HARMONY OR HEGEMONY? CHINESE CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF THE TIANANMEN SQUARE DEMONSTRATIONS OF 1989, TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE, AND TIBETAN SOVEREIGNTY

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ABSTRACT

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The Tiananmen Square Demonstrations of 1989, the Taiwanese independence movement and the claims for Tibetan Sovereignty, collectively referred to as the Three T’s, are issues suppressed and censored within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The two research questions which anchored this thesis were 1) How is knowledge related to Tiananmen Square, Taiwan, and Tibet communicated? 2) To what degree does the government censored discourse involving Tiananmen Square, Taiwanese independence, and Tibetan sovereignty affect citizen perceptions of government and their role as citizens? To understand this phenomenon, a thorough literature review outlined the socio-cultural foundations of the PRC, the Chinese educational system, the historical background related to each of the Three T’s, and an overview of the Chinese media. An initial process of inductive grounded theory data collection, coding, and analysis yielded a categories and subcategories explaining the phenomenon from participant voices. Next, the grounded theory deductively coded through the lens of discursive analysis, cultural reproduction, and symbolic violence. The findings discussed how 11 Chinese citizens perceived these events and through which means was their knowledge of these events constructed. The core category, censorship, anchored the findings for both research questions. Regarding how knowledge of the Three T’s was communicated, categories of educational pedagogical authority, media pedagogical authority, and family and community pedagogical authority organized the findings. Regarding the second research question, subcategories of perceptions of the education system, lack of critical thinking, academic and social pressure, Internet, Japan, special treatment of minority groups, perceptions of government, and the role of democracy created a holistic understanding of a complex socio-cultural context.
Dedicated to Jo and Maya
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Upon arriving in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2009, I was warned by the American organization I worked for to not discuss the 1989 Tiananmen Square student demonstrations, issues related to Tibetan sovereignty, or the Taiwanese independence movement with my Chinese students or co-workers. These events were collectively referred to as the “Three T’s”. This warning struck me as odd, and though it was never explicitly stated what the repercussions of talking about these events might be, I understood that my life as a foreigner would be easier in leaving these issues alone when talking to Chinese citizens. From 2009 to 2010 I taught English at Liupanshui Normal College, situated in a coal mining city in the southwestern province of Guizhou, where my understanding of the complex Chinese socio-cultural context underlying suppression of the Three T’s took form.

Within the PRC these three historical events represent large scale collective challenges to the legitimacy of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CPC). All three events have been actively suppressed by the state ideological apparatus in media, education, and in society at large (Collins, 1989; Hessler, 1999; Qiang, 2011; Shirk, 2011; Wangdu, 2007; Zhang, 2011). This phenomenon of information suppression in the PRC is well suited to the analytical lenses of discourse theory and social constructivism. To understand how perceptions can be molded by limiting, framing, or stigmatizing knowledge related to the three T’s, a theoretical framework built on the theories of Michel Foucault and Stuart Hall’s discursive analysis and Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction and symbolic violence serve to illuminate how socially constructed discourses can assume power, create knowledge, shape perceptions, and be maintained over time (Foucault, 1972; Hall, 1997; Bourdieu & Passeron 1990).
The CPC invests significant resources to influence perceptions of these events by channeling public opinion (Qian & Bandurski, 2011; Zhang, 2011). In molding discourse through the suppression of knowledge related to the Three T’s, perceptions of government legitimacy are affected (Zhang, 2011). From a utilitarian understanding, this censorship is weighed against a consequence of maintaining social harmony under CPC rule (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013; Zhang, 2011). Opinion channeling is driven by a complex CPC state ideological apparatus which censors media, the education system, and internet content (Chen, 1998; Hu, 2012; Hessler, 1999; Shirk, 2011; Wangdu, 2011; Wang, 2012; Zhang, 2011). This research investigated how 11 Chinese citizen’s constructed knowledge and perceptions related to the Three T’s.

Historical Background of the Three T’s

Over 20 years have passed since the student protests of Tiananmen Square, a watershed event in which citizen activism collided with authoritarian CPC rule on the international stage (Calhoun, 1989; Nathan, 2001; Zhang, 2011). This protest movement catalyzed a government crackdown in which demonstration leaders were arrested, protestors killed, and other citizens imprisoned for charges related to anti-government activity (Nathan, 2001). Beyond the realities on the ground, the events at Tiananmen Square ushered in numerous CPC reforms reclaiming ideological control in media, public relations, and education (Shirk, 2011; Zhang, 2011). Since that time information related to the phenomenon has been stigmatized and information suppressed (Calhoun, 1989; Nathan, 2001).

Taiwan’s complex geopolitical history and current political status as a quasi-sovereign state are issues that have challenged CPC legitimacy since 1949 (Manthorpe, 2008). At that time, the defeated Republic of China (ROC) regime, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek
and the Kuomintang (KMT), fled to Taiwan and assumed control of the island (Horayangura, 2012; Manthorpe, 2008). The contemporary issue concerns whether Taiwan should remain a territory of the PRC, become integrated into the PRC, or declare sovereignty as an independent political state (Manthorpe, 2008).

Since the PRC occupation of Tibet in 1950 and the signing of the 17 point treaty in 1951, unrest has plagued what is now known as the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) (Goldstein, 1998; Hessler, 1999; Sperling, 2009). In the wake of armed clashes with the People’s army in 1959, the Dalai Lama, the recognized spiritual leader of the Tibetan people, fled to Dharamsala, India, forming the Tibetan government in exile (Goldstein, 1998). Despite continued resistance to PRC rule, the CPC has focused efforts on development of the TAR through infrastructure projects, tax relief, and education investments (Yeh, 2007). These programs, in combination with large numbers of ethnically Han Chinese migrants to the TAR, have changed the demographic and economic context of the region (Hessler, 1999). This slow assimilation process has factored in anti PRC demonstrations, riots, and immolation protests by monks (Beech & Cheng, 2011). On the international stage, the Tibetan government in exile has gained international attention and outcry for the situation of Tibet, its culture, and its struggle for sovereignty (Goldstein, 1998).

Role of Education

Coinciding with the economic and social liberalization programs of Deng Xiao Ping in the years after the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese public education system slowly transformed from centralized control to more localized autonomy regarding curriculum, textbooks, and testing (Hu, 2012; Wang, 2012). Initiated by the central standing committee of the CPC, these reforms addressed an economically driven agenda focused on advancing fields related to engineering, science, and technology (Hu, 2012). As urban schools continue to move away from
textbook bound curriculums and teacher centered pedagogical practices, rural schools have struggled to keep pace (Wang, 2012). A comprehensive high stakes exam, The National College Entrance Exam (NCEE), colloquially known as the Gao Kao (big test), is the measuring stick by which university placement is ultimately determined and one of the few opportunities for social mobility among the lower classes (Feng, 2013; Lafraniere, 2009). The practices of national high stakes testing and hierarchical teacher-student relationships have deep cultural and historical roots in the Confucian and imperial Chinese traditions (Lee, 1984; Siegel, 2007).

The CPC mandate for ideological education, in the form of moral education at the elementary level, and classes in politics thereafter, has remained (Chen, 1998; Hu, 2012). Further efforts took root in the 1990’s, in the wake of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989, which addressed CPC concerns about “moral decay” resulting from the shift to free market oriented economic policy and increasing westernization (Chen, 1998; Zhang, 2011). The CPC launched the Socialist Spiritual Civilization (SSC) program in 1996 in an attempt to disrupt westernization processes that were increasingly appearing in Chinese media and to refocus public attention on issues surrounding the normative authority of the Communist party (Chen, 1998).

Role of Media

Prior to the economic and cultural liberalization under Deng in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, journalism in television, print, and radio media was largely a mouthpiece for the ruling regime, a way to unilaterally communicate with the populace (Shirk, 2011; Zhang, 2011). In 1979 there were 69 newspapers in the country, all run by the party and state government outlets (Shirk, 2011). After these reforms, both television and print media underwent significant free market liberalization, as government subsidies declined and advertising revenues were
introduced (Shirk, 2011; Zhang, 2011). However, the CPC retained power through licensing for all media ventures (Shirk, 2011; Zhang, 2011).

Starting with 1978, in the similar vein of print media, Chinese television began a liberalization process, introducing advertising revenues and market competition, while decreasing state subsidies (Miao, 2011; Zhang, 2011). China Central Television (CCTV) currently runs 22 channels as the lone national network in the PRC (Miao, 2011; Zhang, 2011). As the most accessible media in rural areas, television content has been of particular concern to the CPC (Miao, 2011). At the present, the state administration of radio, film and television (SARFT) is responsible for the operations of the estimated 3,000 local television stations and the licensing of commercial media interests (Miao, 2011; Zhang, 2011).

The Chinese internet is overseen by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, which provides the country with the infrastructure and service providers. The Ministry of Public Security’s Cyber police force is tasked with regulating online content, internet fraud, and pornography (Shirk, 2011; Zhang, 2011). Through pre-publication and post-publication internet censoring, CPC mandated material is suppressed (King et al., 2013; Shirk, 2011; Zhang; 2011).

In 1996, the internet was opened to the Chinese populace, growing from its nascent form to an estimated 20 million users by 2001 and an estimated 200 million users by 2008 (Harvard International Review, 2009). It was in 2008 that total Chinese internet users surpassed the United States as the largest demographic on the planet (Harvard International Review, 2009). The power of the internet as a medium for political expression was emboldened by the relative lack of political enfranchisement or expression in Chinese society (King et al., 2013; Shirk, 2011; Zhang; 2011). The CPC has acknowledged, through sponsored media outlets, that the
ability of the party to guide opinions or set the agenda for information related to domestic and international news coverage has been devalued by the spread of internet media (Guo & Xie, 2005; Zhang, 2011). In response to this, a sophisticated effort has been made to wrestle back control and channel public opinion along CPC lines (Shirk, 2011; Zhang; 2011).

Theoretical, Conceptual, and Analytical Framework

The first phase of the research was the development of a grounded theory. According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), grounded theory methodology was developed to promote the creation of more contextualized and specific explanations in sociological research. In developing a grounded theory from the data, as opposed to relying on analytical frameworks which already existed, researchers could explain phenomena in new ways which did not rely on the categories, theoretical frameworks, or organizing principles established through more traditional social science research methods. Instead, the theory would be specific to the issue under study.

Due to the complex nature of the phenomenon regarding the Three T’s, it was important to separate inductive and deductive data analysis. To accomplish this, a mixed qualitative methodological approach was used, combining both inductive and deductive phases of data analysis. This combination provided a robust understanding of the phenomenon from different perspectives. For an organic understanding of the Three T’s, social constructivist grounded theory methodology yielded an emergent core category, categories, and subcategories which explained the phenomenon from participant experience. These grounded results were then coded in light of the deductive lenses of discourse theory, cultural reproduction, and symbolic violence. Finally, a comparative analysis between both the inductive (constructivist grounded theory) and deductive methods (discursive analysis, cultural reproduction, and symbolic violence) provided a
rich theoretical understanding of the how participants constructed knowledge and perceptions of the Three T’s and what the data deductively suggested.

Significance of the Study

This study provides a grounded understanding of how 11 Chinese citizen perceptions constructed knowledge and perceptions regarding the Three T’s. An important facet of this research was the process of contextualizing participant perceptions in the socio-cultural framework of collectivism. To view participant perceptions through the lens of western individualist culture would be mistaken. In this vein, exploring this phenomenon is important to a better understanding of cross-cultural differences concerning issues related to the Three T’s, such as rights of the individual and freedom of information.

Secondly, investigating the role of the media, the formal education system, and the internet in shaping dominant discourse in the socio-cultural context of China is important to understanding the geopolitical future of the worlds largest demographic. The power of the internet in disseminating information, creating knowledge, and affecting perceptions was illuminative and explored in depth. Lastly, in voicing these participant realities, power can be given to alternative discourses concerning the Three T’s, lifting the burden of the dominant stigma.

Purpose of the Study and Research Questions

This study will explore Chinese citizen perceptions of the 1989 demonstrations at Tiananmen Square, Taiwanese independence claims, and Tibetan sovereignty disputes. These three topics are politically sensitive within the People’s Republic of China.

The following questions guide this research:
1) How is knowledge related to Tiananmen Square, Taiwan, and Tibet communicated?

This question seeks to explore the degree to which alternative discourses emerge within a system of stigmatized and suppressed information through both formal and informal education.

2) Research Question # 2 -- To what degree does the government discourse involving Tiananmen Square, Taiwanese independence, and Tibetan Sovereignty affect citizen perceptions of government and their role as citizens?

Follow up questions seek to delve further into the participant perceptions of citizenship and governance.

Definition of Terms


CPC – Chinese Communist Party; Ruling regime since 1949 revolution

Discursive Analysis – Exploring the relationship between the creation of knowledge through language and the power it employs

KMT – Kuomintang Party – Political party of Chiang Kai-Shek, active in Taiwan

NCEE – National College Entrance Exam

PRC – People’s Republic of China – founded in 1949

ROC – Republic of China – Regime replaced by the CPC in 1949, fled to exile in Taiwan.

SARFT – State Administration of Radio, Film and Television

Social Constructivism – the stance that reality is constructed among members of groups interacting, creating their own artifacts and common understandings of what surrounds them
SSC – Socialist Spiritual Civilization

Symbolic violence – When a less powerful demographic adopts the worldview of the powerful in justly rationalizing their own powerless situation (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990)

TAR – Tibetan Autonomous Region

3 T’s – 1989 Tiananmen Square student demonstrations, Tibetan claims to sovereignty, and the Taiwanese independence movement
CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter Overview

The complexities involved in how knowledge related to Three T’s is created and disseminated are numerous. To contextualize the participant voices, a general understanding of the contemporary Chinese socio-cultural context is necessary. This chapter is organized in a chronological manner, tracing the historical arc of Chinese collectivism to the codification of Confucian thought, concluding with aspects of contemporary normative Chinese social behaviors. From this base, a brief historical account of the Three T’s is presented and followed by an overview of the Chinese education system. Next, the Chinese media and internet are presented along with the development of the Chinese censor apparatus. In conclusion, the conceptual and theoretical framework used in the second phase deductive analysis is described in depth.

Historical Background of Contemporary Chinese Values

Through the lens of history, the contemporary socio cultural context of China can be grounded in a general understanding of its foundations. This information is important to understanding a socio-cultural framework for how knowledge related to the Three T’s is created, disseminated, and sustained in the PRC. This framework of cultural values and normative social structures are rooted in the vast history of Chinese civilization, a historical legacy which informs current issues related to government censorship and consent of the governed (Xi & Feng, 2010). Multiple facets of traditional Chinese culture underlie contemporary social values, but foremost stand the legacies of collectivism, Confucian thought, and a socialization promoting authoritative hierarchical relationships in families, education and society.
In both formal and informal education, the values of society are in part reproduced through the manifest and latent means of schooling (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). Chinese society is rooted in collective values – values where individuals are concerned with the collective and greater good of the community. Over history, deviations from the status quo were not conducive to the benefit of the community, and the concerns of the individual were sublimated in concern for the collective (Xi & Feng, 2010).

Through a sociological lens, the behavior of conforming in a collective society and adhering to social norms can be connected to the history of China. Education, with its integral role of socialization, can reinforce these values and serve as a microcosm of society and government institutions at large in how administrators, teachers and students behave (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990).

**Historical Background of Collectivism**

Collective values in China grew over thousands of years, steeped in efforts of survival centered on communal life. This culture of interdependence grew out of agriculture. In this agrarian society, social mobility outside times of turbulence, such as war and famine, was rare (Zhao, 2013). This communal worldview and interdependence persevered through political changes, dynasties, wars, devastation and reconstruction. From various traditions arose ways to understand the world and construct meaning, but it was the labor of rice farming that provided the greatest rationale for interdependence in China. A contemporary relic of this legacy can be found in written Mandarin characters, many of which incorporate the rice paddy into their pictographic representations. The written character for land is a depiction of a rice paddy (田). This character is integrated with a body as part of the pictograph for male (男). To integrate this
connection between the land (specifically rice paddies) and the symbol for the male demonstrates an important relationship between agrarian life and the role of men in Chinese culture.

Farmers along the eastern coast of China began growing rice approximately 7,700 years ago (McBeath, 2010). The crop demonstrated its ability to sustain large populations and was easily stored to survive winter months. As rice farming spread, paddy culture grew along with it. (Totman, 2009). Rice paddies yield crops year in and out, without rotation, but this hinged upon an intricate irrigation system that connected paddies from a water source (McBeath, 2010). These interconnected paddies, the precision needed for planting; the transplantation of seedlings, harvest, weeding, paddy flooding, and general maintenance of rice paddies was labor intensive and time sensitive (McBeath, 2010). Paddy culture was not conducive to individual farming and thrived in an interdependent system. Through an anthropological lens, cultures rooted in rice production tend to be more collective and socially intricate than that of others, due to this interdependence (Totman, 2009).

Interdependence, aside from rice farming, entailed respect for the point of view of others in the family and community. This worldview promoted social relationships rather than individual independence and autonomy. This is evident in the values of paddy culture. In cultures that have developed based on this rice based economy, such as China, the opinions and sentiments of others are seen as more valuable than that of the individual (Chou, Tu, & Huang, 2013). This affects the means of communication channels concerning how individuals share their views and opinion. (Kwon, 2008). Because of the premium attached to the opinion of others, it is through indirect communication that the views of the individual are expressed. Chinese society emerged from paddy culture and grew from densely populated rice farming communities that depended upon an efficient division of labor within the family, and more
importantly, the connections between these families for the collective survival of the community (Chou et al, 2013). This system of interdependence and collective harmony slowly became a way of life, an internalized value system that shaped the individual identities and actions of members.

The practical implications of paddy culture and interdependence were codified in China through Confucianism. Confucian thought was accepted as a moral framework based in many ways upon paddy culture (Wargo, 1990). Social harmony was the ultimate goal of Confucian thought. The way (dao) was built upon an ethical framework rooted in humanity (ren), virtue (de), righteousness (yi), ritual consciousness and propriety (li), and filial piety (xiao ti) (Samovar, McDaniel, & Porter, 2012; Huang, 1997).

To Confucius, humanity was what society was built upon. To be able to perform good acts for others, to be moral exemplars in behavior, and to strive for improvement as a moral person were essential characteristics (Chou et al, 2013). Virtue entailed the ethic of reciprocity and an understanding of empathy. This conception assumed humans were born under similar auspices and should behave as if this common origin should direct egalitarian behaviors. According to Confucius, “By nature men are similar; by practice men are wide apart” (Analects 17.2). It was from this original understanding that society should behave and govern (Chou et al, 2013; Huang, 1997). Righteousness referred to the ability to discern and carry out the morally or ethically correct choice. This wisdom of righteousness was rooted in the central tenets of Confucian thought, from the examples set by family, government, and community (Chou et al, 2013). This collective understanding of morality was described by Confucius, “The gentleman, in his attitude toward all under heaven, neither favors anyone, nor disfavors anyone. He keeps close to whoever is righteous (Analects 4.10 as cited in Huang, 1997, 19).
Ritual consciousness related to the rules or the mutually understood moral framework underlying society that governed human beings. It was this set of rules and frameworks which maintained propriety in the management of government institutions, social relationships, and the family. It was through these rituals, and the respect for the historical legacy from which they had evolved, which codified behaviors in a culturally embedded understanding. This consciousness of the “rules” conveyed meaning and tradition over time (Chou et al, 2013). Lastly, these rituals were also hierarchical, as differentiation in behavior correlated to the social standing or position of members in society. The reverence for the rules and for the historical legacy of ritual created a normative etiquette for social and interpersonal relationships. These normative behaviors guaranteed a structure for all walks of societal interactions (Chou et al, 2013; Samovar, 2012). These rituals were further harnessed by rulers to effectively govern and regulate their people’s actions through social pressure, a system preferable to legal sanctions and punishments for offenders who stepped outside of the status quo (Huang, 1997).

Filial piety was a central tenet of Confucian thought which grew out of agrarian feudalism and patriarchal clans (Samovar, 2012). This spoke to the role of the parents as the most important aspect of the family in terms of love and obedience (Huang, 1997). This respect and reverence for family extended beyond earthly dimensions and extended into the past in the form of ancestor worship. The reverence for what had come before can be seen in the great pride that contemporary China places on its cultural traditions, written history and family centered lifestyle. The role of parents was one of character education as well, where children learned both good traits and were advised to disregard those that were bad (Chou et al, 2013). This familial structure was mirrored on the imperial level as well to limit the vast distances within the Chinese imperial state. Due to this distance, the family became elevated as the organization to which
obedience and reverence was most important (Zhao, 2013). This ethical framework guided individuals, families, rulers and the ruled in hierarchical roles governed by appeals to humanist conceptions of good. This framework was based upon the values which maintained social stability and codified a tradition of hierarchical relationships. These codified power relations were welcomed within dominant imperial ideology (Zhao, 2013). This hierarchy of roles and codified behavior were measures to stabilize society.

*The Mandate of Heaven: A Legacy of Authoritarian Rule*

The mandate of heaven was the rationale through which rulers retained their legitimacy. If the regime abided as moral and just, the mandate of heaven remained. If the regime and rulers were overthrown by the ruled, they had lost the mandate of heaven due to their moral transgressions (Zizek, 2011). Confucius starkly described what the mandate of heaven and hierarchy entailed when asked about the principles of good government, where he replied” good government consists in the ruler being a ruler, a minister being a minister, the father being a father, and the son being a son.” (Analects 12.11). This ideal of specialized and separate societal roles is the opposite of what is often equated with participatory democracy, where citizens ostensibly have a say in their governance, and the rulers are representative of their constituents (Zizek, 2011). Instead, power is concentrated and delegated from the top and is only replaced when the regime has proven too intolerable for the lower rungs of hierarchy to continue.

Confucius’ view of social disorder, on the other hand, very much mirrored the interpretation of participatory democracy, a state in which “rulers do not rule and subjects do not serve (as cited in Zizek, 2011).” This strict hierarchy was a measure to stabilize society and provide clear roles, rules, and identities for individuals within China.
Furthermore this separation of hierarchical spheres allowed leaders an opportunity to “make the rules” for a culture in part based on ritual consciousness. It was this manipulation of ritual where ancient Chinese rulers could appeal to norms that were in their best interest (Zizek, 2011). Confucius emphasized the importance of recognizing normative ritual behaviors, “look at nothing in defiance of ritual, listen to nothing in defiance of ritual, speak of nothing in defiance of ritual, never stir hand or foot in defiance of ritual” (Analects 12.1) This speaks to a passive obedience to history and ritual which discourages critical engagement. The possibility for a manipulation of normative discourse, or new “rules” introduced as ritual, is problematic. Confucius himself echoed his role as a transmitter of this ritual and wisdom; not the source -- though in fact many of his thoughts were original inventions, not a narrative delivered to him from history (Zizek, 2011). This long transition, from agrarian interdependence to codified Confucian values took many years to develop. The worldviews, beliefs and identities in the contemporary context of China reflect this socio-historical evolution.

Contemporary Chinese values

Confucian values, though abandoned as remnants of a bourgeois past during the Cultural Revolution, have gained traction in recent years due to their cultural significance and still underscore important aspects of Chinese communication and social relationships to the present (Xi & Fung, 2010). The CPC refrain echoes this concept almost verbatim, as “social harmony” has become a slogan and rationale for many official policies (Shirk, 2011). The overarching social goal of harmony affects conceptions of the individual in ways different than the west. The following general terms, face, patriotism, respect for authority, meaning beyond language, and thinking dialectically, outline an understanding of contemporary Chinese thought. Furthermore, these traits each highlight current manifestations of hierarchical social relationships in which the
powerful are respected and deferred to out of deeply embedded moral framework of ritual consciousness.

*Mienzi – Face*

*Mienzi* is the most important aspect of the Chinese conception of self (Xi & Feng, 2010). *Mienzi* can serve as a social extension of the individual, of family, community, and nation. It is composed of two main levels: 1) the personal projection (worth, image, position in society) and 2) the societal maintenance of high moral standards (Xi & Feng, 2010). In China, face is gained through a combination of personal status and of paying respect to the accomplishments and “face” of others. Chinese face is a far more socially constructed idea of self than that of individualist cultures. *Mienzi* has many implications for social behaviors, from small matters such as seating arrangements at meals and gift giving to much larger issues of business, foreign policy, and governance (Xi & Feng, 2010).

When face is lost, Chinese can become defensive or confrontational (Xi & Feng, 2010). To lose one’s temper is to lose face, and such confrontations are often passive and indirect. One such macro example relates to the Chinese state’s reactions to claims published by the United States concerning human rights violations throughout the 1990’s, which it has contested by publishing a parallel report documenting the human rights abuses of the United States (Xi & Feng, 2010).

*Aiguo Zhuyi – Patriotism*

The discourse of Chinese patriotism is often painted in western media as nationalist and even xenophobic (Xi & Feng, 2010). However, there is a strong legacy of love for country that has grown from both a rich and long cultural tradition and a more recent legacy of turmoil resulting from foreign imperial ambitions. Beginning with the Opium wars of the 1840s and
continuing until the end of World War II, China suffered a number of defeats in geopolitical terms. This love of country is an important ideological tool used in many nation states to mask social and political problems (Torfing, 1999). According to Samovar, Chinese generally define significant amounts of their identity in relation to their culture and history (Samovar et al, 2012).

**Chongshang quanwei – Respect For Authority**

This understanding of respect for hierarchy and the deference expressed for people occupying a higher societal position have deep historical roots (Xi & Feng, 2010). The Chinese, in general, give respect to the government, the elderly, and those with superior knowledge and experience. An example in China is demonstrated through the use of different subject pronouns such as nin (您) reserved for the elderly, as opposed to the regular ni (你), used for everyone else. Another example involves intricate seating arrangements at banquets, where honored guests are seated facing the door.

**Yan Bu Jinyi – Meaning Beyond Language**

This value refers to the inability of language to fully convey meaning. The inability accounts for the indirect and less verbose nature of Chinese speech patterns (Xi & Feng, 2010). Understanding this indirect communication, or its combination with other forms of non-verbal’s, is an important part of meaning construction. This nuanced and subtle communique is a more holistic creation that assumes a degree of empathy, attention to actions, and one’s own inner voice (Xi & Feng, 2010).

**Bianzheng Siwei – Thinking Dialectically**

This phenomenon can be seen in the symbol of the Ying-Yang, the demonstration of the interconnected nature of the dialectic, the interdependence of parts that may be in opposition. It is from this opposition that change occurs (Xi & Feng, 2010). Relating this balance of opposing
sides, communication patterns often avoid absolute or extreme statements, speaking to both positive and negative aspects of situations and the overall picture.

**Chinese Education System**

*Policy Position of the CPC Central Committee*

During the Cultural Revolution, Chinese education was reduced to political activities and agricultural or industrial skills training courses (Wang, 2012). Following this period, the Chinese education system underwent drastic changes to revert to a more traditional education system under the banner of four major reforms (Hu, 2012). From the late 1970’s, a mandated 9 years of national compulsory education has resulted in high enrollment figures in tertiary education. These are seen as major successes in the 30 plus years of reforms led by the CPC (Hu, 2012). Underlying these victories is a policy tone focused on the overall economic impact of education on society. This economic development has in turn helped the political prospects of the CPC (Hu, 2012).

Between the years of 1978 and 1985, the ministry of education issued the “Draft Teaching Plan For Full-Time Ten-Year Schools”, which served as a guideline for classroom teachers across the PRC. According to this plan, standardized textbooks were published by the People’s Education Press, a subsidiary of the ministry. One major reform to the previous curriculum replaced the subject of politics in primary school classrooms with moral education (ideology and morality) (Wang, 2012). Another aspect of this phase in educational reform was differentiated curriculum between urban “key” schools and those of rural schools. The rationale was based on the need for these elite urban schools to produce the engineers and scientists which were economically necessary for development (Wang, 2012). This differentiation in curriculum influenced the next phase of reform, lasting from 1986 to 1996.
The first major reform was issued by the CPC Central Committee in 1985, titled “The Decision on Education Reform”. This reform highlighted the need for education to serve the purpose of socialist construction, and for socialist construction to serve education (Hu, 2012). This reform identified remaining leftist ideological positions which were skeptical of knowledge, talent, and in general displayed contempt for education (Hu, 2012). The shortcomings of the educational system were apparent, especially in the wake of economic liberalization, which had exposed many sectors of Chinese society to the outside world. The reform also made certain guarantees to the autonomy of universities and colleges to make selected decisions regarding curriculum, hiring, and exchange programs (Hu, 2012).

The 1985 CPC Central Committee’s decision on education reform allowed for more autonomous educational decision-making at the local level and mandated national 9-year compulsory education. Ideological education was still cited as the most important task of schooling, especially in the wake of the student demonstrations cumulated by Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Wang, 2012). The dominant ideology underlying curriculum development at this time was organized around academic subjects with superficial reference to social or personal applications (Wang, 2012). This phase also saw multiple textbook publishers enter the market, though each fulfilled specific guidelines set by the ministry of education (Wang, 2012).

The second reform, issued by the CPC central committee in 1993, was titled the “Outline for the reform and development of Chinese Education”. This reform once again reiterated the priority of education as a foundation of socialist modernization. This reform outlined the “backwardness” of Chinese education, especially in its test-orientated nature. The committee further pointed out that educational thinking, teaching methods, and teaching content were
divorced from what was needed (Hu, 2012). Higher education was once again encouraged to become more autonomous and internationally connected.

In reaction to this mandate, quality education in economically important areas such as science and technology was determined by decision makers to be a main function of the Chinese education system (Hu, 2012; Wang, 2012). Though the reform did not actuate change to the existing curriculum, there was a widespread revision of textbooks (Wang, 2012).

The third reform, released in 1999 by the CPC central committee, was titled “Decision On Deepening the Education Reform and Promoting Quality Education”. By 1999, the function and strategic orientation of education had taken a different turn from previous reforms. The language related to socialist development had been dropped, while the focus turned to education’s role in comprehensive national strength. This national power was determined by the quality of workers and the quantity and quality of all trained labor. The Chinese education system was perceived to be lacking in relation to concepts of education, education systems, personnel training patterns, teaching contents, and teaching methods (Hu, 2012). Reforms for higher education entailed further moves to streamline and continue the process of maintaining autonomous institutions.

This reform resulted in the most comprehensive changes to the Chinese educational system since 1978 (Wang, 2012). The “Outline of Basic Education Curriculum Reform” was released by the ministry of education in 2001. Sought as a solution to the historically teacher centered and textbook based curriculum; the focus of the reform was changing status quo pedagogical practices. Taking a constructivist stance, the outline set goals for the “development of students”, and not “the mastery of knowledge”. The reform advocated for different pedagogical practices which connected content to the everyday lives of students and encouraged
inquiry-based and experiential learning (Wang, 2012). In response to this reform, many higher education institutions began programs in teaching and curriculum, especially at normal colleges aimed at teacher education (Wang, 2012).

The fourth and most current reform released by the CPC central committee was titled “The National Medium and Long Term Educational Reform and Development Plan Outline”, released in 2010. As an acknowledgement of education’s cornerstone importance in national rejuvenation and social progress, the report cited the difference in advancement between urban, rural, and regional educational systems as problematic. The report further cited an underfunded system which did not conform to the social and economic development of the country (Hu, 2012).

Over the course of 30 years these reforms have decentralized decision making from the ministry of education to more autonomous localities, calling into question the role of the central administration in forming curriculum and informing teaching practices. However, ultimate authority still remains with the decision making authorities in the CPC (Wang, 2012).

Ideological education continues to be an important concern for the CPC (Hu, 2012; Wang, 2012). Ultimate authority for content delivered via curriculum passes through the ministry of education in Beijing. The hierarchical organizational management of education on both the macro and micro scales speaks to the historical status quo. Despite calls for pedagogical practices that move away from teacher-centered, textbook driven classrooms, the demand of large class sizes and test-driven accountability measures pressures teachers to strive for a “mastery of knowledge”. Despite educational reform efforts, many aspects relating to pedagogy and teaching materials remain unchanged, especially in rural areas (Wang, 2012). Textbooks
remain centrally planned and printed by Ministry of Education contracted publishing houses and continue to be a central teaching tool for numerous schools (Tan, 2012).

Curriculum in China is established by a central authority and receives some additions from the provincial and local levels as well (Krajewski, 2006). For elementary schools, covering the first 6 years of education, this curriculum is based on four main concerns: ideology and moral education, academic knowledge, physical education and health, and production technology. In urban areas, at magnet schools, classes such as reading, writing, math, music, art, history, moral education, physical education and natural sciences are further diversified into subject areas such as chemistry and physics (Krajewski, 2006). During the 3 year middle-school curriculum, natural science is replaced by physics and chemistry, while the moral education component becomes politics.

Regarding administration hiring practices and leadership, school principals are chosen from the ranks of the teachers and usually do not have special training or accreditation before being hired in both urban and rural areas (Krajewski, 2006). The process of school leadership training often commences after their tenure has begun and is not a deliberative or participatory process, as many western school administrators embrace through delegation of duties or committees (Krajewski, 2006). At the top of the school hierarchy, the principal is responsible for the direction of the school, the atmosphere in which students learn, and the motivation of the teachers. Including the practice of teaching one class, the work hours for principals can exceed 17 hours a day. (Krajewski, 2006). Due to the relative low pay and underfunding of many Chinese schools, one role of the principal is to act as entrepreneur for the school, to bring in outside sources of funding or incentives for the teachers.
A Legacy of Exams

The legacy of high stakes testing in China dates back to 600 AD, during the first Keju imperial civil service exams (Siegel, 2007; Lee, 1984). These exams were used by the ruling elites to develop an aristocracy from an upwardly mobile agricultural class. This process bolstered the credibility of the administration by including a geographically diverse representation. One route to upward mobility in the hierarchical power structures of the Confucian and imperial traditions were to become a scholar or representative of the government. Education was also a tool for the imperial regimes to keep a tight grip on the ideology and culture being transmitted to this scholarly caste and their influence in their local communities (Lee, 1984).

A contemporary example of this testing environment is the Nation College Entrance Examination (NCEE), colloquially known as the Gao Kao (big test), a comprehensive nine hour national exam. During the years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), college entrance was not based on exam results or academic performance, instead on the political and family backgrounds of students (Feng, 2013). The NCEE was reinstated after the Cultural Revolution ended, and since 1977 has been a national determinant of whether a student attends tertiary education or not (Feng, 2013; Lafraniere, 2009). In 1977, 6 million students competed for 220,000 university slots (Siegel, 2007). In 2007, 10 million students competed for 5.7 million university slots (Siegel, 2007). The pressure surrounding this test is immense; competition for prestigious university slots and upward social mobility for the lower classes is largely achieved through educational advancement. The importance of the test to students, teachers, schools and communities has had negative effects, as test related suicides, cheating scandals, discrimination lawsuits, and corruption have accompanied the annual June test window (Siegel, 2007;
Lafraniere, 2009). Further compounding this pressure is the one-child policy enforced by the government through a rigid system of financial penalties for violation. These students often bear the hopes and dreams of both parents and grandparents without other siblings to share the weight (Siegel, 2007).

Over the past decade, reforms have been aimed at leveling the playing field for urban and rural test takers, allotting university slots for traditionally under represented regions of China which were seen as neglected (Siegel, 2007). The Gao Kao further increased access for children of migrant workers as part of the Hukou, or migrant worker registration system. For many years the Hukou dictated where students were to sit for the exam (the home province from which they migrated, often in poor rural regions) (Feng, 2013). However, in 2012, reforms aimed at equal educational opportunities mandated that areas with large migrant populations should move toward efforts to allow migrant students sit for the exam at the urban high school they have attended (Feng, 2013).

*Higher Education*

The liberalization of many sectors in the 1980’s was mirrored in Higher education costs as well, as state subsidized tuition was slowly eroded by private tuition fees, affecting the last group of non-fee paying students (those who wanted to be teachers) in 2000 (Feng, 2013). In terms of reforms to the institution of the Gao Kao, 81 colleges in 2013 were granted the autonomy to recruit 5 percent of their student population regardless of Gao Kao score, highlighting an independence and autonomous assessment outside of what has been the status quo for college admissions. This process often involves interviews where students are encouraged to creatively respond to questions (Feng, 2013).
Political Ideology in Chinese Education

Direct political ideology classes have been a facet of Chinese education since 1949 (Chen, 1998). In the wake of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989 concern about the “moral decay” resulting from the shift to free market oriented economic policy and increasing westernization was a chief concern. The Communist party launched a program entitled Socialist Spiritual Civilization (SSC) in 1996 (Chen, 1998). This was a broad attempt to disrupt westernization processes that were increasingly appearing in Chinese media and to refocus public attention on issues surrounding the normative authority of the Communist party. SSC involved large scale reorganizations of state television stations to be run by party members and content to be vetted through the party before airing. Newspapers that were popular with the Chinese intelligentsia, such as Liaoyang (Outlook), were shut down. Public museums and statues were erected celebrating heroes of the 1949 revolution (which schools were mandated to attend on field trips). 100’s of movie productions were filmed in Shanghai focusing on narratives specifically concerning themes of nationalism and pride related to the Communist revolution. This program’s main thrust was to make patriotism the “main melody of the society” (Chen, 1998).

1989 Tiananmen Square Demonstrations

In April and May of 1989, student demonstrations against the ruling CPC began in Tiananmen Square, a historic landmark in the capital city of Beijing. In early April a crowd of students gathered in mourning for Hu Yaobang. This nascent protest marked the third student movement in a decade, the first in 1979, followed by another in the winter of 1986-1987 (Calhoun, 1989).
Hu, the disgraced former premier of the Communist party, had become a martyr of sorts since the unrest of 1986-1987. His relatively liberal stances regarding political and social reforms culminated in a refusal to enforce a hard line crackdown during that winter, two and half years before the Tiananmen demonstrations (Calhoun, 1989).

In December of 1986, a group of students at the University of Science and Technology, in Hefei, Anhui province organized marches in 12 Chinese cities to support increased economic and political liberalization (Nathan, 2001). The students, led by vice chancellor of the University, Fang Lizhi, further antagonized the CPC by calling for an elimination of one party rule. Deng Xiaoping moved against the growing student movement and ordered Hu to dismiss Fang, and two of his main supporters, from the party (Nathan, 2001). Hu refused these orders, and for two weeks the demonstrations continued, until he was forced to step down as Party General Secretary and deliver an involuntary public critique and recantation of his actions. Hu had been seen by many students as a symbol of hope, lending their protest legitimacy and potential transformative power (Calhoun, 1989).

After Hu’s death in April of 1989, students began to collect in Tiananmen Square as the Qing Ming festival vacation arrived, a festival to celebrate familial ancestors. As the festival came and went, many students stayed on in the square as new groups arrived from the larger Beijing Universities (Nathan, 2001; Calhoun, 1989). Public support continued to reinforce the student protest movement throughout the spring as April turned into May. The fortuitous scheduled visit from the Soviet reformer Mikhail Gorbachev, and the influx of foreign journalists arriving in Beijing, was another incentive for the protests. At the beginning of May, a 70th commemoration of the May 4th movement gave further energy to the protestors (Nathan, 2001; Calhoun, 1989).
In the wake of World War I, German territorial rights in Shandong province of China had been transferred to Japan. This was seen as a weakness on the part of the ruling Chinese government at the time, a weakness that student activists addressed in fomenting the 1919 May 4th movement. This historic symbol of student resistance, solidarity and protest served as another historical backdrop for the 1989 protest. Some in the square committed to a hunger strike, vowing to not eat until the government met the demands of the protest movement (Nathan, 2001; Calhoun, 1989).

The 1989 student demonstration spread from Beijing. During that spring, similar protests began in almost every major city within mainland China (Calhoun, 1989; Nathan, 2001). However, the events in Tiananmen Square were central to the conflict due to symbolic and logistical reasons. There was not an organized leadership coordinating the goals or tactics of the protests, though general frustrations with corruption and government impunity were often cited as a rationale (Calhoun, 1989). There were numerous leaders of different protest factions who were often at odds with each other concerning what their aims were (Calhoun, 1989, Nathan, 2001). These aims were never clearly stated in a unified sense.

Nevertheless, a cadre of outspoken student leaders had been gathered to meet with Premier Li Peng, an event that was broadcast on state television (Calhoun, 1989). Wuer Kaixi, a 20 year old medical student, wore his hospital clothes (perceived as a sign of disrespect), and berated the leader for arriving late (Calhoun, 1989). These acts were broadcast on a national stage. Kaixi had said this demonstration was to put the premier on the same level as the protestors, though the actions were seen by many as a provocation to the CPC leadership.

The government had difficulty ignoring the protest as it gained momentum. Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang, however, did not see the students as a direct threat (Calhoun, 1989,
Nathan, 2001). He saw the protesters voicing their frustrations and challenging the government to live up to its ideals. His leadership, in considering the protestors “patriotic”, led to a division in the upper echelons of the CPC during the spring of 1989, split between conservatives and those more sympathetic to the students (Calhoun, 1989, Nathan, 2001). Out of protest, Ziyang did not attend the party meeting when martial law was decided as the course of action. He was removed from his position as Party secretary soon after the events wound down.

Of more immediate concerns, the CPC was suspicious of the movement’s origins and support. On June 1st, an emergency report to the Beijing Party Committee lashed out against the foreign material aid, and foreign support being given to the demonstrators and specifically at the Voice of America (VOA) for broadcasting incendiary reports that were feeding the protest movement (Calhoun, 1989). There was speculation that much of the money coming to the protest trickled in from abroad. The CPC also lashed out against the George H.W. Bush’s administration and perceived western presence in the protest movement (Calhoun, 1989).

The initial party line was disseminated in late April when an editorial from Deng Xiaoping stated the student demonstrators posed a threat to both the political structure of the nation and the nation itself (Calhoun, 1989). The CPC further argued that since the party was being directed by foreign agents, it could not be patriotic and the students were being fooled by foreign influence or misguided in their naïve want of westernization (Nathan, 2001). The hardliners saw the demonstrations as an assault on the CPC and the socialist system (Nathan, 2001). Deng Xiaoping had transformed the economy with free market reforms, and many gains were made in the country, especially relative to the chaos during the Cultural Revolution (Calhoun, 1989). A nascent “New China” was what the CPC was protecting. Martial law was declared and troops sent in to break up the protest.
The use of the word “democracy” echoed the 1919 May 4th movement call for “democracy and science” (Calhoun, 1989). The protesters did not make specific demands for democratic reform, though did hint at greater freedoms for students and workers in assembling freely. The protestors did not state a desire to overthrow the CPC to bring a democratic system to fruition. The protest movement, comprised largely of Beijing University students and intellectuals, was an elite portion of the population (Calhoun, 1989, Nathan, 2001). Less than one percent of the Chinese population at the time held college degrees (Calhoun, 1989). The movement, however, threatened the CPC.

The night of the June 3rd crackdown in Tiananmen Square, a vote was taken to determine the course of the protest that evening – to go or stay. The majority voted to leave, but in a somewhat collectivist interpretation of a democratic action, many of the people that voted to leave stayed on in solidarity as troops arrived (Calhoun, 1989).

Through the western lens, this student movement and its violent repression was seen as a totalitarian response to western conceptions of governance, political values, and democracy. This western framework played into the portrayal seen by many; a struggle between the internal forces of a nascent democratic movement and a strict totalitarian rule. However, the Deng and the CPC saw the student demonstrators quite differently, as unpatriotic counter-revolutionaries which threatened social stability (Calhoun, 1989).

International opinion largely condemned the actions of the CPC in the wake of events at Tiananmen Square. Knowledge of lead up to the protest and the government reaction has been removed from normative discourse in Chinese media and education. There is much in terms of the events at Tiananmen Square that have never been released to the public by the CPC.
Tibetan Sovereignty

According to Tang dynasty documents, starting in 634 A.D., a delegation representing a unified Tibet arrived at the imperial court in Chang’an (present day city of Xi’an) to begin formal relations (Bushell, 1880). Before this time, Tibet was composed of 150 different sovereign tribes until the beginning of the 6th century, when they were united under Luntsansolungtsan, who expanded this Kingdom into present day central India (Bushell, 1880). Tang imperial documents from this time depict a nomadic agricultural people who farmed grains and kept yak, pig, dog, sheep, and horses (Bushell, 1880). These peoples were observed to not keep fixed dwellings. The capital of the kingdom was the present day Lhasa. It was during this time, through expansion into Nepal and India, that Buddhism was adopted as the official state religion of Tibet. Tibet also expanded towards imperial China in the years after initial contact, for a time occupying several Tang cities before eventually retreating to the Himalayan plain (Bushell, 1880).

The contemporary dispute concerning the Chinese claim to Tibet can be traced to the late 17th and 18th centuries when Tibet became a protectorate under the Manchu led Qing dynasty (Goldstein, 1998). However, Tibet retained its own culture, language, officials and army during this time and paid no tribute or taxes to the Qing regime (Goldstein, 1998). It was during this time, in 1642, that the Dalai Lama line of spiritual leaders began in Tibet (McGranahan, 2005). From 1728 until the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912, imperial administrators, ambans, were stationed in Lhasa, the historical capital of Tibet (Hessler, 1999). Records indicate that in 1792 the Qing Emperor sent troops to the area to repel invading Nepalese forces. Historians posit that Tibet served as a buffer state for invading forces and the Qing presence was accordingly low key (Hessler, 1999). The impact of Han culture was minimal; Tibetan language and cultures, as well
as the authority of the Dalai Lama, were allowed to maintain authority over domestic concerns. Britain had invaded Tibet in 1904 to open trade markets, and Chinese nationalist leader Sun Yat-Sen used this invasion in his populst platform. According to Sen, this was the latest example of foreign invaders further embarrassing China and the inability of the Qing regime to effectively govern.

By the time of the Qing overthrow in 1912, Tibet had been largely autonomous for many years (Goldstein, 1998). The Tibetans dismissed Chinese officials from Lhasa and claimed autonomy despite continued claims by Chinese and the refusal of the United States and Great Britain to acknowledge Tibetan autonomy (Goldstein, 1998). The maintenance of trade relations with China trumped diplomatic acknowledgment of Tibet. From the fall of the Qing in 1912 until the arrival of PRC troops in 1951, Tibet was largely autonomous as civil war and warlord rule prevailed in the eastern provinces.

Like the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai Shek, Communist forces also claimed Tibet as part of China, but had the military power to do so by force (Goldstein, 1998). CPC historians interpreted new texts that cited Chinese “ownership” of modern day Tibet to the Yuan (1271-1368) and Ming dynasties (1368-1644). This account has been contested by Tibetan scholars as fabricated, as some of the appointed officials did not appear in Tibetan documents from the time (Sperling, 2009). The discourse surrounding CPC governance of Tibet had been framed as liberation from feudalism, similar to the rest of Republican China. The boundaries of what were considered to be the newly united PRC extended to the furthest reaches of what had been considered China during the height of the Qing Dynasty, which included much of what is represented today as the present day PRC (Hessler, 1999).
The CPC sought a formal agreement of reunification between the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government. The Dalai Lama refused, and the People’s Liberation Army rolled into Tibet, making quick work of the Tibetan armed resistance (Goldstein, 1998). Once again, the CPC called for negotiations. The Tibetans appealed to both India and the United Nations for help, though neither were responsive (Goldstein, 1998). The ensuing negotiations resulted in the 17 point agreement between the Tibetan and Chinese governments signed in May of 1951. This agreement acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over Tibet for the first time in its history (Goldstein, 1998). However, it also recognized the rights of the Dalai Lama’s regime to continue its governance of the area until further reforms were asked for (Goldstein, 1998). Certain guarantees sought to protect the Tibetan language and culture through education, as part of the 17 point agreement: “the spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality shall be developed in step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet (Wangdu, 2011, pg 21)”.

Over the next decade this transition proved difficult, as resistance mounted against the CPC’s economic, social and political reforms (Yeh, 2007). In the eastern region of Kham, Tibetans took up arms in 1956 against Chinese troops and officials (McGranahan, 2005). This resistance crystallized as an uprising, with CIA assistance, on March 10th, 1959 which the CPC regime suppressed (Goldstein, 1998; Yeh, 2007). In 1959 the Dalai Lama fled for India, followed by an estimated 80,000 Tibetans (Goldstein, 1998). The CPC assumed full administrative and governing power, eliminating feudal and serf structures and instituting communes. The monastic system was also dismantled, and during the Cultural Revolution, all religious practices were outlawed (Goldstein, 1998). During the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976), the Tibetan language was suppressed as part of the “four olds” as a traditional understanding of antiquity that was to be banished (Wangdu, 2011).

With Deng Xiao Ping’s rise to power after the Cultural Revolution, a new tone emerged between Beijing and the Tibetan government in exile. Deng sought to settle issues concerning Tibet, aside from Tibetan independence, once and for all (Goldstein, 1998). Alongside the external diplomatic actions directed at the Dalai Lama, a domestic reform agenda was also ushered into place (Goldstein, 1998). This reform included increased Tibetan representation in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) administration, revitalization of Tibetan culture, which included Tibetan Buddhist monk recruitment. Chinese officials and the next in line to the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, worked together to have Tibetan be adopted as the official language of government in the TAR. The increased efforts to increase the visibility of Tibetan language and culture was paired with a domestic economic stimulus program which aimed to improve the standard of living through tax easements, infrastructure investment and other subsidies specifically targeted at the TAR (Goldstein, 1998).

In the early 1980’s The CPC encouraged a fact finding mission on behalf of representatives for the Dalai Lama to Tibet in the hopes of opening a new round of dialogue (Goldstein, 1998). The missions, however, did not shape up as Beijing had hoped, as the teams encountered unanticipated poverty and strong Tibetan nationalism, something which bolstered the resolve of the government in exile. Secret meetings between Beijing and the Dalai Lama occurred in 1982 and 1984 but did not bear results (Goldstein, 1998). The talks broke down due to the Tibetan insistence upon a democratic government in the TAR, autonomous of CPC rule, and a demand of further territorial reach into western Tibetan regions of China which had not been part of the present day TAR (Goldstein, 1998).
In response to the collapse of these negotiations, the Dalai Lama moved to rally popular support by visiting the west in 1987 as a political figure, whereas before he had presented himself as a religious leader. As part of the tour, his trip to Washington D.C. resulted in a denunciation of CPC policy in the United States legislature. Attached to the foreign relations Authorization act of December 1987 was language that condemned Chinese human rights violations in Tibet. In an early 1988 speech at Strasbourg, France, the Dalai Lama cited the illegal possession of Tibet by the PRC and proposed a plan for autonomous democratic rule under a constitution which protected similar freedoms as those enjoyed in the west (Goldstein, 1998).

Coinciding with this political tour, riots broke out in Lhasa. The CPC authorities quelled the disturbances, faulting their own administration for mishandling the development programs underway in the TAR. Another invitation was offered to the Dalai Lama from Beijing to begin talks again, but officials in the exile government convinced him to decline, as their political position was advantageous at the time. A second and third riot broke out during 1988, with a fourth riot at the beginning of March, 1989, ushering in a period of martial law and hard-line response to the unrest. This civil unrest, combined with the student movements of the late 1980’s, spurred a crackdown led by the installed Tibetan Autonomous Region party secretary Chen Kuiyan (Goldstein, 1998).

Due to the international campaigning of the Dalai Lama, the CPC was subjected to external political pressure from the international community while at the same time dealing with domestic pressure from unrest in the TAR (Goldstein, 1998). The Dalai Lama had outmaneuvered the CPC on the world stage. Moderate voices within the regime were drowned out by hard-line critics of the cultural revitalization efforts being carried out in Tibet, which were
perceived to be bolstering Tibetan nationalism and fueling some of the unrest. CPC conservatives eliminated the previous cultural reforms and focused doubly on economic development (Goldstein, 1998).

Part of this economic opening and infrastructure development of the TAR has been a large influx of Han Chinese seeking new opportunities and bringing with them, in large numbers, a slow integration into the PRC. For many years the isolation and distance between Tibet and the Han dominated eastern provinces had proven prohibitive to a high level of assimilation. This slow change away from Tibetan nationalism through Han assimilation was in the long term interest of CPC policy (Goldstein, 1998). The position of the regime regarding Tibet was exemplified by the People’s Daily, the CPC’s press outlet:

“Whenever one mentions Tibet, one usually associates it with backwardness, with being closed and with barreness…Tibet [has] a very, very long way to go for its economic development… … But this is no reason for Tibet to be content with the present situation and not to think of making progress. …Backwardness is not terrifying. Being geographically closed is not terrifying. What is terrifying is rigid and conservative thinking and the psychology of idleness (People’s Daily, 1994 as cited in Yeh, 2007).”

In the run up to the Olympics of 2008, attention turned to China as it prepared for the summer games. A protest in the TAR began as rumors circulated concerning the treatment of monks arrested for planning a demonstration to coincide with the March 10th anniversary of the 1959 Lhasa uprising. In response to these arrests, other monks took to the Lhasa streets. The march soon turned violent as groups of Tibetans began to riot and loot. The animosity was largely directed at the Han and Cui ethnic groups present in Lhasa (Economist, March 14, 2008). The crowds shouted “long live the Dalai Lama” and “Long live Tibet”, while another report
witnessed a Chinese flag being trampled on in the streets by protestors. Numerous internet media outlets were blocked including YouTube, the Guardian, and the New York Times. In the days which followed the attacks, state television repeatedly broadcast bulletins in both Chinese and Tibetan that responsibility for the small disturbances in Lhasa were the workings of the Dalai Clique. Tourist and foreign press visas were halted, as the unrest continued into the spring and through the Olympic Games. Since 2009 more than 120 Tibetans have immolated themselves in continued protest of the PRC.

The CPC solution to the harmonious integration of Tibet into the PRC has relied on social development and infrastructure projects. Since 1951, over 200,000 Han workers have served in Tibet in government sponsored development programs. Taxes are largely exempt for the Tibetan people. Other preferential tax codes have been established to encourage farmers to lease land tax free with low interest loans. There is no duty import imposed on goods from bordering Nepal and students from the TAR are given preferential status in the higher education admission process (Hessler, 1999).

From 1952 to 1994 Beijing invested 4.2 billion dollars into the region and in 1994 began 62 infrastructure projects in the area. In 1996, the Chinese spent nearly 600 million dollars in Tibet, a large sum for an estimated 2.5 million people. Beijing has provided Tibet with the modern infrastructure it lacked before (Hessler, 1999).

Regarding education in the TAR, the Tibetan language is used up to the primary level in most of the schools (Wangdu, 2011). In secondary schools, most use Mandarin as the language of instruction with Tibetan offered as a language subject. This puts many Tibetans at a disadvantage compared with fellow Han students who speak a mandarin based dialect in the home. Some areas in Qinghai, the province north of Tibet in the Gobi desert, teach the subjects
of history, geography, and math in Tibetan, but teach physics, chemistry, and biology in Mandarin. Tibetan schools also follow a national curriculum developed in Beijing which largely disregards Tibet and Tibetan culture outside of geography (Wangdu, 2011).

Current manifestations of a Beijing policy aimed at controlling civil unrest in the region are numerous, though following the jasmine revolutions and Arab spring, the “stability maintenance” apparatus funded by the government has impacted the Tibetan population in targeted ways. One aspect of this policy has restricted the movement of Tibetans to Lhasa from surrounding provinces with large Tibetan populations, such as those adjacent Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan. Han citizens of other provinces do not face the same scrutiny, as this policy has been aimed at limiting potential collective action on the part of Tibetans (Woeser, 2012).

Taiwan Independence

In framing the problematic situation of Taiwan’s status as sovereign state, the historical context highlights the complexity of the problem and its contemporary manifestations. On the island of Taiwan, evidence of agricultural production dates to 3,000 years BC, attributed to the Taiwanese indigenous population (Rubenstein, 2007). There is some dispute as to where the indigenous population arrived from, with many western anthropologists positing a southern origin theory that the groups arrived from Malaysia and the northern island of Luzon in the Philippines. On the other hand, many Chinese anthropologists maintain a northern origin theory that the indigenous population of Taiwan arrived from the southeastern coast of the present day PRC (Rubenstein, 2007). There is widespread agreement, however, that Taiwan has a culture shaped by its legacy of oceangoing trade due to its geographic position as a trading link for many economies in Southeast Asia (Rubenstein, 2007). This dispute over origin continues to play a piece in framing Taiwan as either an autonomous state created upon the foundation of a separate
people, or the idea that Taiwan was founded by Chinese and has always been in some way a part of what is now the PRC (Rubenstein, 2007).

In 1624, a period of Dutch colonial rule began on the Southern portion of Taiwan, while the Spanish maintained a presence on the northern coast. This period of brief colonization was ended by Zheng Chenggong and his family, descended from Fujian province on the mainland, in 1662. Zheng’s forces were an armed, private, sea-trading network which controlled interests being undermined by the Dutch and Spanish trading (Li, 2007). The geographic location of Taiwan connecting trade in Southeast Asia and to the world brought much wealth to the Zheng family who owned an estimated 70 percent of the ocean faring vessels at the time, controlling prices and trade between the historically closed mainland and the outside world (Li, 2007).

With the rise of the Qing dynasty, large waves of Han Chinese and Hakka (a Chinese minority group) from adjacent Fujian and Guangdong arrived. Along with these groups arrived imperial soldiers to occupy the island in 1684 (Li, 2009; Rubenstein, 2007). A ban on foreign trade by the distant Qing emperor brought the relationship between the coastal areas and the island of Taiwan closer together. During this time, Taiwan was considered a part of Fujian province. Through this imperial occupation, Han Chinese became the dominant cultural group, eclipsing the native Taiwanese indigenous groups (Li, 2007).

Over the next two hundred years, western powers Great Britain and the United States became increasingly interested in opening Chinese markets. In response to these pressures, and a stagnant domestic trade, the Qing emperor opened Taiwan ports in 1860 (Li, 2007). The return of international trade to Taiwan brought increased wealth to the Qing Empire with Taiwanese ports as the conduit.
Imperial Japan had long sought control of Taiwan due to its strategic position. After defeating the Chinese Navy in 1895, Taiwan was signed over to the empire of Japan after the first Sino-Japanese war and the treaty of Tianjin (Horayangura, 2012; Li, 2009; Rubenstein, 2007). During the ensuing years, Taiwan underwent an intensive industrialization as a Japanese colony, following the example of the Japanese Meiji restoration in 1868, the fast paced transformation undergone by Japan in the wake of economic trade liberalization. During colonial occupation, Japanese became the standard dialect (Li, 2009).

The Wuchang uprising led to the overthrow of the Mainland Chinese Qing Empire in 1912. The new regime was led by the democratic revolutionary, Sun Yat Sen, who was elected provisional president (Horayangura, 2012). Sun thereafter resigned from this post in favor of military leader Yuan Shikai, as his former revolutionary party was reorganized as the Kuomintang (KMT), or nationalist party (Horayangura, 2012). Between with the founding of the Republic of China in 1913 and 1929, 1000 warlords fought over 140 wars (Li, 2009). The power vacuum in the post imperial China was not fully filled until the 1949 victory of the Communist Party.

In 1913, in efforts to consolidate his power, Yuan Shikai announced that the KMT was to be disbanded and that Sun Yat Sen and other KMT officials were wanted on charges; Sen fled to Japan (Horayangura, 2012). In 1916, revolts against Yuan began in several Chinese provinces and Sen returned to Shanghai from exile in Japan to lead a new movement. By June of that year, Yuan had succumbed to illness and died, replaced by his vice president Li Yuanhong (Horayangura, 2012). Sun Yat Sen was elected to the position of Generalissimo in mainland China to try and stabilize the Northern provinces from warlord rule. However, opposing military forces once again took power of the Chinese parliament and restructured Sen’s position to make
it largely symbolic (Horayangura, 2012). After this Sun resigned from his post and lived in Shanghai to work on his writing.

With the outbreak of World War I, the Japanese declared war on Germany, invading Shandong province and Shanghai, where the Germans maintained quasi-colonies (Horayangura, 2012). The Treaty of Versailles awarded the former German territories to the Japanese, a slight towards the ruling Chinese authority which catalyzed a national movement. On May 4th, 1919 students from 13 universities gathered in Tiananmen Square to protest the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the Japanese presence in Shandong province. The populist student movement rallied nationalist pride which reacted against the perceived weakness of China in geopolitical affairs (Taylor, 2009).

Following the May 4th movement, the military rule of the country was dissolved and Parliament was reconvened, where Sun Yat Sen was elected president, a position he maintained until his death from Cancer in 1925 (Horayangura, 2012). Following the death of Sen, Chiang Kai Shek rose to power and marched with KMT forces through the north of China to defeat the warlords and unify the country, in collaboration with Communist forces and Soviet military advisors (Taylor, 2009). After establishing the capital in Nanjing, Chiang dissolved the collaboration between the Communists and sowed the seeds for the Chinese civil war, consolidating most urban centers under KMT rule, although the rural areas remained somewhat autonomous or under influence of the Communist and remaining warlord forces (Taylor, 2009). During the early 1930s, the Chinese civil war pitted the Communist forces eventually led by Mao Zedong against the KMT forces of Chiang Kai Shek. In 1934, the Communists had nearly been defeated in central China, but narrowly escaped west, retreating on the famous “long march”. The pre-World War II Japanese attack along the entirety of the eastern provinces complicated
matters further, drained KMT resource, attentions, and efficacy of governance. The Chinese Communist Party gathered significant populist power through their appeal to rural poor as defenders of the peasant class, enough to eventually defeat the Nationalist forces in 1949.

It was the defeat of Japan by the allies in 1945 when Taiwan came under the control of the Republic of China (ROC), which at the time held tenuous power on the mainland. The ROC was responsible for organizing the turnover of Taiwan from the Japanese. In this process the KMT forces seized private property, Japanese state run factories, and numerous other entities which enraged Taiwanese locals (Taylor, 2009). It was from this point that Mandarin, the dialect of Beijing, was reintroduced as the official language. In the wake of the transformation from Japanese to KMT occupation, a large anti-government protest began in Taipei on February 2nd, 1947, in which much of the city was seized by Taiwanese locals. The protestors issued a set of demands to be involved in negotiations with the Japanese to determine the future of Taiwan, and for basic guarantees concerning Taiwanese citizen roles in government (Taylor, 2009). The KMT forces cracked down in Taipei and the surrounding areas taken by locals. An estimated 10,000 to 30,000 people died in the ensuing backlash, beginning a long period of martial law on the island.

With the eventual victory of the Communist party in 1949, the KMT administration fled to the island and assumed complete control of Taiwan, establishing the Chinese government in exile at Taipei with a goal of retaking mainland China (Li, 2007; Taylor, 2009). The totalitarian rule of Chiang Kai Shek and the KMT was problematic in many ways, as the most government posts were held by former officials from the mainland regime. A purge of Communist sympathizers or suspected collaborators resulted in tens of thousands of imprisoned Taiwanese during what was called the “White Terror” (Taylor, 2009).
It was this totalitarian, one party rule of Chiang Kai Shek and the KMT which catalyzed the Taiwanese independence movement (Manthorpe, 2008). Under the guise of “wartime” governance against the PRC, the KMT continued to refuse Taiwanese representation in governance. This legacy was continued after Shek’s death in 1975, as the long state of martial law (1949-1987) continued. Throughout this time the dissident movement for Taiwanese independence moved forward, a social movement fueled by think tanks and lobbyists founded abroad by expatriates, especially in the United States, under which the conditions of Taiwan and Taiwanese citizens under the KMT were protested (Manthorpe, 2008).

Due to this countervailing pressure, and the successful transformation of the Taiwanese economy, a multiparty system was instituted after the lifting of martial law in 1987 (Manthorpe, 2008). The dissident voice was captured in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) platform, which took up Taiwanese independence as a political issue (Manthorpe, 2008). By becoming a part of the institution, the Taiwanese independence movement lost steam, as increased economic cooperation after the economic liberalization of the PRC in the early 1980’s added benefits for both economies. Throughout the 1990’s military threats from the PRC, including firing missiles into the strait of Taiwan, and the ambivalence of the United States to offer full support for a sovereign Taiwan has led to the “one country two systems” solution which remains the status quo to the present (Manthorpe, 2008).

In the past 370 years, the polity of Taiwan has existed under 7 different regimes, as sovereignty has fluctuated over the course of history (Li, 2007). The historical legacy of Taiwan is an issue wrapped in a conflicting identity of mainland Chinese and that of a sovereign state with a unique history and culture.
Chinese Media


From the founding of the PRC in 1949 through the Cultural Revolution in 1976, print, radio, and television media were state controlled entities, mouthpieces for CPC propaganda (Shirk, 2011; Zhang, 2011). Coinciding with the reform policies of economic and ideological liberalization begun in the late 1970’s under Deng Xiao Ping, media markets were opened to competition through decreased state subsidies and the introduction of advertising revenues, creating larger numbers of newspapers, magazines and television stations across the country. Though initially this decentralization was conceived as a strategy for further CPC ideological reach to the local level, demand for news and other substantive media quickly obscured the remaining official CPC mouthpieces (Zhang, 2011). However, the CPC retained control through licensing of these media groups and content monitors managed by the state administration of radio, film, and television (SARFT) (Qian & Bandurski, 2011). Though never openly acknowledged, a branch of SARFT known colloquially as the “publicity department” is charged with determining media content, censoring, and production of government propaganda (Shirk, 2011).

The advent of the internet has quickened the speed of how information is disseminated and how communication occurs (Fallows, 2011; Hess, 2013). As seen in the Arab Spring, and currently in mass protests in the Ukraine, regimes have increasingly faced organized collective action orchestrated through internet communications (Fallows, 2011; Hess, 2013). The Chinese
The Chinese government has taken a proactive stance to maintain stability through suppressing information, media stories, and messages which hold potential for collective action (King, Pan & Roberts, 2013). The ultimate goal of this campaign is to provide stability and maintain the oft echoed CPC discourse of a “harmonious society” (Shirk, 2011; Zhang, 2011). In an age when total CPC control of media is no longer a viable option, “public opinion channeling” has become the ideal, as outlined by former head of state Hu Jintao in 2009 (Qian & Bandurski, 2011; Zhang, 2011). For discourse and behaviors to be guided or channeled there has to be motivation for acceptance by the population. The authority of the PRC, in the form of police, military, and political power, serves as a motivating guide for discouraging deviations from the status quo. The media neglects information related to collective action and critique of CPC legitimacy. If found to be reporting on such subject matter, the entity facing losing their licensure on the organizational level or career on the individual level (Shirk, 2011; Zhang; 2011).

**Chinese Internet Censor Apparatus**

The Chinese internet is overseen by the ministry of Industry and Information technology, which provides the country with the infrastructure and service providers. The Ministry of Public Security’s Cyber police force is tasked with regulating online content, internet fraud, and pornography (Shirk, 2011). In October of 2013, Beijing News reported an estimated 2 million people, listed as internet opinion analysts, on state and commercial payrolls (BBC, October 4, 2013). The purported goal of this censor apparatus is to filter pornography and gambling websites. The actual policies and position of the CPC regarding their content filtering operational procedures have not been made public. However, recent research has yielded strong evidence that the government is actively suppressing information that might yield citizen collective action and or mobilization (King et al, 2013). Previous research focused on suppression of information
relating to citizen dissent, critique of high ranking party officials, or the legitimacy of the ruling party. According to King (2013), the underlying goal of this vast apparatus appears to be containing collective action on behalf of the citizenry.

The power of the internet as a medium of participatory expression was emboldened by the relative lack of political enfranchisement or expression in Chinese society (Zhang, 2011). The CPC has acknowledged, through sponsored media outlets, that the ability of the party to guide opinions or set the agenda for information related to domestic and international news coverage has been devalued by the spread of internet media (Guo & Xie, 2005).

The role of the state in developing public internet usage has been instrumental, highly scrutinized, and controlled since at least 2003 when the “great firewall” was installed as a mechanism for filtering offensive content and centralized filtering of information (Harvard International Review, 2009). This centralized filtering apparatus regarding internet content has grown alongside the rapidly advancing internet and telecommunication advancement of the last decade. According to numerous sources, the government apparatus can be broken down into three components: technical filtering, pre-publication censorship, and post-publication censorship (Qiang, 2011).

Technical filtering, involves the infrastructure and hardware of the Chinese internet. All Chinese internet traffic is bottlenecked through a state sponsored centralized operator that links China to the international internet. It is this function that can block foreign websites to the Chinese populace (Facebook, YouTube, twitter) on a permanent basis, but also allows certain news outlets such as the New York Times to be blocked when coverage is deemed problematic. The 6-8 state licensed operators of internet service are responsible for the CPC content filtering mandates, standing to lose their license if found to deviate from the centralized agenda (King et
al, 2013; Qiang, 2011). Keyword filtering software is the most common tool used by internet service providers in ensuring compliance with this mandate.

Prepublication censorship refers to the CPC rules of content to be filtered. This list of taboo topics ranges from long standing suppressed subjects such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations, Taiwanese relations, Tibetan sovereignty, and references to the Falun Gong group (a large spiritual movement targeted by the CPC due to its size and autonomy), but also corresponds to breaking news stories, and disgraced party officials (Shirk, 2011). These mandates for suppression are issued by the CPC censor authorities to the internet providers, carriers, and commercial outlets running websites (Qiang, 2011). Failure to enforce the mandate can mean the loss of government license. In terms of soft suppression, prepublication censorship also takes on other forms. One example is the ubiquitous presence of Jing Jing and Cha Cha, two online cartoon figures that warn internet users of online content infringements (Qiang, 2011). Jingcha is the mandarin word for police. These subtle reminders posed in prepublication reinforce the message that the internet activities of citizens are being watched (Qiang, 2011). The 50 cent party is another example of pre-publication activity which focuses on agenda setting and “opinion channeling”. Members of the 50 cent party are paid to post pro-government remarks in social media, blogs, or lead discussions within the framework of the government agenda (Shirk, 2011).

Post-Publication censorship is the onerous task of combing through web content posted in China. This process depends upon contracted individuals, and employs an estimated 2,000,000 censors who manually delete items, images, posts and other questionable content from the Chinese web (BBC, October 4, 2013). Due to this manual process, there is often a lag time of
between 24 and 48 hours where the content in question exists before being deleted (Qiang, 2011).

*Chinese Print Media Censor Apparatus*

Prior to the economic and cultural liberalization initiated under Deng Xiao Ping in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, print media was largely a propaganda tool of the ruling regime (Shirk, 2011, Zhang, 2011). In 1979 there were 69 newspapers in the country, all run by the party and state government. Foreign news coverage came from wire reporting through the Xinhua News Agency, the central mouthpiece for the CPC. The People’s daily and other official newspapers included commentaries and editorials read over loudspeakers in the streets as people made their way to work. Factories and organizations were required to have subscriptions to party newspapers (Shirk, 2011). News which affected localities, such as events, crime, or fires, were often not reported. The information gap between CPC officials and the general public was large. This eventually depoliticized the public, as had been the case in the Soviet totalitarian regime as well, resulting in a public that no longer listened to party voices for substantive news (Shirk, 2011).

In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, large government subsidies for newspapers, magazines, radio, and television were tapered off to encourage market competition as advertising monies increasingly drove revenues for the large majority of these media outlets (Zhang, 2011). Due to demand for news and the increasing profitability of these media ventures, the number of newspapers exploded across the country, reaching more than 2,000 published newspapers and 9,000 magazines at the present, the vast majority of which are commercially supported. This fierce competition for readership, combined with government censorship of sensitive political
material, has driven the media industry into a uniquely innocuous sensationalism of local and national events (Shirk, 2011).

There are twelve newspapers with national circulation of more than 1 million readers, printed in numerous locations throughout the country (Qiang & Bandurski, 2011). The official papers of the government remain Guangming Daily, People’s Daily, and Economics Daily (Shirk, 2011). The Guangming Daily bills itself as “a spiritual homeland for intellectuals” while the People’s Daily is the historical mouthpiece for the CPC. Economics Daily deals largely with business reports. Outside of the official papers, many of the other commercial media companies are partly owned by government and party authorities. However, all print media falls under the watch of the central authorities who have the power to fire editors and close newspapers. Placed in competition with commercial media sources, the official party news outlets are often derided for their authoritative and increasing irrelevance (Qian & Bandurski, 2011). In a study of Beijing newsreaders in 2004, nearly all respondents who read one newspaper preferred commercial media sources to that of the official CPC papers. Only respondents who read 2 or 3 papers were likely to subscribe or read official papers as well (Qian & Bandurski, 2011). This gap between commercial news outlets and the credibility of official party papers is problematic for the CPC in its efforts to “guide opinions”.

In efforts to recapture some of what had been lost in terms of print media agenda setting, the CPC launched a new strategy in 2007 which focused more on the role of internet media and the commercial urban newspapers that could be better utilized by the party to proactively control breaking stories (Shirk, 2011). The civil unrest in Tibet in the lead up to the 2008 Olympics, and the ensuing international coverage, was in part a motivation for this new strategy, where many felt was the result of a failed media policy. The status quo response during the unrest had been
vigilant censorship of the events, shutting down the Tibet border and slowly letting official information trickle out. However, this tactic proved ineffective in the wake of internet media capabilities which the international media fully utilized (Shirk, 2011).

The new strategy spearheaded by Hu Jintao signaled a move away from traditional CPC censor control of banning reporting, shutting down access to the area, and other hard-line suppression tactics (Zhang, 2011). The new strategy highlighted the need to frame CPC issues in a more subtle and proactive means such as utilizing the internet and commercial news outlets for greater credibility and control over news releases (Qian & Bandurski, 2011; Zhang, 2011).

**Chinese Television Censor Apparatus**

China Central Television (CCTV), has 22 channels and is the lone national network in the PRC (Miao, 2011). The state administration of radio, film and television (SARFT) is responsible for the operations of the estimated 3,000 local television stations and along with the Publicity department of the CPC is the ultimate authority when it comes to what airs on Chinese television. As the most accessible medium if media in rural areas, television is important to how people learn, and of particular concern to the CPC (Miao, 2011).

Starting with 1978, in the similar vein of print media, Chinese television began introducing advertising to finance local television stations and CCTV as well (Miao, 2011). The stations are allowed to schedule programming to attract viewers, though ultimate programming decisions are centrally controlled. The rapid proliferation of television stations and increased broadcast hours, fueled the import of foreign programming beginning in the 1980s (Zhang, 2011). The understanding that these self-sufficient television stations were responsible for winning viewers while remaining politically neutral drove a similar type of news programming
in many localities, a middle ground topical broadcast which sensationalized innocuous new stories (Miao, 2011; Zhang, 2011).

Repercussions for Citizens

Numerous individuals and organizations have been punished for disseminating content perceived as violating content standards. According to Reporters without Borders in a report from October 13th, 2013, currently 70 “netizens” and 29 journalists are imprisoned in China on various charges related to their transgressing media and internet content regulations.

The most visible of those imprisoned is the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, currently serving an 11 year prison sentence for publishing material determined by authorities to be “inciting subversion” in its calls for political reforms and addressing human rights violations (Qiang, 2011; Reporters without borders, October 13th, 2013).

Another example involves the case of Hu Jia, a human rights activist sentenced to 3.5 years in prison for “inciting subversion of state power” through articles published online. Huang Qi, a blogger who posted critical comments and photos of the Sichuan earthquake relief effort, was jailed for “illegal possession of state secrets”. Liu Jin, a former university librarian, was sentenced to 3 years in prison for “using a heretical organization to undermine implementation of the law” after downloading information about the Falun Gong group and passing it on to others (Harvard International Review, 2009). In January 2008, a construction company executive named Wei Wenhua was beaten to death by officials after using his phone to film and distribute a clash between police and demonstrators concerning waste dumping in their neighborhood (Harvard International Review, 2009).
The Xiamen PX Case

A case which highlights the convergence of old and new media, the role of the CPC in guiding public opinion, and the participatory political outlet of new media technology involves the case of the Xiamen PX project. Plans had been made in the eastern city of Xiamen to build a large chemical processing facility manufacturing an industrial solvent named paraxylene, a chemical with demonstrated links to cancer and fetal mutations (Qiang, 2011; Qian & Bandurski, 2011). Citizens of the community had not been consulted about the environmental impact report, and a local chemistry professor, Zhao Yufen, wrote an open letter to local officials warning of the danger the proposed plant posed. He was summarily told to remain quiet by local officials and that the project would continue as planned due to its importance to the local economy (Qiang, 2011; Qian & Bandurski, 2011). Professor Zhao, and other community leaders, circulated a petition to local delegates to be presented to officials at a regional CPC assembly. The story was taken up by some major newspapers as a general critique of a widespread practice of local officials not considering the needs of citizens in development projects. Local officials in Xiamen met and decided to ban coverage of the story in the local press. This suppression of the story was taken up in the blogging activities of Zhing Xiaoyong, a Xiamen resident who began reporting on events under an online penname, reports which were sent all over the country (Qiang, 2011; Qian & Bandurski, 2011).

The clashes over the plant continued into May 2007, when residents of Xiamen began organizing a protest march via text messages in response to the beginning of the project. By May 29th, newspapers were reporting that 1 million short text messages had been sent amongst people in Xiamen and also to people in other cities. The messages called for residents of Xiamen to turn out in force on June 1st to protest the Xiamen PX project (Qiang, 2011; Qian &
Bandurski, 2011). The momentum of the internet attention and media outside of the Xiamen ban on reporting pressured the local officials to “postpone” the project, though the movement was in motion. One web-user was arrested after posting in a chat room a call to “march” on May 29th. Despite the efforts of officials to control the protest, thousands took the streets in non-violent protest on the 1st and 2nd of June. The images of the demonstration were broadcast across the country by cell phones. In the wake of the protest, a new protocol was established by the local authorities that included consultation with citizen groups in developing projects such as the Xiamen PX plant (Qiang, 2011; Qian & Bandurski, 2011).

This case demonstrates the status quo CPC reaction to civic unrest (media suppression/closing the area to journalists) not working in the age of the advanced media and communication technology. This case, along with the riots in Lhasa in 2008, changed CPC policy concerning future episodes of civic unrest (Zhang, 2011).

Conceptual Framework

*Social Constructivism*

From the epistemological stance of a social constructivist, an ontological lens of postmodern discursive analysis lends itself well to analyzing the Three T’s. This social constructivist stance is reinforced by my choice of qualitative study. The constructivist grounded theory approach focuses on the myriad worldviews, perceptions, realities, views and actions which comprise complex contexts’. The goal of this research methodology was to explain a how knowledge and perceptions about the censored Three T’s were constructed, and how this affected the participant understandings of government and their role as citizens (Charmaz, 2006). The complexities of the socio-cultural context in the People’s Republic of China required an
inductive approach to understanding how the Three T’s were perceived by participants. This inductive process led to the generation of a contextually grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006).

Social constructivism is a worldview that relies on the participant perceptions of a phenomenon. In many cases, the subjective views of the participant are negotiated historically and socially (Creswell, 2013). The cultural and social norms of Chinese society have formed the context in which the individual realities of participants have been constructed. Instead of beginning with a hypothesis, social constructivist grounded theory inductively yields a theory or a pattern from the data accumulated. The value of thick, rich detail and context is important to both qualitative study and social constructivist grounded theory because it reflects the lived experiences and perceptions of the participants (Creswell, 2013). The cultural and historical context in which participants live is essential to this study. It is through this lens that the particular details, values, and beliefs can be contextualized in a general understanding of the phenomenon (Creswell, 2013). Through a grounded theory research methodology, this inductive process of data collection and data analysis captures a unique understanding of this complex phenomenon.

Theoretical Framework

Discursive Analysis

After the grounded theory emerged, I sought to deductively identify the discourse which comprised the truth or knowledge base of the phenomenon. For this phase of coding, I used Michel Foucault’s and Stuart Hall’s work in discursive analysis. Foucauldian discourse analysis is concerned with relationships of power and language, of how dominant groups use this relationship to subordinate the less powerful through politics, education, and the media (Foucault, 1972).
The discursive approach seeks to expose a particular reality or truth at a particular moment in time. It is concerned with exposing how these truths are constructed at certain times in history and how the perceived truth affects the actions of different subjects operating under the “rules” of the discourse (Foucault, 1972). Following this, what we think we know in a particular time about a specific topic has a bearing on how we regulate, control, and discipline subjects of the said topic. Foucault maintained that the application and effectiveness of power and knowledge is more important than the “truth” of it (Foucault, 1972). This is an apt point concerning the treatment of the Three T’s in the dominant Chinese discourse – the power of the censor apparatus in shaping knowledge and power obscures the “truth”.

According to Stuart Hall in 1997, a discursive formation can be summarized as follows. First, statements are made about a topic by a dominant group, statements that create an “official” knowledge about the said topic. Secondly, “rules” are created prescribing ways of talking about the chosen topic and excluding other ways. These rules also govern what is “sayable” or “thinkable” about the chosen topic at a particular historical moment. Third, subjects in some way embody or personify the attributes of the discourse. After that, the process of how this knowledge acquires authority or a sense of embodying the “truth” must be pinpointed. Following this, the institutional practices for dealing with the subjects, whose conduct is being regulated and organized according to the “rules,” is scrutinized. Finally, the researcher must acknowledge that a different discourse or truth will arise at a different historical moment, replacing the existing one, and opening up a new discursive formation, starting a new cycle (Hall, 1997).

Social constructivism and discourse analysis complement each other, providing a macro and micro picture of the Three T’s. First, the socio-cultural context which underlie the values,
culture, worldviews and beliefs of the participants provided a macro perspective. Secondly, it was from this broad understanding that discourse surrounding the Three T’s was analyzed through a focused lens.

**Cultural Reproduction and Symbolic Violence**

The final step of deductive coding analyzed the grounded theory in relation to the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, particularly his theories of social reproduction and symbolic violence. Bourdieu studied the reproduction of hierarchies in societies (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990). According to Bourdieu (1990), it was through social mechanisms of influence, such as language and culture, that the powerful can subjugate and maintain power over time. Education and media play a significant role as pedagogic authorities on behalf of socially constructed cultures and power hierarchies (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990). For Bourdieu, the interaction between habitas, field, and capital explain power relations in complicated societies.

According to Bourdieu, the field is the social context of the actor, a context with its own rules, symbols, power structures, and culture. Habitats are the worldviews and systems of perceptions which guide action within the field (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990). The habitas is constructed by the pedagogic authority, a product of education. Capital refers to the exchange of power within the field, a form of power gained through negotiation of approved symbols, rules, education and behavior (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990). Capital can take many forms can be symbolic, economic, and social.

Bourdieu’s use of *symbolic violence* referred to instances when subjugated actors adopted the worldview of the powerful in justly rationalizing their own powerless situation. This internalization of subjugation as the status quo was symbolically violent and served to reproduce inequities in social hierarchies (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990).
Chapter Summary

The collective values of interdependence and social harmony are based in the labor intensive and collaborative process of rice farming. For effective production of rice and communal social stability, each person had a role to fulfill. The opinions and individual wants were sublimated in a greater concern for the well-being of the community. This way of life influenced the communication styles, language, worldviews and governance, becoming a codified school of thought in the analects of Confucius.

The socio-cultural context of authoritarian rule by the Chinese Communist Party in the People’s Republic of China under a rationale of harmony echoes Confucian thought. The emergence of the CPC relied on this context to maintain their own authoritarian collective ideology on a populace tired of warfare and imperial weakness. By controlling the perceptions of citizens through formal and informal means of education, the ideology of the CPC could withstand the economic and social liberalization in the years following the Cultural Revolution.

The events related to the Tiananmen Square events of 1989, to the Taiwanese independence movement and Tibetan unrest served as threats to the mandate of heaven cited in the analects of Confucius. The suppression of information related to these events in education, media and consequentially society was a result of this campaign.

What is Known So Far?

Information and knowledge related to the three T’s is suppressed in education, the media and society at large. What is not known is how or if people learn about these events given the level of attention directed at controlling and censoring content in the PRC.
CHAPTER III. METHOD

Chapter Overview

This research combined a mixed qualitative research process of inductive grounded theory methodology and deductive analysis. This chapter is organized to describe the process through which data was collected and analyzed, beginning with a) the conceptual framework, b) research methodology, c) justification for the chosen methods, e) description of participant selection and participants, f) pre and post interview protocol, g) description of open coding, h) description of axial coding, i) the deductive analysis process is described.

Conceptual Framework

The inductive nature of grounded theory qualitative methodology is well suited to exploring and constructing theory around the complex context surrounding the “Three T’s”. Beyond this inductively constructed theory taken from the data, deductive lenses of discourse analysis and theories of cultural reproduction and symbolic violence will be applied to increase the rigor of the data analysis. This combination of inductive grounded theory methodology and deductive theoretical analysis will yield a more descriptive and rich understanding of the Three T’s. This two-phase analysis of the data will also compartmentalize the data into inductive and deductive sections, reducing the impact of researcher bias if the analysis was conducted as one whole unit.

How the Three T’s are perceived in relation to other emergent themes is integral to researching this phenomenon. As a researcher with a social constructivist worldview and postmodern theoretical framework, the participant voice situated in a socio-cultural context is the most accurate method of finding out what is occurring relating to these events (Three T’s) and how a sample of Chinese citizens perceive them. Through a grounded theory qualitative study
the dimensions of the participant voices can be compared to others, themes teased out from the data, and an emergent theory developed connecting these themes. In other words, from the participant voices, an inductive understanding of this phenomenon can take form and be compared to pertinent literature during coding and data analysis.

Phase 1 -- Grounded Theory

Grounded theory methodology is well suited to investigating complex social problems and constructing theories which help explain what is happening, especially through the creative and responsive nature of the research design. Through the process of constant comparison of various data sources (interviews, notes, conversations, memos, literature) coding yields a main category and various themes later connected by theoretical coding. The rigor of the methodology lies in its pursuit of countervailing theory as part of the constant comparison process, of member checking and triangulating sources as well.

Phase 2 -- Deductive Analysis – Social Constructivism, Cultural Reproduction, and Symbolic Violence

Social constructivism is an epistemological stance which is concerned with how cultural context, history and worldview affect the knowledge formation of individuals and how this knowledge affects society (Kukla, 2000 as cited in Kim). In this paradigm, individuals learn and negotiate subjective truths as part of a process embedded within a cultural framework. To understand what has been constructed, it is essential to understand the social context of the individual. Social constructivists break down reality, knowledge, and learning as follows.

In this paradigm reality is constructed through human activity, that in coordination with other members of society, the properties of the world are invented (Kukla, 2000 as cited in Kim). Reality must be socially constructed; it cannot be discovered in other form.
Social constructivists perceive knowledge as a human product, culturally and socially created. Individuals create meaning though interacting with others and the context in which they live (Ernest, 1999 as cited in Kim). Learning is a social process, where an exchange between the individual factors of development and external stimulus create a contextually defined creation of knowledge (McMahon, 1997 as cited in Kim).

The Constructivist grounded theory approach focuses on the myriad worldviews, perceptions, realities, views and actions which comprise complex specific contexts. The goal of this research methodology is to explain a phenomenon (Charmaz, 2006). The complexities of the socio-cultural context in the People’s Republic of China require an inductive approach to understanding how the Three T’s are perceived by participants. This inductive process will lead to the generation of contextually grounded theory regarding the phenomenon (Charmaz, 2006).

Research Design and Methodology

Justification and Importance of Phase One Grounded Theory and Phase Two Deductive Analysis Approach

What sets grounded theory methodology apart from other methodological approaches is the lack of hypothesis testing. This was especially important in researching the Three T’s due to the complex socio-cultural context of the phenomenon coupled with my researcher bias in analyzing the phenomenon from a western perspective. Instead of deductively testing a hypothesis through research into the phenomenon, grounded theory provided an inductive, emergent explanation for how the perceptions and knowledge related to the Three T’s were created and what affect this knowledge had on other areas of their lives.

According to Glaser (1992), this methodology ideally results in a theory which satisfies two criteria: First, that it works when correctly carried out with the appropriate research
questions and overall design, and secondly, that it helps people in the situation to make sense of their experience and manage it better. Grounded theory methodology mirrors the natural process of social constructivism in its inductive creation of a theory or understanding of the phenomenon under focus. This inductive discovery allowed for creative exploration in terms of my research design. This fundamental difference of inductive processing affected how the research process was addressed. As opposed to a more linear step by step research process, grounded theory is flexible in its approach to the situation, as the data collection, note-taking, coding and memoing occurred simultaneously, each aspect affecting the other in a generative process of theory building.

Figure 1 – Visualization of the Research Process

Grounded Theory Process

Initially, the literature provided a means for establishing a baseline understanding and context for the area being studied. Barney Glaser, a pre-eminent grounded theorist, warned against too much literature review in specific areas related to the phenomenon, as he saw it as an
inhibition in seeking emergent, inductive coding (Glaser, 1978). However, given the complexity of the Three T’s and the foreign socio-cultural context in which the phenomenon occurs, a greater emphasis on understanding the history and culture of China and government was needed. I acknowledged the subjective nature of any historical narrative, and was limited to English texts, but I sought to limit this subjectivity through triangulation and inclusion of countervailing sources, including an ethical argument for Chinese censorship included in the discussion section. Relating to the Three T’s, the literature review contains aspects which provide a general historical backdrop to the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989, the history of Tibet which fuels the current conflicts, and a similar historical record provided for Taiwan’s history. Furthermore, the importance of the socio-cultural context is addressed in providing a general understanding of historical factors involved in the development of Chinese culture and a topical contemporary description of this culture looks like today. Lastly, an overview of Chinese education and media was addressed in creating a literature base to proceed.

Grounded theory methodology, during data analysis, allows for a second, deductive round of literature review after the inductive process of coding has reached saturation. This deductive aspect of the literature review should be responsive to the direction of the emergent theory in the data collection process, helping to guide or strengthen (through countervailing data) the emergent theory. As opposed to other methodologies, the literature is placed on equal terms with the other sources of data in grounded methodology, reinforcing emergent theory or its generation.

Participants

I used a purposive sample for selecting participants in this study. The criteria for this sample were Chinese citizenship and experience as learners within the Chinese and Taiwanese
educational systems. These participants ranged in age from 21 to 45 and were taken from both genders. In recruiting participants I used a snowball strategy to reach 11 participants via contacts who knew other Chinese and Taiwanese nationals in the vicinity of Bowling Green State University. A total of 15 – 20 interviews were initially targeted in the HSRB approval.

I primarily collected data through individual interviews. My questions were well suited for generating qualitative interview based data. To generate the thick, rich details in relation to the Three T’s I asked open ended questions regarding perceptions, personal opinions, and experience with how knowledge related to this phenomenon is communicated and constructed.

**Description of Participants**

The findings in this study were the result of interviews with 11 participants of Chinese nationality participated in a semi-structured interview format lasting between twenty five and seventy minutes. Other than verification of age, ethnicity, education level and Communist Party affiliation, no demographic information was specifically requested of the participants. Throughout the interview process, participants responded to open ended questions which provided information about their perceptions of the context surrounding the Three T’s and how they perceived the topics. The following are brief descriptions of the participants that took part in the study. To protect confidentiality, names of participants have been changed and only general information about their lives is provided.

*Bai Yang*

Bai Yang is 25 year old male and is ethnically Han Chinese. He is an only child from a major eastern urban center and a recent college graduate. Two and half months before the interview he had arrived in the United States to pursue graduate studies.
Liu

Liu is a 25 year old female, the younger of two children, and is ethnically Han Chinese. Liu is a Communist Party member and a college graduate. At the time of the interview, Liu had been pursuing a graduate degree in the United States for two months.

Jiu

Jiu is a 27 year old male who is ethnically Han Chinese. He was raised in a major urban center, graduated with an undergraduate degree, but was disillusioned by his chosen career path upon graduation. He met a Tai chi mentor who inspired him to change his career path. At the time of the interview he had spent one year pursuing his new career in the United States.

Yi

Yi is a 23 year old female who is ethnically Han Chinese. She was raised in a major urban center in Southeastern China in a middle class family. Yi is a recent college graduate who arrived in the United States 1 month before the interview to pursue a graduate degree.

Xin

Xin is a 25 year old Female who is ethnically Han Chinese. She was raised in a rural area of northeastern China but studied for her undergraduate degree in a major urban center. Her parents are working class laborers. She arrived in the United States five weeks before the interview to pursue graduate studies.

Feng

Feng is a 24 year old Female who is ethnically Han Chinese. Feng comes from an upper middle class family in a medium sized city in central China and is a Communist Party member, as are her parents. Feng arrived in the United States a year and a half before the interview to pursue graduate studies.
Shui

Shui is a 21 year old Male who is ethnically Han Chinese. He was raised in a major urban center in southeastern China. Shui did not finish his undergraduate degree, though he hopes to return to university to complete his degree. Shui arrived in the United States three weeks before the interview.

Huo

Huo is a 27 year old female who is ethnically Han Chinese. She is the younger of two children and was raised in a rural area in central China. She attended high school and higher education in a medium sized Chinese city where she completed an associate’s degree. After working in the Chinese education system she came to the United States to pursue graduate studies. At the time of the interview she had been living in the United States for a year and a half.

Zhi

Zhi is a 23 year old Female from Taiwan. She was raised and attended school in a major urban center in Taiwan where she also completed her undergraduate degree. She arrived two months before the interview to attend English language classes.

Cai

Cai is a 45 year old female who is ethnically Han Chinese. She has worked and lived in a major urban center in north central China for many years, where she also completed a graduate degree. She has worked in tertiary education in the Chinese education system and arrived in the United States seven months before the interview.

Mei
Mei is a 25 year old female from Taiwan. She was raised and attended school in a major urban center where she also completed her undergraduate education. At the time of the interview, she was pursuing a graduate degree after a year and a half studying in the United States.

Overview of Methods

Ethical Clearance

Time Frame: May-July 2013

Methods: After submitting the Human Subjects Research Board (HSRB) documents for approval in mid-May of 2013, the research office granted approval for the documents, including the verbal and written consent forms, flier for distribution, sample interview questions, and email contact protocol. (Approval No. 480416-5 Valid until June 26th, 2014).

Data Collection

In grounded theory methodology, data comes from interviews, conversations, or other mediums which can be woven into the emerging theory. In this sense, data can be found everywhere in the collection process, noted in memos, notes and diagrams as it materializes (Glaser, 1992). Note taking and memoing are important facets of the interview process in identifying key words and emergent themes; this organization eases later coding and is taken real-time to capture the essence of the moment. This study concerned an in-depth data collection involving numerous sources of information such as interview transcripts, notes from conversations, documentaries, newspaper articles, videos and internet. The internet is a powerful medium for communication within Chinese society; a fact borne out by the literature (Shirk, 2011). However, the most important data accumulated in this research was taken from participant voices in interviews.
Table 1 – Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Interview Transcripts</th>
<th>Newspaper Articles</th>
<th>Government reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Notes from Conversations</td>
<td>Documentary Films</td>
<td>Peer-reviewed research</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email correspondence</td>
<td>Internet Videos</td>
<td>Chat Rooms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memos</td>
<td>WikiLeaks</td>
<td>Participant voices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interview Protocol

Due to the sensitive nature of these issues within normative discourse, I initially focused on establishing rapport and trustworthiness before I began with the formal interviews. This was established through an initial meeting and general get-to-know you session. This more extended process of relationship building through email and informal conversations proved fruitful in interviews. Often this occurred over some food as a way to open the channels of communication. Having this type of relationship, one that had been established to be trustworthy, was essential to data collection through interviews in this study.

After this initial meeting, I explained and read through the informed consent release approved by the HSRB board for this research. After clarifying any questions, participants were instructed to sign the release to begin the interview process. I collected my data through face to face, semi-structured, individual interviews lasting between 25 and 70 minutes. The interviews were tape-recorded, except for one participant who refused to be tape recorded. My open-ended questions were well suited for qualitative interview based data given the heavily contextualized subject matter. I asked questions regarding perceptions, looking at the process of how specific information was communicated within the experience of each participant.

Examples of Interview Questions:

1) How would you describe Chinese education?
2) How are the events surrounding Tibet treated in the classroom?

3) How do people learn about sensitive issues such as Tiananmen Square?

Memoing

During the interviews, I tried to maintain the flow of the conversation while at the same time taking notes and written observations of nonverbal communication. This protocol helped in identifying words that were particularly emphasized by participants as key to understanding certain contextual phenomenon. This keyword, real time coding, helped in later data analysis.

Member checking

Considering the language barrier of researcher and participants (native English speaker compared to native Chinese speaker), an important part of my data collection in interviews was member checking. I did this through reading back to participant’s notes I had taken on their answers in a general summary form and verifying that what they said. This was an important aspect of taking accurate notes and steps to maintain a close relationship between the data and participant realities (Creswell, 2013).

Post Interview Process

After processing the information during the interview, I reflected on any insights I may have gained through the interview process and tried to recall any non-verbal or verbal behavior that may have been expressed from my notes. A reflection memo followed after the interview had been completed, a part of the constant comparative process.

After transcribing the interview verbatim, I read the transcript again as a whole. From there I took notes on the transcripts concerning key phrases, ideas, and concepts that struck me as conducive to emergent categories, themes, and sub themes. These emergent themes were the product of an inductive process, one which sought to remain objective, and not forced (Glaser,
1992). From there I determined if any emergent themes, or codes, that reflected the views of the participants, had surfaced. Ideally these codes embodied the very language of the participants, *in vivo* codes as suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998), to reflect the reality of the participant. Other coding signifiers could be generated from the existing literature or generated by myself as researcher.

*Increasing Rigor In Accuracy and Reducing Researcher Bias*

Though validity in the quantitative methodological sense does not apply to grounded theory, steps were taken to increase accuracy and reduce researcher bias during the data collection and data analysis process as listed below:

*Investigator and Data Triangulation*

In an effort to increase internal consistency in the research and reduce my own researcher bias, I used other another researcher to separately code the data from transcriptions. This aspect of the research process was cited by Creswell (2013) as investigator triangulation, a process which helps to improve accuracy in data analysis and decrease researcher bias. Through comparing these separate coding notes to my own, and through the constant comparative analysis advocated by Glaser, data triangulation could be actuated. Data triangulation helps to create a holistic understanding of the data in its richness (Creswell, 2013).

*Data Analysis*

The analytical framework for a grounded data analysis in this research combined Glaser’s (1992) constant comparative method with Strauss and Corbin’s Open and Axial coding frameworks. After the grounded theory emerged, the deductive analysis in light of the social construction, cultural reproduction, and symbolic violence were compared and contrasted with the grounded theory.
In grounded methodology, the researcher seeks to objectively assess the phenomenon under study and to figure out what is going on, who the actors are and what their place is; to construct a general understanding of the situation. This process began with the first interview, and continued in subsequent interviews as a comparative process in which emergent themes yielded emergent theory. This process was known as constant comparative analysis (Glaser, 1992). The diagram below demonstrates the process:

**Figure 2 – A Visualization of the Constant Comparative Process**

As this constant comparative process progressed, one theme emerged as a predominant code, as the core category, the central crux around which the theory and related themes could be organized. This code in relation to the Three T’s was *censorship*.

Glaser (1992) advises against determining a core category early in the data collection process, and instead advocates focusing on one category if numerous categories emerge. This process of continuous coding eventually winnows the data to relevant material integral to the emergent theoretical umbrella. When the coding of certain themes or categories becomes redundant, coding saturation has been reached (Glaser, 1992). According to classic grounded
theorists such as Barney Glaser (1992), the coding process follows three steps: Open, theoretical, and constant comparative coding. Open coding is the initial analytic process, yielding themes from the data, and ideally a core theme. Theoretical coding is the next step in the analytic process, where connections are developed between the emergent themes. Constant comparative coding refers to the ongoing process of both open and theoretical coding and their continuing evolution in the analysis process (Glaser, 1992). This process of coding is best visualized through diagramming and thought maps where the data can be analyzed in light of its complexities.

**Coding Scheme**

Strauss and Corbin (1998) found some aspects of classic grounded theory coding problematic given the complexities of the social constructivist context. In this vein, their work in grounded theory increasingly focused on one coding family concerning the causes, conditions, and consequences of the phenomenon being analyzed (Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006). It was this ontological movement which led to their development of open and Axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This methodical process, of moving from Open coding and later to axial coding via the condition/consequential matrix, is well suited to a social constructivist conceptual framework and furthermore to the discourse analysis and the cultural reproduction theories of the project’s theoretical framework.

**Open Coding**

According to Strauss and Corbin (1998), Open coding is the initial process of analysis in which concepts are located and their properties and dimensions pin pointed in the data. This process takes into account the phenomena, or central ideas in the data represented as concepts. Concepts are deemed the building blocks of theory, where categories are concepts that stand for
phenomena. These categories can be described in terms of properties, the description of which gives it meaning. Dimensions refer to the range of general properties of a category. In the open coding process, three modes of information communication within the Chinese context became readily apparent as participants discussed the Three T’s. Three pedagogical authorities which shaped participant perceptions and creation of knowledge concerning these events were described. As shown in Figure 3, these pedagogical authorities were the education system, the media, and family or community.
Figure 3 – Open Coding Results

The Three T’s

- Tibetan sovereignty
- Tiananmen Square 1989
- Taiwan Independence

Censorship

- Media Pedagogical Authority
- Educational System Pedagogical Authority
- Family, community, & informal pedagogical authority
- Media Pedagogical Authority
- Educational System Pedagogical Authority
- Family, community, & informal pedagogical authority
Axial Coding

According to Strauss and Corbin (1998), axial coding is the process of relating categories to their subcategories, linking categories at the level of properties and dimensions.

![Axial Coding Diagram]

**Figure 4** – A Visualization of the Axial Coding Framework

Axial coding takes elements of both inductive and deductive logical processes to find connections between themes taken from the data. Axial coding begins with categories concerned by the phenomenon under investigation. This research used the core category of censorship and three sub-categories: educational pedagogical authority, Media pedagogical authority, and familial and community pedagogical authority. From these three subcategories, through the lens
of the core category, the Three T’s were analyzed in terms of its causation, structural foundations, and socio-cultural context (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Lastly, deductive links were made between the categories involved.

**Figure 5 – Axial Coding Results**
Forming a Grounded Theory

Through diagramming the core category, categories, subcategories, and dimensional properties of the data, connections were made in the formation of a theory explaining the how the Three T’s are communicated and what affect this has had on participant perceptions, while at the same time answering the research questions from an inductive point of view.

Deductive Analysis

Once the core category (censorship), categories, and subcategories were discussed, the deductive analysis began. This phase employed the same the grounded categories, subcategories, and their inherent dimensions coded in light of the deductive theoretical framework. This deductive step furthered the scope of the theory, increased the theoretical rigor, and separated researcher bias from the inductive data discussion.

For the first research question results, each grounded category explaining how the Three T’s were communicated (educational pedagogical authority, media pedagogical authority, familial and community pedagogical authority) was coded in light of Michel Foucault’s discursive approach, tracing the institutional role of censorship in creating normative or dominant discourse through the voices of the participants. In coding the categories for this analysis, the discursive approach of Stuart hall (1997) was used to demonstrate how participants and the literature described discourse surrounding the Three T’s. Extending the analysis one step further, the same categories were analyzed in terms of Pierre Bourdieu’s theories of cultural reproduction and symbolic violence.

Regarding the second research question, deductive analysis consisted of analyzing the grounded theory sub-categories (perceptions of Chinese education system, lack of critical thinking, academic pressure, internet, Japan, special treatment of minorities, role of democracy,
and perceptions of government) in light of Pierre Bourdieu’s theories of cultural reproduction and symbolic violence.

**Table 2 — Core Category Coding Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Category – <em>Censorship</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Raw Data</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discussion of raw data</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grounded analysis of data</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Deductive Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discursive approach</th>
<th>How is discourse shaped by this?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural reproduction &amp; symbolic violence</td>
<td>What aspects of culture are being reproduced? How is power distributed?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 – Research Question One Coding Table

Research Question # 1 -- How is knowledge related to Tiananmen Square, Taiwan, and Tibet communicated? What is the role of education regarding these topics?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Educational Pedagogical Authority</th>
<th>Media Pedagogical Authority</th>
<th>Familial and Community Pedagogical Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw Data</td>
<td>3 T’s participants experience</td>
<td>3 T’s participants experience</td>
<td>3 T’s participants experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of raw data</td>
<td>What was going on related to their educational experience(s)?</td>
<td>What was going on related to their media experience(s)?</td>
<td>What was going on related to their informal educational experience(s)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grounded analysis of data</td>
<td>Compare and contrast with other findings</td>
<td>Compare and contrast with other findings</td>
<td>Compare and contrast with other findings</td>
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Deductive Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discursive approach</th>
<th>How is discourse shaped by this?</th>
<th>How is discourse shaped by this?</th>
<th>How is discourse shaped by this?</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural reproduction &amp; symbolic violence</td>
<td>What aspects of culture are being reproduced? How is power distributed?</td>
<td>What aspects of culture are being reproduced? How is power distributed?</td>
<td>What aspects of culture are being reproduced? How is power distributed?</td>
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Table 4 – Research Question Two Coding Table

Research Question # 2 -- To what degree does the censored government discourse involving Tiananmen Square, Taiwanese independence, and Tibetan Sovereignty affect citizen perceptions of government and their role as citizens?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Category</th>
<th>Educational Pedagogical Authority</th>
<th>Media Pedagogical Authority</th>
<th>Familial and Community Pedagogical Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub - categories</td>
<td>Perceptions of Chinese Education System 1)</td>
<td>Internet 1)</td>
<td>Role of Democracy 1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lack of critical thinking 2)</td>
<td>Japan 2)</td>
<td>Perceptions of Government 2)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Academic and Social Pressure 3)</td>
<td>Special treatment of minorities 3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Data</td>
<td>How do participants perceive the education system? 1)</td>
<td>How did participants say about the media? 1)</td>
<td>How do participants perceive their societal roles and the CPC regime? 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of raw data</td>
<td>What was going on in their experience(s)? 2)</td>
<td>What was going on in their experience(s)? 2)</td>
<td>What was going on in their experience(s)? 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grounded analysis of data</td>
<td>Compare and contrast with other findings 3)</td>
<td>Compare and contrast with other findings 3)</td>
<td>Compare and contrast with other findings 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deductive Analysis

Cultural reproduction & symbolic violence  | What aspects of culture are being reproduced? 1) | What aspects of culture are being reproduced? 1) | What aspects of culture are being reproduced? 1) |
|                                           | How is power distributed? 2) | How is power distributed? 2) | How is power distributed? 2) |
Chapter Summary

The purpose of this study was to form a theory addressing how knowledge concerning the Three T’s is constructed within the socio-cultural context of the PRC and how this shapes participants perceptions of government, citizenship, and society.

Though it was impossible to be truly inductive in the research process, this mixed qualitative research method allowed me as researcher to organize the research around an inductively oriented process of grounded methodology. Inductive research does not test a hypothesis, but is the process of discovering an emergent theory explaining or enlightening a phenomenon taken from data collection. The rigor of the methodology was rooted in the constant comparative process of data triangulation, sorting these various factors in light of the phenomenon, and state of the theory being created. The literature review, data collection, coding, analysis, and theory construction were a concurrent creative process with reactive possibilities. From this process a theory which worked and helped explain the phenomenon emerged, an explanation of how knowledge concerning the Three T’s was constructed in the PRC, grounded in the experiences of the 11 participants. The second phase of deductive analysis in which the core category, subcategories and other dimensions of the data were analyzed in light different theoretical lenses broadened the discussion and research base from which conclusions were drawn.
CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Chapter Overview

In organizing this chapter, it was important to find a format which answered both research questions and also adhered to the grounded theory. To accomplish this, the findings and discussion have been organized in three parts. In the first part, the core category of censorship will be presented and discussed to anchor the chapter in understanding how the participants perceived information and knowledge related to the traditionally censored Three T’s.

Part two presents data related to the first research question in light of the core category of censorship. The categories of educational pedagogical authority, media pedagogical authority, and familial and community pedagogical authority address the means by which knowledge related to the Three T’s was communicated in the experience of the participants. In discussing the raw data, the findings are compared and contrasted with findings from the literature and other data sources related to the corresponding category. This will conclude the inductive grounded analysis and segue into the deductive analysis phase. This process will apply the lenses the discursive approach, cultural reproduction, and symbolic violence to the categories resulting from the grounded analysis.

Regarding the second research question, the results are organized in light of the core category of censorship, and continue to be organized by categories of educational pedagogical authority, media pedagogical authority, and familial and community pedagogical authority. The raw data is presented corresponding to a) perceptions of Chinese education system, b) lack of critical thinking, and c) academic pressure. The category of media pedagogical authority is subcategorized by a) internet, b) Japan, and c) special treatment of minorities. Lastly, the family and community pedagogical authority is sub categorized by a) role of democracy, b) perceptions
of government, and then discussed through comparing and contrasting the findings with the literature. The deductive analysis portion regarding the second research question applies the lens of cultural reproduction and symbolic violence. To finish the chapter, a countervailing argument in favor of CPC censorship is discussed in depth to provide a holistic understanding of the phenomenon.

Core Category – Censorship

The Three T’s represent what are widely considered to be censored, stigmatized, and taboo subjects within the People’s Republic of China. The core category of censorship underscores the raw data, the discussion of findings, and the analysis. How this specific information related to the Three T’s is taught and perceived by Chinese participants within this censored context can illuminate how other sensitive information may or may not be communicated. Though these participants were willing to discuss topics which many were not accustomed to confronting, one quote, by Cui, exemplified the gravity of the phenomenon:

This topic are too sensitive for me. I am scared even by the very mentioning of them. Besides our textbooks never mention these things and people don't talk about these things. So I almost know nothing about it... Sorry to disappoint you. In fact, there have been people who are not allowed back because of a similar experience. It is...they are no longer able to...be able...go back to China...I still have my family there.

Other participants were more willing to speak on what censorship meant to them in the Chinese context, such as Bai Yang, who talked about the limits of free speech in the PRC:

Chinese censorship...see...the limit of Chinese censorship...you can say something but you cannot say “let’s do something.” The email or phone call being controlled or
censored in China you can say Oh the government sucks or something…or I hate the government …but you say “let’s do something!” and the police will get you….so that a little bit of kind of democracy in China…you can say it, but you can’t do it.

Other participants spoke skeptically of traditionally CPC controlled media outlets such as CCTV in favor of respected commercial newspapers and a less controlled internet news environment

The government controls everything controls the media…Sometimes I will watch television…I will not care because it does not have a close relationship to us….yeah but what influence my views? I think for one is for newspaper and internet information on the internet.

According to Shui, traditional state owned media outlets such as CCTV were not taken seriously: “But if we look at the newspaper or TV…it’s like…sooooo bad. Especially CCTV, its government control that. So we don’t, we don’t watch the CCTV.” This effect of censorship on traditional media credibility was further described by Xin, a participant with experience within Chinese media: “I found that after I graduate from that college I don’t trust any news anymore…So sometimes I just read it for fun…”

Liu saw the issue of “truth” as ambivalent and decidedly skewed to portray a government narrative of events, which highlighted a fundamental question regarding what to believe: “I think the government or the officers talk this, but the citizens we just read the, know this from the newspaper or the internet, so it’s what the government wants us to know. We only see that part. So the truth…who knows?”. Shui was also skeptical of the government hiding information that might make stoke citizen resentment of the regime: “so we feel not happy because the government a lot of secret. When we know the secret we will be very angry.” The assumption
that the government was hiding information from the public, or from the less educated public, was seen as ineffectual by Xin, who said:

I don’t know why the government do so, they like try to hide the bad news. I mean, for educated people, if they want to know what happened in China, they want to see, they want to know what happened in China and how foreign media can see this issue, they can find their way to the website. And for some uneducated people, or some people they don’t care what happen, no matter he or she, they won’t care, maybe he won’t use Facebook.

Xin further described, from experience in Chinese media, the process by which she understood how forms of censorship took place:

“Usually when it moves to the government level, the like, if the reporters, he or she has experience, several years working experience, she can judge by herself which topics she can write and in some sense forbid and after she writes the news, it will be passed to the editor to proof read the article and see if there is sensitive topics he will be debate this article or tell the reporters to change a new one or to edit the news. And then it will pass to the next editor, to higher level, and he will review like the whole newspaper and he will decide for the final decision what can be published and what cannot. So if it cannot, if it say no, the article will be deleted. So the reporter cannot make the decision. Some reporters just to write something that they believe is true that they think is true, but the editor can delete it.
Others, such as Feng, described how popular culture imports such as television programs, were filtered for appropriate content. She cited the ineffectiveness of the censor apparatus in light of the internet:

For China, for the video show, they have a department really just focus on to they have rules to test which one is allowed. Which show is not allowed. It’s not just for the Taiwanese; it’s also for the south Korea, American, British, and also the Chinese show. If they have any word is not good for the government or it’s ah, is you can search on the internet but you never being show on any TV channel.

For a participant from an older generation, Cai felt that individual freedoms in the contemporary Chinese context, especially regarding speech, were much greater than before due to the internet. This comparison was a valuable comparative insight between generations:

The freedom of speech is no longer as restricted as before. Just don’t have face book. But we can also discuss, you can discuss in the internet and there are people who has very radical opinions and a group of people just that think we should model after America, we should uh…get democracy. And another group of people will discuss and refute.”

Censorship emerged often in the raw data both as an *in vivo* code, in the participant’s words, and also in their description of censorship. This aspect of Chinese media has been widely documented in the literature (Miao, 2010; Qian & Bandurski, 2011; Qiang, 2011; Shirk, 2011).

Discussion

However, these results differed in the numerous references to the internet as a source of valid information and venue for free speech. During the course of interviews, censorship was
discussed in relation to the Three T’s, the recent Bo Xilai scandal, the China Southern weekend protest, and other incidences involving CPC officials and perceived legal impunity. Areas related to censorship of CPC corruption especially annoyed and angered participants; according to Cai and Shui, instances of corruption by CPC officials were places where citizen outcry over censorship could be most readily felt, and where results could be seen due to this pressure.

In terms of recent collective activism on behalf of citizens and government policy changes, CPC corruption has been a well-documented target of both citizen outrage and government attempts to curb a culturally embedded practice of quid pro quo behavior and extravagant gift giving amongst the CPC ranks (Ansfield & Buckley, 2013). The reach of concern about corruption revelations and subsequent censorship has extended to international media outlets such as the New York Times. A recent episode of this international reach of CPC censorship concerns official reporting of high level CPC official corruption. The online edition of the international New Times has been blocked numerous times by government censors over the past year in the wake of a story detailing the illicit wealth accumulated by premier Wen Jiabo (Brenscher, 2012). Reporters for both the New York Times and Bloomberg news outlets have been denied work visas within the country due to coverage of CPC corruption (Shear, 2014).

Given this extent to which CPC authorities have moved to censor revelations official corruption in the global context, the situation must be tightly controlled in the domestic context.

In discussing censorship, participants described a media with very little credibility. Instead of obtaining information about events from traditional sources, participants sought out online information. Bai Yang, along with Cai, described generational differences between traditional and online media consumption. This phenomenon has been analyzed by Shirk (2010), and Miao (2011), as both a generational difference (older generations tend to consume more
traditional media) and an urban-rural divide (the rural population is more apt to consume CCTV broadcasts than read newspapers or access online media).

Deductive Analysis

*Discursive Formation*

The CPC creates an official knowledge base about many subjects through actively censoring information that is not desirable to the regime. As an authoritarian power which has acknowledged a goal opinion channeling, this official knowledge base becomes a dominant understanding of reality through the censor apparatus. This reality is reinforced through media, education, normative behaviors, and to a degree through online communications. The participants who personify the discourse are Chinese citizens or others living under the censor apparatus, though the decentralization of the internet has weakened the power of the government in shaping discourse. As Xin cited, the censor apparatus devalues information presented in traditional Chinese media for those who are aware of other perspectives online. This knowledge becomes the “truth” through fear of deviating from official government knowledge and a complex system of a socio-culturally reinforced conformity and a collectivist “regime of truth”. For example, if an event is censored enough, it ceases to exist in discourse and essentially ceases to possess power. The institutionalization of a censored media, internet, and educational system socializes and regulates Chinese citizens under an authoritarian regime also legitimated by the legacy of Confucian thought.

*Cultural Reproduction and Censorship*

The creation of discourse through government censorship creates a power differential between the CPC and ordinary citizens, especially for those without access to internet resources.
Through suppressing information, a portion of citizens cannot make informed decisions about the regime and are more apt to be controlled.

According to Bourdieu, the *field* is the social context of the actor, a context with its own rules, symbols, power structures, and culture. In relation to the field in the PRC, the rules are firmly established through CPC formulated laws regarding suitable media, educational, and internet content. The field has been influenced by a cultural process rooted in a historical legacy of both paddy culture and the codification of hierarchical collectivism through an embedded Confucian framework. *Habitus* are the worldviews and systems of perceptions which guide action within the field (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990). The underlying Confucian tenets of familial piety and ritual consciousness are conducive to a patriarchal utilitarian understanding of censorship.

*Capital In Relation to Censorship*

Capital refers to the exchange of power within the field, a form of power gained through negotiation of approved symbols, rules, education and behavior (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990). From participant voices, there is no economic, social, or cultural capital to be gained through discussing censored topics in the PRC. If one wants to steer clear of trouble with authorities, social discomfort, or a jail sentence, the “official” knowledge established through media, education, and normative behavior is vastly more valuable to pay attention to.

*Symbolic Violence and Censorship*

Bourdieu’s use of *symbolic violence* referred to instances when subjugated actors adopted the worldview of the powerful in justly rationalizing their own powerless situation. This internalization of subjugation as the status quo was symbolically violent and served to reproduce inequities in social hierarchies (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990). Regarding the issue of censorship,
some participants cited the “protection” being provided by the government censor apparatus. This understanding of censorship rationalizes government power and control over knowledge, ceding freedom of information to the CPC regime. Furthermore, participants described a divide between rural poor and urban rich for gaining perspectives outside of what was offered through CCTV and newspaper broadcasts to create knowledge about censored events. However, a vast demographic within the PRC does not have the means or the capital incentive to seek out foreign websites or alternative discourses online. This powerless demographic, behind the veil of censorship, demonstrates the most profoundly “channeled opinions”.
Research Question 1

To both organize the findings and answer the research questions, part two addresses how each of the Three T’s is represented in relation to three categories: educational pedagogical authority, media pedagogical authority, and family and community pedagogical authority.

Research Question #1 -- How is knowledge related to Tiananmen Square, Taiwan, and Tibet communicated? What is the role of education regarding these topics?

Category 1 – Educational Pedagogical Authority

Subcategory – 1989 Tiananmen Square Demonstrations

According to participants, the role of education regarding Tiananmen Square was ignored in K-12 curriculum, textbooks, and classroom discussion. Overall, this topic was the least discussed of the Three T’s in the education system. According to Yi, “I think that we talk about Tibet and Taiwan more than we do about the demonstration.” In the university, this topic was discussed by some professors.

According to Bai Yang:

The events Tiananmen Square was completely censored…. Professors mention that, but only in their class. They do not publish it online or something seen by thousands of people. Sometimes they briefly mention that. In primary school, middle school, high school they completely ignore that…university student didn’t care about that. They know almost nothing about that; just treat it as a story.

Other students, such as Feng, did not recall any discussion of the events in their educational experience, “That is never talked”. Jiu, on the other hand, recalled a passive resistance to any type of engagement with the Tiananmen events, “Teachers would avoid these topics… We never talk about this before we enter the university…they can’t talk about it in front of people, maybe some teachers in private. We don’t have a chance to talk about this in high school… we are a
slave to the education system.” Xin recalled asking her teacher about Tiananmen Square, and the teacher’s response about the irrelevance of the material relative to the Gao Kao (National College Entrance Exam):

But the textbook just ignore the Tiananmen events… Usually high school teacher they do not talk about this too much. We tried….my high teacher in high school was a history teacher, so we have a students in our class have a closer relationship with her and we tried to ask her to tell something about Tiananmen and she said she was not willing to do so. She said it is spread out to the whole country and places far away from Beijing and the students went on the street to protest something and she said she was in a very bad condition at that time and went to hospital. Maybe it was an excuse of hers. Actually she didn’t know too much about it and she had no comments on these things and she said it was not relevant to Gao Kao and you don’t have to know much about it.”

Bai Yang was especially adamant about the level censorship in the education system related to the Tiananmen events, which he described further:

Not part of class, you never found anything in textbooks, or other public books in China. Not Tiananmen, it is censored. Not publish a book like that. Not talked in public…Never in public….maybe sometimes never in a large environment like in public speech. We may talk in here or in classroom after class. That’s fine.

Subcategory – Taiwan Independence

According to participants, the educational discourse relating to Taiwan disregards the issue of sovereignty and instead focuses on a normative understanding of rightful PRC possession. Two participants alluded to the repressive actions of the lengthy period of martial
law imposed during the Kuomintang occupation of Taiwan starting in the 1950’s and extending through the 1980’s. In response to the question “Is Taiwan a part of China?” participants illuminated their educational experience, according to Feng: “Yeah, Of course! That is the first sentences the teacher will tell us.” Yi also responded quickly to the question, “Yeah, of course. I never thought it was not…”. Bai Yang communicated a similar sentiment, “Children, young students are kept telling that Taiwan absolutely belongs to China, but some scholars said Taiwan should belong to native Taiwanese because China took their land by force. In elementary school they say that is absolutely Chinese land. For 600 years…” Bai Yang continued to address the issue related to educational censorship, “You know the Taiwan issue you can find in not textbooks but books about Taiwan history in library. It shows how horrible they treated the Taiwan people. The media never publicly says that. They ignore that. But not censor that.” Yi did not recall the role of education, but was adamant about the authority on Taiwan, “The government told us Taiwan is a part of China.” However, not all participants agreed that Taiwan was a part of China, especially Zhi, a Taiwanese participant:

I don’t think so. Because we have…we have some similarity, but we have many more differences, we have different political system, different laws, we use different letters. I think the similarity just…maybe we came from the same ancestor and we speak Mandarin, but others are not similar. I don’t think so.

In terms of classroom discussion, the issue of Taiwan was approached in some participant experiences. Yi described Taiwan in the context of politics class: “I think in politics we talk about Taiwan and we usually talk about how to uh, improve the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland.” Huo also recalled discussing Taiwan in a politics class, but in a sense of geography: “No. uhh, except we study the geography, we will talk about the name and the
something’s about Taiwan, but…geography. I remember we also will talk about that in political class.”

**Subcategory – Tibetan Sovereignty**

Participants described their educational experience with issues related to Tibetan Sovereignty as a component of geography and politics classes, though the subject was not covered in any type of depth. Bai Yang saw the events as minor compared to the Taiwan issue, describing the educational atmosphere: “Actually, it’s not a big issue in textbooks. Not as serious as Taiwan. Now Tibet is under control by the government, the railway has been set. They can put soldiers there easily…it is not a big deal for them” According to Liu, the scope of the discussion was limited, “we usually talk Tibet in geography class. And in politics I don’t think Tibet problem is that big during my school year so we don’t talk too much about that. They just say the Dalai Lama is wrong, is a bad guy. It’s like that.” Xin described textbooks with very limited information related to Tibet, “And the textbook doesn’t have anything about Tibet…there is a few paragraphs talking about the Dalai Lama, we know he escaped from China to the United States and that is all.” In response to what Liu thought about the Dalai Lama, she was clear, “I don’t like that. You know Tibet is part of China and he shouldn’t do that.” Yi also spoke about the general impression of the Dalai Lama and her understanding of Tibet taken from the textbooks:

“We don’t like that man, the Dalai Lama…(laughs). Tibet is also a part of China. I remember in middle school or maybe high school the textbook would tell us that Tibet was very poor and ….that Tibet was a slave owner state…. and this changed to socialism in 1950. They tell us the soldiers saved the people there. I saw a video about the history of Tibet, the people there are very poor and the life there
is very terrible. But now I think it changed a lot from the pictures…the economy
becomes better, there is a train to go to Tibet…it is a great work…the train…the
people there have changed because of the tourism.

Other participants described Tibet in terms of scenery or geography and were unaware of
the political situation in the TAR. According to Huo, “I really don’t know more about their
political issue of Tibet.”

Discussion

This category of educational pedagogical authority emerged from how knowledge
related to the demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in 1989, Tibetan sovereignty, and Taiwanese
independence was communicated within the educational experiences of 11 Chinese citizens. The
suppression of the Three T’s in Chinese society is a finding consistent with the literature
(Collins, 1989; Hessler, 1999; Qiang, 2011; Shirk, 2011; Wangdu, 2007; Zhang, 2011). Beyond
the Three T’s, other suppressed historical issues in the education system include the great leap
forward and the Cultural Revolution (Kahn, 2006; Forney, 2008). Both of these events are
thought to negatively reflect on the legacy of the CPC and are also suppressed in textbooks and
curriculum. However,

The data reveals subtle differences between the degrees to which the Three T’s are
suppressed relative to each other. Namely, Tiananmen Square in 1989 is an event which is still
heavily stigmatized in education. Participants differentiated the issues of Tibet and Taiwan in
education as having some related content, but the issue of Tiananmen was uniformly ignored and
avoided at the K-12 level. Regarding Taiwan and Tibet, there was a sense of “us versus them”,
as participants described classroom experiences with the political situations in Taiwan and Tibet
in the form of discussion and textbook passages. The events of Tiananmen were described as
far more hushed; censored by teachers and textbooks. This educational narrative promotes a discourse devoid of the event and legitimizes a knowledge base which excludes the event.

The particular legacy of the Tiananmen events, as an exercise of collective citizen participation for social change, is the type of behaviors and information the CPC has been suppressing through media censorship (King et al, 2013). Though the legacy of Tiananmen has been diluted for many in the 25 years that have passed, the topic retains a taboo stigma.

Concerning the issue of Taiwanese independence, the normative discourse taught in education on the Chinese mainland is one in which the People’s Republic of China has the legitimate and rightful claim to the island of Taiwan. Participants dismissed an independent Taiwan, some tracing their understanding to elementary school where Taiwan was framed as a part of the PRC. The Taiwanese participants, however, disagreed with the assumption; from their perspective, Taiwan was not a part of People’s Republic of China due to their history, culture, political systems and legacy of autonomy. This cursory way in which the mainland Chinese participants described Taiwan as a part of the PRC, countered by the Taiwanese participant perceptions, spoke to the ongoing schism in national identities between the two entities, a finding highlighted in the literature (Manthorpe, 2008). Overall, the information related to Taiwan was not discussed in the same hushed tone as the events of Tiananmen in 1989. Participants were more willing to discuss the issue, how it was treated in their classroom experiences, and how they perceived the issue was discussed in society. Several participants from mainland China recognized the cultural, historical, and societal differences separating Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China as well.

Regarding Tibet, participants described their educational experience as a brief section in the textbook or as a part of geography class. Information related to the civil unrest in the Tibetan
Autonomous Region (TAR) was not described in any detail as related to their experiences in education. Tibet was described as a backwater, with a distinct culture apart from the dominant Han majority. There did not seem to be any sort of engagement with the culture or political issues related to sovereignty, though participants described that Tibetan culture as “different” than Han and that it was “far away”. This coincides with the literature, which describes Tibet as marginalized in the national curriculum (Wangdu, 2011).

Yi and Jiu described Tibet as a slave owning state before being liberated by PRC forces, confirming an educational narrative in which a history of slavery and theocratic rule had been ended by PRC liberation in the 1950’s. This was followed by improvement of economic conditions, means of transportation; a development that continues to the present. The Dalai Lama, the spiritual and political leader in exile of the Tibetan people, was described in a pejorative light, as a “bad guy”, escaping China to the United States, or promoting revolution against PRC troops. This negative portrayal reflects a CPC policy which has widely cast the Dalai Lama in a negative light in media and education for many years (Goldstein, 2008). For a few of the participants, however, Tibet represented a place on the map covered in geography class and little else.

Deductive Analysis

Discursive Formation

As educational pedagogical authority, administrators, teachers, schools, textbooks, and students play an important role in creating and legitimizing knowledge about the Three T’s. The rules are created by a central authority and passed to administrators and teachers. In this sense, especially regarding knowledge, the curriculum, teacher, and textbook determine the “rules” of what knowledge is legitimized in the educational system. As participants cited, it is against the
“rules” of the educational pedagogical authority to discuss the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989, or to talk about the rights of Taiwan and Tibet in relation to sovereignty. These understandings of the Three T’s are underscored by larger society-wide normative behaviors which censor the Three T’s in media and internet communications. Teachers are also beholden to administrators and parents to teach to the test which is a large determinant of social mobility. The subjects of this discourse are students, who are regulated and organized according to the rules of the school, teachers, administrators and parents.

Cultural Reproduction and Educational Pedagogical Authority

According to Bourdieu, the field is the social context of the actor, a context with its own rules, symbols, power structures, and culture. The power structures of the Chinese educational system replicate the hierarchical roles separating the ruling CPC authority from the citizenry. In schools, the teacher represents authority and the students represent future citizens. The rules, symbols, and culture of the school socialize students for their eventual transition to citizens already educated in the behaviors of the dominant group. Regarding information related to the Three T’s, the field of the educational pedagogical authority also mimics the rules established by the greater societal discourse of censorship.

Habitus are the worldviews and systems of perceptions which guide action within the field (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990). The worldview and systems of perceptions which guide the Chinese pedagogical authority once again mirror those of society at large. There is a fear, a futility, and a sense of social deviance in questioning either the teacher as authority figure or the knowledge base of the curriculum. This worldview mirrors the Confucian tenet of ritual consciousness, the obedient reverence for the rules and behaviors that have come before (Huang,
In regards to how the Three T’s are taught and learned, this worldview strictly adheres to the status quo of the educational pedagogical authority.

**Capital in Educational Pedagogical Authority**

Capital refers to the exchange of power within the field, a form of power gained through negotiation of approved symbols, rules, education and behavior (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990). A major conduit of cultural capital in the PRC is gained through strictly adhering to the authority of the teacher and parents. This obedience to authority is socially embedded and especially pertinent to teachers, who are seen as the arbiters of knowledge (Xi & Feng, 2011). It follows that explicitly studying the material presented in class and in the textbook, and succeeding in exams, is conducive to cultural and social capital with historical roots. The knowledge presented by the educational pedagogical authority (largely devoid of the Three T’s) is valuable in terms of potential social mobility and opportunity. Sensitive political information in the Chinese education system is devalued, not on the test or discussed by the arbiters of knowledge (teachers) and retains little capital of any sort.

**Symbolic Violence and the Educational Pedagogical Authority**

Bourdieu’s use of *symbolic violence* referred to instances when subjugated actors adopted the worldview of the powerful in justly rationalizing their own powerless situation. As a major tool of socialization, the educational pedagogical authority is an integral cog for disconnecting the Chinese citizenry from participatory citizenship. Part of this process is through limiting discussion of politically sensitive issues related to collective action in school and censoring textbooks and curriculum along similar lines.

Category 2 – Media Pedagogical Authority
Sub category – 1989 Tiananmen Square Demonstrations

The media, as a platform for education related to the Three T’s, was described by participants as complicit in government manipulation of information, especially related to complete censoring of the events at Tiananmen Square. According to Jiu, this suppression caused him to become more interested with this content rather than less: “The Chinese government, if you are trying to repress and hide information, people will want to know more…There is some information on the Internet and some books, but they are banned. They will sell on the street, the guys who sell porn, they also sell contraband information.”

Others, such as Feng, had to access the information when they arrived in the United States, “You know, if the government do not want me know, I am the people really curious about that so I will search when I come here. Yeah, so when I came here, I ask my boyfriend, say “can you search this for me? I really want to know what really happen. I want the truth.” Bai Yang talked of the ways in which students would evade censorship software to talk about Tiananmen Square online:

University students would like to talk about that and they create words with similar spelling to mean things to skip censorship. It’s a type…I don’t know the exact words they use, but they say like…they like…give a nickname to China and the Chinese government. They use word like firework to mean gun shooting…sometimes they use, I they use…I don’t know the word, a machine that pushes the earth and level it….I don’t know the word (bulldozer). Yeah, they will use a word like this instead of tanks…they use this to make a story about Tiananmen Square to get around the firewall.
However, for other participants, such as Yi, they had never seen iconic images related to the Tiananmen demonstrations, such as the “tank man”. Some did not acknowledge knowing of the events. When asked about Tiananmen Square in 1989, Liu replied: “No, I don’t know that. I think at that time I am too little.” When prodded if she has ever heard of this, she replied “no”. Huo similarly denied knowledge of the event, stating: “I don’t know because I was so young and…(long pause) maybe my parents is also doesn’t like to talk about the political so…sorry.”

On the other side, Jiu was emboldened by curiosity, and he generalized his feelings to others:

The Chinese government, if you are trying to repress and hide information, people will want to know more. The Tank man video I downloaded 5 years ago…I broke it up over many days, the download. I felt a bit scared watching, like someone was watching me. The democratic protestors used those students. There are different cultural pressures.

Sub-category – Taiwanese Independence

In discussing how the media represents issues of Taiwan independence, participants spoke of the geopolitical implications of the situation, references to other countries, and military strategy, as Yi imparted:

We always do not care about what Dalai Lama or Taiwanese behavior when we are talking about the issues because compare to China, they are not strong enough to fight with us. But what we really care about is that what American government will do. Obviously, American government will support, but what kinds of degrees of the support. I told you a secret is that we call America the police of Pacific.
That means American government always want to deal with or control everything that none of business to him…

Yi spoke of the media’s bias positive slant to news she received, “usually talk good things about China, they usually support the government when it is international events.” Feng also noted that Taiwan was in her experience represented in the media as a means to gauge the foreign policies of other countries and the PRC:

The video will repeat if they were talk about this, they will repeat every time. They will say the government, the president Hu will when they meet with the other the other leader of which country they will uh talk about their Taiwan’s problem and then they will say “if that leader will show the respect to the China and the video will say okay. They will say, okay, we will very think Taiwan is a part of China…So actually, um when I come, before I come here I think , “yes, our government is right” because from the history the Taiwan is absolutely a part of China.

Bai Yang found the strategic location of Taiwan to be of importance in its media portrayal, “Because Taiwan is ruled by their own government, they have their own navy and army…it is important maybe. Also, important location.” He continued to describe the effect of censorship on the Taiwanese issue as a falsehood in some respects:

The censorship about Taiwan issues is a kind of illusion…sometimes not as strict. Some people publish this opinion online…I mean several, just a little amount of scholars publish this in books or online, but it is still not the mainstream. They do not say that it should be independent, but that it should be given back to them.

Taiwan is more open. Taiwan has a lot of published books on history, they
actually write down what actually happened, but no one reads. You can find these books in all the big libraries in mainland China, but no one reads them! So maybe originally it was legal, but the media just don’t mention, just mention and follows whatever the government says…

Sub-Category – Tibetan Sovereignty

Participants described the relative dearth of information concerning Tibet in the media. A general sense was conveyed that Tibet was a relatively unknown culture and landscape, without much information broadcast in their experiences. According to Bai Yang:

Chinese people don’t know that much about Tibet. First, there are less people second Chinese people are not familiar with their religion. We just get the news that the leader of Dalai Lama travel around the world and never saw some, or nation leaders would meet him, and the Chinese government or that they protest or not. The information is not there…some people talk about that online…but they say something not the same as the government. Like the religious Dali is 70 or 80 years old and already an old man. He has no soldiers…no army…no ability to get Tibet independence…so Just let him go! Just let him go! You are a huge country and He is an old man…you should kind of show your tolerance okay?

Xin described her impressions of Tibet as forgotten by the media in terms of reporting, “I don’t know….I think I seldom read any news about Tibet….this is all like travel plans to Tibet….They have their own religions, own cultures and it is far far away…..” Jiu, however, told of a book he had read which portrayed Tibet in a negative light before PRC annexation, “I read a
book and it talked about…people are really stupid…the Dalai Lama and monks….the people would eat their shit as medicine. After the CPC invaded they try to rebel but they can’t…”

Discussion

According to participants, the media pedagogical authority delivered information related to the Three T’s in a similar fashion to the educational pedagogical authority. None of the Three T’s was described in any detail in relation to media, especially not Tiananmen Square. This finding is well supported by research into the censoring of both traditional and digital media, (Hessler, 1999; King et al, 2013; Qiang, 2011; Shirk, 2011; Wangdu, 2007; Zhang, 2011).

Participants described a widespread understanding that traditional media sources were tools of the CPC reflecting a government approved version of events which reported on “good things”. CCTV, newspapers, and certain search engines such as Baidu were seen as especially prone to government manipulation and not representational of the entire story.

The normative discourse related to the Three T’s in traditional media was described by participants as censored and controlled. However, the findings were illuminative of the means by which information trickled through media censors. The means to evade censoring software through the use of codes, the purchase of illegal videos concerning Tiananmen from street vendors, or the staggered download of footage from peer to peer sharing sites were interesting sub-currents to suppression of information through state-owned and state- monitored commercial media outlets. These findings confirm that digital media outlets pose a threat to the effectiveness of the government censor apparatus. These alternative discourses existed and were described in the context of micro-blogging through social media software such as Sina-Weibo or other online forums like QQ. Shui gauged the importance of events on Sina Weibo by how quickly censors deleted content in the lag time between posting and removal. Considering the relatively recent
events in the Middle East and Ukraine and the buried legacy of Tiananmen Square, these micro-
blogging social media tools will be a target of CPC regulation for years to come. For a service
like Sina Weibo, the rapid rate with which information can be reposted poses a potential
breeding ground for mass civic demonstrations on behalf of the Chinese populace.

Other participants, however, could not identify any perception of the Three T’s through
the lens of Chinese media. A number were unaware of images used in western media outlets to
symbolize the Tiananmen Square demonstrations, such as “the tank man”. Though the symbolic
power of this image was taken from a different western context, the fact that the image or the
video it was taken from were not accessible to a handful of college graduates within the People’s
Republic of China was telling. Of those that had seen the video, they described their private fear
of watching the film.

Feng, Xin, and Yi described the ways in which media presented Taiwan as a tool for
foreign policy and gauging how foreign envoys respected or did not respect CPC rule. This was
a way to measure face and power, in how foreign governments treated the issue of Taiwanese
independence (Manthorpe, 2008; Xi & Feng, 2011). This was representative of the connection
that can be made of observing the issue of Taiwan through the lens of the western media, which
has traditionally used the issue of Taiwanese independence as a means to question or compliment
CPC authority in the region (Manthorpe, 2008). The topic of Taiwanese independence was not
described as pressing an issue, as three participants described improved political conditions
which had smoothed over in the last few years. This improved relationship recently made
headlines as the first high level talks between the Chinese and Taiwanese governments occurred
(Ramzy, 2014). Bai Yang cited an illusory censorship regarding the phenomenon, one in which
apathy and disinterest sufficed to “censor” what was available in public and university libraries.
He cited the comparative military importance of the Taiwanese issue over the question of Tibetan sovereignty.

The role of the media concerning the issue of Taiwanese independence was an important determinant for some participants in their understanding of Chinese identity. According to the participants, the media were complicit in echoing a similar narrative to the educational system regarding both Taiwan and Tibet.

The media portrayal of Tibet also seemed to be relatively obscure for most participants. Many described a “revolutionary” movement led by the Dalai Lama, while others cited the internet as another area where this type of news could be found if one knew where to look. Bai Yang talked of the countervailing discourses to government hegemony regarding Tibet in online forums where a more conciliatory tone was taken towards the Dali Lama. Alternately, Jiu described a book he read in which Tibetans were depicted eating the excrement of high ranking Tibetan monks before being liberated by PRC forces. There is a documented history of feudalism within the TAR in the centuries before PRC rule, but only websites confirmed discussion of seemingly disparaging depictions of eating excrement. Other participants could not recall seeing much news at all about Tibet outside of television reports documenting improved development conditions, tourism revenues, and travel opportunities. This domestic reporting of Tibet is documented in the literature as well (Goldstein, 2008).

**Deductive Analysis**

*Discursive Formation*

As a pedagogical authority, media plays a large role in reinforcing official knowledge established in the educational system and creating knowledge through discursive means.

Chinese media is overseen by the SARFT, a centralized authority monitoring content (Qiang,
The media pedagogical authority creates an official knowledge base about the Three T’s through creating “rules” in the form of laws. These laws enable the censorship of the events of Tiananmen Square and the portrayal of Taiwan and Tibet in a politically advantageous context which represents the interests of the regime and negates any reference to collective action on behalf of Taiwanese nationals or Tibetan protestors. The participants who personify the discourse are Chinese media consumers. The most affected by this discourse are bound to traditional forms of media such as television, newspapers, and radio more so than internet or digital media. In this sense, those who are poor, living in rural areas without internet connection, or of an older generation not accustomed to obtaining information through other sources personify this discourse more than others. This knowledge becomes the truth through a “regime of truth”, under which knowledge excluding the Tiananmen and presenting both Taiwan and Tibet in advantageous terms becomes collectively reinforced and acted under as the truth.

The institutionalization of a censored media has a long history in the PRC. This censor action regulates discourse and channels opinions and actions.

Cultural Reproduction and the Media Pedagogical Authority

The field within the Chinese context is affected by media, and the media are closely monitored by the CPC. Under CPC rule, media has been an acknowledged pedagogical authority of ideological importance since the establishment of the regime in 1949. Though many of the symbols, rules, and media outlets have been liberalized since the Cultural Revolution, the power structures and culture of a centralized control are intact. The CPC controls the media field through licensing and government approval, suppressing the events of Tiananmen and framing Taiwan and Tibet in ways beneficial to legitimizing the actions of the regime. A censored Media serving as a pedagogical authority affects the perceptions and worldviews of the Chinese field.
Through suppressing the Three T’s, the actions and behaviors in the field are guided by a CPC agenda. From participants, the greatest affect they spoke of concerning a censored media pedagogical authority was the devaluation of information and trust from media sources and government. In terms of a younger generation raised in a digital media environment, the distrust of traditional media outlets and government press coverage will have future consequences and perhaps reinforce other informal media.

*Capital in the Media Pedagogical Authority*

Capital refers to the exchange of power within the field, a form of power gained through negotiation of approved symbols, rules, education and behavior (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990). From participant voices and the literature, there is not powerful economic, social, or cultural capital to be gained for media coverage of the Three T’s in the PRC. Due to the “rules” of the field, the Three T’s represent negative capital. The literature documents many instances of television stations shuttered, editors fired, and licensing revoked for media outlets which defy content monitors (Qiang, 2011; Zhang, 2011). Jiu spoke of a slight economic capital to be gained through the sale of pirated censored goods (related to Tiananmen), but the fear he felt in accessing the material spoke to the stigmatization and taboo nature of the material he was accessing.

*Symbolic Violence and the Media Pedagogical Authority*

Bourdieu’s use of *symbolic violence* referred to instances when subjugated actors adopted the worldview of the powerful in justly rationalizing their own powerless situation. Under a censored media pedagogical authority, those in power seek to rationalize the status quo hierarchy and power allocation through a positive portrayal of the authority. The vast resources which have been invested in the censor apparatus, the extent to which CPC officials are extending their
censor demands to multi-national corporations (Google, Bloomberg Media, New York Times), and the consequences for deviating from government protocol highlight that the maintenance of the status-quo through a censored media pedagogical authority is a priority.

**Category 3 – Family and Community Pedagogical Authority**

**Sub-Category – 1989 Tiananmen Square Demonstrations**

The role of family, friends, and community emerged as the preeminent pedagogical authority for participants regarding the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989. This was particularly illuminative as participants described parents, family members, friends, and acquaintances who imparted their understandings, experiences, and oral histories of the events to them. Xin described the phenomenon of private family centered communication about the Three T’s in broad strokes:

People do not talk about them in public, maybe like in families or friends parties, some people usually men in middle age like to talk about politics. We do not post our opinions about these issues online if you post it it will be deleted by the website. Do you know Weibo in China? It is like Twitter? If you post your opinion it is against the government decision or against the government propaganda, it will be deleted by the website. And if you like, what you post, has been reposted by too many people, the policemen will come and you to have a cup of tea…that is what they say in Chinese.

Yi explained her perception of the Tiananmen events through her own personal connection as she recalled her mother telling her an anecdote about her grandfather and uncle:

My uncle….at that time was in the university and he was…he participated in the demonstration…but it was very dangerous and after his father know that, he drove
an ambulance into Tiananmen square and to pick him up outside… his father called the ambulance because maybe he has some relationship so he calls the ambulance to drive into the square because a lot of people are there so and then he can pick him up…otherwise he might have been caught…Yeah he escaped, but my mom told me this story because it was very serious at that time.

Shui described the events at Tiananmen through old newspapers his father, a reporter, had saved since 1989. The pictures, words, and authenticity of the documents seemed to secure his perceptions of the truth, “No…a lot of China students don’t know this, but I know because my father told me. My father is…newspaper, make newspaper…Like that…before. He showed me the newspaper, very old newspaper, but that is true.” Huo, who had never heard of the events at Tiananmen, said that sensitive political topics were often communicated in the ranks of the family, but not in hers, “Family maybe…according to your family members’ interest.” Feng, a Communist party member along with her parents, recalled her connection to Tiananmen Square through an ongoing debate she maintained with her parents and a friend concerning the role of the government’s use of force in the face of such a large demonstration, that a violent crackdown was necessary to neutralize the threat at the time and transition the students back to studying:

Yeah, because I am born in 1989, so, but my parents were told me ahh… about that. The, uh, my parents also talk about that, it’s like, uh we have two different opinions, is that one is they think the government is too they can’t kill the students…In the Tiananmen, that one might, my parents might be thinking okay that is not a good thing because they killed a lot of students but one of my friend he is a really you know, he really care about any direction, any policy or any statement of our government. He will say okay, so, if the government didn’t do
that, how can they keep the ask the students go back to their own position and just study [Feng described a common discourse rationalizing the use of armed forces as a means to disperse the Tiananmen protesters].

Xin described a co-workers and friends who were her personal connection to the events at Tiananmen and how this has informed her own perceptions of gauging truth: “My supervisor was amazing…she like, she like experience everything. She told me stories about the Cultural Revolution, about China, about the Tiananmen…I have friends that have experienced Tiananmen, and have friends that were 30 and 35 that were in primary and middle school. They tell me about Tiananmen… But I am interested in Tiananmen. I don’t judge it on what knowledge I have already know, I know something, I can judge something that this is saying on their purpose, I know it is not all the truth.”

Subcategory – Taiwanese Independence

Participants discussed the issue of Taiwan independence in personal terms, through family connections, and largely through their experiences as international students and how they engaged with the issue through studying abroad. Fundamental difference of opinion existed between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese in terms of their respective nationalities. Feng described such an initial meeting and debate with a friend she made upon arriving in the United States to study:

But when I come here, when I meet, met, I have a very good friend who comes from Taiwan and before I come here when somebody say okay, like, we will watch the Taiwanese drama and there was our country…”how are you a country? You are just a city or province okay?” but when I come here, my friends also say that, and that I think they will be fine because it’s like when they really need help,
so the China’s government never show help [Feng described the difference of opinion regarding whether Taiwan was a part of the PRC between her classmate and herself].

For Xin and Jiu, their perceptions concerning Taiwan were molded by family members. According to Xin, “I have friends from Taiwan and my grandma’s brother was in Taiwan so I know a little about Taiwan.” Jiu spoke of relative who was a university professor in the United States, relaying to him the human rights abuses performed by the KMT in Taiwan under martial law, “When I came the US I talked to an uncle…he told about the repression of the Kuomintang.” Huo, who did not want to discuss many of the other issues, was interested in the difference between her roommate’s opinions concerning Taiwanese independence:

Yeah…but my roommate is from Taiwan and she is also my classmate and sometimes, oh, Taiwan, sometimes when she want to…when someone ask where are you from, she also answer directly “I am from Taiwan”, but I don’t know, I also think that Taiwan is a part of China and China is a country that when you answer that question you maybe will answer “I’m from China and um that she also answer “I am from Taiwan” directly, just like Taiwan is a country (laughs). So, but we never talk about this political questions between maybe mainland and Taiwan, so.

Zhi, a Taiwanese national, described confronting the issue of her identity in conversations with her mainland Chinese friend, and through navigating applications and settings for her smart phone:

She says “no, Taiwan is part of China, I know that” I say “okay” and I think in China they all think Taiwan is part of China because when I reaches some apps
(for iPhone) or something and then I want to choose my country, I cannot choose Taiwan as my country, I just can choose China and then the city is Taiwan, and I say “really? Okay”.

Sub-Category – Tibetan Sovereignty

Participants described fewer personal connections to Tibet than to Tiananmen Square and Taiwan. In the case of Feng, one of her friends had served in the military in Tibet: “I have some friends in Tibet and that is just uh so he is a soldier…it is like you can join the army as a volunteer. So he go to Tibet and he told me that that place is really….is….is not peaceful so if even though they are the government soldier, they have area, but you can’t leave this area or nobody will protect you.”

Discussion

The findings pertaining to the family and community pedagogical authority reveal that knowledge, particularly related to Tiananmen Square, is often privately communicated within the People’s Republic of China. Outside of state monitored institutions such as schools and media, participants felt more secure discussing these issues in the confidence of their families. These findings reveal the strength of the family in terms of pedagogical authority in Chinese society. Several participants spoke of their connections to the Three T’s through the eyes of their parents, work colleagues, professors outside of class, other international students, and the anonymity of the internet. The centrality of family in Chinese society is a time honed socio-cultural value with roots deeply tied to Confucian thought (Samovar, McDaniel, & Porter, 2012; Huang, 1997). Familial piety extends to society at large, one in which the children are obedient to the parents, honor and respect them, and are not rebellious (Samovar, McDaniel, & Porter, 2012; Huang, 1997). These values of filial piety and obedience are demonstrated at the individual level of the
participants in the relationships they describe: obeying their teachers, their parents, and the government (Samovar, McDaniel, & Porter, 2012; Huang, 1997).

Once again, regarding Tiananmen Square and the Three T’s in general, the internet provided a medium for participants to engage with these subjects as anonymous netizens without suffering the same social consequences that public discussion would warrant. As Bai Yang said, “People say if they like to discuss politics they will discuss in online”. This arena for engagement with sensitive political matters outside of close friends and family has expanded the possibility for alternative political discourses to grow under the state-sponsored censorship related to the Three T’s. Alternatively, social circles were also disengaged with political discussions, which informed their own worldviews. According to Huo “I don’t know, around my friends, maybe never talk about political, it is maybe habit. So, maybe other people like to talk about that, but we don’t know this, so…my classmates and my friends around me talk about this never…never… because I have a little memory about that.”

Regarding Taiwan, the humanizing impact of interaction with people from “the other” demonstrates an experiential pedagogical authority which affected the perceptions of the participants far more than their experiences under the educational and media pedagogical authorities of mainland China. The findings illuminated an important facet of cross-cultural interaction between Taiwanese and mainland Chinese, as some participants cited their first real interaction with this issue in their experience living abroad, finding roommates who spoke the same language and shared some common cultural footing. Before that time, their interaction with the “other” had not been grounded in lived experience. It was through these encounters that humanity and dialogue could be sought.
Deductive Analysis

Discursive Formation

In terms of shaping normative discourse related to the Three T’s, the family and community pedagogical authority are fluid and relative to the context of the individual in the PRC. Outside of the monitored and controlled educational and media pedagogical authority, how discourse and knowledge are created in relation to the Three T’s depends upon the family and community. The “rules” established in relation to discourse in this sense are relative to the family, social circles, and individual worldviews of the subjects. Underscoring this flexibility, however, is the larger censored dominant discourse relating to the three T’s.

In relation to the internet, the “rules” are established by the online censor apparatus, though this has not been easily enforced. Software keyword censors filter content along with the hired contractors tasked with the time consuming job of manually erasing information. However, this control or enforcement of the “rules” on the internet is less efficiently exercised than by the educational and media pedagogical authorities.

The subjects of this discourse are Chinese citizens, and it is through their own eyes that the knowledge gained from the familial and community based pedagogical authority can gain a sense of the ”truth”. According to several participants, it was from their parents that the events at Tiananmen Square became “truth”. These countervailing discourses are more valued as knowledge than the devalued media and educational discourses which have been discredited as evasive or even false representations of events which their family conveyed to them. The institutionalization of the discourse is somewhat achieved through the internet censor apparatus, though it is not as effective in molding discourse compared to education, media, or family.
Cultural Reproduction Through the Family and Community Pedagogical Authority

According to Bourdieu, the field is the social context of the actor, a context with its own rules, symbols, power structures, and culture. The most important factor regarding analysis of the field and habitus in relation to the familial and community pedagogical authority is the Confucian tenet of filial piety. This socially embedded value speaks to the role of the parents as the most important aspect of the family in terms of love and obedience (Huang, 1997). This respect and reverence for family extended beyond earthly dimensions and extended into the past in the form of ancestor worship. This respect for what had come before can be seen in the great pride that contemporary China places on its cultural traditions, written history and family centered lifestyle. The role of parents was one of character education as well, where children learned both good traits and were advised to disregard those that were bad (Chou et al, 2013). This relates to certain families discussing the Three T’s, especially something completely censored in education and the media such as the Tiananmen Square events of 1989. This responsibility falls at the feet of many parents who experienced or know of the events, but depends upon the individual worldview of the parent to reveal their experience to their children.

Capital in the Family and Community Pedagogical Authority

Social capital takes on an abstract form when discussing the Three T’s in relation to the familial, community and informal pedagogical authority. Depending on the family context, parents may feel a moral imperative to move beyond the dominant discourse concerning their personal experiences with the Three T’s, especially the events at Tiananmen Square, which are not taught in other contexts’ and may not arise without their own pedagogical authority. This type of social/moral capital may cultivate a critical and curious mind in their child, something
that is of value in other areas of the Chinese field, though not very valuable in terms of sensitive political issues.

Symbolic violence in the Family and Community Pedagogical Authority

As the strongest countervailing force to the centralized educational and media pedagogical authority, the familial, community and informal pedagogical authority is valuable in providing critical capacity and real information for the powerless. These power relationships are more discrete, confidential, and trusted than either the media or education. What the family, friends, and certain areas of the internet offer is substantive due to its separation from government mandated censorship.

Grounded Theory explanation of events

From participant reactions and the literature, the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989, Taiwanese Independence, and Tibetan sovereignty are each suppressed due to their threat to CPC legitimacy (Collins, 1989; Hessler, 1999; Qiang, 2011; Shirk, 2011; Wangdu, 2007; Zhang, 2011). Information related to the events at Tiananmen Square was suppressed more than issues related to Taiwanese independence or Tibetan sovereignty through both the educational and media pedagogical authorities. Taiwan and Tibet were described as parts of the PRC with different cultural contexts, and framed in education and the media in ways advantageous to the regime. Regarding the creation of knowledge related to Tiananmen Square, the family and community pedagogical authority was valuable to participants in determining what legitimizing knowledge. In terms of normative discourse, Tiananmen Square was completely censored; the Dalai Lama was cast as a villain hindering a backward land in the process of development, while the vilified KMT forces of the defeated Republic of China led a separatist Taiwan.
Research Question 2

To organize these findings and their analysis in light of the core category of censorship, and to answer the second research question, the educational pedagogical authority and is subcategorized as a) perceptions of Chinese education system, b) lack of critical thinking, and c) academic and social pressure. The category of media pedagogical authority is subcategorized by a) internet, b) Japan, and c) special treatment of minorities. Lastly, the family and community pedagogical authority is subcategorized by a) role of democracy, b) perceptions of government.

Research Question # 2: To what degree does the government discourse involving Tiananmen Square, Taiwanese independence, and Tibetan Sovereignty affect citizen perceptions of government and their role as citizens?

Category 1 – Educational Pedagogical Authority

Subcategory – Perceptions of the Chinese Education System

Participants described their perceptions and understandings of the educational system in varying tones. According to Cai, a university professor of education, the curriculum was a result of a central plan, “We have a unified curriculum for the whole country… or at least for the whole province… it was made by the administration of education. For example, for each grade you have your goals”. Cai continued to describe the uniformity of textbooks across districts and the process through which the books are written:

all across the country… they tend to use the same text book… For example, I will assign a publishing house and this publishing house will hire some very…the best teachers to write the textbook and they will be examined by the administration of education and be tested on it. Finally if they find that this textbook is qualified, they will give it they will require all the schools to use this same textbook.
Everyone 5 or 3 years they will re-write the textbook and see if it is out of date or if there are other mistakes.

Participants also traced some aspects of the education system to the results of the Tiananmen Square events. According to Feng, the two week mandatory military training for all college freshmen was a result of the Tiananmen events, “for the ummm, 1989…before then, the students when they enters a college, they do not need to participate, you need to before you study, you need to…you need military training…” Bai Yang described the progression of political ideology classes attached to the curriculum, their general reputation and the role of censorship masked under the auspices of exams and distraction.

In junior middle school we have a morals class. How to behave good, how to behave bad. In high school it is called morals and politics…in university it is called politics to generate change...actually, the government control is almost happen in the media or newspaper….but in textbooks it kind of distracts you or makes you focus on exams…your final score is decided by exams. In university Chinese students are too busy dating or looking for jobs and other stuff. They do not care about the politics class that much.

Cai described testing at the elementary school level and how the scores are used to gauge teachers, schools, and students for the accountability:

So usually the final test will be the… the standard test. Every school uses the same set of test papers, for example all the 1st graders use the same test papers and they can figure out if their education quality is equal to the average score…If your students, their score, are lower than the average score of the district, then you will be in trouble…and then the president, or the headmaster, will ask you to explain
it. So the teacher are highly pressured. So the system of Chinese education is test oriented.

Cai continued to recall the amount of information required by the curriculum and how little room there was for deviation from normative teaching styles:

The Chinese education system tries to cram the information into the students…so usually there are more than students can digest so there is not chance for the teacher to supplement. So what the student learns in school is just the basic ones….if the student want sot learn the extra ones they can go to the night school or to the weekend school…”

Shui described what he saw as his perception of schools, a corruptive combination of money and power: “the government controls schools. The school have many, you know, like school president and they control the school and the teacher job high job, so maybe will change some teacher to, you know… use the money and the power.”

Subcategory – Lack of Critical Thinking

A number of participants cited the lack of critical analysis on the part of Chinese students in their perceptions of the Chinese education system. Bai Yang described this phenomenon, “Chinese student do not like to ask why? They just need to pass the exam and okay and ask questions with direct question with instructions. They don’t have this kind of questions that can be discussed or argued about. Sometimes the Chinese GRE asks this kind of questions, but you cannot answer it in your own opinion.” Jiu stated a similar sentiment, but related it to his own unfulfilling experience as a student, “There is a never a question of “why should I?” in China, or this is not what I wanted?” Yi perceived the education system in China as a means to an end, a process in which academic achievement was a means toward material reward:
I think that education system made Chinese student seldom learn knowledge actively. We always studied because of a purpose. For students beyond high school because they want to get into a good middle school, then high school, so that they can finally be easier to get into a good university. Because education sources are limited, and the difference between good school and not so good schools are great. For university students, they studied because they need have a high GPA to get a good job, or they need to access to master's university. So we seldom read books that are not required. So students are always lack off humanism in education, they are not strong in mind. They are always realistic and material. So that more and more woman marry or have affair with a man who is wealthy but have a wife, even they don't love them. They care about money, they want to have a good life without working hard.

Feng rationalized a lack of critical engagement with the societal status quo in comparison to European thought “we never have the thinking change like in European, they have the enlightenment. It’s like it’s hard to change… it’s not because the government, you need to have enlightened thinking, it’s like that…uh, so, I think that will be horrible, because change is not really smooth.”

Cai described the Chinese education system superior in providing students with foundational knowledge, however she saw the issue of teacher centered pedagogical practices and lack of creative of dynamic thought as a result of time constraints:

I should say they have a very solid foundational knowledge, but they are not flexible and creative enough because most of the classrooms are teacher centered because we have bigger classrooms… no chance for student to be flexible. So I
think creativity is something we need to heed too. It’s a time…It is an issue of
time…I cannot see any way out for that creativity. For example my class, the
teacher dominates the talk…in my class I talk for 40 minutes. I do the most of the
talking, and the student sit there, quietly listening and take notes…even they have
no chance to ask questions.”

Shui described Chinese students as controlled, a product of not wanting to think beyond
the scope of their assignments, “China students don’t like free think. It’s too, too, too you know,
too old, like too controlled. Like just do homework, don’t want to think about more.” Yi
described a similarly restricted way of thinking, “Obedient to what teachers said…almost in the
university always the only the one the only way to answer a question. So we always believe
what the teacher said or say to most of the students.”  Feng perceived students who held
opinions, ideas and thoughts that they were apprehensive to express in the classroom:

Generally they do not want to express their thinking during the class. And they just listen
and finish the homework. Even though they have their own idea they will never talk to
others okay…I have some comments on this teacher, I want to talk to my teachers first
and I want some change….the Chinese students never do that.

Liu felt that education, in some ways, did not prepare students to think for themselves:
I think students are taught to respect teacher and believe what teacher uhhh
believe what teacher tells you. Yeah... in China, teacher has clear statement of
what you should do, what you should not do and if you do what teachers tell you
shouldn’t do and you will be punished. The bad side is that the students don’t
have too much critical thinking or creating thinking and they just taught what to
do and to tell and they don’t think too much about what they like or what they
should choose or what is good for them. They are just teachers and parents this society just prepared everything for them.

Xin described a similar reliance on both teachers and parents by students in the Chinese education system, “Some Chinese students are dependent and rely on their parents and teacher a lot…I mean, they cannot do very like daily things by themselves. They cannot even go to the supermarket to get what they need.

**Subcategory – Academic Pressure For Chinese Students**

The Chinese educational system is rooted in hierarchical, teacher-centered pedagogical practices. Feng described the Chinese education system in a brief summary “Test. Every day is test. It’s like the high school, it’s like you need to take test each week for 7 subjects.” The largest of these tests is the National College Entrance Exam, colloquially known as the Gao Kao (big test). Cai recalled the years preceding college entrance as a tough time, “I think Chinese people have more pressure…study, until they get to the college level, students are the least happy, the least happy…” According to Huo, preparing for the Gao Kao was arduous, as she shuddered recalling: “So, is why the high school students is also sooo busy to study for the Gao Kao…. Most pressure.” Yi also scowled when recalling her time describing the Gao Kao and the economic pressure placed on parents to subsidize their child’s education with private tutoring:

  oh there is no time to relax….yeah we have class nearly every day and exams…it is the most hardened time, for studying…the students….they have to learn a lot of things….for parents of course it is an economic matter. If you don’t have money and you don’t have relationship than some people have ability that your child not have the ability or the resource to do better…
Xin traced college entrance to the Gao Kao score, a pressure driven incentive to succeed in the Chinese education system, “I think from primary school to high school I like the education system. Although it makes students have very high pressure…the admission all depend on your Gao Kao score.” Shui described incidences of this academic pressure leading to suicides on his college campus, “Some student die for that. Just last year my college, someone jumped. Maybe a lot of pressure” Liu described her typical academic schedule in secondary school, with academic preparation stretching into 12 hour days:

I think before they go to college, they are very busy and they have a lot of homework to do and also they have many classes from Monday to Friday and on Sunday or Saturdays they have to participate in other activities like artist, uh dancing, singing or this kind of activities and most often they are forced to do so and for the college students I think they have more free time and they they have less uhh academic burden. And they have test and not so much project or research to do. Yeah, for middle school students and high school students it is usually starts from 6:30 AM and to 10:30 PM I think. (laughs) yeah, more than 12 hours.

Xin described student dependence on the family as exacerbated by the one-child policy. This policy focused the attention of both parents, and grandparents, on one student: “Maybe because of the steady pressure they have no time…because of the one child policy because like one child has two parents and four grandparents so they can pay more attention on the child so it makes him reliable on his family.” Bai Yang saw the focus on exams as a type of censorship in itself, a distraction, “actually, the government control is almost happen in the media or newspaper….but in textbooks it kind of distracts you or makes you focus on exams…” Cai
perceived widespread academic pressure as a result of the large population which were not showing any signs of abating:

If it is just easy as it is here in the United States as it is to get into the university… then we don’t have to be test oriented, we can try to foster other abilities. You know in the past, for my age, 100… 1 out of 100 students can get into college. Now it might be 50, I don’t know the exact, maybe 20…so the pressure is must less in this age than in my age. So the students may have, but still China has a big population, so people have to compete against each other…so I think the test oriented approach will be around for long time…I guess it’s just too many people…to get a job… you have 100 people waiting for the same job…everyone has to compare resume. The jobs go to the prestiged college.

Huo further echoed Cai’s perceptions of the pressure resulting from competitive labor markets flooded with increasing numbers of Chinese college graduates:

I know maybe the Chinese because of their social, the pressure comes from the social…because maybe we know if you can get the master degree or high degree or degree in famous college you can teach, you can insure you can get the chance into the big company or you can find a good job in this. So, now, more and more parents and more and more maybe, mmm, teachers know if we can get the high school and we can enter the famous college we can insure that you can find the good job
Discussion

Regarding descriptions and perception of the Chinese education system, participants overall spoke of a teacher centered, test driven curriculum. This finding mirrors similar descriptions found in the literature (Hu, 2012; Krajewski, 2006; Wang, 2012). Participants unanimously described an intensive classroom experience in terms of workload, long hours, and pressure. High stakes testing seemed to be the axis around which students, parents, and teachers rotated, and were measured by. This system, according to Cai, inevitably drove classroom pedagogy towards a teacher centered model due to its integral importance in evaluation of teacher job performance, security, and professional standing. She went on to perceive this as a matter of time for teachers – the pressure of the curriculum, the high amount of content, and testing by which all were evaluated left little time for deviation from the traditional teacher centered model of lecture and practice. The literature, however, demonstrated that policymakers have established reforms aimed at moving away from such a system of standardized testing in efforts to create a more dynamic workforce to compete with western labor (Hu, 2012; Wang, 2012). However, this discrepancy between policy and field experience highlights the onerous task of changing normative assumptions of teacher and student roles in Chinese education, one that has also has traditional roots in the Confucian moral framework.

The test, as a phenomenon, was reflected upon by numerous participants and was descriptive of all three subcategories. Participants cited the pressure they felt to attain “high scores” on their exams. No participants alluded to other aspects of education, each speaking in tones equating education with testing, homework, and high scores. Bai Yang cited that there was never a question of “why?” regarding curriculum or material, as if students were herded toward some end goal and towards a better future without critical reflection. Jiu talked of his
disenchantment with his education, that it had never been what he wanted, though he carried through for his parents. This understanding of the education system was seen as a means to an end, through which tremendous pressure, competition, long hours, frustration and sadness were by products on the road to a chance at social mobility and distant success. These findings were illuminative of the socio-cultural and economic context underscoring the daily lives and concerns of these participants in the People’s Republic of China. The value of education within the Chinese context is an entrenched socio-cultural value with roots in the Confucian framework (Chou et al, 2013). In summary, participants described the worst time of their lives as the one year period preceding the National College Entrance Exam, or Gao Kao. Other participants spoke of any dynamism or interesting lectures being sucked out of their educational experience as practice tests and strict drilling replaced a more creative learning environment.

Pressure was also felt on the other side of the classroom. Test pressure was described by Cai as being passed down from central authorities where testing served as a measuring stick for teacher performance. In Cai’s opinion, the role of teachers as the arbiters of knowledge in the Chinese classroom was central to issues of accountability to the administration and parents. The stringent curriculum combined with an understood role as classroom authority and pedagogical center forced teachers to adhere to a lecture and textbook bound pedagogy or face lowered test grades and complaints from concerned parents, administrators, and a general loss of face regarding their professional standing.

The reach of the CPC into the classroom, aside from the latent curriculum, was in the form of institutionalized ideology classes. Such courses dealt with morals, politics and Maoist and Marxist ideology throughout middle, secondary and tertiary education. These findings are bore out in the literature (Chen, 1998; Krajewski, 2006), but the descriptions offered by
participants offered contextualized descriptions. Bai Yang described these classes as some of the more onerous, boring, and the least dynamic in terms of lectures and testing, repeatedly testing the same materials and answers from year to year. This finding suggests mandatory courses rife with rote memorization, an indoctrination which reinforces the status quo position of the CPC. Interestingly, these subject areas were also where professors in universities were given more free reign to discuss political issues and offer critique of the government. According to Bai Yang, it was a professor of Marxism who delivered the most scathing critique of the CPC he had ever heard in a public forum.

Feng described an aspect of tertiary education which emerged as a result of the Tiananmen event in 1989. As part of ideological reforms, a cursory two week military training was mandated for all university freshmen (WuDunn, 1989). This military training continues to the present, as all incoming freshman must complete two weeks of marching, firing weapons, and other military led drilling.

From both participant voices and the literature, the Chinese education system serves as a tool of socialization which extends as arbiter of discourse related to the Three T’s. The aforementioned treatment of Tibet and Taiwan and the suppression of the Tiananmen events create conditions which inform (or don’t inform) student perceptions of these events. This is important given the value placed in education within the PRC. Participants cited a lack of critical engagement with their course work and the education system in general, though they often defined their life path and educational experience in secondary school by the scores they received on the Gao Kao.

This system could in many ways be seen as a ritual, in the vein of the Confucian tenet of \textit{ritual consciousness} (Chou et al, 2013). This combination of pressure, lack of critical
engagement, teacher centered/textbook centered learning, high stakes testing, and suppression of information influences dominant discourse, worldviews, and socialization. Ritual consciousness dictates there is a correct moral framework which governs social harmony that has been established over time and codified as ritual. These rituals are revered and obligatory; not open for critique. Ritual consciousness is a reverence for set rules. The educational system falls within this hierarchical moral framework, and to question its form is anathema.

**Deductive Analysis**

*Cultural Reproduction under the Educational Pedagogical Authority*

The educational field described by participants and in the literature is rife with high academic expectations and pressure for students. The rules of this field in the PRC are established by teachers, administrators, and parents. The power structures are hierarchical, mirroring the societal power relationship between of authoritarian governmental authority and citizen obedience. The culture underlying the field is a complex socio-cultural understanding rooted to Confucian values.

The worldviews and systems of perceptions described as being established through the Chinese educational pedagogical authority is an acceptance of knowledge as a means to an end. This worldview does not foster a critical engagement with teachers (authorities), the education system (institutions) or knowledge (media), reproducing a worldview that is sought by CPC officials for citizen acceptance of authoritarian rule.

In relying on test results as the barometer by which students, teachers, and schools are judged, the perceptions and construction of knowledge which negates critical engagement with the Three T’s is reinforced. The repetitive study of state censored curriculum and material under
the pressure of a test oriented educational system guide the perceptions and actions of Chinese students.

Capital in the Educational Pedagogical Authority

The cultural and social capital of high scores on the Gao Kao determine opportunities, open doors, and create “face” in the Chinese field. Attaining these high scores requires intense preparation, a phenomenon which participants described as related to economic capital in the form of exclusive and highly priced private tutoring aimed at Gao Kao preparation, especially in urban magnet schools.

For teachers in the field, cultural and social capital is gained through strictly focusing on high test scores for their students and achieving results. Through their student’s performance, the teacher’s social standing in the school and the community is improved, and they are “given face” for their work. According to Feng, this also means rewards in terms of economic capital as well for teachers who succeed.

Symbolic violence and the Educational Pedagogical Authority

The Chinese educational system as pedagogical authority represents a worldview in which critical engagement with official knowledge is discouraged and obedient acceptance of authority is encouraged. This worldview helps to maintain the status quo power hierarchy. Furthermore, the powerless in Chinese society, the migrant workers often arriving in urban centers from rural agricultural backgrounds, are not afforded the same educational opportunities due to the Hukou registration system for the children of migrant workers, a notoriously difficult bureaucracy to navigate (Feng, 2013).
Category 2 – Media Pedagogical Authority

Subcategory – Internet

Participants uniformly described internet and online in conjunction with the discussion of the Three T’s, as an area in which discourse usually reserved for private conversation was more open and safe. The comments by participants regarding online behaviors ranged from observational, “you cannot log in Facebook and watch YouTube”, to the descriptions of how users could evade censors and discuss issues such as the Tiananmen events. Shui described the censor apparatus monitoring the micro-blogging social media site Sina Weibo, “Yeah, cause if you just put somebody in the Weibo…Weibo will just delete that. They will delete that. Yeah, maybe they will delete the account, a lot of people are deleted.”

Bai Yang described both encoding messages and the pro-government “50 Cent Party”. According to Bai Yang, “the funny thing is the Chinese government recruits some internet writers online. In China we have a nickname for them, 50 cents, 50 Chinese cents. That means once they put one note in the form that support the Chinese government, you will get 50 cents. We call that the 50 cent party. Yes, good things. Every Chinese leader in central government has a nickname, we always discuss these things.” Xin also described her perceptions of evading censors and the actions taken by recently arrested famous micro-bloggers:

We sometimes combine like pinyin and characters together so the website system will not easily to find it, but they will find it someday, so you will have to change your code… I think the famous bloggers were arrested because they didn’t use any code in their Weibo’s, so they just say….they just speak out directly what they want to say about the country, but usually on Weibo there is all negative comments on the country. That is what normal people will do. They post Weibo
online because maybe they need help so must be something bad happen to them and it is reported by a lot of people and it is reposted around the whole website.

Shui also felt that Weibo was a powerful medium for dissent which had recently been the focus of lengthy jail sentences for some famous online activists, “Yes, but now, this year, the government controlled the internet. They put somebody, you know, toss somebody not good for the government in the jail, in the prison. Last month. We know about this, we know this is not fact, it is true, but they control anything... Maybe on Weibo, but they will delete, also the man says something on the paper now, they will go to jail. 5 years.”

Bai Yang continued to describe his perceptions of the “great wall” and censor apparatus’ ineffective control of information and generational divide regarding how media was consumed:

Many news get published online. Chinese government has changed their kind of ruling policy. According to...Once upon a time they had a very strict control online, but it doesn’t work. Doesn’t work. They don’t have so many people to check. So now they use software...this also doesn’t work, and they kind of lose control...but the newspaper no, TV no....because actually but actually people in my generation or younger that like to search and chat online, but the older generation use the newspaper, TV. They still depend on those kind of stuff. They still get to be controlled. My generation grow up and become the mainstream of politics of power, what that will be is not the problem of the current government. How to control us is the next government’s job. Kind of internet gets more transmission.

Xin commented on the state of the Chinese internet censor as she saw it:
I think the internet is controlled by the country. It is free for people to post online, but the internet like Weibo so people can post opinion online, that is set up in the system for sensitive words if the words appear, your comments will not be posted online automatically, but if they haven’t put your sensitive words in the system, they might be deleted later. Do you know Baidu? It totally works for the Chinese government. But sometimes the websites like Sina Weibo and Tongshu Weibo they want to help the Chinese to speak out so they won’t delete the comments immediately until like I believe someone from the government come to talk to them so they have to do so. But Baidu, is always if you try to search some sensitive words online, and it will have a notice that based on Chinese policy and law, some words and names are not allowed to appear.

Liu, however, perceived the actions of the government censors in a different light than Bai Yang, referring to the internet in a positive light, but also acknowledging the censors, “I think it plays an important role, it is fast and you can know something immediately and uh, but sometimes it blocks a lot of things. To make people feel safe.” The perception by Liu, that the censors were protecting people from bad news, from events that might hurt others, and that the creation of laws monitoring content were a way for the government to help citizens was expounded on.

Umm, I know that maybe the government will build the law about if somebody spread the bad bad news about their to bother political or other maybe hurt somebody’s ummm insurance or hurts somebody’s if you spread the bad news to hurt somebody or hurt some, and it maybe there how to say…you got my meaning about that? So you can’t spread the bad news, especially about the
political online. You will break the law. Break the law. Maybe um the
development of technology, you know if you post news online its spread so fast
and it will make the big effect. And so the law will control that strictly now.
Xin described her perceptions of internet media, and traditional media in general,
being part of a larger news cycle which moved from one issue to the next without
resolution:

I think from Newspaper, TV news, internet….It seems in China now you can
never get a result of any events. If something bad happen people like discuss on
the internet and try to figure out which is true and how the government will solve
this problem and usually this will update by a new issue….so you…it seems like
nothing has a result

In Bai Yang’s experience, the emergence of the Bo Xilai scandal was slowly
revealed over a period of months within Chinese media sources. He heard about it from
a friend in England months before the news filtered into mainstream Chinese media:

My friend, who was studying in England, he sent me messages about this news.
But in China we didn’t know anything…. because Bo controlled Chongqing
media, nothing got out. You know the murderer Jun ran to American ambassador
and to ask for protection and then the Americans said “take him” we don’t want
him, and some people came to Chongqing from Beijing and took him. It was then
that the Chinese media make headlines about this man being a traitor. But we
didn’t really know what was happening; it was then that it got online and through
proxy news filtered in over a few months.
**Subcategory – Japan**

Over the course of discussing the Three T’s, the subject of Japan emerged in numerous contexts, beginning with Yi’s description of Japan’s image being a result of her educational experience, “And another point is in school….for example some of my middle school friends…the more education we learn the more that we don’t like Japan. But if the students who only take the middle school education that maybe they will not think that.” Shui described a personal connection to his perceptions of Japan:

Oh, we hate Japan. That is fact. My grandma…my grandma’s father and mother died because of Japanese. So very sick…the Japanese were very sick in China. Every China people know that. That is fact. That is not government control that. That is true history. Many people die for the Japanese… You know the Nanjing? That is true…that is true…a lot of people. So we hate the Japanese.

Xin described Japan as a tool of distracting Chinese citizens from other domestic issues or contentious foreign policy:

I think China use Taiwan….I don’t know maybe China use Japan to balance the relationship with Taiwan or maybe Taiwan use Japan to balance the relationship with China. Always there is news saying that Taiwan wants to be independent and they don’t want to belong to mainland China and if these sounds are too loud in the public, and the relationship between China and Japan suddenly turns bad. It is trying to transfer the people’s attention off the Taiwan issue. This is easy to control, using the people’s opinions on Japan.
Bai Yang attested to a similar phenomenon, a media which uses the historically entrenched hatred for Japan as a distraction from issues that may threaten CPC legitimacy in domestic policy:

Very hardly do we hear something bad, every time… it is actually when something between China and Japan comes up…that is when we know something bad has happened in China…we should tell our people something else…sometimes some news negative or bad in China, some government official is corrupt or there was a serious cave-in in China, or something that happens that is bad and the government doesn’t want the people to know…they will make up something bad about Japan

*Subcategory – Special Treatment of Minorities*

Related to the issue of Tibet, participants revealed perceptions of unfair government policies for minority groups regarding reserved university placements. These slots were described by Xin as established under a different set of criteria than that faced by Han students. Jiu saw this phenomenon of preferential treatment applied to Uighur students, “I had my classmates from Xingjian, they have slots at the university. They are taken care of.” This difference in ethnicity was explained by Yi, “we are in different….they are minority. And the people in China are more Hanju…”

Cai recalled a story from her time working at a University in central China, prefaced by “Most of the things you (Americans) get from your media is a lie.” Her story involved the Muslim Uighur minority group in China, traditionally settled along the Silk Road connecting Xi’an (in north central China) to Xingjian (the traditionally Muslim province in northwest China). At her university, a small group of Uighur students were celebrating a cultural holiday
outside of a dormitory, drinking and being generally loud. This continued deep into the night. At a certain point, someone shouted from the dorm above for them to be quiet. The group was rather drunk by this point and they took knives (Uighurs traditionally carry ornate knives on their belts) and went in the dorm looking for the person who had yelled down at them. She said that the police handled it as a case of drunken students basically being disruptive. She continued recalling that the English staff often listened to Voice of America (VOA) every day on a shortwave radio as practice for their English listening skills. The next day, this incident was reported on VOA as a race riot in the Republic of China, in her city, by the Uighur population. She said this was not the case at all, but this news was being reported across the globe. Cai recalled that from then on, when their staff heard reports on VOA concerning China, they laughed at it. She said that these minority groups, such as the Muslim Uighurs and the Tibetans, use international media in this way to leverage their position within the country.

Xin saw the preferential treatment of minorities extending to protection from police in cases of fights:

We have ethnic policies on students, especially in undergraduate college and yes, the Tibetan they can attend any university…not any university….but they are really good top Chinese university with a very low Gao Kao score. This is a kind of policy for them. And they will protect them in school and I remember that one semester we have football match in school and uhh… our team, the team of our department it is easy for boys when they attack each other and it is very common. And I think the students from our department attacked the animation department. There was like two Tibetan students on that team. So the school considered this as a really serious issue and they talked to each boys on the playground and they
won’t tell anything and they tried to comfort the Tibetan Students. They also like beat other people or do something wrong, but the school just say that “you are okay, I won’t call the police, just come down and tell me if you are feeling uncomfortable. So they are treated very special…They are very sensitive, they will not do anything for Tibet. And the same policy will happen for Xingjian, the people from Xingjian…there are a lot of like thieves in Beijing now, also in other cities and they are Uighurs and the police have a special policy on them. Although they have caught them, stole cell phone, purse, they call the police and the policemen will come over and they will not punish the Uighur.

Discussion

The word *internet* and *online* were used numerous times to describe places where information related to the Three T’s could be found outside of textbooks, school, and traditional forms of media. The anonymous nature of the internet created an informal arena where sensitive issues were given life for discussion outside of a strictly censored societal context, a place where alternate discourses exist outside of normative “rules”. The findings further illuminate the power of the internet in accessing information that is being actively suppressed by the CPC apparatus.

Both Bai Yang and Xin described the use of codes to evade Chinese government censors. Bai Yang confirmed the existence of the 50 cent party described by Qiang (2011) hired to spread disinformation in chat rooms, social media, and other online media. Once again, the repeated citations of Sina Weibo (Chinese twitter) as informative and a source for “real” news was reinforced. Of the participants, those from the urban areas mentioned Sina Weibo far more than those of rural origin. Participants also described the generational shift between a controlled old media and the older demographic which still reads newspapers and watched CCTV. Bai Yang
compared this older demographic to a younger generation that accessed information in a far more decentralized online world, a rift which will have repercussions regarding future governance. Liu also saw the decentralized nature of internet communication as causing more transparent actions on behalf of the regime. This finding is supported by Zhao (2011), who cited this phenomenon as creating a countervailing pressure on the CPC for reform, especially regarding hot button issues such as official corruption.

Another illuminative finding demonstrates micro-blogging social networking sites, particularly Sina Weibo, have had an impact on the government control of information as the amount of users and information being posted outpaces the tremendous resources put forth by the government to manually delete and monitor the Chinese web. The popularity of Sina Weibo described by the participants is a threat to CPC sponsored “opinion channeling”. Liu described the possibilities of the internet diminished government control over information. She predicted this development would be met with more stringent censor actions and legal restrictions placed upon the web. This battle between technology and government censors shows the difficulties in trying to control the web. The term control was used in vivo to describe the government relationship to much content in education, media, and the internet. However, participants hinted that this control had decreased with the rise of the internet. According to Bai Yang and Liu, the internet has forced the CPC to cede some power to the citizenry. Transparency of government actions and policies, which under traditional media was rather opaque, has changed due to increased communication technologies provided by the web.

However, the CPC has not stood by and passively watched as users of services like Sina Wiebo chip away at the censor apparatus and their power. Shui and Xin spoke of a crackdown this year in which bloggers on Weibo have been imprisoned with sentences of 5 years for various
critical postings. This trend has been underscored by a new government policy of the “7 bottom lines” which has made rumor mongering illegal on internet platforms (Buckley, 2013). These actions, combined with a crackdown against a targeted 100,000 Sina Weibo accounts, have led to a 9 percent drop in Sina Weibo account numbers earlier this year (Custer, 2014). This crackdown has opened up other sectors in mass text-based mobile applications for communication as a new arena outside of government censors. This cycle of suppression and new evolutions of communication technologies is especially pertinent to sensitive political issues such as the Three T’s and other forms of collective action, where the censors can never quite catch up with technological innovation.

The topic of Japan emerged as references in one form or another occurred from interview to interview. The comments often reflected how participants perceived government control of media as a way to rally anti-Japanese nationalism. Bai Yang cited this as a product of both the educational system and the media apparatus combined with historical events that have never reached closure, such as the atrocities at Nanjing. By harnessing this topic through media coverage, Bai Yang said citizens were distracted from domestic problems.

A further emergent finding arose in discussing the issue of Tibet. Participants did not have much to say about Tibet outside of their opinion on the Dalai Lama and a vague understanding of disputes in the area. However, many developed perceptions of Tibetans and Uighur’s through their experience in higher education and the preferential treatment given to these groups. The importance given to academic achievement and high testing scores by the ethnically Han participants was a bone of contention for many when discussing issues related to Tibetan sovereignty. It was through university placement slots that many of the participants had engaged with Tibetan and Uighur minority students, though each description cast a negative light
on this practice and their perceptions of the ethnic groups. Both Xin and Cai described situations in which groups of ethnic Uighur and Tibetan students had been protected by university officials even though they had been involved in events involving violence and the police. Xin further described a growing amount of Uighur “thieves” in Beijing. There were no positive descriptions of minority groups from participants; instead the picture described was a portrayal of students who were undeservingly accepted into university despite low Gao Kao scores.

According to participants, Japan, Tibetan and Uighurs were the “other” in contrast to Han Chinese culture, history, and norms. In the case of Japan, a long standing animosity has taken place since “the Sino-Japanese war” in the words of Bai Yang. Shui attested to the atrocities of the Japanese at Nanjing in the late 1930’s while Feng, Xin, and Yi highlighted the present day incarnations of this hatred for Japan as a nationalist tool for rallying patriotism during times of domestic trouble. Japan was and continues to be used as a media and government tool of manipulation. From participant voices, Tibetan and Uighur minority students were representative of a compensatory system which they did not feel was fair.

Deductive Analysis

*Cultural Reproduction and the Media Pedagogical Authority*

In relation to the field in the PRC, the rules are firmly established through CPC formulated laws regarding media and internet content. In relation to knowledge concerning the Three T’s, the rules and power structures of the media field do not permit countervailing information to be broadcast concerning either Taiwan or Tibet, only news which legitimizes CPC authority. In this sense, the pictures of a backwards Tibet on the road to improvement or a conciliatory Taiwan on the road towards reunification were within the rules of the approved CPC
media field. Regarding the symbol of Tiananmen Square in 1989, the rules are complete censorship.

When talking about Chinese ethnic relations, it is important to recognize a Han dominated field and habitas. Putonghua (Mandarin) is the adopted official national language of the PRC and is the spoken dialect of Beijing, the traditional power center for the imperial Han regime and CPC leadership. This language distinction is especially important for minority groups in the PRC, of which there are 55 recognized groups comprising around 8.5 percent of the population (World Factbook, 2014). The remaining 91.5 percent of the country are of Han ethnicity (World Factbook, 2014). On the island of Taiwan, 98 percent of citizens are ethnically Han, the remaining 2 percent indigenous Taiwanese (World Factbook, 2014). The dominant Han field and habitas are rooted in a socio-cultural legacy of both paddy culture and the codification of hierarchical collectivism through a Confucian framework which differs from the history and culture of other minority groups such as the Tibetan, Uighur, and Taiwanese. These groups possess their own languages, customs, worldviews and traditions.

This distinction between Han and minority groups is one way in which the Tiananmen events are suppressed more so than the events involving Taiwan and Tibet. In both of the latter cases, the nationalist/patriotic rhetoric against counter-revolutionary “others” in the form of Tibetan radicals or Taiwanese KMT separatists can be employed to portray the villain. At the same time, infrastructure development projects, improved transportation, and Han migration expand the CPC field to Tibet and Xingjian provinces, a migration similar to what has already occurred in Taiwan. From these CPC infrastructure investments the trade, tourism and development projects slowly dilute the collective power, culture, and potential of countervailing forces on behalf of both the Uighur and Tibetan communities. The educational system serves a
similar function, expanding Han influence through means such as university slots for minorities, and a Mandarin based curriculum (Wangdu, 2011). This phenomenon is similar to the imperial Keju exams of ancient China, where the imperial regime enfranchised an upwardly mobile peasant class through education while at the same time strengthening their ideological control and geographic reach.

**Capital and the Media Pedagogical Authority**

As a largely culturally homogenous society, power in the PRC is gained through negotiating the dominant Han culture. This includes speaking in a Mandarin dialect to demonstrate education, understanding Han behaviors and customs necessary for success in social relationships, and demonstrating a worldview which coincides with dominant Han thought. In relation to Chinese ethnic minorities, social, symbolic, and eventually economic capital resemble traits of the ethnic Han majority.

**Symbolic Violence and the Media Pedagogical Authority**

A large part of Tibetan and Uighur resistance to PRC rule has been the slow marginalization of language, culture, and traditions under the pressure of increased tourism, Han migrant presence, and a Han dominant educational curriculum (Wangdu, 2011). One way in which these groups may come to rationalize their powerless position in the hierarchy of the PRC would be adopting Han language, culture, and worldviews in place of what had been Tibetan or Uighur.

**Category 3 – Familial, Community, And Informal Educational Pedagogical Authority**

**Subcategory – Perceptions of Chinese Government**

Participants described their impressions of the government in general terms, though the overall impression was ambivalent. Yi thought some aspects related to Tiananmen Square
seemed somewhat unbelievable, “but now its influence about that is that Chinese people cannot
demonstrate without permission of the government, did you know that?” Shui hinted at a general
negative opinion of the government, but shared his guarded optimism for a better future, “You
know, I feel disappoint in the government. Everybody feel disappoint. If you ask somebody
Chinese, they will tell you disappoint. But now, maybe change, new president. Maybe we will
change some things, but lots of things not change.” Jiu also had hope for the new President, but
felt most people were disengaged, “Most people can tell you whatever, they don’t care about the
government, they don’t care.” Shui also described a disengagement from government due to a
lack of empowerment, “we talk about it, but there is no change. We cannot change anything, we
cannot change, so we talk about boring, sometimes don’t talk”. Cai described the government as
having its faults, but more importantly having made many wealthy, “they would like to…
attribute everything to the government…that is the fault of the government, government is
corrupt. Yes I would agree, our government is corrupted to a degree, yes everything has two
sides, but the government has done something good…the least…the one thing…at least, they
have made people rich.”

Shui spoke of his perceptions concerning government response to citizen activism in
relation to the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989, describing the plainclothes government
officials known as the Cheng Guang, the pseudo police force that is often sent to break up civic
protests:

a lot of students go to Tiananmen to…what…to…to… to…don’t agree, disagree,
that the government so they maybe the government cleaned that people. But now,
this thing happen in China is very normal…you know the Cheng Guang killed
someone on the street is very normal. Also the people are very angry. They are
like police, but they are not police. They have no gun. Also if now, have a lot of
student disagree with the government, now it is the Chen Guang to control the
students. They can beat someone. You know, we will be angry, but the
government disagree with that….we beat the Cheng Guang too…yeah, sometimes
we will beat the Cheng Guang too

Feng felt pride in her country, but did not like the flag rallying aspects of the government,
“One of the reasons I don’t like this government is because they really just they will push you to
love this country, it’s like “love this government” Feng continued to describe the difficulties of
controlling a large population, and that perhaps it was through authoritarian means of censoring
in which domestic problems could be avoided, “I think it’s because China has a lot of people. If
they have less people, everything will be controlled. It’s like our class, even if they have four
students even though they are talking, that will be no big deal, but if 80 students talk together,
that is a big deal. Because arrrrrgghhh it’s so loud!” Lastly, Feng spoke of her perceptions
regarding the prospects of governmental change within China as a difficult process due to the
history and entrenched thought processes at play:

The Chinese citizens is really easy to listen to someone, it’s like that people is not
really good, and they will push you or they will say some word to…to do a very
bad thing. It’s like they were like “okay, I want to protect our country or I really
like my country and I need to do some change, but I think never gonna be happen
unless there is a very peaceful country situation…if I am the people who does not
really care about the politics, okay, sometimes I will say that is not really good.
You know China has a lot of people, how can we…I think maybe it’s not because
this government is wrong, it is because…. it’s hard for them to make some change because we have a long history.

Subcategory – The Role Of Democracy

In discussing sensitive political issues, participants referred on numerous occasions to democracy in relation to the CPC regime. Bai Yang described a situation in which democracy was a less of a concern than fulfilling the necessities of day to day life:

You know…actually Chinese people….they don’t think that democracy is a must for them. They care more about how much money they should earn…about how to buy a house, how to get a car…The Chinese government always kind of controls what people get…they cannot let you get whatever you want. If you have nice food, nice car and nice house, then you ask for democracy. If they think you about paying for your house loan every month, then you won’t think about democracy. Yes, economic control. I just give you a list of satisfaction, if that is not enough for you…economic satisfaction.

Cai was similarly skeptical of any democratic reforms, as she saw the CPC regime as more successful than not, especially in changing the quality of life for so many people:

So, someone ask me, so “do you want democracy?” I said: normally, Chinese people don’t talk about political things, democracy, openly. We do not care about it. And so someone ask again: do you want to overthrow your government? And I say, No, who cares? As long as they can give me money, make us life better, who cares? They have done a good job! That is most of the Chinese people think, although we hate corruption. We try to expose corruption. And also, uh…for democracy, and also, I also think that, because the US government is based on the
fact that US, uh, American culture is individualistic culture, so you cannot have a
central government, you do not like a central government, but for Chinese people
that is a collective culture right? So maybe a central government is more
important for these collectivist people?

Liu also discussed this dimension of political disinterest, a disinterest which resulted
from both a lack of power to change their political representation and a more pressing concern
for their immediate lives, “I think that people usually don’t pay that much attention to politics…
they worry about their lives, even if they care about that, they can do nothing to change that.
They don’t have, usually we don’t vote who is the president, who should be the….so I think they
talk about this, but it is not in a formal way.” Jiu saw the logistics of democracy as the main
stumbling block for any sort of democratic reforms in the PRC, “we have 1.3 billion people, I
don’t want to say that they are stupid, they just don’t think about those things. The American
system is not perfect… there are too many people in China for a democracy.” For Cai, her
impression of democracy from school was descriptive, but not fully fleshed out until arriving in
the United States:

Actually democracy is not an issue….in China. So…in high school classes,
students are also introduced to the other political systems of countries. But there
is no comment. We know what the American system is like. Yeah…You have
senator…how they are elected…and things like that….just a basic
knowledge….but there is no comment. So democracy is not an issue….There is
no comment…actually, only after I came here, I compared the system, myself, I
know what it democracy is
Discussion

Participants described a largely negative view of the CPC regime, citing corruption, disappointment, overzealous flag waving, secret police beatings, the illegality of collective demonstration, and lack of empowerment in the government process as major concerns. Of the positive descriptions, Cai cited material wealth while others like Liu and Huo saw the actions of the government as a paternal protection. These occurrences have been documented in the international press and in the literature, though the contextualized descriptions of these events provided a personal touch.

The topic of democracy emerged as participants engaged in political discussions. Democracy was described as a minor concern in the daily lives of Chinese citizens or the daily lives of their acquaintances, an informative finding. For Bai Yang there was not a pressing need for democracy. Instead, material goods and success were what drove Chinese citizens. Cai saw democracy in similar terms; democracy was not what people wanted as long as they were successful in material terms. The government’s perceived role was to provide stability and the means to increase personal prosperity, not so much to share power with individuals. Two participants cited the size of the Chinese population as an impediment to any sort of democratic reform. Amongst participants, a near uniformity was placed on the material gains and prospects of individuals rather than on the agency of individuals to be democratically involved. This appraisal of democracy by participants highlights the cross-cultural differences that emerge when western normative assumptions of individual rights and representative government clash with issues of Confucian paternalism and collectivism.

Furthermore, the history of China suffered a lengthy period of turmoil under the auspices of democratic reform with the fall of the Qing Empire at the beginning of the 19th century. The
ensuing years between 1911 and the Communist Party ascension in 1949 were filled with numerous attempts at a unified democratic government, a goal never truly attained as the imperial system crumbled into quasi-feudalism under warlord rule (Taylor, 2009).

**Deductive Analysis**

*Cultural Reproduction and the Family and Community Pedagogical Authority*

The political field in the PRC has been controlled by the CPC for many years. To exercise power within the political field requires CPC membership. To become a member of the Chinese community party, numerous steps are needed which include high academic achievement, nomination by a current party member, interviews testing ideology, probationary status, and eventual membership dues.

The underlying worldviews in the Chinese political field cited by participants are well established in the literature and work to maintain CPC authority. The relationship of parents and children conveyed through familial piety embrace a paternal worldview of governance. The reverence for rules and framework for “how things are done” are embodied in the Confucian tenet of ritual consciousness and CPC power hierarchy. This socio-cultural foundation legitimizes the censoring actions of the CPC and maintenance of the status quo. The current political regime perpetuates a worldview in which ruler is ruler, father is father, and son is son. This Confucian proverb underlies why the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989 are still treated with such sensitivity. The mass defiance of paternal authority, of the ruler, almost crumbled the regime. Though there were numerous attempts by the CPC to attach foreign agent provocateurs to the organization of the demonstrations (particularly the United States) the movement was determined to be homegrown (Collins, 1989) and even more troubling.
Capital and the Family and Community Pedagogical Authority

Capital refers to the exchange of power within the field, a form of power gained through negotiation of approved symbols, rules, education and behavior (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990). Social, symbolic, and economic capital are accessed in the field of Chinese government through CPC members. This form of social capital is a tool for advancing within the existing social networks of power in the PRC. Membership is determined based on a number of factors, but is often the result of high academic achievement and a lengthy application process and yearlong probationary status.

Symbolic violence and the Family and Community Pedagogical Authority

The issue of symbolic violence related to the Three T’s is socio culturally embedded in a tradition of authoritarian paternal governance. The sense taken from Cai, Liu, Yi, Bai Yang and Shui was that they could not change anything, that it was out of their hands, and that this was reason enough to not care. This is political disenfranchisement and demonstrates symbolic violence on a fundamental level. The disenfranchisement is reinforced through the suppression and stigmatization of landmark episodes of civil disobedience such as the Tiananmen Square events of 1989 when change did occur because of ordinary citizen action.

Countervailing Argument

The Case for Chinese Censorship Of The Three T’s

It is important as researcher to acknowledge the bias of researching the Three T’s – these are events which have occurred outside the American socio cultural context. The Three T’s are symbolic of events often considered violations of human rights in the west, and to assume that these events have the same connotation in the PRC is faulty. Furthermore, the issue of purposely suppressing information is also a seeming violation of what are considered inalienable human
rights in western thought. Once again, to assume that the sociocultural context of the PRC is similar in this regard is faulty. The first step in creating a more balanced view of the phenomenon is to argue the case in its favor.

*What Is Censorship?*

Censorship occurs when an entity prevents or restricts members of a group from accessing information that they would otherwise have access to. Secondly, the entity which is censoring must have some power or authority over those being censored. Lastly, the benefit of restricting the information is either to the group that no longer has access to that material, or is of benefit to those doing to the restricting (Brenkert, 2009).

Governments and some religious institutions have such power to fulfill all three of these criteria through police force and political/spiritual authority over the people (Brenkert, 2009). Less powerful entities can still censor, though may not fulfill the second criteria.

*Universal Declaration Of Human Rights*

The United Nations (UN), as an international governing body, was formed in the years after World War II in response to the atrocities and violent legacy of the early twentieth century. To foster interdependence, increased communication, and a framework for negotiation, the UN sought a basic understanding of universal rights. This interpretation of human law called upon drawing understanding from many traditions and socio-cultural contexts. The basis for this framework is reminiscent of the idealized veiled “original position” of John Rawls, wherein morally irrelevant factors such as ethnicity, class, race, or nationality are dismissed in the search for basic understanding of human law and human rights (Rawls, 1972).

From this original position, according to the United Nations declaration of human rights, censorship infringes on Article 19 and freedom of information:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers (Universal declaration of Human Rights, 2013).”

However, article 19 is problematic, as access to information is not an absolute. There is information that is justifiably censored, information that could potentially harm others if not suppressed. Censorship is justified in cases of inciting hate crimes, propagating genocide, child pornography, protecting the identities of witnesses in legal systems, etc. (Shyu, 2008). The United States government recently deleted Iraqi documents detailing how to make an atomic bomb from the internet (Shyu, 2008). Determining what the boundary between protecting citizens from information and depriving citizens of liberty is a difficult task.

Deontological and Consequentialist Framework Regarding Censorship

To visualize the ethical dimensions of Chinese censorship, a spectrum ranging between deontological and consequentialist understandings is helpful. On the hypothetical side of deontological reasoning, there are no cases in which censorship is permissible, such as the stance advocated in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In assuming this stance, one must accept that the free flow of information is a natural human right not to be interfered with by other actors or institutions. The absolutism of deontological reasoning is a problematic stance when dealing with censorship due to the many instances when a government’s censorship is quite understandable, as explained above (Shyu, 2008). However, the moral exemplar of a deontological ethical stance in relation to censorship is important for ethical frameworks; to slide too far towards utilitarianism as a state rationalizing censorship is paternalistic and infringing upon liberty.
On the side of consequentialism, the use of censorship is permissible if the outcomes are good. Classic utilitarianism further refines this claim, stating that the degree of acceptable censorship is proportionally related to the amount of benefit it brings to the greatest amount of people. If the censorship only benefits a few, then it is not ethically just. However, if the censorship benefits millions, then it can be rationalized. John Stuart Mill, a proponent of utilitarian thought, saw censorship negatively due to its intellectual impact on those affected. With information censored, even if that information was false, actors could not independently work out accurate approximations of truth through discourse.

The arguments against utilitarian claims are that the rights of the individual are devalued to the greater good of the collective, as opposed to the inverse deontological claim where the rights of the individual trump the collective good. In placing Chinese censorship on this ethical spectrum, the regime sides as an extreme example of utilitarian thought through purportedly placing social harmony and social stability above individual rights.

The Importance of Socio-Cultural Context in Individual Rights

Another extenuating factor when assessing the ethical implications of government censorship in the People’s Republic of China is the socio-cultural context, worldviews, and history underlying the phenomenon. Through the lens of western liberalism, the rights of the individual have assumed hegemonic status of power. Democracy, capitalism, and the dominant Judeo-Christian tradition have provided a rich impetus for such inherent understandings of deontological individual rights.

However, the People’s Republic of China and many other Asian cultures maintain higher societal levels of collectivity, interdependence, and hierarchical social roles rooted in different philosophical traditions. In such cultures, the role of the individual is less important than the
collective. This plays out in communication styles, social relationships, and governance. Quite appropriately, this socio-cultural difference was fleshed out during the drafting of the universal declaration of human rights, a committee chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt. She recalled, in her memoirs, an exchange between Dr. Peng Chung Chang, the Chinese delegate (representing the Republic of China, not the PRC) to the committee and Dr. John Humphrey of Canada, as well as Dr. Charles Malik of Lebanon:

Dr. Chang was a pluralist and held forth in charming fashion on the proposition that there is more than one kind of ultimate reality. The Declaration, he said, should reflect more than simply Western ideas and Dr. Humphrey would have to be eclectic in his approach. His remark, though addressed to Dr. Humphrey, was really directed at Dr. Malik, from whom it drew a prompt retort as he expounded at some length the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Dr. Humphrey joined enthusiastically in the discussion, and I remember that at one point Dr. Chang suggested that the Secretariat might well spend a few months studying the fundamentals of Confucianism! (as cited in Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2013).

This difference between the hierarchical, role-based Confucian value system of social harmony and the western liberal democratic understanding of individuality occupy different wavelengths of ethical reasoning and distort perceptions of just human law.

Confucian Framework

The mandate of heaven is the ancient rationale through which rulers retained their legitimacy in Imperial China. If the regime abided as moral and just, the mandate of heaven remained. If the regime and rulers were overthrown by the ruled, they had lost the mandate of heaven due to their moral transgressions (Zizek, 2011).
Confucius starkly described what the mandate of heaven and hierarchy entailed when asked about the principles of good government, where he replied “good government consists in the ruler being a ruler, a minister being a minister, the father being a father, and the son being a son.” (Analects 12.11). This ideal of specialized and separate societal roles is the opposite of what is seen as just in participatory democracy, where citizens ostensibly have a say in their governance, and the rulers are representative of their constituents. Instead, power is concentrated and delegated from the top and is only replaced when the regime has proven too intolerable for the lower rungs of hierarchy to continue.

Confucius’ view of social disorder, on the other hand, mirrored the decentralized notion of participatory democracy, a state in which “rulers do not rule and subjects do not serve (as cited in Zizek, 2011).” This strict hierarchy was a measure to stabilize society and provide clear roles, rules, and identities for individuals within China.

Under the Confucian framework, authoritarian governance trumped democratic decision making or individual rights. Though the CPC does not claim Confucian ideology, this focus on social harmony and hierarchical societal roles has the same normative power as the power of the individual in the west.

The Case For Chinese Censorship

In On Liberty, Mill defended despotic rule for backward societies where barriers stood in the way of rapid social development, given that under a utilitarian framework, the best intentions of the denizens were kept at heart by the regime (Mill, 1999).

The CPC, through unilateral authoritarian rule, has brought collective success to the PRC in terms of development, prestige, national pride, and raised standard of living. Given the economic, cultural and ideological troubles during the Cultural Revolution, this consequence of
their unilateral rule legitimizes the means, including censorship. Furthermore, the purported mission of Social Harmony, the Confucian ideal co-opted by the contemporary CPC public opinion channeling, rationalizes government suppression of information in a utilitarian framework.

This utilitarian rationalization of censorship in China has global implications. Given the transition costs for many states in the post Arab Spring, a sudden regime change in the PRC, with over one-fifth of the world’s population, would be far more problematic than censoring collective protest movements. The PRC and CPC are "Too big to fail". In protecting the regime, the world economy is kept safe.

Finally, article 19 of the Universal declaration of human rights was composed in the spirit of a different philosophical worldview which exaggerates the rights of the individual. Furthermore, its deontological absolutism is ethically flawed, as information needs to be censored at times to protect society.

**Evaluation of Mixed Qualitative Methods for Data Analysis**

The combination of inductive and deductive analytical methods increased the rigor of the findings and discussion while at the same time limiting researcher bias by separating the grounded theory from the lens of deductive analysis. Furthermore, the final comparative analysis concerning the core category of censorship in relation to the socio-cultural context within the PRC created a balance in the discussion through countervailing argument. These various methods, in unison, provided a holistic picture of a complex issue.

**Chapter Summary**

According to the data, within the People’s Republic of China, the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989 are tightly controlled in both the educational system and traditional media outlets
such as television and printed material. Participants described their perceptions of the event through the lens of informal education in the form of family members, friends, the internet and other acquaintances. The events of Tiananmen are more suppressed than information related to Taiwan or Tibet, which are both described as being suppressed, but less taboo in media, education, and society. Regarding Taiwan, mainland Chinese participants described Taiwan as rightful possession of the PRC; Taiwanese participants stated the opposite. Participants described their understanding of Taiwanese independence through the lens of their formal education, media exposure, and informal understandings of the issue. According to the data, the issue of Tibetan sovereignty was understood in a similar vein to that of Taiwan that Tibet stood as a rightful possession of the PRC led by a “bad guy” in the form of the Dalai Lama. Participants described their perceptions of Tibetan sovereignty through the lens of education, media, and informal understandings of the issue.

The suppression of Three T’s, in a larger sense, represent many issues related to how power, governance, and the construction of knowledge are transferred in Chinese Society. Participants described their impressions and understanding of the public education system and a perceived lack of critical thought reinforced by a pressure inducing and competitive test driven pedagogy. According to the data, the media, along with education, played a large role in creating discourse. Themes emerged related to hatred of Japan, censorship, government control, the role of democracy, and the special treatment of minority groups in higher education. Finally, Participants described the internet’s role in creating alternative discourses regarding the Three T’s and other suppressed information, especially through Sina Wiebo. All of these themes in part informed the participant’s perceptions of government.
Regarding deductive analysis, the CPC regime controls dominant discourse related to the Three T’s through institutional censorship which suppresses educational and media engagement with the issues in ways detrimental to the regime. However, where the pedagogical authority of education and media are effectively censored, the private context of the family and community possesses its own power in forming countervailing discourse. The underlying socio-cultural field of Confucianism, specifically ritual consciousness and filial piety, codify a public obedience to the government sponsored discourse. This discourse suppresses the Three T’s due to their potential for fomenting organized demonstration against CPC authority. However, within the family and other informal and anonymous arenas such as the internet, the possibility for countervailing discourses is increased and less bound to the collective “rules” of the educational and media pedagogical authority. This censored discourse is symbolically violent because it deprives citizens of knowledge related to the potential of collective action and reinforces the status quo.

The hierarchal, authoritarian Chinese education system socializes students into a similar hierarchical, authoritarian society. Critical engagement with knowledge is not encouraged within the educational field, a socialization which is later reflected by citizens lacking critical engagement with issues related to the authority of the CPC regime. Social and cultural capital is attached to high scores on exams, creating a social and academic pressure for students that guide them in obeying the authorities of family, teachers, and government. This pressure is exacerbated by the one child policy, focusing the attention of the extended family on one student. The internet is one area in which alternate discourses and the rules of the field are relaxed, a troubling fact for the CPC
censors. One way to rally support for the regime on the internet and in media is through using a general hatred of Japan to distract from domestic problems or rally nationalist sentiment in times of need. This, along with special treatments of minority groups, is one way in which the dominant Han ethnicity is used to differentiate the “other”.

Though the perceptions of the Chinese government were largely negative, participants related governmental role to issues of material possession. Democracy was largely seen as not needed or wanted in the PRC, a result of ritual consciousness, collective understanding, and utilitarian pragmatism.

The political disenfranchisement of participants, powerlessness in the face of negative government perceptions, and general sense of inability for change was symbolically violent as it was accepted as the status quo.
CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

How knowledge concerning the Three T’s is constructed, taught, and learned within the PRC is important to contemporary cross-cultural understandings and communication. The literature review discussed the socio-cultural foundations upon which contemporary Chinese society is rooted and described the Chinese educational system, historical background to the Three T’s, and a description of the Chinese censor apparatus. The rich details and data gathered through illuminative interviews provided individual voices and unique insights into censorship, knowledge formation concerning the Three T’s, and the contemporary discourse regarding the phenomenon. The data was compared and contrasted with the literature and a secondary level of deductive analysis. The final chapter has five sections which include a) summary of the study, b) conclusions of the findings, c) applicability of theory, d) limitations of the study, e) implications for practice, and f) recommendation for future research.

Summary of Findings: Hegemonic Harmony

The findings illuminated how a group of 11 Chinese citizens perceived information related to the 1989 Tiananmen Square student demonstrations, issues related to Tibetan sovereignty, and the Taiwanese independence movement. These three historical events represent large scale collective challenges to the legitimacy of the ruling Chinese Communist Party. All three events have been actively suppressed by the state ideological apparatus in media, education, and in society at large (Collins, 1989; Hessler, 1999; Qiang, 2011; Shirk, 2011; Wangdu, 2007; Zhang, 2011).

From the voices of participants, censorship in the Chinese educational system and media apparatus has affected how knowledge related to these topics is created, framed, and acted upon.
Any reference related to the 1989 events at Tiananmen Square has been censored from media and education. Regarding Taiwanese Independence and Tibetan sovereignty, participants described the presentation of both topics in media and education as slight, and when encountered, presented in a way in which the legitimacy of CPC actions were reinforced. For example, the Dalai Lama was framed as a villain and Tibet as a backwards culture undergoing beneficial development. Taiwan was described as a part of China which had escaped KMT persecution and was returning to the fold. However, Taiwanese participants did not agree and identified with Taiwan as a sovereign state. Participants uniformly described the most important pedagogical authority related to the 1989 events at Tiananmen Square as informal – their knowledge was created and presented through their families, friends, and the internet. Regarding alternative discourses related to Taiwan and Tibet, participants also cited increased access to knowledge through informal means – specifically the internet. For all Three T’s, alternative discourses outside traditional media and education were important sources of information for participants. Both the educational and media pedagogical authorities were devalued due to the perception of government censorship.

Through deductive analysis, participants described a censored dominant discourse related to the Three T’s. This discursive formation was institutionalized and empowered through education and media under the heavy hand of the government. This hierarchical control and censoring of knowledge related to the Three T’s was reproduced through a socio-cultural context based on Confucian hierarchal social roles, ritual consciousness, and obedience to authority. These values were reinforced through a process of socialization involving the pedagogical authorities of education, media, family and community. The recent research of King et al. (2013) has suggested that the CPC censor apparatus’ protocol is to suppress any incidence of
collective citizen action. The Three T’s are suppressed for their relation to collective citizen action.

In researching how the government censored discourse related to the Three T’s affected citizen perceptions of government and their role as citizens, participants illuminated the pressures and conditions of how knowledge was created and legitimized related to the Three T’s. Participants spoke of an authoritarian education system in which critical thought processes were subsumed by more pressing interests such as high scores on exams and competition for prestigious university placement. The pressure within the educational system affected teachers, parents, and fellow students in negative ways. The results of the Gao Kao, as a gateway for social mobility, was the axis around which the educational system rotated.

In terms of summarizing the media, participants described traditional outlets as devalued, representing a government controlled flow of information and creation of knowledge that was widely known to not represent the full picture. Participants spoke of the effect that censored traditional media may have had on guiding the opinions of older generations or uneducated citizens. Perceptions of the CPC censor apparatus was described in varying ways. Some thought it intrusive and others felt that it protected them in a paternal sense. Japan was depicted as a media topic through which Chinese nationalism could be rallied in the face of domestic problems. Lastly, negative participant descriptions of minority groups emerged from both media and experience in higher education, where preferential treatment and protection were unfairly allotted to the Tibetan and Uighur population.

Through the lens of the familial and community pedagogical authority, participants on the whole perceived the government with guarded negativity. Many described change as out of
their hands. The possibility of democratic reforms was not seen as needed, wanted, or possible given the large population within the PRC.

In terms of cultural reproduction, participants described an educational system in which obedience to authoritarian hierarchical power relations were rigidly followed. Obedience to authority, the maintenance of face, patriotism, Confucian ritual consciousness, and filial piety underscored the values and rules of the field. Students were not given time or opportunity to critically engage with material, class work, or their teachers. The pressure felt by students on both the social and academic level to succeed was exacerbated by the one child policy and competitive university placement system and competitive labor markets. Tibetan and Uighur minority groups were offered university placement slots as part of an assimilation process into the Han dominant culture, a practice which reinforced negative stereotypes among the Han population. The overall negative participant descriptions of government, the sense of powerlessness to effect change, and rationalization that democracy was not needed embodied symbolic violence.

Conclusion

The three T’s are symbolic references to instances where the legitimacy of the CPC regime was questioned through collective citizen action. Due to this fact, under a rationale of social stability, the Three T’s have been suppressed in both education and media to discourage potential action. The 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations are particularly suppressed due to their immediacy as a domestic Han led uprising. The Confucian framework has been co-opted for CPC purposes, creating an educational and media pedagogical authority which seeks to guide the opinions and actions of Chinese citizenry in ways which maintain the status quo power hierarchy. This sense of social harmony is hegemonic in Chinese society, which publically
adheres to the “guided opinions” of the Three T’s but privately construct knowledge in the family, community, and internet.

This censored discourse is shaped by an education system which reproduces a culture of authoritarian obedience and critical disengagement. Confronted with a censored and monitored media, alternative discourses related to sensitive material are largely found in private settings such as the family, friends, or community (including the internet). This censored discourse affects how Chinese citizens perceive their government in a negative way. However, democracy is not seen as a solution for these problems.

**Evaluation of the Theory**

According to Creswell (1998), the ultimate responsibility of verification in a grounded theory study is the researcher. During the research process, the rigor and scrutiny applied to the data through the lens of the researcher is thinking of questions which “relate the categories and then returns to the data and looks for evidence, incidents, and events that support or refute the questions” (p. 209). Strauss and Corbin (1998) detailed four central properties for judging applicability of a theory to a phenomenon. For grounded theory, they expanded the field to seven criteria.

According to Strauss and Corbin, a good grounded theory study will possess four properties: *fit, understanding, generality, and control*. The first property, *fit*, holds that the theory is “faithful to the everyday reality of the substantive areas and carefully induced from diverse data” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 23). This theory, concerning the creation of knowledge and discourse related to the Three T’s, is grounded in data from Chinese citizens who have been socialized and educated in the context of the PRC. Upon completion of data analysis,
two separate Chinese nationals reviewed the results of the axial coding categories and core category for verification and fit with their own experiences.

The second criterion of an applicable grounded theory study is understanding. This property relates to the theory making sense to the participants in the study, and to others who have experienced this phenomenon. Other Chinese citizens were asked if the theory was easy to understand and if it was similar to their observations. Chinese citizens are socialized and educated in a system which is censored. However, countervailing discourses exist through informal educational means in the personal lives and anonymity of the internet. How these different systems work together to help create a central discourse meets the criteria for understanding because of the member checking with Chinese citizens to verify the theory.

Generality refers to when the theory is “abstract enough and includes sufficient variation to make it applicable to a variety of contexts related to the phenomenon.” This occurs when the inductive data upon which the theory is based “are comprehensive and the interpretations conceptual and broad (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p 23).” The data collected on the Three T’s applies to a general understanding of how knowledge is created and disseminated in the PRC, and adds meaning to how other sensitive subject matter is taught and learned. Participants described a number of emergent topics in relation to the Three T’s and censorship, such as the Bo Xilai scandal, protests over newspaper censorship in Guangzhou, and the perceived legal impunity of officials accused of corruption and crimes. This differentiation in application supports sufficient variation.

The final criteria for Strauss and Corbin related to control. “Finally, the theory should provide control with regard to action toward the phenomenon” because the data are “systematically derived from actual data related to that (and only that) phenomenon (pg. 23)”. 
The categories and concepts from this study were systematically derived from actual data regarding the Three T’s. The findings mirrored previous research regarding Chinese censorship, media, education, and the socio-cultural foundation of the PRC (Collins, 1989; Hessler, 1999; King et al, 2014; Qiang, 2011; Shirk, 2011; Wangdu, 2007; Zhang, 2011).

The four criteria for gauging applicability of this grounded theory study are addressed and fulfilled in the aforementioned section. The axial categories of educational pedagogical authority, media pedagogical authority, and informal familial and community pedagogical authority under the core category of censorship are derived from the data and holistically describe the phenomenon of how knowledge related to the Three T’s is constructed and communicated in the PRC.

Seven further evaluative criteria for grounded theory were further refined by Strauss and Corbin to guide and determine the quality of an emergent theory. As a final step to assist the reader in gauging the veracity of the research, Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggest the following criteria be addressed:

1) How was the original sample selected? On what grounds?

As described previously, the original sample was selected from a pool of Chinese citizens living and studying in the United States. Participants were selected based on their willingness to be interviewed concerning the sensitive political issues in the form of the Three T’s.

2) What categories emerged?

The interview yielded data which were sorted into parts and looked closely at concerning similarities and differences in relation to how participants had constructed knowledge to these three events. From this process, three axial categories emerged; educational pedagogical authority, media pedagogical authority, and informal familial and community pedagogical
authority which all support the core category of censorship. Further subcategories concerning description of related factors to the Three T’s were: perceptions of the Chinese education system, lack of critical thinking, academic and social pressure, internet, Japan, special treatment of minorities, perceptions of government, and the role of democracy.

3) What were some of the events, incidents, or actions (indicators) that pointed to some of these major categories?

The three axial categories are interactive and inform each other, especially taken in light of the core category. Participants’ described learning from numerous areas of life, but especially in relation to formal education as an authority and arbiter of knowledge, of which the Three T’s were portrayed in a specific manner. In the more informal arenas, media and the internet were described as learning tools from which participants drew an understanding of knowledge related to the Three T’s. However, regarding media, due to the core category of censorship, this knowledge was somewhat devalued. Lastly, the family and community were areas through which students could truly engage with the Three T’s and specifically the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations.

4) On the basis of what categories did theoretical sampling proceed? That is, how did theoretical formulations guide some of the data collection? After the theoretical sampling was done, how representative of the data did the categories prove to be?

A desire to understand how Chinese citizens expressed censored information is what drove the sampling process. In terms of theoretical sampling, I was most concerned with applying the bias of my own socio-cultural values, beliefs, and worldview to the phenomenon. It was this worry that drove the deductive process of making the case for Chinese censorship
necessary as part of the research process. After this process was complete, a more integrated and holistic narrative was developed to verify the findings.

5) What were some of the hypothesis pertaining to conceptual relations (i.e. among categories), and on what grounds were they formulated and validated?

This study began as a search for understanding how and knowledge related to the censored Three T’s was created and communicated within the People’s Republic of China. During the open coding process, I looked for meaning while coding the transcripts, trying to discern the rationales and means through which participants formed their perceptions of the Three T’s. It was difficult to remove my personal experience from the coding process, as I found myself comparing the experiences of the participants with my former students in the PRC and with my normative understanding of human rights as based on my liberal western democratic and Judeo-Christian socialization. As I revised the theory, I reviewed the raw data to check my own bias in maintaining a steadfast objectivity. However, when the raw data coincided with the analysis and my own experience, it felt authenticated.

6) Were there instances in which hypotheses did not explain what was happening in the data? How were these discrepancies accounted for? Were hypothesis modified?

In trying to maintain objectivity throughout the process, there was no hypothesis to explain the phenomenon under study.

7) How and why was the core category selected? Was the collection sudden or gradual, and was it difficult or easy? On what grounds were the final analytic decision made?

Beginning with the first interview, the sensitive nature of discussing the matter was apparent. In subsequent interviews, participants were visibly unsettled in discussing their perceptions of these events, or politics in general. As data was collected, sorted, compared, and
analyzed in the constant comparative process, the three axial categories emerged in light of the core category, which was inferred from my investigation of the Three T’s in the first place, though I never overtly intended for the research to be a direct investigation or reflection of censorship in China.

The evaluative criteria outlines the essential information related to the logic of my coding procedure and the evaluation of the results.

Limitations of Research

Regarding limitations to the research, several areas proved problematic in terms of data collection and reliability. The first regards the difference between the native language of the participants (Chinese dialects) and the language in which the interviews were conducted (English). This language difference could have distorted participant meanings or their understandings of the interview questions. These distortions may have affected the reliability and accuracy of the data. Through member checking, some of these distortions are accounted for.

Secondly, a limitation in this study was a lack of access to data. My inability to read standard Chinese impeded gathering data concerning the censor apparatus, the Three T’s, the education system, or drawing from other sources available solely in Chinese. A larger base for analysis could be reached through multilingualism. This is a limitation which could inform future research in the area. Furthermore, many documents pertaining to the censor apparatus and the policies of the education system or media are not published or accessible to the public. This limitation was not accounted for.

A further limitation of the study is my etic position, as an outsider looking into a different socio-cultural context and asking questions concerning political issues often raised from a
context with a different socio-cultural context and worldview. The Three T’s represent issues often portrayed in western media outlets as examples of totalitarian Chinese authority being exercised on the international stage. As geo-politically charged subject matter, this limitation was a constant worry; the questions I asked participants were not inductive, but posed from a different socio-cultural perspective. This limitation was accounted for through the presentation of a countervailing argument calling into question normative western liberal assumptions of human rights and through my experience living in the PRC.

Implications for Research

In the literature review the socio-cultural context of collectivism was traced from its deep historical roots to a contemporary society which echoes the Confucian moral framework. In this section I will discuss implications for future research and practice.

*Implications for Future Research*

This mixed qualitative methods study provides an inductive and deductive framework for future research specific to how Chinese citizens constructed and perceived knowledge of sensitive political issues. How this knowledge was created, framed, and disseminated in the censored Chinese context is important to understanding the actions and behaviors within this foreign context.

Future research could look closely at how the specifics of the Chinese educational curriculum censors or frames issues related to collective action such as the Three T’s in both the domestic Chinese and international context. For example, how has the Arab spring been portrayed in education? What about the work of Mahatma Gandhi?

Another direction for future research would involve analyzing the role of media suppression in the longevity of non-violent protest movements before escalation to violence. An
essential facet of a successful non-violent protest movement is media coverage. This media coverage galvanizes wider support for protestors and their cause through humanizing peaceful methods and demonizing violent force. However, if there is no media coverage, non-violent protest cannot galvanize the same level of support. What happens in these instances?

A possible direction for future research involves how digital media such as Sina Weibo affects government censor policies. How are these policies perceived by Chinese citizens?

*Implications for Future Practice*

Further comparative research regarding the Chinese educational and media pedagogical authority compared to a western liberal democratic context would provide an interesting comparative insight for students and citizens in both the PRC and other cultures. Education such as this would provide more critical capacity for how global citizens consume and perceive their own media. Misunderstandings between socio-cultural contexts different than that of the PRC are important for future geopolitical cooperation.
REFERENCES


zhang, x. (2011). the transformation of political communication in china. new jersey: world scientific press.

APPENDIX A – IRB APPROVAL LETTER

DATE: August 9, 2013
TO: Nicholas Bardo, MACIE
FROM: Bowling Green State University Human Subjects Review Board
SUBMISSION TYPE: Revision
ACTION: APPROVED
APPROVAL DATE: August 8, 2013
EXPIRATION DATE: June 26, 2014
REVIEW TYPE: Expedited Review
REVIEW CATEGORY: Expedited review category # 7

Thank you for your submission of Revision materials for this project. The Bowling Green State University Human Subjects Review Board has APPROVED your submission. This approval is based on an appropriate risk/benefit ratio and a project design wherein the risks have been minimized. All research must be conducted in accordance with this approved submission.

The final approved version of the consent document(s) is available as a published Board Document in the Review Details page. You must use the approved version of the consent document when obtaining consent from participants. Informed consent must continue throughout the project via a dialogue between the researcher and research participant. Federal regulations require that each participant receives a copy of the consent document.

Please note that you are responsible to conduct the study as approved by the HSRB. If you seek to make any changes in your project activities or procedures, those modifications must be approved by this committee prior to initiation. Please use the modification request form for this procedure.

You have been approved to enroll 15-20 participants. If you wish to enroll additional participants you must seek approval from the HSRB.

All UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS involving risks to subjects or others and SERIOUS and UNEXPECTED adverse events must be reported promptly to this office. All NON-COMPLIANCE issues or COMPLAINTS regarding this project must also be reported promptly to this office.

This approval expires on June 26, 2014. You will receive a continuing review notice before your project expires. If you wish to continue your work after the expiration date, your documentation for continuing review must be received with sufficient time for review and continued approval before the expiration date.

Good luck with your work. If you have any questions, please contact the Office of Research Compliance at 419-372-7716 or hsr@bgus.edu. Please include your project title and reference number in all correspondence regarding this project.

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APPENDIX B – CONSENT LETTER

Letter of Informed Consent: Interview (Chinese Citizens 18 years old and over)

Title of the project: Chinese Citizen Perceptions of the Tiananmen Square Demonstrations of 1989, Taiwanese Independence, and Tibetan Sovereignty

Principal Investigator:
- Nicholas Bardo, M.A. Student in Cross-Cultural and International Education, Bowling Green State University, Email: nbardo@bgsu.edu, Phone: (603) 491-9049.
- Advisor: Dr. Hyeyoung Bang, (419) 372-4251 or email: hbang@bgsu.edu

About the study: This study concerns Chinese citizen perceptions of the 1989 demonstrations at Tiananmen Square, Taiwanese independence claims and Tibetan sovereignty disputes. How are these issues approached in Chinese society, education, and media? How have these issues been represented in the Chinese context? The interview will take approximately one hour to complete. The interviews may be audio recorded with your permission, as indicated by your signature below. Interviews will take place in-person at a mutually agreed upon time and location on or near (within 5 miles) campus. Interviews will be conducted at your convenience.

Benefits: If you agree to participate in this research, you will provide important information regarding Chinese citizen perceptions that are often not represented in the United States media, education or society at large. This work may be used to better understand certain cross-cultural differences between these two cultures.

Risks: Since the study asks participants about sensitive subject matter, some participants may feel uncomfortable talking about these issues. For this reason, at any time a participant feels uncomfortable with a question or questions, they may choose not to answer the question(s), or withdraw from the study altogether.

Confidentiality: Your real name will not be connected to the data. Immediately following the interview, the voice recording will be transcribed verbatim to a written document and then erased from the digital recorder. The information you provide in the form of a transcribed interview will be stored electronically on a password protected computer of the principal investigator (myself). No one other than the research team (myself and my advisor) will have any access to the data.

Voluntary participation: Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may withdraw from the interview at any time, and you may choose not to answer any questions. Whether or not you choose to participate will not influence your future relations with the researcher or Bowling Green State University. Participation or withdrawal will not affect any rights to which you are entitled.

Contact Information: If you have questions or concerns you can contact Nicholas Bardo at (603) 491-9049 or email: nbardo@bgsu.edu. You may also contact my advisor Dr. Hyeyoung Bang at (419) 372-4251 or email: hbang@bgsu.edu and/or the Chair of Bowling Green State University’s Human Subjects Review Board at (419) 372-7726 (humb@bgsu.edu), with questions or concerns about participant rights.

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EFFECTIVE 09/01/2013
EXPIRES 08/26/2014