POLITICAL SPONTANEITY AND SENEGALESE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, Y'EN A MARRE AND M23: A RE-READING OF FRANTZ FANON 'THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH"

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A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

December 2012

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This project analyzes the social uprisings in Senegal following President Abdoulaye Wade's bid for a third term on power. From a perspectivist reading of Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* and the revolutionary strategies of the Algerian war of independence, the project engages in re-reading Fanon's text in close relation to Senegalese new social movements, Y'en A Marre and M23. The overall analysis addresses many questions related to Fanonian political thought. The first attempt of the project is to read Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched* from within The Cultural Studies. Theoretically, Fanon's "new humanism," as this project contends, can be located between transcendence and immanence, and somewhat intersects with the political potentialities of the 'multitude.'

Second. I foreground the sociogeny of Senegalese social movements in neoliberal era of which President Wade's regime was but a local phase. Recalling Frantz Fanon's critique of the bourgeoisie and traditional intellectuals in newly postindependent African countries, I draw a historical continuity with the power structures in the postcolonial condition. Therefore, the main argument of this project deals with the critique of African political leaders, their relationship with hegemonic global forces in infringing upon the basic rights of the downtrodden. And last, I argue for the relevance of cyberculture and online social media which stands as a counterhegemonic platform. In addition to that, I was more interested in focusing on how online users self-critically talk about the nation and politics and the long-awaited moment in setting afoot a *Nouveau Type de Senegalais.*
To my beloved parents, Ernestine Ndour and Mamadou Waly Faye for their unconditional love, consistent support and encouragements. Given the political commitment of this project itself, I dedicate this work to Mamadou Diop, a graduate student of the University of Cheikh Anta Diop of Dakar, a fallen hero of the social uprisings and to all the other victims as well.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deepest gratitude goes first to Allah the Almighty, for he gave me the physical and spiritual force to go through this difficult academic journey. I also thank, from the bottom of my heart, the Fulbright Program and the Institute of International Education (IIE) that sponsored and financed my 2 year academic journey in the United States. I thank my academic adviser, Radikha Gajjala, not only for her guidance and encouragements, but also for her insightful graduate seminars that have been so informative for my research questions and methodologies. So many thanks to Dr Dalton Anthony Jones whose exploding academic energy and thoughtfulness inspired me from day one. My deepest gratitude to his influence in triggering thought-provoking arguments and analyses about my research questions. I equally thank Dr Babacar M'baye at Kent State University and Dr Ibra Sene at the College of Wooster for their insightful and informative corrections of my work, from proposal to thesis chapters.

Special thanks to Bineta Seck and her family in Columbus, Ohio, to Farba Seck, Ameth Seck and their lovely sisters Nene and Diewo Seck. I cannot pay back the Secks for they represent my second family here in the United States. Many thanks to my BGSU folks, including but not limited to, Dr Cameron Gokee (Ann Arbor, Michigan), Teresa Mercer, Stephen P. Shankster, Oluwadamilare Adeyeri, Natasha Truong, Adamou Fode, Makhtar Sall, Bernard Frampton, Guedeyi Hayatou, Craig Magrum … , for our academic and non-academic discussions that have somewhat contributed to enhance my analyses in this project. Special thanks to Nene Seck, in Staten Island, NY, for her true friendship. Thanks to all the good online/offline friends and people I have met during my journey in the United States of America.
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INTRODUCTION

Following the multiple crises of Western ideology in implementing the ideals of modernity, challenges are increasingly being launched by postmodernist criticism. Already in the late 70s, Jean François Lyotard spoke of the collapse of modernity's grand narratives, an awareness that basically conditions postmodernity (The Postmodern Condition 1979). "The Fall of the House of Reason" (Trouillot, 2003) is in fact what is commonly known as the failure of the social project of the Enlightenment. Some of the limitations of the philosophy of the 18th century, including but not limited to the universalization of Western thought, sublimation, if not deification of Reason as the sole means of access to knowledge, hostility to racial difference, imaginary geography of the world as center and periphery (Wallerstein, 1974), have been disrupted by the maintenance of postmodernism's cultural relativism.

The symbolism of skin color may be invisible in today social interactions and/or state policies, but the legacies of racial divides are still tangible in our contemporary cultures. Though different from outright racism, "Color-Blind Racism" (Bonilla-Silva, 2010) still characterizes the way in which people interact with each other, always having in mind the traumas of history on the one hand, and the privileges of colonial rule on the other. In that regard, Postmodernism did a great job in shaking the status quo of race, gender, and cultural essentialism by delineating the many limitations of ideologies such Marxism, Hegelianism, Kantianism, to name but a few, and the way in which these ideologies disseminated the linearity of knowledge and history and their liberatory aspect (Butler, 2002). And by re-appropriating the deconstructive mode of Postmodernist's
criticism, Postcolonial Studies' aim, in general, consists of "disturb[ing] the order of the world, threaten[ing] privilege and power, [and] refus[ing] to acknowledge the superiority of western cultures. Its radical agenda is to demand equality and well-being for all humans on this earth" (Young, 7, my emphasis). Interesting enough is the intersectionality of Postmodernism/Postcolonialism/Subaltern Studies, if not feminism in the very way of challenging metanarratives and their power in disseminating normative discourses.

The American Culture Studies in Bowling Green State University in Bowling Green, Ohio, has been of great help for me in deconstructively scrutinizing Postcolonial/Subaltern Studies in their sometimes uncritical postmodern trend of thought. To what extent has Postmodernism succeeded in disrupting modernity's metanarratives? In Relativizing everything, has Postmodernism not allowed the emergence of nihilistic ghettoized identities? What is at stake in the re-emergence of the individualized self in reaction to hegemony, be it in the social or institutional level? To answer these questions, one has to take into account the resurgence of nationalistic policies on both extremes (the West and the Rest) and the subsequent anxieties that stem from it, given the ceaselessly globalizing world in which information and communication bring people and cultures ever closer. The anxieties of our contemporary self-identities might have stemmed from the way history has been taught so far, a universalist history on the one hand, and a no less legitimate nationalistic history but sometimes uncritical scholarship on the other. The tricky task of teaching national history is not only an American issue, but it is a global phenomenon. In the relationship of Europe and its empires, the teaching of national histories might be some of the many causes of what is
today uncritically called "cultural Marxism." The postcolonial condition that we are living is still full of reminiscences of the past's troubled periods, the reason why the oppressed minorities always tend to wave their status of "victimage" (Gilroy, 2005). In order to heal the world from its uncured wounds, greater efforts have to be made on the teaching of History, the striking need to balance the necessity of national history on the one hand, and the insistence on its deep connection to what is called "World history" on the other.

Important to this new way teaching history in its globality is the centrality of human interactions through the process of migration, dating back to early development of human history up to this day rather than the rise-of-the-west ideology. And these migrations and "human webs," can best be understood in the critical thinking and teaching of the doubleness of their features: cooperation and competition. As McNeill and McNeill have pointed out, "the worldwide web disrupted and destroyed, but it also transformed and created" (The Human Web 178, my emphasis). Therefore, in order to disrupt the oversimplification of historical narratives, the notion of ambivalence is brought into discussion, showcasing at the same time the complexity of social interactions. In other words, insights and productive scholarships are focusing on what was "transformed and created" rather than the things that were "disrupted and destroyed". In that regard, Postcolonial scholarship has been more concerned about the damages of colonial rule over formerly dominated peoples and cultures, hence the need to, as Stephen Morton has pointed out, go beyond the parochial excitement and to make a productive shift "From a Postcolonial Critique of Reason to A Critique of Postcolonial Reason" (Gayatri Spivak 15, original emphasis).
The notion of ambivalence, in turn, leads somewhat to the academic field of Cultural Studies and the way in which it is being theoretically framed in the United States mainly. In that regard, Homi K. Bhabha is one of the most shadowy theoreticians of culture and the very notion of cultural identity. His *The Location of Culture* (1994) has been of tremendous influence in the field of Cultural Studies thus far. Today, and specially in the post-9/11 era, cultures seem to be at war. The war on terrorism of the Bush administration and its echoes from European nation-states' policies on immigration have drastically shaped the way not only Western institutions, but westerners themselves relate to Otherness. The notion of security has become a complex cultural and political apparatus through which the Other is being looked upon.

In its attempt to counter the Western hegemony and the multiple discourses attached to it, Postcolonial theory and practice, like the Subaltern Studies' project, envisioned to push the "center" back to the "periphery, and vice versa. When *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures* was first published in 1989 by Ashcroft and al., one could sense the reactionary standpoint from which the empire attempted at writing history from below. Almost every literary text in this book responded to Eurocentrism with a fierce criticism that made (and perhaps still makes) sense given the way the West has undermined the histories and cultures of non-Western peoples. As Robert J.C. Young defines it, Postcolonial theory and practice "disturbs the order of the world. It threatens privilege and power. It refuses to acknowledge the superiority of Western cultures. Its radical agenda is to demand equality and well-being for all human beings on this earth" (*Postcolonialism* 7). Though Postcolonial theory is here nicely defined, it must not, however, cover up the sometimes parochial framework
that is characteristic of much of Postcolonial scholarship, a parochial excitement that always impoverishes real discussions about the past and the ways in which colonized and colonizers interacted and gave birth to something exclusively new. The McNeills for example, insist on the necessity of mixing "old and new wine, and [the] pour[ing it] into a new bottle", a methodology that, instead of always focusing on the misdeeds of imperialism and colonialism, would rather insist on the fact that "the worldwide web (...) also transformed and created" (The Human Web 178, emphasis added).

The Western ideologies, from philosophy to history writing, always hinted at the notion of history, if not modernity, as a linear line, drawing itself progressively from the past to the present. But, as Peter Gran has pointed out, history is the development of "a series of roads not taken". Reversely, Postcolonial parochial scholars always theorized the singularity of the colonial experience, always glossing over what he calls "the built-in contradictions of ruler-ruled relationship" (Beyond Eurocentrism 15, 6). Similarly in the Postcolonial/Subaltern Studies, Leela Ghandi has harshly criticized "the putative non-West upon the putative West, through gestures of oppositionality, culturalism, nativism [and] fundamentalism". Such a framework, she argues, says nothing about those in the metropolis, who right from the start, "renounced the privileges of imperialism and elected affinity with the victims of their expansionist cultures (...) the nonplayers in the drama of imperialism" (Affective Communities 1). And "because of the heavy burden of translation in the colonial encounters" as Lauren Benton has pointed, "the interpretation of the new cultural forms is not easy and cannot be deduced from a simple algebra of domination and subordination" (Law and Colonial Cultures 16).
Though the postcolonial condition envelops the experience of colonial domination of the non-Western world, the major issue that is today debated with *periodization*. While Leela Ghandi dates the origin of Postcolonial thought in the "aftermath of colonial occupation" (*Postcolonial Theory* 2), Robert Young highlights the opposition of the scholarly investigation as anti-colonial, arguing for the equality of "cultures of decolonized nations." Therefore, Young posits Postcolonial thought as "the political and cultural experience of the marginalized periphery [which] developed into a more general theoretical position that could be set against the western political, intellectual, and academic hegemony and its protocols of objective knowledge" (*Postcolonialism* 65). In addition to this postcolonial theoretical position toward western rationalism, Ania Loomba, in *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, focuses on its "Politics of Location." For the sake of historical difference, she asks a fundamental question within Postcolonial theory. "We might ask" she says, "not only when does postcolonial begin, but where is postcoloniality to be found?" (14), Location and the difference of the colonial experience, then, has come to play an important role in Postcolonialism.

It is in this context that Fanonian Studies has come to be: positing a postcolonial theory and practice in and after the experience of colonial domination. Because Postcolonial theory in general was born out of the interstitial theoretical space of Poststructuralism, Postmodernism and their ambivalent relationship with Marxism,¹ Fanon Studies has come to encompass the multi-layered critical responses to European rationalism, racism and imperial capitalism outside the borders of the West. While it is

¹ Ghandi, *Postcolonial Theory*, p. 25
difficult to have a total representation of Fanonian Studies because of the complexity of Fanon himself, it is worth mentioning some of the most "representative" of his thought.

**THESIS STATEMENT**

This research focuses on the Senegalese political life and the social movements that are rising up following the Senegalese President's decision to run for a third term on power. Having amended the country's constitution several times, the President, Abdoulaye Wade, sees his political legitimacy being challenged, not only by opposition parties, but youth movements among which the M23 and Y'EN A MARRE are the most representative. I am particularly interested in analyzing the ways in which the political parties and youth movements are organized, structured and how the outcome of which would either disrupt or strengthen the ruling party's ability to win the forthcoming presidential elections on February the 26th 2012.

First, I argue that Frantz Fanon's insights on the revolutionary political organization are an important theoretical framework that can help to really grasp the strengths and limitations of such youth movements along with the official oppositional parties. Fanon's theorization on the power and weakness of *political spontaneity* is quite similar with the internal fissures that the M23, especially, is currently undergoing, let alone the fact that young people themselves seem disillusioned by the political leaders' ability to lead and strategize the ongoing social/political revolution. Alongside Fanon's insights which are typical of the postcolonial context, I concur that the theories of hegemony, posthegemony within Cultural Studies, too, are interesting theoretical frameworks.
Second, I proffer that the internal fissures and disagreement of the coalitional front of youth movements and opposition parties stem principally from the lack of organization and strategies which seem to benefit the ruling party's state apparatus war machine. Because some of the political leaders of the M23 were ex-members in the ruling party, some political analysts argue that their unclear position within the current social revolution would be characteristic of the state apparatus' power of capture and attempt at dislocating and weakening the potential outcome of the uprising. Therefore, alongside Fanon's insights on revolutionary process typical of the postcolonial context, I argue, lastly, that the notion of hegemony, on a national level, tells more about the Senegalese Democratic Party on power and the youth social movements 'discontents about political leadership.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Published in 1961, Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* has come to be considered as the "Bible of decolonization" as Stuart Hall once pointed out. Because of his angst with regards to the ills of colonialism, and the recuperation of his thought by racial theorists, Fanon's theorization of violence has been controversial in the circles of Cultural critics. While some argue that Fanon's experience in Algeria was a "horizontal (post)-colonial encounter", which transformed "Fanon the psychiatrist into Fanon the militant" (Omar 2009), others critique Fanon's alleged Western stereotypical framework when it comes to understanding the real forces of Algerian revolutionaries. "Contrary to Western conceptions, then" Fouzi Slisli (2008) argues, "Algerians peasants did not rebel against French colonization out of instinctive, subconscious reflexive mechanisms, as would a
pack of wolves." "On the contrary" he continues, "Islam's social and political mandate provided an authentic anti-colonial ideology capable of mobilizing the peasant as well as the urban masses". Slisli goes on to ask, "why did Fanon call this anti-colonial culture and tradition a peasant culture instead of what it was: a Muslim Culture?"

According to Slisli, Fanon glossed over the real social forces that fueled the Algerian revolution by not naming the Islamic tradition of the country. On a Deleuzian philosophy on transcendence and immanence along with Hardt and Negri's analysis of the "Multitude" (2009) and its merging into a more horizontally-constructed "constituent power" (Jon Beasley-Murray 2010), however, it is arguable that Fanon's silence on the cultural background of the Algeria revolution might have been somewhat strategic, if not political.

Gibson (1999) criticizes the lack of consideration of Fanon's "new humanism" by Postcolonial theorists, viewing him either as a Manichean thinker, or at best as a critic of manicheanism; rather Gibson focuses on the doubleness of Fanon's use of the term "ideology." Not only did Fanon emphasize the need to go from a national liberation to a social revolution, but he blamed the national bourgeois intellectuals who strove to secure their "Kleptocratic caste." Nigel Gibson, in addition, suggests that Postmodernists, who consider "Fanon's aim for rationality [as an] anathema to post-modernist sensibility," regard Fanon's ideology as a totalizing discourse. In addition, Frantz Fanon legacies shed light on the necessity of a normative political theory in Postcolonial Studies. Frantz Fanon's concern with the colonies was their total liberation from the shackles of neocolonial power. Given the variedness of Fanon's intellectual itinerary, from an identification to French traditional thought to an espousal of "revolutionary socialism," Fanon's relationship to traditional Marxism raised controversial topics because, as some
critics argue, Fanon skipped the bourgeois middle stage capitalism in his theory of political economy (Hanley 1976). In trying to rescue Fanon from harsh critics, Tony Martin (1999) argues that Frantz Fanon can be considered Marxist, but in the sense of Castro or Mao, in that Fanon "accepted Marx's basic analysis of society as given and proceeded from there to elaborate on that analysis and modify it where necessary to suit his own historical and geographical context" (87, emphasis added).

Homi K. Bhabha's Foreword of the 2004 edition of The Wretched of the Earth foregrounds Fanon's legacies in the global perspective and the need to go beyond Manichean thinking. The becoming of a "new man" in the Third World countries, Bhabha argues, "is only achievable in the process of resisting the peremptory and polarizing choices the superpowers impose on their 'client' states" (xiv). The ethical and political project of Fanon disrupts any notion of narrow-minded nationalism since, as Fanon strongly believed, nationalism has to be an open-ended and dialectical process. In this angle of view, Bhabha reframes Fanon in a "futurity project," not only in the ability of the colonial world to be freed from cultural depersonalization, but in its liberatory standpoint away from univocal choices between the capitalism/socialism dualism.

The issue of African liberation, too, has been fought on the linguistic battleground. Since language is a bearer of a culture's identity, some African Postcolonial thinkers thought it was necessary to liberate Africans from the imperial languages for the sake of a better expression of an African specific worldview. Ngugu Wa Thiong'O (1986) is archetypical to this linguistic determinism. Psycholinguists, however, discriminate "coordinate bilinguals" from "compound bilinguals." Though most of African
Postcolonial subjects are more likely to become "compound bilinguals," Alamin Mazrui (1993) argues that the colonial linguistic experience should not be lumped together under the rubric of subordination and imposition. The introduction of imperial languages in colonial Africa was unevenly, if not differently applied.

Mardorossian (2009) talks about the "lacuna" of Postcolonial theorists to focus on Fanon's Martinican genealogy which intersects with Edouard Glissant's insights on the "Poetics of Relation." His article talks about Fanon's visionary philosophy and social diagnosis of the Caribbean compartmentalized world that somewhat triggered the black man's internalization of a Manichean world. In *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon neither wanted this self-flagellation, nor the romanticization of blackness that the Negritude then promoted. He foresaw an alternative to both worldviews: disruption of polarizations and the implementation of humanistic dialectical thought. Positing Frantz Fanon within the framework of Glissant's philosophy on the openness of identity can but be an interesting point to disrupt the sometimes ventriloquist Postcolonial theory and practice.

In her article about terrorism, masculinity and the nation, Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks (2002) talks about the necessity to re-read Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* from a Post-Fascist global perspective in which the absence of the nation - as a stabilizing force - strip the wretched of the earth of a legitimizing discourse. Seshadri-Crooks posits Fanon revolutionary stick to violence on what she calls "the shuttling/oscillation between a spontaneous rage and its recuperation as a nationalist discourse." Not only does she proffer that Fanon's "new humanism" is neither a self-affirming ego nor the "crutches of nativism or Negritude," but she sustains that his
humanism is "a will to power" which is anti-egotistical. In addition, the author of this article analyzes Fanon from a feminist perspective, suggesting that Feminists sometimes fail to contextualize Fanon who, according to her, embraced a "new masculinism," a political masculinism which is not anti-feminist.

The feminist analysis of Fanon's insights is framed in a Subaltern perspective in Nigel Gibson (2001). In this article, Gibson analyzes Fanon's essay *Studies in a Dying Colonialism* (1967) and the issue of women's involvement in the Algeria liberatory struggle. Arguing that the woman body was the battleground on which the notion of the nation was to be fought for, Gibson contextualizes the traditional patriarchy which was reinforced, if not created by the Manichean divide of colonialism and the colonialist's will to unveil the Algeria woman, an unveiling synonymous to a sexual power and desire to control the Algerian woman's body. Not only was the unveiling of women synonymous to a liberation from its traditional and culturalist connotation, but it allowed the militant women to join the militant man for the sake of a coordinated action. The subaltern (Algerian) women, in addition, could speak within an "institutional structure" that the radio broadcasting came to epitomize. Here again, the radio, as Gibson puts it, epitomized a "wireless democracy" for women to voice themselves against not only the white colonizer, but the "kleptocratic caste" of bourgeois state capitalism and neoliberalism. Interesting is Fanon's critical insights on the tragedy of the revolution which lies in the incapacity of the nationalist leaders to institutionalize women's rights and recognition as full actors and speakers during the years of liberation struggles. The pitfalls of a non-dialectical and retrograde nationalism, traditional and religious fundamentalism, however, is, as Marie-Aimee Helie-Lucas argues aloud (1990;1999),
what characterized the postindependence era in Algeria when women, in spite of their combative participation in the national liberation, were simply asked to return to their homes.

Though short in length, Robert Young introductory essay on Postcolonial theory (2003) can be regarded as this version of postcoloniality that emphasizes experiential dimension of knowledge rather knowledge as produced by arm-chaired historians or analytical philosophers. Suggesting that "power remains carefully controlled" mainly by the West, it would be interesting to see how the West still controls this power. In the case of Postcolonial countries, part of the reason the West stills control power, is ,I believe, due to the postcolonial ruling classes' inability to prioritize the need of the mass populations in detriment of theirs which, according to the "Rich of the Rich "paradigm within world historiography (Peter Gran 2009), is still class-oriented. Young's argument of postcolonial subjects' experience of pain and their being sealed "into that crushing objecthood" (quoting Fanon) raises some questions for what Postcolonial thinkers need today is a class-based analysis of postcoloniality away from cultural identity rooted in tradition or custom, at least in the African context. The analysis of Capital is a must focus in here as well. Ruling classes are real alliances in the process of the West's control of power.

In a revisionist perspective, Paul Gilroy (2010) aims at redirecting the insights of Fanon not to a colonial discursivity but to the complex state apparatus of what he calls "securitocracy" of Western nation-states behind their "fortifications" (18). Frantz Fanon's insights on psychiatry can, according to Gilroy, help us better analyze the social
experiences of the "denizens, pseudo-citizens, illegal and sans papiers" and "the aspects of the social and psychological conflicts...inside the postcolonial metropolis" (20).

Because of the "spectacular mainstreaming of black cultures," most of readings on Fanon's works merely focus on the "amputed and epidermalized humanity," of the colonial moment. To what extend can Fanon's insights be applied to the dynamics of postcolonial identity? And because Fanon's critique of the colonized himself and the incompleteness of African nationalist movements have been glossed over in postcolonial reason, some cultural theorists, mainly blacks, are somehow reluctant to talk about the "responsibilities" of blacks, as "individuals...in both collective rehabilitation and personal salvation. Mass incarceration is apparently the favored means to accomplish this regressive 'form'" (21). In a nutshell, if we, contemporary and/or postcolonial subjects, want to have a more complete picture of the Fanon's legacies, we should make a move beyond the label "postcolonial," to translate "the postcolonial critique of reason" into "a critique of postcolonial reason" (Spivak, 1990, 1999). "Scholars in the Humanities" Spivak writes, "must see the 'Third World' as a displacement of the old colonies as colonial proper displaces itself into neocolonialism (meaning the largely economic rather than the territorial enterprise of imperialism)" (3). There seems to be a productive move or shift within postcolonial scholarship.
PROPOSED PROJECT

When I first encountered Fanon in university curriculum in my home country, we, as graduate students, read Fanon in a very specific way. The discussions always revolved around the canonical figure that Fanon is thought to embody, the hero of decolonization and the fierce defender of colonized people. Viewed through this glass, what we focused on Fanon's legacies was his criticism on racism, the ills of colonialism and the psycho-affective consequences of the Negro's depersonalization both in the metropolis and in the colonial social setting. At that time, I could only but refer to Frantz Fanon as the postcolonial intellectual who uncovered the unstated motivations of the white invader. I remember a classmate who used to cite Fanon's prose with fierce enthusiasm if as he was a believer holding the Bible or a religious text on his hands. In universities in the Postcolonial world, or at least in my home country, those who are supposed to cultivate students' interests and curiosity in Postcolonial Studies and particularly in Frantz Fanon's ideas, fail to uncover the very essence of *The Wretched of the Earth*. Students always emphasized Fanon's criticism against Western rationalism and its Eurocentrism attachments.

In this project, however, I aim to look at Fanon's legacies in a different perspective. First of all, I am interested in *The Wretched of the Earth* in terms of audience. Because of what Paul Gilroy calls "the spectacular mainstreaming of black cultures [through] the amputated and epidermalized humanity" (2010), most Postcolonial students somewhat miss the essence of Fanon's insights in this book. They focus on what world historians call the "Rise of the West" matrix and completely gloss over the political
agenda of Fanon's "new humanism." In *The Wretched of the Earth*, Frantz Fanon is talking to Postcolonial subjects and their responsibility to build a new society after the end of colonialism. In the outcome of political despotism and lack of coordinated democracy in postcolonial African countries, Fanon stands as an alarm regarding the exigencies of real politics and the organization of a true civil society.

Many consider the decolonization processes are failed revolutions. African nationalists and intellectuals failed to conceive of what history means and the responsibilities of African Postcolonial subjects in engaging with their histories. The relationship of Fanon with the Negritude movement is quite telling in how Africans should relate to their past for a better "futurity project." While Negritudists waved the notion of Tradition as a reservoir of pure and authentic force for the sake of a counterhegemony against colonialism and its Eurocentric attachments, Fanon aimed to shift the focus and go beyond the culturalist and nativist connotations of nationalism. For him, the liberation from colonial power, the economic and political, is a fundamental issue for Postcolonial African countries and precedes cultural emancipation. I do not aim at polarizing Negritude and Fanonian dialectical thought. Rather, I will be more tempted to consider the two philosophies through the lens of poetic literature (Negritude) and prosaic literature (Fanon) in their defense of the nation. In this context, one should ask, as Dipesh Chakrabarty does, the question to know "how could one reconcile the need for these two different and contradictory ways of seeing the nation: the critical eye that [seeks] out the defects in the nation in the purpose of reform and improvement, and the adoring eye that[sees] the nations as already beautiful and sublime" (*Provincializing Europe* 151).
In addition to audience, I propose to analyze Frantz Fanon's notion of "the new humanity." The western humanistic ideas that were theorized from the Italian Renaissance onwards somewhat accompanied the exercise of empire and colonialism and viewed the non-European world as the site of application of its principles. Frantz Fanon's "new humanism", though unclearly, stands on a difference perspective and seems to spring from the organization and strategies of revolutionary changes in the postcolonial world. Instead of replacing the old Western humanism, Fanon posits the importance of dialectic thought and practice within the postcolonies. In this project, I will posit Fanon's legacies in the very task of Postcolonial theory in writing history from below. There is no doubt that History was written through a Eurocentric paradigm and that the Other's history has remained buried for a long time. But, time has come when no Eurocentric worldviews can hold for long. In the field of World History, scholars have interestingly disrupted the old paradigms and grand narratives of history, ranging from traditional Marxism to Wallerstein "world-system." The uniqueness of Europe as an idea is disrupted in favor of world-centric frameworks that are put forward to excavate History's complex development, disjunctions and ruptures. Most of the time, Postcolonial theory fails to go beyond such oppositional frameworks. What is more, such theory needs to overcome the then colonial Manichean worldview. Positing Fanon in the framework of World history and the necessity for dialectical thought between the Self and Otherness is a must focus for Postcolonial theory and practice whose aim, after all, is to write the history of the non-Western world.

The last thing that my project deals with, in relation to Senegalese new social movements, is an analysis of Fanon's "Grandeur and Weakness of Spontaneity." While
Y'en A Marre is today hailed as the movement that toppled down the incumbent president, more needs to be talked about the coming into being the movement itself, its ideology with regards to traditional sort of statist politics, and more above all, the awareness of the Y'en A Marristes of the self-contradictoriness of the revolution itself. How can we conciliate theory and practice in setting afoot this Nouveau Type de Senegalais that Y'en A Marre's ideology.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROJECT

As I have already said, Fanon has been, and still being read especially in the Postcolonial location, as the theorist of colonial racism and of the curative effects of violence in the decolonization process. All the students of Postcolonial Studies back home whom I discussed Fanonian thought with, still prioritize this one-sided dimension of his theory. While this is correct, I think a re-reading of Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth in terms of audience would do justice to the essence of Fanonism. Given the political despotism, the lack of dialectical thought between the ruling class and the mass population, and more importantly given the "deafness" of the ruling class to the needs and aspiration of the society in general in today postcolonial world, Fanon still stand a thoroughly valuable insight for national redress. From a locational perspective, or a continental African standpoint - what Ayo Sekyi-Otu calls an "African situationist reading of Fanon" (Fanon's Dialectic of Experience 3), Fanon's legacy in this book still is the harbinger for the political and socioeconomic trepidations of most of postcolonial African countries.
This project is equally significant in that it locates itself in this Postcolonial theory that engages itself with a sort of inward-looking examination of internal social hierarchies and inequalities. Because Postcolonialism by and large has been concerned with the critique of Western reason and imperialism, the responsibility of the postcolonial society for development and social emancipation after colonialism have not that much examined. It is in this perspective that I want to re-read *The Wretched of the Earth* in terms of audience and the his insistence on the necessity to grow from liberatory revolution to *social revolution* after the end of colonialism. In addition, the realization of a social revolution in today's postcolonial Senegal for example, is a prerequisite to Homi Bhabha's *The Location of Culture* and the construction of a "third place." Bhabha's theory on cultural movement and translation is very insightful and is empowering when it comes to the *individual* agency. But on a national or collective level, Bhabha, I think, misses the *material condition of mass population* victimized by the ever growing despotism and corruption of their national leaders whose egotistical rules greatly impact on the lives of the economically and socially downtrodden. The current social youth movements and the opposition parties that joined the struggle echoes Fanon's call on the responsibility of postcolonial people to create a new society through political education, dialectical relationship between leaders and the population, the success of which is sometimes taken for granted. The Senegalese new social movements on which I am focusing in this project are important moments in the history of the nation for these social phenomenon really provides us, Senegalese, with questions that deal with the creation a new society, the outcome of which is still a yet-to-come reality.
METHODOLOGY

To foreground the research methods of this project, I will use online social media as my "ethnographical" site. Facebook will be my primary source of instant information and how people voice their opinions about the current events on the ground. Interesting enough is the fact that Facebook units Senegalese at home and those in the Diaspora when they meet on "equal footing" in discussion groups on Facebook and share ideas and information about the pros and cons of the social revolution. Because of my inability to physically go to the physical site, interview people and take part in participant ethnography, the only way to do this research, I think, is by means of social online media and the democratic online spaces where Senegalese of all obedience voice what matters for them.

Before I engage in this direction, I, first off, intend to do a comparative theoretical analysis between Frantz Fanon's critical insights about the "kleptocratic caste" of bourgeois leaders and traditional intellectuals and their co-optation by the state apparatus and the compelling paradigm in World history scholarship, which is Peter Gran's "Rise of the Rich". In fact, Peter Gran's later book *The Rise of the Rich: A New View of Modern World History* (2009) disrupts the Euro-dominance in Postcolonial history writings and focuses on the class-based alliances between the Western and Third world ruling classes in the oppression of their mass population. One could argue that state men, the "New men" as Gran calls them, especially Third world leaders are in a complete state of biddability in relation to the West. And this, as Peter Gran argues, "has made the counterhegemonic struggle on the national level so difficult and frustrating for nations
caught in the world market" (xiv). In turning the criticism inward, Postcolonial theory and practice would better shed light on the necessity to work on things internally before African people can fruitfully participate in the global world. Thus, my first aim is to draw a connection between the academic field of World history and its paradigm shift in historiography and the critique of Postcolonial reason within Postcolonial theory.

Second, and since I come from a postcolonial location, I will build on Sekyi-Otu's "situationist reading" of Fanon, say, to bring in my personal sensibility as a postcolonial subject who, from a continental perspective, has witnessed the trepidations of the postcolonial world in implementing the Fanonian project of true revolution and "new humanism." Being born and having grown up in Senegal, an African postcolonial country, I strongly believe that before African postcolonial subjects can engage in the globalization era, they have, first, to eradicate the verticality of social relationships and process Fanon's dialectic of colonial experience. Unless we settle human relations through a philosophy of ethics and democracy, our aspirations towards globality in its multi-layered dimensions will always be flawed.

And finally, I will, from a Cultural Studies' perspective, use additional theoretical frameworks about Affect theory and its possible applicability in the Senegalese context. To do that, I will focus on Micheal Hardt and Antonio Negri's Commonwealth (2011) and their notion of the "multitude" whose potential political all-inclusiveness is a must in social organization such as M23 and Y'EN A MARRE. Along with Hardt and Negri, Jon-Beasley Murray's Posthegemony (2010) and the necessity to face hegemony differently will be the last theoretical bedrock in my attempt at analyzing the populist trend of social
movements in Senegal which seems to divert the movements from their original social demands.

CHAPTER LAYOUT

In the first "Reading The Wretched from Within the Cultural Studies," I argue aloud that Frantz Fanon's new humanism is an avant la lettre theorization of Affect, and especially the idea of the 'multitude' and its political potentialities to create new societies. It is my attempt to read Fanon from the perspective of Cultural Studies. I first compare Fanon's thirst to see postcolonial societies transform themselves with the nomadic and anti-oedipal philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Given that Fanon was a fierce critic of African traditions and the way family, tribe and ethnic identity seemed to hamper the transformation of man in the Postcolony, I am inclined to intersect it with Deleuze and Guattari's critical insights, especially in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. In addition, I argue that Fanon's insistence of the need to implement a participatory democracy in the postcolonies, the crying need to "make a new start, develop a new way of thinking, and to endeavor to create a new man" (Wretched, 239) is no difference with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of "immanence" and the horizontal relationships on the social plane. Recasting Fanon and postcolonial theory in a Deleuzian nomadic thought, I believe, sheds light on the ways which Africana philosophy itself should deal with the ambiguities and dilemmas of postcolonial modernity.

Chapter One, "The Sociogeny of Senegalese Youth Movements," deals with the social context that brought about the social general outcry against President Abdoulaye Wade's political regime. Before talking about Frantz Fanon and his political thought, it
would be interested to have a diagnosis of the causes that triggered the Senegalese new social movements. Tracing back his Wade's coming to power in the 2000's as a new era of hope for Senegalese people, this chapter explores the many limitations of Wade's rule of the country, both politically and economically. This chapter equally tries to make a connection between the local and the global in term of neoliberal rational hegemony which stirs up social protests almost everywhere in the world. I will argue that *Y'en A Marre*’s scream against the despotism and nepotism of Wade's liberal governmental policies goes in lines with the valuing of the human voice in tackling social matters and demanding equal opportunities for all.

And Finally, chapter Three, "The Relevance of Cyberculture: The Use of Online Media in Senegal," focuses on the phenomenon of online social media, especially Facebook, and its utility setting public space and raising consciousness. On the level of theory, I build on Ato Sekyi-Uto's Fanon's *Dialectic of Experience* (1996). I posit my reading of Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* from a contextual, if not locational exploration of the text in relations to Senegalese new social movements, which I believe, are the logical manifestations of the dilemmas and ambiguities of colonial and postcolonial modernity. While I am aware of the fact that the trauma of race and systemic segregation are Fanonian realities or situations in postcolonies such South Africa, Zimbabwe with their history of settler colonialism, I, however, will argue, in this chapter, that the Senegalese postcolonial condition is exempt from racial relations. What I will focus on is the dimension of class consciousness that is arguably the cornerstone of the social relationships between elites politics, the rulers and the downtrodden mass populations who aspire to economic emancipation. In addition, I am analyzing the
dissident voices that intersect on Facebook group discussions and the way in which they sort of provide a self-critical approach of the idea of the *Nouveau Type de Senegalais*.

Echoing John Holloway's *Changing the World Without Taking Power* (2011), most of the comments and posts on Facebook are highlighting the need to go beyond the critique of traditional politics per se, and emphasis on self-contradictoriness of the revolution itself. Online debates about identity, politics and the setting afoot a new type of Senegalese, I will try to show in this chapter, echo Frantz Fanon's postmodern standpoint that "nobody has the monopoly of truth, neither the leader nor the militant. he search for truth in local situation is the responsibility of the community" (*The Wretched*, 139).
CHAPTER I:

READING *THE WRETCHED FROM WITHIN THE CULTURAL STUDIES: IS FANON'S NEW MAN THE MULTITUDE?*

Since its independence from France in 1960, Senegal has been one of the most stable West African countries, politically, socially and religiously. Unlike Algeria, Senegal did not get its independence in bloodshed. Politically speaking, it has been a democratic country where multipartism and freedom of speech, among other democratic principles, are guaranteed by the country's constitution. The Socialist Party , from Leopold Sedar to Abdou Diouf, ruled the country for 40 years, from 1960 to 2000, and elections are said to have been fairly organized. In the 2000s, however, a new era of hope and social euphoria sprang out of the election of Abdoulaye Wade, the leader of the *Parti Democratique Senegalais* (PDS). Thanks to the fairness and the transparency of the 2000 elections according to international observers, Senegal was hauled as an example of democracy and political alternation in Africa: even Abdou Diouf, now president of *Francophonie* (the Organization of the French-speaking countries), congratulated Abdoulaye Wade days before the polls were released by the nation's Constitutional Court. The Senegalese democracy, when compared with the rest of Africa, can arguably be viewed as a "political exceptionality," albeit the limitations the multiparty system which is gradually and "carefully controlled by a process of incremental democratization."²

My attempt at trying to analyze the current socio-political context of Senegal from the insights of Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* is greatly influenced by Ato Sekyi-Uto's "African-situationist reading" of Fanon, which is by no means a promotion of a "monopolistic back-to-the-motherland appropriation of his vision." Even though Sekyi-Uto values the postmodernist reading of Frantz Fanon of which Paul Gilroy and Homi K. Bhabha as the most representative scholars, he nevertheless argues that "the agnosticism of these postmodernist readings, in common with some nationalists appropriations of Fanon, deprives us of weapons with which to confront some of the urgent questions of postindependence world: questions of class, ethnicity, and gender, of democracy and human rights, against assertions of cultural particularity and difference" (3).

Not only did Fanon reject the rationality of European-centered Psychoanalysis and the "psychological reductionism" attached to it, he arguably foregrounded the psychology of the then colonized subject in its "radical sociogeny" (Bulhan qtd. in Sekyi-Uto 6). As a result and building Abdilahi Bulhan's *Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression* (1985) whose focus is Fanon's *Black Skin White Masks*, I am arguing that the sociogeny of the Senegalese social movements has a lot to do with Sekyi-Uto injection on the so multifaceted socio-economic crisis in the postcolonies. And a postmodernist reading of Fanon, while being insightful on the geopolitics of global affairs, seems to gloss over the very contextuality of the *Wretched of the Earth*. If one takes into account the collective agency of postcolonial subjects, those trapped at home and victimized by the pitfalls of (neo)liberal policies, both globally and locally, one sees that postmodernist reading of

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Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* is nothing but an "evisceration of Fanon's texts" (Sekyi-Uto 3).

My relationship with the ongoing social revolution in Senegal with regards to Frantz Fanon, while being an act of remembering, "a painful re-membering, a putting together of the dismembered past to make sense of the trauma of the present"\(^4\), deals with "a matter of *place*, a function of the *rememberer's location* in the map of contemporary history" (Sekyi-Uto 10, emphasis mine). The 2009 pre-doctoral thesis I wrote while I was in Senegal dealt with the controversial academic debate between the Afrocentric school of thought and scholars of the Black Atlantic culture. On this global context of Blackness and identity, Fanon can, as Henry Louis Gates Jr. suggests, be recuperated as a "global theorist of alterity."\(^5\) It is interesting to see how both schools of thought read Fanon's texts differently, the one being an Afrocentric-oriented reading while the other focuses on a postmodernist and globally-contextualized reading centered on Black identity and alterity. Ironically, both are diasporic readings of Frantz Fanon that somewhat miss some important facets of *location*. What if we read Fanon from a postcolonial African *locational* perspective? How can we deal with Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* if we don't focus on "the economic, political, and utter moral bankruptcy of postcolonial [political] regimes, with their unending train of rapacious and murderous tyrants, chieftains, and cliques, a succession of brutal enigmas which confound our ability to name the social identities of principal individual and collective agents" (Sekyi-Uto 12)?

The more we focus on the global dimension of Fanon's legacy, the more we are inclined

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to miss the originality of his texts' essence which is the politics of location. National consciousness, which is sometimes confused with narrow-minded nationalism, is the first step to be dealt with before Africa can dive in internationalism.

After I highlight some of the inadequacies of Fanonian thought with regards to putative violence in our contemporary world, this chapter attempts to emphasize his sense of "new humanism." Though Fanon's insistence on violence is to be historically contextualized, the clear-cut sort of antagonism between the nationalist bourgeois and the peasantry/lumpenproletariat is very inadequate in present-day revolutions. To what extent can the antagonism against the state's apparatus lead people to freedom and emancipation from capitalism? This Us vs. them opposition is arguably not the case with the Senegalese new social movements whose entity is very heterogeneous. Not only are "peasants" and working class men among those who scream against Wade's political regime, but youth people, students, minority intellectuals and members of the civil society are equally part of the "flies caught in spider's web." In other words, what should be the politics of taking into account this conglomerate of different identities and subject-positions that scream in unison? How far is *Y'en A Marre* able to really discuss the necessity to recognize the discordance of voices and the necessity to come to terms with this contradiction?

After I re-emphasize Macky Sall's ascendance to the Senegalese presidency in 2012 as a phenomenon that provides more room for thought in politics, I will make the suggestion that Frantz Fanon was a Cultural Studies' scholar *avant la lettre*. Not only is he a central figure in Postcolonial theory and the critique of Western reason, but more
important is the fact that, especially in *The Wretched*, he put forward the idea that revolution is aimed at changing society and culture altogether. The dialectical experience of fellow citizens, when colonialism is officially overthrown, and the ways in which to create a new humanity first locally and then globally, is, I argue, where Fanon intersects with the theories of Affect, the Multitude and the need to discriminate, not only the people from the Multitude (John Beasley-Murray 2010), but to really valorize the social institution of "constituent power" over "constituted power." In other words, this chapter will try to show that Fanon's insistence on creating a new humanism after the "fall" of colonialism in the Postcolony is basically Hardt and Negri's theoretical move from "Being to Making the Multitude" (Commonwealth, 173).

**MACKY SALL'S COMING TO POWER AND THE CRITIQUE OF SENEGALESE TRADITIONAL POLITICS.**

Until late 2007, Macky Sall was escalating the ranks within Abdoulaye Wade Senegalese Democratic Party (P.D.S.), from minister in Wade's government, Prime Minister and eventually President of the National Assembly. After Idrissa Seck - another P.D.S member and ex-Prime Minister of Wade - was prosecuted and smirched by some alleged fund embezzlements in the government (an affair that still remains occult), Macky Sall was, from then on, the second personality of the Democratic party. The skirmishes between Macky Sall, as the president of the National Assembly, and Abdoulaye Wade, the president of the republic, began when the former signed a document which asked for the president's son, Karim Wade, to come before the MPs and defend his management of the ANOCI, the organization of the Islamic Conference in
Dakar. This multi-millionaire budget state organization that the president's son ran, according to some journalist investigations (Coulibaly 2009), was managed in a nepotistic way and permeated some high officials, Karim included, to enrich themselves. Thereafter, the president of the republic was angered by Macky Sall's call for the "prosecution" of his son. The president asked Macky to resign from his presidency of the National Assembly because, he thought, Macky's move was attempted at challenging his own authority in the party, what Penda Mbow calls Wade's cult of state "personalism," Wade's thirst in turning, if not securing his "tight control of the National Assembly" and on "the prime minister [who] serves [his] will" (158). Eventually on November the 9th 2009, by means of constitutional amendment, Macky Sall was toppled down from the presidency of the National Assembly, and thereafter literally ousted from the party, given that he had no option but to resign from the party membership.

Laurent Correau, a journalist at Radio France Internationale (RFI), has documented a radio broadcast on how Macky Sall won state power within three years after his disgrace from Wade and the Democratic Party. The broadcast highlights the political itinerary of the former unfortunate state party member and his figurative sojourn in, and his going through, the desert. After the fall into disgrace of the prince and the demonization by his former fellow party members, Macky created his own political party Alliance pour la Republique Yaakar. At this point, I argue that Macky Sall's experience with the ruling Democratic party somewhat resembles the situation that Fanon described some 50 years ago in newly independent African postcolonies. Some party minority

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intellectuals within the party machine who dare question the ideological of the group find themselves "rapidly isolated and removed." Because "the party machine tends to resist any innovation [the] minority finds itself isolated, confronted by a leadership, frightened and anguished at the idea it could be swept away in a whirlwind whose nature, strength and direction are beyond its imagining." (Wretched, 77). The innovation of transparent governance within the Democratic that Wade seemed to embody is probably what frightened and angered Wade given that numerous judicial cases are pending during his regime.

The strategy of Macky Sall's politics of trying to reconnect with the masses, away from the urban sort of elite traditional politics, provides more food for thought in the political life of Senegal. Within the three years that he fell in disgrace from the Democratic Party machine, Macky Sall adopted the political strategy of touring the country while the ruling party was busying itself to keep hold on its state power. At the same time, Benno Sigigl Senegal, the leader of the coalitional opposition parties, was politically weakened by its crisis of leadership. Meanwhile, Macky Sall reached out the rural areas, meeting with people and explaining the reasons why he fell in disgrace on the one hand, and the need for a change of political regime on the other. Macky had, strategically speaking, understood that politics is not an elite responsibility. "The collective struggle," Fanon would argue, "presupposes a collective responsibility from the rank and file and a collegial responsibility from the top. Yes, everyone must be involved in the struggle for the sake of the common salvation" from Wade's despotism and authoritarian political regime (Wretched, 140). Even though Frantz Fanon was not explicitly referring to President Abdoulaye Wade here, I argue that the political wrongs
he was criticizing in the early 1960s have really not changed that much. This Sense of "politics of proximity" with the population at large is in effect in Senegal only when elections are approaching. And up to a point in Senegal's political history, especially in the 2012 presidential elections, the vast majority of the people has demystified traditional and professional politicians. In fact, what they, the people, have come to understand is that "the more vigilant they become, the more they realize that everything depends on them (…) The people understand that wealth is not the fruit of labor but the spoils from an organized protection racket. The rich no longer seem respectable men but flesh-eating beasts, jackals and ravens who wallow in the blood of the people" (*Wretched*, 133).

In the heights of the new social movements' violent protests against Wade's bid for a third term, Macky Sall renewed his contact with the people while the other members of the M23 - the political movement of June 23rd 2011- focused on the constitutional battlefront with Wade not running for power. To the exception of a few Senegalese politicians including Macky Sall, all opposition leaders joined force and faced police crackdown in Dakar, the capital city, and in major city areas throughout the country. Instead of confronting the ruling party machine in putative violence, Macky opted for an electoral campaign out of the city and once again reached the rural areas and the rest of the country. There were two options: fight against Wade's bid for an unconstitutional candidacy for an eventually election boycott or fight him on the political terrain by reaching the mass population, explaining them the historical necessity for political change in Senegal that is realizable by means of ballot box. Eventually on the night of March the 25th, the last method brought fruition as Wade was toppled peacefully and
democratically with the election of Macky Sall with more than 65% of the polls on the second round.

Considering Macky Sall's coming to power as the historic momentum in Senegal's political history is by no means a praise song for his presidency. Positing such an analysis would alter the rationale of my main arguments. Rather, I argue that his move beyond oppositional confrontation with the state apparatus' power of capture, his move toward another plane of political power building is, perhaps, what made his political choices more efficient and rewarding in terms of gaining state power. To a certain extent, I believe that Macky Sall, by increasing his contact with the masse populations, wanted to raise consciousness and let them discover that in order to topple Wade peacefully, they must understand that "the struggle must be based on a clear set of objectives, a well-defined methodology and above all, a recognition by the masses of an urgent timetable" *(Wretched, 86)*. However, that Macky Sall is the first political figure to have approached the population politically speaking would be a dangerously weak argument on my part. Politicians have always got in touch with the people. How far will Macky Sall's term(s) in power be a fundamental rupture with, and a departure to a brighter future for Senegalese people, is an open question for time will tell.
FRANTZ FANON'S POLITICAL THOUGHT AND CULTURAL CHANGE.

Asking whether Frantz Fanon was a theorist of Cultural Studies *avant la lettre* (before the word) or not, can be thought-provoking and would cause some outright objections. The outcome of Macky Sall's election, as I already implied, provides more food for thought in the process of Senegalese Subject's movement into *becoming*. First is the inadequacy of putative or retaliatory violence against the state. To a certain point, I would argue that the M23’s uncompromising struggle to topple the incumbent president oppositionally, showing everybody that political leaders are now emboldened and risk their lives to face state violence, seemed to have little impacted on the eventual ballot boxes. This sense of heroism arguably refers to Fanon's theorization of violence, albeit its curative dimension. But time has changed and we, Senegalese people, are no longer living in the colonial time and its putative violence. Positing a revolutionary violence in Senegal is inadequate given that Senegalese people have had a specific historical trajectory. Unlike Algeria which got independent in bloodshed, Senegal has arguably had a negotiated, if accommodationist independence. Some historical revolutionaries like Mamadou Dia and his allies, who wanted to radically distanced Senegal with neocolonist ties with France, were automatically, and unfortunately, warded off and tossed in jail by Leopold Sedar Senghor, Senegal's first President after independence. The negotiated independence blocking off the radical wing of the struggle, embodied then by Dia and his allies, might have an impact on the national collective psyche of the Senegal people who have never experienced violent revolution, or at least one in bloodshed. Compared to other countries in the West African region and elsewhere in the continent, Senegal is usually depicted as a country of peace and social stability.
Frantz Fanon's antagonism in the Algerian war of independence poses another problem in the Senegalese case study. The fundamental difference between the period of decolonization of African countries and the present-day sociopolitical realities have led some critics to label Fanon's revolution as a "peasant messianism" (Sekyi-Uto, 161). Viewed from the prospective of temporality, the dichotomization of the protagonists, between colonial masters and peasantry/lumpenproletariat, or between two fundamentally opposed protagonists in Hegel's dialectic, is very reductionist in the Senegalese case study, especially because those who scream against Wade's political regime come from a heterogeneous entity. To a certain extent, the new social movements in Senegal have rationalized the sociopolitical realities of the country in a them vs. us schema, trying to gloss over the crucial fact that "anti-power exists contradictorily, problematically … in the everyday frustrations" (Holloway, 156). The fundamental problem, as John Holloway argues, is that "non-radical struggle[s]" see Capital from a sense of "externality … whereas the radical approach of the struggle would imply the transformation of everything, ourselves included" (166, emphasis mine). The problem with the "non-radical" approach of any struggle against the state and capitalism lies in the fact that this approach always tends to view the identity of those who scream monolithically. This, in turn, does nothing else than empower the capitalist state to become more totalitarian in response.\(^7\)

Apart from these shortcomings of Fanonism, two fundamental features of Fanon's revolutionary thought, however, justify his coquetting with Cultural Studies: his critique or silence of the libidinal transcendental force of the revolutionaries - what Cultural

\(^7\) Holloway, *Change the World Without Taking Power*, p. 166
Studies' scholars call "transcendence" - and his call for a new humanism in "posthegemony." In "Islam: The Elephant in Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth" (2008), Fouzi Slisli criticizes Fanon's disregard of the cultural, if not religious background of the Algerian peasantry that took arms to chase French colonialism away. "Rather than spontaneity and organization" Slisli argues, "what The Wretched of the Earth describes is the combination of two systems of organization - one Marxist, the other Islamic" (97). Foregrounding the Algerian peasant's rebelliousness out of the Fanonian schema, Slisli suggests that Algerian people had had a rich Islamic anti-colonial history dating back to the eighteenth century, long before Frantz Fanon theorized his radical psychotherapy. For instance, as he puts it, "the Darqawiyya Muslim Brotherhood, for example, mounted a stiff rebellion against Ottoman rule from 1783 to 1805, and again from 1805 to 1809," though the rebellion was eventually defeated by a "massive Ottoman retaliation" (99). Interesting in Slisli's argument is his point that, even though these historical Islamic anti-colonial rebellions were defeated by, either Ottoman domination or Western colonialism, "Islamic ideology was still able to mobilize anti-colonial resistance and rebellions." Because "Islam, unlike other religions, escapes institutionalization" and that "[c]loseness to power compromises the independence of Islamic scholars …[,] the masses always look for more independent scholars to follow" (100). Frantz Fanon, as he argues aloud, completely misses the socio-historical legacies of Islam in Algerian when he theorized peasant's rebelliousness in a mere western theoretical framework.

While Slisli's argument is somewhat tenable, I would argue that Fanon's silence of the Islamic tradition of Algerian rebels might have been political. Most of the times, religious revolutions that fight against empire always posit themselves on a civilizational
frontline, which as Fanon would say, completely misses the materiality of human life in which economic power relationships are structured and jealously secured by hegemonic influences. Because of the teleological ground of Postcolonial Studies that has been the "consistent critique of Eurocentrism and patriarchy" (Edward Said qtd in Brennon, 94), nationalist movements always tended, perhaps still today, to merge into religious-ethno nationalisms. "Disenfranchised from a coherent political alternative after the fall of socialist sphere," As Timothy Brennan argues, "these nationalisms increasingly took on the shape of ethnic, religious, or anti-western movements. The political had become civilizational" (Wars of Positions, 68). Fanon had arguably understood the slippery of the civilizational frontline and the fanatic dimension of its ideology while the materiality of colonial authority and power were this-worldly. In order to deal with the worldliness of politics, we need to stop seeing politics only through the state channel. What we need is a Gramscian politics that escapes and goes beyond the statist and governmental hegemonic politics, and which urges us to see politics as "encompass[ing] the wide range of human activity often see as non-political, such as our everyday beliefs and behavior, from the books we read and the films we enjoy to our religious feelings and perceptions of the world."8

The third Fanon's fundamental theoretical feature is his ideas on a "new humanism." When Fanon strongly argued aloud in the closing lines of the book that "for Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must make a new start, develop a new way of thinking, and endeavor to create a new man" (Wretched, 239), his vision of a futurity project lies beyond not only the problematic Western liberal humanism, but also

the sometimes nationalist and narrow-minded sense of humanity of the colonized. As Robert Bernasconi suggests, "Fanon recognized that the disappearance of colonialism necessitated the disappearance not only of the colonizer, but also of the colonized."\(^9\)

Even though Fanon's new humanism has been criticized by some scholars as a mere reversal of Western-type humanism (Robert Young, 1990), what they mostly miss is the dialectical dimension of Fanon's ideas of the colonial experience. Not only does universality "reside in [the] decision to recognize and accept the reciprocal relativism of different cultures"\(^10\) after the radical extirpation of colonial inhumanity, but and more importantly it necessitates the radical transformation of the colonized and postcolonial subject with regards to old frame of references. Fanon's critique, or at least silence of the religious dimension in the revolutionary process (Slisli 2008), and his call for a fundamental and radical change in the production of subjectivity refer, I argue, to Affect theory, the potentialities of the "Multitude" that has be more politically inclusive in the posthegemonic contemporary era.

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\(^9\) Robert Bernasconi. "Casting the Clough: Fanon's New Humanism for a New Humanity" in Lewis R. Gordon and al., *Fanon: A critical Reader*, p. 113

THE PROSPECT OF A 'MULTITUDE' IN Y'EN A MARRE'S NEW
SENEGALESE MAN.

The idea of the "multitude," first philosophized by Spinoza who interrogated the capacity of a body, runs throughout Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's dense and radical philosophy, especially in their work *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1987). In fact, the radical-ness of their philosophy lies in its opposition to the traditional Western philosophy from the Enlightenment onwards. The book, as Brian Massumi suggests, "speaks of many things, of ticks and quilts and fuzzy subsets and noology, and political economy." The distinction between Deleuze and Guattari's thought and the traditional Western philosophy is that the former is "nomadic" and theorizes the idea of the plateaus whereas the former is considered "official" and "the annals of" which "are populated by bureaucrats of pure reason' who speak in the 'shadow of the despot' and are in historical complicity with the State."

The first thing that *A Thousand Plateaus* deals with is the issue of *articulation*. "In a book, as in all things" Deleuze and Guattari argue, "there are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but also lines of flight, movements of *d deterritorialization and destratification*" (3, emphasis mine). The idea of the "rhizome" with which the book opens up is radically contrasted with the arborescent filiations of a tree's predatory main root. In other words, the connection/disconnection, say, the power of the rhizome to deterritorialize and reterritorialize in Deleuze and Guattari's thought, is

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12 Ibid.
fundamentally different from the predatory root of the tree which contains everything in fixity. Against "structuralism, but [also] the history of the Western thought that has been based on being and identity," Gilles Deleuze provides a radical thought that deals with "the questions of philosophy, art and science [that] are extensions of the questioning of life, a power that is also expressed in smaller organisms and their tendency to evolve, mutate and become." While Deleuze and Guattari talk about many things at the same time, the point of intersection of Deleuzian thought with Fanonism is the is issue of transcendence and sovereign power.

The philosophical concepts of subjectivity, experience, idealism and empiricism are intertwined, but more radically disrupted in Deleuzian nomadic thought. Like Foucauldian philosophy, Deleuze's radical thought tries "to break free as subjection to transcendence" (Foucault, qtd in Colebrook, 71). Transcendence is the concept whereby the human subject foregrounds any explainable experience out there, a "Truth" that can interpret and give meaning to anything that happens on the social plane of interaction. Deleuze and Guattari call this the disease of "interpretosis" (Colebrook, 71). The power of this human "disease" elects "priests" who produce, according to Deleuze, common sense, "which take the forms of 'Everybody thinks that …' or 'We all know' … or 'It would be mad or absurd to think that …" (Colebrook, 73). Instead of this human priesthood that explains everything in relation to an "Absolute Truth" that manages order, Deleuze and Guattari theorizes "THE plane of immanence" which, rather than foreclosing truth in an isolated plane or ground, operates through different planes and connections: first is the ideas of "chaosmos," of human subjectivity that always begins in chaos in

contrast to the common sense of the cosmos where stability is the rule; second is the "double articulation" which refers to the opening lines of _A Thousand Plateaus_, and third, the idea of "Absolute deterritorialization." According to Colebrook, what Deleuze and Guattari propose is a "transcendental empiricism" that "frees thought of any ultimate metaphysical foundation by insisting that far from being some actual ground, life itself is a virtual multiplicity, not things and agents but contemplations and contractions, events and responses."¹⁴ Therefore, Deleuzian radical nomadic thought, sees life as an ceaseless opening toward new directions, ungraspable lines of flight and chaotic forms of subjectivities.

I, however, am aware of the risks that I am running in trying to analyze _Y'en A Marre's_ ideology with the insights of Deleuzian philosophy. Given the importance and centrality of religions in the everydayness of people's lives in Senegal, I understand that Deleuze might seem irrelevant in this context. I am definitely not saying that the Senegalese people should ward off their religious subjectivities. The relationship between the believer and his God, whether Atheist, Christian or Muslim, is, I strongly believe, a personal matter. The major problem that is typical of Senegal's political life is that sometimes religions, particularly the Islamic religious brotherhoods, are in complicity with the secular authority. From Leopold Sedar Senghor, the first Senegalese President to Abdoulaye Wade, there has always been a tradition of "state's allegiance" to the religious authority," which I believe, can solely be understandable through the electoralist schema. More than often, religious leaders have asked to their disciples to vote for X, Y, Z candidate because of their personal and brotherhood's affiliative relationships. And that a

¹⁴ Colebrook, _Gilles Deleuze_, p. 87
politician has to appeal to the authority of the religious leaders if she or he wants to gain popularity is an argument is at large in Senegal and that must be wiped out.

In my attempt to re-read Fanon's critique of religion in the unfolding evolution of revolution, I am not following Fanon in silencing the religious background of Senegalese people. Unlike some African countries where religious cohabitation has always been a dream, folks of different religious confessions in Senegal have always lived in mutual respect. Religion, whether Christianity or Islam, still continues to be the bedrock of Senegalese people's sense of who they are. In a more kind of exaggerated tone, the journalist Moriba Magassouba subtitled his book on Islam in Senegal "Tomorrow the Mollahs?," because the image of religion can be found anywhere in Senegal. In city areas, there is a "proliferating signs of religiosity, the founding of religious associations, and mosques 'multiplying like mushrooms."15 In Senegal, there is an interesting history of statesmen and religious leaders' relationship which always benefited the former in terms of mass population electoral support. While the electoral support of President Senghor (a Christian) by the Islamic religious brotherhood in the early '60s late '70s was a good thing in terms of social cohesion, this history of statesmen/religious leaders intimate relationship has been problematic in Senegal's politics. For sure, all religious leaders had not always supported politicians, either during their campaigns or after their elections. For example, "the early 1990s," as Villalon suggests, "a religious movement known as the Moustarchidines became directly and centrally involved in political protests surrounding the 1993 elections, marking the first time that resistance to the Parti

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Socialiste's (PS) historical domination was cast so explicitly in Islamic terms" (130). A part from this Moustarchidines' move in challenging state political, statesmen and religious leaders have always been in a good partnership based on unstated interests.

There, too, are interesting ideas in Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1983) relevant to this project. In it, they provide a critical response to Freudian's Psychoanalysis and its oedipalizing philosophy. By claiming that "a schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than the neurotic lying on the analyst's couch" (*Anti-Oedipus*, 2), Deleuze and Guattari theorize the idea of Anti-Oedipus who "seeks to discover the 'deterritorialized' flows of desires … the desiring-machines that escape [Oedipal] codes as lines of escapes leading elsewhere."¹⁶ Deleuze and Guattari defines psychoanalysis as follows:

> a frenzied oedipalization, a betrayal of desire, the unconscious closeted in a day nursery, a narcissistic machine for arrogant and mouthy little egos, a perpetual absorption of capitalist surplus value, flows of words against flows of money, the interminable story …"¹⁷

The closeting and betrayal of the unconscious and its potential for "desiring-production," is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, best at work when psychoanalysts insist on the idea of representation and meaning, rather than the utility of that very meaning. "The unconscious," they argue, "poses no problem of meaning, solely problems of use. The question posed by desire is not "what does it mean?" but rather "How does it work?" (*Anti-Oedipus*, 109).

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¹⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 111
What *Anti-Oedipus* proposes, which I believe is of importance in this project, is the killing of the oedipal and oedipalized "nationalistic, religious, [and] racist sentiment" that are all inherent in our egos (*Anti-Oedipus*, 104). Schizoanalysis, as opposed to Freud's psychoanalysis, "is a political analysis of desire [that] becomes a mighty tool where schizophrenia as a process - the schiz - serves as a point of departure as well as a point of destination … they encourage mankind to take a journey, the journey through ego-loss" (Mark Seem, xix, emphasis in original). This Schizoanalysis of the economy of desire, I contend, is a valuable argument to disrupt the very foundation of the political life in Senegal where, more than often, religious sentiments, uncritical and overt political party militancy and the idea of the "Great Man and the Crowd" are social phenomena, among others, that hamper the development of radical transformation of politics and society (*Anti-Oedipus*, 102)

Another problem that *Anti-Oedipus* finds in psychoanalysis is the notion of "familialism … [and] the daddy-mommy-me triangle,"18 which is somewhat the same as the political filiations of Senegalese people. Rather than the biological sense of this triangularity, however, this familialism sounds more like communities of ontological beliefs, whether religious or political, where the "rendering [of] debate impertinent, [the] mobiliz[ation of] group angst against reprobates … insist[s] on solidarity before criticism" (Edward Said qtd. in Brennan, 6). At some point, the notion of familial filiations, whether biological or based on systems of belief, must be looked upon for the sake of producing another sort politics in the country. And *Anti-Oedipus'* insistence on deterritorializing the subject desiring-machines, on warding off the power of

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18 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 51
transcendence onto us, I believe, can be an answer against group identity that, most of the time, looms large in Senegal on all political levels.

In putting Deleuze and Guattari in conversation with Frantz Fanon's criticism of the religious, I want to deconstruct the relation of the religious with the secular as far as politics is concerned in Senegal. While Fanon was more concerned about the power of the religious to divert the objectives of the Algerian revolution - toward the civilizational frontline - it is interesting to see what he might say about today's Senegalese politics. What is problematic in the religious brotherhoods in Senegal is their overt power over the secularism of the state. In the history of Senegal, there have always been Ndigals - official political announcements made by religious leaders, asking their disciples to vote for a particular political leader. And most the time, the religious leaders ask them to vote for the ruling party.

Some scholars have argued for the uniqueness of Senegalese religious institutions and their coexistence with the secular state. Religious institutions have had a central place, not only in Senegalese everyday social ritual practices, but also with regards to political life and state secularism. As Leonardo Villalon argues, this Senegalese uniqueness in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Islamic world lies in the fact that, albeit their central place, religious institutions "have made no significant challenge for control of the state, at least until recently" (129). What is more, a deep analysis of the internal power structure of the religious institutions will reveal some crisis of leadership from within as there is a generational change with the emergence of younger religious leaders (marabouts). The emergence of these young marabouts, according to Villalon, is
primarily due to the "very reluctance by major marabouts to take public political stances." This in turn, has "opened up possibilities for younger marabouts to adopt more controversial positions, for or against the regime, in a bid for followers and influence, a tendency which grows with the increase in the number of potential claimants to maraboutic status with each generation" (135). Therefore and because of young marabouts' search for social power and influence, not only with regards to their disciples, but also in relation to politicians, there seems to be a generational conflict within the very establishment of religious institutions.

As I have already implied, I would not argue for the silencing of the religious influence in Senegalese lifestyle as Fanon is said to have done in the Algerian war of independence. Critiquing Fanon on this point is a failure to acknowledge his prophetic vision about the way in which nationalism and religious patriarchy have "betrayed" Algerian women and their legacy in the war of independence. Rather, I have tried to have a critical analysis of the religious/secular coupling in Senegalese politics and their sometimes complicit relationship when it comes to issue of power over the people. Deleuzian nomadic and anti-oedipal philosophy and Frantz Fanon's critique of the religious institutions are mighty tool to deconstruct sovereign power, be it state or religious. With the outcome of 2012 presidential election in Senegal, there is a heap of hope regarding the relationship between religious leaders and the secular institutions. What is more, a famous religious leader from the Murid brotherhood has been recently prosecuted in a murder case. One can say without exaggeration that this case could be a first step toward the normalization of the state and social institutions as far as the rule of law is concerned.
CHAPTER II:


Since its independence from France in 1960, Senegal has been one of the most stable West African countries, politically, socially and religiously. Unlike Algeria, Senegal did not get its independence in bloodshed. Politically speaking, it has been a democratic country where multiparty elections and freedom of speech, among other democratic principles, are guaranteed by the country's constitution. The Socialist Party, from Leopold Sedar and then Abdou Diouf, ruled the country for 40 years, from 1960 to 2000, and elections are said to be fairly organized. In the 2000s, however, a new era of hope and social euphoria sprang out of the election of Abdoulaye Wade, the leader of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS). Thanks to the fairness and the transparency of the 2000 elections according to international observers, Senegal was hailed as an example of democracy and political alternation in Africa: even Abdou Diouf, now president of the Organization of the French-speaking countries (Francophonie), congratulated Abdoulaye Wade days before the polls were released by the nation's Constitutional Court. The Senegalese democracy, when compared with the rest of Africa, can arguably be viewed as a "political exceptionality," albeit the limitations the multiparty system which is gradually and "carefully controlled by a process of incremental democratization."19

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My attempt at trying to analyze the current socio-political context of Senegal from the insights of Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* is greatly influenced by Ato Sekyi-Uto's "African-situationist reading of Fanon, which is by no means a promotion of a "monopolistic back-to-the-motherland appropriation of his vision." Even though Sekyi-Uto values the postmodernist reading of Frantz Fanon of which Paul Gilroy and Homi K. Bhabha as the most representative scholars, he nevertheless argues that "the agnosticism of these postmodernist readings, in common with some nationalists appropriations of Fanon, deprives us of weapons with which to confront some of the urgent questions of postindependence world: questions of class, ethnicity, and gender, of democracy and human rights, against assertions of cultural particularity and difference" (3). Not only did Fanon reject the rationality of European-centered Psychoanalysis and the "psychological reductionism" attached to it, he arguably foregrounded the psychology of the then colonized subject in its "radical sociogeny" (Bulhan qtd. in Sekyi-Uto 6). As a result and building Abdilahi Bulhan's *Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression* (1985) whose focus is Fanon's *Black Skin White Masks*, I am arguing that the sociogeny of the Senegalese social movements has a lot to do with Sekyi-Uto injection on the so multifaceted socio-economic crisis in the postcolonies. And a postmodernist reading of Fanon, while being insightful on the geopolitics of global affairs, seems to gloss over the very contextuality of the *Wretched of the Earth*. If one takes into account the collective agency of postcolonial subjects, those trapped at home and victimized by the pitfalls of (neo)liberal policies, both globally and locally, one sees that postmodernist readings of

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Fanon's the *Wretched of the Earth* is nothing but an "evisceration of Fanon's texts" (Sekyi-Uto 3).

My relationship with the ongoing social revolution in Senegal with regards to Frantz Fanon, while being an act of remembering, "a painful re-membering, a putting together of the dismembered past to make sense of the trauma of the present"\(^{21}\), deals with "a matter of place, a function of the rememberer's location in the map of contemporary history" (Sekyi-Uto 10, emphasis mine). The 2009 pre-doctoral thesis I wrote while I was in Senegal dealt with the controversial academic debate between the Afrocentric school of thought and Paul Gilroy's the Black Atlantic culture. On this global context of Blackness and identity, Fanon can, as Henry Louis Gates Jr. suggests, be recuperated as a "global theorist of alterity."\(^{22}\) It is interesting to see how both schools of thought read Fanon's texts differently, the one being an Afrocentric-oriented reading while the other focuses on a postmodernist and globally-contextualized reading centered on Black identity and alterity. Ironically, both are diasporic readings of Frantz Fanon that somewhat miss some important facets of location. What if we read Fanon from a postcolonial African *locational* perspective? How can we deal with Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* if we don't focus on "the economic, political, and utter moral bankruptcy of postcolonial [political] regimes, with their unending train of rapacious and murderous tyrants, chieftains, and cliques, a succession of brutal enigmas which confound our ability to name the social identities of principal individual and collective agents" (Sekyi-Uto 12)? The more we focus on the global dimension of Fanon's legacy, 

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the more we are inclined to miss the originality of his texts' essence which is the politics of location. National consciousness, which is sometimes confused with narrow-minded nationalism, is the first step to be dealt with before Africa can dive in internationalism.

Even though Frantz Fanon said little about certain aspects of democratic politics (i.e. electoral mechanisms), some critics argue that he is definitely a "democratic theorist." As "the Cold War must [have been] ended, for it leads nowhere" (Fanon qtd. in Adam 199), Hussein Adam suggests that his political writing "is both compatible with and supportive of an understanding of democracy as a process in which individuals cooperate as equal and free participants in the demanding task of development and self-rule" (119). "Participatory democracy" is what Frantz Fanon longed for in his political writings in the contextuality of the decolonization momentum, contrary to the tradition liberal democracy of the West. Fanon's contextualized notions of democracy have been analyzed by critics such as C. B. Macpherson who asks:

What does this vision of democracy account to? … it is neither our Western liberal-democracy nor the democracy formulated by Marx or Lenin: it is newer than either of these, yet in a sense it is older than both … The notion of democracy as rule by and for the oppressed people. (quoted in Adam 121).

Important in Fanon's ideas of democracy is the notion of the collective which is at odds with the individualism of Western liberal democracy. In fact, Fanon's visionary insight lies in the fact that he beforehand understood the cul-the-sac that was coming ahead in

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African Politics if the rationality of capitalism and liberal democracy were implemented in the newly independent African nation-states characterized by "unmitigated slide into single-party autocracies, personal-rule authoritarianisms, and military dictatorships" (Adam 121). The antidemocratic trends that Fanon criticized, in addition to autocracy and dictatorship, is the mimicking national middle class or bourgeoisie that, in addition to lacking economic power, "is not engaged in production, nor invention, nor building, nor labor. It is completely canalized into activities of the intermediary type" (Fanon qtd. in Adam 123). The reaction, then, of Fanon's peasant revolutionaries against the flourishing national bourgeois market is arguably the same situation as in Wade's (neo)liberal situation in which newly rich elites control much of the national economy. Like Fanon's peasants in the rural areas and the lumpemproletariat in slums in city areas, Senegalese people have decided to voice in unison, in the course of the years 2011 and 2012, their despisement of Abdoulaye Wade's liberal government and the Senegalese individual liberties it infringes upon.

Due to its neoliberal political policies and the ascendancy of newly wealthy ruling elites, Abdoulaye Wade's administration has come to lose its political legitimacy and people's trust. Although the Democratic ruling party has realized some positive initiatives, mainly in terms of infrastructures, it is argued that it missed the real social needs of the Senegalese mass population who eke out a living on a daily basis. It is the rising rate of poverty in the country that caused, in recent years, the massive clandestine immigration of what is today called the Senegalese boat-people. Thousands of young men washed up on the shores of the Canaries Islands in Spain and up to a thousand died during the Atlantic voyage. The image of wealth and comfort that the West still signifies
for young Africans in general, and Senegalese in particular, has accentuated this illegal immigration. Most families back home undergo a great deal of financial sacrifice to pay the treacherous journey for their sons, hoping in return, that they will be able to provide a much-needed supplement for the family income. According to Paul Mitchell, in March 2006, "a boat with the mummified bodies of 11 men were found 3,000 miles across the Atlantic ocean, drifting off the Caribbean islands of Barbados. [...] A note from one of them, believed to be Diao Suncar Dieme from Bassade in Western Senegal, read, 'I would like to send to my family in Bassada a sum of money. Please excuse me and Goodbye. This is the end of my life in this Moroccan Ocean.'"24 It is, however, important to highlight that this social phenomenon existed prior to Abdoulaye Wade's much criticized political regime, though it has intensified during his (neo)liberal policies which, arguably, victimized the mass populations, especially those in the rural areas.

Abdoulaye Wade, the incumbent president, is one of the most respected African presidents, especially when it comes to Pan-African issues. With the former Libyan leader Colonel Khadafi - ousted by NATO alliance without very much effective resistance from the African Union - and former South African president Thabo Mbeki, they launched promising continental political and economic projects which culminated in the creation of NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) and the OMEGA Plan for Africa in July 2001. The latter was personally developed and presided by Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal's president. On a continental and international level,

Abdoulaye Wade has had an important role as he usually participates in G20 summits to promote Africa's economic and political interests.

The event of the Arab Spring has been a pivotal political moment for the Arab people and for Sub-Saharan Africans as well. Due to the intimate relationship between Colonel Khadafi and the African heads of state, there was a striking silence of the African Union (A.U.) and its apparent (political) inability to have a clear and uncompromising voice regarding the political crisis in Libya. Abdoulaye Wade himself kept silent from the beginning of the rebels' uprising until the last days. It is argued that, due to France's political pressure on Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade "betrayed" Colonel Kaddafi asking him to step down and eventually, he went to Benghazi to officially support the revolutionaries. According to political analysts, Abdoulaye Wade did so because he hoped he would back up to France's support in what people think to be a monarchical devolution in Senegal characterized by a" multifaceted crisis and a regime that seems to be aiming at a Togo-style succession in which the longtime president's son takes his father's place" (Mbow, 168). This, arguably, was the situation where Senegal would drive at if Abdoulaye Wade's bid for the eventual nomination of a Vice-president was passed at the National Assembly.

In January 2011, Y'EN A MARRE was created to materialize the country's outcry against the rising cost of life. On June the 23rd 2011, Y'EN A MARRE succeeded in mobilizing thousands of protestors in the streets of major Senegalese cities, following the president's bid to amend the constitution for the forthcoming presidential elections, to be held on February the 26th, 2012. This amendment would allow the next president to be
elected with only 25 % of the total polls. The opposition political parties, alongside the civil society and intellectuals, joined Y'EN A MARRE's call out for massive protestation: hence the creation of M23, the movement of June the 23rd. But before talking about the creation of such movements, it would be interesting to analyze Abdoulaye Wade's political regime and its major characteristics since the 2000s.

**ABDOULAYE WADE'S COMING TO POWER AND THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA.**

The 2000s have been an important decade in Senegal's political and socio-historical trajectory. The political power turnover that toppled the 40 year-socialist rule (1960-2000) was hailed by African and international democrats alike. Senegal entered a new era of hope for a socio-economic change to be triggered by Abdoulaye Wade's Democratic Party’s Wolof slogan *Sopi* (meaning change). Wade was elected thanks to a coalition of opposition parties that had enough with the incumbent socialist rule said to have been trepidating to keep the country's socio-economic welfare on track. On February the 25th 2007, Senegalese people re-elected Wade with 56% of the total polls in the first and only round, even though a sense of growing social despair and an endemic rising rate of unemployment were the real discussions of everyday life.²⁵ Following the June 2007 12-party boycott of the legislative elections, Wade ended up having a comfortable majority in the 150-seat National assembly. From then on, he engaged in a series of constitutional amendments to fit his monarchical devolution. Given the growing

social discontents about Wade's political regime and the opposition parties' lack of legitimacy - since they are not represented in the National assembly - intellectuals and the civil society organized the Assises Nationales, a national conference presided by Siggil Senegal, the Senegalese leading opposition coalition "whose name in Wolof means 'give Senegal back its pride'" (Mbow 156). Penda Mbow is a History Professor at the University of Cheikh Anta Diop of Dakar and an ex-member of Wade's government.

There are a few characteristics of the Senegalese socio-political context and the youth movements' sociogeny. Given the sometimes inert political forces and a weak democratic culture, Wade's ruling party was busying itself reinforcing its grip on the Senegalese socio-political fabric somewhat characterized by a fragmented civil society, disparate and disorganized women's, youth and labor organizations. In addition, one of the major characteristic of Senegal's social life since the independence of the 1960s is the politically-motivated influence of religious brotherhoods and confessional organizations. As a result, "the opposition, civil society, the press, and various observers have regularly decried Wade's administration turn into autocracy and patrimonialism, which has given rise to a crisis of legitimacy and a loss of citizens' trust in their own government" (Mbow 157).

Another social event that short-circuited the social euphoria of the 2000s is the sinking of the government-owned ferry, named MV Joola, off the Gambia cost on the night of September the 26-27th 2002. While there were 1,800 people that perished in the

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26 Leonardo Villalon's article (1999) examines in further details the intersections of Religion and politics in Senegal and the power dynamics and generational conflicts that tend towards a political and religious leadership changes.
belly of the Atlantic ocean, "making it one of the worst maritime disasters on record anywhere," (Mbow 157) high-level officials that were blamed for negligence of the ferry's maintenance, though fired by the president, were not appealed to a court of claims for an eventual trial. The ironic in this fact is the millions of dollars that were expended for the presidential plane's maintenance while a quarter of the sum would be far enough to take care of the ferry's old engines, reported to be one of the main cause of the *Joola*'s maritime catastrophe.

Political authoritarianism and autocratic turnover, while being somewhat typical in most African countries, is somewhat typical to Wade's regime. In an interesting article where Alfred Ndi rethinks Amartya Sen's theory about freedom as development, 27 we can see how African literature has fictionalized the African socio-political scene. According to Alfred Ndi, post-independent African nations, because of their nominal independence, copied and pasted the colonizer's constitution whose political agenda was a "macro social assumption that liberal democracy and modern capitalism would lead to freedom and social progress for all" (179). Chinua Achebe's *A Man of the People* (1966), Tah Asongwed's *Born to Rule* (2009), Ousmane Sembene's *God's Bits of Wood* (1979) and *Xala* (1973), to name just a few, are African novels that satirize African newly independent nation-states and their attempt to integrate themselves into the global economy. Such postcolonial African novels deal with the initiative period of post-independent African countries and their ambivalent relationship with the West's most hailed (neo)liberal principles. Though African newly formed nation-states embraced

democratic ideals of multiparty elections, in the late 1960s, as Alfred Ndi puts it, "the democratic culture began to collapse and was increasingly replaced by a new epoch of patrimonialism in which the ruling elites became patrons that used states resources to secure the loyalty of certain members of the general population who became their clients" (180). As these novels show in details, "the development of Capitalism in Africa has been shaped by international finance capital than by indigenous savings and financial resources" (181).

This "return of personalism" is what Penda Mbow criticizes in Abdoulaye Wade's (neo)liberal rule since the 2000s. Given the quasi-similarity of France and Senegal's political regimes, the president's "tight control of the National Assembly" turns into a situation where "the prime minister serves the will of the president" (158). It would be good to remember, at this point, that Abdoulaye Wade has been the longtime opposition leader in Senegal's political life since he created his party in 1974. He has always fought against what Mbow calls "Senghorism (… ) a single-party regime that swallowed up the existing [political] formations and drove the leftist parties underground" (160). Even though Wade's political is a liberal democracy in the sense that multipartism is guaranteed by the constitution, he has always engaged in a sort of political clientelism in trying to co-opt the most dissent political leaders, intellectuals and members of the civil society in his governments. Penda Mbow is quite right when she says that money is the driving force that keeps the political arena's dynamics alive.

Others characteristics of Abdoulaye Wade's rule are the overlapping of the religious and the secular within the Senegalese social fabric. Even though Senegal is
constitutionally a secular country, religion greatly influences the social consciousness of the Senegalese population, composed of 95% Muslims. Dating back to Leopold Segar Senghor's intimate relationship to the Senegalese Muslim brotherhoods in which statesmen back up to the religious leaders for electoral support, we live today in a Senegal where "there are no clear boundaries between the religious and civic spheres." Knowing that he can use the Marabouts (religious leaders)'s powerful spiritual influence on their disciples, Wade ends up "turning the game of alliances in his own favor and further entrenching the system of clientelism" (Mbow 160). The alliances of statesmen and religious brotherhoods are exclusively built upon money. Not only is the democratic ruling party financing some satellite minor political parties for the sake of multipartism, but it grants financial supports to the major religious brotherhoods, which obliges the latter to manipulate religion for political purposes. As a result, the manipulation of religion ends up "sap[ping] the foundation of Senegalese secularism, thereby putting stability and tolerance in jeopardy." "In a multiconfessional country with numerous religious brotherhoods," Mbow continues, "secularism or state neutrality in religious matters is indispensable to the building of democracy" (162). Even though the maraboutic religious authorities has historically seen as "power brokers in Senegalese electoral politics" (Villalon 135), the 2012 electoral runoffs have proved that there is a growing sense of collective consciousness that challenges the religious authority as far as state Politics is concerned.

28 Leonardo Villalon has given a definition of maraboutic authority in the Sufi Islamic social fabric of the country, an authority that, "in theory … is earned by means of a reputation for piety and knowledge on the religious sciences and acquired through study and initiation into the mystical secrets of the order by religious guides" (134).
A lack of political dialogue between the ruling party and the coalitional political forces is also a major feature of Wade's 12-year rule. The latter has always claimed that the Democratic ruling party is not ready to set real conditions for political dialogue, a situation that led to their boycott of the 2007 legislative elections. Given Wade's straightforward intentions to reign over not to rule and/or govern the country, it is arguable that he would turn a deaf ear to any appeal for a real democratization. As Penda Mbow herself claims, "the democratic ruling party has no capacity for debating ideas. The president is surrounded by PDS members whose dispute revolve around matters of precedence and the dividing up of privilege and sinecures" (166). Even though corruption and embezzlements occurred during the socialist political regime (1960-2000), it turns to be more arrogant during Wade's (neo)liberal government(s). Money rules under Wade's political regime. And professional Politics is a real shortcut to have access to financial means."One may wonder," Mbow asks, "how a system in which Wade could win with almost no money in 2000 has become just seven years later, a system in which cash appears to have been the decisive factor" (165). Political transhumance - the migration of politicians from opposition to the ruling party - is typical of the Senegalese's political arena. Not only are they "beginning to arouse the people's mistrust" because of professional politicians who only care about themselves and their families, but "in Senegal, as in many [African] countries, political parties proliferate and disappear at will in dizzying bouts of fusion and floor-crossing that, on the whole, makes it hard to take the country's political scene seriously" (167).
FOREGROUNDING WADE’S POLITICAL REGIME IN (NEO)LIBERAL RATIONALITY.

While Wade's party is called the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), many political analysts argue that autocracy and personalism have mainly been its major characteristics thus far. The PDS's whole rationality and/or rhetoric is reduced to the personality of a single man: Abdoulaye Wade. And even though young people were the majority of the electorate that supported Wade in 2000, they are today the most disillusioned by his 12 years (neo)liberal rule. Though some might argue that youth (culture) rebelliousness is a new phenomenon during Wade's neoliberal rule, it is, however, correct that Senegalese young people were always concerned with the politicians' little care of their social lives, even during the socialist regime. It is probably their sickness of the incumbent longtime socialist rule that triggered their affective pull toward Abdoulaye Wade's political charisma during the campaign of the 2000 pivotal elections. But before we examine Senegalese social reactions to Wade's (neo)liberal government(s), it would be interesting to place it in a global perspective because one cannot talk about national (neo)liberalism without contextualizing it globally.

The political crisis of the Abdoulaye Wade's political regime is but a local phase of a global problem in which people are "experiencing a contemporary crisis of voice, across political, economic, and cultural domains, that has been growing for at least three decades" (Couldry 1, emphasis in original). In his book Why Voice Matters: Culture and Politics after Neoliberalism (2010), Nick Couldry analyzes the "value" of (human) voice and foregrounds it in an Aristotelian philosophy which discriminates the sonic from the
"logos" dimension of people's ability to voice social matters. Alongside what he calls "religion-fueled utopianism" or "neoconservatism," Couldry contextualizes the crisis of voice within American and British "neoliberal democracies" which, given their reduction of the social world into "markets [and] spaces of potential competitions," speak a language of "hegemonic rationality" (5-6). Neoliberal rationality is deemed hegemonic because, by "blocking other narratives from view" (6), and working "through the internalization" of its core principles into social consciousness, "extend[s] and disseminat[es] market values to all institutions and social action" (Brown qtd in Couldry 12). Similar to the Subaltern's inability to speak within hegemonic discourses, the people's in neoliberal rationality can, arguably, be disrupted through what Wendy Brown calls "a counter-rationality - a different figuration of human beings, citizenship, economic life, and the political" (qtd. in Couldry 12). Similarly and though not the outcome of an overnight phenomenon, the Senegalese people at large has come to deeply catechize the rationality of Wade's regime with regards to the socio-economic problems of the country that are believed to peak under his regime.

African countries have been critically responsive to global Capital and its accompanying cousin: (neo)liberal rationality. Being one of the poorest continent of the world, if not the poorest in terms of social and economic development, Africa has witnessed the most dramatic consequences of global capitalism. Parallel to the global social response to neoliberal "hegemonic rationality," there have been emergent social and intellectual movements across the continent that try to set an avenue to raise social

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awareness about the contemporary crisis of economic policies, most of the time imposed from the outside. In his article "African Anti-capitalisms," Patrick Bond tracks "the momentum and ideological orientation within the independent resurgent African independent Left which is based on 'civil society' and 'social movements.'" These new emergent independent voices, he continues, encompass the most adequate "scale politics for this resistance, given the international balance of forces" (233, emphasis in original).

Historically, there was a diversity of African resistance to global capitalism, dating back to the anti-slavery movements up to the end of the Apartheid regime in South African, alongside various continental nationalist, and sometimes "tribal-based uprisings" against colonial power.  

However, due to the shadowy influence of 'hegemonic (neoliberal) rationality,' African leftist movements, though historically embedded, have come to lose their power and efficacy. As Bond argues, one can notice "the continent's increasingly desperate and militant labor movement. To be sure, by the start of the 21st century, key sectors of labor - and indeed much of African civil society - were civilized, tamed, and channeled into serving the ruling classes" (237).

Given the social latency of African societies with regards to the effects of neoliberal economic policies, and the ruling elite's ambiguous position in implementing responsible socio-economic policies in return, Patrick Bond argues that "the legacies of Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral serve to remind us that African Anti-capitalism cannot be left up to African nationalists who retain power in most states." Even though today's African elites have created some politically-potential continental organizations, such as

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the NEPAD, yet one can argue that their complicit relationship with global capitalism and its neoliberal rationality dates back to the early years of African post-independences. In fact, as Jimi Adesina argues aloud, "Amilcar Cabral's injection that for the African petit-bourgeois class to become one of the people, it must commit class suicide. It must turn it back on its natural instincts to realise its class potential of becoming a bourgeois class and share the aspiration of the people - not only in nation building, widening of social access, but in the area of resource accumulation and control" (Qtd. in Bond 236, first emphasis in original, second mine).

Senegalese social movements' reaction to Abdoulaye Wade's regime can be registered in this broad continental, if not global sense. First, as Penda Mbow has fleshed out in her article, theirs is triggered by Wade's monarchical political devolution which seeks to wipe out any political counter-response to his "return to personalism" and his Senghorian sort of politics. Similarly, in his book Contes et Mecomptes de l'Anoci, banned from Senegalese bookstores by Wade's government, Abdou Latif Coulibaly, journalist in profession, laments the undemocratic endeavors of Wade's regime along with his patrimonialism of the state financial resources. But on the economic level, the enrichment of the elites in detriment of the masses is what mostly sickened Senegalese population whose social demands are vividly voiced with regards to their material life conditions. Frantz Fanon talks about this sense of elite rule in relation to bourgeois class consciousness. Being basically different from the Western "dynamic, educated, and secular bourgeoisie [that] fully succeeded in its undertaking of capital accumulation and endowed the nation with a minimum of prosperity," the national bourgeoisie in

underdeveloped African countries is merely "acquisitive, voracious, (...) dominated by a small-time racketeer mentality content with the dividends paid by former colonial power" (Wretched, 119). The ruling elite of Abdoulaye Wade's political regime are said to be well-known in their commission-dividend mentality with the multinational corporations and global capital investment contracts. Some critics have lambasted Fanon's skipping of the national bourgeoisie, a critique of Fanon that fails to pay attention to the socio-economic context of African countries. Given its mere dependency on international capital investment through what Nick Couldry calls "hegemonic [neoliberal] rationality," (6) Fanon argued aloud that "the bourgeois phase in the underdeveloped countries is only justified if the national bourgeois is sufficiently powerful, economically and technically, to build a bourgeois society, to create the conditions for developing a sizeable proletariat, to mechanize agriculture, and finally pave the way for a genuine national culture."

Wade's government has launched some agricultural reforms to try to empower the farmers but the fruition of such governmental projects can hardly be palpable.

The only reason to believe that Wade's regime lacks the intellectual capacity to confront ideas democratically is the fact that Abdou Latif Coulibaly's book, Contes et Mecomptes de l'Anoci, has been banned from entry in Senegalese bookstores since its publication. Only Senegalese from the diaspora can put a hand on it. In addition to the critical journalistic writings of Coulibaly on the financial mishandlings of Wade's regime, Penda Mbow argues that Mamadou Seck's Les Scandales politiques sous la presidence de Wade (Harmattan, 2006), Mody Niang's Qui est cet homme qui dirige le Senegal (Harmattan, 2006) and Babacar Sall's Le Stagiaire: journal d'un president de la

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33 Frantz Fanon. The Wretched, p 119.
Republique (Dakar: Les Sentinelles, 2007), all published by Senegalese authors, "have been barred from distribution in Senegal" (169). Echoing Mbow's harsh criticism against Wade's personalism, Coulibaly laments the fact that every political leader, once elected and/or nominated in high officialdom, busies himself working for the sole interests of his family, his clan and the religious brotherhood he/she belongs to. The ANOCI to which Coulibaly's book is referring in his book is the 11th summit of the Islamic Conference that was organized in Dakar in 2009. The management of this multi-billionaire budget project was run by Wade's son, Karim Wade, who is meanwhile a member of his father's government and his special counselor. By a meticulous journalistic investigation, Coulibaly has come up with details about how the budget of the ANOCI project has been handled by Wade's son and members of the ruling party. Coulibaly's journalistic writings have irritated Wade and his government and Coulibaly himself has been intimidated by people allegedly from the ruling party and received death threats.

34 Coulibaly, Contes et Mecomptes, p. 22
CHAPTER III:

THE RELEVANCE OF CYBERCULTURE IN THE Y'EN A MARRE'S PHENOMENON: FACEBOOK AS A CASE STUDY.

"To tell the history of another is to be pressed against the limits of one's own - thus culture learns that terror has a local habitation and a name." Sara Suleri

Sara Suleri efficiently summarizes the central agenda of my project for I am interested in uncovering the vertical and horizontal power relationships in the Postcolony. In this project, I am using the new translation of Fanon's book by Richard Philcox Foreworded by Homi K. Bhabha. My interests in re-reading Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth are fundamentally shaped by my engagement with Postcolonial theory and literary criticism. Engagement because as I mentioned in the previous chapter, the politics of cultural hybridity is central in the understanding of ambivalence which is historically embedded in the encounters between Europe and the peoples it colonized. In my previous Master thesis, I focused on Paul Gilroy's The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Conscience (1993) that has been a turning point in the theorization of cultural identity, not only in the sociological sense, but more importantly in the substance of the curricula of Black, Cultural, and Diaspora Studies in Great Britain and the United States. What I found quite interesting in Gilroy’s approach, is his mapping out of a geographical

area and the circulation and migration of cultures that produced fundamentally transnational and hybrid cultures, the acknowledgement of which has, for a long time, been not seriously taken into account, if not simply glossed over by researchers in the field of Cultural Studies and in History departments. Therefore, from the early 1990s onwards, discussing cultural identity and Diaspora has truly been challenging, given the intricacies, if not ambivalences of the cultural exchanges and "human webs" and its contradictions that took place in the geopolitics of the Black Atlantic and the triangularity of its commercial and cultural aftermaths (McNeill and McNeill, 2003).

While I was in the local, I focused on the Global. And now in the global, I look back to the local. As I argued in the first chapter, the current sociopolitical events in Senegal cannot be understood but within a global setting of neoliberal policies that have repercussions on the social dynamics of locality. In this chapter, I will use Fanon to analyze the sociogeny of *Y'en A Marre* and M23 and the impact of online media on the unfolding events of the social revolution in Senegal. I am particularly interested, on the one hand, in the ways in which online media - Facebook- contributed to the raising of consciousness among Senegalese youth culture and the niche and safety net that online media represents for them to voice social matters. On the other, I will argue that, while Facebook was pivotal in raising awareness among youth, it failed to educate them by providing efficient strategies regarding the real meaning of politics in such important moments. Facebook has been an important tool to counter the violence of governmental crackdown in city areas. The elections of Macky Sall as the fourth Senegalese president, however, provides more food for thought about what it means to engage in politics. While some of the opposition leaders saw Wade's running for a third term as the most
important thing to fight against, Macky Sall reached out the rural areas and spoke to the people. This, I will argue, echoes a specific feature of Fanonism which urges underdeveloped countries' political leaders to "increase [their] contacts with the rural masses" (*Wretched*, 129). To what extent did Macky Sall understand that the relationship between the political leader and the people is a "lucidity [that] must remain deeply dialectical" (*Wretched*, 135)? Why did the majority of the opposition electorate not vote for those candidates who confrontationally and uncompromisingly faced Wade's bid for a third term on power? These, among others, are the theoretical questions I aim to unpack in the following paragraphs.

In this chapter, I will focus on the Senegalese online social media - mainly Facebook - and the way in which it allow for the voicing of the social matters. Online social media in Senegal, as in elsewhere, has been key in raising social awareness among youth. I have been a member of some group discussions in Facebook, Y'en A Marre, the name of the very social movement that sparked the revolution that eventually toppled the incumbent president, RNS (Rehabillitons Notre Senegal). In these online communities, Senegalese in the diaspora but also those at home, are coming with different subject positions and identities, discuss the current social issues not only during the social unrests, but and more importantly after President Wade left office. Though it would be interesting to analyze how Senegalese online communities dealt with the social protests and the responsive state violence (police crackdown), I am more interested in hearing the voices of people after the momentum of the revolution itself. Right after the newly elected president took oath of office, dissent voices have begun to criticize the newly elected president for he is reported to be repeating the political maneuvers of the previous
regime. For the sake of ethics, I have myself asked for the permission to quote people's posts in the ongoing threads of comments in the different Facebook discussion groups. While some have declined my requests, the majority of the members of the group discussions have given me the permission to quote their online posts and comments. Therefore, the authors of the online comments that I will be citing in the following pages have given me the permission to quote theirs in French.

**FANON AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBALITY.**

My re-reading of Fanon's *The Wretched* does not in any way aim to undermine the insightfulness of his ideas on the contemporary issues of globality. Reading Fanon from a global perspective is what postmodernist thinkers such as Homi K. Bhabha and Henry Louis Gates Jr. among others are concerned with. Bhabha in fact, posits Fanon's insights in a "global future [in which] Fanon intriguingly projects unfinished business and unanswered questions related to the mid-twentieth century and the 'end' of empire into the uncertain futures of the fin de siècle and the end of the cold war."37 In this sense, Fanon's insights about the "univocal choices" of the postindependent African nations with regards to the global competing hegemonies is a must focus given the shadowy global forces' constraints on the ex-colonized peoples' socio-economic aspirations. In the context of the postcolonial metropolis, postmodernists have provided powerful metaphors to unpack the troublesome relationship between Europe and the immigrants coming from the postcolonies. Concerning the Cold War, Frantz Fanon harshly criticized the ideology that wanted Third World countries to part of the either/or setting between the capitalist camp

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and the Soviet Union. "It was commonly thought," Fanon argued aloud, "that the time has come … for the Third World, to choose between the capitalist system and the socialist system. The Underdeveloped countries, which made use of the savage competition between these two systems in order to win their national liberations, must, however, refuse to get involved in such rivalry." (*Wretched*, 55). In the heated debate on national identity in today's France, for instance, recalling Fanon's insights about metropolitan racism can shed light on the contemporary mutations of racism intertwined with the discourse of freedom, citizenship and migration. As a result, as Paul Gilroy suggests, "multicultural society seems to have been abandoned at birth [and its] death … is being loudly proclaimed on all sides. The corpse is now being laid to rest amid the multiple anxieties of the 'war on terror'" (*Postcolonial Melancholia*, 1). The post-9/11 era, undeniably, has been a pivotal moment regarding immigration policies following the growing fear toward the Other who signifies the "invaders of both colonial and postcolonial varieties" (*Postcolonial Melancholia*, 12). Even though reading Fanon implies a great deal of temporality, the reasons of immigration to the metropolis are almost the same for once-colonized people. France, in the case of Senegal, still somewhat signifies the "the holy of holies." "There is a kind of spell cast from afar," Fanon says, "and the black man who leaves in a week for the *metropole* creates an aura of magic around him where the words Paris, Marseille, the Sorbonne, and Pigalle represent of the highest points."38

In his comparative analysis of Fanon and Jean Amery's *At the Mind's Limits* (1980), Paul Gilroy rereads both authors' ideas in relation to what he call the rationality

of the West's "securitocracy" and the walling off of immigrants from the West's territories. In fact, Gilroy's prospect of humanism is a critique of what is sometimes called "liberal humanism" which, most of the time, silences the tangibility of metropolitan racism and its contemporary configurations. According to Gilroy, Fanon and Amery paved the way for a "radical humanism," which somewhat echoes Foucault 'Biopolitics'. In cross-reading the psychological and physical tortures of colonial times (Blacks) with the "concentrationary universe" of Jews, Gilroy sees the body as an ontological site of identity that stems from a particular place/location and triggers a specific consciousness. Even though physical torture might be irrelevant in today metropolitan areas, I argue that contemporary racism causes serious psychological effects on immigrants in the West. "It may be greater," Gilroy suggests, "if [Fanon's] ideas can be reapplied carefully to managing challenges that are tied up in the lives of the often traumatized incomers (migrants) who are expected to bring the global insurgency alive on the fertile soil of their racialized exclusions from the dreamscapes of indentured consumerism" (21). This interconnectedness of identity and economics echoes Sara Ahmet's reading of Affect and its relations to the social dynamics of immigration in Great Britain, especially. "A principled internationalism and a cosmopolitan conviviality" are arguably the best ways to tackle the issue of what Bonilla-Silva calls "Color-blind Racism" and the way it affects the lives of minorities in the Western cosmopolitanism.

41 Gilroy, Postcolonial Melancholia, p. 8
Fanon's insights on the psycho-affective consequences of contemporary racism can be cross-read with the politics of migration and geography at the intersection with Affect theory. In his article "Emotions and Affect in Recent Human Geography,"43 Steve Pile analyzes the "representability of emotions and Affects" (7) in which "Emotional" and "Affectual geographers" have been interested. Interesting enough is the importance of Affect theory in dealing with the relationality between different bodies and its outcome in "in-between" spaces. Since Affect itself is open and capable of producing something between and among bodies, and that "Affects flow between bodies through circulation, transmission and contagion" (Thrift, qtd in Pile 15), the questions that remain to be asked, as Pile has pointed it, are: "what are the Affects that trouble the mind? Why some and not others? What prevents some [positive] affects emerging?" (14). Psychoanalytic geographies, thanks to their emphasis on desires and anxieties, phobias and pleasures and their embodiedness in the "middle ground between inexpressible Affects and expressible emotions," can help us dig deep in our attempt to fully grasp, though with some theoretical difficulties, the causes and consequences of the geopolitics of fear. This "unconscious racism," makes "turbulent passions remain on the surface, while still waters run deep" (15). And one can herein see the saliency of Fanon's diagnosis of colonial racism in its contemporary mutations in this globalized world. Not only has the white man to escape the pathology of white supremacy, but also the black man must transcend the ontological understanding of his identity. As Frantz Fanon put it, "ontology does not allow us to understand the identity of the black man, since it ignores the lived experience.

43 Steve Pile. "Emotions and Affect in Recent Human Geography" Transaction of the British institute of Geographers NS 35 2010, 5-20
For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man."

*(Black Skin, 90).*

**A PERSPECTIVIST READING OF THE WRETCHED.**

While postmodernist theorists busy themselves reading Fanon from a global perspective, I think that a *locational*, if not an "African situationist reading" (Sekyi-Uto 1996) of *The Wretched* provides more clues about the socio-political dynamics of postcolonial Africa. The current socio-political contradictions of contemporary Africa have also been the focus of philosophical debates. Echoing the Althusser/E.P. Thompson divergences on what it is philosophical and what is not, with Althusser focusing on empiricism and discourse and E.P. Thompson arguing aloud that "knowledges have been and still are formed outside the academic procedures," African ethnophilosophy, has tried, on its own, to deal with the intricacies of African postcoloniality. Having always tried to posit his thoughts somewhere between "the particularistic antiquarianism of ethnophilosophy and the abstract universalism of professional philosophy," Tsenay Serequeberhan suggests that Fanon's theoretical thoughts could best be understood as a "hermeneutical orientation in the contemporary African philosophy." This hermeneutically oriented Africa philosophy is deeply rooted in the process of African metamorphoses out of the vestiges of coloniality. In other words, this philosophy is "concerned solely with critically supplementing, on the level of theory, Africa's own

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concrete efforts at a radical self-emancipation." This, to my mind, cuts across Fanon's ideas on the prospect of "new humanism" which, while being very critical of, and different from, the liberal humanism that the West promoted and still promotes, re-appropriates the tools of rationality for the inroads of self-emancipation. The re-appropriation of the tools of rationality - critical thinking and self-reflexivity - is, as Fanon believed, the only way to "infuse a new rhythm, specific of a new generation of men [and women], with a new language and a new humanity." This, according to Fanon, can only be achievable if Africans, men and women, disrupt the binary thinking of different philosophies - the Western and the non-Western - and critically think of the materiality of their contemporary life conditions and the historicity of their temporality. In this regards, Achille Mbembe's *On the Postcolony* (2001) sheds light on the complexities of postcolonial African power structures that are context specific. Unless scholars dig deep in the socio-cultural dynamics that fuel the relationship between the rulers and the ruled, something important will be missed out of the wider picture.

The contemporary condition of postcoloniality cannot be lumped into a single category. Following the difference of the enforcement of colonial authority temporally and spatially, ascribing primacy of racial power relationship to understand coloniality and postcoloniality can be somewhat limiting, if not misleading. According to Stella Nkomo - referring to Loomba (2005) -, "the heterogeneity of [Postcolonial theory] is partly due to the interdisciplinary nature of postcolonial studies which ranges from literary and cultural studies to economics and political science as well as its diverse theoretical

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46 Ibid.
47 *The Wretched*, p. 2
48 Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, p. 104
underpinnings.⁴⁹ For instance, race can obviously help us uncover the socio-economic relationships in settler colonies. In South Africa and Zimbabwe among many other settler colonies, the redistribution of land has raised controversial and divergent opinions in national and international debates. But the postcolonial context of Senegal cannot be categorized in this socio-political frame of a racially-heterogeneous national population. In contrast with settler colonies, the Senegalese postcolonial condition is a situation of "internal and external pressures [in which] … leaders are now busy refashioning their despotic regimes into simulacra of democracy." In such a situation, "what would be the political and ethical consequences of ascribing primacy to class as opposed to race" (Sekyi-Uto, 12-13)? Trying to answer these questions necessarily entails a reconsideration of Fanon's legacies with the immediacy of situated knowledge. In other words, the Senegalese socio-political context on which I am focusing calls for a deconstruction of Fanon's _The Wretched of the Earth_ on the one hand, and eventually needs a reconstruction of his ideas in a somewhat different social context on the other.

**BUILDING ON, BUT RE-READING FANON IN THE SENEGALESE CONTEXT.**

First off, I will begin with substituting the actors in the Algerian revolution with the ones in the Senegalese social uprisings: 1) I am arguing that the Senegalese ruling elites play the role of the colonialist and that of the national bourgeois intellectuals in enforcing their political authority by use of violence (police crackdown), 2) and that the Senegalese mass population - in the image of _Y'en A Marre_ and M23 - epitomizes

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Fanon's peasants/lumpenproletariat and the revolutionary minority intellectuals and their attempt to empower political agency and raise consciousness. By means of this *symbolic abstraction*, I want to unpack the strengths and limitations of *Y'en A Marre* and M23 in the unfolding events of the Senegalese uprisings. Viewing *Y'en A Marre* as essentially epitomizing the Fanon's lumpenproletariat *per se*, however, would be dangerously misleading. I will argue that we need to go beyond the Fanonian Marxism that beforehand constructed the struggle as a class struggle. In the present Senegalese context, as in elsewhere, the question at stake is more important than the binarism of a bourgeoisie vs. the working class.

The publication of *The Wretched of the Earth* was the product of an intellectual and militant relationship of Frantz Fanon with the Algerian liberation struggle against France in the 1960s. It was a (post)colonial *horizontal* encounter between an intellectual and the mass population who strove to take their destiny in hand (Omar 2009). As Fanon suggests, "decolonization is always a violent event" (*Wretched*, 1). Because of the dehumanizing social practices of the colonial authority and the petrified worlds it constructed, violence was a legitimate and viable means to "provide the new context in which the majority of the people could thrive and regain their health and dignity."50 "Looking at the immediacies of the colonial context," Fanon tells us, "it is clear that what divides this world is first and foremost what species, what race one belongs to" (*Wretched*, 5). The colonial vocabulary and the zoological terminology that condemned the colonized in a state of immobility, ended up creating a situation in which an

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"overexcited affectivity, spied on invisible guardians who constantly communicate with the core of the personality, takes an erotic delight in the muscular deflation of the crisis" (Wretched, 19 emphasis added). The incredibly violent colonial oppression, as Fanon believed, had to face an equally violent reaction from the colonized people. Contrary to what many of Fanon's opponents argue, the violence with which the colonized responded to the colonizer is a curative process meant to crash the psycho-affective consequences of the status of thinghood to which they had been ascribed (Francoise Verges, 1996).

The colonial social setting in which Fanon initially foregrounded its thoughts was the dialectical relationship between a white colonizer and an Algerian colonized man, though this situation was almost always the same in colonial Africa. Two races were to clash, even though the power relationship was unbalanced. In a situation where the ultimate end was an inevitable confrontation, "everything [was] permitted, for in fact the sole purpose of the gathering [was] to let the supercharged libido and the stifled aggressiveness spew out volcanically" (Wretched, 20). While Fanon's theorization of "pure violence" can be registered on the level of "marginality and epistemic privilege," Sekyi-Uto reads Fanon revolutionary violence closely with Hegel's master/slave dialectic. "Fanon's [discursive] coquetting with Hegel," he tells us, is an "antialectic of absolute difference and total opposition" whose setting and "perverse intercourse of its protagonists invite a revengeful form of insurrectionary action cast in the image of revolutionary catastrophism." The catastrophic outcome of the Algerian revolution, and in extension to African decolonizations, stemmed from the "extraordinary phantasms

52 Ato Sekyi-Uto. Fanon's Dialectic of Experience, pp. 24-25
[and] the machine gun at the ready” that the colonized subject embodied.\(^{53}\) Where the limitations of Fanon's opponents lie in fact is their failure to contextualize the social environment in which Fanon was speaking. Proponents of non-violent resistance can see Fanon's revolutionary theory as cataclysmic. But, while this is true, they must be reminded that Fanon's violence is a "redemptive act (...) that comes instantaneously yet inexorably to avenge and extirpate a radical evil."\(^{54}\) The radical feature of colonialism and the way it undermined both peoples and their cultures is what most critiques miss in the wider picture of Fanon's depiction of coloniality. A proper understanding of the dimension of violence in Fanon's thought can perhaps be situated in Frederic Jameson's equation of the notion of "mediation," or again in Aristotle's ideas of "pathos and catharsis" in the very process of revolution. Viewed through this glass, Fanon's stick to violence is nothing but the oppressed's achievement of a psychological liberation.\(^{55}\)

Another central theme in Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* that is interesting to my analysis of the Senegalese social movements, which I will provide shortly, is the relationship between the intellectuals and the masses. Because they are differently located on "marginality" with regards to colonial power, the elites and the masses had different agendas. "In any union or political organization," Fanon writes, "there is a traditional gap between the masses who demand an immediate and unconditional improvements of their conditions, and the cadres, who (...) put a restraints on their demands" (*Wretched*, 63 my emphasis). This fundamental issue in terms of agency is quite telling in the sense that

\(^{53}\) Fanon, *The Wretched*, p. 20

\(^{54}\) Ato Sekyi-Uto. *Fanon's Dialectic of Experience*, p. 45

"the peasants distrust the town dweller" (*Wretched*, 67). Being in a state of biddability in relation to the occupier, the city dweller represents nothing but a "traitor" who seeks to benefit at the maximum from the colonial system, while ignoring the masses' misery. Talking about the insurrection that first took place in the rural areas, Fanon mentions the lumpenproletariat that is the logical extension of peasantry in urban areas. "This fraction of the peasantry, (...) this cohort of staring men" he says, while being "blocked at the urban periphery (...) constitutes one of the most spontaneously and radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people" (*Wretched*, 80-81). However, Fanon's dichotomization of the rural and the urban here does reflect a discrimination between modernity (city) and tradition (rural), but it refers to the way in which a incredibly small number of the population is mostly benefiting from colonialism while the most downtrodden part of it suffers from its ills.

The last central theme of Fanon's book on which I will focus in my analysis of Senegalese social movements political *spontaneity*. I will argue in the next section that Senegalese social movements' creation stemmed from a spontaneous (re)action. At the onset, there have been "no program, no discourse, … no resolutions. The problem [was] clear-cut: [Wade and his peers] must leave. Let's us build a common front against the oppressor and let us reinforce it [by any means necessary]" (*Wretched*, 83). When *Y'en A Marre* called for a massive protest against Wade's bid for a Vice-presidency amendment, and when politicians and members of the civil society joined in, there was no upstream political strategy on how to " politicize the masses, to enlighten their consciousness or raise the struggle to a higher level". Because of the "all-embracing and radical (...) strategy of immediacy" (*Wretched*, 71; 81) the peak of the violent protests of Senegalese
people seemed to lead to an impasse as political leaders and the young protestors lacked a sense of consensus on how to strategize against, and respond to, the brutality of the police crackdown in city areas. In addition to the apparent lack of political strategy at the junction between Y'en A Marre and M23, I will try to compare the colonialist' use of "countersubversion" (*Wretched*, 86) in its relationship with indigenous religious leaders and its similarity to Wade's constant back-up to Senegalese religious brotherhoods for political support in the deep socio-political crisis. Building on *The Wretched of the Earth's* second chapter - "Grandeur and Weakness of Spontaneity" - , I am interested in analyzing the triumphant spontaneous zeal of the social movements in triggering a massive response to topple down Wade's regime on the one hand, and on the other, to see how the lack of political strategy has impacted on the leadership of the opposition parties to clearly set define a "clear set of objectives [and] a well-defined methodology" (*Wretched*, 86). As I will try to show, the internal divergences of M23 - whether to fight against Wade's running for third term or to accept it and go for the elections- have had decisive impacts at the end of the day. With the election of Macky Sall as Senegal's fourth president after Wade, an outsider for the runoff, a lot of questions needs to be rethought because as Fanon puts it, "to wage war [against a despotic rule] and engage in politics [with the population] are one and the same thing" (*Wretched* 83).

**FROM INTIMACY TO THE PUBLIC SPHERE**

The slogan *Y'en A Marre* is a French phrase which means "we are fed up." There are two main things that triggered *Y'en A Marre* as a movement on the onset: The Senegalese Rap musicians that founded *Y'en a Marre* were inspired by the musical
lyricism of Tiken Jah Fakoly, a reggae star from Ivory Cost. In a soundtrack called *On en a marre*, Jah Fakoly harshly criticizes the socio-political cleavages, not only in his country Ivory Coast, but all across the African continent. What is more, in *Mon Pays Va Mal* - another of his soundtracks - Tiken Jah Fakoly comes down hard on the socio-historical legacies of slavery, colonization and neo-imperialism, which have direct links to the current African civil wars, military coups and the increasing impoverishment of the mass populations. As a result of his uncompromising musical lyricism, Jah Fakoly himself was considered persona non grata in Senegal following his fierce criticism of Abdoulaye Wade and his political regime. Stating that Wade should step down if he loves his country, the then Interior Minister called for a ban on Jah Fakoly in the country because, he believed, the reggae musician's criticism was "insolent and discourteous." Second, *Y'en A Marre* was inspired by the social protests of some Imams - religious priests - from the suburbs of Dakar, the capital city. In fact, these Imams marched on the streets and called on Senegalese people to no longer pay their electric bills given the striking electricity shortages and the corresponding rising monthly bills.

On a late January 2011 afternoon, Senegalese Rap musicians *Thiat, Malal Tall* (Also known as *Fou Malade*), and Rappers from *Keur Gui* and their journalist friend Cheikh Fabel Barro, were discussing the unfolding events of the Imam protestors. At some point, they were imagining how they could, as citizens, be part and parcel of these social unrests. What began as a simple discussion between friends in intimacy, would after some days, become the center of gravity of the Senegalese's outcry against Wade's

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56 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ThmhpX2srzo&feature=player_embedded  
political regime on the public ground. While taking part in the World Social Forum February 2011 meeting in Dakar, the *Y’en-a-marristes* as they are now called, laid out their political agenda and on a single day, they gathered 5,000 signature supports on the campus of the University of Cheikh Anta Diop.58

Although Senegal has had a somewhat democratic political system, intimidation and death threats on the most emboldened critics, however, are the means by which Wade's regime tried to secure his rule over the Senegalese people. In the previous chapter, I mentioned some investigation journalists that have been constantly threatened by Wade and his cohort. In such a situation, it is quite arguable that voicing social discontents in the public sphere can be risky. But as the people became more determined to challenge the state's apparatus to intimidate, dissident voices began to spring here and there. The day of "glory" of *Y’en A Marre* is undeniably June the 23rd 2011, when thousands of Senegalese people marched toward the doors of the National Assembly to express their refusal to the president's bid for a Vice-presidency. Following the violent confrontations between the police and the protestors, the president resigned from enforcing the amendment. From that day on, every Senegalese citizen came to identify himself or herself with the rationality and ideals of *Y’en A Marre*.

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THE IDEOLOGY OF THE MOVEMENT: BREAKING FROM COMMON SENSE.

Y'en A Marre has been the focus of Senegalese sociologists and political analysts who have dug deep in the societal manifestations of the movement itself. According to sociologist Malick N'diaye, there is a clear-cut difference between the movement's philosophical doctrine and the traditional political parties. Instead of putting emphasis on winning state power - the main objective of political parties - the Y'en A Marristes called for the disruption of the hierarchization of the struggles and put emphasis on the necessity to change mentalities. Thus, their vociferous call to create a Nouveau Type de Senegalais (A New Senegalese Man) is the movement's nodal point. What is more, Y'en A Marre's ideology turns more self-critical for it calls for the critique of the historical role of the elites in the revolutionary process and the change of social consciousness of the people in leading the struggle.59 During my research on Y'en A Marre's ideological doctrine with regards to the social unrests, I found that the movement's instigators are influenced by Frantz Fanon's political thoughts. Their motto, for example, is Frantz Fanon's well-known maxim which proffers that "each generation must discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it, in relative opacity" (*Wretched*, 145). Letting the youth Senegalese people to discover their mission and fulfill it is arguably Y'en a Marre's greatest thirstiness.

Y'en A Marre's outcry, which embodies the general despisement of Senegalese people of Wade's political regime, can be seen through the prism of a "Scream." My contention is that Y'en A Marre's blatant call for a socio-political change is perhaps best

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understood through the revolutionary ideas of John Holloway's *Change the World Without Taking Power* (2010). Even though *Y'en A Marre* and the political opposition leaders joined forces to challenge the incumbent president at the onset, the *Y'en A Marristes* made it clear that their movement was not driving at winning state power. Instead of the traditional framework with which political parties envision to change society - say, winning state power - *Y'en A Marre* can be viewed as those revolutionary movements which approach things very differently. For social movements like *Y'en A Marre*, the scream begins with a "dissonance [that] comes from [a particular] experience" (Holloway 1). This specific experience, John Holloway argues, is that of "flies caught in a spider's web … flies caught in a web of social relations beyond [their] control" (5). Therefore, the main line of demarcation between *Y'en A Marre* and the M23 political leaders lies in the strategies of social changes: win state power through political leadership or go beyond the frame of the state and emphasis the role of the people to trigger change. The rationale behind changing the world outside the channels of state power is best describe by Holloway when he states:

> Changing the world without taking power gave voice to an idea that that was central to the alter-globalization movement, to the Zapatista uprising in Mexico, to at least part of the great upheaval in Bolivia in those years and to everyday practice of so many and many many groups throughout the word, struggling to find a way forward, a different way of changing society, clear in their reputation of the old state-centred politics and all it involves in terms of corruption and
boredom and using people as means to an end.\textsuperscript{60}

In the Senegalese context, \textit{Y'en A Marre} has envisioned, though in a sort of embryonic phase, to implement this radical foundation of social change. Its blatant outcry, arguably, goes beyond the M23’s ideology of changing society through state power. Because of their tiredness of traditional politics, Senegalese people, especially youth, were more compelled to identify themselves with \textit{Y'en A Marre}. Perhaps at this point, it will be interesting to remind the reader that the political leaders who compose M23, organized the \textit{Assises Nationales}, a national conference and discussions about the socio-economic crises of Senegal some years ago. Though the intention was praiseworthy, it is at the same questionable in the sense that young people were not part of the \textit{Assises}. What we had instead, was a conglomeration of intellectual politicians, members of the civil society among others, who closed themselves in conference rooms in the most beautiful hotel in Dakar, \textit{Le Meridien President}. Not only were young people not active in the debates of the \textit{Assises}, but the propositions that came out of it went ignored by Wade's government. To a certain extent, the \textit{Assises Nationales} turned to be an elite's club wrapped in a particular rhetoric of politics.

Instead of the traditional approach of politics that channels social changes through winning state power by elite intellectuals, \textit{Y'en A Marre}'s rationale in hailing to a New Man (sic) cuts across Holloway's "critical-revolutionary subject" (140). Away from the intellectual-man-of-providence believed to lead the masses, \textit{Y'en A Marre}'s New Senegalese Man (sic) is the one that critically engages in the dialectic of experience, the

one who really understands that at stake are "people whose subjectivity is part of the mire of society in which we live, flies caught in a web" (140). It is on this fundamental break from transcendence that the movement posits its ideology. In stepping out from the binary antagonism between ruling party and opposition politicians, Y'en A Marre has probably understood that the most important is not a them vs. us sort of approach of Politics. This narrow sense of political class consciousness is what mostly makes the whole of the political scene in Senegal. Whenever opposition politicians reach out the population, it means that elections are closing in, trying their utmost to gain people's vote in order to reach state power. In a country of 12 million people, it is quite amazing to see that there are more than a hundred political parties simply because the presidential apartments are always cast by their headlights. In such a context, what matters is not political ideology, but the sole ideology of how to win state power. Perhaps Frantz Fanon is right when he argued that "the formation of nationalist parties in the colonized countries is contemporary with the birth of the intellectual and business elite" (Wretched, 63). Though this assertion has to be contextualized, I think it bears some historical continuity in today Senegal's politics for the political leader is most of the time seen as a homme providentiel, always addressing masses from mountaintops.

That "the political education of the masses is now recognized as an historical necessity," (Wretched, 88, emphasis added) is an argument that a few people in Africa would disagree with. In some circles, this assertion might sound questionable, especially when it comes from the mouth of an intellectual. But if one sees critically the current political scene in Senegal for example, one will easily understand that the vicious circle between political leaders and the mass population is one of uncritical political militancy.
When we critically "observe[e] the ardor and enthusiasm of the people as they deal decisive blows to the [ruling party] machine" (*Wretched*, 82), we come hard on the fact that the traditional politicians sort of hijack the legitimacy of the people's hope for real social changes. Because of their lack of political education as Fanon suggests, all we actually see is "hot air, verbiage, bantering, and futile agitation … [and] demagoguery" (*Wretched*, 82). This, to a certain extent, refers back to Penda Mbow's critical analysis of Politics under Wade's regime in which cash money seemed to have had the final decisive influence during the crucial phase of electoral campaign. From another perspective, *Y'en A Marre's* New Senegalese Man and his potential self-reflexivity echoes Hardt and Negri's "Becoming-prince" and the idea of the "Multitude." In a country where democracy mostly works through simulacra, the *Nouveau Type de Senegalais* is "the process of the multitude learning the art of self-rule and inviting lasting democratic forms of social organization".61 At the level of theory, *Y'en A Marre* ideological line of thought cuts across Michel Foucault's ideas of the individual and the "Dispositif," the very process of producing subjectivity. Being part of this "Dispositif" entails the reflection on the "material, the social, the affective, and cognitive mechanisms of the production of subjectivity" (Hardt and Negri, x).

**RE-APPROPRIATING THE TOOLS OF MODERNITY: THE CASE OF ONLINE MEDIA.**

Since the initial frame of reference of this project is the Algerian Revolution throughout Fanon's political thought, I approach online media as a tool of modernity

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brought into the postcolonies. In *A Dying Colonialism* (1967), Frantz Fanon discussed the importance of some of the colonialist's modern tools - Medicine and the Radio - which initially were aimed at enforcing colonial power and authority. In his article "Beyond Manicheanism: Dialectics in the Thought of Frantz Fanon" (1999), Nigel Gibson analyzes the way in which science and technology accompanied the French colonization of Algeria. Due to the imperialist character of science and technology and in reaction to it, the colonized Algerian people adopted a "defense mechanism." In fact, as Nigel Gibson puts it, the Algerian initial protests against science and technology "represent[ed] an obstinate allegiance to tradition, not because of any inherent value of tradition but because tradition has offered a refuge from colonial predations - a form of repudiation of, or resistance to, the colonizer who has been bent on destroying those traditions" (344). In the course of the revolutionary struggle in Algeria, Medicine the and Radio as tools of the colonizer came to lose their colonialist signifiers. Because they could be used for the purpose of the struggle, Algerians "took over" science and technology for a better articulation and meaning of the struggle. "By stripping them of their superstitions," the re-appropriation of the radio for example, "provide[d] the space in which a liberatory ideology [could] be developed and articulated" (Gibson 343). Because the struggle took part everywhere in the country, the radio could participate in disseminating the propagandist ideas of the revolutionaries for better purposes. In the heat of the Algerian independence war, "having a radio meant seriously going to war … it was hearing the first words of the nation … the identification of the voice of the Revolution with the fundamental truth of the nation has opened up limitless horizons" (Fanon qtd. in Gibson
At a crucial moment in the process of revolution, a critical relationship with the tools of the oppressor is more than needed to get ahead toward emancipation.

The use of online media, especially Facebook, developed in a somewhat similar way in Senegal. Previously seen a Western thing to which a few privileged people could have access and network in some private clubs, the number of Facebook users has exploded exponentially in the country in recent times. On the onset, most people in Senegal were reluctant in opening a account page in online media like Facebook because of the nature of the internet itself in making oneself somewhat globally visible in the online public sphere. In 2008 when I created my Facebook page for example, the majority of the people on my friend list were outside the country, mostly not Senegalese. In 2012, it is completely the reverse. I would not argue that this rise of Facebook users in Senegal is due to the waves of the Arab Spring. People in Senegal began to be more familiar with online media like Facebook and YouTube years before the events in Tunisia or Egypt. It is interesting to mention, however, that Facebook, like in any other place in the world, was merely for networking, making friends all over the world and making fun of it.

**FACEBOOK AS A (GLOBAL) PUBLIC SPHERE**

The Facebook online discussion groups on which I am focusing are important forums where Senegalese people join in and exchange ideas. Interesting enough is the fact members of the discussion groups - Y’en A Marre and RNS (Rehabilitons Notre Senegal (*Let Us Rehabilitate Our Senegal*) - are voicing global issues, not only about the

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62 Gordon et al. *Fanon: A reader*, p. 276
African continent, but issues on the international level as well. The first issue is that of interest to this project is the relationship of the United Nations and the rest of the world. Massamba Alwaly Ndiaye, a member of the Y'en A Marre Facebook discussion group who lives in Tours (France), voiced concerns about the sometimes unclear positions of the UN with regards to political regimes in the world. Criticizing the Bassar El Assad's regime in Syria, he argues that "La mise au ban définitive du régime sanguinaire de Bachar El Assad qui depuis plus d'une année massacre dans une totale impunité les enfants de ce grand pays qu'est la Syrie !!! Devient une URGENCE" - "The banning of El Assad's bloody regime, which for over a year continues to kill children in great impunity in this great country (Syria), has become an EMERGENCY" (my translation). While it is difficult to argue that because he is in the diaspora this commentator is sensitive to the Syrian issue, a great number of online community members, even those at home, sometimes argue for or against the El Assad's regime. The Syrian case is of a great recurrence in the online debates. In response to Massamba's original post, Cheikh A.T. Diagne is more concerned about the oil issue that is central to the crisis. Comparing Syria with Libya, he suggests that :

"Une dictature meurtrière. Les nations Unies a chaque qu'il y a un projet de résolution contre les dérigeants syriens, finissent par reculer devant le soutien que la russie apporte a ces sanguinaires de Damas. L'OTAN, qui dans la crise libyenne, avait réagit avec promptitude en envoyant ses troupes sur place sans attendre le feu vert de l'ONU semble se désintéresser du cas syrien. Normal me diriez vous, la Syrie n'a pas de pétrole" - "A murderous dictatorship. Whenever there is a draft resolution against the Syrian leaders, The United Nations always yields to the Russian support to this bloodthirsty regime of Damascus. NATO, which in the Libyan crisis, had promptly reacted bysending his troops on the
spot without waiting for the green light from the UN, seems to lose interest in the Syrian case. Normal would you say to me, Syria has no oil."

In reading this thread of comments, one can sense the lack of legitimacy of The United Nations in the eyes of most people around the world. Thanks to counterhegemonic journalism and online media, the political maneuvers of geopolitics are now on the timeline. Originally set to discuss Senegalese sociopolitical issues, debates in the online group discussions transcend the nation and encompass the hottest global phenomena.

Concerning the NATO military intervention in Libya, Bilal Khadhafi Diagne, a member of the Y’en A Marre group discussion, talks about what he calls "Les mensonges de la guerre de l’Occident contre la Libye" - "The lies of the West in the war against Libya." Arguing that the reasons given by NATO to militarily attack Col. Khadafi are pure fabrication, Khadhafi Diagne gives two main unstated reasons for the military intervention. The first reason he has given is Colonel Khadafi’s financing of the "Premier Satellite africain Rascom 1" - "the first African satellite, Rascom 1" which, he argues, would guarantee full coverage for African telecommunications at a far cheaper cost compared to Western satellites. The second main reason, he continues, is the Fonds monétaire africain, Banque centrale africaine, Banque africaine des investissements Les 30 milliards de dollars saisis par M. Obama appartiennent à la Banque centrale libyenne et prévu pour la contribution libyenne à la finalisation de la fédération africaine à travers 3 projets phare: la Banque africaine d’investissement à Syrte en Libye, la création dès 2011 du Fonds monétaire africain avec un capital de 42 milliards de dollars avec Yaoundé pour siège, la Banque centrale africaine avec le siège à Abuja au Nigeria dont la première émission de la monnaie africaine signera la fin du Fcfa grâce auquel Paris a la
mainmise sur certains pays africains depuis 50 ans. On comprend dès lors et encore une fois la rage de Paris contre Kadhafi." - "The African Monetary Fund, The African Central Bank, and the African Investment Bank. The $ 30 billion seized by Obama belonged to the Central Bank of Libya and were Libyan planned-funds for the contribution to the finalization of the African Federation through three key projects: the African Investment Bank in Syrte, Libya, the creation in 2011 of the African Monetary Fund with a capital of $ 42 billion with seat located Yaounde, the African Central Bank with headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, the first issue of the African currency spell the end of CFA with which Paris has a stranglehold on some countries African in 50 years. There subsequent rage of France against colonel Khadafi is therefore understandable."

Here is an account of the economic interests that lied beneath the NATO military intervention in Libya. However, my contention is that this one-sided view of the Libyan complex issue misses Colonel Khadafi's human rights abuses against his own people and the violent, autocratic and undemocratic manner with which he handled the initial peaceful protestors in Libya. Though the Libyan guide was an economic threat to the West, his sociopolitical mishandling of the crisis spoiled his legitimacy in standing against global economic hegemony.

Fary Moreira Ndao, a student majoring in Geology at the University of Cheikh Anta Diop in Dakar (Senegal), urges us to take notice of the overexploitation of African mining industries by multinationals. Having posted a video that features the fraudulent political maneuvers in the mining code in Zambia, he makes a comparison with the Senegalese mining industry from which the Senegalese government only has 10% of the shares:
Voici un documentaire exceptionnel, récompensé du prix iLondres, décrivant les agissements frauduleux de la Société Miniere Glencore qui exploite du cuivre en Zambie. Sa diffusion a profondément marqué les esprits en Europe et en Zambie où le pouvoir a perdu les élections présidentielles au profit de l'opposition, notamment à cause des problèmes de fraude effectués en connivence avec la société minière. Les 10% que le code minier donne aux sénégalais sont l'arbre qui cache la forêt. Ce documentaire pourrait bien augurer de ce qui se passe au Sénégal et dans plein d'autres pays africains comme la RDC. Documentaire de 55 minutes, téléchargeable. A voir d'urgence! 

"Here is an exceptional documentary, awarded the prize iLondres, describing the machinations of Miniere Glencore, the Company which operates in the copper industry in Zambia. The video's viral circulation has raised consciousness in Europe and Zambia, where the government lost the presidential elections in favor of the opposition, particularly because of problems of fraud made in collusion with the mining company. The 10% that the Senegalese Mining Code is the tree that hides the forest. This documentary could augur ill of what is happening in Senegal and in many other African countries like the DRC. It is a 55-minute documentary, downloadable. A must watch! http://vimeo.com/25000940."

Fary Ndao's comments about the corruption in the circles of mining industry management somewhat echoes Micheal Burawoy's ethnographical research regarding the complex nationalization of the Zambian mining industry.63 Instead of the positivist ethnographical approach, Burawoy values what he calls "a reflexive model of science [which] embraces not detachment but engagement as the road to knowledge" (20). The combination of "local processes" with "extralocal forces" in the Zambian copper industry pushes the author to use Frantz Fanon's theory of Postcolonialism and the intersecting of race and class in postcoloniality. In fact, Burawoy uses many theories (Gramsci and Fanon

mainly) to deal with the social context of his site, trying to unpack the ladders of socio-economic hierarchies within the postcolonies. "The extended case method", he writes, "is able to dig beneath the political binaries of colonizer and colonized, white and black, metropolis and periphery, capital and labor to discover multiples processes, interests and identities" (24). Fary Ndao's comment, if looked more closely, will reveal the race/class dimensions of the colonial legacy which still hampers the upward economic mobility of the downtrodden mass population in Zambia.

The online communities, too, are interested in the academic debates regarding Afrocentricity and Ancient Egypt and its anteriority with regards to other world civilizations. Because this rationale of this research project somewhat deals with the contemporary Senegalese subject and his/her relationship to his/her past/tradition. I found it interesting to highlight the following comment. Scienti Fou, a member of Y’en A Marre group discussion and referring to Senegalese historian Cheikh Anta Diop, posted the following comment:

Le Nègre ignore que ses ancêtres, qui se sont adaptés aux conditions matérielles de la vallée du Nil, sont les plus anciens guides de l'humanité dans la voie de la civilisation ; que ce sont eux qui ont créé les Arts, la religion (en particulier le monothéisme), la littérature, les premiers systèmes philosophiques, l'écriture, les sciences exactes (physique, mathématiques, mécanique, astronomie, calendrier...), la médecine, l'architecture, l'agriculture, etc. à une époque où le reste de la Terre (Asie, Europe : Grèce, Rome...) était plongé dans la barbarie" CHEIKH ANTA DIOP: Le guide" - "The Negro does not know that his ancestors are the oldest peoples that lead humanity into civilization because they adapted themselves to the material conditions of the Nile Valley. It
is they who created Art, religion (especially monotheism), literature, philosophical thought, writing, the sciences (physics, mathematics, mechanics, astronomy, the calendar ..) medical science, architecture, agriculture ... at a time when the rest of the Earth (Asia, Europe, Greece, Rome, ...) was in a state of barbarism" Cheikh Anta Diop (The Guide)"

The first thing that caught my attention is the capitalization of the name of the Cheikh Anta Diop. Considering Cheikh Anta Diop as a guide, as the commentator joyfully puts it, is what not only many academics and students, but also non academic Senegalese people usually do. This uncritical approach to Diop's legacy sometimes impoverishes the many possible directions that current and future generations could take. According to Mamadou Diouf and Mohamad Mbodji, for example, "there is a problem. To question the work of Cheikh Anta Diop, even from a scientific point of view, was for a long time synonymous with African anti-patriotism; to refer to it in passing was an obligation one could readily fulfill, especially in the academic work, to repeat its great principles, often without any knowledge of the work itself, was a certificate of nationalism and Pan-Africanism."

In the same trend and in a more philosophical way, Abiola Irele emphasizes the practical significance of Ancient Egypt with regards to current African sociopolitical issues. The insistence of Cheikh Anta Diop's vein of work, he argues aloud, "was not meant as an encouragement to cultural smugness but to a greater effort."

Scienti Fou's Facebook comments about the great scientific maxims of Cheikh Anta Diop somewhat echo the sterile ideas of narrow-minded nationalism and its bankruptcy. And in

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65 V.Y. Mudimbe, The Surreptitious Speech, p. 213
such discussion setting, whether academic or informal, "it becomes impossible to escape from unanimity; there is no room for a classical academic discussion in which the points of agreement could coexist with the points of disagreements" (Diouf and Mbodj, 129).

TALKING ABOUT THE NATION

With the social unrests and the "embryonic" Senegalese revolution, the limitless possibilities of online media became incredible. Parallel to its entertainment side, Facebook is arguably one of the modern tools that really raises consciousness in the very process of the social protests. After the official creation of Y'en A Marre a social movements, a subsequent Facebook group discussion was created online with almost 30.000 members today. The discussion group is called Y'en A Marre. The are several other group discussions formed by Senegalese on Facebook, both back home and in the diaspora, who are concerned with the ongoing and unfolding events. The majority of the groups of discussion on Facebook revolves around not only the elections and its unfolding events, but deal with social life and its challenges as well. Thus, in this context, Facebook is arguably an online public sphere for people virtually meet and share ideas.

In fact as Marame Gueye argues, "in Senegal, internet usage has increased with the flourishing of cybercafés in neighborhoods where youth can interact with the world with a very affordable price. Because a large number of Senegalese are immigrants in Europe and North America, the internet is an affordable vehicle for linking the diaspora to their home country " (31). Regarding the public sphere where individuals meet to express information and viewpoints which online media can somewhat epitomize, Manuel Castells has provided an interesting analysis of the public sphere from a
Habermasian perspective. In theory, the public sphere is the intersection and/or the interstitial space where state and civil society meets and constructs a "network for communicating information and points of view" (Habermas, qtd. in Castells, 78). Online media like Facebook is nothing but the virtual reproduction of the idea of the public sphere which "is an essential component of sociopolitical organization (...) the space where people come together as citizens and articulate their autonomous views to influence the political institutions of society" (Castells, 78). From a democratic point of view and in society where online media is highly accessed by people in contrast to undeveloped countries where the meaning of online media can be different, the failure of civil society in effectively channeling confronting and divergent ideas can make "the state drifts away from its subjects" (Castells, 78). But the cultural dimension with which citizens bear when joining in online media interactive debates is sometimes overlooked by this global idea of the public sphere. In other words, in addition to the fact that online media is a sociospatial interaction between different individuals, it is also "the cultural/informational repository of the ideas and projects that feed public debate" (Castells, 79). The cultural dimension of how people locationally engage in online media is sometimes glossed over by globalist interpreters of the media.

Even though the four crises that fuel online activism - crisis of efficiency, legitimacy, identity and equity - arise globally but are managed locally, a better understanding of the cultural background of that local management of online interaction can be insightful for many. Speaking truth to power through the channels of online

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67 Castells, "The New Public Sphere," p. 82
media, in the case of Senegal, is culturally performed. In her article on modern media in Senegal, Marame Gueye analyses the dangerousness of the online space that modern media provides to youth culture with regards to state power. The explosive development of online media in Senegal is partly due to the fact that speaking truth to power in the offline public sphere can be risky, because "although Senegal is a democracy with a fairly outspoken press, openly criticizing the president has becoming increasing dangerously. His entourage is notorious for retaliating against journalists who highlight the administration's failures" (Gueye, 29).

Talking about the social challenges and the crying need to create a new society has been the focal point of analysis of the Facebook commentators. During the hottest moments of the violent protests against police crackdown, a lot ideas and heated debates were on in the online social networks. commentators would argue for or against the strategies taken by the opposition political parties and the appropriate way to make the revolution successful. But in this project, I am more interested in what are commentators talking about after the incumbent President Wade was democratically toppled down and how they regard the newly elected president, Macky Sall, and his government.

A Y'en A Marre's Facebook group discussion, who declined my permission to give his identity but who agreed for the anonymous citation of his words, has given a deeply critical view of the Senegalese society in general. His clinical diagnosis of how society works is of much interest to my analysis of Frantz Fanon's "setting afoot a new

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This comment talks about many things at the same time. It shows that no sooner that
president Macky Sall took office than people began to talk about self-reflexive criticism.

The unhealthiness of the institutions, the perversity of society and the viciousness of the
nation as this commentator argues, is wherein lies the main themes of online discussions. The hypocrisy of some marabouts (religious leaders), educators and critics may hint to the issue of intellectuals and the state and their complicity in not taking the sociology and philosophy of social voices, the importance and value of voice as Nick Couldry would suggest in *Why Voice Matters: Culture and Politics after Neoliberalism* (2010). In addition to the problematic political standpoint of traditional intellectuals, this comment deals with the sensitive issue of homosexuality in Senegal. In recent days, a video of two young girls who were reportedly having sex went viral and incited a huge scandal in Senegal.

Always in the same thread of comments, the anonymous commentator keeps on problematizing some current social issues in Senegal. The "pornographic" lesbian video of these young girls from Grand Yoff - a district in Dakar, the Senegalese capital city - according to him, is less dramatic that "le Sabar tannberr" (some "obscene" dances that women use to perform in the streets). While these "obscene" women dances are being performed in the open in the streets, at least the sexual intercourse of the young girls was a matter of privacy that the guy who posted the video on Facebook violated. The anonymous commentator argues aloud that:

"Que nous sommes hypocrites nous sénégalais quelle différence y'à t-il entre ses danses obscènes et la pornographie . la scène se déroule en pleine rue à Dakar sous les yeux des enfants notamment des jeunes filles mineures et nous osons condamner la vidéo pornographique des filles de grand yoff au moins leurs obscénités se sont déroulées dans un cadre privé tandis que ses danses vulgaires à travers sont pignon sur rue et sont propagées par des émissions sataniques telles que Dakar ne dort pas . Sénégalais Moy nafèkh"
"Senegalese people are hypocrites. What a difference is there between [these] dances and obscene pornography? The scene takes place on the streets of Dakar under the eyes of children, especially underage girls, and we dare condemn the pornographic video of big girls, at least their obscenities were held in private while vulgar dances around on the street and are propagated by satanic emissions such as "Dakar Ne Dort Pas". Senegalese are really hypocritical."

This comment, I believe, touches the main question of how media, somewhat negatively, participates in the "normalization" of some filmic scenes that most Senegalese would deem obscene and against traditional values. Knowing that Senegalese are religious people, though moderately, the sensitive questions of homosexuality is of great importance and, I think, all Senegalese should take their responsibilities to really discuss about it. When the pornographic video went viral, these innocent young girls who, reportedly, were flirting with lesbianism, went hiding. To a certain extent, this situation echoes the issue of silencing the voices of lesbians and gay people in black communities who are very reluctant to responsibly talk about it.

In a final paper of a graduate seminar on the reproduction of masculinities in the United States, I focused on the taboo of homosexuality in black communities. In that research paper, I argued that it would be interesting to start off by considering queerness as “Subalternity” in that the oppressed subject’s voice is hardly audible due to authoritative heteronormativity and sometimes religious ideologies. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s seminal question in Subaltern Studies, asking to know if the Subaltern can speak, is quite similar to the status of queer people not only in mainstream culture, but in Black communities as well. In that regard, Dwight A. McBride’s article “Can the Queen speak? Racial Essentialism, Sexuality and the Problem of Authority” problematizes the
same social context of the unvoiced subjectivity. What McBride has seen as an unsettled phenomenon is the authority of Black intellectuals who speak for others in a problematic way, arguing that “African American intellectuals participate, even if out of political necessity, in forms of racial essentialism to authorize and legitimate their positions in speaking for and ‘representing’ the ‘race’” (25 emphasis mine). What is more, McBridge is “concerned … about young black women who together with men are learning [from those who speak for the race] that their value lies between their legs” (26). In fact, the authority of Black intellectuals in speaking for the race is problematic for their positions as academics do not necessarily match with the lives of those who are sometimes economically downtrodden. What has impoverished the Black communities’ openness to queer identity, as McBridge points out, is “the black communities’ [disgust about] gay or lesbian sexuality [that] m[eets] derision at best and violence at worst; [the ] black church [that] preach[es] the damnation of homosexuals, [and] … African American Studies curriculum [that] provide[s] no serious or sustained discussion of the specifics of [black] lesbian and gay folks.” (26). As a result, community, church [and in this case Islam] and academia are in coalition in fighting, disregarding and silencing the voices and rights of lesbian and gay people. However, I do know that the level of tolerance if not acceptance of homosexuality in the United States is very different to Senegal. But, as I try to argue, time has come that Senegalese people tackle the issue more responsibly and rationally than emotionally. On a constitutional level, perhaps time has come to review the paradox of Senegal's own secular institutions, copied and pasted from France's while Senegal's social and religious institutions are very different from France's.
The uncritical way of dealing with homosexuality in black communities and countries is seeing it as a white thing. That homosexuality never existed in Africa is one of the more laughable arguments one can read about. For instance, F. C. Welsing argues that “Many [Black psychiatrists] in the Black population are reaching the conclusion that such issues (homosexuality) have become a problem of endemic proportion amongst Black people in the U.S., although it was an almost nonexistent behavioral phenomenon amongst indigenous Blacks in Africa” (qtd. in McBridge 31). Doudou Diop, another group member in the Facebook discussion, problematizes the issue. He has asked important questions, though his final comments seem, at least to me, questionable. He asks the following questions:

Que faire des gordjiguous au sénégal? faut les condamner? les châtier? ou jouer la tolérance envers eux? les médecins ont démontrés que c est une maladie bc d entre eux naissent avec...alors sont ils coupables où la nature pour ne pas dire dieu qui demande qu on les dilat........!!ils sont très nombreux au sénégal et si on y prend pas garde on finira comme les toubabs. .....doy na warr"

How should we deal with homosexuals in Senegal? Condemnation? punishment or tolerance? Physicians have demonstrated that it is because of a disease they are born with that makes them who they are ... So, are they guilty of behaving against nature, must they be dilapidated?! They are very numerous in Senegal and if we are not careful about them, we will end up like white people."

In her article “Heart of Lavender,” Eugene J. Patron has pointed out that this idea of homosexuality being almost nonexistent in traditional Africa has been reinforced by previous anthropologies, almost conducted during colonialism and imperialism, researches that were more likely to be interested in the notion of the collective than in the
lives of individuals (Patron 129). In fact, as she argues, “historian Wayne Dynes has, in the introduction to a list of 84 references of homosexuality in Africa, noted that ‘Europeans have often held that ‘sodomy’ is a vice of advanced, even decadent civilizations. The African, being innocent ‘children of nature’ must be exempt from corruption” (qtd. in Patron 129, emphasis added).

In contemporary African cultures, homosexuality is almost always viewed as an external phenomenon that entered Africa through the invasion of white people from the 15th century onwards. Today, the phenomenon is almost linked to tourism which is very important in the economies of African countries. In fact, tourism might be an accelerator of homosexuality in Africa, but the phenomenon existed prior to our times. As Patron has pointed out, “probably the best-documented cases of homosexuality in Africa are amongst the mine workers of South Africa” being separated from their girlfriends and wives during a relatively long time, male miners tend to satisfy their sexual desires with a male-male sexual intercourse, due to the exclusively homosocial mining world, what Eugene has termed as “situational homosexuality” (127). According to Mclean, there are specific terms that refer to male-to-male sexual intercourse. “A Skesana” he says “is a boy who likes to get fucked … [and] am Injongo is the one who makes the proposals and does the fucking” (qtd. in Patron 127-128, my emphasis). What must be critically looked upon, especially in the case of Senegal, is the way modern social media brings privacy into the public sphere. I think what is happening behind closed doors should not be exposed under the eyes of underage folks.
In addition to homosexuality, the online communities members discuss the issue of capitalism and consumerism in Senegal. Echoing John Holloway's analysis of the core of Marxist revolution with regards capitalism, which is the "them vs. us externality," some commentators have had a critical approach of Senegalese households expend their little money they can hardly save during family ceremonies. Cheikh Oumar Ba, another commentator criticizes the fact that:

Les dépenses improductives privent les ménages sénégalais d'une grande partie de leur épargne. Les cérémonies familiales constituent entre autres l'une des principales causes de gaspillage de cette épargne. Cela est un handicap pour l'économie nationale dont une part importante d'investissement potentiels est ainsi détournée. Loi Numéro 67-04 du 24 février 1967 tendant à réprimer les dépenses excessives à l'occasion des cérémonies familiales. Cette loi mérite réactivation au même titre que la loi sur l'enrichissement illicite car il y va de notre survie. Les dépenses lors des cérémonies constituent la principale cause de décès chez les hommes sénégalais. Nagn ko wakh nak"

Unproductive expenditure of Senegalese households deprive their family of their savings. Family ceremonies are one of the main causes of wasted savings. This is a handicap for the national economy for a significant investment potential is uselessly expended. The law 67-04 of 24 February 1967 to crack down on excessive spending during familial ceremonies deserves enforcement because just as the law on illicit enrichment. Spending ceremonies are the leading cause of death among Senegalese men."

Most of the time there criticism on how those on offices in the government squander money budget, sometimes for political gains. While this is true, this commentator, calls for a self-critical analysis of society and its relationship with capital. In traditional ceremonies, there is fascinating to see how people irresponsibly fritter away money that
is hardly gained. Therefore, before we criticize our leaders for their mismanagement, we should, as this commentator would argue aloud, begin by apply the saying "charity begins at home."

All these comments and ideas resolve around the concept of "Nouveau Type de Senegalais" (New type of Senegalese), an ideology that is the bedrock of Y'en A Marre's social movement. Reflecting on Frantz Fanon's insistence to "make a new start, develop a new way of thinking, and even endeavor to create a new man" (The Wretched, 239) is remarkably what online communities members strive for. Lymortel Cimmoly, a Y'en a Marre's group commentator, analyses the issues of identity and identification within the nation. Echoing Frantz Fanon's criticism of the "cracks of [narrow-minded nationalism which] explain how easy it for young independent countries to switch back from nation to ethnic group and from state to tribe" (The Wretched, 97), Cimmonly asks the following questions:

"Le repli identitaire au senegal m'inquiete! La nation est relegue au second palan: Le parti, l'ethnie, l'appartenance sociale au detriment du peuple?? La religion au detriment de la nation, le tarikha prend le dessus sur la religion. de plus en plus le senegalais raisonne selon son appartenance sociale, religieuse, confrerique, ethnique ou politique... A vous d'en debattre. Je prefere suivre."

The defensive identity in Senegal worries me! The nation is relegated to the secondary: The party, ethnicity, social class at the expense of the people? Religion to the detriment of the nation, the tarikha [religious brotherhood] takes precedence over religion. Therefore, the Senegalese individual thinks accordingly to his social, religious, ethnic or political belonging... You must debate about this. I would prefer to follow."
Lymortel Cimmonly's analysis genuinely depicts the way in which, not always, but more often, Senegalese people relate to each other. Solidarity always comes before criticism. During electoral campaign, politicians press on people's affects for putative electoral purposes. Uncritical overt militancy sometimes causes havoc and people would fight each other for no reason. Talking about these social phenomena, as Frantz Fanon would solemnly argue, is the first step toward setting afoot a new man. This comment, to a certain extent, echoes Frantz Fanon's 'new humanism,' the creation of new subjectivities within the postcolony. He calls for a critical approach to tradition and the ways in which it may hamper the emergence of Y’en A Marre's *Nouveau Type de Senegalais*. This new type of Senegalese, as the commentator urges us to think of, should, for the sake of the revolution, should emerge out of the contradictions and ambivalences of traditions and modernity, from a sense of third space of enunciation. The notions of religion, family and ethnicity are sometimes obstacles for the creation of new subjectivities.

Against the presidentialist political regime of Senegal there have been some dissident online voices. Recalling Abdoulaye Wade's personalism and autocracy, online community members are now interested in seeing a more balanced power relationship on the top, between the President, the National Assembly and the Senate. During Wade's regime, the two last institutions were functioning depending on the wishes of the incumbent president. This refers to the unhealthiness that a commentator was talking about on Facebook. For instance, as Coolman Sall suggests, "Wade a ete une parenthese tres douloureuse pour notre cher pays le SENEGAL. On doit y tirer toutes les lecons pour mieux avancer.....Pour que le SENEGAL marche comme le souhaite nos concitoyens il
faut 1 POUVOIR et 1 CONTRE-POUVOIR tres fort." Wade was a very painful parenthesis for our dear country SENEGAL. We must draw all the lessons for the Future .... If we want an emerging SENEGAL as our citizens wish, there must be power and a very strong counter-power." What is Coolman Sall arguing for is a more deep analysis of the Senegalese political institutions. Abdoulaye Wade, as a person, is not the main issue. What is worth looking upon is the system that gave him absolute power over other governmental and judicial institutions. He is quite right when he states that Wade was a painful moment in Senegal's politics in that president Wade stripped the institutions of their capacity of control over the government. The counter-power he is referring to is a must given the presidentialist political regime of the country, another unfortunate and painful legacy of French colonialism.

Macky Sall, Senegal's newly elected president, has also be on the timeline of many commentators. Though he sort of embodies a sense of hope for the future of Senegalese politics, some alert voices have begun to call for cautiousness about Macky Sall's political endeavors. The opponents of Macky Sall's regime argue that there will not be any change in politics in Senegal for, because of the traditional ties that the new president has with the previous regime, we might have a change of players but not of a system. Serigne Mbacke Fall, a commentator in a Facebook group discussion, criticizes the current cacophonous political debates. He urges us

"Faire de la politique, oui mais autrement. Entre ces tirailllements indécents se trouve un peuple affamé tirant le diable par la queue. Le Sénégal mérite autre chose que des futilités entre personnes. Les défis sont énormes et l'attente grandiose. Mettons nous au travail pour un Sénégal émergent."
"To do politics, yes but otherwise. While politicians are babbling on in indecent political rivalries, hungry people are pulling the devil by the tail. Senegal needs more than trivialities between people. The challenges are enormous and of grandiose expectations. Let us work for an emerging Senegal"

Many voices are now criticizing his political standpoint with regards to the previous regime. I am not sure if those who argue against him are from the opposition parties, but I personally believe that it might be too early to have a objective and critical analysis of the new president's policies. Change, for sure, will not change overnight. Given the fact the previous regime has left Senegalese institutions in a somewhat total mess, the new political will need more time to efficiently deal with the unhealthiness of our political institutions.

My attempt in analyzing the divergent and sometimes virulent critical voices in Senegalese cyberculture is an effort and an argument in seeing those online community members as intellectuals, in the political sense of the term. The history if intellectualism in African countries has had different trajectories and histories, which most of time, betrayed the long-awaited social revolutions. The use of online social networks and the setting of online public spaces is now very important in Senegal. People, now, are talking about contradictory agendas, conflicting identity and subjectivities and the need to overcome difference if the struggle is to be successful. Seydou Nourou Traore has rightfully defined the usefulness of cyberculture, especially in crucial moments like the one in Senegal. He argues that

Qui parle de réseaux sociaux parle d'interconnections. Donc, il n'y a pas de raison que tous ceux qui gravitent autour de la politique ne se retrouvent pas au sein des
réseaux sociaux pour discuter. En tout cas, un appel est lancé à tous dans cette direction. Nous devons le faire pour réduire le fossé entre nous, l\'ever les équivoques, es malentendus, enrichir davantage nos réflexions et trouver ensemble les solutions aux problèmes du Sénégal car le développement ne se fera de façon sectorielle ou sectaire.

"Social networking is nothing but interconnections. So there is no surprise to see people of different political ideologies interacting and discussing in online forums. In any case, there is a call to this direction. We should do so to reduce the gaps between us, remove ambiguities, misunderstandings, further enriching our thoughts together and find solutions to the problems of Senegal because development will not be done at a sectoral or sectarian level."
CONCLUSION

Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* is one of the most important academic works in postcolonial theory. While theorists and cultural critics have studied the book in relation to global phenomena - identity politics, diaspora and the history of colonial racism and its continuities in the metropolis - this research project has provided a critical approach of the book with regards to the *politics of locality*. The Senegalese new social movements that have recently challenged the twelve rule of neoliberal sociopolitical regime in Senegal, are examples of what Fanonism is all about in Africa in general, and in Senegal in particular.

In the level of theory, this research project has tried to read Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* from a Cultural Studies' perspective. Much scholarship has been devoted to the history of Western liberal humanism and the way in which it sort of accompanied the exercise of the European colonialism in the rest if the world. But Fanon's "new humanism" is more directed at the responsibility of the then colonized subject and today postcolonial individual to more critically think of himself/herself for the sake of implementing a new thinking. This new critical thinking, that is a sense of "not-yet-ness," deals with the relationship with the subject and his/her past and tradition. This project, in addition, has argued that Frantz Fanon was a cultural studies' scholar before the word in that he objectively talked analyzed the ways in which religious and ethno-nationalism had somewhat diverted colonized people from the real agenda of the nation. While Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari are key figures in the scholarship of cultural studies, Fanon, in the early '60s, sort of pioneered the notions of immanence and
the philosophical concepts of intersubjectivity when he insisted on dialectical experience in the postcolony.

Since this project focuses on Senegalese new social movements during the course 2011-2012, I found it interesting to make a historical diagnosis for a better understanding the social movements' sociogeny. This research paper has argued that, while youth rebelliousness was part of the history of Senegal's politics, *Y'en A Marre's* recent volcanic eruption was triggered by Abdoulaye Wade's autocratic and nepotistic political regime for twelve years. Even though neoliberal rationality is best understood on the global level, it was worth analyzing the internal power structured that still hamper the emergence of more democratic political regimes in Africa in general, and in Senegal in particular. In fact, this focus on the class issues in the postcolony is, I think, a must paradigm shift for postcolonial theory has been busy critiquing the West and its responsibility in the postcolonial condition. While the West's responsibility must not be glossed over, I argue that the non-Western societies' should not be ignored either.

The *Y'en A Marre* social phenomenon in Senegal was experienced in the offline world. But it went viral as well. With some empirical data from Facebook group discussions, I have shown that Senegal people are interested in setting afoot of a *Nouveau Type de Senegalais*. Echoing Frantz Fanon's "new man," *Y'en A Marre's* call to really think of ourselves and our society at large is, on the level of theory, what John Holloway is trying to convey through his controversial *Changing Society Without Taking Power* (2010). Because talking truth to power was somewhat risky during Abdoulaye Wade's political regime, online social media are now being maximized for the setting of
interesting virtual public spaces, where dissident voices against power, but contradictory in themselves, try to make sense of the self-contradictoriness of screaming online voices. What I found promising in the online forums is the fact people are less interested in criticizing those from the top than those from the bottom, that is the people as a whole. The notions of family, religion and ethnicism, among many other things, are now critically thought. With the interactional relationship between Facebook online commentators, I believe that in the future a greater self-awareness will emerge in Senegal for "self-awareness does not mean closing the door to communication. Philosophy teaches us on the contrary that it is its guarantee. National consciousness, which is not nationalism, is alone capable of giving us an international dimension" (The Wretched, 179).
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