternative media. Especially, left leaning groups such as New Democracy, Telangana Prajasanghala Joint Action Committee, Telengana Communist Party and marginalized caste groups associations (which are mobilized both in terms of class and identity).

These differences notwithstanding- Kenix (2012) questions the polarization in terms of alternative and mainstream media to argue for a media continuum. News media is identified as an area where we witness the synergies between alternative and mainstream media (Kenix, 2012). While most news sources online are traditional media establishments backed by big capital, Internet is also helping alternative media traditionally limited by circulation and
resources to break into the global news flows. Some of the initial optimism regarding internet as a utopian level playing field wanes with recognition of rapid monopolization cyberspace led by Google (Dawson and Foster, 1998). Dawson and Foster (1998) argue that every new media innovation despite its potential to further democracy has brought forth emergence of new monopolies.

The media continuum ranges from online newspapers and blogs to social networking (Kenix, 2012). The photographs of prisoners being tortured in Guantanamo Bay were circulating online as trophies of war until CNN and other mainstream news organizations latched on to them in what became a major critique to the war on terror. Further, we should also allow for the expression of “alternative-ness” even within the mainstream – E.G. Bill Moyers on PBS; George Monbiot in the Guardian; comedy central; P. Sainath in the Hindu (India) etc.

Kenix’s (2012) work that problematizes alternative media and mainstream media dichotomy is particularly important for shifting the emphasis to media framing. Frames contextualize news in pre-existing schemas (Kenix, 2012). Ideology is an important determinant for the framing of social movements both in alternative and mainstream media. Media reflects ideological biases in framing issues such as climate change. News media have been noted for being positively or negatively inclined towards social movements. For instance, Giltin’s (1980) study of anti-Vietnam war protests reveals the unfavorable framing by the mainstream media.

*Media Framing*

Gitlin (1980) defined media frames as the following,

*Media* frames, largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organize the world, both for journalist who report it and, in some important degree us who rely on their reports. (p. 7)
Gitlin’s (1980) examination of media framing is based on the media coverage of anti-Vietnam war activism. Study of social movements and their coverage by newspapers has proved to be insightful for framing analysis. Framing of social movements allows for the possibility of the agendas being set by social movement actors. Favorable and unfavorable coverage of campaigns and social movements by various media outlets has been an important source of research on media framing. There are strong political interest groups that either support or oppose formation of the Telangana state. Media framing of the Telangana issue, it follows, would be determined not just by journalistic routines, but also by the ties news organizations have with political elite.

Frame, framework, framing invoke a commonsensical understanding of the representations of media texts. Since framing was unearthed as a widespread phenomenon through systematic and extensive study by Goffman (1974), it has been an integral part of the study of media and communication. Entman (1993) has argued framing can help media and communication emerge as a superdiscipline. Study of framing is spread across disciplines, by making it the central concern of media and communications the subject stands to emerge as the focal point of research (Entman, 1993). While one may not agree with Entman’s (1993) proposal to turn framing into a super theory, its importance especially the implicit ties between media and power elites cannot be underestimated.

Since early 80s, media scholars researching professional codes and routines of journalists brought critical perspectives to framing the field has been progressing through increasing the overlap with political communication (Denning, 1986; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Roefs, 1998). The focus of framing has shifted from media practitioners to social groups. Social groups are the locus of frame production and its effect (Roefs; 1998). Social groups can be mobilized around
moral, political or religious issues pointing to an overlap with social movement theories. Study of social groups assumes importance as groups-produced frames can influence media effects on the individuals allied to social groups (Roefs, 1998). So where are these new trends from audience studies and social movements taking framing to? Framing shares with agenda setting its focus on public policy issues in voter’s minds (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). However, it goes beyond what people are talking to how they are thinking and talking (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). It is also more developed as a coherent conceptual framework than agenda setting. It is logical to argue where the impact of framing would be most contested? Study of political communication assumes significance as a contested territory with very high stakes for public good. Political interests play an important role in relative salience of communication texts. A particular evaluation leads to a particular diagnosis or treatment (Entman, 1993).

*Political Communication*

Framing and agenda setting literature is grounded in the relationship between media workers and political actors. Negrine (1996) has argued that little attention is paid to the role of the public in the process. How the public makes sense of political news? How does political communication help or distract people from understanding importance of issues? These process need to be understood better (Negrine, 1996). The more recent models of framing such as cascade activation do consider public opinion as a factor in news framing (Entman, 2003). The perspectives from media framing and political communication are coming together in recognizing the mediatization of political process. Post-globalization the impact of professionalization of media necessitated by neoliberal economic relations has been a central concern of scholars of political communication (Hamelink, 2007; Mancini, 2007; Negrine,
The process of mediation through which publics mobilize and constitute media has been on the research agenda of scholars invested in social movements/alternative media.

The political struggle for separation has a role in shaping political consciousness of the region which would then lead to a radical re-orientation of media framing and public sphere discourse at important junctures of history. Community based organizations have been trying to address the issues of displacement, alienation and social exclusion (Thirumali, 2013). The media of pamphlets are putting forward narratives based on communitarian rights (Thirumali, 2013). Instances such as distribution of pamphlets in the Legislative Assembly by women belonging to marginalized Madiga community rupture the credibility of the system of governance (Thirumali, 2013). Cassette, CDs, pamphlets can be seen or heard at coffee/tea shops, public gatherings including marriages, festive celebrations. Cell phone ringtones with Telangana themes have been very popular in the recent times within the region (Thirumali, 2013).

Marx and Engels (2006) essentialize freedom and equality as capitalist values as against honor and loyalty that are dominant values in feudal society. Elaborating on ruling class ideology Marx and Engle’s argue that every new mutation in the power structure requires the forces opposed to ruling class to sharply and profoundly differ from previous ruling elite. It is not the whole mass of opposition that is empowered in the process that leads to replacing the old ruling class but often a select group that is termed as new ruling class. Their emphasis on ideology as means of elite control has led to development of the Gramscian notion of hegemony. It follows that elites are the freest members of society who can realize their class interest through operationalizing entrenched hegemony.

Marx and Engels’s (2006) analysis raises essential questions regarding the influence of power on political consciousness. Ideology’s binding grip on societal structures based on brute
economic forces seems to exclude agency of those oppressed by these very structures. This analysis, not surprisingly, have prompted criticisms for overestimating role of power in describing political consciousness. The struggles over democracy, colonization, slavery and segregation have contributed to altering of socio-political consciousness and nature of power in society. Power can be understood not merely in terms of measure but also as a discourse. Can the powerful global political and economic elites be subject to scrutiny and action based on the prevailing discourses of justice and equality? Can representative democracy be instrumental in such an endeavor? The role of symbolic contestation and rhetorical persuasion in shaping political consciousness demands closer examination in various intercultural and international contexts.

Social movements scholarship is contributing to this line of thought by arguing that mobilization can cause shifts in meanings that directly impact mass consciousness (McGee, 1980b). Rhetorical devices are key to such paradigmatic shifts. McGee (1980a) identifies ideograph as building blocks of ideology that operate as a bridge to symbolism. Mass consciousness he argues is not directly determined by beliefs or behaviours but through a “vocabulary of concepts that function as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for behavior and beliefs” (p. 6). Ideographs are everyday rhetorical terms rooted in history and culture that invoke strong identification with important socio-political commitments (Cloud, 2004). It is an everyday abstraction that “represents collective commitment, it warrants power and guides behavior, and it is culture bound” (Cloud, 2004, p. 288). Ideographs exist in real discourse functioning “as agents of political consciousness” (McGee, 1980a, p. 7). They are not terms invented by observers, but come into being as part of real lives whose precise motives they articulate (McGee, 1980a). A call for separate Telangana invokes the historical identification associated with it. “Separate
Telangana” as an ideograph is the rhetorical insistence on political and cultural separation from Andhra.

**The Role of Intellectuals**

Sreberny (2007) argues that mainstream media (such as guardian/observer) offers spaces for intellectuals to reflect over contemporary issues of concern. These public intellectual need not possess any academic qualification; their recognition as intellectuals is based on perception. So, this group includes novelists and fiction writers like Arundhati Roy (Sreberny, 2007).

Intellectuals have a role in voicing concerns of the marginalized groups in media; they also have a role to play in mobilizing these groups. Craft particularism is declining in Telangana as marginal communities engaged in crafts, agriculture or living in forests are losing their means of subsistence to the market forces. Displaced and dispossessed these groups are thronging the urban labor market. This situation finds parallels with Italy in 1920s when Gramsci documented similar process. Gramsci (1978) has argued that if proletariat can “conquer certain from of egoism which can and do subsist within the working class as such, even when craft particularism has disappeared” (p.) it can form a potent revolutionary force. Gramsci (1978) elucidates the role of intellectuals in building new coalitions by bringing together peasants of the south and industrial workers of the north.

Gramsci (1978) argues that in every country, the layer of intellectuals has been radically modified by the development of capitalism. The old type of intellectual was the organizing element in a society with a mainly peasant and artisanal basis. To organize the State, to organize commerce, the dominant class bred a particular type of intellectual. Industry has introduced a new type of intellectual: the technical, organizer, and the specialist in applied science. In the societies where the economic forces have developed in a capitalist direction, to the point where
they have absorbed the greater part of national activity, it is this second type of intellectual that
has prevailed, with all his characteristic of order and intellectual discipline. In the countries, on
the other hand, where agriculture still plays a considerable or even preponderant role, the old
type has remained predominant.

Chomsky (1967) argued that intellectuals in the West were playing a prominent role in
running the welfare state, thus rejecting any need to radically transform society. Most Western
intellectuals did not see any need to further class struggles based on ideology. Chomsky (1967)
calls such intellectuals ‘technical experts’ and questions how they would deal with problems of
commodification of labor and alienation among working classes?

It seems fairly obvious that the classical problems are very much with us; one might
plausibly argue that they have even been enhanced in severity and scale. For example, the
classical paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty is now an ever-increasing problem on an
international scale. (Chomsky, 1967, para. 40)

Even as Western developmentalist discourses suggest that the problems in, at least, the western
world have ameliorated as a result of capitalist development this is a misleading perspective.
Exacerbating poverty is a widespread reality especially in the third world. However, one might
conceive, at least in principle, of a solution to the problem of poverty within national boundaries,
a sensible idea of transforming international society to cope with vast and perhaps increasing
human misery is hardly likely to develop within the framework that positions technical experts as
intellectuals.

The development of technical experts points to the role of intellectual as a resource in
service of the state. Oppositional movements too create their own resources to resist statism.
Weiner (1978) notes that in case of Telangana movement an important aspect of the struggle
over resources is the creation of resources. Social and regional movements develop various
“infrastructures: ethnic restaurants, religious institutions, newspapers, neighborhood associates,
charitable organizations, welfare institutions, medical facilities, burial associations, and
educational centers” (Weiner, 1978, p. 10). These institutions also become centers for the
emergence of leaders and intelligentsia who try to speak for the community such as “newspaper
editors, heads of ethnic associations, the clergy, and elected political leaders” (Weiner, 1978, p.
10). Both migrants and the local groups organize these resources.

Indeed, to the extent that local groups seek to restructure the ethnic division of labor, they
must build political resources—new journals to articulate the claims of the local people,
literary associations to attract the emerging intelligentsia and, ultimately, political
organizations to press nativist claims upon government. (Weiner, 1978, p. 11)

Intellectual and activists in Telangana have for long argued, even in absence of political
movement, that the resources are being unfairly appropriated by Andhra. The movement is
directed not against those from Andhra who come to Telangana for livelihood but only against
those who are exploiting the region. The statistics from areas such as irrigation, education,
agriculture, industry, government and political representation are presented to make a forceful
case for separation of Telangana (Innaiah, 1997; Jayashankar, 1997, 2003; Naram, 1997;
Pochanna; 1997; Prabhakar, 1997; Ravinder; 1997; Reddy, 2003; Simhadri, 1997). In view of
piling grievances beginning with non-implementation of Gentleman’s Agreement it is argued
that a separate state is the only solution. The intellectual inquiry into the misery of Telangana
includes analysis of media and narratives (Akhileshwari, 1997; Khan, 1997; Stevenson, 1997;
Yadagiri, 1997).
**Conceptual Framework**

Said (1993) unearths the persisting influence of imperialism on discursive cultural formations regarding people of orient. Further, in the postcolonial context culture is problematized by the politics of race, religion, region and gender (Hegde, 2006). Shome and Hegde argue, “[P]olitics of post coloniality are centrally imbricated in the politics of communication” (2010, p. 89). The communication dimension of the postcolonial struggles has remained in background and most scholarship has concentrated on the media. Post-colonial scholarship needs to further “interventionist theoretical perspectives” on colonial erasures to be regarded as critical (Shome & Hegde, 2010, p. 90). Interventionist perspectives have to go beyond the socio-psychological descriptions of diaspora to interrogate linkages between race and imperialism.

Couldry’s (2010) theorization of exclusion of voices from neoliberal domain has important implications for social justice. Excluded voices foreground discussion in politics shaped in opposition to neoliberalism. In this conceptualization media, especially the websites like Awaaz.org have a role in recognizing legitimacy of marginalized (Couldry, 2010). To gain first order understanding of the notion of voice it is important to understand how neoliberalism operates. Key dimensions of the world that neoliberalism impacts include economic, social and political. Neoliberalism functions on several levels as a principle, as a working doctrine and through embedded rationality of everyday social organization. The notions of public sphere have shaped the discipline of media studies (Curran, 2006). Couldry (2010) proposes Amartya Sen’s work on ‘real freedoms’ is the basis for ends of economic life and John Dewey’s notion of ‘democracy as social cooperation’ over Habermasian communicative action as the end of post-
neoliberal democratic politics. Such a shift is necessary for the politics of valuing marginalized voices.

So, what has neoliberalism done to voice? Voice is primarily understood in terms of a social process. Valuing such a process is both the second dimension of voice as well as a second order understanding of voice (Couldry, 2010). When market dictates the values; voice loses its value. By promoting the view of market autonomy neoliberalism takes the power away from the state. Consequently, state has limited role in addressing the problems that arise. Having lost the voice social movements resisting the project of markets have none to address. One example of this process of the suppression of voice can be seen in the analysis of groups such as trade unions. Trade unions have largely vanished from political terrain and have lost their ability to shape policy. According to Couldry (2010) providing media platforms to excluded voices has implications for resistance and change.

Beasley-Murray (2011) offers a critique of the notion of civil society, growing power of neoliberal state and non-communicative resistance movements. Beasley-Murray (2011) constructs an alternative theory from these criticisms:

Activists often disdain theorizing as impractical and overintellectual, as though political action were simply a matter of common sense; but given that contemporary neoliberalism also relies on presenting itself as second nature, as beyond question, such a refusal of theoretical reflection can only be self-defeating. (p. 89)

Drawing from Hegel and Tocqueville Beasley-Murray (2011) finds that civil society is an intermediate sphere that operates between the state and the Habermasian “lifeworld.” The term civil society includes not just community and non-profit organization but all social organization including trade unions, political parties and church groups. True nature of this sphere lies in
being “subservient to, state and market” (p. 93). Liberal and Social Democratic norms of *bourgeois* rationality and consensus prevail within this sphere. This distances civil society from any form of radicalism, antagonism or conflict. Civil society has been an influential term in development and policy. Organizations ranging from various UN bodies to Ford Foundation support civil society in developing countries.

Neo liberal state operating on the premise of transparency has withdrawn “from its social responsibilities” (pp. 73). Even as Nation-State relinquishes the markets to the economic forces of globalization it continues to grow in power and influence. Civil society struggles to find its space between the State and the market. Social movements are the lifeblood of civil society. They are celebrated for undermining formal politics and bringing ‘participatory democracy’ to the fore. As managerial discourse of business gain prominence, the State switches to the role of social and economic regulator. Now, social movements become a form of (democratic/anarchic) ‘fundamentalism’ and civil society fanatic.

Beasley-Murray (2011) studies Latin America after the dawn of Regan-Thatcher era, specifically the presidency of Alberto Fujimori and Maoist resistance (Sandero) to his neoliberal policies in Peru. Sandero was an extremely opaque militant movement led by Abimael Guzman, its chief ideologue, which operated a parallel government in areas under its influence in the Andes. Sandero’s presence is a challenge to “both neoliberalism and civil society theory” (p. 78). Beasley-Murray (2011) highlights Fujimori and Guzman’s incommunicative personas.

A multitude confronts Empire and yet… there is less than ever to choose between them. But surely there is some alternative to the fundamentalism of a Sandero Luminoso or an al-Qaida on the one hand, or of neoliberalism’s diffuse forms of command and control on the other. (2011, p. 121)
There is apparently a way out which leads to good fundamentalism and good multitude driven by life as against death that mark neoliberalism and Maoist resistance. Beasley-Murray argues “all social formations are structured through affect, by the reasons of the heart and the passions of the reason” (pp. 119). Refering to technocratic neoliberal discourses of polling and populisms in democratic politics, he argues, “Civil society theory and neoliberalism alike set out to exclude affect, passion, and the body from politics” (pp. 117). The ideal of excluding voices and experiences through the neoliberal discourses is important to a conceptual formulation for resistance movements.

Section 1 of literature review covered the changing notions of nationalism since its emergence in Westphalian State. Theorists of post- globalization argue that nation-state has declined in relevance in the recent times. Appadurai (1990) and Bhaba (1994) bring to our attention the fluidity in the notions of national boundaries. Castells (2009) calls for theorization of power in network society. The fluid nature of capital flows and declining role of welfare state has implications for the people living in different territories. We may begin by identifying a broader theoretical implication of this case study of Telangana:

1. How can Telangana nationalism be interpreted in terms of its evolving shape, form, function and imagining?

The literature review examined the various relationships between political-economic systems, cultural productions, media institutions, caste based social organization in the context of Indian media with reference to those aspects that could be accentuated in Telangana. The context of transformation of state (Kothari, 2005) and emergence of new states (Tillin, 2013) sets the framework for structural analysis of political processes including role of constitution and political parties. Accounting for culture is important for a nuanced and accurate assessment of
structural factors. With in the context of structural constrains of political economy and cultural aspects such as caste and religion we examine the relationship between media and Telangana movement by asking:

2. What are the political, economic and cultural implication of Telangana movement on media and vice versa?

Nationalism has been noted to include both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic aspects (Spivak, 2010). This dissertation argues that a standpoint of marginalization is important to examine hegemonic and counter-hegemonic stances of nationalism. An exploration of media and communication practices of marginalized groups in Telangana is of relevance to bridging gaps in research in democracy, social movements and media.

The focus on media practice allows us to examine how activists’ situated lives and actions are directed either towards or by the media to fulfill material and symbolic goals (Couldry, 2004; Cammaerts, Mattoni, McCurdy, 2013). With technological convergence, media practices circumscribe our ‘ability to communicate one-to-one, one-to-many, and even many-to-many’ (Cammaerts, Mattoni & McCurdy, 2013, p.5).

3. What are the media practices of the marginalized groups in Telangana?

The proposal hypothesizes that at a macro level after globalization the production of the dispossessed has intensified. These processes influence the media structures including those in Telangana. At a micro-level our attention should turn to the issues of social justice and agency. Within the context of oral/communal culture how could then the marginalized groups work against their disempowerment? So, another hypothesis is that nation-state can continue to play a constitutive role against one-dimensionality of the production of dispossessed. Through different measures such as taxation, investment in education and welfare it could create help ameliorate
situation of the marginal groups. Political agency and mediation bring about these changes in constitution of regional conditions, and have broader implications for notions of democracy and citizenship. Final hypothesis is that marginalized groups have a vision for equity and justice rooted in the notion of ‘common’. This hypothesis could be problematic and go against the grain. For instance, Chatterjee (1994) has argued that sub-altern need not present a coherent vision of resistance to the hegemony. Hardt & Negri (2011) argue that medieval Europe had a notion of common shared land that is different from private or public (state) ownership. It is important to take the idea of common out from its de-racialized and de-gendered context and re-examine it in the context of caste, class and gender in Telangana.

4. What does nationalism mean in a post-colonial and globalized world and to whom? A narrative of global and transnational expansionism/imperialism can be seen in religious (Roman Catholic Church before Westphalian State), commercial (East India Company) and often both as in case of Spanish colonization of Americas (Gonzalez, 2011). The present age of mediatized globalism or network society requires resituating ideas of nationalism and imperialism.

The implications of globalization are multidimensional and exert wide-ranging influence at local, regional, and national levels. Appadurai (1990) analyzes disjunctures or separations between these various levels of interactions. There are possibilities associated with diffusion of boundaries (Bhaba, 1994). The researcher takes a structural approach akin to Straubhaar (2007) to examine these various dimensions of globalization and contextualize determinants of both disjunctures and opportunities.
CHAPTER III. RESEARCH STRATEGY

Research Epistemology

Political economy is realist in its epistemology; thereby it distinguishes itself from ideographic approaches that argue for the reality of ideas alone or nomothetic approaches that argue for observations as the sole source of knowledge (Mosco, 2009). The chief concern of political economy is the articulation of power in society. Dallas Smythe, who was one of the founders of this tradition along with Schiller and later Mattelart, concerned himself with research on all aspects of “the power processes within society” (Smythe, 1960, p. 563). Smythe’s (1960) work focuses on scarcity of production and distribution of media products. Political economy rejects essentialism or single factor determinism (Boyd-Barrett, 2006). Additionally, political economy’s epistemology is constitutive in that it rejects simple causal analysis, including the assumption that social analysis follows a linear pattern (Mosco, 2009). Political economy of communication contradicts formulations on evolving structures based on technological determinism. Harold Innis (2007 [1950]) has attributed the far-reaching changes that primarily led to the reformation and subsequently contributed to the rise of capitalism to the invention of movable type. Often the parallels are often drawn between the invention of the printing press and the invention of the internet to underscore that we are living in the Information Age. To uncritically accept these assumptions would be a disservice to the field. A causal relationship between empires and prevailing means of communication is problematic. Hamelink (1994) traces the history of the evolution of institutions or structures since the printing press and the Reformation to explain the world in terms of political economy rather than technological determinism. Hamelink (1994) analyses the emergence of nation-state in terms of dominant interest groups that came to power with it, specifically examining the emergence of global
regulatory institutions after World War II and later with the neo-liberal project to argue that hierarchy is renewed through technological innovation. The claim that the current system of organized capitalism is being replaced by a worldwide system of deliberative e-governance needs critical examination. For the New Right this means realizing the ideal of small enterprise, the demise of big government and the creation of a seamless world of ‘perfect competition’ (Dawson and Foster, 1998, p. 51). The internet's architecture, which decimates distance and is beyond control, is supposed to bring about this utopia. Every new media innovation notwithstanding, its potential to further democracy has brought about the emergence of new monopolies (Dawson and Foster, 1998). Newspapers have formed cartels; a handful of news agencies dominate news dissemination; three big networks dominate satellite television in the US; a few big studios control Hollywood, and Google and Microsoft are fast monopolizing the virtual world. The realist epistemology of political economy avoids the optimism associated with technological determinism and urges researchers to recognize that the contemporary economy and technology are being structured in power.

To complement the macro emphasis of political economy on structures, the epistemology of post-colonial feminism that examines the micro of everyday life needs some consideration. Together the dialectic thus generated could lead to new insights regarding forces of change and the status quo. Dalmia and Alcoff (1993) argue that western academic theories indulge in ‘epistemic discrimination’ against traditional women’s beliefs (p. 218). By contending that these beliefs cannot meet the definitions of knowledge stipulated as epistemic, they make a case for changing the definitions of knowledge. The case is based on a pre-Cartesian perspective of what was considered knowledge in various cultures. For instance, Aristotle measured knowledge in both forms, propositional and practical, in contrast to the restrictive definition of modern
epistemology. Cartesian epistemology, which considers knowledge as propositional, has led to an undermining the knowledge of women and low-class men (such as barber-surgeons) and hence their social standing. It has been argued that caste system has historically accorded lower status to working communities (Ilaiah, 1992). However, Dalmia and Alcoff’s argument is worth considering for the broader implications about privileging alternative forms of knowledge.

Influenced by feminist and post-colonial thinking, this article examines the loss of the practice of midwifery to hegemonic institutions of modern medical practice. The authors narrate an ancient Indian fable of a scholar learning from a housewife and a hunter to demonstrate that the conception of propositional knowledge being superior to practical knowledge is relatively recent. Among the strengths of midwifery was midwives' ability to perform abortions, inhibit miscarriages, and reduce the pain of child birth. Midwives ‘attended women throughout the entirety of their labor’, rather than only for delivery, providing psychological as well as physical support (p. 222). Despite their strengths, midwives lost out to physicians because they could not document their knowledge. Ancient trades and associated lifestyles continue to lose out to modernization/globalization processes without recourse to making an argument about their relevance or irrelevance. The assumptions of the modernization project have made these processes invisible and unaccounted, even as the dispossession of several working sections of the society is a widespread reality.

To build a case for broadening the definition of knowledge, Dalmia and Alcoff argue that ‘some knowledge can only be shown and some can only be said’ (p. 241). Propositional knowledge is a statement of truth or about ‘knowing that’. Practical knowledge comes about from enacting or experiencing. The two kinds of practical knowledge include (i) ‘knowing how’ – a result of practicing a trade – and (ii) Experiential- e.g., women who experience pregnancy
have a subjective perspective on the process that others do not (p. 230). So, there are two ways in which knowledge of midwifery could be reinstated as knowledge. The first is to challenge the idea of facts as truth and include the experience of success in the practical involvement of the world as knowledge (p. 235). Alternatively, using an idea of ‘grasping’ that involves either ‘knowing that’ or ‘knowing how’ it can be argued that a midwife recognized the nuances of the process in a knowledgeable way. Hence, if she was confronted with a manual of codified rules of midwifery, she could react in agreement or disagreement (p. 237). What could be the implications of such a broadening of definitions of epistemology to the communities practicing pre-modern trades? Dalmia and Alcoff’s argument for documentation and codification of practices can be extended to bring to light the processes by which those practices and practitioners are being obliterated by the continuing march of modernization and its latest incarnation, globalization. The sections below will seek to explain how political economy is consistent with ethnographic methods and a grounded theory analytic approach.

This section continues the methodological exploration of the interstices of cultural studies and political economy to focus on insights from ethnography. Rather than answer the research questions raised with some kind of finality, what I want to do is to highlight the recent employment of ethnographic research to address some long-standing political economy concerns (Schiller, 2009). These new trends draw from cultural studies literature to put their analysis in motion. The emphasis of ethnographic research shifts from systems or structures to the study of practices. The static variables of systems analysis are put in motion to explain the processes and practices that shape and reshape power relations.

The shift need not imply discarding the idea of hegemony. Rather it requires asking the old question of hegemony as a lived and moving experience, “formative but also transformative”
practice. (Williams, 1977, p. 113) Such attempts can lead to a dynamic understanding of the variables concerning structural studies and could potentially lead to unearthing new relationships between micro and macro. Roudakova’s (2009) analysis of the constitutive role of community media in the Venezuelan nation-state is an argument to recognize “mutual constitution of human agency and social structure” (p.276). Chavez initiated drastic anti-neoliberal reforms opposed by the media and the middle and upper classes. The New Venezuelan state and government aided community media, which was the new basis for everyday cultural support of the legitimacy of Chavez. Of course, this led to tensions between the “professional” national media and the community media.

Now, what could be the pitfalls of applying ethnography to make that jump from micro to macro? Micro is rooted in specific historical, cultural and institutional contexts. This makes any global projects in terms of either broad generalization or comparison seem redundant. This tentativeness of resistance makes structural political economists uneasy. Further, a detailed understanding of the macro that this paradigm presupposes is not static. This does not mean these challenges should be left unmet. What it means is a recognition “of the purpose-the politics” of such enterprise (Roudakova, 2009, p. 277). The ultimate evaluation of this approach, too, lies in what it seeks to attain.

Research Design

What constitutes a reasonable approach to acquiring knowledge? Method is of critical importance in validating findings and raising them to the status of knowledge. Method is grounded in ‘direct observation, open-ended interviewing and textual analysis of human products’ (Murillo, 2004, p. 157). Qualitative methods such as grounded theory and ethnography emphasize the research process being inductive (free from a priori assumptions). Soyini
Madison (2012) argues that ethnography is critical theory in action. Critical ethnographers have represented a culture within a larger historical, socio-political and symbolic context (Van Maanen, 1995). Social research design is based on choices a researcher makes about privileging a set of voices (Ragin & Amoroso, 2011). It is important to recognize that both epistemology and method together constitute a political project. In a critical sense this ‘includes radical ideas challenging regimes of power’ (Madison, 2012, p. 14). The project needs methods whose extent of application depends on the researchers' aims, the theoretical framework informing the research and the ‘scene’ itself (Murillo, 2004).

Triangulation

The literature on research methods suggests that one way to strengthen a study design is through triangulation of the methods and procedures involved in examining a phenomenon (Patton, 1990). This can mean taking both quantitative and qualitative approaches and using several methods or data sources. Denzin (1978) has identified four levels in which triangulation can be applied: (1) data triangulation- the use of different sources to obtain and ascertain data; (2) investigator triangulation- the use of multiple investigators to examine the same phenomenon; (3) theory triangulation- the use of multiple perspectives that inform a research program; and (4) method triangulation- the use of combination of methods to study a single problem. It has been argued that triangulation is not merely a tool or a strategy of validation; rather, it is an alternative to validation (Denzin, 1989a, 1989b, p. 244; Fielding & Fielding, 1986, p. 331; Flick, 1992, p.194). The combination of multiple methods and empirical materials in a single study adds rigour to any investigation (Flick, 1992). The investigator of this research program takes an overarching political economy perspective and applies a combination of methods based on grounded theory, also drawing from contemporary arguments in ethnography.
and discourse analysis. This section explores the issue of method triangulation and the next section deals with data triangulation.

**Grounded Theory**

Grounded theory is a methodology for developing theory grounded in data that is systematically gathered and analyzed. Theory evolves during actual research through a “continuous interplay between analysis and data collection” (Strauss & Corbin, 2005, p. 273). This approach was originally known as the *constant comparative model* to emphasize the central feature of the analytic of the method: to develop theories from data (Glaser & Stauss, 1967). Grounded theory methodology involves “generating theory and doing social research [as] two parts of the same process” (Glasner, 1978, p.2).

In this methodology, “theory may be *generated* initially from the data, or, if existing (grounded) theories seem appropriate to the area of investigation, then these may be *elaborated* and modified as” new data is measured rigorously against the existing theories (Strauss & Corbin, 2005, p. 273). Researchers carrying out studies in the tradition of “theoretical elaboration” i.e., based on previous research, are said to use grounded theory as a methodology as long as they are involved in evaluating theory and analytical frameworks against incoming data (Vaughan, 1992).

Since the method permits the use of grounded theories to carry forward the tradition of cumulative research it follows, what theories can be considered grounded? Theories that are based on grounded research. Glaser and Stauss (1967) were cognizant of the alternative approaches to generating and elaborating theories based on ethics or economic principles. Strauss and Corbin (2005) consider public sphere to be one such theory developed through an alternative approach. Grounded theory methodology is invested in generating “concepts and
tracing their relationships” though concerted and detailed hard work (Strauss & Corbin, 2005, p. 274). Notwithstanding the ideals of this methodology on minimizing *a priori* assumptions, it has been used by researchers working within traditions such as ethnomethodology, feminism, political economy and various strands of postmodernism. Strauss and Corbin (2005) contend that these new developments do not alter the central demand of constant comparison but rather bring forth additional concepts or ideas developed by contemporary movements as *conditions* into research studies utilizing grounded theory.

The openness of grounded theorists to new developments of incorporating ideas from social and intellectual movements has led to the methodology’s interpretation in terms of a conditional matrix (Strauss & Corbin, 2005). This allows the practitioners of the grounded theory method to respond to changes in the conditions—such as ideas, technologies or new uses of space—that affect their subjects of study. The general procedure is to ask, what is the influence of globalization on the marginalization of certain social groups of people? Then we trace the relationship between globalization and marginalization as accurately as possible. Then we look at the possibilities of reverse flows, such as how the marginalized groups’ use of mediation might impact mediatized processes of globalization. Then the grounded theory procedure forces us to ask, “What is power in this situation and under specified conditions? How is it manifested, by whom, when, where, how, with what consequences (and for whom or what)?” (Strauss & Corbin, 2005, p. 276). Not asking such question impedes the development of grounded theory methodology, precluding further conceptualization and hindering unveiling the features of power. Thus by building *conditions* into our theories we subscribe to ideal versions of knowledge leaving the way open for further development of theories. Trends from discourse analysis and ethnography inform the *conditions* of this study.
Discursive conditions

In order to understand the conditions that need to be applied to the grounded approach we need to consider what discourse analysis tells us about the conditions of contemporary political economy. Stuart Hall says discourse ‘constructs the topic in a certain way’ and also limits other ways of looking at it. He further states, ‘Independence of the topic beyond the discourse can’t be verified’ (1992, p. 291). This implies that discourse is also the very way of looking, and media as a means of experiencing our environment shapes our worldview. For instance, Edward Said (1978) treats Orientalism as one such discourse that guided and regulated a whole age of literature produced in the west. Discourse analysis is not limited to reading the content. Institutions and practices that produce a certain discourse are also part of the discursive regime. This research project draws our attention to the contrasting discourses of globalization and imperialism.

Culture often comes to be associated aggressively with either nation or state, demarcating ‘us’ from ‘them’ in a xenophobic fashion. Said (1994) argues, “Culture in this sense is a source of identity” (p. xiii)–a rather combative identity marked by calls to return to tradition. In its combative avatar, identity politics calls for a return to rigorous moral codes that reject the permissiveness associated with the relatively liberal politics of multiculturalism and hybridity. In recent times, in the formerly colonized world, identity politics has taken the form of religious or nationalist fundamentalism. Culture as identity is an arena for political and ideological clashes. Said (1994) implicates education and media as he argues that, far from being a placid realm, culture is a battleground which teaches, for instance, Americans, French and Indians to be uncritical towards their own nations while simultaneously denouncing others. This view of culture is not only veneration one's own culture but also divorcing culture from the realm of
everyday. Culture as a source of identity transcends the everyday to create subjects. Colonial expansion was justified in terms of the right of the colonizer to rule over the ‘inferior races’. Colonial rule represents an active practice of othering; Said (1994) terms the consensus of colonial authorities regarding how the colonized subjects were to be treated the “departmental view” (p. 72). The departmental view suggests how the officials would react in colonial empires.

Said argues that in dealing with cultural identities we are dealing not with essentialization (although essentialization is part of its enduring appeal) but as “contrapunctal ensembles” (1994, p. 52), which positions one identity against another, as no identity can ever exist without an array of opposites or negatives. This leads into the examination of an uneasy relationship between nationalism and liberation, which are two ideals of anti-imperialist struggles. Newly independent post-colonial states have revived the idea of imagined community. While these states face many problems, intellectuals from these states, especially those who emigrated to the West, betrayed a liberationist ideal of nationalist independence. Further, these scholars found common cause with the suppressed voices of feminists, African-Americans and others.

DeLuca and Demo (2009) offer a recent example of how the changing discourses of social movements influence our interpretation of the environmental movement. They argue the change in arguments supporting environmentalism that have moved from preservationist, nationalist discourses to those that are more sensitive to the class and racial dimensions of ecological conservation. While the earlier approach saw human encroachment on the environment as a violation of its pristine purity, the present approach recognizes several sustainable ways in which communities have interacted with nature. These arguments have impacted the way environmentalism conceives itself and the kind of ends it argues for.
Ethnography of Everyday Life

Evaluator of political economy from a feminist stance call for connecting everyday moments of women’s lives with structural capitalism (Dewey, 2008; di Leonardo, 1991, 1993, 2000; Gunewardena & Kingsolver, 2007; Lamphere et al., 1997; Press & Livingstone, 2006; Riordan, 2002; Meehan, 2002). Apart from the conceptualizing linkages between everyday lives and societal structures, feminist perspectives problematize the notion of resistance. Resistance is tied not necessarily to social movements but to everyday lived experiences. Lived experiences in a consumer society are understood in terms of a myriad of possibilities ranging from oppressive capitalist intrusions to means of gratification. Ethnographic inquiry can yield insights into varying responses to the imposition of structural constraints by the process of globalization in localities like Telangana.

Van Maanen (1995) explains critical ethnography as representing a culture within a larger historical, socio-political and symbolic context. Ethnography opens up exciting possibilities as it is applied not only to writing but also to many possible multimedia realizations. Siegel and Conquergood’s (2008) documentary on gangs of Chicago is one such work that uses film as a tool for field investigation and critically analyzes the reasons for such phenomena to exist. In fact, the connection between ethnography and filmmaking is quite old. Flaherty’s Nanook of the North, made in 1922, is one such romanticized ethnography in the anthropological tradition. However, these varied examples follow the inductive approach; ethnographies are supposed to be detailed works focusing on specificities and thick descriptions.

Following Hall's influence on textual analysis and contestation, media scholars Press and Livingstone (2006) call for connecting the micro and the macro through ethnographic methods. Scholarship based in audience study perspectives is making efforts to address the issues
concerning media imperialism and political economy (Press & Livingstone, 2006). Press and Livingstone (2006) argue that the study of consumption of cultural products requires something more than textual analysis; it requires an assessment of the context of consumption. It requires the researcher to go out there and understand this process of consumption rather than merely deconstruct and reconstruct the text. This is not to discount the textual analysis. Textual analysis is a necessary step in the process, and political economy has to look at production, distribution and consumption in totality. Another overarching theme in their venture is a criticism of media-centric evaluation of audiences (Press & Livingstone, 2006). To understand audiences is to be able to contextualize their behaviour in a wider socio-political setting. An understanding of this wider history is informed by the various approaches and methods that researchers take. A contextualization of consumption, however, requires an ethnography of everyday (Press & Livingstone, 2006). Such calls for examining ethnography of everyday have found resonance in feminist epistemologies (see Alcoff & Potter, 2009).

*Data Collection Protocols*

Duration of the field visit in India was from May 26th to July 28th, 2014.

*Interviews*

Ethnographic interviews, also known as “informal conversational interviews”, occur in the course of the participant observer’s study (Patton, 1990, pp. 281-282). These are informal, spontaneous, free-wheeling conversations between the interviewer and the interviewee. The ethnographic interview does not seem like an interview to the actor; casual remarks lead to a researcher's questions of interest (Lindlof, 1995). My initial interactions with Telangana activists were due to my long-standing association with some of these actors. These interactions, especially in the past few years, have influenced my perceptions regarding the Telangana
movement and have led to more focused research questions. Ethnographic interviews, verbal exchanges, exchanges of information, arguments, and debates continued to play a role during the field visit (Goodall, 2000).

The fieldworker’s presence then offers to those (actors) in the setting a rare and perhaps gratifying opportunity to speak with some authority on subjects they know best. These are comfortable grounds, and creating situations in which such talk can occur is the essence of competent fieldwork. (Van Maanen, 1981, p.478)

The fieldworker needs to adjust to the demands of the situation and be alert to the useful information coming from the sources. Interview procedures also needed to be adapted to local culture. It is not uncommon in India for a social actor not to turn up for his/her interview. However, in such cases the interviewer needs to be persistent and give the social actor another chance or request access to another similar social actor. For instance, an interview with a politician had to be rescheduled several times due to his unavailability.

Apart from informal interviews, fieldwork comprised open-ended interviews with the explicit consent of the interviewee. In-depth interviews ranged from 30 to 50 minutes which gave me time to probe each issue in considerable detail (Holstein and Gubrium, 2011). As the respondent gets the idea of what the interviewer wants to know, information becomes easier to extract. If the respondent is reluctant, it offers the interviewer a chance to either probe further or move on to the next question (Berger, 1998). The interviewer and the respondent start with casual conversation about the topic leading to a recorded interview. Social actors engaged in the movement often prefer off-the-record conversations. Hence, the casual conversations before and after the recorded interview are also of significant value in understanding respondent perspectives. Telangana activists affiliated with various organizations such as the Telangana
Intellectual Forum, the Telangana Praja Sanghala Joint Action Committee, Telangana Vimochana Samiti, New Democracy, and the Telangana Communist Party, as well as journalists representing Telugu and English media, were interviewed. Activists associated with diasporic formations such as the Telangana Association of North America and the Telangana Development Forum were also interviewed.

Though more common in marketing research, focus group interviews are gaining popularity in academic research. Krueger and Casey (2009) argue that focus groups are better for gaining understanding about how people feel or think about an issue, product or service. Each group consists of 5 to 10 participants who are similar to each other in a way that is important to the researcher. This type of interviewing works well when participants enjoy sharing their perceptions or ideas. Focus groups are effective when people have a range of feelings about an issue, when the researcher is trying to understand differences between categories of people, and when the researcher wants ideas to emerge from the group. The women’s focus group in this research project brought out a range of feelings as respondents had differing views on separation. Focus groups can allow the researcher to take up a less dominating and directive role. The interviewer needs to be skilled, as one speaker could dominate the focus group. Though organizing focus group interviews provides logistical challenges to the researcher, this method could help triangulate information gained through other means. Telangana activists, journalists and students could be amenable to focus group interviews.

**Topic Guide:**

- Why support a Telangana State? What do you stand to gain/lose?
- Role in the separatist movement
Is there a specific caste, class, or other issue you stand for? Who will benefit in the new state?

Why did the movement gather momentum in recent times?

What could the movement mean to the marginalized classes?

Hopes, aspirations and fears regarding Telangana State

Any criticism of the movement and its leadership

How did they mobilize support for Telangana? What were the challenges?

Role of media in mobilization

Elaboration on specific media forms and their merits: pamphlets, press conferences, public meetings, TV, newspapers etc

Problems associated with media, constraints, special interests, journalistic competitions etc.

*Documentary Analysis*

Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) situate contemporary critical discourse analysis in late modernity, particularly in works of Giddens, Habermas and Harvey as well as feminist and postmodern approaches. Lisa Lowe (2007) argues that cultural discourse spans cultural artifacts and practices. Thus, a study of discourse should not be limited to a particular set of documents and should explore the power relations under which the text is generated. This argument provides a framework to interrogate power relations that could be applied to study relationship between online and offline politics, and between policy texts and their consequences. While documentary analysis cannot be the only mode of data collection, it is an important part of the triangulated scheme of data gathering.
The study of documents has implications for deciphering relevant discourses. Documents offer ways to decipher culture, process, objects and the meanings that create social reality. Our ability to read documents is based on a theoretical orientation about what is of value and the technological ability to achieve it (Altheide, 1996). In order for research to critically assess the role of media texts, both context and process are important. Context implies the social conditions under which the document was produced. Process implies that everything is under construction and subject to contestation. Context and process together contribute to the gradual emergence of meaning and interpretation. Interpretative processes are "characterized by abductive thought" where one draws "a new principle from established facts" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 243).

The process of qualitative document analysis can be understood in terms of five discrete steps:

1. Accessing Documents,
2. Collecting Data,
3. Data Coding,
4. Analyzing
5. Reporting Findings.

The Coding process involves identifying themes and frame. Themes are recurring theses; a typical thesis runs through several reports. A frame is a schematic of interpretation, a parameter or boundary, for identifying and labeling occurrences of information (Altheide, 1996). The differences between the themes and frames are analytic and determined by the researcher. In this case themes and frames were informed by wider media narratives and developed through an exhaustive literature review.
I found a range of official, unofficial, primary and secondary documents of relevance to the study during fieldwork. The Telangana issue has dominated news discourse in recent times, and under such circumstances newspaper articles assume importance for social researchers. Policy documents such as *Andhra Pradesh Government's Vision 2020* document lay out the aggressive neoliberal modernization policies. Such documents offer insights into how post-colonial state is bought in to the discourse of globalization. The contemporary changes in the land acquisition laws detailed in policy and legal documents have a direct relation with subsequent dispossessions of small peasants. Reflective biographies of administrators and politicians like K.V.R.K. Prasad and P.V. Narasimha Rao often offer insights into policy debates and practices (including corruption).

In 2010, the Federal Government constituted a committee to study the issue of Telangana and recommend solutions. The Sri Krishna committee report (2011) on the situation in Telangana provides a rich source of primary and secondary information on the state of marginalization in the region. Other historical documents dating back to the 1970s detail issues of economic and social disparity between the Telangana and Andhra regions. Telangana was a major political issue in the 2008 election to the state legislature. It has been noted that the process of elections is becoming increasingly mediatized. The manifestos of several political parties featured promises of separation before 2014. In 2014, the manifestos of parties like TRS and Congress claimed credit for separation. Grassroots organizations actively involved in the movement produced a considerable body of literature; some of them cite demographic and economic statistics and estimations to back up their arguments. The researcher would look out specific information regarding relationships that activate media and social communication in Telangana.
Documents:

Official Documents:

  (Chairperson Justice B. N. Srikrishna, members Prof. Ranbir Singh, Dr. Absaleh Shariff,
  Dr. Ravinder Kaur and Mr. V. K. Duggal)
- Andhra Pradesh Vision 2020 statement (1998), Govt of AP.
- Selected Documents on Telangana (1972)
- Report of the committee of jurists on Telangana safeguards (1969)
- Bureau of economic and statistical reports on development (yearly)
- Constitution of India http://lawmin.nic.in/coi/coiason29july08.pdf

Other Documents:

- Newspaper articles
- Statement of agenda on Telangana- Peoples Telangana Foundation
- Biographies of Politicians, Bureaucrats
- Pamphlets produced by various groups
- Hyderabad declaration in Telanganalo Samajika Prajarajyam (2010)
- Economic and Political Weekly, Special issue on Andhra Pradesh: Economic reforms and
- Indiastat.com (information on media etc)
- Private correspondence between politicians

Participant Observation

Participant observation is especially appropriate for scholarly problems when

- Little is known about the phenomenon
There are important differences between the views of insiders as opposed to outsiders.

The phenomenon is somehow obscured from the view of outsiders.

(Jorgensen, 1989, p.13)

The relationship between the Telangana movement and the media is obscured from public view. Further, witnessing the passions for and against Telangana it is amply clear that there are sharp differences between how insiders and outsiders view the movement. Participant observation and ethnography have been useful as methodologies for studying the process of news making.

Jorgensen (1989) further explains,

Participant observation is most appropriate when certain minimal conditions are present:

- The research problem is concerned with human meanings and interactions viewed from the insiders’ perspective;
- The phenomenon of investigation is observable within an everyday life situation or setting
- The researcher is able to gain access to an appropriate setting;
- The phenomenon is sufficiently limited in size and location to be studies as a case
- Study questions are appropriate for case study; and
- The research problem can be addressed by qualitative data gathered by direct observation and other means pertinent to the field setting.
Participant observation is especially appropriate for exploratory studies, descriptive studies, and studies aimed at generating theoretical interpretations. (p.13)

Participant observations provided a promising opportunity in a country known for its teashop public sphere (Ninan, 2007). It is fairly common for people who assemble for meetings, press conferences, and other gatherings to sit down and talk about their concerns regarding the Telangana movement/state. I was invited to such gatherings when in the field. This method is less intrusive as it does not always need signed consent.

**In-Process Memos**

In-process data analysis began at the same time as the fieldwork. As the researcher is collecting data s/he starts reflecting on the past events. In-process memos are "products of more sustained analytical writing and require a more extended time out from actively composing fieldnotes" (Emerson et al., 1995, p.103). In-process memos included notes and commentaries. However, a researcher writing a memo “clearly envisions outside audiences and frames his [or her] thoughts and experiences in ways likely to interest them” (p.103). In-process note taking is a conscious effort on the part of a researcher working towards data analysis.

**Coding and Categorizing**

Coding is a shorthand term that means to “label, separate, compile, and organize data. Codes range from simple, concrete, and topical categories to more general, abstract conceptual categories for an emerging theory” (Charmaz, 1983, p. 111). The second sentence conflates code and category. However, we could maintain an analytic difference between the two. The purpose of coding is to identify individual elements constituting a category (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). A category, on the other hand, helps unearth the underlying meaning behind the individual
elements. Codes have a mechanical purpose that helps the researcher sort, retrieve, link and mark data that is obtained in the field from documents, interview transcripts, audio-visual materials, fieldnotes etc. Categories can be developed deductively (etic) or inductively (emic) from either the existing theoretical concepts or emergent data. It might seem, at first instance, that grounded theory has an ethical obligation to inductive research; by recognizing conditions we now allow conceptual development of knowledge in the political economy approach. Hence, categories influenced by both cultural and economic conditions that the researcher encounters in the field can guide our interrogation of power in the Telangana region via grounded research. Emergent theory is “grounded in” the relationships between data and the categories into which they are coded.

- Categories develop through an ongoing process of comparing units of data with each other (a process known as the constant-comparative method).
- Codes, categories, and category definitions continue to change dynamically while the researcher is still in the field, with new data altering the scope and terms of the analytic framework. (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 250)

The inductive thrust of grounded theory privileges evidence and the researcher’s experience of field settings in the development of codes and categories. There are two kinds of coding—open coding and in vivo coding—in the fieldwork stage of research (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). Open coding is the initial, unrestricted coding of data by the researcher (Strauss, 1987, pp. 28-32). The goal of coding is “to open up the inquiry. Every interpretation at this point is tentative” (Strauss, 1987, p. 29). In vivo coding refers to using the coding terms of social actors to interpret their reality—as obtained during interviewing (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). In vivo coding goes together with the researcher’s open coding.
Ethical Considerations

Ruane (2005) believes that ethical considerations are the center of epistemic and methodological choices made by researchers. Institutional Review Boards were set up to help avoid damage to subjects of research. Owing to the intensity/stakes in the regional conflict, several Telangana activists could face potential threats. The researcher, following IRB guidelines, maintained the anonymity of interviewees. Activists and journalist of registered social, political and media organizations were given unique alphanumeric codes.

In a research project of this nature, it is possible that there exists important information that cannot be attributed to its original sources. In such cases alternative sources were sought to triangulate the data. Where such alternative sources could not be found the data was left out and not included in the results. Confidential reports and off-the-record conversations were triangulated with alternative sources that assert the same realities. When such information was found to be of interest, researcher posed similar question to other interviewees and looked for newspaper stories or media reports that might help confirm this information.

Reflexivity in Field Research

The literary style and the emphasis on reflexivity essential to beneficial qualitative research appeal to me, particularly for the flexibility they allow to present a more nuanced Caribbean perspective, otherwise muted…I also find the methodology’s appreciation for deep meanings of people’s everyday words, actions, and accounts both fascinating and intriguing, because while official sources and data provide a fertile terrain for the critical researcher, the everyday discourses of average citizens potentially serve as a critical oasis. (Frampton, 2014)
Previous sections discussed a triangulated approach to add rigour to the research project. Reflexivity can be explained in terms of the researcher being a *bricoleur*, a hands-on professional with multiple competencies (Levi-Strauss, 1966, p. 17), whose research project employs multiple methods and a close-knit set of practices that result in a solution to the problem in a given context (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). I agree with Denzin & Lincoln’s (1994) assessment that a *bricoleur* is adept at interviewing, observing, and interpreting historical and personal documents, uses intensive self-reflection, and possesses knowledge of many interpretative paradigms that in her/his view may not be synthesized.

The bricoleur is aware of his/her positionality and that of those in the setting in terms of class, personal history, and identity markers such as caste, gender, ethnicity, religion and region. I do not set myself up to provide value-free interpretations, but I am aware that my narratives on relations between local and global are informed by traditions and paradigms of research including Marxism and post-colonialism.

I agree with Couldry (2010) that voice is an important concern in the research on culture and politics after neoliberalism. I engaged in a dialogue to understand the local lived experiences and work to situate these realities within the processes of globalization. I sought to understand appeal and relevance of nationalist rhetoric to those on the margins. My positionality and ties with those engaged in grassroots mobilization helped in creating the trust with my respondents that is essential for a project on voice.

I had already been in India for more than a week when I received Human Subjects Review Board approval in June 2014. Then I started contacting prospective research subjects who were known to me, providing them a brief introduction of my project and requesting their participation. As I met the participants, snowballing was set in motion with participants referring
me to more participants. I went to several public meetings to record observations and to speak with people. The meetings also helped identify interviewees and focus group discussants. In some cases, due to word of mouth, participants approached me and volunteered to be subjects of the study. As this was the period when the Telangana state was formed, newspaper articles in several dailies were collected. I also collected private, government and multilateral reports on issues related to Telangana which proved to be particularly illuminating.

Coding was done through both manual and electronic means. Dedoose, a cloud based, qualitative and mixed-methods software package, was used to code and categorize the data. Codes were identified in the transcripts and other documents. These codes were categorized to aid in the emergence of themes. Categories were somewhat fluid and changed as more data was added. Through several iterations the themes in the present form emerged. Use of Dedoose was also coupled with some problems and limitations. The software started crashing when larger documents were uploaded. Hand-drawn maps and sticky notes were indispensable.

Limitations of the Study

A study of such a vast phenomenon as a major regional movement would have some limitations. This study is not invested in the study of historical discourses of Telangana. The Telangana movement has a history of over sixty years. The history of discourses of Telangana, especially in the local Telugu media, would make a formidable research project. Further, studying any fixed period in the past sixty years would yield considerable data and analysis that would be a worthy research project in itself. Often studies in history offer a wider range of sources including confidential government records, which are of value to the researcher. This study is focused on the contemporary conditions and relations in Telangana. The methods seek to answer how marginalized groups are resisting the process of globalization
Standardisation of questions and analysing findings can pose considerable difficulty. A further problem can arise in terms of getting the right number of respondents for the project, especially during the field visit (Berger, 1998, p. 55). There could be a hesitation to sign an informed consent form, which could lead to the researcher’s requests being politely declined. In these situations the researcher could continue searching for alternative interviewee. Alternative arrangements could also include phone interviews, Skype interviews, and interviewing an associate in place of the original actor. In the case of phone interviews, the consent form can be read out and the respondent will be asked if they agree to being interviewed. In this research project, all interviews were recorded and conducted face-to-face. Another factor that needs to be accounted for is that, when respondents get a sense of what the interviewer wants, they may frame the interviews favorably, leaving out conflicting details. In such cases researcher should ask questions to draw out interviewee attitude. As I interviewed editors, politicians and other social movement actors with strong convictions, in most cases, rather than leave out details, they brought in details to help me understand their perspective. The extremely busy schedules of the respondents can add more constraints.

Triangulation cannot completely do away with validation. For instance, in the last decade expatriates have been buying large swaths of land around Hyderabad City. While this process has been building up resentment in locals, it is difficult to estimate how much (capital) has been invested in such processes or how many people have been displaced due to such acquisitions. However, ethnographic interviews can bring out the details regarding such experiences. Similarly, various narration about flows of cash into media houses
CHAPTER IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Selected Biographical Portraits

Kaluavakuntla Chandrashekhar Rao (born February 17, 1954) popularly called ‘KCR’ is first and current Chief Minister of Telangana State. KCR was born in Vellama landlord community, and was rich landlord with considerable property before entering politics. He attended Arts College, Osmania University and obtained a Masters in Telugu literature. KCR started his political career as a Youth Congress leader in the 1970s and joined TDP (Telugu Desam Party) in 1983. During 1987-88, he was the Minister of Drought and Relief in Andhra Pradesh (AP). In 1996 he became the Minister of Transport of AP and served as Deputy Speaker of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly between 2000-2001. Unhappy for being repeatedly passed over by Chandrababu Naidu for a Cabinet Position, KCR quit TDP (Nag, 2011, Thirumali, 2012). With formation of 3 new states in 2001, KCR sensed an opportunity for Telangana which was the oldest demand for a separate state in India. KCR founded Telangana Rastra Samiti (TRS) in 2001 with the objective of fighting for Telangana statehood and has headed the party since its inception.

Different States in India go to elections at different times. However, the elections to Andhra Pradesh Legislature and Indian Parliament are held simultaneously. In 2004, TRS joined the Congress led United Progressive Alliance when the latter included Telangana formation in its manifesto and served in the Union Cabinet as the Minister of Labour and Employment in Delhi. In the 2004 elections, TRS won 5 seats in the Parliament and 26 seats in the AP Legislature. KCR resigned in 2006 after UPA failed to move on the Telangana issue. In 2009, KCR joined Chandrababu Naidu’s TDP led alliance and suffered an electoral set back as his party’s tally fell to 10 and 2 in Indian Parliament and AP Legislature respectively.
KCR revived the Telangana movement by starting ‘fast onto death’ hunger strike in November 2009. After 13 days of his strike, Union Cabinet announced Telangana and KCR quit his fast. Within a few weeks of the announcement, Union Cabinet reversed its stand. When Telangana was finally achieved in 2014, TRS won a 63 of the 119 Assembly seat and KCR became state’s first Chief Minister. TRS is a family controlled political party with KCR’s son, daughter and nephew holding prominent positions.

**Muddasani Kodanda Rama Reddy** popularly know as Prof. M. Kodandaram (born September 5, 1955) teaches Political Science at Osmania University. Prof. Kodandaram was a civil liberties activist with Marxist leanings in the 1980s. In the mid 1990s, as part of a wider intellectual trend, he started sympathizing with the Telangana issue and began organizing seminars under the banner of Telangana *Vidya Vantula Vedika* (Telangana Scholars Forum). Simultaneously, he is an activist on Polavaram Dam displacement issues. After the Union Government reversed its stand on Telangana on December 23, 2009, all political parties came together under the banner of Telangana Political Joint Action Committee (TJAC). Later political parties such as the Congress and the TDP left TJAC accusing it of working for TRS. Prof. Kodandaram was appointed Chairman of TJAC. Kodandaram and TJAC carried out several agitations between 2009 and 2014. Most notable among them were Million March in March, 2011; *Sagara haram* in September 2011; and *Sakala Janula Samme* (Civil Disobedience) between September and December 2011.

**Maroju Veeranna** (Jan 1, 1962- Dec 28, 1999) know as Veeranna was born in *Kansali* or blacksmith caste in rural Telangana. He joined Naxalite movement and worked in Janashakti group. The CPI (ML-Janashakti), an underground political party, was led by Rajanna with Veranna as second in command. Both Rajanna and Veranna came from modest rural backgrouds
and belonged to lower caste communities. In the mid 1990s, Veranna started arguing for inclusion of regional, social and caste based issues along with the traditional class based mobilization for the relevance of Marxist-Leninist (ML) politics. Veeranna came out of hiding while not disassociating completely with the Naxalites and started organizing tribal and caste groups, such as *Tudum Debba, Nagara Bedi, Erukala Kurru*. The first is an organization of *Koya* tribe, the second *Lambada* tribe and the third *Erukala* tribe. In 1996, Veranna played a part in forming Telangana *Jana Sabha*, a frontal organization of lower caste, tribal and naxalite groups. Telangana Jana Sabha by many accounts was a watershed moment for the separate Telangana struggle. In 1998, Veranna formed a political party, “Communist Party for the United States of India (Dalit, Bahujan, Workers liberation)” explicitly created to fight for Telangana and other smaller states. On December 28, 1999, Veranna was killed by police in an ‘encounter.’ The ‘encounter’ in India refers to extra judicial killings by police. However, the organized mobilization of lower caste and tribal groups continued and took a potent form in the form of Telangana Praja Sanghala Joint Action Committee (TPSJAC) - led by Dr. I. Thirumali- during the Telangana agitation.

*A Note on Interviews*

Interviewers 1, 3, 7, 8, 11, 12, 17 and 18 are senior news editors. Interviewees 9, 10, 19, and 21 are academic professionals active in the Telangana movement. Interviewers 5, 13 and 15 are career politicians. Interviewers 4 and 14 are grassroots activists. All interviewees except interviewee 19 are supporters of the Telangana statehood. Interviewer 3, 12, 17 and 19 were satisfied with IRB confidentiality clauses that assured them that their names would not be disclosed. All other interviewees, most of them very vocal supporters of Telangana, were taking
a stand consistent with their public positions on various issues and said they would not mind if they were quoted by their names.

Interviewees 15 and 21 are among most vocal proponents of Telangana and they made several references to themselves in course of their interviews. Other interviewees who made references to themselves, their position and organizations, included Interviewees 1, 3, 7, 8, 11, 12, 17 and 18. Interviewees were also selected to reflect caste, religious, tribal, and gender diversity in Telangana. Two media politics focus group discussions, 2 student focus group discussions, a Dalit activists’ focus group discussion and a women’s focus group discussion were conducted. Interviewees 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18 and all focus group discussants spoke in Telugu. I translated these interviews to English. I was also a participant observer at 7 different public meetings in Telangana. The analysis below is based on archival documents, newspaper articles and the interviews.

RQ1. How can Telangana nationalism be interpreted in terms of its evolving shape, form, function and imagining?

Legislative Perspective on Formation of States in India

Formation of a new state based on a popular demand is an exceptional event. To understand the success of the Telangana movement in carving out a new state, both in general and particular contexts, constitutional and partisan political opportunity structures need to be established. The Indian Constitution specifies rules under which new states may be created. Article 3 of the constitution states that parliament may by law form new states by separating of

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2 Dalit is a term preferred by some lower cast groups to self-identify themselves.
territory from any state. Article 3 also empowers the parliament to merge states, increase or
diminish territory of states and change the name of states.

Provided that no Bill for the purpose shall be introduced in either House of Parliament
except on the recommendation of the President and unless, where the proposal contained
in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has been
referred by the President to the Legislature of that State for expressing its views thereon
within such period as may be specified in the reference or within such further period as
the President may allow and the period so specified or allowed has expired (Constitution
of India, pp. 2-3).

There are several precedents to the formation of new states in India as per the stipulations
mentioned in Article 3. A major redrawing of state boundaries was taken up in the mid 1950s to
satisfy the demands coming from regional forces all across India. The States Reorganization
Committee (SRC) was instituted in 1953, and recommended creation of states on a linguistic
basis in view of multiplicity of such demands from various regions in the country. The States
Reorganization Act was passed in 1956 which reorganized several states in India including a
merger of Andhra and Telangana. A more recent instance of major state reorganization was in
2000 when three new states- Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand - were carved out of
existing states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar. Tillin (2013) has argued that these
new states are a result of ‘politics of compromise’ where competing social and political groups
gradually reach an agreement on changing state boundaries.

On December 5, 2013, Union Cabinet–the cabinet of the federal government–cleared the
Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Bill (Telangana Bill) which identified 10 districts including the
state capital Hyderabad that were to constitute a separate state of Telangana. The proposed bill
also included the provision that Hyderabad (the area comprising the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation) should serve as joint capital of Telangana and the residuary Andhra Pradesh for a period not exceeding 10 years within which Andhra Pradesh would develop an alternative capital. The bill was sent to the President of India who then sent it to the Andhra Pradesh Assembly.

Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly and Council, overriding protests from pro-Telangana members, rejected the bill on the 30th January, 2014. Union Parliament passed the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act 2014 on February 20th despite strong protests from Members of Parliament (MPs) representing constituencies in Andhra who tried to stall the proceedings.

Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Kiran Kumar Reddy, belonging to the Congress Party, resigned in a bid to protest the formation of Telangana and the state was put under President’s Rule. Elections for Telangana and Andhra Pradesh legislatures were held in April along with the elections for the national parliament. On June 2, Kaluvakuntla Chandrashekar Rao (KCR), leader of Telangana Rastra Samiti (TRS) was sworn in as the first Chief Minister (CM) of Telangana State. The ruling party, TRS, won 63 out of 119 seats in the Telangana Legislative Assembly.

The Telangana Bill ignited a debate on the nature and purpose of Indian federalism. Celebrations in Telangana followed even as some politicians and lawyers wanted to move the Supreme Court against the creation of the new state. Constitutional experts argued that the Union power to redraw State boundaries unfettered by constitutional restraints allows the flexibility to create suitable state-nation arrangements and that this has sustained Indian federalism. An editorial in *The Hindu* argued:
this constitutional question sits at the fault lines of two conflicting constitutional impulses on federalism in India: first, the imperative of crafting an accommodating state-nation and second, to guard against the excesses of venal partisan federalism. On balance, I conclude that the absence of a State Assembly resolution is not a constitutional barrier to the creation of Telangana. We must preserve the Union power to redraw State boundaries unfettered by new constitutional restraints, imposed either by the President or the Supreme Court, as the flexibility to create suitable state-nation arrangements has sustained Indian federalism and political unity. (Krishnaswamy, 2014)

There is no precedent for creating a state without the concurrence of the State Assembly. As is clear from the Article 3 of the constitution, the absence of a State Assembly resolution is not a constitutional barrier to the creation of Telangana. The current interpretation of Article 3 and the legislative processes points to the uniqueness of the case of Telangana State, which needs to be analysed both in terms of political context and political opportunity afforded by partisan politics.

The Indian government appointed a committee of experts, led by Justice Srikrishna, to look into the demand for separate Telangana in February 2010. This committee was called The Committee for Consultations on Situation in Andhra Pradesh or Srikrishna Committe. The Srikrishna Committee Report advanced several ambiguous suggestions as solutions to the Telangana issue. The report was widely criticized by pro-Telangana activists and politicians. However, the Srikrishna Committee Report did perceive the political demand for a Telangana state as legitimate due to the persistent underdevelopment of the region. The Gentlemen’s Agreement settled in 1956 devised statutory means to eliminate under-representation and underdevelopment in the Telangana region (Krishnaswamy, 2014). Article 371-D was introduced in 1973 to formalise the Six-Point Formula through a non-territorial asymmetric arrangement to
reserve jobs and educational opportunities to people from the region (Krishnaswamy, 2014).
Along with employment, the report examines the situation with regards to irrigation, electricity generation and education. It concludes that the failure of structural arrangements to address underdevelopment, unique demography and cultural yearning for independent identity led to the present demand for a new State.

One of the options mentioned in the report was maintaining the status quo of a unified state by treating the movement as a law and order problem “to be handled by the state government, not requiring any major intervention by the Union Government.” (2010, p.452). To its credit, the movement was largely peaceful. Interviewees 1, 7, 15, 18 and 21 asserted the non-violent nature of the movement. Interviewee 15 said, “It was most peaceful movement we had ever seen. Because, I had seen 69 movement. Not a single bullet was fired, no curfew was imposed, not in one but 10 districts.” This is one of the key changes in the Telangana nationalism as it evolved from the scars of 1969. To their credit various groups across the political spectrum committed themselves to non-violent agitational techniques. Srikrishna Committee further argues that this approach could work:

“[B]ased on the history of the last 54 years when the demand for a separate state of Telangana was dealt with mainly in a political manner by accommodating different interest goups in the government and the party structure. At the same time, it is noticed that the emotional appeal of ‘Telugu Pride’ was invoked to keep separatist sentiments in check with the result that the demand for Telangana subsided but did not entirely disappear” (Srikrishna Committee Report, 2010, p.452).

The strategies of political accommodation coupled with emotional appeals to Telugu pride failed to curb the movement. As I shall analyze in subsequent sections, the Telangana movement
caused a split between Telangana and Andhra that reverberated across party lines and impacted the highest echelons of power in the state. It became untelanble for representatives from Telangana to disagree with the goals of the movement and agree to maintain status quo.

In addition to responding to popular demand, the creation of a new state caters to regional and/or national level political interest groups. For instance, with linguistic State reorganization in the early decades of independence, based on the principle of linguistic nationalism, there is no doubt that several regional party formations benefited from this process: the Dravidian parties in Tamil Nadu, the Shiv Sena in Maharastra, and the Akali parties benefited from the creation of a Sikh majority Punjab.

While the constitution is ambiguous, the states in India were reorganized on the basis of consensus between union and state governments. The deviation from the consensual interpretation of Article 3, towards a more literal interpretation of the same, calls to attention the role of political parties in passing the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act. Louise Tillin’s (2013) analysis of post-linguistic state formations in India shows that, in 2000, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s political interests were critical to its ‘small States’ agenda that led to the formation of the States of Uttaranchal (now Uttarakhand), Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. So, invariably States have emerged from popular demands for autonomy anchored by political parties which motivate (and hope to benefit from) the creation of new States.

**Political/Partisan Considerations**

Interviewees 1, 2, 5, 15, 17, 19, 20 and 21 highlighted the role of political parties in the creation of Telangana. Interviewees 1, 2, 15, 17, 19 and 21 specifically analyzed the role of TRS in the creation of Telangana. Interviewer 15, a senior parliamentarian, argues that formation of three new states functioned as a catalyst to reviving the demand for Telangana.
**KK15:** When Deve Gowda announced 3 states, at that time we were all in Congress.

Immediately some 46 Congress leaders, Chukka Rama Rao was alive, Baga Reddy, Jagan, Mrs Pulla Reddy, Venkataswamy all gathered in my house, they said what is happening? Telangana is the oldest demand. All of us had taken part in 69. We went to Advani, Vajpayee. Later Sonia Gandhi.

Announcement of the 3 new states came in 1997 three years before their actual creation. According to interviewer 15, many of his contemporary politicians were involved in the 1969 Telangana movement as student leaders. They met BJP and Congress leaders to talk about Telangana. The national leaders were not inclined to hear them out. L. K. Advani (BJP) was lukewarm in his response as TDP was BJP’s alliance partner at that time. Sonia Gandhi did not understand and retorted, “you will want 600 states”.

**KK15:** TRS had first public meeting of a lac (100,000) or two. It really gave a boost to our campaign. There was only two parties, NDA and Congress. Immediately, Congress high command woke up to the needs. There was also an overwhelming response to TRS from people. It got lot of publicity in press.

KCR’s first public meeting drew a massive crowd that alerted regional and national political parties. However, after the failure of Telangana Praja Samiti (TPS) to sustain itself after the 1969 agitation, there were many in Telangana who doubted TRS would last long enough to contribute towards separation. Moreover, there were other political entities that had emerged in the time between TPS and TRS to fight for the cause of statehood. Interviewer 1, a former news editor, analyzed the survival of TRS as an independent political entity for over a decade.

**RM1:** When KCR started the party we thought he will carry it for one or two years and give up. And he will be co-opted by either TDP or Congress and he will not stay in the
game. But, so it happened that both congress and TDP have given him support and made him stronger by their association with him. In 2004, Congress associated with him and in 2009 TDP and they gave him legitimacy. They gave legitimacy to the movement and this leader KCR.

A complex set of factors, including electoral alliances played a role in KCR’s political survival. The TRS allied with different parties at different points of time that offered to support a state for Telangana. TRS was part of the Congress led alliance. The Congress manifesto at that time included a promise to work for consensus on the Telangana issue, “the Congress Party notes that there are many valid reasons for formation of separate States in Vidarbha and Telangana” and promised to constitute another States Reorganization Commission (p.19, 2004). TRS won 26 seats in the Assembly and 6 in the parliament. KCR became a Cabinet Minister of Shipping at the center, which he later quit as he grew dissatisfied with the lack of progress over Telangana.

KK15: On February 10, Rajashekhar Reddy gave a statement that an all party consensus needs to be developed on Telangana. This was a face saving device. And we went to the 2009 elections he was confident Rajashekhar Reddy, I was not but he went alone and won the election. KCR was supposed to join us, but he deceived me, I went to meet him and he agreed. Jayashankar came... we were in Delhi... he agreed to us and had a tie up with TDP whatever reason I was crestfallen, but not YS Rajashekhar Reddy.

KCR’s political fortunes took a downturn after the 2009 elections. TRS had 26 legislators and 5 parliamentarins, after the election it had 10 legislators and 2 parliamentarians. The incumbent Congress Party CM YS Rajashekhar Reddy won a second term with a slender majority and without TRS as an ally. Out of the 119 seats in the Assembly from Telangana TRS
won 11, it’s lowest since the party’s inception. Nine months after his re-election, Reddy died in a helicopter crash in September 2009.

RM1: Had Rajashekar Reddy not died in accident, copter accident perhaps he would have nullified this movement, purchased people. He made all arrangements for the funeral of TRS but it so happened his funeral had to be conducted. After his death TRS mobilized more people, the Congress also could not stop its leaders in the districts from associating with TRS.

On Nov 28, 2010, KCR began an indefinite fast demanding Telangana. On December 9th, amidst reports that KCR’s health was deteriorating, Home Minister of India, Chidambaram announced “the process of formation of Telangana state would be initiated” (official statement). A student’s account of KCR’s fast is provided in section 3. Wikileaks released US Ambassador Timothy Roemer’s email to the State Department. Roemer offers this explanation:

Contacts tell us that also at play behind the scenes was an intense battle for the top spot in the state government between the incumbent chief minister, K. Rosaiah, and his rival Y S Rajasekhara Reddy’s son. The latter, not unhappy that Rao’s fast was creating discomfort for his rival, has encouraged the split within the party on the Telangana issue.

(“Wikileaks”, 2011)

Following YS Rajashekhara Reddy’s death, Rosaiah was appointed the new CM of Andhra Pradesh despite opposition from Reddy’s loyalists who wanted his son Jagan Mohan Reddy to be elevated to the position. Roemer calls KCR “politically desperate has-been regional politician” and criticizes Congress for “abruptly caving” in to his demands. KCR’s hunger strike split the Congress party (and also the TDP) on regional lines with those from Telangana supporting KCR’s demand.
Interviewee 15 who was also a member of ruling Congress Party expressed his surprise at the decision: “He (Rahul Gandhi) went beyond our expectations and virtually announced Telangana. Everyone was happy.” However, owing to pressure from Andhra MP’s Central Government reversed its stand on December 23rd, 2009.

In March 2011, Jagan Mohan Reddy launched his own party- the YSR Congress Party (YSRCP). Many Andhra Congress Party leaders started moving over to YSRCP. The Congress Party wanted compensate for the loss of influence in Andhra and to regain influence in Telangana. The Congress Working Committee passed a resolution on July 30, 2013 asking government to bring forth the Telangana bill. While KCR had promised to join the Congress if it helped create Telangana, Congress expected at least a winning alliance with the TRS.

Interviewees 5 and 16 also gave the credit for Telangana formation to Sonia Gandhi. Interviewee 16 said, “despite many parliamentary hurdles she was firm and saw the bill through”. Interviewee 16 is of the opinion that, “the credit does not go to Congress Party but it goes to Sonia Gandhi”. Explaining reasons for Congress Party’s failure to win in 2014 elections he said, “The local leaders could not communicate to the people here.”

Interviewee 15 puts forth a popular perception that Congress would not benefit, saying, “Congress may have given it but after 1200 people committed suicide. For 12 years we fought them, people are not going to vote for them for giving the state”. Interviewees 15, 19, and 21 see the TRS as a the only option. Explaining TRS victory in the elections, interviewer 15 says, “Others who criticized KCR, there was no alternative. Alternative is not Congress, alternative is not TDP which is an Andhra party.”

BJP’s support was also crucial for the passage of Telangana Bill in the parliament. The BJP is not a major player in politics of Telangana or Andhra Pradesh which until 2014 election
were dominated by Congress and the TDP. During the formation of 3 new states in 2000, BJP announced its support for the small states agenda. According to its view, smaller states are seen as being more efficient. In an interview with a senior editor of a national daily the issue of the future course of state formation was discussed.

Sumanth: Now, this state is violating the linguistic state principle. There are other demands like Vidarbha, Bundhelkhand, There are some indications that UP will be divided into three new states. So, what might be a new basis for creating a State?

KN17: There is no basis, it is created on the basis of demands. If Narendra Modi is going to be there he is going to create more states...he is a one man rule…so a great idea for one man Prime Minister is to break states so that you don't have powerful Chief Ministers. So, instead of 30 CMs if there are 50 CMs each of them will not be powerful so from his perspective he will try to break. But, from the perspective of big business which he is also represented (representing), they want unified markets, they don't want small states. So they have to deal with lesser (fewer) authorities lesser number of authorities.

The future of state formation in India will be based on competing pulls from regional groups, political parties that want to win over such regional groups and market pressures. The next section will explore the relations between dominant castes and political parties.

*Dominant Castes and Nationalism*

BBN10: See the national history of India. Brahmins used national movement to establish themselves as political powers. And particularly in the south, the sudra upper castes in Andhra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, used subnationalism to establish themselves as political classes. Okay, in Andhra; Reddys and Kammas, Karnataka: Vokkaliga, Lingayat, and Gowda, down south Nayars, in Tamil Nadu Chettiyars and other people.
Formation of states has empowered certain caste groups in various regions of India. With Telangana the dominant caste groups from Andhra became rulers of this region. Further, some of these dominant caste groups are not seen as native to Telangana. Interviewee 15 reiterates an argument popular among pro-Telangana activists that these caste groups did not integrate into Telangana society and remained aloof.

KK15: We have all the castes, in Telangana we have all the castes except two. One is Kammas, (the other caste) we don’t have (is) Rajus...(these) Two castes we don’t have. Whenever there is a developmental patch, Kammas come here. They are very enterprising people. The have come here, settled down but did not blend with milieu, identify with milieu.

Table 2: Chief Ministers/Ministers of Andhra Pradesh from 1956 to 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chief Ministers</th>
<th>Deputy Chief Ministers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Telangana</td>
<td>Rayalaseema</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>10.6 Y</td>
<td>23.9 Years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As noted in a previous section linguistic states brought regional parties into prominence. This process is also tied to regional dominant castes. First Chief Ministers of Andhra and Hyderabad states were both Brahmins. The successor state Andhra Pradesh has had 16 Chief Ministers between 1956 and 2014. Of the 16, 13 were from Congress, 7 of whom were from the Reddy caste. The TDP made up the other 3, all from Kamma caste. From 1982 to 2014, the Chief Ministership remained between the Reddy and Kamma castes, with the sole exception of Rosaiah
who held the post for 9 months between 2009-2010. Further, since 1982, all CMs were Andhra upper castes.

Caste based associations (Sanghams) have played an important role in promoting caste based political parties. KCR’s Vellam community is a landlord (Dora in Telugu) community like the Reddys. In the 1990s, KCR’s attempts to advance in TDP were frustrated by the then CM Naidu. Unable to secure cabinet position, KCR left the TDP (Nag, 2011). According to Interviewee 2, in 2000, Vellama Sangham “had a meeting in ITMR and helped KCR in forming the party.”

These caste based competitions have a role in Diasporic politics. Various caste groups assert themselves both within and outside the territory of the nation-state based on caste or regional affiliations. Homeland politics has an impact on the politics of diasporic associations. This has been evidenced by fragmentation of Telugu diasporic associations based in the United States.

GS2: After going there the differences in communities emerged because, in 1969 to the agitations the seeds of discord were sown. The seeds of Telangana and Andhra. After that people like Hanumantha Reddy went to US…they wanted to dominate…why should Kammas be allowed to dominate. So this difference of opinion developed.

Sumanth: So, was Hanumanta Reddy from Telangana?

GS2: He is not the only one, Bylam Malla Reddy, Pinnapreddy Srinivas Reddy, there was male gynecologist, and some other doctors, they said we can’t stand their domination let us separate from TANA and then they formed ATA

Interviewee 2 narrates the schism in Telugu associations in North America owing to various factors including caste and regional politics back home. The Telugu Association of North
America (TANA), formed in 1970, was the first diasporic group in the USA. Unhappy with Kamma domination of TANA, Reddys formed American Telugu Association in 1990. The North American Telugu Association (NATA) is the latest diasporic association that was formed in 2013. As the various Telugu diasporic associations were led by Andhras, Telangana Development Forum (TDF) was formed in 1999 to articulate separate Telangana culture. In 2007, the Telangana Non-Resident Indian Association (TeNA) was formed to counter the Reddy dominated TDF. However, in the recent past with reignited Telangana nationalism, the differences between TDF and TeNA reduced and the two are now characterized by overlapping membership.

**Agrarian Crisis in Telangana**

To understand the transformations in the imagining of Telangana, such imagining should be situated in political, economic, social and cultural contexts. This section will draw from the Srikrishna Committee report to highlight some of the economic reasons driving the movement. A broader theoretical development of Telangana nationalism in its post colonial and global context will be pursued under research question 4.

The Srikrishna Committee was constituted in 2010 by the Government of India to examine the Telangana issue and suggest pathways to its resolution. The imagining of Telangana nationalism has been constructed on the basis of its differences from Andhra, and the perceived neglect suffered at the hands of rulers from Andhra. This section will assess some areas where differences have been pronounced and central to the vision of a separate Telangana. The Srikrishna Committee Report was submitted to the government in December 2010. The report was based on data collected from the three regions of the former Andhra Pradesh: Telangana,
Rayalaseema and coastal Andhra. Rayalaseema and coastal Andhra are generally referred to as either Andhra or Seemandhra.

The census of 2011 found that Telangana has a population of 35 million and Andhra 50 million. The arguments of discrimination are centered around sharing of resources like water, power and jobs. Irrigation is a glaring source of contrast, with Andhra historically being driven by canal irrigation and Telanga by tank irrigation. Both canals and tanks were constructed by public funds and are accessible to farmers without additional expenditure. In recent times, with introduction of cash crops and falling water tables, there has been an increase in private bore wells.

Two thirds of irrigated area in coastal Andhra was through canals at the time of reorganization, whereas, it was only 16% in Telangana and 19% in Rayalaseema. A cause of concern is that surface water irrigation through tanks has declined significantly from over 64% in 1955-56 to just 12 % in 2008-09 in Telangana. (Sri Krishna Committee Report, 2010, p.89)

Andhra’s irrigation pattern continues to be dominated by canals with around 60% share, though in the recent times there has been an increase in bore wells (Sri Krishna Committee Report, 2010). In the case of Telangana predominance of Tank irrigation has been replaced by bore wells which today constitute 75% of all irrigation in Telangana (Sri Krishna Committee Report, 2010). Unlike Canal or Tank irrigation, the power intensive bore well irrigation requires significant investments in terms of electricity consumption (Table 3).
Table 3: Irrigation under Bore Wells (2009-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No of Bore Wells</th>
<th>Irrigated area (In Acres)</th>
<th>Electricity consumption (MUs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seema-Andhra*</td>
<td>1,114,000</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
<td>7,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telangana</td>
<td>1,567,000</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
<td>10,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: APtransco/APgenco Cited in Srikrishna Committee Report, 2010, p.236

Changes in irrigation patterns, (un)availability of power, migration towards cash crops and high interest microfinance schemes have impacted the farmers of Telangana.

But, what is revealing is the fact that considerably larger proportions have reported themselves as agricultural laborers in Telangana which has increased from 38% to 47%, and in Rayalaseema this share has increased from 24% to 39%. In coastal Andhra region, the share of agricultural labor has increased only by about one percent. (p.101)

These statistics indicate increasing dispossession of farmers in Telangana. The move from being farmers to agricultural laborers (or even migrant laborers) has resulted in an agrarian crisis. Farmers who had moved to power and water intensive cash crop cultivation were particularly hit hard by mounting debt burden due to high input cost, “between May 2004 and November 2005, Telangana reported 663 suicides while Rayalaseema reported 231 and coastal Andhra stood at 174” (p. 366). As shown in the following table land inequality was rising in Telangana.
While the Srikrishna Committee Report does not specifically recommend formation of a separate state, or for that matter even argue that there is any neglect of the region by the AP state government, for many involved in the Telangana movement these symptoms were just some signs of Andhra ruling class apathy. Their list of grievances grew much longer when extended to include a range of issues from employment and education to language and the media.

**Articulation of Social Justice**

Caste based social justice mobilizations have been altering the political landscape in India. The demand for a new state is intimately tied up with the politics of marginal caste and tribal groups. A more complete discussion of politics of marginal communities will be taken up in the answer for Research Question 4. The Chairman of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, B.R. Ambedkar, was a known proponent of small states. Ambedkar argued that smaller states would empower marginalized caste groups in society and provide efficient administration (Small States Message-Dr. Ambedkar, 2012). Interviewers 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 18 predict that the
Telangana state will be led by lower-castes in the future. KCR had consistently promised since the formation of TRS and in the run up to the elections to the new state that he would not be the chief minister but would ‘make’ a Dalit (castes listed as Scheduled Caste) the Chief Minister and Muslim Deputy Chief Minister.

Sumanth: So, what kind of opportunities do you see in the new state for marginal communities?

Participant1: I see a huge opportunity. Like already Reddys have been marginalized in Telangana as well as Andhra. It is only time factor likewise Vellamas. He is showing no sign of improvement. Doraism! He has taken 3 of his family members, 5 of his chamchas (dependent followers). 2 chamchas for Deputy Chief Ministers and 3 Chamchas.

Participant2: Even giving 2 deputy CM, he need not give. That means they are an important force and they have to be accommodated.

Participant1: Yes, its like window dressing. But the fact is that both Andhra and Telangana have accepted the fact that SC\(^3\)s, and (O)BC\(^4\)s and Muslims are important. (Media Politics Focus Group 2)

The Telangana movement has been noted for participation by marginalized sections of the society. Interviewee 8 said, “If you ask me, why we got Telangana its only because of SCs, BCs and minorities and ST\(^5\)s. If you take these 1100-1200 boys, who committed suicide, I think 95% of them are from that background.” Telangana agitation saw suicides and self-immolations by

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\(^3\) Castes listed in Constitution as Scheduled Castes
\(^4\) Castes listed in Constitution as Socially and Educationally Backward Classes also called Other Backward Classes (OBC) or just Backward Classes (BC)
\(^5\) Tribes listed under Scheduled Tribe category in the Constitution.
young students as protests in support of a state. The first such incident occurred on Nov 28th, 2009 when KCR sat on hunger strike.

KN 17: So, I also realized that movement for Telangana was not just a movement for Telangana but also a OBC movement, because OBCs also wanted power, which had already happened in north India but has not happened here. So, I was of the opinion that if Mr. Chiranjeevi had been successful with his *Praja Rajyam*, if the *Praja Rajyam* would have been successful, this Telangana (movement) would not have happened.

Chiranjeevi is a popular movie star who started a political party called the *Praja Rajyam*. This party adopted the term *samajika* Telangana (social justice for Telangana). Interviewee 17 says, “Ultimately, as he called it samajika Telangana will happen. It will take time, it won’t happen in one time automatically.” However, he also qualifies his argument saying some of the lower caste leaders are not very different from Reddys. “For instance, Madhu Yaski Gowd their economic interests and other interests are very much the same as the Reddys. This is what happens when a lower caste leader comes (up) his economic interest resembles that of the upper caste fellows.”

Interviewees 8, 10 and 17 question if the current TRS leadership has inclusive vision that empowers the downtrodden. In interviewee 17’s words “Of course these are early days they are grappling with issues but does the leadership of Telangana have this vision we don’t know.”

RQ2. *What are the political, economic and cultural implications of the Telangana movement for media and vice versa?*

Interviewees 2, 7 and 15 traced the evolution of Telangana nationalism especially since 1969. Three broad factors emerged to differentiate present agitations from those of 1969 - participation, media and violence. The present movement extended beyond students and government employees in urban areas to include rural sections of the society. Multiplicity of
Media especially 24 hour TV news was another major change that effected coverage of the movement. The third, as claimed by interviewee testimonial in a previous section, is that compared to 1969 there were fewer, or perhaps no, instances of violence directed towards Andhras. In this section we analyze firstly the role of media in the Telangana movement.

Ownership and Control of Andhra Media

The literature review has shown that expansion of the language press in India, especially in the case of the Telugu press, helped foreground local issues and grievances. This process has had an impact on Telangana movements. Interviewees 3, 6, 11, 12 and 18 are now in senior editorial positions and started their careers as journalist in Andhra news media. Interviewees 3 and 7 explain that Andhra media expanded to Hyderabad.

AN7: Telangana movement lacked media, and Seemandhra media is present here.

Basically, Vijaywada based media expanded to Hyderabad and Telangana like *Andhra Jyoti, Andhra Prabha, Andhra Patrika*. Telangana media last existed in the time of Suravaram Pratap Reddy.

Interviewee 7 refers to the *Golconda Patrika*, a biweekly journal, started by Suravaram Pratap Reddy in 1926 to promote Telugu language at a time when it was not an official language under Nizam of Hyderabad. Andhra media expanded to Hyderabad after the merger of Andhra State with Hyderabad State. Tables 5 and 6 show the ownership pattern of newspapers and TV channels in Andhra Pradesh before 2009. Interviewees 7 and 18 highlighted the caste and regional character of the Telugu news media. Interviewee 7 said, “Media’s character was that it promoted a dialect from two-and-half districts.”

**PY18:** All the newspapers are Kamma Newspapers. There is no multiplicity but monopoly of one cast and one region, Krishna and Guntur, two districts without exceptions.
Table 4: Newspaper Ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Owners Caste</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Owners Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eenadu</td>
<td>Kamma</td>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>Seemandhra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saakshi</td>
<td>Reddy</td>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>Seemandhra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaarta</td>
<td>Marwari</td>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>Telangana (Gujarati)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Jyoti</td>
<td>Kamma</td>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>Seemandhra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andhraprabha</td>
<td>Vysya</td>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>Seemandhra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surya</td>
<td>BC (Palinati Vellama)</td>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>Seemandhra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praja Shakti</td>
<td>Reddy</td>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>Seemandhra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vishalandhra</td>
<td>Reddy</td>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>Seemandhra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deccan Chronicle</td>
<td>Reddy</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Seemandhra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hindu</td>
<td>Brahmin</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Tamil Nadu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times of India</td>
<td>Marwari</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>North Indian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siyasat</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>Telangana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: News Channel Ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TV Channel</th>
<th>Owner’s Caste</th>
<th>Owners Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ETV (Eenadu</td>
<td>Kamma</td>
<td>Seemandhra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV9</td>
<td>Kamma/Raju/Reddy</td>
<td>Seemandhra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gemini</td>
<td>Kamma</td>
<td>Seemandhra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTV</td>
<td>Kamma</td>
<td>Seemandhra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV5</td>
<td>Kamma</td>
<td>Seemandhra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maa TV</td>
<td>Raju/Kapu/Kamma</td>
<td>Seemandhra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Simhadri, 2008- last column added)

Working Conditions of Journalists before 2009

As noted in the literature review, in the quest for greater circulations, the Telugu newspapers started producing district tabloids. Interviewee 3, and 18 explained that this was an innovation of the Telugu language newspapers like *Udayam* and later *Eenadu* that spread across the language press in India. Interviewee 12, an editor with a TV channel, started his career as a newspaper journalist.

AR12: After that I shifted to *Eenadu*, (19)89 there was tabloid journalism. They brought out district tabloids.

Sumanth: District Editions?
AR12: Not editions, tabloid, this page here. In the main paper district edition would have one page. To increase district coverage, they introduced tabloids. I joined as Eenadu rural mandal reporter. (Translated from Telugu)

Unlike district editions which have one page dedicated to local news, these district editions were tabloids attached to the regular newspaper. The newspaper was set by editors in Hyderabad, local editors published the district tabloid. The tabloid is put inside the newspaper and are sold together.

Journalists working in the Andhra owned press faced caste and regional biases. Interviewees 3 and 12 reflected on the asymmetric power relations involved in working for the Andhra owned press. Interviewer 3 said that though he was not very aware of discrimination back then he would get questions like “why we should not project Yadagiri Gutta like Tirupati?”

Yadagiri Gutta is a pilgrimage center in Telangana and Tirupati a pilgrimage center in Andhra.

KS3: In 1986, there were very few people from Telangana in Andhra. 3 or 4 people all from Andhra. They don’t know names of places in Telangana. They always used to spell wrongly. They also used to make fun of us. How is this Laxmanchanda, Narayakate, Biknoor what sort of names are all these? By that time we knew all names from Andhra.

Working in Andhra dominated work places posed distinct problems and pressure to blend in for those who were natives of rural Telangana. Interviewee 12 said, “I joined as Eenadu rural mandal reporter. Then what ever I spoke people around me could understand”. Later he moved to Hyderabad desk which was dominated by people from Andhra, “I had 2-3 friends, names are

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6 Mandal is an administrative division that falls in between village and district. From bottom up the hierarchy of administrative division with in Andhra Pradesh State is the following: Village, Mandal, District and State.
irrelevant. They used to say your copy is good but you talk like a villager, Why?” Like interviewee 3, interviewee 12 did not see it as a problem, “I saw how they speak and I had to learn. I used to read Hyderabad bureau copies with care. I thought I was being a good learner.” Interviewee 12 also explains that caste was an element of discrimination.

AR12: Then I moved to Andhraprabha as a district editor, when I got an offer. I was in Karimnagar (In Telangana). Most editors there were Brahmins (from Andhra). They would only recruit the Brahmins. They would touch your shoulder if they find the thread they will take you as a Brahmin. That is how they recruited. They thought I was a Brahmin.

(Translated from Telugu)

Interviewee is referring to janeu/janjam, a sacred thread that Brahmins wear around their shoulders. Interviewee 12 belongs to a lower caste which also has the tradition of wearing the sacred thread. As he tried hard to blend in and not reveal his real identity he was privy to some private conversations that were aggressive and racist. He narrated an incident where one of his colleagues asked him referring to employees of the paper from Telangana, “these b****** don’t know how to speak, don’t know what to eat, Sir how can we run a paper employing these people?” Recollecting such incidents Interviewee 12 said, “This is how they spoke, I suffered there.”

Political Economy of Media in Telangana

The literature review has explored the area of journalistic ethics. Ethics of western style objectivity and balance in mainstream journalism were contrasted with the tradition of activist journalism. Interviewees 1, 3, 7, 11, 12 and 18 revealed various variations of journalistic ethics. Journalists were aware of the structural limitations of working in commercial news media. Interviewee 18 said, “Journalist’s role is limited…Journalists don’t have the freedom to write.”
Quoting Chalapati Rao, editor of the *National Herald* between 1946-78, established by Jawaharlal Nehru, he said, “freedom of press is freedom of owners of printing machines.” He further explained the nature of capital that was driving news media.

PY18: Land mafia is running newspapers, not just Telugu press all over the nation.

Ramnath Goenka- it was called jute press, Sanghi textile press. Chit fund press like Ramoji Rao. The common interest amongst all of them is that they are land mafia. Even Surya press, he occupied lands, Sakshi–Jagan is a land occupier. Sanghi–Varta occupied lands. Ramoji Rao- Eenadu occupied 3000 acres to build film city. Land mafia thrives by supporting whoever is in the government and protects them. They make a mountain out of a molehill if there is an enemy. They will hide mountains for friends.

Following the onset of globalization there has been a rapid growth of the private sector. The growth in private wealth came through the sale of public sector companies. Interviewee 18 quotes Joseph Stiglitz, “privatization is corruption.” He said, “Chandrababu Naidu and later Rajashekhar Reddy pursued aggressive land acquisition policies”. Interviewee 18 said, “Telangana suffered kleptocracy rule by thieves. Chandrababu and later Rajashekher Reddy, latter bigger thief than former”. Chandrababu Naidu de-industrialized Telangana, “He sold Alwyn, HMT, Piaggio PL 170 scooters manufactured by Alwyn company were sold. Republic Forge, IDL, IDPL…” During this period “Industries set up by Nizam, in Jeedematla, Uppal, Azamabad were sold in the name of downsizing and rightsizing.” In a telling example Nizam Sugar Mill was sold by imposing a curfew.

PY18: In Nizamabad, in Bodhan sold to the Gokaraju Rangaraju company was the worlds largest sugar making company. It had 32000 acers of sugarcane field, its own agricultural land. No sugar factory has so much own lands (sic). It is worth 32000 crores, at 10 lacs
worth\textsuperscript{7}. Swiss challenge method, a bogus method was put forth. Shashank Goel now in Delhi, AP resident commissioner, he did what Chandrababu told. I44 section was imposed, curfew, nobody was allowed to take part only one company Gokaraju Rangaraju…he has built an engineering college here. It was estimated at 169 crore, and he paid 10 crores. The rest 159 crore he raised by selling machines in the industry. This means the assets were shared… Some local leaders of Congress, Chandrababu, Bapiraju, Gokaraju they ate all the money.

Interviewee 7, 11 and 18 lament the failure of the Andhra owned press to report on corruption, deteriorating conditions of rural areas and growing dissent among people during the 1990s and 2000s. Interviewee 18 said, “No, nothing. Even if we gave a press statement they would not publish.” Explaining the reason for such silence he says, “Biggest advertiser is state government or central government not private. So, if they have to survive he (Naidu) has to advertise. Even if one negative question was asked in press conference editor would freak out.”

\textit{Regional Split in the Telugu Media}

The previous sections explored personal and professional issues related to the working conditions in Andhra owned media. This section will explore examples of organized and individual efforts to challenge the status quo within media houses. A schism emerged on regional lines during student agitations in 2009-10 coinciding with KCR’s fast. The schism impacted politics as well as media. Politicians were split along regional lines across parties. Congress and TDP legislators from Telangana started demanding a separate state. A friend who works for the Times of India told me that journalists and editors were divided on regional lines. During this

\textsuperscript{7} At Rs 10 lacs per acre 32000 acres would cost Rs. 3200 crores and not 32000 crores as the interviewee suggested.
phase of Telangana agitations, Telangana journalist were very active and after Home Minister Chidambaram’s December 9th statement Andhra journalists became active as reports of United Andhra movement started coming from Andhra.

AN7: December 2009 was crucial. Conflicts came out in the open; there was schism. There was space until then in the media. 2009 was important; KCR was not very committed in fact, (neither was) his health in a very bad shape. Srikantachari’s suicide and students’ movement were some factors, anyways then the December 9 statement came. Andhra media’s behavior changed. Until then they wanted to increase circulation. Now, their original character was revealed. I was deputy editor of Andhrrajyoti. Media became anti-movement.

The Andhra media misinterpreted TRS’s decline in 2008 as the absence of Telangana ‘sentiment’. Interviewee 7 said, “Due to his (KCR) weakness he lost in election. Then media started saying there is no movement. But, the movement has spread into people.” Andhra media was taken aback by the protest and later by the December 9 announcement on starting the Telangana formation process. Interviewees 3, 7, 11 and 12 were working in Andhra owned media in 2009 when the Telangana announcement was made. Interviewee 11 provides the following account of an instance of newsroom conflicts:

K11: I was in TV9, it was in Feb 2011. Police went to girls’ hostel and misbehaved. Girls brought out a rally in the evening at 7:30. Male police stopped them and lathichared8. Then we went as reporters to prevent the lathicharge. That means we put it on live TV. So police stopped, because it was being telecast. Then my editor asked me to go away on pcr and

8 Lathicharge is beating with cane. This is a method police use to disperse protestors.
stop the broadcast. I did not stop the broadcast, it was live for an hour. They told me I was provoking. I was moved to a different beat.

In India, as per the law, only women police can arrest (or lathicharge) girls. Interviewee 11 used his position as a journalist to intervene in a situation, he said “when my region is being discriminated against I will be biased towards it.” Journalists used their positions as journalists for pro-Telangana activism.

Emergence of T Media

Telangana journalists also organized themselves at a collective level. The Telangana Journalists Forum was set up in 2001, in the words of interviewee 7 “almost simultaneously with the formation of TRS. This body was exclusively devoted to the Telangana cause.” As Interviewee 7 explained, Telangana Journalists Forum played an important and independent part in the movement. They were never part of the Political Joint Action Committee, which came into being after December 23, 2009. Journalists made their own efforts to contribute to the pressure to form Telangana, “Two thousand journalists went to Delhi in 2010”.

AN7: There has been a growing realization that Telangana lacks media. This was not the case in 1969. This question was not raised during the 69 movement. It was a movement of students and government employees; it was lopsided. This movement came from Universities, from intellectual class so these questions came up. All dimensions related to identity politics came up with it. (Translated from Telugu)

The lack of Telangana media was not an issue in 1969, but this became an issue in the present movement. The most recent phase of Telangana nationalism has been characterized by increasing participation from multiple groups including professional and caste based organizations. It has also been characterized by cultural narratives of independence. While media
owners were from Andhra, Telangana produced a good number of journalists. Since the 1940s, the leftist influence has been pronounced in Telangana. Interviewee 7 attributes this influence as a factor responsible for producing journalists: “After 1948 a lot of journalists came from Nalgonda. After Naxalbari they started coming from Karimnagar”. Nalgonda district in Telangana was the nerve center of the peasant rebellion in 1948. Contemporary Maoists in India trace their lineage to the Naxalite movement, which got its name from Naxalbari in West Bengal. The Naxal movement of the late 60s found many recruits in Telangana’s Karimnagar district.

AN7: Most editors in Hyderabad dailies are from Telangana. K. Srinivas Andhrajyoti is from Telangana, Vardhili Murali editor Saakshi he is a BC is from Telangana even the Hindu’s Srinivas Reddy is from Telangana he is from Karimnagar, Visalandhra editor Srinivas Reddy, Vaarta editor until recently Takasala Ashok, HMTV editor Ramachandara Murty.

The two factors, an increasing realization that Telangana needs its own media and the fact that there were many highly qualified professional journalists committed to the Telangana movement available prompted efforts to build news media companies with a favorable disposition towards the movement.

KCR made the first efforts toward building media houses in Telangana. Interviewee 7, who has been instrumental in establishing Telangana’s first newspaper Namaste Telagana said, “KCR bought Raj news from someone in Tamil Nadu and this was the first Telangana media”. According to information available in the public domain Raj News was launched in March 2010. Raj Network (a south Indian media conglomerate) and TRS were the owners of Raj News. In April 2011, TRS launched T News and Raj Network took over Raj News. According to most accounts another channel emerged during this time that was not explicitly pro-Andhra: HMTV
(officially launched in February 2009). There are two other pro Telangana Channels in operation as of 2014: V6 and TNN. The viewership data for Telangana media is not yet available, but in interviewee 7, 11, 12, and 18’s opinion V6 is the most widely viewed news channel in Telangana.

Interviewees 2, 7, and 18 indicated that most news media are making losses. Various interviewees indicated a range of motives behind running channels, ranging from money laundering and seeking political influence, often doing both. Among news media, TV news media and print media provided two distinct kinds of challenges.

According to the website of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, in 2013, there are over 800 channels in India including 300 news channels. According to interviewees 2 and 18, some such channels are mere licenses obtained by individuals with interests in real estate. During elections these channels start broadcasting in order to gain favors from politicians. TV news channels carry advertisement tickers even as the news is being read. Another strategy is to sell one-hour slots to hospitals and telemarketing firms.

However, print media posed a bigger challenge to potential investors. As noted above in the political economy section, print media survives on government or political patronage and needs big investors already established in some other business. Telangana had some small startup newspapers that survived intermittently.

AN7: There was gap in print media. There were small newspapers like Devulapalli Amar’s Prajatantra. Several others attempted but they could not survive beyond a couple of months. It is not easy to run a daily newspaper. We used to write in the existing mainstream media.
Interviewee 7 who was deputy editor in a major Andhra newspaper was approached by KCR to start a new paper, “I spoke with him for 6 hours, I had my doubts. Political parties want mouthpieces. I told him making it a mouthpiece would be waste.”

AN7: It will be first of its kind, so history and culture should be given primacy. He had many reservations, he did not want many people, he would say I don’t want this person or that person. I said, in that case I can’t work. I have worked in mainstream press, if this is going to be another mouthpiece I don’t want to do this. I won’t run TRS paper. Then he understood, and agreed.

Conflicting Narratives in Media

As the central government started wavering on its decision to form Telangana, media were fiercely involved in manufacturing competing narratives. Religious polarization played a part in dominant narratives. This section will also explore the complex politics of Hyderabad-based Urdu media. Interviewees 8 and 20 informed me that Muslims welcomed the merger of Andhra and Telangana in 1956. Nizam’s refusal to join the Indian Union and subsequent police action to annex Hyderabad state unleashed sectarian violence. Interviewee 8 said Muslims in Hyderabad felt that the influx of new people from Andhra would help them and it did. Interviewee 8 said that subsequently “anti-Muslim feeling has come down.” Reflecting on the conditions of Muslims in 1950s, interviewee 20 said that there was rampant poverty (and prostitution) in the Muslim dominated old city.

Interviewee 8 explained the politics of sectarian (or communal) riots in Andhra Pradesh, “out of four Urdu papers only one, Etemaad, which is controlled by the MIM (Majlis-Itehadul-Muslimeen), was against Telangana.” The MIM is a Muslim political party with strong political grip over the old city area in Hyderabad.
ZAK8: One thing is, they (Andhra Politicians) can buy the MIM anytime. No Telangana politician can fulfill MIM desires. They are so rich. Another thing is there, they are using MIM as a ploy for Wakf properties. All the Wakf properties which are grabbed by Andhra Politicians are taken by MIM. So, it was furthering their own cause. Andhra business lobby cause and MIM cause. So this was very important. They have always used communal riots to stop Telangana.

Interviewee 8 explained, “Whenever Telangana was peaking up, this communal card was played up by Andhra politicians.” Sectarian violence has an impact on anti-Telangana narratives.

Interviewees 5 and 8 explained two sides of the narrative. Interviewee 5 summarized the anti-Muslim narrative, “There were concerns that Telangana will unleash the Razakar rule. There was a time when Razakar rule happened. Same thing will not happen again because people are educated.” Razakars were private militia founded by Qasim Razvi, founder of the MIM that were used for intimidation in the last days of Nizam rule in the Hyderabad state. Similarly, according to interviewee 8, dominant narratives tell Muslims that the sectarian violence that accompanied police action would be repeated if the Telangana state were formed. In addition to these narratives there are other narratives, which were prominent in the mainstream press:

ZAK8: Multi-national companies *ko bolte the* (are told) if Telangana happens it will be a naxal raj. So they are afraid of Telangana. Reddys, Kammas *ko bolte the* (are told) if Telangana happens you will lose your power. Landlords *ko aise he tha* (are told), Naxal movement communist movement they will start demanding lands from you. One thing can be true not all 5 things.

The Srikrishna Committee Report highlights the “internal security problems created by Maoists/Naxals” in the newly formed states of Chattisgarh and Jharkhand (p. 439). It states that
internal security of Chattisgarh has deteriorated due to Maoist violence and in Jharkhand the Maoist/Naxal problem persists. In its discussion of option 2, the separation of Seemandhra and Telangana with Hyderabad as capital of the latter, it is said that this could have an “impact on internal security situation with the anticipated growth of Naxalism and religious fundamentalism” (p. 451).

Pro-Telanagana activists and the emerging Telangana news media challenged these dominant narratives. Interviewees 1 and 7 spoke about an influential TV program aired on HMTV after December 9, 2009. Explaining the show, interviewee 1 said, “Nowhere has a TV channel gone to the people every Sunday for 7 months. At every meeting there were 500 people, at every meeting 5-6 people spoke.” As part of the series meetings were held in different parts of the state. Explaining the format of the program he explained that the meetings were held in both Telangana and Andhra. An eminent intellectual from one region would be taken to another region for the meeting. The intellectual would be allowed to present the perspective of his/her region and then the discussants from the other region would respond.

RM1: People in Warangal (Telangana) the audience included militants like Manda Krishna Madiga and others they were all shouting. But, I shouted back, they heeded to me and they kept quiet and listened to Professor Das. This process went on. In Nellore (Andhra) when we had the programme, Chandrashekhar Reddy that TDP legislator said, The Telangana agitators, or leaders should be shot dead like the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Then I have taken Professor Chakrapani from Hyderabad and he countered that political leader and made him shut up… it was all shown live. People all over the state were glued to TVs. This we did as an exclusive effort from our side. Other channels even MR RadhaKrishna from Andhrajyoti emulated this program.
**Cinema**

The movie industry also posed challenges to artists and activists from Telangana. The Hyderabad Film Chamber was set up during Nizam’s time to exhibit films from Madras (now Chennai) or Bombay (now Mumbai). There was no production in Hyderabad. Chennai was the center for Tamil and Telugu film production. Actors like NT Rama Rao and Nageshwara Rao went to Chennai to pursue their careers.

Interviewee 3, argued that contrary to the current claims that Andhras developed Hyderabad, Andhras were very reluctant to come to Hyderabad. Chief Minister Brahmananda Reddy offered land on the Hyderabad- Vijaywada highway “and named it Chitrapuri (Filmcity) for film industry. Nobody came. They came only in the 90s when all infrastructure was developed.” Eventually, the film industry moved to Hyderabad from Chennai in the 1990s after Chief Minister Chenna Reddy’s persuasion.

RM16: To them Telangana or Rayalseema culture seems strange…when they wanted to show novelty they showed Telangana people as Villains and Comedy (sic). This had an impact psychologically on Telangana. We started feeling that that is the right way of talking.

Interviewee 16 said this impacted both cine workers and audiences in Telangana. Workers in the film Industry faced problems similar to those faced by journalists. He said “big directors from Telangana pose as if they are from Andhra. Before trying to get into cinema, they tried to change their language (accent). Trying to fit in.” Audiences felt, “that is the culture”.

RM16: Ramoji film city everyone is from Krishna and from the same caste. Even as they claimed to be superior culturally, they did not come on the basis of merit or human equality. They came on the basis of caste, religion and region. So, their professionalism
Filmdom preferred workers from Andhra; they “brought their own people to fill jobs like light men, chai makers.” This increased the pressure on natives of Telangana at all levels to try and fit in. However, Interviewee 16 claimed that unlike other industries, film workers did not get support from Telangana activists. People liked to maintain distance from cinema industry.

RM16: They may think cinema is a bad field that they don’t know about cinema. Cinema is an industry too, it has workers too. Cinema provides employment and livelihood. So, since I did not get support, I gave my film for free on city cable and put it on Youtube. Even if I don’t make money I want the cinema to live.

Even as cinema producers and lead actors were from Andhra, Telagana had distributors including several small distributors with a single theater. These distributors get a 10% share in the profit. Interviewee 16 explained that starting from 2004 cinema producers developed a monopoly by vertically integrating production and distribution and further shutting out the Telangana.

RM16: People like Rama Naidu, the producer, he has a studio, his son is the hero in his films, he felt why should I share 10% profit with distributors. He wanted that profit too. He started Suresh distributions. Then he turned his attention to theaters and started leasing them. Then they made an unforgivable mistake. Once they established control from studio to theater they a started demanding exorbitant rates from independent distributors.

Interviewee 16 explained that small distributors lived a life of dignity, they were well to do members of rural/semi-urban communities. Now, their profit margins came down. As the distribution business was not profitable many distributors were forced to lease theaters to
producers. Interviewee identified Ramoji Rao, Allu Arvind and Sunil Narang as producers who along with Rama Naidu follow this model.

**Challenges and Opportunities**

The suicides of over one thousand young people for Telangana was discussed by most interviewees. Interviewee 16 said, “People, political leaders, intellectuals and even suicides played a role. Suicides created sympathy and forced them to question what might be going wrong. ” Between 2010 and 2013 there was a competition between Andhra and Telangana media to project news items favorable to their point of views. Interviewees 3, 7, 8, 12, 15 and 21 emphasized the negative role of Andhra media in projecting/fabricating news suggesting the Telangana state would not be formed as one reason behind suicides in this period especially towards the end of 2013.

AN7: Media never created hope until the last movement that is why so many suicides happened. Andhrajyoti, eenadu, TV9, saakshi they kept saying the state would not be formed. We kept saying it would. After new state, we should assert ourselves, that is part of identity movements. Even in cinema industry there is assertion.

While the researcher was in the field, TRS government asked Multi-System Operators (operator of multiple cable or direct-broadcast satellite television systems) to pull out TV 9 and ABN *Andhrajyoti*. As the Table below shows TV9 was the leading News channel according to the TRPs at the time. According to APlive.net Soon after the ban TV9 lost 54% of the viewership and ABN lost 45%. Interviewee 12 was concerned and thought crackdown on Media is wrong. The following table shows the viewership measured in terms of TV Rating Points (TRP) for various channels before and after the ban was imposed. Both TV9 and ABN dropped in their rankings after the ban.
Table 6: TRP Ratings of Telugu News Channels

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two States</td>
<td>Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV 5 News</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV 9</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTV</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 TV</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studio N</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETV AP</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakshi TV</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V- 6 News</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, interviewee 7 and 11 took a strong stand against these channels. A young lower caste woman elected as a legislator from Telangana was ridiculed in the media. The young legislator was overwhelmed during the swearing-in ceremony in the Assembly.
AN7: He (KCR) is trying to control Andhra Media. In fact there are legitimate reasons for doing so. If you look at the TV9 report it crossed limits, they said things like “these people can’t use laptops.” Caste, region and above all class, people of this class should not come to assembly. The girl who was ridiculed was a dalit who was involved with dalit movement.

Interviewees 7 and 11 charged that the Andhra Media was used against Telangana for propaganda, and its character has not changed. The ban remains in place at the time of writing. Interviewee 7 was advocating a cable law.

Sumanth: What is this cable law?

AN7: Government controls cable. Now, MSO’s have blocked the channels. Government can block channels if cable law is passed.

Sumanth: Have the MSO’s voluntarily blocked the channels?

AN7: Will they block voluntarily? KCR has good relations with owners and MSOs. It is a mafia. It is a major business runs in crores. They never cared when we asked them to block news during the movement. We told them not to broadcast news that were leading to suicides.

Inference can be drawn that the MSO blocked the Channel because KCR is in government. Telangana editors such as Interviewee 7, 11 and 18 believe government can help Telangana media. Interviewee 7 said, “Print media needs encouragement. He is trying to have a policy to promote our newspaper. It is well within the rights of the government.” Interviewee 7 and 18 explained print media survives on government advertisements. The Government advertises in the biggest newspapers in terms of circulation. Since the 3 biggest papers are Andhra Papers (Table) advertisements never came to Namaste
Telangana. Now that the new state has been formed, the government can choose to advertise in Namaste Telangana. “He (KCR) doesn’t want to give advertisements to Andhra paper.” Interviewee 7 told me that Namaste Telangana is the 3rd largest paper in Telangana, behind Eenadu and Saakshi and ahead of Andhra Jyoti.

Table 7: Circulation figures of Telugu Newspapers in India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>July-December 2013</th>
<th>July-December 2014</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eenadu</td>
<td>1,801,213</td>
<td>1,767,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakshi</td>
<td>1,254,716</td>
<td>1,250,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Jyoti</td>
<td>507,597</td>
<td>512,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation, July-December 2013)

Interviewee 16 has been demanding greater government intervention in cinema. Some of his demands include giving a Rs. 15 lac subsidy if a filmmaker makes a film with local talent, “Telagana cinema should get a tax holiday to encourage investments.” Another demand is to have a training institute for cinema. Further, he argued that to end Andhra monopoly on theaters the government should build 100 seat theaters in each ‘mandal’ or encourage private investment through attractive loans. The interviewee recounts that upon his recommendation, KCR included some of his demands in the election manifesto, “Most manifestos don’t usually include anything about films”.

MR16: Moreover, these days cinema is transmitted via satellite. In fact, Government can transmit and make money. Ticket prices can be reduced encouraging public access. For any movie the theater owner and producer should share profits. If government is the producer it will share profits. This would help smaller producers survive and provide cheaper access to theaters.

Sumanth: So multiplexes do not show movie reels like in the past?

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9 Administrative division between Village and District.
MR16: No, This is called digital screening projection. Theaters get a code and they
download movies via satellite on to a hard drive one day before the show. If government
offers this technology they can make money.

Sumanth: they have agreed to setting up the cinema institution?

MR16: Yes, they have agreed to what is easy.

Sumanth: Did they agree to subsidy?

MR16: No, but they said they will provide incentives.

Sumanth: Do you know what incentives?

MR16: No idea.

RQ4. What are the media practices of the activists and marginalized groups in Telangana?

Suicide as Calculated Political Protest

There is wide unanimity that suicides have played an important part in the Telangana
movement. The first instance of suicide was that of K. Srikanta Chary, who immolated himself
on November 29, 2009 as KCR started his hunger strike. As will be discussed in the next section,
Chary’s death made it difficult for KCR to stop his hunger strike.

Telangana Senior Citizens Association (TSCA) collected data on suicides between
November 29, 2009 and May 25, 2012. TSCA reports that between this period 878 people died
for Telangana. Of these 190 consumed pesticide, 133 were found hanging and 112 died by
setting themselves ablaze.

The interviewee informed that newspaper and media reports led to suicides. Interviewee 21
said, “In fact, people who committed suicides, read newspaper or saw TV before taking the
decision to sacrifice their lives.” Andhra media indulged in mischievous reporting.
KR21: For example when they (Andhra Congress Party leaders) went to Delhi and met...Pranab Mukherjee. Pranab Mukherjee, it seems, told them that you people kept quite when the party promised Telangana state. President made the announcement on the floor of the house. Subsequently, when the December 9th statement was issued you all kept quite. We have you know over a period of time gone forward on this particular issue with a commitment now we cannot retreat. News item reports, you know, completely contrary that these leaders have said that formation of Telangana state can harm the interests of the Andhraites. And that news becomes prominent.

Between December 2009 to March 2014, Andhra media kept distorting news to suggest that Telangana state can not be formed. These news items created resentment and despair amongst the youth. On July 20, 2011 a youth from Telangana went to Delhi and hung himself to a tree barely 100 yards from the Parliament House.

KR21: Yadi Reddy died precisely after such reports. He wanted to teach a lesson to Delhi and he say, you know, I will go and sacrifice my life in Delhi to teach a lesson to the leaders in Delhi. To show them the strength of this movement.

Yadi Reddy left a note requesting national leaders to fulfil the promise of granting Telangana. These news reports in the Telugu language media created a sense of despair amongst the youth who decided to sacrifice their lives. Interviewee 21 notes a trend in media reports: after every major agitation, they would bring an Andhra leader to say whatever may be the strength of these agitations, the spread of these agitations we will not allow Telangana to happen. So they will make these leaders, you know, to issue statements they would bring them on to Television, they would give long hours to them and interview them on the Television.
Telangana Student Movement

Telangana student agitations played an important role in the separatist movement. Student movement’s relationship with partisan politics and various media will be analyzed in this section. Focus group discussions with students reveal the evolution of the movement. Under the “six point formula” Andhra Pradesh was divided into the following six zones for employment and administration. The list of zones and the districts in each zone are listed on Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission’s website as following.

Zone 1: Srikakulam, Vizianagaram, Visakhapatnam

Zone 2: East Godavari, West Godavari, Krishna

Zone 3: Guntur, Prakasam, Nellore

Zone 4: Chittor, Kadapa, Ananthapur, Kurnool

Zone 5: Adilabad, Karimnagar, Warangal, Khammam

Zone 6: Hyderabad, Rangareddy, Nizamabad, Mahbubnagar, Medak, Nalgonda

The first 3 zones are in Andhra; zone 4 is Rayalaseema; zones 5 and 6 are in Telangana.

Employees for non-gazetted positions compete with others in their zone for jobs. Applicants for such government jobs in one zone cannot apply for jobs in another.

Student 2: 2009 when Rajashekhar Reddy was CM, there was 14f (a section of Indian Penal Code) related to police recruitment. Removing 14f opens Hyderabad and anyone from Andhra could also get jobs here. Hyderabad is part of Telangana, they were trying to deny this. At that time students who were preparing for SI (Sub Inspector of Police) exams like Anwar sat on indefinite fast. KCR noticed it, he went to Karimnagar courted arrest and said he would fast. (Student Focus Group 1, Translated from Telugu)
Rajashekar Reddy government decided to remove Hyderabad from Zone 6 and declare it a free zone so that anyone from the state could apply for jobs in this zone. Students and TRS started protesting this move. TRS was also considering moving the court against this decision. Students and KCR extended support to each other’s agitations. KCR was arrested in Sidipet, Karimnagar where he sat on fast.

Student 2: We protested his arrest and took a rally from Arts College to NCC gate. During the rally, SP (Superintendent of Police) Stephen Ravindra was there, there was an air of confrontation between students and police. We were 1500, they had barricaded so as to avoid clash. However, there were mufti police amongst the students, they look like students, one of them hit Sir (SP). What happens when you hit an IPS (Indian Police Services) officer? (Student Focus Group 1, Translated from Telugu)

Students were lathicharged by the police and the media present at the location started broadcasting events live, “At that time media played a very active role especially TV9. Balka Suman, who is now a (TRS) Member of Parliament, was beaten 26-28 times with very thick sticks. They showed it as 1,2,3, this aroused feelings in people.” A participant in the women’s focus group recollected the live telecast of agitation from the university:

W1: we saw how Srisailam was beaten, it was atrocious…felt very sad. He was speaking emotionally about Telangana amongst so many people. He was dragged inside and covered in purdah (cloth) and beaten up that is tragic.(WFGD)

Students retaliated and went on a rampage around the university area. Student 2 said, “Anything and everything on the road was destroyed, vehicles, shops, even policemen were beaten up. SP did not do anything because of the media furore.” Student agitations and KCR’s fast were becoming a serious law and order challenge to the Rosaiah Government. KCR was
moved from Karimnagar which was very restive at that time to Khammam district jail. Government moved him to the Khammam district as it was deemed relatively peaceful rather than bringing him to Hyderabad. Looking at the escalating student agitations, KCR called off his fast and appealed for calm, and drank lime juice signaling end of the fast.

Student 2: When he drank lime juice, that day it was at 7pm we had dinner and went to A-Hostel. We saw it live on TV, reports showed KCR drinking juice, then within five minutes we broke some tree branches, wrote a placard saying “KCR drink our blood not lime juice”, and we started KCRs funeral march.

Sumanth: That was reported live on news on all channels.

Student 2: Yes, we did that, me and this other friend and Sri Ram, Sri Ram played a very crucial part in the movement. (Student Focus Group 1, Translated from Telugu)

Students were angry that KCR called off his fast. KCR’s fast had also coincided with reports of immolations and suicides. TRS leaders including KCR’s son visited the family of the first person who immolated himself soon after KCR began his fast. So, students saw the withdrawal as an act of betrayal. (Now, TRS denies this incident that was broadcast live on TV). This incident was also discussed at length in Student Focus Group 2. Student 2B, commenting on KCR’s resumption of the fast said, “he realized the movement was going to go out of his hands. He took a strong decision come what may and he resumed his fast”.

Student 4: Withdrawing fast by drinking juice and then resuming fast were both political moves. Movement became very popular; various movement organization like Mala Mahanadu, Praja Sanghalu had started to extend support to us.

Some students in both focus group discussions asserted that the movement was becoming increasingly popular with various caste and employee groups from Telangana extending their
support, “That evening when the news of KCR withdrawing his fast came, Manda Krishna came to the campus. Students requested him to take up leadership of the movement” (Student 1, Student Focus Group 1). Manda Krishha, president of a political party Madiga Rastra Porata Samiti, is an influential dalit leader from Telangana. Hinting at the broad base of the movement and the potential for the emergence of alternative leadership, student 3 argued, ”Everyone had a reputation, they were not new leaders.”

Student 3: with KCR’s resumption the credit went from students back to KCR. If KCR had withdrawn, student leaders and student movement would have got its due. But the movement would have been suppressed like 69 movement. (Student Focus Group 1, Translated from Telugu)

Some students in the focus group highlighted the need of established political forces. As noted in the literature review 350,000 cases were filed against 162,000 students during this phase (Thirumali, 2013). Students and TRS could benefit from each other. Students recollect an incident where KCR invited student leaders home after his fast.

There were different perceptions of this meeting that were discussed. Student 4 argued, “To bring the movement under his control KCR called student leaders home for dinner and asked students to travel in the countryside. It was like a king calling his laborer home and asking him to work for him”. Student 3 argued that students sought KCR’s help, “We need (political) support otherwise when we come out we could disappear… Student leaders need to take precautions, because before anything happens to us it will happen to them”.

In the Student Focus Group 2 students pointed to another reason behind this meeting. Student leaders was making money, Student 1B said, “There was a talk that during the movement 5-6 crores were donated to students. There were quarrels amongst student unions like
ABVP or SFI because of money”. Student leaders were receiving money during the agitations, “NRIs (Non Resident Indians) would come to the tent because Arts College was the center. They wrote checks right there… They would show us and tell, this NRI has sent so much.” The meeting between KCR and student leaders was primarily to keep financial conflicts form derailing the student movement.

District tabloids started publishing photos of students who participated in the movement. Armed with photographs police would come looking for those students, “in a way all this was done to discourage students from participating in the movement.” (Student 2b, SFGD2)

Student 1b: Police would come to university looking for people whose photos were printed in papers. Police would often use teargas in the university, it was difficult to be in the room…we often broke the window panes. To avoid this and to avoid police several students left for their villages and did not return for two months.

Student 2b: many students would be picked up in the nights

Ironically, these intimidatory tactics of the police that led to the exodus of students from University back to their villages, proved to be a shot in the arm for the movement. In many cases, these students were first generation college graduates in their families, and were taken seriously by their communities. As students in the focus group discussions and participant observation of village based activists revealed, these students started mobilizing their families and villages to agitate.

Movement and the Media

Student 3: Media is very cruel. Our villagers were not allowed to protest on the streets. We have had a movement since 69. They highlighted broken window panes of cars, but so many Rajiv Gandhi, and Indira Gandhi Statues were destroyed in Andhra.
Student 4: Five lacs (500,000 rupees) worth of BSNL cable was destroyed, no cases were filed.

Student 3: When we give a call, there is police protection. When so many people came out on the streets there were no policemen in Andhra. (SFGD2)

Soon, after the December 9 announcement media reported on the counter agitation in Andhra. In view of this counter agitation in Andhra for a united State, the central government announced putting on hold the plans to form Telangana state later that month. Telangana activists challenge the legitimacy of united Andhra movement, which the allegey was backed by the government. Students point out that there were several curbs on agitations in Telangana. Central police forces were brought into the state and university campus and cases filed against agitators.

KK15: In this big agitation media played a foul with us. Even if I resign, its a small item. If there is big agitation here, they say it is small. They have played up the orchestrated agitation there. What is the result? Samaikyanadhra big agitation, Kiran Kumar Reddy did not get a single seat. Kiran was a champion who resigned as chief minister for united state did not get a single seat.

Interviewee 17 explains the united Andhra movement did not have wide base in Andhra region, like the Telangana movement had in Telagana. As noted in the previous section by the end of 2009 various groups were unhappy with Andhra dominated media in Telangana. Student 3 describes actions of frustrated students during the first phase of agitations in Osmania University, “Media was not just covering it was hiding the facts. Students responded by destroying OB vans, after which the media started covering.”

Several interviewees agreed that social movement should develop their own media. Interviewee 14 said, “Media should bring out issues in a democracy. When media become
corrupt there is a problem. This is a challenge for social movements.” The literature review noted that pamphlets are very popular in the Telangana movement. Student 3 said, “pamphlet is a big weapon. It is written by someone with intellectual capital.” Pamphlets serve various purposes, Student 3 said, “Food, behavior, language all aspects were covered”. In some cases their production was voluntary. And sometimes JACs (Joint Action Committees) produced pamphlets and distributed them through newspaper agents.

Student 4: if we found a pamphlet that was intellectually stimulating and we thought it would be useful to the movement then we would make a thousand copies and distribute it. Depending on financial capability.

Student 6: for example there is chalo assembly program tomorrow. I want to bring out a pamphlet to educate students. I can approach student JAC…there are 5-6 professor who guide us. We decide what is to be written. And we go to hostels and leave pamphlets in mess (dining room), TV room and students will come to know. (SFGD 1)

Pamphlets were effective because they were cheap and the distribution of pamphlets was targeted to reach the appropriate demography of concerned students/citizens. Internet and email were also used for dissemination of pamphlets. For instance, in the case of Muslims, Interviewee 8 explained that there were many apprehensions about Telangana with many being skeptical owing to the memory of police action particularly in Hyderabad city. Interviewee 8 published pamphlets to change Muslim attitudes towards Telangana.

ZAK8: we came out with 5 pamphlets…series of 5. How Muslims lost in Telangana? We give around 30 points, then what will happen to Muslims if we give Telangana. These types of things, what happened to lands, what happened to jobs. Thirty eight Muslims were suspended from jobs, from 1948, 49 to 1960 on flimsy grounds that they don’t know
Telugu. Lands (held by Muslims) fell from 40% to 2%. They used to own 40% of the lands; now, all lands had been taken away.

Apart from pamphlets interviewee 21 highlighted the importance of banners or ‘flexis’. Flexis are big posters with information on injustices to Telangana. Interviewee 21 said, “Particularly, in 2009 these flexis played an important role. Banners you may call them. And they would appear in almost every village with information on injustice to Telangana.” Further, Audio cassettes featuring folk singers are very popular in Telangana. These cassettes are also played at marriages (Thirumali, 2013).

Oral communication played an important role in sustaining the movement. As the government largely barred holding public meeting or rallies in Telangana, students and activists devised ways to dodge the police.

Student 1b: it was Chalo Assembly program on Dec 10 I think, there were a lot of policemen on campus they would not let us take out a rally to the Assembly, we met in the evening and resolved to go to assembly in pairs or small groups.

Student 2b: we took the Habsiguda route to assembly

Student 3b: some of us also went individually

Student 4b: Until we got very close to Assembly we were separate. (SFGD2)

These strategies proved very effective on September 30, 2012 during the Saagara Haram march in Hyderabad. Despite heavy deployment of police, thousands of protestors gathered on the Necklace Road in Hyderabad (Telangana March, 2012). The protestors gathered on the Necklace Road destroyed several statues of Andhra cultural and political icons.

Along with public meetings, performances of folk artists played an important role in spreading the movement to rural areas. Major political public meetings would also feature
performances by folk artists. Student 3b identified some groups that perform at such meetings, “Rasamaya Brundam is one, Vimalakka’s Arunodaya Brundam is another, Gaddar has another one.” These folk performances are called Dhoom Dhaam.

Sumanth: What is Dhoom Dhaam?

Student 1b: Peoples struggles are told as a song.

Sumanth: So, is it one song?

Student 4b: No, there are several songs.

Student 2b: Telangana was like this before the Andhras came and it is like this after the Andhras came. What will be good for Telangana?

Student 1b: about festivals, about culture.

For example, Nandini Sidda Reddy sir has written

_Nageti salallo na Telangana na Telangana_

_Navveti batukullo na Telangana na Telangaana_

(My Telangana, My Telangana in the lines drawn by tilling

My Telangana, My Telangana in the lives that are smiling)

This song was written by Nandini Sidda Reddy, a retired Lecturer from Government Degree College, Siddipet in Karimnagar for a movie Veera Telangana (2010). Reddy won Nandi Award for Best Lyrics in 2011, given by AP state government, for this song. The Telangana movement revived old forms of communication, and had a cumulative impact through many such performances in rural areas. These performances took the movement to grassroots level.

The Telangana movement also employed new media technologies like social media, YouTube and IPTV (Internet Protocol Television). Interviewee 18 explained advantages of IPTV technology. IPTV broadcasts are transmitted over the internet. Users need a code and receiver
box to watch the programs. Unlike traditional mass media, IPTV has a potential for two-way interaction.

Sumanth: How many locations can you talk to simultaneously?

PY18: As many as I want, but telephone lines should be available. It’s a communication channel. It’s a two way channel. Now you can redefine TV as interactive. I can conduct TV polls. 15 min packets take 2-3 seconds. Satellite is real time. But people can’t make out audio and video are in sync…

Sumanth: What interactive programs do you have?

PY18: *Patalu Atalu*. We call singers, to that extent we have interactions. We have health shows. Right now it’s inviting callers, over a period we can have video as well. I would need some investment.

Interviewee 18 said the major advantage with IPTV technology was that it is cheaper than traditional broadcasting. In traditional broadcasting, news channels have to buy transponders on geosynchronous satellites. As the geosynchronous orbits are crowded, transponders are not readily available, “If we apply now it will take 3 to 4 years to get a slot. We cannot wait so long.” IPTV technology is being used in India for local production and dissemination of video programs.

*Caste and Gender Issues*

Telangana is a region where lower castes, tribes and religious minorities constitute around 90% of the population (Table 8). These groups are demanding greater political participation, and view Telangana’s separation from Andhra as a step towards realizing their goal.
Table 8: Caste-Wise Population Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Other Minorities</th>
<th>OBC</th>
<th>High Castes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telangana inc Hyderabad</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telangana exc Hyderabad</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10.</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>8.</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayalaseema</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coastal Andhra</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Srikrishna Committee report 2010, p.366
Note: SC, ST, Muslim Proportion based on Census 2001
the OBC proportions were estimated using the NSSO survey data.
The proportion of High caste is arrived at by deducting the proportions of the rest.
As an activist suggests at a meeting of Telangana based civil society organizations said:

Osmania Students, students from Kakatiya (University) contested in Mehboobnagar about 8 to 9 in every constituency. With mikes and in jeeps for over 15 days Telangana is not just for Landlords and Reddys, for the first time through mikes in streets…this I must say is a result of our discussions, meetings and our hard work…but no one (in mainstream Telangana politics) talks about the political participation of 90% of people in Telangana who are from depressed and weaker sections, let us take these issues forward. Let us take them up as weapons. Already we have a very aware society. (PO 2)

The previous section has noted that the students have strong connections to the countryside. Most of these students are from marginalized sections of the society. It was also noted that several students contested the election on behalf of TRS. There were several other students who contested elections without any major political party backing them. These students’ resent continued domination of a few caste groups in the politics of Telangana. Interviewee 14 said, “new politics can be ushered in through students.”
It was noted in the literature review that Malays in Malaysia claim to be *bhumiputra* (sons of the soil) in relation to migrant Chinese (Weiner, 1978). The term *Bhumiputra* is a Sanskrit term that literally translates as the ‘son of the soil’. *Bhumi* is earth or land and *Putra* is son. This term (*Bhumiputra*) in most modern Indian languages also translates to ‘son of the soil’. In the sense that Weiner (1978) uses it, *Bhumiputra* signifies a first claim on the resources by the locals. As an activist narrates Bhumiputra associations assert their claims on the land resources:

For example, when I was going to Karnataka, when I was going to Bellur Airport. When I was going to airport I paid Rs30 (in toll), on return from airport I paid Rs 115. That means in two hours the toll tax rate were raised. The contractor is Navayuga constructions. They immediately… the *Bhumiputra* association asked why on our land, on our road, should we pay to Andhra contractors and damaged the road. (PO 2)

The *Bhumiputra* association in this case translated its claim on the land and the road into action. The term Bhumiputra was used in a sense that was similar to what Weiner(1978) suggested. Could the term be used in some other sense? Being a *Bhumiputra* also involves participation in native rituals. Important practices of Telangana identity construction, have since the early 2000s, involved reviving old agrarian festivals of the region. Telangana movement actors actively celebrated the *Bathukamma* and *Bonnalu* festivals. These festivals mark an important separation from the Telugu speakers of the ‘othered’ region. The festivals *Bathukamma* and *Bonnalu* are framed as natural, historical and cultural markers of separation. In the new Telangana State, *Bathukamma* and *Bonnalu* have been declared state festivals. These festivals are centered on worship of female deities of fertility. Read within a wider environmental context, these festivals help throw new light on understanding the notion of *Bhumiputra*. 
Do you know what Batukamma means?... What is Batukamma? Before Batukamma there is Boddemma. What is Boddema? It is Bodduthadu. It signifies the connection between mother and child. Is there such meaning understood today… they ask money from you and me to perform a program but what is Bathukamma? What is Boddumma? What is the reality of the situation today? Bringing a colorful plastic idol of Boddumma is that Boddumma?...Not only land all five elements…connection (between the elements of life) comes. (Interviewee 4)

As the interviewee 4 suggested, the notion of Bhumiputra can be thought of as a having social, political, cultural and environmental connotations. Bhumiputra can be thought of as signifying the ‘grounded’ nature of the local people who make a living out of the land. Bhumiputra in this sense seeks not to separate man from nature as its exploiter or custodian but can be thought of as an assertion of oneness between the population and nature.

Tribes are amongst the most disprivilaged communities in India. Their social status corresponds to that of lower castes, sometimes much lower. Plains tribes, those who have settled in plains areas, have been living in rural communities. Major tribal groups include Lambadas (originally nomads but now settled) and Erukalas.

BBN 10: Major tribes in Telangana are: Lambada’s, biggest, almost 60% of tribes belong to Lambada. Then Koyas, second largest tribe in Telangana. Gonds, third largest. Then there are about 30 groups, small, small. Some are even in thousands. Now, Chenchus have gone to Andhra region. Their population is very small in Telangana. Kolas, there are Nayak Kols, there is also considerable number of Erukalas in various villages.

Interviewee 10 explained the growth of tribal populations in the slums, “Earlier only Muslims and Dalits used to live in the slums. Now if you go to any slums you will find large
numbers of *Lambadas.*” Tribes are now working as construction laborers, and autorikshaw drivers in Hyderabad. Another issue that interviewee 10 talked about was the growing menace of AIDS in tribal areas

BBN10: One of my co-brother(s) is working in Mehboobabad area, everyday he says he is getting 10 AIDS cases. Imagine how serious the problem is. Here in railways from Garla, girls sell peanuts till Warangal. That is complete Lambada belt, these girls are exploited and when the come back they spread (STI) in *Tanda* (Lambada Settlement).

Srikrishna Committee report reveals that the illiteracy rates are highest among the ST female adults in rural areas of Andhra Pradesh (96.5% in 1991 which declined to 86.5% by 2001) depicting the impact of multiple deprivations in this group (2010, p. 130). These statistics reveal that women of marginalized sections are doubly disadvantaged. Their marginalization is a factor in their economic and sexual exploitation.

*Tribal and Environmental Activism*

Tribal population in Telangana can be classified as forest tribes and plains tribes. Forest based tribes are based in the forested hill tracks of northern Telangana. Interviewees 10 and 14 lament the non-implementation of 1/70. 1/70 is a bill passed by AP Assembly in 1970 which forbids the sale of tribal land to non tribals. The 1/70 Act was envisaged to protect the right of tribals to forest land. Forest lands are also protected by the department of forestry. Tribes practice agriculture in forest areas,

BBN10: because this land is forest land they don’t get *patta.* So literally, because of this they don’t get land. They have land but they don’t get it on their name. Their agricultural land(s) are you know forest land. And forest people (forest officials) always harass them, burn their hamlets, (and) torture them…this kind of displacement is now happening.
The tribes living in forest areas do not get “patta” or the documentation to prove their ownership of forest land. They are often arrested and tortured for practicing cultivation in forest areas. This harassment by forest officials is pushing many into Maoism. Interviewee 10 said, “they are actually crushed between this forest, revenue and police forces. Because of this also many of them take support of ML (Marxist-Leninist) groups”. Maoist groups offer protection to tribals from forest officials, “ML groups threaten revenue people and you know forest people. Just because of this support they support ML groups. Give and take kind of thing.”

There has been a longstanding demand for formation of Tribal districts in Telangana. Interviewee’s 10 and 14 said that the tribal people were one of the worst victims of globalization and hence they have been amongst the most active participants in the movement. Interviewee 10 said, “Many tribal leaders actually led the movement. From Lambadas for example Bellaih Nayak, one of the very powerful leaders, played very active role in (Praja Sanghala) JACs.”

The northern districts of Telangana along the Godavari river belt, Nizamabad, Adilabad, Karimanagar, Warangal and Khammam are rich in coal deposits. Khammam district is a center for coal production with Singareni and Kathagudem mines. Interviewee 14 explains the problems associated with open casting

P14: In past, in the Singerani region they dug holes so they were mining and then on top there are trees, flora, fauna, and people were doing agriculture as well. Now with the advent of open cast system there is an environmental crisis. Due to implementation of open cast system we are losing lakes, hills and everything. Those who have built their lives, and cultures around those lakes, hills and forests are losing everything. That is an important problem in Telangana. Open casting is a problem in Odisha and Chhattisgarh.
Interviewee 14 explains that open casting began “when new economic policy was adopted in 1991. That policy was adopted within a couple of years and Godavari Khani became an open cast mine.” The interviewee is from Adilabad district where “some thousands of acres of forest land has been lost to open casting.”

Sumanth: What is the advantage of open casts for them?

P14: Open cast reduces costs. The coal mining can be taken up by machines. Older mining (method was) labor intensive. There is a system of laborers going down. In open cast mines there is no need of any employees. Just machines, whatever the depth, even if the depth is half kilometer, machines will go there and tippers will bring the coal to ground level.

Interviewee 14 explained that as per the law, contractors are required to fill the cast after mining with soil and plant trees. But, that is not implemented anywhere. Further, even if forest officials were to implement afforestation they would plant one kind of tree thus destroying natural bio-diversity.

Sumanth: At least they should fill it?

P14: They need to hire labor to fill it.

Sumanth: Is that left open like a well, lake

P14: Yes, there are instances where people and animals have fallen in them and died. So they dig the soil and throw it in the periphery. It looks like a mountain from the other side, but when you climb there is deep ditch.

Interviewee 10 and 14 further explained that heavy explosives are used to create an open cast mine. The dust and the noise of blasts force many to leave the village. Interviewee 10 said, “In 3-4 districts open casting was allowed …if you go to Manugur area the dust is formed so dark even in 10 meters you can’t see a person. So, people are getting you know lens (eye sight)”
Open cast mines are extremely profitable for the contractors many of whom are related to politicians.

P14: Contractors stand to gain. If he buys a(n) open cast for 100 crores, he will have 50% profit. In one open cast a contractor earns up to 50 crores. And open cast period doesn’t even last 6 months. Contractor transforms into a politician…it’s difficult to separate the two.

The issue of Polavaram dam, under construction, was an important subject in Interviews 2, 7, 10, 17, 18, 19 and 21. The researcher also observed a discussion on the dam during a field visit to Khammam district (where the dam will be situated). The Polavarm dam was pushed aggressively by Rajashekar Reddy Goverment and would be one of the largest dams in India. Since the dam is being built on a plains area it would submerge large swaths of land in Telangana, Andhra, Chattisgarh and Odhisa states. Anti-Polavaram agitations have been carried out both independently and in alliance with the Telangana movement. Interviewees 2, 7, 18, 20 and 21 said that Polavaram was one of the conditions on which the Andhra lobby insisted in return their agreement to the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh.

Interviews 7, 17, 18, 19 and participant observations revealed that hilly tracks of Godavary called Papi Kondalu will be submerged. These hills are inhabited by tribal populations. A participant at the Khamman discussion expressed apprehensions about the possibility of unknown tribes living in the thick forest areas that will be submerged. Large parts of Papi Kondalu area are not accessible by road.

PY18 : Tribals don’t speak our language. Koyas and Konda Reddys they don’t read newspapers. Most importantly they are not consumers for corporate companies. They are not voters. So, nobody is interested. Parties don’t care because they don’t vote.
Interviewee 2 and participants at the Khammam discussion noted the cultural significance of the Bhadrachalam area which will also be submerged. There is a major Hindu temple and several small Buddhist monuments in this area. Most interviewees expressed dismay that legal mechanisms could not prevent this dam from being built. Interviewee 18 explained that constitutional procedures under the fifth schedule which governs protected tribal areas were blatantly violated “As per this gram sabhas (local Village Committees) should pass resolutions, only then can they proceed. But this is also bogus.” Interviewee 18 also expressed doubt that the compensation would reach the impacted tribes.

PY18: According to record of rights, 2 and half times compensation should be given. If you are losing 10 rupees you should be given 25. They don’t have records. In tribal areas they have protected nature there is no pollution in river water. Government targets these areas because tribals don’t have land records. We are seeing this in open caste mining. SC and STs 80% of them do not have land rights. Even among BCs 80% don’t have land rights, washermen, barbers, toddy tapers, shepherds, cowherds what do they have? Landlords who sit in Hyderabad without any ties to villages get money…there is corruption (so) those who are struggling don’t get (compensation).

Interviewee 18 is pointing to the discrepancy in assigning compensation to victims. Landlords with large landholdings, often living in Hyderabad, get compensated by the Government for loss of land at market rates. The poor, including artisans and laborers do not get compensated even when they have lost their subsistence.
Emergence of Telangana Middle Class

Interviewee 21, a high profile University Professor who played an important part in building the Telangana Joint Action Committee, argued that the emergence of a middle class as an important factor in the Telangana movement. According to interviewee 21 a middle class provides intellectual leadership to the movement, “Much before the Telangana movement started the middle class educated sections have been politicized in Telangana. Partly, because of the failure of 1969 movement.” The merger of the Telangana Praja Samiti (TPS), a new political party which supported student agitations, with the Congress put an end to political struggle for separation.

Failure of the Telangana movement in 1969 frustrated the newly emerging middle class. Interviewee 21 recounts the discussions at that time: “when these leaders ditch us what are the alternatives left to us?” The declaration of internal emergency proved to be an “eye opener for most of the educated sections.” Marxist struggle seemed the only alternative and many youth joined Naxalites. Since the late sixties Telangana was the hot bed of the radical Marxist underground movement.

Interviewee 3 and 21 argued that a fundamental change happened in the countryside. Interviewee 3 said, “By the 1990s landlords were not physically present in the villages. They left the villages and settled in urban areas.” With this, according to interviewee 21, “The domination of landed gentry, upper-castes over the village life has more or less been demolished.” Interviewee 21 argued that these changes coupled with implementation of reservation policy by the government led to rural lower caste youth entering and hence expanding the middle class.
Interviewee 3 pointed out that these changes also transformed the nature of Naxalite struggle: “Then the radical left changed its course and started fighting directly with police.” With the direct confrontation between the Maoists and the police “a distance developed between the movement and the people.” In this changing scenario policies of globalization were introduced in India. Andhra Pradesh was one of the states that aggressively pursued new economic policies.

These changes also created a crisis for the radical left; many started coming out of the movement. In 1990, balladeer Gaddar quit the Naxalite movement and joined the mainstream. Interviewee 18 informed the researcher: “by 1996 Gaddar was writing Songs- Na Tali Telangana, Tiragbadina Telangana. At Vishweshwara Rao’s Telangana Studies Center we recorded songs, on cassettes.” Interviewee 18 also emphasized the role of academic centers in recording these cassettes. Gaddar represents a wider trend in the 1990s, when Marxists of all hues including university academics were drawn towards identity movements.

KS3: Leftists who were ardent to left ideology and remained with leftist camp have not seen the movement from identity perspective. They also supported the movement. Some left groups supported because it is a backward region, some supported because people are in the movement and we should support it. But, all the leftists want patronage of both the regions.

Interviewee 3 underlines the character of the Telangana movement, which has some ties with the leftist movements but is an identity struggle. In 1997, Osmania University organized an academic seminar titled “Telangana: Dimensions of Underdevelopment”. As a result of this conference an edited volume by the same name was published in which the statistics from areas such as irrigation, education, agriculture, industry, government and political representation are presented to make a forceful case for separation of Telangana (Innaiah, 1997; see also

Consequences of Globalization

As noted in the literature review, there was a major drought in AP in the late 1990s. Traditional seeding techniques were given up in favor of multinational GM/BT seeds. This led to high input costs which when coupled with water and power shortage made farming conditions difficult. Interviewee 10 said, “Chandrababu introduced microfinance...you know (as) globalization from below again microfinance was used...you know...to buy multinational products.” Farmers growing cash crops like cotton were committing suicides.

**Table 9: Farmers Suicides 1998-2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>From 1-7-1998 to 14-5-2004</th>
<th>From 15-5-2004 to 28-2-2005</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telangana</td>
<td>1048</td>
<td>1184</td>
<td>2232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayalaseema</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costal Andhra</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(M Kodandaram, 2008)

Interviewee 21 pointing to the phenomenon of farmer suicides said, “So people started exploring the reasons for this crisis.” Farmer’s suicides were symptomatic of a wider problem in the society which was blocking marginalized sections from entering middle class; “the liberalization process has in fact completely blocked the integration of Dalits and BCs into economy and into politics”. The context of globalization must not be missed here. It is important to examine the social base of the new economic policy in its specific context. Interviewee 21
said, “Andhra Pradesh Liberalization process cannot be separated from social and economic
development process.

MKR21: Since they have been enjoying the political power they have been trying to
impose and implement with all the brutal force that the state enjoys. So, in reaction to this
Telangana demand comes to the fore. The Telangana demand this time around is a demand
for control over resources.

While the Telangana movement had widely recognized Andhra Capitalist interests as the
prime reason for their deteriorating conditions under globalization, interviewee 10 implicates
local elites as well: “my personal opinion is local elites, Reddy, Kamma, Vellama, as well as
Andhra capitalist class played an equal role in destroying (the) livelihood of Telangana and
economy.”

At a meeting, the researcher recorded testimonials of artisans who had lost their traditional
profession.

1. *Shilpkaars* or sculptors complained that soft stone is lost due to intensive stone quarrying.
They are now making bronze statues of political leaders for survival.

2. Basket Makers at Singareni coal mines made their living by making bamboo baskets that
were used by mine workers to carry coal. Basket Makers complain that officials were
bribed into buying plastic baskets. Having lost their previous vocation they are now
making sticks for construction work.

3. Carpenters complained that they are losing work, due to displacement of farmers as there
is no demand for making farm implements.

4. Various community members complained that children are failing in government run
schools, demanding a return to traditional professions.
5. Kurmis community member complained that no one is buying *gongali* or *kambal* (traditional blankets).

_Evolution of Identity Based Mobilizations in Telangana_

Between 1978 and 1990 various professional organizations have mobilized for Telangana. According to interviewee 21, in 1978, a group of Naxalites met in Jagitayal town and resolved to move away from killing landlords to joining struggles for regional justice. In 1989, Telangana information trust brought out a booklet against land grabbing by _Eenadu_’s Ramoji Rao. Interviewees 7, 10 and 18 listed development of social movement organizations in the 1990s and 2000s.

Social organizations like Telangana Janasabha, Telangana Ikya Vedica sprang up in early 1990s to fight for a separate Telangana. Interviewee 7 and 18 talked about one of the most important public meetings of that time. In 1996, activists and members of various caste associations held a major meeting in Bhongiri. This event is described as a watershed in the history of the Telangana movement. This meeting signifies the shift from class-based politics to an identity movement. After this meeting an organization called *Sabanda Varnalu* came up which represented, among others, lower-caste communities such as *Rajaka, Vamsaraju, Naibrahman, Yerukala* and *Lambadas*.

BBN10: Maroji Veeranna from Janashakti group came out (of hiding), and he was organizing caste-class based groups. And in very short period he could reach to every Telangana…say…mandal level towns. He formed committees at various levels, Taluka levels at some areas he also formed village committees and all that.

Interviewees 7, 10 and 18 explained that Veranna, a former Maoist, organized progressive caste and class based groups in 1997. These efforts led to formation of Telangana Janasabha, an
umbrella organization, particularly active in Karimnagar, Nizamabad, Warnagal districts. In the 1999 elections, Telangana had already become an issue at grass roots level.

According to several Telangana activists, a panicked state government initiated political killings. Interviewee 10 recollects, “B. Lalitha was killed very brutally. Ultra-Marxist group activists were killed. In the name of, you know, ultra Marxist they were actually Telangana activists.” Cultural activist and singer Belli Lalitha was brutally hacked to death (Belli Lalitha’s Murder, 1999).

PY18: Then in Warangal, Warangal meeting had 3-4 lac people come. Surapet meeting, meeting in Ramanapet. So there were several meetings. After that we brought Indra Reddy. Gadar was shot at. These…the big meeting(s) created fear in him (Chandrababu Naidu). This was a potential threat to Chandrababu Naidu. So, he got 16 people killed in one town in Bhonagiri. Karunakaram, Idannna, Balaraju 16 people in all.

In December 1997, All India People’s Resistance Forum (AIPRF) (related to Veeranna’s Telangana Janasabha) organized a two-day convention and a public meeting in Warangal in which half a million people from all districts of Telangana participated (“Condemn political assassination”, 2013). In this meeting, Warangal Declaration was passed based on the concept of a democratic Telangana.

BB10: Once KCR floated TRS, he could swallow all these organizations. Since he came from political background, you know there were so much media focus and all that within short period he becomes champion of Telangana and he swallowed small forms of agitations and movement organizations who have been working for a long time. That is how he became the monarch of the movement.
Interviewees 4, 8, 10 and 14 argued that Andhra media did not believe that a separate Telangana would be achieved but projected KCR as the leader of the movement because of his interesting personality. Interviewee 10 said, “Whenever there is meeting, he is very talkative, orator in a sense, makes very Telangana colloquial statement(s). And people watch that. There is that business angle.” According to interviewee 10, Telangana JAC, which was formed after KCR’s fast, also helped bring various agitators under common leadership: “That is how when this JAC was formed this Jana Reddy very cleverly put a Reddy as JAC chairman.” The Telangana Joint Action committee was envisaged as the umbrella organization of all groups participating in the movement. TJAC is also known as a Political JAC, which was formed shortly after the Central Government reversed its stand on Telangana in 2009 with the TRS, BJP, Congress, TDP, CPI and New Democracy as its members. Later, the Congress and TDP withdrew from TJAC.

Telangana Prajashanghala JAC was formed in 2009 as an umbrella organization of marginal caste, tribal groups. It was formed on the basis of the concept of Samajika (Social) Telangana, which argued that the notion of democratic Telangana is limited to political equality and does not address social exclusion within Telangana. TPJAC and other caste based organizations also participated in TJAC led Sakalajanula Samme (All peoples strike), which was the largest series of protest organized as part of Telangana movement between September and December, 2011. Sakalajanula Samme brought Telangana to a halt with protesters marching on roads, railway lines; even the autoriksha union joined the strike.

The Telangana Intellectuals

So far the role of political parties, journalists and activists has been analyzed. In attempting to answer what nationalism could mean in a post-colonial and globalized world, we should also
analyze the role of intellectuals. The Telangana movement particularly has been noted for the involvement of academics and intellectuals. Almost all interviewees and focus groups focused on the importance of intellectual activity and organization to the Telangana movement. Isolating intellectual activity poses challenges because of the organizational activity taken up by intellectuals with professional and caste based groups. So, when we are looking at intellectual activity that includes political activism, this activism need not be restricted to university academics. Student focus groups and interviewees 1, 3, 7, 9, 10, 15, 18, 19 and 21 discussed the role played by intellectuals and literary figures in the Telangana movement.

While it has been noted that intellectuals had played an important role in the Telangana movement, two different perspectives on the role of intellectuals in the future were identified:

MKR21: First thing is, Andhra political leadership is sustained, guided and protected by the media. In the case of Telangana the emerging leadership must be protected by the middle classes. It is they who can provide arguments in favor of particular decisions.

According to this view, the middle classes should continue to ‘protect’ Telangana’s new political elite. The businesses, and in particular the media in Telangana, continue to be dominated by Andhra elite. So, the middle classes should “put forth the arguments to protect a particular political force.” The primary responsibility of the middle class is that of “guiding, shielding and protecting political leadership.” According to some, one important change in intellectual responsibility that has emerged in Telangana is the shift from the role of agitation to the role of conservation.

According to another perspective, it is not just the Andhra capitalists who have gained from globalization. A section of the political and economic elite in Telangana have risen to control government in this new state. KCR in his first speech as Chief Minister of Telangana
asked *Prajasanghalu* (civil society) to get out of movement mode and contribute towards ‘consolidation of gains’. Interviewee 10 said, “KCR is trying to kill all forms of movements, and people involved with the movement. What you call “*udyamarupalu*” (structures of movement)” According to Interviewee 10, memories of the movement are a threat to the emergent Telangana political elite: “So he is trying to give a gesture that he is incorporating all, but he is incorporating only weak personalities.”

Interviewee 10 argued, “Among the intellectuals, always you have the elite bourgeois group, then you have progressive intellectuals. Then you have another group with lower caste background who are now suspicious of both these two groups.” A wider perception shared among most intellectuals is that the movement has “created strong political consciousness among the people and this consciousness is not going to end with the realization of Telangana state” (Interviewee 10).

BBN10: There is a possibility of…you know…bringing alternative politics in Telangana. What happened in Telangana is that people fought but people did not get the power. The same old political group captured political power.

Interviewees 8 and 10 believe new social forces will soon emerge to replace the Telangana political elite. Interviewees 10 and 14 believe that an alternative politics based on human values can be constructed through further struggles of intellectuals, activists and students.

There are different kinds of intellectuals (Gramsci, 1978) and there are different definitions of the role of intellectuals in society (Chomsky, 1967). ‘Intellectuals’ of different political inclinations and different agendas have been active in the movement. Most prominent is the Telangana Political Joint Action Committee Chairperson Prof. M. Kodandaram. Along with TRS chief K. Chandrashekhar Rao, Kodandaram has become a leading figure in the
movement—both belong to the dominant feudal communities and have much to gain in the new state. Ballad singers, intellectuals, activists and students from marginalized communities are also involved in organizing dissent. Telangana Universities have been nerve centers of the agitations. Poor students from dispossessed communities who cannot afford private engineering or professional education, go to state run universities such as Osmania University in Hyderabad (Thirumali, 2013). These state run universities are providing resources to express dissent.

Students have become a potent force in the movement. Student bodies have ties with TRS, Kodandram and other intellectuals. Organized political dissent and its repression by the state have consequences for the students from marginalized groups. There were 6801 instances of agitation in all Telangana districts between December 23rd, 2009 and January 21st, 2010\(^\text{10}\) (Thirumali, 2013). In all 350,000 cases were filed against 162,000 students during this phase (Thirumali, 2013). However, student-intellectual-politician coalitions are not bereft of internal dissent.

*Looking forward*

TRS promised free education for all in its election manifesto. Interviewees 9 and 10 argued that deterioration in the quality of education was a bigger problem. Government run school and colleges provide subsidized education. Interviewee 9 argued that teachers transferred to rural school were not regularly going to schools taking classes. Corruption in the school system helps such teachers negotiate absences without getting caught. Interviewee 10 argued that “[t]here is a caste angle in this. Only SC, ST, BC within BC lower BCs are studying in government schools.

\(^\text{10}\) Central government had agreed to the demands of protestors for separate Telangana on December 9, 2009. Under pressure from Andhra capitalist political class it reversed its stand after 20 days leading to further agitation.
and Telugu mediums.” According to this view a schism is developing in society as upper castes send their children to private English medium schools and lower castes go to government run schools.

ZAK8: another very important thing what I noticed is the privatization of education. That is very important. When I was in Nizam College…in 82-83 batch. Kiran Kumar, Sudheer, Balakrishna all these, Suresh Reddy they were all our classmates…So, when we wanted our friend Pankaj to fight election, this Kiran Kumar Reddy, Raghuram Reddy told us tum logon ko kya hai hamara family political me jana (What is it to you? we are from political families) that is our future. So, all these politicians’ sons breeding ground was Nizam College or SP College or xyz college. There are 3-4 colleges. Half the cabinet is from these 3-4 colleges. OU, Arts College. Because of privatization rich people started sending their children to private colleges. This gap has been filled by SC, ST and BC leaders.

Osmania University Arts College was the center for the Telangana movement. Most students who participated and led the movement were from aforementioned sections of the society. As noted in a previous section, some of these students are now Legislators and Members of Parliament.
CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS

Discussion of Results

Results of data analysis reveals that Telangana nationalism has undergone change since 1969. Change has been witnessed in forms of protest, ownership of mass media and participation in the movement. While the movement in 1969 unleashed xenophobia, in its most recent incarnation the Telangana agitations avoided targeting people and property of the Andhras. The movement is noted for being largely peaceful and employed non-violent strategies, although it can be argued that the suicides by young people were instances of self-inflicted violence.

Secondly, Telangana has not had its own media for a very long time. The 1969 movement was not backed by Andhra-based Telugu language newsmedia. While the movement did have political/partisan support in the form of TPS it did not have its own media. The presence of TPS confirms that Telangana protagonists believed that a state could be formed through political means. The TPS experiment is regarded as a failure because it merged with Congress within 2 years of its formation and abandoned the struggle for separation. However, before its merger TPS demonstrated the popular support for Telangana statehood by winning 10 out of the 11 parliamentary seats in the Telangana region in the 1971 general election.

The backroom maneuverings that led to TPS’s merger with Congress are seen by social movement actors in the region as betrayal. Since the formation of TRS in 2001 its leadership has had to assert on several occasions that it would not betray the cause of Telangana statehood. Many interviewers agreed that they had thought TRS could not last beyond a few years. The survival of TRS as an independent political party for over 13 years before the formation of Telangana can be attributed to the changed partisan character of national and regional politics. The success of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha in achieving Jharkhand in 2001 illustrates the impact of
smaller regional parties on national polity. In the latter half of 2013, TRS promised to merge with Congress if Congress helped pass the Telangana Bill in parliament as a strategy to force Congress into acting positively on Telangana statehood.

Wider participation of various social groups is the third important reason for other manifest differences in Telangana nationalism. In 1969, the movement was largely restricted to Universities and students, with some participation of government employees and lawyers later on. The movement did not assume a mass character. Even in 2009, student agitations during KCR’s fast that involved confrontations with police resulted in destruction of property and vehicles around the University area.

Answering RQ1

Contemporary scholarship on social movements is invested in trying to understand the political conditions—political opportunities and constraints—under which people mobilize (Tarrow, 2011). For instance, glasnost and perestroika created conditions for nationalism in Soviet minority republics. Emergence of new states in India, in 2000, created conditions ripe for the political articulation of a separate Telangana.

Between 1989 and 2014, no single political party could get the minimum required seats to govern on its own, and by the end of the 1990s political parties coalesced around the Congress and the BJP. Tillin (2013) argues both national parties, Congress and the BJP, were uncomfortable sharing power with powerful regional allies, some of whom would switch sides to stay in power, and sought to accommodate emerging regional forces through accommodation, which in the case of Uttarakhand and Jharkhand resulted in new states.

However, in the case of Telangana, which is the oldest demand for a state in India, the two national parties playing into the hands of the rich Seemandhra elite maintained diplomatic
ambiguity. The Congress Party agreed to consider the demand for Telangana statehood during the 2004 elections and then sought to bury the issue. The Telangana movement succeeded in creating a regional cleavage amongst representatives of different political parties. This cleavage made the continuance of Andhra Pradesh untenable and paved the way for passage of the Telangana Bill.

The statehood movements that are articulated in terms of “cultural identity and regional deprivation” are gaining in strength (Tillin, 2013). Intensification of modernization is leading to a rise in "sons of the soil” conflicts that pit natives against migrants (Alonso, 1990; Dunn, 2009; Jackson, 2006; Laurax, 1993; Tanabe, 1993; Vandekerckhove, 2009; Weiner 1978). Academic research in ‘sons of the soil’ conflicts in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America raises concerns about a crisis of state and democratic citizenship (Jackson, 2006; Boas & Dunn, 2013; Dunn, 2009; Fearon & Laitin, 2011; Geschiere, 2009; Vandekerckhove, 2009).

In order to understand the demand for Telangana statehood it must be contextualized in post-colonial history. I agree with Fanon (1963) that when bourgeois neocolonial elites replaced colonial elites the social and economic structures of domination persisted. This often resulted in rule by a tribe or a region which reproduced structures of cultural domination. Weiner (1978), in his study of "sons of the soil" conflicts, distinguishes different kinds of migration patterns. This, I argue, is important as those who migrated to Telangana from Andhra did so as political, cultural and economic elites. Agricultural surplus from Andhra was invested in Telangana to acquire land, political control and media of cultural domination.

The Telangana movement has fostered intense ethnic identification. The concerns regarding citizenship rights of migrants were often cited as a reason against statehood for Telangana. The Telangana movement, by avoiding systematic and targeted violence against the
people of Andhra, gained legitimacy for the demand for statehood in the eyes of the wider Indian public. The worst incidents of violence were suicides by distressed farmers and protesting students rather than those directed at ‘enemy’. The political and intellectual discourse within Telangana, while being articulated in terms of internal colonization, regional deprivation and cultural identity, adopted methods of protest that were consistent with the spirit of a non-violent democratic movement.

Anti-colonial nationalism developed from a site of subordination (Chatterjee, 1994; Spivak, 2010) until the post-colonial nation was subsequently dominated by national elites. The Telangana movement positions itself in a familiar site of subordination and pursues democratic means of protest for statehood against internal colonization. The ruling classes of Andhra Pradesh emerged from the Andhra and Rayalseema regions, often from the Reddy and Kamma castes. Further, the wealthy Kamma and Raju castes are not natives of Telangana; in a culture where social life, including marriages, is largely based on caste, these communities stayed aloof and did not assimilate into the wider Telangana society. After six decades of living in the same state the Telangana region remained a separate subordinate entity. The Telugu nationalism promoted by the Andhra ruling classes was not based on accommodation of lower castes into sub-altern nationalism of the type that Chatterjee (1994) conceives.

I agree with Srinivasulu (2013) that the political mobilization in Andhra occurs along the lines of caste while the category of class retains importance in Telangana mobilizations. Guha (1982) notes that various castes have different rankings in the social hierarchy of caste systems in different regions. The disparate lower castes of Telangana, who are also proportionally higher in population than their Andhra counterparts, have often coalesced and fight for a common cause. However, the Telangana movement cannot be explained in term of just caste or class; a
broader sense of regional disparity and regional cultural identity across the upper and lower segments of society is a significant aspect of mobilization in Telangana. Further, women and tribal activism have played an important part in the movement for statehood. A desire of the marginalized communities facing the brunt of processes of economic globalization to better their lot is at the heart of the Telangana movement (Thirumali, 2013).

Answering RQ2

For six decades Telangana did not have media to articulate its interests. Andhra control of media in Telangana resulted in cultural predominance of the Andhra lifestyle and demotion of Telangana as an inferior culture. For instance, the Cinema industry dominated by Kammas is particularly noted for negative stereotypes of Telangana. The relationship between local and regional media too could be imperialistic. Media imperialism of this sort where one region loses its influence without gaining any form of reciprocal leverage is important in understanding the Telangana movement. Andhra regional media have helped (Andhra) delta culture prevail over the local culture of Telangana.

The reciprocation is prevented by discursive means. The ‘discourse of Andhra’ held its sway across media. As noted, cinema was one of the most powerful means of perpetuating cultural domination over Telangana. Telangana activists hence argue that the economic, political and cultural domination of Andhra over Telangana is an example of internal colonization. The Telangana movement led to the emergence of cultural formations that challenged discursive domination.

However, its quest for newer markets led the Andhra media to innovate and bring forth district tabloids that played the role of local media. The district tabloids of newspapers like Eenadu and Udayam led to accommodation of local aspirations. After 2009, a schism emerged as
Andhra media could no longer contain passions for Telangana. The colonization of the local generated a conscious counter-reaction.

With the advent of globalization, the ideological dimensions of imperialism become evident. The discourse of globalization was in a mutually reinforcing relationship with the discourse of Andhra, especially in the late 1990s. I agree with Thomas (2010) that the discourse of globalization held its sway over national media which reported positively on Andhra CM Naidu’s efforts to woo global capital and turn Hyderabad into an IT hub while ignoring the agrarian crisis which was leading to farmers' suicides. Information obtained through interviews, the Sri Krishna Commission report and wiki leaks cables points to concerted efforts to cast Telangana statehood as a threat to Andhra and global business houses in Hyderabad.

In the 1970s the agricultural surplus generated by the green revolution in the Andhra Delta sought new avenues of investment. The Eenadu, started publishing by the mid-1970s with such agricultural surplus as investment. This newspaper, known to be partisan towards the TDP, worked with leaders like NTR to build alternative coalitions to challenge Congress. This opening of political space together with wider access to education and state resources helped new leadership develop from marginal sections of society especially the OBCs. As discussed above, in their quest for new markets and greater circulation newspapers started bringing out district editions. The district edition gave voice to regional aspirations of people. The editors and journalist of district editions could articulate grassroots perspectives. Marginal voices became more vocal in political and media establishments.

The domination of upper castes in Indian newsrooms is noted (Tunstal, 2008). This domination of caste and region put marginal sections of Telangana in a doubly disadvantaged position especially until early 1990s. The media in Telangana was an active site of contestations.
Starting in 2009, journalists defied editorial diktats at the peak of the movement to represent marginalized Telangana voices. This notion of a journalist as a political activist in Telangana is at odds with the western conception of professional journalism and in line with such findings regarding journalism in India both in colonial and post-colonial times (Golding, 1977; Chandra et al., 1987).

Journalism and intellectual activity have strong traditions in Telangana; the region has witnessed leftist movements and identity struggles since the 1930s. Journalists set up forums in support of Telangana around the same time that TRS was formed. Telangana journalists were political activists whose creative energies were tapped by the movement. Several editors and journalists of Andhra dailies and TV news channels were from Telangana region. Later, they provided the workforce for emerging Telangana media.

The literature review defined the political economy of media as a field of study concerned with the notion of control of society not just through institutional coercion but also through the hegemonic power of ideas. As Telangana illustrates, structural and discursive inequality was fostered by the Andhra ruling classes through media. Andhra media dominated Telangana, through both institutional and hegemonic means. The domination spans all forms of media including newspapers, TV news channels and cinema. The next paragraphs will seek to present historical contextualization of demands for Telangana statehood.

Hallin and Mancini (2004) note a high degree of political parallelism in the press in southern Europe. Political parallelism is characterized by instrumentalization of the media. However, in India political parallelism is also related to social mobilization. Tunstall (2008) notes that the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu has had a history of partisan press and cinema, a characteristic that he also sees in Andhra Pradesh in the Eenadu-TDP relationship since the
1980s. The political press in Tamil Nadu was tied to anti-caste mobilizations and in the case of Andhra to caste-based mobilizations.

Thomas (2010) argued that Congress’s strangle hold on regional politics was broken by the rise of a caste-based regional political elite. Eenadu and TDP are both controlled by the Andhra-based Kamma community. The Kamma community, hailing from the Krishna and Guntur districts, had long dominated Telugu media. Empowered by the green revolution and under the leadership of charismatic movie star NTR, the community sought to challenge Reddys for political power. Tables 23 and 24 show the domination of the Andhra region and the Kamma caste in the newspaper and television media. During the tenure of Y.S. Rajashekhar Reddy, the Reddy community, which was politically predominant in Andhra Pradesh, made inroads into media. However, both these groups represented Andhra regional interests.

Before 2011, Andhra-based media controlled news and entertainment media in the Telangana region. In a commercialized context, news formats have been blamed for sensationalization of news across the world (Giltin, 1991; Thussu, 2003). The trend towards 24-hour news and sensationalization can be noted in Indian media after neoliberal economic reforms (Thussu, 2003). In addition to economic pressures, an important factor contributing to 24-hour news reports in Andhra media is political instrumentalization. For instance, ETV started beaming hourly news telecasts in 1995 as Chandrababu Naidu overthrew NT Rama Rao (NTR) as TDP leader (Dhonti, 2014). ETV’s news bulletins were intended to shore up support for Naidu against a popular NTR.

Political parallism, instrumentalization and clientalism (Hallin & Mancini, 2004) has been noted in the south Indian press (Tunstal, 2008). However, unlike Hallin and Macini’s (2004) negative connotations to such relationship in Southern Europe, Tunstal’s (2008) analysis reveals
the progressive aspect of political parallism that seeks to protect the Tamil nation from the
cultural imperialism of the north. Further, this dissertation reveals ruling-class
instrumentalization of the media which was exposed and challenged by the Telangana
movement.

This dissertation reveals another problem with the western normative understanding
separating state and media on which comparative analysis such as Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) is
based- that in most cases media needs state support for its existence and expansion. Most editors
of the Telugu regional press claimed to be running huge losses. As private advertisers favor big
national and regional media, the State government is the biggest advertiser in local and regional
YSR Reddy’s government in 2004 decided to end this relationship to promote an alternative—
Saakshi–weakening Eenadu’s monopoly.

Govermental support to newspapers is not limited to advertisements, but is often
characterized by active ‘persecution’ of competitors. YSR Reddy's government acted against
illegal microfinance schemes run by Eenadu. Eenadu suffered after 2004 and had to sell most of
its media business in north Indian states to India’s largest business house, Reliance, to survive
(Dhonti, 2014).

With formation of a new state, Telangana media, especially media houses with ties to the
Telangana elite, are hoping to consolidate themselves with the government’s help. Smaller
Telangana media with modest reach and meagre budgets such as TNN remain skeptical of
government providing the necessary impetus for their growth.
Answering RQ3

A culturally informed critique of the public sphere in a postcolonial society allows for mobilizations from below. Ninan (2007) has argued that media operate within a "tea shop" public sphere where newspapers and radio function as focal points of collective discussions on political issues concerning the community. Local *paan* shops and tea stalls have radio and newspapers, allowing people to congregate and discuss politics. This “tea shop” public sphere, this dissertation argues, is qualitatively different from the “coffee house” public sphere.

In the absence of a Telangana mass media, the Telangana movement relied on oral communication, traditional cultural art forms and cost effective print and electronic channels of communications. Telangana has a rich tradition of folk singing. A popular form of folk art used to promote the movement was *dhoom dham*. This is a cultural performance that includes drumming and songs by folk artists. Major political public meetings feature *dhoom dhams* before, after and sometimes in between political speeches.

Political meetings called *garjana* (roar) were advertised through the use of wall posters, *flexis* (banners) and pamphlets. These ‘flexis’, posters and pamphlets include important information on the issue to be discussed with details of the venue. Thousands of pamphlets were produced by diverse actors such as students, employees, and caste groups to bring attention to issues and generate a wider discussion. Pamphlets are targeted towards either a specific audience or the general public. Instances of pamphlets directed towards Osmania University students and Muslims in Telangana were noted in chapter 4. Pamphlets seeking to espouse the cause of Telangana in a general sense are distributed widely via newspaper agents, as well as bus and autoriksha drivers. These pamphlets find their way to tea shops and homes and help shape the counter-discourse of Telangana.
As discussed in the literature review, C.A Bayly (2000) defines ecumene as a public sphere of formal and informal exchanges involving oral and print communication. This ecumene that existed in eighteenth-century colonial India is an important critique to the concept of public sphere and instructive in understanding public sphere formations in an oral culture. This colonial ecumene offers insights into the mediatized public sphere of post-colonial India. Participants in an ecumene include literates and non-literate. Rajagopal (2009) explains the special significance of oral culture in India by recounting how the colonial rulers banned drumming and imprisoned folk singers.

Popular folk art forms assumed a political character in colonial times especially during the peasant rebellion, and later during Razakar violence in the late 1940s. These songs, written under Communist influence, use existing folk formats and tunes to communicate political meanings. The political character of folk art was also important to the Naxalite movement. Through the 1970s and 80s folk singers like Gaddar performed on issues like child labor, poverty and caste-based discrimination. By mid 1990s, folk artist began to tap into the growing ‘Telangana sentiment’. These songs recorded on tapes and CDs were played at marriages and other social functions.

Rajagopal’s (2009) argument about folk artists being a threat to the imperial government finds parallels in Telangana. The famous Telangana balladeer Gaddar was shot on April 6, 1997. Gaddar survived the near-fatal attack, however some others like folk singer B. Lalitha, who was brutally hacked to death in 1999, were not as fortunate. Ghosts of the past could haunt the Andhra political class as Telangana media asserts its independence. With the formation of the Telangana state, the emboldened Telangana mass media is now blaming the then powers for these attacks (“Belli Lalitha death secret,” 2014).
Student agitations have been historically catalysts for the Telangana movement. With 65% of its population below 36 years of age and 150 million between 18 and 23 years old, India’s youth influence the political landscape (“Note to India’s leaders,” 2014). Telangana’s students and youth were foot soldiers of the movement for separation. Osmania and Kakatiya Universities were epicenters of agitations, and students were active participants in all forms of agitations. These student agitations are volatile and difficult to contain. For instance, Sagaraharam protests on 30th September 2012 led to the destruction of statues of Andhra icons on the banks of the Hussain Sagar Lake.

Agitations grew in strength from 2009 onwards, with each agitation bringing new groups into its fold. The current agitation differed from those in 1969 with participation of rural and caste-based groups. Various caste-based associations came under the banner of Telangana Praja Sanghala JAC. Islamic organizations such as Jamaat-e-Islami Hind also joined Telangana agitations. With organized efforts from community organizations, the movement grew in strength.

Sakalajanulasamme (all peoples struggle), organized by TRS and TJAC, started on September 13, 2011. It was conceived as a strike by all sections of people, and legal political parties of various ideological inclinations ranging from BJP to New Democracy (Communist Party of India- Marxist Leninist New Democracy) supported the call. The strike was supported by students, lawyers, teachers, government employees including coal miners, electricity board employees and caste and community organizations. Protestors did not attend to their duties in offices and sat on road and rail lines. Villagers would cook, eat and dance on highways causing traffic delays. The forty-two-day-long sakalajanulasamme disrupted rail and roadways and led to an unprecedented power crisis.
In order to understand the success of the Telangana movement it is important to examine the constitution of the wider social movement in the mid and late 1990s. These developments need to be contextualized within the neoliberal economic policies unleashed earlier in the decade and within the specific socio-political context of caste-based mobilizations in India.

Government policies such as affirmative action, and long term migrations patterns of rich upper castes from villages to cities through the 1970s and 1980s, were changing the character of rural Telangana. The Naxalite movement was losing some of its base in rural Telangana, though it remained strong in forested tribal areas. This prompted thinking among Naxalites and leftist academics about the future of the Marxist movement, many of whom were now from lower caste/tribal backgrounds. Issues of caste, gender and regional justice were appealing to some of them.

Several Naxalites quit the underground movement and started organizing around a broader conceptualization of social justice based on prevailing caste, class, gender, and regional inequities. Maroji Veeranna was one such former Naxal who tried to integrate caste-based concerns with class issues. Veeranna was instrumental in forming Telangana Janasabha in 1995 that brought various lower-caste groups together to seek social and regional justice for Telangana.

Social activists, intellectuals and folk artists played a vital role in recognizing identity issues and supporting each other. Folk songs were recorded in university studios, and activists came to campus to recruit students into socio-political activism. Intellectuals engaged students in debates concerning regional and social justice. The Telangana movement in 1969 laid the foundations of successful political careers for several political leaders. Student leaders in Osmania University understand that University to pave the way to a political career. With
education, lower strata of the society were gaining confidence to organize themselves politically. These diverse activities did not always function in unison. There were deep divisions between various groups of intellectuals, activists, artists and politicians. However, the divisions were largely fluid with various actors constantly working with those they opposed.

Different visions of Telangana based on varying emphasis on class, caste and region continued to be argued through the last two decades. By the late 1990s, these different shades of intellectuals, with the exception of very few, agreed that a separate Telangana would help social justice. This coagulation of perspectives is also evident in the political arena, where politicians from different parties agreed Telangana formation would be beneficial.

However, the grip of feudal elites on political parties is discernible. Even as this leadership is resented by lower caste activists there are strategic relations between the two. In the late 1990s, several pro-Telangana activists were being killed. The Emergence of a political party conceived to primarily fight for statehood was welcomed by activists who needed political support. As a discussant in a women’s focus group suggested, people understand the need for political leaders to deal with Andhra elites. This understanding does not imply passive subservience, as marginalized communities seek to be at the center of new political discourse. For instance, TRS had promised to write off farm loans in its election manifesto. Within days after being sworn in the TRS government made a decision to “write off loans up to Rs. 1 lakh availed between June 2013 and May 2014” ( “Protests mark cap on crop loan waiver;” 2014). This decision was met with protests by farmers across the new state including KCR’s own constituency, forcing the government to rethink.
Answering RQ4

This dissertation has delved into the media imperialism of Andhra in Telangana regions. These relations played a part in privileging the Andhra normative approach of domination. Early academic perspectives in framing, public sphere, citizenship and discourse do not tell us as much about the dynamics that propel social movement. Literature within these paradigms is beginning to reconcile with cultural analysis of identity and nationalism that reorder the structure and discourse of the public sphere. Nationalism is an important component in such reordering. A broad sweeping critique of perspectives from studies in media framing, public sphere, citizenship, and discourse from a post-colonial standpoint is the power of social movement in altering the landscape on which they are premised. Social mobilizations disrupt the structure and discourse of politics.

Tillin’s (2013) analysis does not pay adequate attention to globalization as a context within which statehood is being demanded. The demand for Telangana statehood needs to account for social, political and economic processes. These process include globalization and the consequent shift from a command economy to a free market economy. While free markets resulted in faster economic growth, wealth became concentrated and the poor were left to fend for themselves. Inadequate central planning coupled with parliamentary democracy led to expressions of frustrations in terms of mobilizations on the basis of class, region, ethnicity and caste. In the case of Telangana, specific attention needs to be drawn towards the demographic concentration of the poor, many processes of dispossession and environmental degradation in both rural and urban areas of this region.

A third explanation of smaller states Tillin (2013) argues it is driven by capitalist expansion. The desire to intensify extraction of natural resources within the context of economic
liberalization has led to a search for viable states that possess natural resources like coal, iron ore, bauxite etc. This explanation is interesting because it notes the impact of economic globalization. However, evidence presented in the fourth chapter does not suggest any causal linkages between new states and capitalist expansion as suggested by this explanation.

Social, economic, and historical factors that made Telangana amenable to such a mobilization need to be analyzed. Results have pointed to issues like the agrarian crisis, open cast mining, and occupation of people’s lands in the post-1990 neoliberal India. Telangana, an upland plateau, was traditionally dependent upon publicly-funded tank irrigation, and farmers cultivated coarse grains such as millet and jowar. Rice cultivation was limited to fertile patches in Warangal, Karimnagar and Nizamabad. The large-scale shifting of farmers to cash crops pushed agriculture towards unsustainability. It fostered dependence on multinational companies for seeds, and escalating costs to dig bore wells for water and heavy dependence on electricity. Andhra rulers had not invested enough in canal irrigation in Telangana and the electricity supply was erratic. The failure of crops such as BT Cotton forced heavily indebted farmers to commit suicide. Unable to cultivate their lands, farmers turned towards agricultural labor.

Tribal areas also experienced a mass exodus of tribes into cities as daily wage laborers and autorikshaw drivers. This trend affected tribal communities both within and outside forest areas. Ineffective implementation of 1/70 often meant that tribals did not possess patta papers to prove ownership of land. Further, open cast mining has had a detrimental impact on tribal habitats.

Aggressive expansion of the Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Area (HMDA) to encompass lands of adjoining districts led to severe irregularity in land procurement. Lands donated for public good under the Gandhian Bhoo dan movement, Muslim Wakf properties, and
common lands of villages were usurped by the Andhra elite with political backing. Many instances where middlemen made millions overnight fueled anger in the local populace. Agricultural lands were taken from villagers for construction of an international airport, HI-TECH CITY, FAB CITY, and GAME CITY. Villagers were offered menial jobs in the new establishment in return for their lands. For instance, Nag (2011) narrates an incident where state government handed over prime land under its control to United Arab Emirates-based investor Emaar MGF in a questionable deal.

Over a thousand youth committed suicides in support of the Telangana movement. The uncertainty between the announcement of the Telangana state in December 2009 and the passage of the Telangana bill in March 2014 led to many speculations in the media. Andhra media’s framing of key developments in Delhi led to despair among Telangana youth. Protest suicides coincided with reports in the media that strongly suggested that the state would not be divided.

Within weeks of assuming power, the Telangana government led a crackdown on some illegal properties in the vicinity of Hyderabad. These instances were reported widely in the media. For example, over 600 acres belonging to a religious charity, Gurukul Trust, were illegally occupied by top politicians, film personalities and bureaucrats (“Gurukul land scam,” 2014). The Telangana government’s decision to demolish illegal construction was widely reported in both Andhra and Telangana media with Telangana media taking a jubilatory tone. Framing in English and Andhra media reported the illegality of the occupations highlighting concerns for some middle class residents living on these lands (“KCR Vows to Resume & Protect Gurukul Trust Lands in the City,” 2014). Such a framing did not find resonance amongst pro-Telangana activists that were interviewed, while it dominated the thinking of Andhras.
Conclusion

The study demonstrates the deep extent of the penetration of economic globalization into distant localities. Traditional core-periphery models of the 1970s are replaced by more nuanced interpretations that show that the conflicts in the periphery have a direct impact on the core (Cammearts, 2014). Liberal perspectives tend to highlight the novelty of globalization. David Held (1999) argued that globalization would transform parochial traditional identities rooted in nation-states in favor of a cosmopolitan world order. Rolland Robertson (1997) describes the eventual outcome of the process of globalization as glocalization. Glocalization is characterized by co-presence or simultaneity of the universalizing and particularizing tendencies. However, as this study demonstrates, it would be a mistake to not recognize the struggles involved in the periphery and conceptualize glocalization as a smooth process. For instance, economic demands for cheap labor have diversified the populations of the western core to some extent. These struggles of glocalization can assume many different forms, including nationalistic movements as witnessed in Telangana.

The case study reveals that with globalization the gap between haves and have-nots increases; neoliberal policies benefit those on top, creating a fissure between them and others. Beneficiaries and discontents of globalization exist across caste, ethnic and regional groups. Those without capital and land resources, and without support from the political establishment, are left to fight for themselves. Political mobilization of these people seeks to alter their living conditions for the better by staking a claim in the state. This also reflects the need for policy to protect vulnerable sections of society from sweeping economic reforms.

The modernist paradigm of the Andhra economic elite, championed by the Naidu government, is challenged by the use of primordialist nationalism. Primordialist conceptions of
nationalism emphasize the ancient culture and traditions of a nation. Media serves as a disseminator of these cultures. A modernist paradigm of nationalism argues that nations are built to serve capitalism and propel the industrial organization of the society. Under this paradigm media plays a constitutive role in promoting nationalism and building a nation. Andhra’s primordial emphasis on Telugu language and culture are resisted through development of alternative symbols. These symbols, like the bonnaulu festival, are also primordialist. Media’s often coercive ways of creating a Telugu identity are resisted though social movements and the development of alternative media. Social movements emerge to shape the consciousness of the people of Telangana. The new consciousness makes them acutely aware of difference and injustice. This consciousness touches various sectors including media industries, creating fissures in Telugu nationalism.

Invoking Telugu nationalism in service of globalization by the AP Government in the 1990s did not work. It generated a counter-reaction from a region which was constantly rejecting coercive assimilation. This study agrees with Siapera (2010) that primordialist, perennialist and modernist conceptions of nationalism are inadequate in explaining changes in the character of nationalism. This study also agrees with Siapera (2010) in arguing that nationalism needs to be understood in terms of the social groups that constitute it. This study acknowledges that realignment of social groups based on ethnic, regional or class could lead to reimagining of a nation. Media's role in this reimagining has to take into account the continued persistence of oral culture.

This study also seeks to contextualize nationalism in a postcolonial context. Kaviraj (2012) notes that Indian political history has been marked by shifts of power between empires and regional kingdoms. Empires, usually short lived, subsume kingdoms, only to be overthrown.
For the most part, real authority lies with regional kingdoms. Even in the case of the most powerful empires, the relationship between empire and lower levels of authority is arranged in a way that resembles modern federal systems. Regional forces have been influencing the state reorganization process in India since independence. These diverse regional impulses have been responsible for changing the boundaries of Indian states.

Another important difference from western nation-states arises due to the caste system. Traditionally, it was not the state but the caste system that performed the function of regulating social life in India (Kaviraj, 2012). Regulative functions are today a domain of the state in India. The modern Indian State is also marked by another feature—the emergence of the ‘political.’ British rule introduced a sovereign state in India—a state which as a consequence of sovereignty regulates social, economic and political spheres. Traditional Indian social life was not organized around separation of these spheres. Caste groups have sought to resist this encroachment by the modern state. For the most part, the resistance manifests itself in the consolidation of caste-based pressure groups that seek to influence political parties and processes. A rarer but by no means absent form of resistance is that of open confrontation. This happens more in the case of dominant caste groups that are resisting wider accommodations by the state of varied caste groups including lower caste groups. Damodaran (2008) argues convincingly that Kamma, Raju, Reddy castes have benefitted due to ties with the political establishment; most successful entreprenuers in Andhra since Indian independence have been from these communities.

The killings of Karamchedu and Chundur, in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the Andhra region, are an example of the latter (Srinivasulu, 2002). During the late 1980s and early 1990s former untouchable communities or SCs had started to benefit from state policies including educational and employment quotas. The display of confidence by the youth of these
communities was taken as an affront by the dominant Reddys and Kammas. This led to several instances of dominant-caste-on-lower-caste killings in Andhra. Srinivasulu (2002) argues this led to caste-based mobilizations among lower-caste Andhras, which he contrasts with class-based mobilizations among lower-caste groups in Telangana. A key insight from this argument is the possibility of bigger coalitions in Telangana. Caste-based oppression in Andhra generated caste-based resistance. The rule of the Andhra elite in Telangana let to a much wider resistance that could not be contained.

Interviewees 3, 8, 10, 14, 18 and 20 emphasized the relationships between the left and the Telangana movement. One important consequence of this relationship is a wider social base that includes diverse caste, tribe, women and Muslim issues. Various social movement actors working in areas ranging from environmental justice to caste-based social justice came together in the movement. Another important consequence is that it also influenced the rhetoric of the movement, which was formulated as against ‘Globalization and Andhra Capitalists’.

This dissertation argues that it would be more accurate to categorize the Telangana movement as a nationalist identity movement. The movement led to social alignment of various marginalized groups with dominant castes of Telangana region to forge a common cause for statehood.

The dominant class leadership of the political parties in Telangana avoided making references to peasant rebellion. Anti-Andhra agitations of the 1950s and late 1960s are seen as precursors to the present movement while assiduously avoiding references to anti-feudal armed struggle. This selective memory of history suits their interests. This selective reading of history is a characteristic of emerging Telangana nationalism. Lower-caste participants at public meetings and in interviews continued to allude to peasant rebellion. They did so to indicate firstly that the
power has not reached the people yet. Secondly, Telangana has a very long history of movement and hence it is unlikely that statehood would contain them and keep them from demanding their share in the establishment.

Apart from the nature of leadership this change in narrative can also be explained in terms of changing caste-based relationships in the rural areas. Interviewees agreed that traditional feudal relationships in the rural areas have nearly disappeared. Several factors, including migration of dominant landed groups to cities and the push created by Naxalites who sought to redistribute lands, led to a better accommodation of upper castes and lower castes in the movement.

*Directions for Future Research*

As noted, Telangana nationalism was constructed in active opposition to media-sponsored Andhra/Telugu nationalism. Folk music, dance performances and drawings, usually an indespensible part of political rallies, helped spread Telangana agitations. Since the peasant rebellion of 1940s, under communist influence, folk art including singing, dancing, drawings and writing assumed political character in Telangana. Many famous songs of that period recount instances of courageous resistance to atrocities of the Nizam and the landlords. Folk artists like Gaddar (Gummadi Vittal Rao assumed this pseudonym after the anti-colonial Gadar Party founded in North America) came to prominence during the student movement of 1960s. As noted by interviewee 21, the failure of Telangana movement in 1969 caused widespread despondency in youth leading many to shun democratic process to join Naxalism/Maoism. Folk art too turned toward Naxalism. The lower-caste mobilizations of 1990s brought folk artists again to the fore—standing up to the centuries of caste based oppression. Again since the end of 1990s folk artists mobilized for Telangana cause, often at great risk. Gaddar’s career proves
instructive, an engineer by training, composed songs for Telangana during the late 1960s. In 1984 he quit his bank job and went underground in 1985. In 1990s, he came out of exile to support lower caste mobilizations. Towards the end of 1990s, Gaddar like many others started performing in support of Telangana once again. An assassination attempt by the State in 1997 exposes the insecurity folk art caused to the Andhra ruling elite. During this phase, as noted elsewhere, some folk performers like B. Lalitha were brutally murdered. Folk artists like Gaddar and Vimallaka have been on the fore front of Telangana agitations. They are considered credible owing to their longstanding association with various progressive causes such as emancipation from caste and gender oppression.

It was noted in the literature review that due to their revolutionary potential in an oral culture, folk art forms were often banned by British colonizers (Rajagopal, 2010). Detailed studies on attempts by the state to marginalize folk art could yield a better understanding of one of the aspects of media imperialism in oral culture.

**Figure 3: Folk Performances**
Telangana State and media have been supportive of folk art forms, with many folk performers such as Gaddar performing on Telangana TV channels. The relationship between oral media and the mass media need to be analyzed. Smaller TV channels, like TNN, are seeking to expand their reach by promoting folk performances that are very popular in the region.

The evolving relationship between Telangana State and political expression in terms of folk performances needs to be studied. Folk artists have been given state awards, which can be seen as an attempt to cultivate pro-establishment attitudes among them. However, it is likely that folk art will continue with its progressive political agenda in the Telangana State, which could put the artists at odds with the Telangana ruling elite.

Future studies on the Telangana movement focused on the Telugu language could yield insights on the construction of nationalism in Telangana. This study argues for a historically-informed critique of globalization and nationalism. Such a critique cannot ignore the history of colonialism and anti-imperialist nationalism. It takes into account continuities and disruptions in means of oppression and in the methods of mobilizations. The process of globalization has been noted for reducing the autonomy of the state in the economic sphere and for fostering cultural homogeneity, especially in terms of growing consumerism.

Future studies must continue to investigate state-media relations within the context of neoliberalism. Does the new Telangana State imply renegotiation of terms of globalization? What is the extent to which the new state addresses issues of unemployment, irrigation and education? The contestations over media can be seen as taking nationalistic tones. In January 2012, when the government of India pushed to open retailing in India, it faced opposition in parliament and the bill finally passed due to TDP which voted in favor of the bill (Inukonda, 2013). This case indicates a nexus of Andhra, Indian and global capitalists whose interests are
converging. Adoption of pro-globalization rhetoric by KCR soon after assuming charge of the new state is noteworthy in this context. The new government promises to make business easier in Telangana by introducing single-window clearance to help investors bypass bureaucratic red tape (“Single window clearance for industry,” 2014). The process by which land acquisition by multinationals and other major business began in the 1990s shows no signs of abatement.

Various different phases of mediatization can be noted even within the last two decades of Telangana movement. Andhra owned mainstream media chose to avoid giving prominence to the mobilizations in Telangana until 2009. Since then with intensification of the movement and unabated series of student suicides made the movement prominent in news. This intensification cause a schism in among politicians as well as journalists along regional lines. This then led to slow development of Telangana mainstream media. After the state formation contestations over Telugu media have intensified, with Telangana media asserting its separate identity and Andhra insisting the oneness of Telugus. Each of the two states in recent times has sought to curtail media of the other. The cross-state expansion insulates media from political pressures within one state. As media is heavily instrumentalized, a change of government creates susceptibilities in the media. With the emergence of a new state, the relations between media, the state and political parties are undergoing transformations. The new Telangana government has banned prominent Andhra channels TV9 and ABN since June 2014. As demonstrated in the results chapter the ban has had an adverse impact on the two channels in Telangana, while they continue broadcasting in Andhra. However, in a deregulated market, media businesses with deeper pockets have more space to maneuver around political constraints. TV9 also operates Kannada, Marathi and Gujarati channels in neighboring states. Further, TV9 has an English news channel and another
Telugu news channel, TV1, unaffected by the ban. On the other hand, ABN owns the
Andhra jyoti newspaper, which has not been banned in Telangana.

The ban on these TV channels raises concerns about government censorship and the
notion of journalistic responsibility. Andhra elites ruled with the crude force of regional
prejudice while also remaining oblivious of it. This has resulted in diametrically opposite
perspectives based on the regional affiliations of journalists on freedom of the press. The results
section also indicated that Telangana journalists do not resent the ban on TV9 and ABN as a
threat to freedom of the press. This attitude included regional and caste-based prejudice as
reported in the results chapter. Future studies should investigate the effects of separation on
regional and caste prejudice in Telugu media.

I have noted some change in the last few years or so with Telugu cinema, with regards to
stereotyping characters from Telangana. This could be motivated by a desire to retain the
Telangana market by the Telugu film industry. It also needs to be noted that while the Telangana
characters are getting greater prominence in the scheme of Telugu storytelling, these characters
continue to be informed by their former stereotypes. Despite greater prominence the characters
are framed as funny or tyrannical. Future research can see the evolution of characterization and
explore the multidimensional relations between text and the political economy of media in
Hyderabad.

Participation of youth and students in social movements is another broad area that could
benefit from future investigations. Youth have been active in various movements around the
world. Young comprise a large portion of population in the global south, where 89% of the 1.8
billion young people between ages 10-24 live (Kedmey, 2014). India alone has 365 million. The
use of social media tools by the young people involved in social movements is now a major area
of academic inquiry. The Telangana movement prefigured the role of martyrdom. While those killed in mid 1940s and late 1960s during movements were previously regarded as martyrs, in the current movement suicides emerge as a prominent means of protest. Why in the age of intense mediatization conditions of despair that led to suicides by students and farmers don’t find voice in media? Immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi of Tunisia has been noted as a catalyst for Arab Spring. As with all protests, suicides have been used for a wide spectrum of political movements from right to left. Self immolations were a tool of protest in India in the 1990s, for the students protesting against affirmative action quota system. Future studies need to explore suicides as protest within the context of politics and mediatization.
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APPENDIX A. HSRB APPROVAL LETTER

DATE:                                    June 2, 2014

TO:                                         Sumanth Inukonda, MSc

FROM:                                   Bowling Green State University Human Subjects Review Board

PROJECT TITLE:               [597983-3] Media, Globalization and Nationalism: The case of separate Telangana

SUBMISSION TYPE:          Revision

ACTION:                               APPROVED

APPROVAL DATE:              May 30, 2014

EXPIRATION DATE:           April 23, 2015

REVIEW TYPE:                   Expedited Review

REVIEW CATEGORY:        Expedited review category # 7

Thank you for your submission of Revision materials for this project. The Bowling Green State University Human Subjects Review Board has APPROVED your submission. This approval is based on an appropriate risk/benefit ratio and a project design wherein the risks have been minimized. All research must be conducted in accordance with this approved submission.

The final approved version of the consent document(s) is available as a published Board Document in the Review Details page. You must use the approved version of the consent document when obtaining consent from participants. Informed consent must continue throughout the project via a dialogue between the researcher and research participant. Federal regulations require that each participant receives a copy of the consent document.

Please note that you are responsible to conduct the study as approved by the HSRB. If you seek to make any changes in your project activities or procedures, those modifications must be approved by this committee prior to initiation. Please use the modification request form for this procedure.

You have been approved to enroll 50 participants. If you wish to enroll additional participants you must seek approval from the HSRB.

All UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS involving risks to subjects or others and SERIOUS and UNEXPECTED adverse events must be reported promptly to this office. All NON-COMPLIANCE issues or COMPLAINTS regarding this project must also be reported promptly to this office.

This approval expires on April 23, 2015. You will receive a continuing review notice before your project expires. If you wish to continue your work after the expiration date, your documentation for continuing review must be received with sufficient time for review and continued approval before the expiration date.

Good luck with your work. If you have any questions, please contact the Office of Research Compliance at 419-372-7716 or hsrb@bgsu.edu. Please include your project title and reference number in all correspondence regarding this project.
This letter has been electronically signed in accordance with all applicable regulations, and a copy is retained within Bowling Green State University Human Subjects Review Board’s records.
APPENDIX B. CONSENT LETTER

Informed Consent for Research Participants

Introduction: I am Sumanth Inukonda, PhD Candidate in the School of Media and Communication, Bowling Green State University in the United States. Prof. Oliver Boyd-Barrett is my advisor. My project is titled “Media, globalization and nationalism: The case of separate Telangana.” I seek your participation in my research due to your experience and knowledge of the Telangana movement.

Purpose: Purpose of this research is to unearth the various relationships between Telangana movement in the media. This research would contribute to the literature on nationalism, social movement, and media. The research could have implications for public policy. No monetary compensation would be awarded to the participants.

Procedure: This research project is based on information from interviews, focus groups, participant observations and documentary analysis. Between May-August, 2014, I will request your participation for interviews or focus group discussions. Your participation would last from 30 mins to 1 hour. With your permission, I will tape record the interview/focus group discussion. Before concluding the interview/discussion, I will offer participants the opportunity to add further information.

Voluntary nature: Your participation is completely voluntary. You are free to withdraw at any time. You may decide to skip questions or discontinue participation at any time without penalty. Deciding to participate or not will not affect your relationship with Bowling Green State University or any other institution or person involved in the research.

Confidentiality/Risks: The information you provide in this research will have your name attached to it. I cannot guarantee confidentiality of the information you provide to me. I also cannot guarantee that other participants will keep your responses during focus group discussion confidential. The information collected by me will be stored on my personal laptop which is password protected. Only two people: Prof. Boyd-Barrett and I will have access to the data. The consent forms will be stored temporarily at 6/71 Thanashanagar, Hyderabad while I am in India, thereafter at 800 3rd Street #4, Bowling Green, OH while in the United States.
**Contact information:** If you have any questions about the research or your participation in the research, I can be contacted on Telephone no. (011) 419-378-1521 in the United States and 08413-233210 in India or by email sinukon@bgsu.edu. My Advisor, Prof. Oliver Boyd-Barrett can be contacted on email oboydb@bgsu.edu. You may also contact the Chair, Human Subjects Review Board at 419-372-7716 or hsrb@bgsu.edu, if you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this research. Thank you for your valuable time.

I have been informed of the purposes, procedures, risks and benefits of this study. I have had the opportunity to have all my questions answered and I have been informed that my participation is completely voluntary. I agree to participate in this research.

_____________________________________

Participant Signature
Prof. Oliver Boyd-Barrett is a co-author and editor of the book "Media, Globalization and Nationalism: The case of Separate Telangana." Prof. Boyd-Barrett is the advisor for this project, and the project is titled "Media, Globalization and Nationalism: The case of Separate Telangana.

The project is focused on the role of media in the context of globalization and nationalism, particularly in the case of Telangana. The project explores the impact of media on national identity and the role of media in the context of regional and national politics.

The project is part of a larger research initiative funded by the National Science Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities. The project team includes scholars from the United States and India, and the project is based at Bowling Green State University.

For more information, please contact the project advisor, Prof. Oliver Boyd-Barrett, at oboydb@bgsu.edu or telephone number (011) 805-640-1605.

Advisor: Prof. Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio 43403, USA. Telephone number (011) 805-640-1605, email oboydb@bgsu.edu.

Participation in the project is open to qualified students from Bowling Green State University and other institutions. For more information, please contact the project advisor, Prof. Oliver Boyd-Barrett, at oboydb@bgsu.edu.
Chair, Human Subjects Review Board at 419-372-7716 or hsrb@bgsu.edu, ఆశిషిస్తుంది. మీ విలువ సమయాన్ని నిర్ధిష్టం చేయడానికి ధన్యవాదములు. మీకు ఈ పరిశోధన ఉద్ద్యమాన్ని, పాఠప్రతిష్ఠా, ఉన్నప్రమాదంలో లాభాలను విషయాలు తెలుపబడింది. మీ ఇష్టప్రవేశం ను నిర్మాణం చేసానికి నాకు చదువు చేసారు. నాకు 18 వర్షాల వయసు పైన పాల్గొనేందుకు సాధారణం. నాకు ముందు వరకు పరిశోధనలో పాల్గొనానికి ఈ వయసు ను సాధారణం. 