THE RHETORICAL USES OF MULTICULTURALISM:
AN IDEOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND MACEDONIAN DISCOURSES
IN THE DIALOGUE FOR EU ACCESSION

Linda Ziberi

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green
State University in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May, 2012

Committee:
Lara Lengel, Ph.D., Co-Advisor
Alberto González, Ph.D., Co-Advisor
Ellen Gorovski, Ph.D.
Marc Simon, Ph.D.
Graduate Faculty Representative
Inter-ethnic co-existence is critical for stability and democratic development of Macedonia, a country with European Union (EU) membership aspirations. This study examines discourses between the EU and Macedonia surrounding the concept of multiculturalism, which emerged from inter-ethnic conflict between Albanians, the largest ethnic minority in the nation, and Macedonians, the majority ethnic group. From the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which provides the main format for multiculturalism discourses, the study interrogates how multiculturalism is rhetorically constructed by EU representatives in their presentations to the Macedonia public, and by Albanian and Macedonian and officials of the Macedonian Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Prime Ministers Office for European Affairs, and the Vice Prime Minister representing the Albanian political party in government.

The study employs the ideographic analysis method of rhetorical criticism which is particularly constructive for interrogating concepts, such as multiculturalism, used by various parties engaged in negotiating conflict. As different ethnic groups in Macedonia have competing conceptualizations of multiculturalism, the study examines how the term is rhetorically constructed to the Macedonian public from outside the nation, and within by Macedonian and Albanian ethnic groups, particularly under conditions of warfare and EU and U.S. pressure. The study provides an understanding of how ideographs such as multiculturalism impact individual choices and ideological assumptions that shape patterns of cultural expression. It affords opportunities to
identify hidden notions and possibilities in the constructions of multiculturalism while considering political, ethical, and social impacts on the people in Macedonia and their acceptance or rejection of this concept. The processes creating and sustaining ideology, and the interests represented in the ideology, must be discovered and understood in order to uncover oppressive power structures and to find opportunities enabling emancipation. The critical understanding of the rhetoric of multiculturalism and its conceptions by all stakeholders focuses upon a vital component in EU accession dialogue between Macedonia and the EU and, therefore, addresses a crucial precondition for achieving a functioning democratic society in Macedonia.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although only my name appears on the cover of this dissertation, many people have contributed to its production. I owe my deepest gratitude to all those people who have made this dissertation possible and because of whom my graduate experience has been one that I will cherish forever.

First of all, I would like to thank the two co-chairs of my dissertation committee, Dr. Lara Lengel and Dr. Alberto Gonzalez. Lara has been a wonderful mentor and friend ever since I came to Bowling Green State University in 2008. Without her constructive feedback and continuous encouragement, I would not have been able to complete my PhD studies. Her patience and support helped me overcome many crisis situations and finish this dissertation. She was always there to meet and talk about my ideas, to proofread and mark up my papers and chapters, and to ask me good questions and help me think through my problems. She and her family made Bowling Green and BGSU a wonderful place to live for me and my family. Along with Lara, Alberto has helped me grow as an intercultural communication and rhetorical scholar. This dissertation is a culmination of what I began to explore in his course *Intercultural Communication* in 2010. He taught me how to question thoughts and express ideas. I am deeply grateful to him for the long discussions that helped me sort out the details of my topic. He showed me different ways to approach the rhetorical analysis and most importantly he gave me the needed confidence that I can do this. I
am indebted to him for his continuous comments, revisions, guidance and encouragement.

I would also like to thank the other two dissertation committee members, Dr. Ellen Gorsevski, and Dr. Marc Simon. In Dr. Ellen’s course *Rhetoric of Peace and Conflict* I was first exposed to critical rhetorical analysis and peace and conflict communication. Her insightful comments and constructive criticism at different stages of my dissertation were thought-provoking and helped me focus my ideas. She introduced me to Peace Studies and her teachings inspired me to write Chapter VII of this dissertation. I am grateful to Dr. Marc for accepting to be part of my committee and for expressing interest in my topic. His encouragement and practical advice in the beginning stages of this dissertation significantly enriched this study. I am also thankful to him for reading my analysis and for helping me understand and develop my ideas.

I also thank my family: my parents, Nehat and Lirije Ziberi, for giving me life in the first place, for educating me, for the unconditional support and encouragement to pursue my interests, even when those interests went beyond boundaries of language, field and geography. My husband, Artan Limani, who accompanied me all the way to US to pursue my studies, for supporting me and listening to my complaints and frustrations, as well as for believing in me. Artan was always there to cheer me up and stood by me through the good times and bad. My beloved daughter Adora deserves the biggest gratitude for her unconditional love that kept me going and for her patience and understanding during the time she had to spend seven months in Macedonia without
her mommy. I hope this dissertation repays all the emotional unrest that she might have experienced during that period and ultimately helps enable a better future for her.

Last, but not least, I would like to thank my Master Thesis advisor from Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI), Dr. John Parrish-Sprowl, who persuaded me to pursue my Ph.D. at the School of Media and Communication at BGSU. John has been a major driving force in my advancement as a scholar and greatly influenced my confidence in this process. I am indebted to him for all his support, guidance and encouragement.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTRODUCTION. NEGOTIATING THE LANDSCAPE OF DIVISION AND MARGINALIZATION</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I. QUESTIONING THE IDEOLOGIES OF MULTICULTURALISM</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questioning ideologies of multiculturalism:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of the study</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has multiculturalism failed?</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vague, ambiguous, and contested concept</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Multiculturalism” in Macedonia</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ohrid Framework Agreement ten years later and implications for EU membership</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU accession dialogues and processes</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texts and analysis</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research questions</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing the study</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II. DEFINING AND CONTEXTUALIZING MULTICULTURALISM</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarly debates on multiculturalism</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Multiple perspectives ..................................................................................................... 33
Multiculturalism in political sciences .......................................................................... 38
  *Multiculturalism and indigenous peoples* ................................................................. 41
  *Multiculturalism and immigrant rights* ................................................................. 42
  *Multiculturalism and national minorities* ................................................................. 44
Post-multicultural age? .................................................................................................. 48
Multiculturalism and cultural studies .......................................................................... 52
  *Critical multiculturalism* ........................................................................................ 57
  *Interculturalism* ...................................................................................................... 65
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 66

CHAPTER III. RHETORICAL HISTORY AND CONTEXTS

OF THE CONCEPT OF MULTICULTURALISM IN MACEDONIA ....................... 68

   Historical context:

   Yugoslavia .................................................................................................................. 69
     *Violence, civil unrest, and war* .............................................................................. 71
     *Rhetorical denial* .................................................................................................. 74
   The Republic of Macedonia ....................................................................................... 79
     *Macedonia and the EU* ......................................................................................... 81
     *Rhetorical needs for Macedonia* ........................................................................ 89
     *Rhetorical history of multiculturalism* ............................................................... 96
     *Post-independence discourses* ........................................................................... 99
     *A myriad of discourses of difference* ............................................................... 103
CHAPTER IV. EU DISCOURSE AND DEFINITION OF MULTICULTURALISM

OF MULTICULTURALISM ........................................................................................................ 128
The history of the EU and its cultural policy ......................................................................... 129
The "cultural deficit" of the EU ............................................................................................. 136
The slogan of "unity in diversity" .......................................................................................... 138
The current state of "multiculturalism" in the EU ................................................................. 142
Orientalizing the “Balkan Other” ......................................................................................... 153
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 158

CHAPTER V. METHODOLOGY .................................................................................. 160
Theories of intercultural rhetoric.......................................................................................... 161
Rhetoric and ideological criticism ......................................................................................... 172
Ideographs and cultural understanding ................................................................................ 177
Researcher and/as the Other ............................................................................................... 179
Procedure ............................................................................................................................... 182
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 184
APPENDIX A: OHRID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT................................. 320

APPENDIX B: EU SPEECHES ANALYZED ..................................................... 332

APPENDIX C: MACEDONIAN SPEECHES ANALYZED ................................. 342
INTRODUCTION
NEGOTIATING THE LANDSCAPE
OF DIVISION AND MARGINALIZATION

My grandmother said I was Muslim,
My parents said I was Albanian
My teacher said I was Yugoslav
My neighbor said I was Macedonian

As an Albanian ethnic minority living in Macedonia during a time of ideological, economic, and social transition, and as an international student in the U.S., marginality defines much of my life. From my standpoint, issues of social justice, democracy, emancipatory discourse and self-reflexivity permeate the lens through which I view the world. My situation is far from unique. Significant ethnic

---

1 My identity statement above is based that of Arben Kastrati (2008, September 28): “My grandmother said I was Muslim; My mother said I was Kosovar; My father said I was Albanian; My teacher said I was Yugoslav.” Kastrati, an actor from Kosovo, performed the character Ramiz in the acclaimed film Before the Rain (1994, dir. M. Manchevski) that addresses the inter-ethnic conflict in Macedonia during the Bosnian war.
conflict exists worldwide, and divisive rhetoric – grounded in an “us” and “them” dichotomy – pervades the political and cultural landscape.

The quote above perfectly describes my religious, ethnic and national identity. I was born and raised in Yugoslavia, a country that existed until 1991. By ethnicity I am Albanian. By religion I am Muslim. I was 14-years-old when Yugoslavia broke down, when I suddenly realized that I now live somewhere else, in an independent country called Macedonia. Before Yugoslavia disassembled, Macedonia was only one of its six republics, and we were all encouraged to be Yugoslavs. The expression of ethnic and religious identity was not encouraged during Yugoslavia, and we were all supposed to be brothers and sisters according to the ideology of “Brotherhood and Unity”. It was the job of the older people like my grandmother to constantly remind me about my religion, and my parents to constantly remind me about my ethnic identity.

After the independence of Macedonia people became freer in expressing our religion and ethnic identity but, being Albanian and Muslim in a country that is struggling with its national identity, means constantly experiencing division and marginality in all aspects of life. Macedonians have always felt that we should all consider ourselves Macedonian, since we live in the country of Macedonia, and that we should not put our ethnic identity before our national identity. My religious identity is also a problem in a country where the majority of the population is Orthodox Christian, and Muslims are constantly viewed as “others” or even as a threat.
Such is the landscape of division and marginality that I am facing every day. All these parts of my cultural identity have greatly influenced my being, the way I view the world and my research interests. I have experienced “otherness” all my life, and it has somehow become a comfort zone from which I operate in my daily life. I’ve also experienced many times now the feeling of being told by others who I am. Such experiences have motivated me to further explore the landscape that surrounds me through the study of communication.

This landscape of division and marginalization, linked to issues of power and ideology, demands a critical and reflective interrogation. At the heart of these issues, differing ontologies and epistemologies intersect producing injustice, colonization, Western domination and hegemony. This is why I am concerned with the stories told in a particular community and what happens when differing cultural and political ontologies and epistemologies intersect.

Living in what has been known as “the Balkans”, and both indirectly and directly experiencing the conflict and wars that happened in this region, I am

---

2 “Balkans” is placed in quotation marks to problematize the term. Please see chapter two of this dissertation for a detailed explanation of the socio-political and cultural analyses of the term. See also Šarić’s study (2004) on Balkan identity and self-images in *Journal of Multilingual & Multicultural Development.*
particularly engaged in the endeavour of examining ways in which individuals in conflict can manage their interactions through dialogue.
CHAPTER I
QUESTIONING THE IDEOLOGIES OF MULTICULTURALISM

"What do they call it? Multi-culti....It's all absurd you know."

- V. S. Naipaul (2004, September 5)

This chapter introduces some of the main issues of the study. It explores the state of “multiculturalism” in the EU and Macedonia today, as well as clarifies the reasons that have motivated this study. The chapter opens up with an overview of the study and continues into a discussion about the claims of the current EU leaders on the failure of “multiculturalism,” and its vague and contested definition in the EU. The chapter continues with a brief historical explanation of the multiculturalism discourse in Macedonia and explains the relevance of the “failure of multiculturalism” in the EU for Macedonia and its Euro Atlantic integration process. The final part of the chapter focuses on the research questions for the study and its organization.

Questioning ideologies of multiculturalism:

Overview of the study

Ideologies of multiculturalism have been widely critiqued by leading scholars in Europe (See Habermas, 1992; Žižek, 1997) and North America (See Giroux, 1993; Glazer, 1997; Gunew, 2004; Kanpol & McLaren, 1995; McLellan & Richmond, 1994; McLennan, 2001; Nakayama & Halualani, 2010) for many years, but recently multiculturalism has been more widely called into question in political and public discourses in Europe (See Modood, 2005; Said, 2011, October 22;
This study is motivated by the recent attention to multiculturalism and employs rhetorical criticism to examine the discourse between the European Union (EU) and Macedonia surrounding the concept of “multiculturalism.” The study analyzes how multiculturalism is rhetorically constructed in the speeches of EU representatives delivered to the Macedonian public and how multiculturalism is rhetorically constructed within the country by Albanians, the largest ethnic minority in the nation, and by Macedonians, the majority ethnic group. Rhetorical criticism affords opportunities to examine the hidden notions and possibilities in the construction of multiculturalism within the discourse between the EU and Macedonia while considering the political, ethical and social impacts in the perception and response of the people in Macedonia and their acceptance or rejection of this concept. This method provides an understanding of the way ideographs (McGee, 1980) such as multiculturalism act on people by exploring how individual choices and ideological assumptions shape patterns of cultural expression. The critical understanding of the rhetoric of multiculturalism and its conceptions by all the parties involved focuses upon a

Footnote:

3 Here, and on the following page, “multiculturalism” is included in quotation marks to indicate the problematized nature of the concept. Throughout the study the term is no longer included in quotation marks for ease of readability.
vital component in the EU accession dialogue between Macedonia and the EU and therefore addresses a crucial precondition for achieving a functioning democratic society in Macedonia.

Has multiculturalism failed?

Rising nationalist attitudes throughout Europe have increasingly threatened ethnic and religious minority populations, making issues of cultural diversity ever more visible. Such attitudes emerge from those who consider that national cultural identity is perceived as being under threat. A recent example emerges from Western Europe, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel told a gathering of young members of her conservative Christian Democratic Union party that “multiculturalism has utterly failed in Germany” (as cited in Weaver, 2010, October 17). Referring to “multikulti” she noted “that we are now living side by side and are happy about it”, simply does not work. “This approach has failed, utterly” (as cited in Hall, 2010, October 18). The Chancellor addressed fears of the nation losing its “German-ness” in the face of newly built mosques, an increase in headscarves in classrooms, and Turkish ghettos in major cities such as Berlin, by adding, “We feel bound to the Christian image of humanity – that is what defines us. Those who do not accept this are in the wrong place here” (Hall, 2010, October 18). In line with Merkel, Horst Seehofer, leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party’s Bavarian sister party, the CSU, has confirmed “‘Multikulti’ is dead” (as cited in Smee, 2010, October 18).
Alarming comments made only days after a nation-wide poll by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation showed one third of all citizens surveyed thought their nation was being “over-run by foreigners” (Siebold, 2010, October 17). Respondents also reported immigrants are “nothing more than welfare cheats” (Hall, 2010, October 18). Even more disturbingly, “more than one in ten called for a ‘fuehrer’ to run the country ‘with a strong hand’” (Siebold, 2010, October 17).

Since then, other political notables across Western Europe have concurred: British Prime Minister David Cameron critiqued the British policy of multiculturalism, arguing that it has encouraged “segregated communities” where Islamic extremism can thrive (as cited in Burns, 2011, February 5). According to Cameron, policies of multiculturalism have fostered extremist ideology and are directly contributing to home-grown Islamic terrorism. In his speech on Radicalization and Islamic Extremism delivered in Munich on February 5, 2011, Cameron stated that governments cannot ignore extremist Muslim ideology anymore, but they “have got to confront it” and they cannot encourage “people to live apart” but that they “need a clear sense of shared national identity, open to everyone” (as cited in Wright & Taylor, 2011, February 5).

Later that same month, French president Nicolas Sarkozy joined in the exchange, supporting Merkel he, too, believed that multiculturalism has failed (Agence France-Presse, 2011, February 10). In a live interview he gave on a French TV station TF1, Sarkozy called for an end to the tolerance of divided communities and claimed that members of all faiths must integrate into the wider
French society and accept its core values. The opposition leader, Marine Le Pen, of the French National Front praised his remarks and said that his views proved that he supported her far right-wing party's ideals. Multiculturalism policies were also criticized by Australia's former Prime Minister John Howard and former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar (Agence France-Presse, 2011, February 10).

While mass immigration has brought a great deal of advancement to Western Europe, such as enormous economic benefits and has helped in creating societies that are less narrow-minded, more vibrant and more cosmopolitan, the policies designed to manage immigration have been largely ineffective (Malik, 2011, July 6). Thus, multiculturalism became a burdened issue throughout Europe in recent years as anti-immigration sentiments are on the raise. A new study conducted by the British think-tank, Demos, claims that far-right is on the rise across Europe as a new generation of young, web-based supporters embrace hard-line nationalist and anti-immigrant groups (Walker & Taylor, 2011, November 6).

Such trends have resulted in the success of populist leaders such as Merkel, Cameron and Sarkozy, appealing to a sense of lost national identity by criticizing minorities, immigrants and particularly Muslims (Kulish, 2011, July 23). Nicolas Sarkozy, for example turned the issue of immigration into electoral politics since the beginning of his presidency, by rounding up Roma, introducing France’s fifth immigration law in seven years, banning Muslim women from wearing the niqab in public places, and launching a national debate on what it means to be French, led by his new Ministry of Immigration and National Identity (Chrisafis, 2010). Moreover,
Associated Press reports that France's expulsion of immigrants is on the rise in 2011 (Corbet, 2012, January 10). The current interior minister, Claude Gueant, claimed that thousands more immigrants will be expelled 2012, as well as few foreigners legally living in France. He claimed that the immigrants that will want to remain in France will have to get rid of traditions that contradict French values (Corbet, 2012, January 10). This is particularly disturbing since France has Western Europe's largest Muslim population, many with family ties to former French colonies in North Africa.

Populist politicians in other parts of Europe have also made major electoral gains by putting fuel on fears about multiculturalism. Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Jimmie Akesson in Sweden are few of the many politicians in Europe who have profited from anti-multiculturalism rhetoric (Kulish, 2011, July 23). The Austrian government was also criticized by the Turkish ambassador, Kadri Ecved Tezcan, for the negative treatment of Turks in Austria. He demanded an explanation why the Austrian government has given full citizenship to 110,000 Turks and at the same time treated them as second class citizens (Traynor, 2010).

While the far right populist politicians generally do not condone violence, experts say that a climate of hatred in the political discourse has encouraged violent individuals who are harming the European society even more (Kulish, 2011, July 23). Such was the case with the Norway attacks that occurred on July the 22nd, 2011 and which once again brought the issue of multiculturalism to the forefront of political discussion in Europe. The attacks were composed of two sequential
actions, the first one being a car bomb explosion in Oslo at the executive government district and the second one a gunman shooting at a summer camp on the island of Utøya, in Norway (Mala & Goodman, 2011, July 22). Both attacks were executed by a single person called Anders Breivik, who was later arrested and confessed to having killed 77 people that day. To this day, Breivik denies criminal guilt because he believes the massacre was necessary to “save” Norway and Europe from Muslim immigrants. He says the attacks represent a cultural revolution aimed at cleaning Europe of Muslims and “punishing politicians who have embraced multiculturalism” (as cited in Erlanger, 2011, July 25).

While Anders Breivik was proclaimed insane by a team of psychological experts in Norway, many authors and scholars claim that his actions and thinking is a consequence of a far right extremist ideology booming in Europe nowadays (Goodwin, 2011; Townsend & Traynor, 2011; Žižek, 2011). Notable Slavoj Žižek, for example categorized Breivik’s claims and his attacks “as simply a consequent exposition of ‘Europe's crisis’ which serves as the (more or less) implicit foundation of the rising anti-immigrant populism” (as cited in Žižek, 2011, August 8). Matthew Goodwin (2011, July 24) claimed that Breivik’s actions were symptomatic of a growing culture of politically motivated violence against immigrants and minorities across Europe. Whereas, according to Mark Townsend and Ian Traynor, “Breivik’s opinions are part of a wider political and cultural shift as anti-Islamic and xenophobic groups take root across Europe” (2011, July 30).
The European Union pledged to address far right extremism immediately after the attacks in Norway that were motivated by hatred of Muslims. European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, said Breivik’s manifesto was not uncommon to contemporary European political discourse in Norway. She claimed she has many times expressed her concern over xenophobic parties who build their successful rhetoric on negative opinions on Islam and other so-called threats against society. She continued to say that such rhetoric “creates a very negative environment, and sadly there are too few leaders today who stand up for diversity and for the importance of having open, democratic and tolerant societies where everybody is welcome” (Spiegel Online International, 2011, July 27).

In addition to the above mentioned issues surrounding multiculturalism and immigration, the EU is currently facing the deepest economic crisis in 60 years, which goes beyond the Euro fiasco and the enormous tide of debt faced by some member countries such as Greece and Italy (Rice-Oxley, 2012, January 25). This situation has resulted in the raise of euro-skepticism across the continent; both by the EU member countries as well as aspiring members (See Brambilla, 2012, January 26; Głuchowski, 2012, January 26; Mestre, 2012, January 26; Rice-Oxley, 2012, January 25; Prieto, 2012, January 26). As a result, national stereotyping and scapegoating between member nations has been on the rise and according to Rice-Oxley (2012, January 25) it is no longer a taboo to express stereotypes such as “lazy Greeks,” “bossy Germans,” “chauvinistic French,” and “haughty Brits” (See Erlinger, 2012, January 26; Freedland, 2012, January 26; Normand, 2012, January 26). Thus, besides struggling
to accept immigrants as part of their own societies, EU member states are also
struggling to accept each other. Thus, the economic crisis and the rise of euro-
skepticism have important implications on the issue of “multiculturalism” in the EU.

While claims that “multiculturalism has failed” have been criticized (See
Olterman, 2010, October 18; Smee, 2010, October 17), they have fueled already
heated immigration debate across the world. Commentators on the European side of
the Atlantic found parallels to similar debates in the United States, where
immigration concerns have lead to “period of raw political acrimony” (Heathcott,
2011, p. 39). While the U.S. has historically honored its immigrants for establishing
its so-called “melting pot” nature, there are increasingly intense discursive wars
over immigration, focused particularly on immigrants from Central and South
America. A rising tide of xenophobic hostility toward immigrants is emerging most
notably by the American right, (See Gimpel, 2010; Hainmueller & Hiscox. 2010;
Hawley, 2011; Heathcott, 2011), who demonize immigrants claiming they threaten
to ruin the foundation of liberal democracy (Caroll, 2010, October 25). Ten years
after the 9/11 attacks, American Muslims face growing prejudices and have become
the country's internal enemy (Fichtner, 2011, 13 November). Similar to the
European examples above, there are fears of the U.S. losing its “American-ness”;
contrary to the late 19th and early 20th century immigrants from Europe who largely
rescinded their identity in order to (at least attempt to) be accepted into dominant
American culture, current immigrants aspire to continue their cultural and linguistic
heritage. As a result, “the U.S. is walking the knife-edge of moral panic, and immigration is the touchstone” (Heathcott, 2011, p. 39).

Vague, ambiguous, and contested concepts

While most scholars have deemed the idea consistent with EU norms, the meaning of multiculturalism was vague and contested within the EU countries even before the immigration debates took place. Most of these countries have very differing understandings and definitions of the concept of multiculturalism that transpire in the ambiguity of the EU foreign policy. For example, countries like Germany, France, and Great Britain use different models for multiculturalism that sometimes even contradict each other (Aggestam & Hill, 2008). As a result, the EU has poorly articulated issues of human rights and minority rights in several occasions. Besides the ambiguity and the current immigration discussions, this ambiguity is currently increasing as a result of the dimension of border protection arising out of a fear of terrorism, and the need to counter very serious threats and strengthen national security of the member states.

One of the most important cultural theorists of the 21st century, Slavoj Žižek, in an interview for the independent media organization DEMOCRACY NOW, agrees to a certain extent with the right wing arguments advanced in both Europe and US and says that countries need to develop a set of values accepted by all. He asserts that “we just need a neutral legal network — how we will politely ignore each other.” (Žižek, 2010, October 18). However, as he says, the question remains: Who will have the power to make the decision about these values.
“Multiculturalism” in Macedonia

Multicultural discourses in Macedonia have developed under conditions of warfare and intensive pressures from the European Union and United States (Staniševski & Miller, 2009). The concept itself resulted from the inter-ethnic conflict between Macedonians and Albanians in 2001, and the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which provides the main format for the multiculturalism discourse (see Appendix 1: Ohrid Framework Agreement).

As a result of the aforementioned conditions of warfare and international pressure, as well as the contexts and power relationship between the two groups, the different ethnic groups in Macedonia have competing conceptualizations of the term. According to Reka (2007), while the Albanian community has a more positive attitude toward the term, due to their interests in Euro-Atlantic integration, the Macedonian majority view multiculturalism either as an ideological import that is completely out of context or as just a catchy phrase replacing the old-fashioned policies of ethnic control.

---

4 The Ohrid Framework Agreement and additional historical contexts will be further analyzed in chapters II and III.
Inter-ethnic co-existence is of major importance to the stability and
democratic development of Macedonia as a country and its road toward accession
into the EU. Macedonia officially received the EU candidate status in 2005 and, in
2009, the European Commission recommended the start of accession negotiations.
But, even though at that time the Commission believed the country was ready to
engage in a higher level of integration with Europe, it also stressed that further
efforts are needed in most areas. The 2010 Progress Report published by the
European Commission pointed to the need for further progress in areas such as:
political dialogue, judiciary and public administration reform, fight against
corruption, freedom of expression and media, and implementation of the Ohrid
Framework Agreement (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2010

The Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed on August 13, 2001 in the
northwest Macedonian town of Ohrid to resolve the ethnic conflict between the
Albanian and Macedonian ethnic communities as well as guarantee the territorial
integrity of the country. Signed by the government of Macedonia and by ethnic
Albanian representatives, the Agreement guarantees the introduction of participative
mechanisms when making decisions related to the communities’ identity; equitable
representation of the members of non-majority communities in the public
administration; a high level of decentralization; promotion of the official use of non-
majority languages and alphabet, as well as the communities’ symbols; and higher education in the language of the non-majority communities that represent at least 20% of the population. As a result, the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement represents one of the guarantees for the multicultural and inter-ethnic co-existence in Macedonia. This is also one of the main priorities for the EU integration and for the Macedonian government according to the Framework Agreement Plan adopted in 2003 (National Strategy for European Integration of the Republic of Macedonia, 2004).

Ten years after its signing, however, the Ohrid Framework Agreement has not yet been fully implemented, and the tensions between the two major ethnic groups are still very much present (See Fouere, 2006; Ilievski & Taleski 2009; Ordanosi & Matovski 2007; Reka, 2007; Staniševski & Miller, 2009), thus the dream of a multiethnic and multicultural Macedonia is far from complete. Jovanovski (2010, April 27) reports that the European Union, NATO, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the US ambassadors in Macedonia issued a statement expressing concern about the separatist declarations by the local political leaders and other individuals, that contradict and abandon the Ohrid Framework Agreement. In this joint statement, the ambassadors asked the local political leaders to reaffirm their full commitment to the Ohrid Framework Agreement, redouble their commitment to inter-ethnic harmony, and refrain from any actions that could create interethnic tension.
On the 10th anniversary of the Stability and Association Agreement and the Ohrid Framework Agreement, held in Ohrid on April 9, 2011, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso stated:

Over the last ten years the Ohrid Framework Agreement has proven its worth as a framework for ensuring a functioning multi-ethnic democracy. Through it your country is indeed providing an example which is of interest to countries around the world. Nonetheless, the enduring challenge of deepening mutual understanding between different communities and building a cohesive country remains. It cannot be ticked off.

Barroso also reminded the Macedonian government that the country must commit to joining “a peaceful Union of democracies based on reconciliation and interdependence, negotiations and compromises” but in order to achieve that goal, the country has to show respect for the rule of law, freedom of expression and good inter-ethnic relations as keys for a well-functioning and cohesive society. He closed the speech with the words of philosopher Henry David Thoreau (1854) who, as he said, represents his wish for the country: “Let go of the past and go for the future. Go confidently in the direction of your dreams. Live the life you imagined.”

---

5 The quote from Henry David Thoreau, from his 1854 work, *Walden*, is often misquoted and converted to imperative mood. The original text is as follows: “If one advances confidently in the direction of his dreams, and endeavors to live the
Even though some progress has been made, the latest European Commission report and the speech by its president shows that the full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement remains as a guarantee for the multi-ethnic and multicultural existence of Macedonia and one of the major obligations for the county to acquire EU membership. Since the basic goal of the Ohrid Framework Agreement is to promote peaceful and harmonious development of the civil society, while respecting both the ethnic identity and the interest of the all citizens of Republic of Macedonia, the country needs to implement the principles of multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity in every field of the social and the political life in accordance with the aspirations for European integration (Jovanovska & Stojmenov, 2010).

EU accession dialogues and processes

To assist the country’s accession process, in March 2000 the EU opened the Delegation of the European Union office in the capital city of Skopje. The main focus of the delegation office is to facilitate the development of political, economic, and trade relations between the EU and Macedonia, promote the values of the EU, and serve as a liaison between national authorities and EU institutions.

“... In proportion as he simplifies his life, the laws of the universe will appear less complex, and solitude will not be solitude, nor poverty, nor weakness.”
After signing the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001, the European Council appointed the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) with a goal to contribute to the consolidation of the peaceful political process and the full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, thereby facilitating further progress towards European integration.

After receiving the candidate status in 2005, the EU appointed its own Special Representative and Head of the EU Delegation with residence in Macedonia, the Irish diplomat Ambassador Mr. Erwan Fouéré who served until the end of 2010. Following the appointment Fouéré, Danish diplomat Ambassador Peter Sørensen was appointed in 2011 as the new head of the EU Delegation. Fouéré and Sørensen lead the Delegation in its facilitation of communication between the EU Commission and the Macedonian government for membership negotiations with the EU, and maintain regular dialogue with governmental and academic institutions, the private sector, and civil society. Ambassador Peter Sørensen left the position later that year to become Head of the EU Delegation in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The current Head of EU Delegation in Macedonia is the Estonian diplomat, Aivo Orav, who was appointed in December 22, 2011.

During the candidate pre-accession process, the Delegation’s role is to monitor and report Macedonia’s compliance with political and economic criteria for EU accession, alignment of Macedonian and EU legislation, and the capacity to enforce this legislation. Finally, the Delegation informs Macedonian authorities, institutions, media organizations, and citizens about the pre-accession process and the EU institutions and policies.
Another key role of the Delegation is to serve as the contracting authority to oversee EU financing of projects to aid the implementation of necessary reforms. To date there have been 250 such projects, including the People and Culture Project (2007-2013) which aims to raise awareness of the cultural richness of Macedonia and other candidate countries from Southeastern Europe and to challenge preconceptions about them. The project brings in musicians, writers, filmmakers and culinary artists from the region on a tour through western European nations and for People and Culture days around Macedonia.

Texts and analysis

Concepts such as “multiculturalism”, “interethnic tolerance”, “interethnic dialogue”, “interethnic cooperation” and “interethnic stability” form an ideographic cluster in the political dialogue between the major ethnic groups, as well as in the country’s dialogue with the EU. Such concepts constantly are brought up in political speeches both by the local and EU leaders, national and international media, as well as within everyday conversations. The question is however, whether those vocabularies have the same meanings for all the parties involved in the dialogue, or whether different parties attach different meanings and ideologies to them. Since the discourse with the EU is so important to Macedonia’s future, answering this question is critical. It is vital to also understand the way a particular vocabulary is used and defined by all the parties involved and how it might affect the accession process.
Accordingly, this study conducts an ideographical analysis of the vocabulary used by the EU and Macedonia from the years 2006 to 2009. Forty-two speeches directly addressing the issue of multiculturalism and multiethnic stability of the country were given by various EU and Macedonian diplomats and reveal the ideographic status of these terms. These individuals include: the former head of the EU delegation in Macedonia, Ambassador Erwan Fouéré, the former EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn and Joan Pearce, Minister Counselor of the Delegation of the European Commission in Macedonia, as well as Macedonian Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski; the Macedonian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Antonio Milosovski, the former president of Macedonia, Branko Crvenkovski, and the Vice Prime Minister for the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement representing the Albanian political party in government, Abdylaqim Ademi. The main ideograph is “multiculturalism,” whereas “interethnic tolerance,” “interethnic dialogue,” “interethnic cooperation” and “interethnic stability” are also included as synonymous terms or concepts that at least have some relationship to the main ideograph of “multiculturalism.”

Rhetoric is central to the constitution of collective life and fundamental to the creation, negotiation and contestation of culture (McGee, 1979). Rhetoric represents a multi-layered process that accomplishes multiple functions simultaneously, and forms the medium through which community understandings and priorities are directed. Ideographs are crucial concepts for understanding cultural and historical influences within the intercultural dialogue between diverse
groups living in Macedonia, and their relationship with the EU. Ideographs are highly loaded terms that have instantly recognizable meaning that has a use to persuade or mediate conflict. They act as forms of political rhetoric that shape the realities of the people living in Macedonia. The ideographs are historically and culturally grounded commonplace rhetorical terms invoking identification with key social commitments (McGee, 1980). In the case of Macedonia, the ideograph of multiculturalism invokes identification to the commitment of a multiethnic and multicultural society that is a full member of the EU. Differences in historical interpretation, geographical and ethnic understandings of multiculturalism – within Macedonia and in the dialogue with EU – produce different conceptions of the term, and highlight the necessity for a more thorough analysis of the different meanings and ideologies that these groups attach to the concept of multiculturalism. While the aim of the ideograph introduced by the EU was to unite these communities, different conceptions of multiculturalism has further separated them and contributed to the vague and contested nature of the ideograph for various groups in the Macedonian context.

Research questions

Given the aforementioned texts and contexts, the principal research question posed for this study is:
“How does the EU rhetorically construct ‘multiculturalism’ as a way to mediate the political and cultural tensions between Albanians and Macedonians to facilitate the accession process?”

The following question sub-sets expand upon the central research question.

*Question sub-set #1*

What is the rhetorical context and history of “multiculturalism” in Macedonia? What are the main tensions between the Albanian and Macedonian ethnic groups and what has been done so far to resolve them? What is the significance of multiculturalism in the EU accession process? How has the multiculturalism debate become a discursive arena in which ethnic anxieties are examined and resolved?

*Question sub-set #2*

How is “multiculturalism” defined in the EU? What are the rhetorical challenges with this concept within the EU countries? How is the immigration debate on both sides of the Atlantic impacting the understanding of this concept? How does the ambiguous conception of such term affect EU’s foreign policy and enlargement process?

*Question sub-set #3*

What is the EU’s ideological conceptualization behind the ideograph of “multiculturalism” when EU representatives present it to the Macedonian audience? How do EU representatives define multiculturalism when they speak to audiences in Macedonia, and how do they define it when they speak to audiences in the EU?
What, according to the EU and its representatives, is the importance of multiculturalism in Macedonia?

*Question sub-set #4*

What are the Albanian and Macedonian perspectives and responses toward the ideograph of multiculturalism? How do these definitions shape the identity of the minorities in Macedonia and whose interests are upheld? What does the upholding of the discursive status quo surrounding the issue of multiculturalism mean to those who are of an ethnic minority in Macedonia?

*Question sub-set #5*

What are some rhetorical and cultural opportunities for the further development of the concept of multiculturalism in Macedonia? How can cultural rhetoric further mediate the dialogue between EU and Macedonia, as well as the dialogue between the two major ethnic groups, the Albanians and Macedonians?

The importance of ideographs in political rhetoric

In line with Black (2003) and Delgado (1999), who assert that the use of rhetoric through ideographs has the potential to influence social change, this study focuses on an ideographical analysis for the purpose of raising awareness about the importance of the diverse cultural conceptualizations of such terms, as well as the meanings that arise as a result of the differing cultural values, experiences, and perceptions among all the parties involved. Moreover, by focusing on the way current ideographs are employed and the effects of their normative use on the
discourse of EU accession, the study raises awareness of the importance of ideographs in political rhetoric and their impact on important decisions that affect whole communities. The ideographical analyses of multiculturalism in the discourse between the EU and Macedonia will help reveal the interpreting systems of Macedonian and EU public motives, as well as the way these ideographs act as forms of political rhetoric to shape the reality of the people living in Macedonia. This process is crucial to understanding cultural and historical influences in the intercultural dialogue between the diverse parties living in the country as well as the dialogue between the country and the EU.

Organizing the study

This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Following this chapter which introduces the study and presents the research questions that guide it, Chapter II begins with an overview of the scholarly debates on multiculturalism, with particular focus on three areas of multiculturalism in policy-making: indigenous peoples, immigrant rights and concerns, and national minorities. This is followed by a critique of the multiculturalism model by cultural studies scholars and the conceptualization of critical multiculturalism and interculturalism as a response to the liberal multiculturalism model.

Chapter III provides a rhetorical and historical account of the concept of multiculturalism in Macedonia. The focus of this chapter is to situate the foundation of the study and describe how the concept of multiculturalism was developed in Macedonia. This chapter answers question sub-set #1: What is the
rhetorical context and history of “multiculturalism” in Macedonia? What are some of the main tensions between the Albanian and Macedonian ethnic group and what has been done so far to resolve them? What is the importance of multiculturalism in the EU accession process? How has the multiculturalism debate become an area in which ethnic anxieties are examined and resolved?

Chapter IV outlines the primary discursive themes that have led up to the current discussions on multiculturalism in the EU and provides the rhetorical context and rhetorical history of the concept of multiculturalism in the EU. This chapter answers question sub-set #2: How is “multiculturalism” defined in the EU? What are the rhetorical challenges with this concept within the EU countries? How is the immigration debate on both sides of the Atlantic impacting the understanding of this concept? How does the ambiguous conception of such term affect EU’s foreign policy and enlargement process?

Chapter V outlines the methodology that is used in analyzing the speeches of the EU and Macedonian political representatives in their dialogue for EU accession. The chapter thoroughly discusses theories of rhetorical criticism, with a particular focus on ideological criticism by Michael McGee (1980), which is the primary method for this study. This chapter also touches upon more broad discussions such as theories of intercultural rhetoric, the role of the researcher as “the Other,” the role of “ideographs” (McGee, 1980) in cultural understandings and explains the procedures of this study.

Chapter VI presents the ideographic analysis of the speeches delivered by the EU representatives in Macedonia and the Macedonian government. The chapter answers
question sub-sets #3 and #4. The first part of the chapter titled *Analysis of the EU Speeches* answers the question sub-sets #3: What is the EU’s ideological conceptualization behind the ideograph of “multiculturalism” when EU representatives present it to the Macedonian audience? How do EU representatives define multiculturalism when they speak to audiences in Macedonia, and how do they define it when they speak to audiences in the EU? What, according to the EU and its representatives, is the importance of multiculturalism in Macedonia? The second part of the Chapter titled *Analysis of the Speeches given by the Macedonian Government* answers question sub-sets #4: What are the Albanian and Macedonian perspectives and responses toward the ideograph of multiculturalism? How do these definitions shape the identity of the minorities in Macedonia and whose interests are upheld? What does the upholding of the discursive status quo surrounding the issue of multiculturalism mean to those who are of an ethnic minority in Macedonia? The chapter concludes by analyzing the similarities and differences in the conceptualization of the ideograph of multiculturalism by the EU and the Macedonian government, as well as touches upon the different nuances in the conceptualization of multiculturalism by the Macedonian and Albanian political elites forming the Macedonian government.

Chapter VII summarizes the findings of the study and discusses possibilities for future research in understanding the ideograph of muticulturalism. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an in-depth discussion of both of the research questions and subsets.
Conclusion

This chapter explained the state of multiculturalism in the EU and Macedonia today, which serves as the main motivation behind this study. The chapter elucidates that while multiculturalism is considered to be failing in the EU, it is still being enforced in Macedonia as one of the main preconditions for joining the EU. The rejection of multiculturalism in the EU and its ambiguity as a concept makes it hard for countries like Macedonia who are struggling to gain accession, to understand what exactly the EU means with this term and to apply it. Unfortunately the EU and the Macedonian government remain largely unaware and uninterested of the differing conceptions of the term within their own communities. Even though multiculturalism in Macedonia is not related to any immigration issues, since the majority of the ethnic groups in this country have been there since antiquity, the rejection of the concept by the main EU leaders greatly affects the way the people of Macedonian and the government responds to one of the main terms set by the EU to meet the precondition for accession to the EU. The lack of any coherent definition and understanding of the concept of multiculturalism in the EU, has led to the rejection of the concept by the ethnic groups living in Macedonia, and to its usage by political leaders only when they want to gain credits with the international community. The next chapter will focus on the theoretical and conceptual definition of multiculturalism.
CHAPTER II
DEFINING AND CONTEXTUALIZING MULTICULTURALISM

“The multicultural movement .. has so far failed to throw up a coherent philosophical statement of its central principles.”

- Bhikhu Parekh (2000, December)

This chapter begins with an overview of the scholarly debates on multiculturalism, with a particular focus on the history of its conception in both the political and cultural studies discourses. The first part of the chapter discusses the conceptualization of multiculturalism by the political sciences scholars in the 1990s and their influence in multicultural policies in various liberal democracies around the world. The chapter discusses three areas of multiculturalism in policy-making: indigenous peoples, immigrant rights and concerns, and national minorities. This is followed by a critique of the multiculturalism model by cultural studies scholars and the conceptualization of critical multiculturalism as a response to the liberal multiculturalism model. The chapter reveals the ambiguous conception of multiculturalism in both political sciences and cultural studies scholarship, which is the reason behind its “failure” in policy making. The problems with the concept of multiculturalism in political sciences and cultural studies discussions have important implications for this study and provide a background to the problem that both the EU and Macedonia are facing with this concept.
Scholarly debates on multiculturalism

In order to analyze how the EU rhetorically constructs multiculturalism as a way to mediate the political and cultural tensions between Macedonians and Albanians to facilitate the accession process, it is important to understand the varying contexts surrounding the concept of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism can be defined as a series of scholarly debates that became prominent in the 1990s as a critique of mainstream political philosophy and social sciences (Inglis, 1996; Jovanovska & Stojmenov, 2010; Kymlicka, 2010; McKerl, 2007; Rex, 2003;). By that time Western countries had started to recognize that the structures and mechanisms of civil society were sexist and racist at many levels and globalization, increased migration and the changed demographic structure of Western countries required new approaches that would correspond to the ethnic and cultural diversity in society (McKerl, 2007). Since its inception, just after the end of World War II, the United Nations (UN) was motivated to ensure peace, development and respect for the rights of individuals, based on the horrible experiences of persons of Jewish heritage, Roma (Gypsies) and other victims of genocide during the war (Kymlicka, 2007; Inglis, 1996). As a result, the UN and its specialized agencies developed certain instruments highlighting the vital issues regarding ethnic minorities. This led to several covenants and declarations passed by the UN, starting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which for the first time guaranteed respect of cultural rights (Inglis, 1996). The 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, extended these rights to also include “the rights of persons belonging to minorities to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life,
as well as in the decision-making process concerning the minority to which they belong; to establish and monitor their own associations; to establish and maintain, without any discrimination, free and peaceful contacts with other members of their group or other citizens of other States to whom they are related by national or ethnic, religious or linguistic ties” (as cited in Inglis, 1996, p. 12).

This made multiculturalism a priority to policy makers, and academics, and social commentators in Western countries and as a result, it became a major area of academic inquiry (See, Bauböck, 1995; Hathaway & Lengel, 1997; Kymlicka, 1989, 1995, 2007; Lengel, 1996; Phillips, 1995; Spinner, 1994; Tamir, 1993; Taylor, 1992; Tully, 1995; Walzer, 1992a, 1992b, 1994; Young, 1990). Multiculturalism research was also motivated by the ongoing complexities in seeking to obtain peaceful coexistence among different ethnic groups in countries around the world during the early 1990s (Inglis, 1996). Some scholars site the break-up of communism in 1989 and the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in South Eastern Europe, including the conflicts that occurred in former Yugoslavia, as the main motivation behind researching issues of multiculturalism (See Inglis, 1996; Kymlicka, 1995; Rex, 2003; Tiryakian, 2003). Kymlicka (1995) stated:

In many countries of the world -including the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia - the status of national minorities and indigenous peoples is perhaps the most pressing issue. People in these countries are looking to the works of Western liberals for guidance regarding the principles of liberal constitutionalism in a multinational state. But a liberal tradition offers only confused and contradictor advice on this question
If liberalism is to have any chance of taking hold in these countries, it must explicitly address the needs and aspirations of ethnic and national minorities (p.13).

More recent motivations behind the study of multiculturalism and its adoption in official policies in different countries are: the growing numbers of political refugees and asylum seekers in Western Europe, concerns about immigration in the EU and US, the ways in which immigrants assimilate or integrate in countries of Western Europe, as well as concerns about "unassimilated" immigrant groups after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Rex, 2003).

Multiple contexts and perspectives

Due to the differing motivations behind the study of multiculturalism, Bhikhu Parekh (2000) asserted that there is still no single definition or single way of thinking about multiculturalism. Some notions of multiculturalism focus on a common culture shared by all in a society while others acknowledge the role of race and ethnicity in a society and, therefore, highlight the dominance and subordination of groups, or the power relations among cultural groups. According to Hollinger (1995), multiculturalism is a political ideology challenging the traditional Western emphasis on individual freedom and rights. Nussbaum (1997) defines it as an explicit policy and legal approach such as those adopted by Australia and Canada to accommodate their diverse population, and according to Cortes (2000), it can be considered as a call for the inclusion of marginalized voices and perspectives in education and the media.
Radtke (2001) believes that multiculturalism is a “diffused concept,” having travelled ubiquitously from its North American origins in Canada and the United States in the early 1970s, across the Atlantic to Western and eventually Eastern Europe, and across the Pacific to Australia and India. Having done so, it has been applied differently by different countries and nations depending on their demographic, social and economic conditions and as a result it has lost its meaning. Benhabib (1996) argued that multiculturalism has been used to refer to such a wide range of phenomena that it “has practically lost meaning” (p. 17). While, some progressive scholars like Iris Young and Nancy Fraser have given up the term “multiculturalism” altogether to defend a cultural politics under a different label, such as Young’s (2000) “politics of difference” and Fraser’s (1998) “transformative politics of recognition.”

As a result, the concept of multiculturalism should not be taken for granted (Awad, 2011). Inglis (1996) made a distinction between “three interrelated, referents of ‘multiculturalism’ and its related adjective ‘multicultural’ which can be distinguished in public debate and discussion” and they are “the demographic-descriptive,” “the ideological-normative” and “the programmatic-political” (p. 16). The “demographic-descriptive” referent of multiculturalism occurs in cases when this concept is used to refer to the existence of different ethnicities or races in a society or country. The “programmatic-political” (p.16) usage of multiculturalism refers to specific programs and policy initiatives designed to respond to and manage ethnic diversity, such as the policies for ethnic diversity that have been organized in the Canadian society for over a century. It is the third referent of multiculturalism, which Inglis (1996) called the “ideological-normative” (p. 16) that this
study is concerned with, and the one that still generates the greatest level of discussion. The ideological aspect of multiculturalism, according to Inglis (1996), is based on the sociological theorizing and the ethical and philosophical considerations about the place of culturally distinct identities in contemporary society and this is the one that provides a model for political action and adoption of policies.

For Inglis (1996), “multiculturalism emphasizes that acknowledging the existence of ethnic diversity and ensuring the rights of individuals to retain their culture should go hand in hand with enjoying full access to, participation in, and adherence to, constitutional principles and commonly shared values prevailing in the society” (p.16). Thus, multiculturalism in general stresses the importance of acknowledging the existence of ethnic diversity and simultaneously ensuring the rights of individuals to keep their culture (Jovanovska & Stojmenov, 2010). By acknowledging the rights of individuals and groups and ensuring equitable access to society, the advocates of multiculturalism also maintain that multicultural policies benefit individuals and the larger society because they have the potential to reduce social conflict based on disadvantage and inequality. Supporters of multicultural policies also argue that it enriches society as a whole and that it provides a way to address the challenges associated with the conflicting values and the possibilities of violence that have come to be associated with ethnic, cultural and religious differences (See McKerl, 2007; Modood, 2007; Trotman, 2002; Inglis, 1996; Parekh 2000).

Trotman (2002) asserts that multiculturalism is the name for an approach that “uses several disciplines to highlight neglected aspects of our social history, particularly the histories of women and minorities” and “promotes respect for the
dignity of the lives and voices of the forgotten” (p. ix). Furthermore, Modood (2007) argued that multiculturalism is just what we need in the 21st century and that “we need more not less" (p. 14). According to him, multiculturalism “is a form of integration that best meets the normative implications of equal citizenship and under our post-9/11 circumstances stands the best chance of succeeding” (p. 14). Parekh (2000) clarifies that multiculturalism is not only about minorities but about majorities as well. He argues that multiculturalism is in fact about the proper terms of relationship between different cultural communities” and that “the principles of justice cannot be derived from one culture alone but through open and equal dialogue between them” (p. 13).

Parekh (2000) discusses how the early 1970s marked the emergence of the multicultural movement at first in Canada and Australia and then in the USA, UK, Germany and elsewhere. According to him, multiculturalism is best understood neither as a political doctrine nor a philosophical school with a distinct theory, but as a perspective on or a way of viewing human life. There are three central insights of multiculturalism according to Parekh (1999): First, human beings are culturally embedded in the sense that they grow up and live within a culturally structured world and organize their lives and social relations in terms of a culturally derived system of meaning and significance. Second, different cultures represent different systems of meaning and visions of life. Third, every culture is internally plural and reflects a continuing conversation between its different traditions and strands of thought. This does not mean that culture is devoid of coherence and identity but that
its identity is plural, fluid and open. Thus, Parekh (2000) strongly believes that culturally distinct groups can coexist in a single society, and that the multicultural nature of a society should be welcomed and celebrated. He asserts that as a result of migration, societies with a single unitary culture are no longer likely to exist in the modern world.

Even though the concept of multiculturalism was developed mainly as a critique of assimilation (Joppke 1996; Kymlicka 1995), some approaches to multiculturalism are very much assimilationist. As a result some scholars study multiculturalism within the spectrum of philosophies of assimilation (See Bloemraad, 2004; Gallagher & Pritchard, 2007; Levin, et. al., 2012; Rodríguez-García, 2010) and integration (See Basu, 2011; Koopmans, 2010; Parvin, 2009). With assimilation, minority cultures are absorbed into the majority culture to the point where the minority culture loses its identity. This is a one-way approach, where the minority cultures need to adapt to the majority culture. This is exemplified in the “melting pot” metaphor of American immigration doctrine, which encourages immigrants to “melt” into American culture through assimilation (Dicker, 1994; Peach, 2005). With integration, the minority cultures are still visible within the majority culture, and there is a two-way approach of social interaction through which minority and majority cultures take action to facilitate integration (Puzić, 2004). This is exemplified by the “cultural mosaic” metaphor used in Canada, which brings the image of many different cultures living harmoniously in one place to create a diverse whole (Peach, 2005). With this metaphor, the minority cultures
maintain distinguishable characteristics and are able to retain their identities within the majority culture.

But, Modood (2005) maintains that multiculturalism differs from integration because it recognizes the social reality of groups - for example, the sense of solidarity with people of similar origin, faith, or language. Multiculturalism also acknowledges the diverse identities of each individual. For example, individuals belong to many different cultures, depending on their ethnicity, race, religion, language, national identity, gender, sexuality, ability, socioeconomic status, etc. Each individual has the potential to identify with multiple cultural identities and therefore is not limited to their “piece of glass” within the mosaic.

Multiculturalism in political sciences

The concept of multiculturalism was mainly developed by scholars in political sciences who became interested in the concept due to their need to define the nature of a good liberal society (See Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995; 2010). This kind of society needed to guarantee the rights of individuals, but the question was whether such rights should be extended to groups as well (Rex, 2003). At first sight it seemed that the very recognition of groups would involve a denial of individual rights, but one of the most important multiculturalism scholars in political philosophy, Charles Taylor (1994), believed this to be wrong. He viewed what he called “recognition” as essential to the concept of rights, and maintained that individuals could be recognized as members of groups.
Kymlicka (1995), another important political sciences scholar, raised similar issues in writing about multicultural citizenship. While both Taylor (1994) and Kymlicka (1995) had a serious impact on conceptualizing multiculturalism in political science literature, and while their scholarship had a considerable impact on developing multiculturalism policies, it is important to note that they were both Canadian and had to deal with the special problem of Quebec’s claims to a separate political identity at the same time as discussing the identity of dispersed groups of immigrants and their descendants. As a result, their views might be problematic to be applied elsewhere. Also, it is important to know that other political studies scholars have also made a significant contribution to the study of multiculturalism, however, this chapter focuses on Kymlicka and Taylor the the major scholars of multiculturalism.

However, the literature on multiculturalism during the 1990s was heavily dominated by political philosophers who developed distinctly liberal–democratic theories of multicultural citizenship. Scholars like Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor were interested in the question of whether multiculturalism was consistent in principle with their ideal theories of justice and attempted to show how familiar liberal–democratic principles of individual freedom and distributive justice could appeal to give a principled defense of certain multiculturalism claims (Kymlicka, 2010).

These philosophical accounts of multiculturalism ground what has been contextualized as the “liberal multicultural hypothesis” (Will Kymlicka, 2010, p. 258) developed by Will Kymlicka as one of the most influential approaches to multiculturalism in such works as Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989) and
Both Taylor and Kymlicka believe that multicultural policy models allow nation-states to recognize the legitimate interests of minorities in their identity and culture without eroding core liberal-democratic values. Members of minority groups have legitimate interests in their languages and cultures, and social justice requires accommodating these legitimate interests through multiculturalism policies, without making predictions one way or the other about how such policies affect broader liberal–democratic values. Moreover, scholars that advocate multiculturalism typically assume that justice for minorities through multicultural policies can be pursued without threatening core liberal–democratic values and without having to compromise on a society’s commitment to individual freedom, equal opportunity and social solidarity (McKerl, 2007).

Kymlicka, in particular, is important to this study as his research specifically focused on national and ethnic groups. Kymlicka (1995) distinguishes between two main sources of cultural diversity: “multinationality,” which indicates a coexistence of more than one societal culture within a nation-state, for example, in Canada, Belgium, Switzerland and Macedonia, and “polyethnicity,” which results from immigration from other states. Kymlicka (2010) also defines three areas of multiculturalism in
policy-making: indigenous peoples, immigrant rights and concerns, and national minorities.

Multiculturalism and indigenous peoples

One of the motivations for adopting multicultural policy models also came from the need to address the issue of indigenous populations in countries such as Australia, Canada and America. According to Inglis (1996), indigenous or Aboriginal groups “see dangers in policy which they fear may reduce their own status to that of simply being one of the many ethnic minorities” (p. 57). Also, they fear that their specific needs which are often associated with land and identity in and may be overlooked.

Will Kymlicka has extensively written about the foundations of Aboriginal rights in liberal theory focusing on countries such as Canada and Australia. He perceives Aboriginal peoples as ‘minorities,’ a term that has become problematic in modern discussions about Aboriginal peoples (See Spaulding, 1997; O’Neil, 1999). In general, Kymlicka (1995) believed that indigenous minorities have the sort of “societal culture” (p. 31) that should be protected by “self-government rights” (p. 97). He defines “societal culture” as one “which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 76). His argument is that “the circumstances of Aboriginal people are special relative to members of the majority cultures, since, unlike the majority cultures, Aboriginal cultures are threatened by the decisions of non-members” (Murray, 1999, p. 110). Thus, without group-specific rights to protect their cultures, Kymlicka (1995) believed
that Aboriginal people would not have the same opportunities as members of the majority cultures have to the primary good of cultural membership, i.e. they would not be equal under the law.

Charles Taylor and some other scholars have rejected Kymlicka’s theory of Aboriginal rights, under the argument that it does not provide sufficient grounds for protecting Aboriginal cultures against threats for assimilation (See Danley, 1991; Nickel, 1994; Taylor, 1992). On the contrary, Murray (1999) argues that Kymlicka’s view provides an important aspect of Aboriginal rights and renewed understanding of liberalism. While scholars still argue on the different approaches to multicultural policies, different countries are regulating the rights of Aboriginal cultures with different policies.

Multiculturalism and immigrant rights

Blom, Maussart, Ernste (2006) cite immigration, which is mainly a result of colonization and globalization, as the main cause behind multiculturalism. As a result, scholarship in the areas of immigrant rights and integration of immigrants and of Europe has grown tremendously over the past decade (See Banting & Kymlicka, 2006; Borevi, 2010; Goodman, 2010; Joppke, 2007; Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010; Kogan, 2003; Koopmans, 2010; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy, 2005; Sainsbury, 2006; Siim & Skjeie, 2008; Inglis, 1996; Soysal, 1994). Kymlicka (1995) believes that the goal of immigrant groups should be “integration” into the dominant societal culture of their new national home and therefore their “societal culture” does not have to be protected by “self-governmental rights” (p. 26). However, “this does not mean that
voluntary immigrants have no claims regarding the expression of their identity” (p. 96), Nation-states should provide immigrants polyethnic rights that will “protect specific religious and cultural practices which might not be adequately supported through the market … or which are disadvantaged … by existing legislation” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 38).

Blom et. al. (2006) discuss two different immigration models used by courtiers in the past decades. The first one, which they call the “anglo-conformity” model (Blom et. al., 2006, p. 8), was mostly used in 1960s by major immigrant countries. This model expected immigrants to adopt the native culture and that after a period of time there would be no difference between immigrants and the local population. The second model is called the “multicultural model” (Blom et. al., 2006, p. 8), and was first adopted in Canada in 1971. Its main goal was to keep the culture of immigrants alive, and allow them to freely differentiate form the local culture. This is the model that is prevalent today and that is being attacked by both policy makers and scholars.

Kymlicka (2001) defined immigrants as “people who arrive [in a certain country] under an immigration policy which gives them the right to become citizens after a relatively short period of time – say 3-5 years – subject only to minimal conditions (e.g. learning the official language, and knowing something about the country’s history and political institutions)” (p. 153). The major immigrant countries in the West are Australia, United States, Canada and the EU. These countries have over 150 years of experience with immigrants, and the social, political and economical integration of immigrants is what Kymlicka (2001) considered the “impressive
achievement” of the 19th century (p. 152). As a result Kymlicka believes that immigrants more easily accept the fact that they have to integrate and adapt to the dominant social culture (2001), in comparison to national minorities which will be discussed in the following section of this chapter.

However, as already discussed in Chapter 1, there are many doubts about the integration of immigrants today and governments have become increasingly concerned with terms such as “ghettoization” and “Balkanization” (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 152). While governments blame the immigrants for refusing to integrate, Blom et. al. (2006) assert that the main cause behind the problems with integration and multiculturalism is the policy of the governments themselves. Governments have changed their opinions about immigration and this is affecting their position in the society. Blom et. al. (2006) believe that in order to achieve the needed level of integration, local populations should strive to respect the foreign cultures, even though those cultures might go against Western liberal-democratic values.

Multiculturalism and national minorities

The area of multiculturalism in policy-making concerning national minorities is most relevant to this study. Scholarship in multiculturalism and national minorities argues that members of minority groups have legitimate claims for differential citizenship rights to protect their particular cultures from unwanted assimilation (See Modood, et. al., 1997; Musterd, 2005; Musterd, S. & de Winter, 1998).
Kymlicka (1995) defines multiculturalism in an ethno-national sense, differentiating between “national minorities” and “ethnic groups” (p. 19). According to him, national minorities arise from the voluntary or involuntary incorporation of an entire nation, whereas ethnic minorities arise from individual and familial immigration from different nations. For Kymlicka (1995), national minorities are groups that share some or all of history, community, territory, language, or culture, and may have become a minority involuntarily through conquest, colonization, or expansion, or it could have voluntarily agreed to enter a federation with one or more other nations, peoples, or cultures. As a result, he defines national minorities in terms of culture, and argues that if minorities wish to keep their cultures, they should be recognized as distinct.

The difference between immigrants and national minorities is in the form of integration. While Kymlicka (2001) believes that contrary to the immigrants, national minorities resist integration and fight to maintain their own social culture, and their chances to get involved in conflicts are bigger than those of immigrants. Blom et. al. (2006) take the example the Basque national minority in Spain who face serious conflict with the Spanish government due to their request to be seen as an independent region. As a result, national minorities should be able to use their language and create their own public institutions in order to sustain their culture, otherwise their language and culture will disappear (Kymlicka, 2001).

Kymlicka (1995) describes culture as a “context of choice” (p. 81). With this conceptualization culture provides people with a sense of belonging and a context for
making choices, and it means that individuals cannot make meaningful choices in the absence of a cultural framework. In this sense, minority cultures should be protected because only a secure cultural context of choice can provide a full range of meaningful options to equally free individuals pursuing their various life-plans. This multiculturalism embraces the liberal emphasis of choice and autonomy, but argues that the freedom of choice is embedded in a culture. Thus, according to Kymlicka (1995), national minorities should be able to preserve their distinct societal culture, whereas ethnic groups should be able integrate into the dominant societal culture of their new state, without losing their ethnic distinctiveness.

O’Neil (1999) critiques Kymlicka’s views on national minorities, by arguing that multiculturalism seeks to offer cultural rights to minorities only in terms that would liberalize illiberal national minorities by justifying the obligation of liberalism on immigrant groups despite his simultaneous argument in favor of polyethnic rights. Also, Blom et. al. (2006) criticize Kymlicka’s view on national minorities claiming that his theory does not fit all countries, especially in relation to his claims on the difference of integration between national minorities and immigrants. They take Netherlands as an example and claim that exactly the opposite has occurred there: immigrants such as Maroccans and Dutch Antilles have refused to integrate to the Dutch culture while national minorities like Frisian have perfectly integrated to the Dutch culture.

Other multiculturalism scholarship presents a more communitarian perspective (See Taylor, 1994; O’Neil, 1999). Charles Taylor (1994) argues that
cultural recognition is the basic human need. Taylor (1992) suggests a type of liberalism that is “grounded very much on judgments about what makes a good life - judgments in which the integrity of cultures has an important place” (p. 61). This model of multiculturalism is therefore willing to allow for collective goals, but according to Taylor, certain forms of uniform treatment are more important than cultural survival, but sometimes, cultural survival is more important. Such shifting goals of Taylor’s theory have been heavily criticized as a weakness in theory building (O’Neil, 1999).

Moreover, multicultural debates in political sciences have been framed around the distinction between “fundamental rights” which include the rights to life, liberty, freedom of speech, and free practice of religion and what Taylor calls “privileges and immunities” that can be significantly reduced in the name of cultural preservation (Taylor, 1992, p. 59). The second one may include unacceptable claims by minority cultures that might wish to restrict fundamental individual rights in order to preserve their integrity. This model of multiculturalism is also criticized for having the possibility to be applied only in the Western context, and that it would not have any legitimate theoretical basis for trumping non-Western notions of justice in the international arena (O’Neil, 1999).

In defense of multiculturalism, Kymlicka (2010) suggests that countries with strong and consistent policies of multiculturalism like Canada, Australia, and Sweden outperform the other Western democratic countries providing some plausible evidence in support of the liberal multiculturalist hypothesis. Also, some
cross-national studies show a whole range of positive effects on multicultural policies in a variety of areas. For example, a cross-national study of 13 countries showed that children are better adapted in countries with multiculturalism policies (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006). Another cross-national study on diversity and social capital conducted in 19 countries shows that multiculturalism policies have a positive impact on political participation and social capital (Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010). A cross-national study of prejudice shows that multiculturalism policies have a positive effect on reducing prejudice (Weldon, 2006).

However, many scholars consider the liberal multicultural model as utopian and highly idealized vision of how one might wish the world to be, thereby presenting an unrealistic basis for describing or predicting the effects of multiculturalism in the world as it actually is (See Barry, 1999; 2001; Goodhart, 2004; Jovanovska & Stojmenov, 2010; Koopmans & Statham, 1999; Schuster, 2006). At the heart of this critique is that the liberal multiculturalist hypothesis needs to be tested against the empirical evidence, with the expectation that this will require some dramatic revisions of this model. Such criticism of the liberal democratic model of multiculturalism initiated by political science scholars has helped inspire new empirical research by social scientists on multiculturalism. High-profile social scientists have become as influential as philosophers in the general debate on multiculturalism, and ideas about liberal multiculturalism have been supplemented by new ideas and concepts from the social sciences.
Post-multicultural age?

The general tone of most recent discussions about multiculturalism policy development and implementation, both in academia and policy circles, is that multiculturalism has either “failed” or is in “crisis” (Kymlicka, 2010; Inglis, 1996). Not only have leaders like German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced the “utter failure” of multiculturalism (See Chapter 1), but the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2008) reports that multiculturalism has failed in Europe, and indeed that it has proven to be as harmful as the assimilationist approach it had replaced. Even founder of the liberal multicultural models, Kymlicka (2010) said that it seems “we have moved into a ‘postmulticultural’ age” (p. 265). But, he maintains that widespread judgment about the failure of multiculturalism is not so much based on evidence and that even the evidence used distorts rather than illuminates the debate over multicultural policies (Kymlicka, 2010).

One critique of multiculturalism comes from Barry (1999), who claims that this concept is against the core values of a liberal society. He asserts that multiculturalism scholars such as Will Kymlicka (1995) and Charles Taylor (1994) make a mistake in viewing the various ethnic groups as only culturally different and insists on focusing on their political relations as well. When we understand the different ethnic groups by their political relations, they present the real problem which liberal political theory has to address. Rex (2001) agrees with Barry and argues that only a limited version of multiculturalism can be sustained.
Another criticism against liberal multiculturalism comes from Goodhart (2004) who refers to the findings on diversity and social capital by Putnam, as proof that the multicultural ideal is not working. According to Putnam (2007) as the ethnic diversity of American cities increases, social capital declines, reflected in lower levels of civic associational life and of interpersonal trust. Kymlicka (2010) rejects Putnam’s (2007) claims, and asserts that he does not see any relation between these findings and the failure of multiculturalism. He asserts that such empirical claims needs to be tested and more research is needed on how multicultural policies affect social capital as well as how social capital in turn affects liberal–democratic values of freedom, equality and solidarity (Kymlicka, 2010).

An example that is particularly influential in the European debate against multiculturalism centers in the Netherlands, a country that is widely cited (See Vasta, 2007; Coenders, Lubbers, Scheepers & Verkyten, 2008; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007) as an example where multiculturalism “failed.” Based on this one case, several scholars have concluded that multiculturalism might even have negative effects. A particularly influential version of this argument lays the blame for prejudice and ethnic polarization in the Netherlands at the feet of multiculturalism, and concludes that other countries should avoid the Netherlands’ costly and failed experiment with multicultural policies (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Kymlicka (2008) criticizes this analysis claiming that it does not provide any evidence that multiculturalism polices worsened rather than improved the problem of prejudice and polarization in the Netherlands. For Kymlicka (2008) dismissing
multiculturalism solely on the Dutch case is premature, and scholars need to look across the full range of cases in Canada, Australia, and Sweden where multiculturalism remains a viable approach worthy of serious consideration.

The main criticism against multiculturalism is that it has the potential to foster highly divisive social conflicts (McKerl, 2007; Inglis, 1996). Contrary to earlier theories, which argued that the importance of ethnicity is declining, the contemporary processes of modernization and globalization are actively contributing to the growing importance of ethnicity and of ties to one’s community. Thus, Inglis (1996) points out that what is missing in this type of analysis is the role of the state and the capacities of social policy to intervene in the process and reduce the potential for conflict.

Other critics direct their attention to what they perceive as the outcomes of the implementation of multicultural policies and its essentialist nature (See Appiah, 2005; Benhabib 2002; Cowan, 2001; Fraser, 2001; Habermas, 1994; Phillips, 2007; Scheffler, 2007). Jurgen Habermas (1994) for example complained that multiculturalism amounts to “false classifications” that “lead to ‘normalizing’ interventions into the way people lead their lives with the result that the intended compensations turn into new forms of discrimination and instead of liberties being guaranteed people are deprived of freedom” (p. 115). Moreover, Phillips (2007) asserted that multiculturalism “exaggerates the internal unity of cultures, solidifies differences that are currently more fluid, and makes people from other cultures seem more exotic and distinct than they really are” (p. 14). Benhabib (2002) claimed that
multiculturalism involves "reductive sociology of culture" that "risks essentializing the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group or race, it risks reifying cultures as separate entities by overemphasizing the internal homogeneity of cultures in terms that potentially legitimize repressive demands for cultural conformity; and by treating cultures as badges of group identity, it tends to fetishize them in ways that put them beyond the reach of critical analysis" (p.64).

Cowan (2001), on the other hand, was concerned "with the ethical ambiguities of a discourse which may constrain, as much as enable, many of those it is meant to empower, by forcing their expressions of difference into a dichotomous interpretive frame that misrepresents their complex identities (p. 154). Cowan’s claims are particularly important to this study, as they directly address the ambiguous nature of multiculturalism as a concept and he shows that even when this concept is "meant to contest claims of national homogeneity, it locks us ever more tightly into precisely the same national logic of purity, authenticity and fixity" (2001, p. 171).

Multiculturalism and cultural studies

Cultural studies scholars have also criticized liberal multiculturalism models categorizing it as both limited in scope and depth (See Alexander, 2009; Bensimon, 1994; Dhamoon, 2006; Habermas, 1994/1992; Hall, 2000; Helfenbein, 2003; Kostogriz & Tsolidis 2008; Mookerjea, 2007; Parekh, 2000). These scholars have argued that the form of multiculturalism reflected in government policies reproduces
an essentialist view of cultural difference and constructs ethnic diversity as culture for commodification and consumption. According to most cultural studies scholars the main problem with multiculturalism is in its conceptualization of culture. Dhamoon (2006) claimed that both Kymlicka and Taylor use culture as a “code” (p. 354) when they speak about specific ethnic groups, historical nations, and linguistic minorities. Also, Parekh (2000) noted that liberal multiculturalism stresses on particularism, individual autonomy and celebratory views of multiculturalism, and in doing so, it establishes a ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy between majorities and minorities.

Angela Merkel’s speech on the failure of multiculturalism underscores the superficiality of multicultural policies in Western democracies. She claimed: “For a while, we kidded ourselves into believing that they wouldn’t stay and would leave. Naturally, the notion that we would become ‘multiculiti,’ that we would live next to one another and be happy about one another, failed.” (Karnitschnig, 2010). This makes it evident that her view of multiculturalism is grounded on a “we” that excludes minority groups and on the notion that these groups (they) “would leave.” Not surprisingly, Merkel concluded that Germany needs an assimilationist solution in the form of new policies to secure minority groups’ adoption of the German language and culture (Eddy, 2010). Ironically, policy makers like Merkel want to substitute the liberal multiculturalism model which was designed in response to assimilation, with assimilationist policies.
Another critique of liberal multiculturalism is that it utilizes culture mostly in reference to non-Western Others who make claims within the boundaries of the West (Alexander, 2009). More specifically, liberal multiculturalism answers questions about how the state should respond to diversity because of concerns over unity. This according to Alexander (2009) implies that liberal multiculturalisms scholars are mostly interested in how the state should manage Othered cultures, rather than how power is exercised and challenged. As a result, Alexander (2009) rightly claims that, “liberal multiculturalists downplay the ways in which power determines social and political arrangements while valorizing particular moral values” (p. 358).

Stuart Hall (2000) was concerned with the constitutive role of power, discourse, social inequality and violence that constrains and distorts the possibilities of multiculturalism as a positive generative space of difference. He notes that by Othering and exoticizing minority cultures, multiculturalism policies merely confirm the hegemonic cultural order by naming the Other as peripheral to the mainstream (Hall, 2000). As a result, the concept of multiculturalism is often considered as inadequate, negligent, and Eurocentric, and cultural studies scholars often problematize and critique essentialist notions that are attached to personhood, subjectivity, and identity formation (Chow, 2002).

Habermas (1994/1992) concurs and adds that multiculturalism policies that establish the individualistic system of rights are simply not necessary. In fact, such a concept is even offensive and disrespectful to minorities. He asserts that a correct “theory of rights” would be one “that protects the integrity of the individual in the
life contexts in which his or her identity is formed” (Habermas, 1994/1992, p. 109).

He goes on to say that a true multicultural society would be one where:

   .... coexistence of forms of life with equal rights means ensuring every citizen
   the opportunity to grow up within the world of a cultural heritage and to have
   his or her children grow up in it without suffering discrimination because of it.
   It means the opportunity to confront this and every other culture and to
   perpetuate it in its conventional form or transform it; as well as the
   opportunity to turn away from its commands with indifference or break with it
   self-critically and then live spurred on by having made a conscious break with
   tradition, or even with divided identity. (p. 131-132)

Bensimon (1994) also criticizes the liberal view of multiculturalism because,
according to him, it downplays cultural differences and “it is primarily concerned
with the reduction of tension and conflict among different groups” (p. 13). For him,
merely “tolerating” diversity is problematic in that tolerance does not foster the kind
of social transformation that enables diverse cultures intentionally to influence the
academy as well as the larger society. Liberal multiculturalism fails to transform
monocultural institutions into multicultural, democratic communities because they
situate cultural diversity as subject matter to be learned or as diverse identities to be
tolerated. Such views of multiculturalism are more accommodating than
transformative.

Fish (1997) went further to assert that the concept of multiculturalism
actually entails intolerance, rather than tolerance. He distinguishes between two
types of multiculturalists: the “boutique multiculturalist” (p. 380) and the “strong multiculturalist” (p. 382). The “boutique multiculturalist” according to Fish (1997) enjoys the superficial cultural benefits of life amidst a range of ethnic groups, including explorations into cuisine, music and fashion. But, because they believe there exist core humanist values, ‘boutique multiculturalists’ cannot accept differences in such core values. As a result, the “boutique multiculturalist” will withhold approval of a particular culture’s practices at the point at which they matter most to its strongly committed members.

“Strong multiculturalism” according to Fish (1997) is only a somewhat stronger variation of this, as it values difference itself. But the trouble with multiculturalism is that by stipulating tolerance as its first principle, it doesn’t allow the concept to remain faithful to the end “because sooner or later the culture whose core values you are tolerating will reveal itself to be intolerant at that same core” (Fish, 1997, p. 383). As a result, the strong multiculturalist cannot tolerate intolerance because it conflicts with the value of difference (and tolerance). So, ironically, according to Fish (1997), what might be at the core of both “boutique” and “strong” forms of multiculturalism is actually intolerance.

Thus, Helfenbein (2003) asserted that “if multiculturalism is to take up the charge from cultural studies, it must begin by troubling notions of identity that provide for dangerous precedent. Identities slip and slide as one negotiates the field of struggle” (p. 13). Nations should rather strive to recognize the multiplicity of identities within each culture and the open set of relations between them (Mookerjea,
2007). As a result, scholars should strive to construct a new common language that facilitates communication and “functions not on the basis of resemblances but on the basis of differences: a communication of singularities” (Mookerjea, 2007, p. 85).

Critical multiculturalism

Thus, critics have suggested that the concept of multiculturalism needs to be redefined to be of value to policy-making (See Castles, 1999; CCSG, 1992; Daniel, 2008; Gunew, 2004; Hage, 1998; 2003; Kalantzis, 1990; O’Regan, 1994; Stratton, 1998). Critical multiculturalism, based on the work of the Chicago Cultural Studies Group (1992) and scholars such as Castles (1999) and Kalantzis (1990), has continued to develop through the contributions of writers such as Hage (1998; 2003), O’Regan (1994), Stratton (1998) and Gunew (2004). These scholars have argued that, with the best intentions, multiculturalism has been quiet on the more difficult questions of how to reconcile conflicting cultural values and even promote cultural intolerance.

The Chicago Cultural Studies Group work on critical multiculturalism claims that the Western liberal democracies have lacked any critical thought about the term ‘multiculturalism’ and the way it is used in a corporate sense to make government and business appear to be committed to the broad tenets of philosophical liberalism which are not concerned with the redistribution of power and resources. The Chicago Cultural Studies Group understands multiculturalism as complex, dynamic histories that cannot be reduced to diversity only. This group
of scholars criticize the liberal model of multiculturalism for putting cultures into categories and for overlooking the reality that people do not actually live in a box, or belong to only one culture, but rather that our personalities are composed of hybrid cultural identities (Jay, 2002).

According to the Chicago Cultural Studies Group (CCSG, 1992), knowledge cannot be separated from the individual or from the social context, but rather our knowledge is the product of the social interactions we have within the groups, or affiliations, of which we are part. Therefore, “the affiliation of your knowledge is less the product of a free choice than something to negotiate. . . . Part of the question is how you deploy the [affiliations] you’re in. That is how identity politics may be fruitfully understood now: as sites of struggle rather than as sites of ‘identity’” (p. 548). This conception brings the concept of culture to the individual level rather than the group level.

Addressing the needs and empowering the voices of those without power in society requires an approach to knowledge building that provides the opportunity to break free from dominant forms of expression. Critical inquiry questions the “view from nowhere” (Chicago Cultural Studies Group, 1992, p. 550) approach to knowledge building that is central to positivistic knowledge and argues that the context matters. So, critical multiculturalism recognizes the cultural differences, accounting for the different cultural and linguistic histories, values, practices of various minority ethnic, religious and/or cultural groups, but also situates these cultural differences within the wider nexus of power relations of which they form a
part. Just the acknowledgement of the cultural and linguistic distinctions on their own is not enough, and the advocates of critical multiculturalism believe that it is also important to unmask the reproductive processes which underlie these and which lead the society to prefer certain cultural values and practices over others (May, 1999). This approach allows for the critical interrogation of the normalization and universalization of the cultural knowledge of the majority ethnic group, and its juxtaposition with other usually non-western knowledge and practices.

Young (2000) asserts that the cultural essentialism that underlies the discussion on multiculturalism conceptualizes “social groups as fixed and bounded entities separate from others in basic interests and goals” (p. 151). Essentializing culture means drawing a clear line between those who belong and do not belong to a group, on the basis of a set of given – “shared” – attributes, and to conceive the group itself as a homogeneous and rigid organism that has to be preserved. To describe the essentialist perspective of liberal multiculturalism Awad (2011) focuses on the essentialization of U.S. Latinas/os to people of “brown” skin color, with a Spanish-sounding last name, whose country of ancestry is somewhere south of the U.S.-Mexican border, and who follow a certain pattern of practices: they probably eat tortillas, enchiladas, and tacos, speak Spanish, and listen to rancheras or salsa. More importantly, a Latina/o politics would be seen as an attempt to defend and preserve
these practices in opposition to alternative cultural practices as well as to an overarching *U.S. culture*. Likewise, essentialism identifies Muslim communities in Europe with a limited set of cultural practices and their interests are more or less equated with the preservation of such practices (p. 44).

Critical multiculturalism understands cultures in a relational way, and scholars using this approach believe that culture is not fixed, but that it emerges from the way people interact (Awad, 2011). Such relational definition of cultural difference enables us to think of minority groups in novel and politically productive ways. Thus, critical multiculturalists do not believe that minority groups should “be equated to the promotion of a minority language, food, religion, and music; their interests cannot be reduced to an aggregation of individual preferences, nor to the mere demand for cultural preservation” (p. 44). Awad (2011) believed that all these minority cultural groups are interested in advancing structural changes that would allow them “to speak the language they speak … eat the food they want to eat and listen to the music they want to hear – either the same recipes and songs their grandparents ate and listened to or newer ones marked by innumerable processes of cultural syncretism – and, *at the same time*, be fully enfranchised with respect to the law, as well as to educational, occupational, material, and political resources” (p.44).

Critical multiculturalism’s structural and non-essentialist approach to culture, in contrast, enables a democratic appreciation of cultural difference
(Awad, 2011) since it criticizes “the ideological apparatuses that distribute power and resources unevenly among the different constituencies of a multicultural society” (Palumbo-Liu, 2002, p. 2). The core of critical multiculturalism is a structural conception of culture, based on the deconstruction of two seeming dichotomies: a dichotomy between structure and culture and a dichotomy between the interests of cultural groups and a common interest. Critical multiculturalism problematizes the apparent tension between each of these pairs. Awad (2011) asserts that “to assume that structure is disconnected from culture and that group interests threaten common interests leads to a problematic understanding of culture and cultural differences, which, in turn, suggests an inescapable conflict between equality (in both political and economic terms) and cultural difference.

Critical multiculturalism rejects neoliberal efforts to co-opt diversity (Melamed 2006), which reduce culture to “ornament,” or to what the Chicago Cultural Studies Group (1992, p. 531) calls “the Benetton effect.” In other words, an understanding of multiculturalism in its critical form underscores the problem of corporate or ornamental approaches that welcome a variety of “ethnic” restaurants “or places of entertainment where the music, art, and literature of different cultures is showcased” (Lugones and Price 1995, p. 103) while securing that “the many cultures are inactive in informing the personality, character, beliefs, and values of workers/citizens and the structure of the economic and political system” (Lugones and Price 1995, p. 105).
McLennan (2001) asserts that critical multiculturalism was developed as a response to the anti-racism, anti-essentialism, hybridity and postcoloniality debates in the 1990s. Giroux (1993) writes that critical multiculturalism aims to "rewrite the politics of representation around race and difference by deconstructing in historical and relational terms not only the central categories of Otherness but also the dominant discourses and representations that secure 'whiteness' as a universalizing norm" (p. 101). In other words, critical multiculturalism frames literature, history, and other subjects with deconstructive theories that teach students to question socially constructed identity categories, including the system of racial and ethnic "marking."

Critical multiculturalists view race as an unstable complex of social meanings that are constantly being transformed by political struggle (Omi & Winant, 1994). They argue that, like gender and sexual representation, the concept of race has real consequences in the lives of individuals and continues to play a fundamental role in shaping and representing the social world. Another aspect of this discussion pertains to how oppression interlocks with race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and other aspects of social identity to shape the life experiences of individuals and groups. Understanding the intersectionality of oppression, facilitates openness and lays the foundation for connecting with others who are different (Adams & Marchesani, 1997). Young (1990) identified a number of ways in which various groups experience oppression. These "five faces" of oppression include exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and
violence. However, she cautions against ranking these elements as being more or less serious. She notes that the presence of any of these five faces constitutes oppression and that most people experience some combination of them. Others have argued that a discussion of oppression must examine the patterns in institutional practices and policies; the role of violence in enforcing and maintaining them; the ideology upon which they are based; their institutionalization, or embeddedness within the norms, traditions, laws, and policies of the society; and the invisibility of groups that are oppressed (Van Soest & Garcia, 2003). By freeing themselves from unexamined prejudices, students can move beyond the perpetuation and reproduction of domination to become transformative individuals (Weil, 1998).

Thus, the literature so far suggests that critical multiculturalism, through its use of analytic concepts such as the global, hybridity, alliance politics, post-modernism and decentralized subjectivity, might help us understand and address the systemic inequalities that are challenged locally, nationally and internationally in the case of the liberal-democratic model of multiculturalism. For example, (McKerl, 2007) suggests this approach helps us consider all sides of the story, such as the multiple perspectives on the treatment of Muslims in various locations and how such treatment impacts Muslims living in the EU. Thus, scholars, just like policy-makers should start listening to the people and clarify that what the policy makers have heard is the same as what the consulters are actually saying. Also,
policies that allege they address social inequalities in Western nations have to be implemented and monitored if they are to remain effective (McKerl, 2007).

Moreover, according to May (1999), another approach to developing a non-essentialist critical multiculturalism is to maintain a reflexive critique of specific cultural practices that allow criticism, transformation and change. Such reflexive position on culture and ethnicity is summed up by Homi Bhabha’s (1994) dynamic conception of culture, a concept that recognizes and incorporates its ongoing fluidity and constant change, with the distinction that he makes between cultural diversity and cultural difference. According to Bhabha (1994) cultural diversity treats culture as an object of empirical knowledge, one that is static, totalized and historically bounded and as something to be valued but not necessarily lived. In contrast, cultural difference is the process of the articulation of culture as knowledgeable, as adequate to the construction of systems of cultural identification. May (1999) asserts that the recognition of our cultural and historical position should not set the limits of ethnicity and culture, nor act to undermine the legitimacy of other, equally valid forms of identity.

Critical multiculturalism should strive to remain open to competing conceptualizations, diverse identities, and a rich public discourse about controversial issues in order to recognize both the limits and the hybridity of all cultures and avoid the cultural essentialism that has been part of previous articulations of multiculturalism (Modood, 1998). Such approach to critical multiculturalism allows minorities to keep their ethnic identities by autonomously
constructing their group identity and political deliberation, without falling into traditional or cultural essentialism trap. But it also forces majorities to challenge themselves into a critical interrogation of the normalization and universalization of majoritarian forms of identity, like for example whiteness, and the subsequent invisibility in discussions of ethnicity (See Giroux, 1997; Hogan, 2006; Lengel & Warren, 2005; May, 1999; Nakayama & Krizek, 1995; Nakayama & Martin, 1999; Sharma, 2010; Ware & Back, 2001; Warren, 2003; Warren & Kilgard, 2001; Wiegman, 1999; Wray, 2006).

Interculturalism

Another concept that is recently being debated by scholars as something that should replace multiculturalism is the concept of “interculturalism” (See Abdallah-Pretceille, 2006; Ghorayshi, 2010; Jiang, 2011; McDonald, 2011; Rodríguez-García, 2010). In order to move beyond mere tolerance of cultural diversity which is seen as a problem to be overcome, interculturalism offers an opportunity to address the complexity of interethnic or interracial relations and cross-cultural exchange, and recognizes the variety of cultural fragments that are significant when talking about issues of culture. This is in contrast to the approach of multiculturalism which views cultures in their entirety (Rodríguez-García, 2010). Abdallah-Pretceille (2006) asserted that cultures can no longer be understood as independent entities, but need to be contextualized in terms of social, political and communication realities. While, according to Rodríguez-Garcia (2010)
“interculturalism can be understood as the interactive process of living together in diversity, with the full participation and civic engagement of, and social exchange between, all members of society beyond that of mere recognition and coexistence, in turn forming a cohesive and plural civic community” (p. 261).

Moreover, the interculturalism approach goes beyond the notion of recognition of cultural diversity as it is the case with multiculturalism, and it offers the possibility of actual structural change in the society. While multiculturalism focuses exclusively on the problem of cultural diversity, the interculturalism model focuses on the negotiation and conflict-resolution processes between the different cultures in the society. Rodríguez-García (2010) asserts that the interculturalism model “acknowledges that all societies are composed of different groups and that minority cultures also deserve the right to propose changes to the society, provided that these changes can be demonstrated to be in the best interests of the cultural group at large and that they do not violate the rights of any other group” (p. 261). This approach invites the possibility of mutual criticism between the different groups and mutual learning across their differences.

Conclusion

This chapter provided a synopsis of scholarly debates on multiculturalism in both political and cultural studies discourses. The literature review showed that two decades after its conceptualization, the liberal multiculturalism model that was initially created in response to assimilation policies, has instigated exactly the same thing it was meant to fight –assimilationist ideals in political discourses. Since its conceptualization,
multiculturalism has received enormous critiques both from the right and the left of the political spectrum. While the right-wing political thinkers claim that it is giving too many rights to the minorities, the left-wing political thinkers think that this model is actually discriminatory for minorities. This shows just how ambiguous and undefined this concept is in academic debates, and different fields and approaches attach different meanings to it.

As a result, cultural studies scholars provide a sharp critique of multiculturalism and some have moved to suggest other concepts to replace it, such as critical multiculturalism and interculturalism, which are supposed to resolve all the issues surrounding multiculturalism. While both critical multiculturalism and interculturalism can provide answers to everything that is wrong with multiculturalism today, they are still very much unknown concepts for policy makers and many politicians remain quite unaware of these terms. As a result, instead of moving toward more inclusion and tolerance, Western societies have moved toward the very concepts they were rejecting two decades ago, and that is assimilation, discrimination and intolerance for ethnic minorities and immigrants. The ambiguity of the concept of multiculturalism in political sciences and cultural studies discussions has important implications for this study and provides a background to the problem that both the EU and Macedonia are facing with this concept. As a result, just like the EU, Macedonia is also having a hard time to applying this concept.
CHAPTER III
RHETORICAL HISTORY AND CONTEXTS
OF THE CONCEPT OF MULTICULTURALISM IN MACEDONIA

"[N]o one has been able to establish with
certainty whether what happens is the future, or
just the past moving backward, like a crab."

— Ismail Kadare, The Pyramid (1996)

Giving an overview of the primary discursive themes that have led up to the current discussions on multiculturalism in Macedonia, this chapter provides the rhetorical context and rhetorical history of the concept of multiculturalism in Macedonia. The series of events discussed below, including, but not limited to the dismantling of Yugoslavia, the wars in the region, the armed conflict in Macedonia in 2001, the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, are commonly reported in European contemporary historical accounts (see Banac, 1992; Bieber, 2011; Bjelić & Savić, 2005; Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2006, December 31; Dimova, 2010; Fraenkel & Broughton, 2001; Glenny, 2001; Gow & Pettiler, 1993; Kaplan, 2005/1994; Kwiek, 2002; Mickey & Albion, 1993; Neofotistos, 2004; Ordanoski & Matovski, 2007; Perry, 1992; 1994; Poshka, 2010; Poulton, 1991; 1993; Redding, 2001; Risteska, 2011, June; Roudometof, 2002; Todorova, 1995; 1997;
The chapter answers question sub-set #1: What is the rhetorical context and history of “multiculturalism” in Macedonia? What are some of the main tensions between the Albanian and Macedonian ethnic groups and what has been done so far to resolve them? What is the importance of multiculturalism in the EU accession process? How has the multiculturalism debate become an area in which ethnic anxieties are examined and resolved?

Historical contexts:

Yugoslavia

Situated in Southeastern Europe in the central Balkan Peninsula, Yugoslavia, the name of which translated literally means “the land of the Southern Slavs”, existed as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, from 1918 to 1941, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from 1918 to 1929. The nation-building rhetoric of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia rested on a view that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes are three tribes of the same nation (Mikula, 2003).

See, for instance, Balalovska, 2000; Banac, 1992; December; Berg & Meurs, 2002; Hislope, 2004; Parrish-Sprowl, 2011; Poulton, 1993; Vassilev, 2007, as the numerous analyses and interpretations of histories of the Balkan Peninsula generally and Macedonia specifically are extremely complex and beyond the scope of this study.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was created in 1945 at the close of World War II, “a union that assembled six republics into a nation on the basis of a shared Slavic history and socialist future” (Brunwasser, 2009, p. 55). The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia grew out of the national liberation movement in World War II under the leadership of its founder and long-time president Josip Broz Tito. Tito promoted the idea of economic and political homogenization that would lead to the creation of a pure workers’ state, which would allow the working class to control the state apparatus (Volčič & Andrejevic, 2009; Woodward, 1995).

The Republic of Macedonia was one of the six republics in The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) created in 1945 at the close of World War II. With the dismantling of Yugoslavia in 1991, Macedonia and its fellow republics, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and the two provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina, gained independence as nation-states.

Similar to its fellow Yugoslav republics, Macedonia was founded on federalist principles and a nation-building rhetoric of “brotherhood and unity,” implying national equality for all the member nations and ethnic groups within Yugoslavia. Even though there remained during this period a tendency against political unification that favored the formation of independent national states (Mikula, 2003), the model of “brotherhood and unity” left a deep cultural legacy of ethnic tolerance that was internalized by most of the post-WWII generations in former Yugoslavia and became an important part of their national identity.
After Tito’s death in 1980, the growing nationalist movements within the six republics quickly gained power and voice in Yugoslav politics. Leaders from all of the former republics and provinces recognized the potential of nationalism as the easiest route to political power and visibility (Woodward, 1995). Nationalist politicians on all sides took what Ignatieff (1993) called “the narcissism of minor difference” (p. 15) and crafted a narrative where their own people appeared as innocents and the other side as genocidal murderers. This new narrative was a significant departure from the reality in which most Yugoslavs had lived since the end of World War II, that of “brotherhood and unity” where the different ethnic groups enjoyed the same rights and opportunities and were supposed to view each other as brothers and sisters.

Violence, civil unrest, and war

The economic and social crisis that Yugoslavia experienced after the death of its leader eventually deteriorated into civil unrest and culminated in the wars of the 1990s, with most republics gaining independence in 1991, one of which was the Republic of Macedonia (Volčić & Andrejevic, 2009). Most scholars agree (See Banac, 1992; Glenny, 2001; Hayden, 1996; Kaplan, 2005/1994; Neofotistos, 2004; Roudometof, 2002; Todorova, 1995; 1997; Volčić & Andrejevic, 2009; Woodward, 1995; Zahariadis, 2003; Žižek, 1989) that besides the nationalist leaders who gained power in the major republics such as Serbia and Croatia, other factors that triggered the violent deterioration of Yugoslav unity and working-class
solidarity were the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the Slovene and Croatian independence movements, and other developments around the world in that period. The wars of the 1990s have been described as the bloodiest conflicts in Europe since the end of World War II (Skjelsbæk & Smith, 2001) and were the first conflicts since World War II to have been formally described as genocidal and many of the key individual participants subsequently were charged with war crimes.

Slovenia was the only Yugoslav republic that survived the violent collapse of Yugoslavia without much bloodshed and is seen as the most successful of the former Republics, gaining full EU membership in 2004. Croatia experienced a violent war and several years of authoritarian nationalism and after 2001 managed to restructure its economic and political systems in order to gain accession in the EU. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced three years of interethnic war among Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, and was ceased by the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. While the Agreement was successful in stopping the war in this region, it did not end the conflict among the three ethnic groups and this remains unresolved as of March 2012. In 2011, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a deeply divided country (Volčić & Andrejevic, 2009). Serbia on the other hand, was one of the republics that fought wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and the province of Kosovo under the dictatorship of the president Slobodan Milosevic, who was later arrested by Yugoslav federal authorities on March 31, 2001, on suspicion of corruption, abuse of power, and fraud. He was
later sent to The Hague Crimes Tribunal to stand trial for charges of war crimes, but died in March 11, 2006 before being sentenced (Clark, 2007). The republic of Montenegro became independent from Serbia in 2006 by a referendum and Kosovo proclaimed independence from Serbia in February 2008.

The case for Macedonia is unique in that it was the only republic to leave Yugsoslavia with no bloodshed (Broughton & Fraenkel, 2002). After the Yugoslav army retreated from Macedonia in 1991, a parliamentary democracy was established. Macedonia managed to escape the full-scale wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslav republics. However, in 2001, conflicts arose in the mountains surrounding the northwest city Tetova. Conflicts were such that the new republic came dangerously close to civil war when the Albanian guerillas demanded greater rights for the ethnic Albanian minority. In August 2001, a full-scale war was prevented by the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) will be discussed more thoroughly later in this chapter.

The conflicts in former Yugoslavia set off waves of refugees, and ethnic fragmentation along with the “uncertain transitions” from socialism to democracy in the recently formed countries and this uncertainty has contributed to the current situation of economic, social, and political instability (Volčić & Andrejevic, 2009). But even though wars and the atrocities experienced in this region have not been forgotten, many scholars argue that there is a denial of the past and of the consequences of resurgent nationalism in the region (Bieber, 2004). This leads to a failure to confront past atrocities and allows nationalism to thrive in all of the
former Yugoslav states, including Macedonia. Such denials have fostered a resulting “syndrome of victimization” which exacerbates hostilities, defers reconciliation, and ideologically legitimizes the everyday discriminatory practices. Such denials of the past also foster the spread of nationalist stereotypes, as well as the ongoing denial of ethnic cleansing and the negative consequences of resurgent nationalism (Bieber, 2004; Volčić & Andrejevic, 2009).

Rhetoric of denial

The rhetoric of denial of atrocities committed during the wars in Former Yugoslavia has been prevalent in the former republics since the end of the wars in this region (See Todorova, 2011; Obradovic-Wochnik, 2009; Sadovic, 2009; Ramet, 2007; Scaiše, 2005; Hoare, 2003). Even though the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) confirmed that the Srebrenica genocide actually occurred, and overwhelming evidence of this and other crimes during the wars in Former Yugoslavia have been presented to the international tribunal, the political leaders and the public in the former Yugoslav republics still have a hard time fully accepting and acknowledging crimes that have been committed by war criminals belonging to their ethnic group/nation. Instead of accusing war criminals, these people are usually glorified as national heroes, funds are being raised to help them defend themselves in the Hague, and some of them were even sheltered for years from the International War Crimes Tribunal. Such cases can be found in Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo.
Since most of the accused war criminals in the Hague are Serbian, war crimes denial and victimization have been mostly prevalent in Serbia (See Obradovic-Wochnik, 2009; Sadovic, 2009; Ramet, 2007), but other former republics are not excluded as well. Ramet (2007) asserts that a significant portion of the Serbian society, including the upper echelons of the government, have constantly denied atrocities committed by former Serbian leaders and usually guilt is transposed onto the other ethnic groups involved in the conflict such as: Croats, Bosniaks, and Albanians. The rhetoric of denial is also usually associated with adoration for the victimized “hero” (or a war criminal).

For example, one of the biggest atrocities during the war in Yugoslavia is known as the Srebrenica Massacre, which occurred between the 10th and 12th of July in 1995, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and where 7000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were executed or went missing, and are presumed dead (Obradovic-Wochnik, 2009). Unfortunately, this event remains controversial in Serbia and various political parties have attempted to dispute the events or the evidence itself. Moreover, Serbia's cooperation with the ICTY had always been problematic, since the key figures of the Srebrenica massacre, and other atrocities committed during the wars in Yugoslavia, such as Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, managed to evade justice ever since their initial joint indictment was issued in 1995. The ICTY managed to arrest Radovan Karadzic thirteen years after his indictment, in July 2008, whereas Ratko Mladic was captured 16 years after his indictment, in May 2011. This clearly shows that these war criminals were sheltered within Serbia for
so long, even though the ICTY and the EU were putting constant pressure on Serbia
to capture them and extradite them to the Hague.

The “collective denial” (Sadovic, 2009, p. 82) of the Serbian public for
atrocities committed during the wars in Yugoslavia has been overwhelming and
surveys such as the one conducted by the Belgrade Human Rights Centre and
Strategic Marketing in 2005 have found that up to 50% of the population were in
doubt as to whether events such as Srebrenica ever happened and, if they did, under
what circumstances (Obradovic-Wochnik, 2009). Another event crystallizing
political attitudes to Srebrenica occurred in 2005 when the Belgrade Youth
Initiative for Human Rights NGO marked the tenth anniversary of the massacre
with a billboard campaign urging Serbian citizens ‘to know’ and ‘to remember’.
The posters featuring black and white photographs pertaining to the massacre "were
vandalized overnight, splashed with black paint or graphitized with Ratko Mladic´s
name or with slogans such as ‘There will be a repeat’ and ‘Knife, Wire,
Srebrenica’" (Obradovic-Wochnik, 2009, p. 66).

The rhetoric of denial is usually followed with a glorification of indicted
war criminals as national heroes who have become victims of the “broad
international conspiracy and continued economic malaise” (as cited in Ramet, 2007,
p. 49) against Serbia. Such rhetoric portrays the conflict as a civil war among
competing nationalisms of Croat, Muslim and Albanian, and in this case the Serb
side is the least to blame (Hoare, 2003). The Serbian rhetoric of denial and
victimization tends to blame Western countries for their interference in catalyzing
the conflict and NATO’s military intervention against Serbian forces. They usually accuse the Western alliance of double standards in its approach to the Albanians both in Kosovo and in Macedonia and other minorities suffering conflict in other parts of the world, and portray Serbia as a victim of the “American imperialism” (Hoare, 2003, p. 545).

Vojislav Seselj, a Serbian radical nationalist who is still an influential and popular politician in Serbia, and who is currently serving time in the Hague calls ICTY “illegal, illegitimate, created unlawfully by the United Nations and working according to the dictates of the United States” (as cited in Simons, 2007, November 9). He said that ICTY’s task is “to prosecute Serbs” and “to falsify modern Serb history” (Simons, 2007, November 9). Radovan Karadzic, one of the Bosnian Serb wartime leaders, denied charges of large-scale atrocities during the Bosnian war, saying that such atrocities are “myths” fabricated by his enemies. He claimed that the Serb forces didn’t kill anyone during the war, but Muslims killed other Muslims and “planted bodies of dead soldiers” around the city to put the blame on the Serbs (as cited in Simons, 2010, March 2). The son of the recently accused Ratko Mladic, Darko Mladic said that his father has denied ordering the Srebrenica massacre. He claimed that "Whatever was done in Srebrenica, he has nothing to do with it. His orders were to evacuate the wounded, the women and the children and then the fighters" (as cited in Beaumont & Meikle, 2011, May 29). On his first appearance in front of the Hague tribunal, Ratko Mladic himself categorized the charges of genocide against him as "obnoxious" and "monstrous" (as cited in Booth, R, 2011,
June 3). And recently Ratko Mladic accused the ICTY of being "biased" against Serbs and for being a "puppet" of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Pomy, 2012, February 24).

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has so far accused only two people from Macedonia for atrocities committed in the armed conflict in 2001 during an operation in the mainly ethnic-Albanian village of Ljuboten. One of the accused was the former Macedonian Interior Minister, Ljube Boskovski, who was acquitted on July 10, 2008; and the other accused is a Macedonian police officer, Johan Tarculovski, who was sentenced to 12 years in prison by the ICTY (Karajkov, 2008, July 23). Both were accused for their role in the attack in the village of Ljuboten, during which seven ethnic Albanian men were killed, 14 houses were intentionally destroyed and more than 100 men were detained and abused (Goodman, 2007, May 13). Both of the accused have pleaded not guilty to war crimes at a tribunal in The Hague, and have denied any involvement with the crimes committed at Ljuboten. As in Serbia, both Boskovski and Tarculovski are still regarded national heroes in Macedonia, and many Macedonian church communities in Macedonia organized money collections in order to help them defend themselves during the trial (Stavrova, & Alagiozovski, 2005). Ljube Boskovski even created his own political party after the UN tribunal at The Hague acquitted him of war crime charges and ran for president as an independent candidate. Also, hundreds of protesters gathered in the capital city of Macedonia, Skopje, to protest the 12 year sentence for Tarculovski (Marusic, 2010,
The protesters were calling Johan Tarcullovski “the greatest hero of Macedonia” and the UN tribunal at The Hague as “a political court” not one of justice (as cited in Marusic, 2010, May 19). Such discourses of denial and victimization continue to be prevalent in the Macedonian public and each side continues to blame only the crimes committed by criminals belonging to other ethnic groups, and they continue to worship criminals within their ethnic group as national heroes who were “defending” their country or their nation (Marusic, 2010, May 19).

The Republic of Macedonia

As one of the former Yugoslav Republics that is strategically positioned in the central Balkan Peninsula, Macedonia presents a very complex country in which to introduce the concept of “multiculturalism” and therefore it provides an ideal setting for its study. In addition, while there is a vast body of research on multiculturalism in various European nations (which will be discussed in Chapter 4), there is very little work on multiculturalism in South Eastern Europe generally, and Macedonia specifically.

Renowned author Misha Glenny (2001) stated, “Yugoslavia existed as long as it did, mostly because its very existence offered an apparently workable solution to the two most complex problems in the Balkans — those of Bosnia and Hercegovina and Macedonia” (pp. 635-636). While Bosnia experienced the harshest war among the Yugoslav Republics in the early 1990s, Macedonia managed to
escape a full-scale war and experienced only a short inter-ethnic conflict in 2001. However, Macedonia’s troubles come as much from its identity issues with neighboring Greece, as well as from other regional neighbors and the interethnic conflict within (Roudometof, 2002). Also, being among the poorest and the smallest of the six Yugoslav republics, Macedonia received the least funding within the framework of Yugoslavia, thus becoming even poorer and less developed in comparison to the other republics after its independence (Atanasova & Bache, 2010). This lack of proper development under the former Yugoslavia complicated Macedonia’s difficult transition to democracy.

Several of Macedonia’s rhetorical challenges originate within the central Balkan Peninsula and its neighboring countries. Macedonia borders Kosovo to the northwest, Serbia to the north, Bulgaria to the east, Albania to the west, and Greece to the south. Ilievski and Talevski (2009) asserted that its southern neighbor refuses to recognize the nation itself, its constitutional name, or the existence of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Bulgaria, its eastern neighbor, recognizes the independent Macedonian state but does not recognize the existence of the Macedonian ethno-nation. Serbia, its northern neighbor, officially recognizes the independent Macedonian state, but the Serbian Orthodox Church does not recognize the Macedonian Orthodox Church (Ilievski & Talevski, 2009). By contrast, Albania, Macedonia’s western neighbor, and the newly independent country of Kosovo in the northwest, recognize Macedonia’s constitutional name and the Macedonian ethno-nation. But since over 30% of the ethnic composition in
Macedonia is Albanian and identify with the same Albanian ethnic group living in Albania and Kosovo, the inter-ethnic conflict within the country complicates relations with both groups. The wars with its neighbors over its territory throughout the history, and the attacks on Macedonian identity create great insecurity for ethnic Macedonians (Lesnikovski, 2011). The most serious among the attacks, that is currently creating serious identity crisis for ethnic Macedonians, is the dispute with Greece, which is disputing the exclusive right of the country to keep its name. Due to this, and other pressures from its neighbors Macedonia was even forced to become a UN member under the provisional name of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, often referred to by the acronym FYROM until an agreement is reached with Greece. As of 2012 such an agreement has not been reached and Greece has so far blocked Macedonia from joining NATO using its veto right as a member and is threatening to block its EU integration with a veto as well. As a result the identity issue has serious consequences for all the people living in Macedonia, and provides a great source of insecurity which in turn greatly affects the interethnic relations in the country and undermines the discourse of multiculturalism advanced by the EU (Lesnikovski, 2011).

Macedonia and the EU

The complexity of Macedonia as a country explains the ambiguity of the EU’s position toward Macedonia after its independence in 1991 until 1995 (Ilievski
& Talevski, 2009). The EU’s lack of a clear strategy toward the country was mostly due to Macedonia’s name and identity issues with Greece, which have drastically intensified lately and present the main obstacle to interethnic stability within the country and its accession to the EU (See Giandomenico, 2009; Ilievski & Talevski, 2009; Mavromatidis, 2010; Vasilev, 2011). The divisions within the EU and the lack of clear strategy until 1995 further reinforced the uncertainty and insecurity within the country, which, compounded by the civil wars in the region and the economic crisis, led to the escalation of the interethnic conflict in the country between the two major ethnic groups (Zahariadis, 2003).

While the EU established full diplomatic relations with Macedonia in 1995, the armed clashes between Macedonian forces and Albanian guerillas in 2001 pushed Macedonia to the top of the EU foreign policy agenda and deepened EU efforts toward mediating the internal conflicts (Ilievski & Talevski, 2009). The armed conflict was ended with the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001, reached through EU and NATO mediation, and full implementation of this Agreement presents one of the basic preconditions for Macedonia’s accession in the EU (Ilievski & Talevski, 2009; Ordanoski & Matovski, 2007; Zahariadis, 2003). One of the main preconditions of the Ohrid Agreement is to guarantee the rights of the Albanian population in terms of education, language use, and equal representation in the political, cultural, economic and public sphere (Czapliński, 2008). This illustrates the importance that the EU places on Macedonia’s maintenance of its multicultural and interethnic character. The EU considers Macedonia a
multicultural and multi-ethnic society whose members have overcome their prior religious and ethnic divisions and are able to cooperate and work together for a common good (Czapliński, 2008; Ilievski & Talevski, 2009; Ordanoski & Matovski, 2007; Zahariadis, 2003).

Even though Macedonia managed to escape the full-scale war that erupted in the former Yugoslav republics, from 1990-2010, it experienced multiple challenges stemming from the wars in the region, its multiethnic character, and weak economy impacted by the transition from socialism to free market economy. As a result, since its independence in 1991, the EU has been seen as the only solution to Macedonia’s troubles and the EU accession discourses affect the everyday lives of everyone living in the country (Ilievski & Taleski 2009; Ordanoski & Matovski 2007). It is believed that once the country gains EU membership there will be greater international investment and economic growth, which will then decrease the political and interethnic tensions that existed in the years after the separation from Yugoslavia (Ilievski & Taleski, 2009). Moreover, EU accession is especially important to the Albanians in Macedonia, a community that represents more than 30% of the population. Besides the economic gains, this ethnic group views accession to the EU as a way to be united with their brothers and sisters in Albania and Kosovo with whom they share the same ethnic affiliation, language and religion (Gordon & Dust, 2004). This perception is mainly due to the absence of borders within the EU countries and ability to move without passports from one Albanian territory to another though they are parts of different countries.
As a result, the EU accession is of symbolic importance to both the Macedonian ethnic group and the Albanian group within Macedonia (Gordon & Dust, 2004; Ilievski & Taleski 2009; Ordanoski & Matovski 2007).

As mentioned above, the armed clashes were ended through EU and NATO mediation that produced the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001. Since the EU had a leading role in the construction of this agreement, it has considered the ending of this conflict as an important success and it regards Macedonia as a rare example of interethnic coexistence (Giandomenico, 2009; Fouéré, 2006; Ilievski & Talevski, 2009). The EU used the US experience with the Dayton Peace Agreement signed in 1995 that ended the war in Bosnia, and learning from their mistakes, decided to take another approach with the Ohrid Framework Agreement (Ordanoski & Matovski, 2007). According to Ordanoski & Matovski (2007), while the idea of the Dayton Agreement was to separate the three ethnic communities (Serbs, Croatians and Bosnians) territorially and politically, making Bosnia a federal government, the idea behind the Ohrid Agreement was to preserve the unitary character of Macedonia with the intention of achieving “interethnic peace by encouraging the two main ethnic communities, Macedonian and Albanian, to resolve their own problems through a process of integration and institutional bargaining and compromise, both at local and state level” (p. 48). The Venice Commission stated that Dayton served as a great tool to enforce peace but was a terrible device for creating a functional state, and the major aim of the EU for the Ohrid Framework Agreement was to be able to create a functional state (Ordanovski & Matovski, 2007).
The historical background of the EU’s involvement in Macedonia and its leading role in the Ohrid Framework Agreement, whose full implementation remains one of the basic preconditions for Macedonia’s accession in the EU, illustrates the importance that the EU places on Macedonia’s maintenance of its multicultural and interethnic character. To a certain extent the Ohrid Framework Agreement has been successful in providing the minorities in Macedonia access to higher education and the Agreement has succeeded in decentralizing some of the municipalities. The Ohrid Framework Agreement brought changes to many constitutional amendments, including rewriting the preamble of the constitution which formerly defined Macedonia as the country of the Macedonian nation and other nationalities living therein (Taleski, 2008; Kreci & Ymeri, 2010). The new rewritten preamble of the constitution which was one of the main conditions coming from the Ohrid Framework Agreement, defines the Republic of Macedonia as a country of “citizens belonging to the Macedonian nation and citizens belonging to the Albanian, Turkish, Vlach, Serbian, Roma, Bosniak and other nations living in Macedonia” (Taleski, 2008, p. 130). The rewritten preamble emphasizes that the citizens of Macedonia should take over responsibility for present and future of their country as well as explicitly states that Macedonia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the unitary character of the State as inviolable and must be preserved (Kreci & Ymeri, 2010).

However, ten years after its signing, the Agreement has not yet been fully implemented and the tensions between the two major ethnic groups are still very
The EU and NATO’s vision for the Ohrid Framework Agreement was to have a loose structure and to be an open-ended document that would provide Macedonia’s ethnic groups with a flexible set of principles or a framework to negotiate solutions for their interethnic problems (Ordanovski & Matovski, 2007). According to the EU, if multiethnic and multicultural democracy is a “living creature” – a constant work in progress through which inter-group relations and positions are continually discussed and renegotiated – then the Ohrid model assumes that the ethnic groups have sufficient political capacity to continually bargain away their problems to keep their common “creature” alive (Ordanovski & Matovski, 2007, p. 50).

On the other hand, this ideology behind the Ohrid Framework Agreement also serves as the Achilles heel of this model. Ordanovski & Matovski (2007) asserted that, due to the inherent contradictions and tensions of multiethnic societies in transition as well as the frequent opportunism of Balkan politics, a very limited number of problems get resolved in due time, if at all. Consequently, the prospect of a multiethnic and multicultural Macedonia is unrealized.

Thus, while the country was granted EU candidate status in 2005, due to the continuation of the interethnic conflict within and the unresolved name issues with Greece, Macedonia has not been able to set a date for accession negotiations with the EU. Moreover, at the NATO 2008 summit in Bucharest, Greece vetoed Macedonia’s bid to join NATO (Reka, 2007). According to Reka (2007) the differing perceptions and the language gap between the two main ethnic groups in
Macedonia hold back any efforts for a truly functioning multiethnic society.

Besides, the new government that came into power in 2006 has stirred controversy and caused tensions affecting the country’s Euro-Atlantic perspective. Fouéré (2006) claims that while the prospect of EU membership has proved to be an effective instrument to sustain stability and achieve some of the needed reforms in Macedonia, the country still needs to deliver on some key reforms in order to reach full democracy and be granted accession to the EU. Some of the most important remaining preconditions for the EU accession include: the full implementation of judicial reforms; struggle against corruption; economic and administrative reforms as well as getting rid of party influence over vital areas of society. All of these issues directly contribute to the level of democracy in Macedonia and most importantly to the overall inter-ethnic situation and stability of the country.

Juncos (2005) argues that the EU should not be considered as an altruistic actor when it comes to promoting democracy, human rights and rule of law in South Eastern European countries. The EU should be seen as “just making short term sacrifices to achieve long-term gains” (p.100), such as regional stability and security. As a result, EU’s foreign policy is still very much regarded as a self-interested foreign policy by the former Yugoslav countries like Macedonia. The EU cannot expect to be considered a global player if it is not able to bring stability to its own neighborhood, which is reflected in the words of the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Secretary General of the Council of the European Union, Javier Solana who in a speech
presented at Olof Palme Memorial Lecture in Stockholm claimed: "I make no apologies for concentrating on the Balkans. They are on our doorstep. The security of Europe depends on stability in the Balkans. They are also a test case for Europe’s enhanced Common Foreign and Security Policy. Nowhere more than in the Balkans is the EU expected to deliver" (Solana, 2001, June 20).

Moreover, the EU has placed emphasis on the promotion of rule of law as a way to reduce the threats that could easily spill over into the EU, such as organized crime, smuggling of weapons, human trafficking and drug trafficking. According to the European Security Strategy: "Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organized crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organized crime within the EU" (High Representative for CFSP 2003, p. 6). Thus, according to Juncos (2005), due to more necessity than to choice, the Balkans has been the EU’s test ground for conflict resolution and promotion of democratic values. The EU has for the first time tried to introduce a comprehensive approach towards conflict management in the countries of Western Balkans such as Macedonia. This has been a slow process of learning from failure, while implementing political tools for conflict mediation, humanitarian aid and long term economic assistance, police and peace-keeping missions (Juncos, 2005; Guzina, 2009).
Rhetorical needs for Macedonia

The EU has only recently formulated a clearer definition of their enlargement policy, with the former Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, contributing to "shaping the policy around the three C’s: Commitment, Conditionality, and Communication" (Giandomenico, 2009, p.103). The three Cs mean: that "the commitment towards the Western Balkans is firm, the process follows a strict conditionality, and the benefits of enlargement have to be clearly communicated to the European citizens" (Giandomenico, 2009, p. 103). The substance of the policy was established during the Kosovo crisis and is not clearly written in a single unified document or statement, but repeated over time by the Council and the Commission.

As mentioned above, Macedonia was granted a candidate status by the Council of Europe in 2005, but in contrast to other countries that have been granted candidate statuses before, the EU didn’t set a date for commencing the candidacy negotiations with Macedonia (Mavromatidis, 2010; Giandomenico, 2009). Mavromatidis (2010) asserts that there has been a behind the scenes bargain for this decision, and France blocked Macedonia's candidacy by threatening to veto the candidate status and by wanting to slow down the whole enlargement process. Finally, after German support for the candidacy, and a compromise on EU fiscal issues, which presented the main problem for France, Macedonia was granted the candidate status (Mavromatidis, 2010; Giandomenico 2009).
The implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), fair elections and constitutional amendments were mentioned as the main priorities for Macedonia to address in order to set a date to start the candidacy negotiations (European Commission, 2005). Most of these priorities were mentioned in the Accession Partnership of 2008 as well (Mavromatidis, 2010). The 2008 Commission Progress Report noted several shortcomings in the achievement of the priorities set by the EU, the most important ones being the irregularities in the 2008 elections as well as the slow implementation of reforms and of decentralization (European Commission, 2008). The 2009 Progress Report is more positive in considering Macedonia ready for entering negotiations with the EU, but there is fear of the Greek veto and bad neighborly relations with Greece are mentioned as a setback (European Commission, 2009). Special attention is also paid to decentralization and a more equal representation of ethnic minorities, which is an OFA obligation as well (Mavromatidis, 2010; European Commission, 2009; Giandomenico, 2009).

According to Vasilev (2011), the EU gave Macedonia the candidate status as an "influential motivational tool, withholding or extending the prospect of membership at timely intervals to elicit behavioral compliance" (p. 56). Giandomenico (2009) asserts that the EU “felt obliged to give this symbolic status [to Macedonia] without the actual benefits of it” (p. 111), despite the fact that the country had not reached the required quality of state administration, elections and other important issues. The only reason the EU decided to grant candidate status to
Macedonia, was to reward the country for it progress in the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and to motivate the leaders to move further in this respect. As a result, the EU has used conditionality with the aim of bringing about favorable changes relationship between ethnic groups (Vasilev, 2011; Giandomenico, 2009).

These reasons are stated many times by the EU leaders and are written in various reports published after the decision was taken. For example, the Presidency Conclusions state that “the European Council decides to grant candidate status to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, taking into account, in particular, the substantial progress made in completing the legislative framework related to the Ohrid Framework Agreement” (Council of The European Union, 2005, p. 7). Also, the EU Special Representative to Macedonia and Head of Commission in Skopje, Erwan Fouere, writes that the candidate status “was a clear recognition of the commitment of the country’s leaders to fully implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement and progress achieved in that respect” (Fouere, 2007, p. 198). The enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn has stated that, “the Agreement signed in 2001 in Ohrid was key in this context” (referring to the recognition as a candidate country) (2007).

As a result, Giandomenico (2009) asserts that the relationship between EU and Macedonia after 2001 has been mostly characterized by “post-conflict management and to some extent conflict prevention” (p. 97). In fact, OFA has become a sort of symbol for the reform progress in the country, as well as the
successful crisis management by the EU. The EU got directly involved in the country after the 2001 conflict, through military and police missions and an extended reconstruction effort, which is still in place. The commitment towards Macedonia has usually been confirmed and reconfirmed through speeches and statements by high ranking EU leaders. For example, the former EU special representative to Macedonia, Michael Sahlin, writes that “the political stability, inter-ethnic harmony, progress and ultimately EU accession of Macedonia has become a prestige matter for the EU” (2007, p. 104) and continues to say that the EU actions in Macedonia were a “very special case of comparatively successful conflict prevention and crisis management – for the EU definitely a huge investment” (2007, p. 108). And the former Secretary General of the Council of the European Union, Javier Solana has been clear about this, and the EU’s engagement in the country by saying that:

The European Union will now redouble its efforts in supporting the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement and will give priority to help bring Macedonia closer to the EU, as foreseen in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement . . . I will myself continue to help the implementation process where I can, assisted by my Special Representative in Skopje, Alain Le Roy, and in close co-operation with the President and Government and the international community (2001, November).

Such EU rhetoric addressed to the Macedonian leaders and the general public plays a significant role in the process of sanctioning and rewarding the
country in relation to the goals set for membership. This is usually carried out through various public pronouncements and visits by influential EU actors, the issuing of reports in which clear and detailed expectations are conveyed to politicians, and setting of time frames according to which reforms are expected to be accomplished. Whenever Macedonia appears to move away from the desired course of action, the EU strategy is to move the government into action through formal statements of concern and criticism, coupled with clear guidelines on what they needed to do to address satisfactorily the problem as it was defined. Whereas, whenever the desired changes are adopted, the EU responds by praising the government, and making it aware that their reforms had brought the country a step closer to fulfilling the goal of membership.

However, no certain date for starting the negotiations with the EU has been set up yet, and Macedonia’s prospects for the EU are still lingering up in the air. According to the *Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012* report published by the European Commission in November 12, 2011, while Macedonia has continued to sufficiently meet the political criteria set by the EU, it still needs to make further efforts in three major areas such as: “freedom of expression in the media, judicial and administrative reform and fighting corruption” (European Commission, 2011). The report also adds that the country also needs to strengthen the dialogue between the government and the opposition in order to ensure the smooth functioning of institutions.
The 2011 European Commission report also stresses on the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) as an essential element for democracy and rule of law in the country. Having marked OFA’s tenth anniversary of existence, the European Commission acknowledges the progress that has been made in the implementation of the Law on languages\(^7\), on decentralization\(^8\) and on equitable representation\(^9\) of the Albanian community in the civil service (which according to the European Commission is in line with its proportion of the population) and the representation of the Roma and Turkish communities increased, but stresses that the government should make “continued efforts” in order “to address ongoing challenges such as education and to ensure harmonious relations between all communities” (European Commission, 2011). The report stresses that the country needs to make “continued efforts” in order “to foster trust, especially in the areas of education, culture and language” (European Commission, 2011).

Another area of concern for the European Commission that is stressed on the report for *Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012*, is the independence and professionalism of the judiciary system, as “corruption remains prevalent in many areas and continues to be a serious problem” (European Commission, 2011). The report stresses that the “weaknesses in the rule of law

---

\(^7\) Macedonian parliament passed a Law on June 19, 2002 making Albanian language an official language within the country. The law made it possible to use the language in all government matters. (See Testorides, 2002, June 20).

\(^8\) The process of decentralization began in 1999 in Macedonia with the adoption of a Strategy on Reform of the System of Local Self-Government. This process however, was intensified after signing OFA in 2001. OFA carried to the adoption of amendments to the Constitution that enable the process of further decentralization of competencies, provide an enlarged scope for the use of languages1 in the local government and define new procedures for the adoption of laws related to the system of local self-government. (See Dimitrievik, 2010).

\(^9\) Equal representation is a criterion that arose as a result of OFA, in 2001. The principle of equitable representation deals with the relation between the ethnic structure of Macedonia on the one side and on the other hand employment in the civil service and the public sector. Its primary goal is to combat the ethnic discrimination in the labor market. (See Selami & Risteska, 2009).
continue to impede the proper functioning of the market economy” (European Commission, 2011).

A more recent concern that has been an issue in Macedonia during 2011, is freedom of expression which came as a result of the closure of A1 TV, a major television channel in the country and three newspapers, Spic, Vreme and Koha e Re owned by the same media mogul on charges of tax evasion. There have been numerous speculations regarding these closures, and it has mainly been reported as a ‘blow to [Macedonian] democracy’ (Levie-Sawyer, 2011, August 1). The 2011 European Commission report says that “editors and journalists reported increasing political pressure and intimidation” (European Commission, 2011), and expressed concern about the self-censorship of journalists and editorial policies.

Last but not least, another important concern stressed in the report for Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012 is Macedonia’s relations with Greece, which the report states “continued to be adversely affected by the unresolved name issue” (European Commission, 2011). As a result the European Commission says that in order to start the negotiations for EU accession, it is essential for Macedonia to maintain “good neighborly relations, including a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution to the name issue, under the auspices of the UN” (European Commission, 2011).

\[10\] For more information concerning these events see: Dimovski, 2010, December 2; Stojanovska, 2011, February 2; Dimovski & Marusic 2011, July 27.
Rhetorical history of multiculturalism in Macedonia

Multicultural and multiethnic coexistence and religious and ethnic tolerance was one of the priorities of Macedonia as part of Yugoslavia, although at the time not called multiculturalism, but rather under the notion of “brotherhood and unity,” which became an omnipresent symbol for reconciliation after World War II (Balandina, 2010). National songs and slogans promoting this top-down philosophy of “brotherhood and unity” played an important role in forging youth identity and endorsing a pan-Yugoslav consciousness (Balandina, 2010) and this model was adopted by the majority of the post WWII generations in former Yugoslavia as an important part of their national identity (Mikula, 2003). This unique concept, promoted under the watchful eye of the authoritarian nature of the socialist regime, often played an important ideological role in repressing expressions of ethnicity, ethnic rivalry, nationalism and religious identity.

However, even though many did not or could not question the ideals of “brotherhood and unity” implemented in Macedonia during Yugoslav era, in everyday life, people experienced quite the opposite of what was promoted. Balandina (2010) recalls a deeply divided society in Skopje, the capital of Macedonia, where she grew up as a child, marked with sociocultural and religious distance among the Albanian, Macedonian and Roma population. The areas in Skopje were and remain “sliced into ethnic geographical pieces” (p. 232), divided by the Roma district, the Albanian zone and Macedonian populated areas. Ilija Josifovski’s study of Polog villages in the early 1970s, in Macedonia, revealed the
deep ethnic gulf that existed between the two communities, and the high level of isolation vis-à-vis the ethnic Other (as cited by Brunnbauer, 2004, p. 577). This is the reality in almost all the cities and villages of Macedonia today. In the elementary and high schools the situation is also very similar, and the distance between the Albanian and Macedonian population is pervasive as they attend separate classrooms due to the language barrier.

The ethnic divisions existing in Macedonia today are not only the result of the armed conflict in 2001, but are also reminiscent of the ethnic divisions and inequalities during Yugoslavia which actually claimed to promote the opposite (Baladina, 2010). “Ethnic divisions have deep historical roots apparent in politics and everyday life practices that continue to nourish negative stereotypes and prejudices about the Others,” overemphasizing the “unknown” and maintaining existing cultural barriers by inciting “feelings of antipathy in both Albanian and Macedonian populations” (Balandina, 2010, p. 232).

The shared geographic location has made the Macedonians and Albanians alternately allies and enemies throughout the history of the Balkans, fighting common enemies during the Ottoman Empire and WWII, but also fighting each other when it came to the protection of their ethnic and religious rights. During the Yugoslav era, tensions between the Albanian and Macedonian communities emerged in the period following Tito’s death in 1980, starting with the student demonstrations in Prishtina, the capital of Kosovo, in 1981 (Neofotistos, 2004). The demonstrations in the neighboring Kosovo caused fear among Macedonian authorities about the
potential spread of Albanian nationalist sentiment in the Macedonian Republic, whose leaders implemented repressive measures against the Albanian population in Macedonia. According to Neofotistos (2004), these measures included “a decrease in the number of Albanian employees in state administration, dismissal of Albanian teachers, official refusal to register names that were taken to index support for Albanian nationalism (e.g., *Rilindja* or “Rebirth”, *Flamur* or “Flag”), and the closure of classes in the Albanian language lacking sufficient enrollment of Albanian pupils” (p. 61).

The Albanian population throughout the 1980s reacted by taking part in demonstrations against such measures. The construction and experience of those events are indicative of the social and political repression against the Albanian minority by the Macedonian majority. As a result, the Albanian ethnic group has created a strong sense of community woven around the collective memory of suffering from the Macedonian authorities. The Albanians tend to identify with people of their own ethnic group and “experience present-day life as members of a group that has allegedly held low social status and suffered continuous social and political discrimination within the wider former Yugoslav and present-day Macedonian society” (Neofotistos, 2004, p. 61).

Adamson & Jovic (2004) assert that even prior to the 2001 inter-ethnic conflict, Albanian and Macedonian social and political identities constantly have been under re-construction and re-articulation by both the internal and international elites and this has affected the differing meanings of nation, citizenship and
multiculturalism. It should also be taken into account that these identities have been strongly influenced by the Marxist paradigm and its Yugoslav official interpretation whereas in the process of transition from socialism to democracy the old paradigm was combined with liberal democratic concepts with nationalism in the vacuum due to the wars in the region and the process of nation building (Adamson & Jovic, 2004). Looking at these issues “through the spectacle of Yugoslav identity politics, the current conflict reflect older conflicts and is understood through categories that have developed according to a language of politics developed through the Yugoslav Period” (Adamson & Jovic, 2004, p. 306). As a result, Macedonian nationalists refuse to recognize that the two ethnicities should have the same status within the country and continue to consider Macedonia as a purely Macedonian nation-state, not a multicultural one. A truly multicultural approach as defined by Barry (2001) would require that Albanians be treated as equal citizens of the country in which they live and not as an unequal minority.

Post-independence discourses

After Macedonia’s independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, Albanian political parties were included in the national government, yet government policies remained quite unresponsive to the specific needs of the Albanian community, resulting in the under-representation of Albanians in local administration, the lack of higher education in Albanian language as well as other social, political and economic disadvantages that marginalized this group (Brunnbauer, 2004). The
disintegration of the Albanian population in the social mainstream was and still is criticized by Macedonian politicians and intellectuals who have not yet developed a sincere interest in developments within the Albanian population (Brunnbauer, 2004). Moreover, the government often lacks first-hand information about the dynamics of Albanian areas because it had neglected them for so many years and has nearly withdrawn its presence in many Albanian villages. As a result, Macedonians are often surprised by Albanian opposition to certain government policies and do not fully comprehend that any measure in the political realm would be perceived and also experienced differently by the two ethnic communities (Brunnbauer, 2004). Macedonian politicians and intellectuals, for example, are not fully aware of the ethnically divisive effect that social and economic policies on the multiethnic coexistence, such as the lack of state investment in predominately Albanian rural areas or towns.

When it comes to the Albanian population in Macedonia even census numbers are contested. The Albanians constitute the largest minority in Macedonia situated mostly in the northwestern part of the country, but the exact size of the population has remained in dispute. Though the official census reports have put the Albanian minority at nearly one-quarter of the population, Albanian sources have claimed the figure to be considerably higher, at almost 40 per cent (Eldridge, 2002). For the ethnic Albanians these differences have been politically and morally relevant. Eldridge (2002) asserts that without levels of inclusion and recognition in the political and security institutions approximating their perceived economic
contributions, the ethnic Albanians have believed they have not been part of Macedonia but are instead tenants in a crumbling and discriminatory state.

Tensions and anxieties between the two communities still remain high. Polls conducted after 2001 suggest that there is a significant ambivalence among ethnic Macedonians to the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which many perceive as a top-down and even coerced policy innovation. However, the same polls suggest that a bottom-up movement for cultural inclusion would have had no chance of success. A UNDP poll conducted in 2003, two years after the Ohrid Framework Agreement, showed that 12% of Macedonians perceived that it would be ideal for them if there were no ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. Whereas, in a poll conducted in 2006 63% of Macedonians believed that Albanians do not experience Macedonia as their home, but 78% of Albanians consider themselves permanent citizens of Macedonia. Moreover, a UNDP poll conducted in 2008 showed that 53% of Macedonians and 54% of Albanians believed that the members of their ethnic group felt anxious about constituting a minority in the community, and 69% of Macedonians and 42% of Albanians claimed to refuse to send their children in schools where the majority is constituted from another ethnic group.

These polls illustrate some of the anxieties that both parties still experience even several years after the Framework Agreement as well as the long road that Macedonia has to walk in order to be considered a truly multicultural society. Moreover, these data show that after the 2001 conflict Macedonians remain anxious, blame Albanians for their troubles and negatively perceive the political stability in
their country. Whereas, while the Ohrid Framework Agreement has made Albanians more content with the changes made in the political system, they still remain rather anxious as well.

There are also deeply divided perceptions about the ethnic conflict in 2001, which is viewed by ethnic Macedonians as having been due to Albanian criminal gangs provoking disorder for their own ends, the influence of Kosovar Albanian guerrillas, and possibly foreign interests including the United States as well as the Albanian diaspora from outside Macedonia (Ringdal, Simkus, & Listhaug, 2007). On the other hand, Albanians tend to view the guerrilla leaders as local and Albanian national heroes, fighting for equality, fair treatment for Albanians, and local autonomy and representation (Ringdal, Simkus, & Listhaug, 2007). As a result, Albanians are favorable toward the rapid implementation of the terms of the framework agreement, and the Macedonian side is not so eager to implement the major points stemming from the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which is why ten years after its signing this still remains an issue and ethnic polarization remains high (Ringdal, Simkus, & Listhaug, 2007).

Brunnbauer (2004) asserts that the marginal position of the Albanian population in the Macedonian society and the social differences that exist between them and the Macedonians, have limited interactions between the two communities and has led to a high degree of ethnic distance. For example, mixed marriages between the two ethnic groups are extremely rare showing a downward trend after the breakup of Yugoslavia. Macedonian society remains deeply divided along
religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic and racial lines, and different ethnic groups still view each other with suspicion and hatred, and have contrasting perceptions of their own situation and problems (Brunnbauer, 2004; Neofotistos, 2004; Friedman 2009; Balandina, 2010). Moreover, the Albanian ethnic group shows only a weak identification with the Macedonian state, which is a direct result of their marginality in political, social and economic life in Macedonia (Brunnbauer, 2004).

As shown above, the division between Macedonians and Albanians are not only political, and do not end with the matters typically contested in minority conflicts such as the use of minority languages, state symbols but are rather the expression of the deep social gulf which divides these two groups. Brunnbauer (2004) asserts that this division is not the case only in more rural areas, or with less educated demographics, but in educated urban milieus as well, where the life-styles of Macedonians and Albanians approach each other. The different social development and cultural differences have had lasting effects, leading to hostile perceptions of each other and a high degree of endogamy (Brunnbauer, 2004; Neofotistos, 2004).

A myriad of discourses of difference

It should also be noted that the ethnic conflict in Macedonia is not linked to any physical distinctions between Macedonians and Albanians, but to “other cleavages such as rural versus urban, marginal versus non-marginal, state-employed
versus self-employed, state-centered versus kin-centered, ‘traditional’ versus ‘modern’” (Brunnbauer, 2004, p. 590). The Macedonian perception of the Albanian individual is often associated with being rural, uneducated, high reproductive behavior, emphasis on household and lineage solidarity, etc. (Brunnbauer, 2004; Neofotistos, 2004). These differences are highly politicized by political elites and expressed mainly in cultural terms because ethnicity has proved to be a powerful tool for mass mobilization and for creating emotional bonds between members of the concerned ethnic group.

Neofotistos (2004) asserts that ethnicity in Macedonia constitutes an organizing principle in the system of social classifications that most Macedonians generate. For example, the Macedonian ethnic group tends to distinguish between their ethnic identity and the Albanian ethnic identity with the use of pejorative terms such as “shiptar” (male) or “shiptarka” (female) or “shiptari” (plural) which allude to a range of stereotypes commonly held about the Albanian people. The stereotypes that the term “shiptar” brings about is that of people belonging to lower classes in the society, that are not of Orthodox religion, regarded as dangerous to both the Macedonian nation and country. The Macedonian ethnic group also tends to be preoccupied with the allegedly high reproductive rates among Albanians, which is usually interpreted as a sign of the Albanian aggression, expansionism and irredentism.

“‘Shiptari’ are also regarded as ‘dishonest’ and ‘unfair’ (necesni) as they are never satisfied with what they have but continuously ask for more. As a popular
Macedonian saying suggests, they want to have ‘fancier bread than the bread they are given’ (preku leb pogaca). ‘Shiptari’ are considered to be ‘uncultivated’ (nekultumi), ‘dirty’ (prljavi), ‘smelly’ (mirisaat), ‘stupid’ (gllupavi), ‘wild’ (divi/divljaci), ‘closed’ (zatvoreni), ‘dangerous’ (opasni), ‘powerful’ (sillni), ‘fanatics’ (fanatici), ‘aggressive’ (agresivni), ‘criminals’ (kriminali) and ‘left in the past’ (zaostanati vo minatoto). Shiptari allegedly force their wives to veil and treat them as ‘machines for giving birth’ (masini za ragjanje)” (Neofotistos, 2004, p. 49-50).

Neofotistos (2004) also asserts that Macedonians argue that Albanians are not threatening whenever they are alone, but that they derive power and become dangerous once they come together as a group. As a result, while many Macedonians live and work with Albanian individuals who are not viewed as threatening on individual bases, but at the same time they fear their alleged social cohesion which is yet another stereotype commonly held by the Macedonian majority against the Albanian minority. However, at the same time most Macedonians admire the closeness in the social relations and the coherence of the Albanian social unit as they all help and support each other in times of need. Usually, the Albanian “collectiveness” is juxtaposed against the Macedonian “individuality” where the promotion of individual interest supersedes the benefit of the Macedonian ethnic collectivity that results in fragmented Macedonian local narratives (Neofotistos, 2004).
Consequently, stereotypes play a central role in the negotiations of Macedonian and Albanian identity in Macedonia, and the Albanians have their own stereotypes and pejorative terms which they use against the Macedonians on daily basis. The pejorative term that the Albanians use against the Macedonian ethnic group is “shka” (masculine), “shkina” (feminine) and “shkie” (plural).

“Albanians in Macedonia tend to employ ‘shka’ to refer to those who are said to be ‘non believers’ (pa fe) and ‘without good soul’ (pa shpirt të mirë) – that is, Orthodox people living not only within, but also outside Macedonia’s geographical borders: Macedonians, Bulgarians, Russians and Serbs. …most Albanians tend to portray them as an ‘artifical people’ (popull artificial) who are also ‘not hospitable’ (pa mishpitje). ‘Shkie’ are also said to be ‘backwards’ (të prapambetur) because they do not treat all people as equal human beings, but instead look down on others and expect Albanian’s to work on their service” (Neofotistos, 2004, p. 51).

The above mentioned pejorative terms and stereotypes indicate the divergent ways local ethnic groups in Macedonia negotiate history and contract ethnic identity in their country. These stereotypes transpire in the ideology that both ethnic groups produce when it comes to discussing the ideal models for their country to follow, i.e. the models that the Macedonian majority considers ideal for their country are fought against by the Albanian ethnic group as repressive.

Zahariadis (2003) maintains that Macedonia’s political and intellectual elites did not give the needed attention to growing ethnic tensions in the country and therefore any strategies used to overcome the divisions between the two ethnic
groups were unsuccessful. Besides, the dispute with Greece over international recognition under the name Macedonia gave rise to the ethno-national conception of the country that stands in direct contrast with the multicultural vision for the country. Thus, the domestic strategies designed to deal with the ethnic tensions had negative consequences and in some cases even worsened the tensions. In many cases, democracy in Macedonia is regarded as just a name attached to a system that at many times is more corrupt or unfair than its communist predecessor. Moreover, the government often assures its citizens about the protection of individual rights and minorities, which has not been firmly embedded in legislation yet.

But despite the difficulties discussed above, Macedonia still remains a viable example of successful ethnic co-existence in the Balkans for some scholars and analysts. According to an article by The Economist titled "A Balkan Belgium?," Macedonia, just like Belgium is described as ethnically strongly divided, but kept still in one piece due to Europe (The Economist, 2008, June 5). While Belgium is part of the EU and Macedonia is struggling to gain accession, one can rightly argue that the prospect for EU integration is one of the elements that have kept Macedonia together during all this long period of ethnic turmoil.

Scholars also point out to the fact that Macedonians and Albanians have indeed coexisted in the preceding centuries fighting common enemies such as the Ottoman Empire and the Nazis during the WWII. This conveys a sense of the generally peaceful multicultural co-existence between the two communities who have shared the same land for centuries. Besides, it should be also considered that
beyond the Macedonian-Albanian anxieties, other minority groups have long coexisted in Macedonia for centuries. These minorities include Roma, Turks, Serbs, Bosniaks, Torbesh, Vlachs and even a small Egyptian minority, who have enjoyed full political representation ever since Macedonia's independence in 1991.

Neofotistos (2004) argues that “labeling Macedonian society as ‘ethnically divided’ and social tensions as ‘ethnic’ defies the negotiation of tension as part of everyday life and demonstrates a profound failure to grasp the social dynamics and intricate dialectics of local life in Macedonia” (p. 48). His research conducted in Macedonia in the late 2003 and early 2004 clarifies some of the social sites of power that the experience of violence creates, by describing a social context that is less clear-cut, where tension and peace co-exist. Neofotistos, (2004) asserts that even though Macedonia at first sight seems to thrive with rigid stereotypes that both ethnic groups, the Macedonians and Albanians deploy to organize their social world along ethnic lines, a closer look reveals the existence of the alternative classificatory principles which he defines as kultura and besa upon which ethnic groups model the endorsement of selected “others” who are seen to escape the conventional stereotypes portrayed by the pejorative terms shiptar and shka.

Kultura and besa are explained as local principles for the production of social taxonomies that distinguish provide some common basis or likability elements between the two ethnic groups. Kultura, literally translated as “culture” for many in Macedonia means “educated,” “modern,” “civilized” and “urban”. As a result, the Albanians that are considered kulturni or “cultural” and fit in the above mentioned
description are considered as equal *nas covek* (our man/woman) to the Macedonian majority and are not looked down by them. Moreover, *besa* which in translation means “trustworthiness,” considered for centuries as a very positive Albanian trait, provides another likability element that the Macedonian ethnic group highly values and admires in the Albanian community and at the same time disparage its absence within their own ethnic community. “Albanians with *besa* emerge as agents of *kultura* and escape the stereotype of *shiptar* (Neofotistos, 2004, p. 58). Thus, Neofotistos (2004) claims that the rigidity of stereotypes and the absorbent nature of ethnic boundaries should be seen in a relation of dialectical interaction with one another, and that stereotypes provide a context in which the common likability elements between the two groups are made possible.

Of course such likability elements cannot be a proof for multiculturalism in the country. The most important component for a multicultural existence is that all parties feel that they have equal chance and equal ownership of the common good of the society where they live. Many scholars would argue that blending and liking each other are not the most important precondition for conflict resolution and multicultural co-existence. Bosnia and Herzegovina is commonly cited as one example with the biggest number of interethnic-marriages during Yugoslavia, particularly between Serbs and Croats, but at the same time experienced the harshest war between these same ethnic groups in the 90s. As a result, likability elements between ethnic groups do not necessarily help a community deprived of the feeling of equality to feel any more equal or resolve conflict.
Toward a culture of peace

Macedonia is still a post-conflict society that is undergoing the process of healing the wounds inflicted from a decade of wars in the region, mistrust and distance between the ethnic groups. It may be one of the rare examples where tolerance and respect for the Other co-exist with a relatively high degree of ethnocentrism and closeness of the circle of values of one’s own nation. This is mostly a result of the segregation of ethnic communities in the country who although share the same land, neighborhood or school, still do not know enough about each other. Only people that do not know each other well, create such rigid stereotypes or different conspiracy theories about one another, which ultimately result in cultural fragmentation, cultural annihilation, and ethnocentric standards. Macedonian government has so far failed to fully recognize its multicultural identity and has constantly tired to view itself in mono-cultural terms since its independence from Yugoslavia, which has resulted in deep divisions among the two major ethnic groups.

A key reality in the Macedonian society is what Galtung (1992) called a “culture of peace” and “culture of war”. For Galtung (1992) the “culture of peace” open to creative, positive transformation of conflict, in which conflict can be a creator. In this culture people question previously held suppositions of conflict and seek to transform mindsets that advance dehumanization and the formation of enemy images. On the other hand, Galtung described the “culture of violence” as one in which violence seems natural and the threshold for it is extremely low, thereby
creating ripe grounds for unresolved conflict to yield violent outcomes. In a culture of violence, conflict is a destroyer and appears in opposition to conflict as a creator. Brand-Jacobsen (2002) said: ‘‘No culture is entirely black or white, entirely violent or peaceful. Just as there are elements of cultures of violence within almost every culture, so there are elements of peace culture’’ (p. 18).

The concepts of “culture of peace” and “culture of violence” have special utility in the Macedonian context. The global preoccupation with violence and conflict in Macedonia that has recently become a trademark should not prevent the country from knowing and living peace presently or in the future. The conflict burden that this country carries can and must be transformed if a future-oriented local culture of peace is to grow. Thus, the production and lived experience of peace knowledge and scholarship in this region can play a large part in this endeavor. But, the negative rhetoric about the peaceful multicultural co-existence between the different ethnic groups means that such knowledge originating from this part of southeastern Europe still remains marginalized and very much on the periphery of any kind of scholarship.

In recent years, however, Macedonia has done quite the contrary. It has unfortunately chosen a path that reflects distrust of ethnic minorities by taking away some rights that they previously enjoyed under the Yugoslav regime. The new government that came into power in 2006 has stirred controversy and caused interethnic tensions with its latest projects like the Macedonian encyclopedia which claimed that Albanians settled the region in the 16th century, even though the
majority of historic accounts around the world claim that they were present in the region long before Slavic tribes arrived centuries ago (Radio Free Europe, 2009, September 24). The same government promoted and adopted textbooks for primary schools and high schools with similarly distorted historical accounts, projects like “Skopje 2014” that are aimed at renewing the Macedonian capital with enormous statues from the Macedonian antique history, without including any Albanian national heroes (Boston, 2011, May 18) and building of the Church at Skopje’s Turkish era fortress (kale) that caused a violent interethnic incident in February 2011 (Stojanovski, 2011, February 15; The Economist, 2011, February 24).

These and other similar projects are usually referred to by scholars as a process of antiquization, which aims to present a highly politicized historiography of Macedonia (See Lesnikovski, 2011; Vangeli, 2011; Moulakis, 2010). Such efforts were additionally validated in the eyes of Macedonian nationalists after Greece’s veto of Macedonia’s NATO bid in Bucharest in 2008, and political myths and grand narratives such as that of ancient Macedonian nationhood became more prevalent in the media and in public spaces (Vangeli, 2011). Vangeli (2011) asserts that “many Macedonians take comfort from the idea that they are the descendants of a glorious world famous empire and use it to reinforce national pride, legitimize the “national struggle” and inspire themselves” (p. 22). The process of antiquization vastly employed by the current government has also an escapist character according to Vangeli (2011). He notes that “the deeper the governments explore the spheres of the mythological and mystical, the less their policies keep in touch with achieving
objective goals” (p. 23) in relation to achieving the conditions set by the EU. Being categorized as a mono-ethnic project, the process of antiquization has actually worsened the inter-ethnic relations in the country and minorities strongly oppose it (Vangeli, 2011; Moulakis, 2010).

These projects have drastically affected the country’s multiethnic existence in the recent years and have heightened the tensions between the two groups. As a result, many Albanians today consider the life under the current democratic regime as being worse in social and economic terms than life under Yugoslav communism. Interethnic conflict requires bold action, and walking the middle line like the Macedonian government has done so far, supports the status and even makes matters worse. The political elites in Macedonia have so far exhibited a very short-term horizon, and neglected the long-term consequences when dealing ethnic division in the country (Zahariadis, 2003).

Brunnbauer (2004) asserts that the Macedonian government needs to fully apprehend the social and economic differences between the Macedonians and Albanians in order to develop policies sensitive to these differences. Government policies designed to bring a solution to the conflict must clearly assess how they will impact the ethnic communities in Macedonia in different ways. The government should strive to give all ethnic groups the feeling that they have equal access to its political, economic and symbolic resources and devise strategies to increase the opportunities of the Albanian population. Otherwise, the government cannot expect
the Albanians to view Macedonia as their country while they are being marginalized by it and their interests and needs are not respected.

Such divisions between the two groups are well known to the EU, as the 2009 EU Progress Report concludes that mutual understanding and intercultural dialogue need to be fostered in the country. The report states that while the interethnic tensions were at a low level after the conflict in 2001, they intensified in some areas and at certain moments. The EU Report also reminds the local actors that the Ohrid Framework Agreement remains a crucial guarantee of the rights of the ethnic communities and remains an obligation for the Republic of Macedonia to begin the process of EU membership negotiations. The European Committee admits that, although in the Republic of Macedonia the legal frame in the area of protection of minority and cultural rights allows a high level of protection, the practical implementation of this legislation is not yet on an adequate level. The remarks of the Committee are mostly related to the integration of the ethnic communities, especially in the areas of education and employment.

The new constitution adopted after the Ohrid Framework Agreement accommodated most political demands of the Albanians, furthering ongoing and thorough decentralization that brings decision-making closer to the people, providing a framework for such sensitive policies (Brunnbauer, 2004). The process of decentralization is one of the most important projects for reorganization of the life of the society in Macedonia stemming from the Ohrid Framework Agreement. It aims to enable the citizens, to be more involved in the decision making process in a wider
number of areas such as education, urban and rural planning, health, culture, and local economic development. The basis of the decentralization process can be recognized in the transfer of the decision-making from the higher to the lower level in the society. This process represents the level of modernization the state has reached through its development, usually referring to the empowerment of the political and financial autonomy of the local authorities, empowerment of the citizen’s participation in the social and political processes, ensuring a higher level of services for the citizens, and establishing collaboration between the local and the state authorities, but also between the local authorities and the civil organizations (Jovanovska & Stojmenov, 2010).

The decentralization agenda assumes transfer of the competencies that used to be under the authority of the central government to the municipalities, which will have a direct impact upon the quality of life and ethnic cohesion in the country. In order to build a solid ground for achieving a sustainable development, in accordance with the aspirations for European integration, there is a need to implement the principles of multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity in every field of the social and the political life. The process of reforms in the local self-government through decentralization is a way of reaching democracy and respect of human rights and dignity. This contributes for better targeting of vulnerabilities and also for more efficient tackling of the problems that citizens are faced. Yet the successful implementation of the decentralization process to a large extent depends on the level of developed communication with all stakeholders. Therefore, the participation of all
concerned subjects should present an essential part of every implemented reform (Jovanovska & Stojmenov, 2010).

Changes in the multicultural ideograph

In the case of the usage of “multiculturalism” in the discourse between EU and Macedonia and within the diverse groups in the country, the ideograph has undergone many changes in response to the historical events described above and as a result of the differing or contradicting political and societal exigencies. Moreover, besides the meanings of the ideograph being changed, the ideograph itself is being replaced by various other vocabularies such as “inter-ethnic tolerance”, “inter-ethnic dialogue”, “inter-ethnic cooperation” or “inter-ethnic stability,” which sometimes serve as synonymous references to the ideograph of “multiculturalism” and other times are filled with additional meanings and references that further problematize the discourse of multiculturalism.

Staniševski & Miller (2009) assert that the institutionalization of discursive practices in Macedonia is a difficult process and require transformations of already established cultural practices. Such transformations of cultural practices would require “(re)socialization of different cultural practices, change in social thinking, and the emergence of viable new political identifications that transcend ethnicity” (Staniševski & Miller, 2009, p. 569). Multicultural discourses have the potential to increase perceptions of social inclusion and forestall an escalation of intercultural tensions, and by opening the dialogue on cultural differences may offer the
opportunity for bridging cultural divisions and developing gradual change in social
perceptions and political identities.

On the other hand Guzina (2009) asks the question if it is logical to expect
that the western practices of liberal pluralism and ethno cultural justice be promoted
as means to solving ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans. This is in line with
Rostow’s (1970) claim that a country can successfully transition to democracy as
long as it has achieved a certain level of national unity. For Guzina (2009), because
there is lack of national unity in conflict torn societies such as Macedonia, it is hard
to achieve a full democracy and the multiculturalism discourse is used by the
government only for tactical purposes of legitimizing the country’s position
internationally which usually happens with the Macedonian government.

The speech of the Macedonian Minister of Foreign Affairs given at the forum
of the UN Alliance of Civilizations, on April 6, 2010, is an illustration of the tactical
purposes the government uses in promoting the multicultural aspect of the country
internationally, while the reality on the ground remains much different. In this
speech he stresses “multicultural trait” that Macedonia possesses, which according to
him makes it “a model for the ability of cultures to complement each other and
function together in a democratic society”. While in another speech given at the
conference of Western and Muslim countries “Common World: Progress through
Diversities,” on October 17, 2010 in Astana, Milosovski claims that Macedonia
represents a multiethnic democracy that has coped with a number of challenges in
the past few years, and can serve as an excellent model of how dialogues among
members of diverse cultures and religions is established and preserved. He concludes that:

- diversities should be utilized as an instrument for promotion of coexistence, tolerance and understanding...
- political leaders should unite their efforts in creating a world where dialogue of diversities and mutual respect will say ‘no’ to lack of communication and misunderstanding.

In addition, Guzina, 2009 considered the clash between achieving democracy and nation building as a major roadblock to the multiculturalism of the society, usually leading to the usual circular argument – “in order for them to become democratic local elites have to give up on nation-building, but in order to do so, they have to be democratic” (p. 6). Thus, according to Guzina (2009) by applying external pressures in order to democratize Macedonia and ingrain multicultural values, the International Community in general and the EU in particular use failed countries like Macedonia as experimental grounds for learning about conflict management and democratization techniques. As a result, these countries and especially the majorities within them, which in the case of Macedonia is the Macedonian ethnic group, view multicultural integration as an ideological export that is either completely out of context or as just a catchy phrase replacing the old fashioned policies of ethnic control. This perception is mostly due to the fact that EU uses approaches in a “template-like fashion rather than tools that should be fine-tuned to fit the concrete conditions in the area” (Guzina, 2009, p. 7).
This is the primary issue with the use of the ideograph of “multiculturalism” and the other synonymous concepts utilized by all the different sides in the dialogue between EU and Macedonia. While EU has imposed the ideograph of “multiculturalism” on Macedonia as one of the main preconditions for EU accession, it has done so by utilizing the same strategy they use in imposing all the other reforms the country needs to make to get accession, and that is by providing a template-like conception of the ideograph of ‘multiculturalism.” What is more concerning is that the EU representatives in Macedonia, or the other diplomats involved in the talks are unaware of the differing understanding and conceptions of the ideograph of “multiculturalism” within their own countries, and how such ambiguity affects the way the struggling country of Macedonia achieves one of the main preconditions for starting the discussion with the EU. The EU requires Macedonia to reach a certain level of multiculturalism, and is unaware of the serious conceptual differences of such a term within its own member states. While the EU asks the different communities living in this country to achieve some kind of coherent understanding of the concept that would represent the “European spirit”, it is more than clear that the EU has a rather vague definition of this concept.

Current rhetorical challenges for Macedonia and the EU

Even though, EU membership is still considered as one the most significant objectives for Macedonia, it is important to note that popular support for the EU
has decreased to 60%, down from the 76% in 2006 (Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010). Mavromatidis (2010) claims that the Macedonian population views EU as salvation from its poor economic condition as well as a guarantor of its existence, taking into account its ethnic problems and isolation from its neighbors. Whereas, Vasilev (2011) claims that “ethnic leaders in Macedonia were adopting the policy and behavioral changes expected of them by the EU because they perceived membership as means to enhancing security and identity concerns (Macedonians) and autonomy (Albanians)” (p. 72). As a result of the development of OFA under conditions of warfare and international pressure, the different ethnic groups in Macedonia have competing conceptualizations of OFA and its implementation as the main condition for EU accession. While the Albanian community has a more positive attitude toward the term, due to their interests in Euro-Atlantic integration, the Macedonian majority view multiculturalism either as an ideological import that is completely out of context or as just a catchy phrase replacing the old-fashioned policies of ethnic control (Reka, 2007).

For the Albanian community, the appeal of “EU membership lies with the potential it has to consolidate their status as a coequal partner in society" (p. 62) due to their struggle for self-determination in Macedonia as well as experiences of discrimination and political marginalization at the hands of the Macedonian majority (Reka, 2007). The EU's insistence on the implementation of OFA as a precondition for accession has "offered a way of consolidating Albanians' new found autonomy within the state and therefore allaying their insecurities about the
possibility of a regression towards the more assimilationist arrangements of the past" (p. 62). On the other hand, the Macedonian majority has been less reluctant to accept these conditions due to the fact that such EU conditionality corresponds to “containment…. of their capacity to be self-determining relative to Albanians” (p. 62). The Macedonian ethnic community has harbored a deep disdain for OFA since it’s signing in 2011, regarding it as an illegitimate creation brought about through violence by Albanian “terrorists” and undue pressure from the international community (Bieber, 2008, p. 36; Engström, 2002, p. 11).

Such rhetoric within the Macedonian public has contributed to the decrease in the level of support for EU membership. Vasilev (2011) asserts that the Macedonian majority has “been deeply insecure about the survival of their national identity and their state’s territorial integrity post-independence" (p. 62), due to their mistrust of Albanians and their perceived "intentions" to unite with Kosovo and Albania in the future. The only reason the Macedonia majority continues to see some appeal in EU accession perspectives is the recognition of Macedonia with its constitutional name by the EU member states and the broader international public. However, the more such prospects seem unreachable, due to Greece’s rejection to recognize Macedonia’s constitutional name, and their threat to veto any decision made by the EU or NATO in this respect, the more does the Macedonian majority’s appeal for the EU fail which is evident in the 2010 Gallup Balkan Monitor.
As a result Vasilev (2011) rightly claimed that the results of the conditionality used by the EU as a mechanism for stimulating cooperation and compromise across ethnic lines in Macedonia will greatly depend “on how the EU responds to the crisis over the country’s name dispute with Greece” (p 73). In the last several years, as Greece’s threat to veto Macedonia’s accession has increased, and after their veto against Macedonia’s NATO bid in 2008 (BBC News, 2008, March 6), the EU had made accession incumbent on the resolution of the name dispute, besides the implementation of OFA and the improvement of the interethnic relations. Even though in December 5, 2011 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled Greece was wrong to block Macedonia’s bid to join NATO in 2008 (Bowcott & Wolfe-Robinson, 2011, December 5; Reuters, 2011, December 6), EU has not taken any concrete measures against Greece in this respect, and as a result there is still no solutions as far as the name issue is concerned.

Consequently, this has given the Macedonian Government an opportunity to scapegoat their lack of success in fulfilling the conditions for accession set by the EU, by blaming the EU for not being able to assist in their problems with Greece. The Macedonian Prime Minister has responded to the criticism by the current EU Enlargement Commissioner, Stefan Fuele, mainly by saying that the EU is trying to force Macedonia to submit to Greece’s position about the name and change its constitutional name (Marusic, 2011, October 18). As a result, the Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski has refused to subject his country to such criticism, and has said that Macedonia will not allow such pressures from the EU due to the name
issues with Greece (Tanjug, 2011, November 12; Marusic, 2011, October 18). In a recent interview the Prime Minister gave for the Macedonian national newspaper Дневник (or Dnevnik) titled “Патот кон НАТО и кон ЕУ се претвори во вистинска голгота” (or in English “The Road to NATO and the EU has been transformed into a real Golgotha”), he claims that “big forces” such as the EU and the US are totally uninterested in resolving the dispute between Macedonia and Greece and claims that as a result Macedonia has poor prospects for accession to NATO at the alliance summit in May, 2012 which will also have implications in delaying the process negotiations for EU accession (2012, January 11). He describes himself as a realist, rather than a pessimist in this matter, and claims that the EU has its own problems to deal with (referring to the Euro crisis, immigration, and minority rights), that the relations between Macedonia and Greece and enlargement in general are not on their priority list (Дневник, 2012, January 11). Later, responding to the criticism by the Macedonian opposition and the Albanian political parties that the current Government is not working towards getting EU accession, the Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski has responded that his government is still fully committed to the EU and NATO, but that it is not up to him to achieve this, as it is up to “the big forces” (referring to the EU and US) to find a solution for the name dispute with Greece before this becomes possible (Дневник, 2012, January 26).

This however, has put the tentative bonds established across ethnic lines in peril. Due to the fact that each ethnic group’s commitment to cooperation and
compromise is forged on the promise of future admission into Euro-Atlantic institutions, inter-ethnic tensions in the country are increasing and the gap between the Albanians and Macedonians is widening. Vasilev (2011) asserts that this situation also has the potential to jeopardize the effectiveness of conditionality in more general terms “as local politicians become increasingly doubtful about their chances of securing membership” (p. 73) to the EU. This has been evident in several recent incidents that have sparkled hatred and tension between the two groups in recent months, such as the hatred toward the Muslim Albanian community expressed in the acclaimed Macedonian carnival in Vevcani held on January 13, 2012, which mocked Muslim communities in the country (Reuters, 2012, January 31). This event sparked another incident, which accrued in the city of Struga, in which Albanian protesters set a 200 year old Orthodox church on fire, as a response to the Muslim caricatures in Vevcani earlier that month (Marusic, 2012, January 31). Moreover, during the European Men's Handball Championship 2012, held this year in Serbia, there were numerous cases where the ethnic Macedonian handball supporters chanted "fascistic" anti-Albanian slogans which created uproar in the Macedonian public, both within the Albanian and Macedonian ethnic communities. There was even a case of a Macedonian reporter being targeted by the handball fans for not being “patriotic enough” due to his criticism of the hatred shown during the handball game (Marusic, 2012, January 27). OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Knut Vollebaek, immediately reacted to the recent inter-ethnic tensions in Macedonia, and said that
this is a wake-up call for the country to do more to rebuild community trust among different ethnic communities living in it (Marusic, 2012, February 10).

Thus, Vasilev (2011) rightly claims once again that the conditionality approach taken by the EU has made the accession process more challenging for Western Balkans governments such as Macedonia by raising the bar for gaining entry into the EU. Given the volatile nature of the Macedonian interethnic context, and the open-ended time frame of the accession process, normative breaches such as those described above are inevitable according to Vasilev (2011). It also becomes problematic to evaluate the progress of the government’s achievement of the conditions beyond passing amendments and laws in the parliament and the unfavorable assessment of the government becomes problematic since behavioral compliance is less easily quantifiable than is policy compliance. All this exposes the process of EU accession to further complications.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a rhetorical context and a rhetorical history of the concept of multiculturalism in Macedonia. The chapter discussed several events that have shaped or led up to the current multiculturalism discussions, such as the breakout of Yugoslavia, the wars in the region, the armed conflict in Macedonia in 2001, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) that ended the conflict, as well as other development in the 10 years after its signing. The chapter has answered question sub-set #1 which include the following questions: What is
the rhetorical context and history of “multiculturalism” in Macedonia? What are some of the main tensions between the Albanian and Macedonian ethnic group and what has been done so far to resolve them? What is the importance of multiculturalism in the EU accession process? How has the multiculturalism debate become an area in which ethnic anxieties are examined and resolved?

The rhetorical context of “multiculturalism” in Macedonia is that it was basically designed under conditions of warfare upon signing the Ohrid Framework Agreement which ended the armed conflict in 2001. While there are many other ethnic groups living in Macedonia, the concept of multiculturalism is mostly used in the context of Albanian and Macedonian relations. Due to the fact that the concept was enforced upon these two parties by OFA, the concept is still not fully been implemented or accepted by the two groups. While the Albanian minority is more accepting toward this concept, the Macedonian majority views it as a foreign import that has nothing to do with the reality of life in Macedonia. Some of the main tensions between the Macedonians and Albanians have to do with the EU accession, for which the Macedonian majority has totally lost its enthusiasm in the recent years, whereas for the Albanian community this is the only way out. While experiencing an identity crisis due to the name dispute with Greece, and the interethnic conflict within the country, the right-wing Macedonian political elites constantly fear the “intentions” of the Albanians as they get more rights within the country. They believe that the Albanian community would ultimately want to join with Albania and Kosovo, and form the dreamed Big Albania.
The chapter also showed that the importance of the multiculturalism in the EU accession process is great, and the full implementation of OFA as well as a peaceful inter-ethnic co-existence is one of the main requirements by the EU in order to start the process of negotiation for EU accession. However, it is evident that Macedonia has still not reached that level and the progress reports published by the European Commission point out that many of the conditions pertaining to OFA and multiculturalism have not yet been met. Also, rather than creating tolerance and understanding, it seems that the process of OFA implementation and the multiculturalism discourse have created more tensions between these two communities in recent years, as there were many incidents that have sparked interethnic hatred. Since nationalism is on the rise in Macedonia, the Macedonian political elites use multiculturalism only to create a positive image in front of the EU and US diplomats, who are known to have great influence in the country’s political decisions. Whereas, when the same politicians address their own constituents, they express high levels of nationalism without even mentioning multiculturalism.

The next chapter will address multiculturalism in the EU and will describe the challenges of the EU countries with multiculturalism.
CHAPTER IV
EU DISCOURSE AND DEFINITION OF MULTICULTURALISM

“Liberal multiculturalism masks an old barbarism with a human face.”
— Slavoj Žižek (2010, October 3)

Giving an overview of the primary discursive themes that have led up to the current discussions on multiculturalism in the EU, this chapter provides the rhetorical context and rhetorical history of the concept of multiculturalism in the EU. The chapter discusses several events that have shaped the current multiculturalism discussions within the EU countries, such as the creation of the EU, its cultural policy and adoption of multiculturalism, the slogan ‘unity in diversity,’ problems with immigration, the ambiguous and differing conceptualization of multiculturalism in different member states, and the recent incidents that have sparked a heated debate within the EU about the “failure” of multiculturalism and its implications for the European societies. The chapter answers question sub-set #2: How is “multiculturalism” defined in the EU? What are the rhetorical challenges with this concept within the EU countries? How is the immigration debate on both sides of the Atlantic impacting the understanding of this concept? How does the ambiguous conception of such term affect EU’s foreign policy and enlargement process?
The history of the EU and its cultural policy

The European Union (EU) is an influential supranational entity that was created in the aftermath of World War II, with the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 (Mokre, 2007) and later with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Ginsberg, 2010). Both these projects aimed to economically and politically unite European countries in order to secure a lasting peace and prevent war and fascism on a continent that had just experienced both (Rittberger & Zangl, 2006; Rodriguez-Pose, 2002; Rosamond, 2000; Mokre, 2007). Stemming from this conception, the primary goals of the EU were economic cooperation, lasting peace and later, integration. These concepts continue to be the most important motifs of the European community today (Ginsberg, 2010). EU leaders later realized that they could not achieve a purely economic integration if they wanted to maintain democratic criteria and that the progress of European integration had been a problem for national sovereignty and for democracy (Mokre, 2007). As a result, issues of “culture” became important to the EU policy makers and started to be addressed several decades after the establishment of the EU.

In the beginning, it was only six countries that founded the union, and they included Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Europa, 2012.). The European construction met periods of prolonged blockage ranging from Great Britain's refusal to get involved in this project to the hegemonic claims of the Gaullist France, which was still traumatized by the pact with its former German enemy (Sdrobiş, 2009). Finally, in 1973 The United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland joined the EU, with Greece following eight years later in 1981, and Spain and Portugal joining five years later in 1986. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism across Central and Eastern Europe, EU gains three more
members, Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. The political divisions between east and west Europe are finally declared healed when ten new countries joined the EU in 2004, making the total number of current members to twenty seven countries (Europa, 2012.). The events of September 11 brought the EU member countries even closer together to fight organized crime and international terrorism (Europa, 2012).

Even though it is still largely considered an experiment in regional peace and prosperity, as the provider of stability, the EU is a magnet for countries along and near its external borders. Currently, the countries that have already gained a candidate status by the EU include: Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey whereas the countries listed as potential candidates by the European Commission are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo (European Commission Enlargement, 2012). Official and potential candidates for EU membership are forced to make major constitutional, political and economic changes in order to join the EU.

The European Union (EU) is a complex treaty-based international organization with supranational legislative and administrative powers over its Member States in carefully defined policy areas (Rittberger and Zangl, 2006). While still lacking its own constitution, the EU is more than a conventional international organization, possessing sovereignty in some areas usually reserved for states, but on the other hand, not being responsible to an electorate for the defense of territory, which makes it less than a state (Ginsberg, 2010). In the last two decades the EU has developed into a significant single market with the Euro as its common currency. The ‘Schengen’ agreements allow people to travel without passports within the EU countries, providing millions of young people an easier way to study and work in other countries within
EU. The EU has also taken an active role in promoting human rights and democracy, both within the EU countries and in the region, and has one of the most ambitious emission reduction targets for fighting climate change in the world (Ginsberg, 2010). It is the world’s largest donor of foreign aid (sixty percent of all official development aid in 160 countries) deploying more than twenty military and peace-keeping missions to help countries either prevent war, end war or rebuild after war (Ginsberg, 2010).

What began primarily as an economic project, the EU development over the past two decades brought the question of democratization to the forefront, which led to questions of what constitutes the European people and how to conceive of its collective identity (Mokre, 2007). The 1957 Treaty of Rome, which laid the constitutional foundations for the EU, did not directly address cultural issues, but rather included only two minor references to culture. The first reference related to “non-discrimination” and the second to exceptions to the free movement of goods where a special case can be made for "the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historical, or archaeological value." (as cited in Shore, 2006, p. 12). The absence of any specific treaty reference to culture meant that, technically, there was no such thing as an EU cultural policy, and that the EU had no legal basis for involvement in direct cultural affairs of member states, but could only take ad hoc "cultural actions" based on European Parliament Resolutions and agreements by Ministers of Culture (Shore, 2006). The lack of attention to culture in official EU documents reflects the low status that EU policy makers and analysts have traditionally given to culture resulting in the narrow definitions of culture they employ today.
By the beginning of the 90s, the EU policymakers realized that the European identity has also developed since its foundation, as a complement to the national identities of the member states (Mokre, 2007). The EU cultural policy in a legal sense was first developed with the Maastricht Treaty (or Treaty on European Union) in 1992 when for the first time in the history of European integration, a paragraph on cultural policy was included in European primary law (Shore, 2006; Mokre, 2007). Even though this treaty did not pay a full attention to culture, its introduction into EU policy in a legal sense is highly significant. Article 128 declared:

(1) The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.

(2) Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging co-operation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:

- improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples;
- conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance;
- non-commercial cultural exchanges
- artistic and literary creation, including in the audio-visual (as cited in Shore, 2006, p. 16).

Although the EU did not have an official cultural policy before the Treaty of Maastricht, a cultural program titled the Cultural Capital of the European Union, was
established earlier in 1985 and is still in force today (see Babkova 2006). The aim of this program was to “open up to the European public particular aspects of the culture of the designated cities, region or countries concerned, and [to] concentrate on the city concerned a number of cultural contributions from other member states” (Myerscough 1994, p. 2). From 1985 to today more than 40 cities have been designated European Capitals of Culture, ranging from Stockholm to Genoa, Athens to Glasgow, and Cracow to Porto. The purpose of this initiative according to the European Commission is to “provide living proof of the richness and diversity of European cultures” (European Commission, 2012). Cultural Capitals of the European Union are nominated by the Council of the European Union and get some money from the commission, but the main share of the budget comes from the city itself, the respective member state, and sometimes a regional entity (such as the province). Even though these events do not bring any dramatic approval of the EU by the citizens of member countries, they still help gain considerable attention and are normally received positively by the city’s population, which understands the economic benefits from such a nomination.

The Cultural Capitals of Europe is a significant example of the attempts made by the EU to awaken a European consciousness by diffusing its symbols, while respecting the contents of national and local cultures (Sassatelli, 2002). After the Treaty of Maastricht some further cultural programs were organized, such as Kaleidoscope, for performing, visual, and applied arts as well as multimedia projects; Raphael, for the cultural heritage; and Ariane, for books and reading (European Commission: Culture; http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/doc419_en.htm). In 1998, after the
Treaty of Amsterdam, these programs were unified under the header “Culture 2000,” which lasted for 7 years until 2007 with the aim promoting cultural diversity and the shared cultural heritage (European Commission, 2012).

From 2007 to 2013, a new cultural program was developed by the European Commission with similar aims to celebrate Europe’s cultural diversity and enhance the shared cultural heritage. Allocating €400 million for the cultural program is considered a serious cultural investment by the European Commission which aims “to promote cross-border mobility of those working in the cultural sector; to encourage the cultural and artistic output; and to foster intercultural dialogue” (European Commission, 2012). Within this program 2008 was proclaimed the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, with the aim to “raise public awareness in Europe and beyond of the need for intercultural dialogue to help us adapt to an increasingly mixed and complex world; involving many people in exploring what intercultural dialogue means in their daily life; and promoting the role of intercultural dialogue in: increasing mutual understanding, exploring the benefits of cultural diversity and fostering active European citizenship and a sense of European belonging” (European Commission, 2012; Aggestam & Hill, 2008).

However, Mokre (2007) notes that the EU financial funding for culture and the arts is still insignificant in comparison to other national European programs. Also, the cultural policy remains still one of few policy fields to require unanimous consensus among EU member states before a policy is accepted. But, because every member state has veto power, this approach constitutes a serious obstacle for the progress of European cultural policies.
The measures stemming from the EU official cultural policy serve as key instruments for considering the role of the symbolic dimension in the construction and legitimization of social reality in the EU (Cohen, 1985; Shore, 1993). Sassatelli (2002) asserts that these events contribute to creating an ‘imagined community’ in the making. The notion refers to a community that does not lie in the tangible relations and binding ties between its people, but exists as a reality of the mind, as the image of the community its members share (Anderson, 1983).

EU needed a cultural policy since it needed to develop a collective identity for the people of the EU, which is a prerequisite for all democratic societies. All democratically organized political systems need to be ruled by its people, and people are able to engage in a society and accept collective decisions that do not directly relate with their individual interests, only if they understand themselves as belonging to a society. Habermas (1992) asserts that all democratic political systems seek legitimacy through the use of culture. The assumption of a common national culture produces a sense of belonging in the individual citizen and helps to create a common identity. Political institutions are obliged to enjoy the consent of the citizens in whose name they govern, in order for them to have legitimacy and authority.

Consequently, according to Shore (2006) the EU cultural policy was eventually developed by policymakers in order to bolster the legitimacy of the EU project and enlarge the scope of EU power and authority, extending its competences into new fields of governance. Due to lack of popular support for the EU and failure to be fully embraced by the European people, the EU developed its cultural policy as a tool to achieve legitimacy.
The "cultural deficit" of the EU

However, the EU still lacks a self-identifying European public that would provide legitimacy to its institutions, which is usually referred to as a "democratic deficit," or as Shore (2006) called it "cultural deficit." Collective identity is a highly ambiguous and problematic concept and defining who belongs to a European collective identity, means that at the same time they need to define who doesn’t belong there or is excluded from what is considered to be a “truly” European identity. As a result, “defining a collective identity always requires drawing a boundary between “us” and “them” (Mokre, 2007, p. 33). Delanty (1995) asserts that to choose a core European tradition results in an arbitrary, ideological, selection towards the inside. It also encourages an imperialist, Eurocentric vision of the world towards the outside (Sassatelli, 2002).

Thus scholars argue that Europe creates itself by marginalizing its Others (Said, 1978) and easily forgets its dark side in order to claim the universal character of its good one (See Bryce, 2009; Hampton, 2011; Kuus, 2004; Mokre, 2007; Rumelili, 2004; Sassatelli, 2002; Strasser, 2008). Sassatelli (2002) argues that the EU should strive to acknowledge its diversity rather than strive to imagine a shared cultural identity. Once culture is seen as a
‘glue’ of European integration, the idea of a European identity risks to be presented as endangering the cultural multiplicity indicated as the key feature of Europe. As a result, Europe should strive to protect, valorize and spread knowledge about European cultures.

Other scholars have noted the EU’s orientalist approach in regards to its enlargement policy as well (See Boedeltje, 2012; Bryce, 2009; Krajina, 2009; Kuus, 2004; Rumelili, 2004; Strasser, 2008;). Bryce (2009) has argued that the EU still deploys an exclusionary discourse in relation to the possible accession of Turkey in the EU, by showing concern about the cultural and civilization ‘Europeanness’ of Turkey. Even when the political actors are supportive of Turkey’s membership such support is discussed only on the basis of Turkey being an exceptional case, considering the guarantee of the Turkish secular democracy within the context of EU. EU’s enlargement is also highlighted by a broadly Orientalist discourse that assumes essential difference between Europe and Eastern Europe, especially to countries of Western Balkans trying to get accession (Krajina, 2009; Kuus, 2004). And Boedeltje, (2012) asserts that the EU imagines its neighboring countries as possible European space of influence, yet to be Europeanized. Such Eurocentric beliefs that neighboring states can be ‘Europeanized’ through the idea of conditionality and socialization but without the prospective of becoming an EU member, have provoked a heated debate all across Eastern Europe and have an important impact on the way these countries meet the criteria set by the EU.
The slogan of "unity in diversity" as central to the EU cultural policy

However, despite this criticism the EU chose to adopt the slogan "unity in diversity" as central to its cultural policy (Banjac, 2011). The website of the European Union explains the slogan in the following way: “It signifies how Europeans have come together, in the form of the EU, to work for peace and prosperity, while at the same time being enriched by the continent's many different cultures, traditions and languages” (Europa, 2012). From the EU’s perspective, the slogan is intended to project the idea that the EU seeks to celebrate and promote cultural pluralism. This is consistent with its repeated emphasis on the idea of Europe as a "mosaic of cultures," and a "culture of cultures." But, Shore (2006) claims that the slogan is not original to the EU. It has been previously used by the Indian Prime Minister Nehru to define Indian national identity, as well as the Western European Communist parties to promote the idea of "Eurocommunism" (Shore, 2006). Thus, the slogan “unity in diversity” has been criticized as “a formal solution with no substance, a superficial if successful motto that can easily fall into a new version of Eurocentric triumphalism” (Sassatelli, 2002, p. 440).

The two conflicting objectives of “diversity” and “unity” which are tightly packed into one clause are a sign of the tension between the national and European level that has become especially evident in European cultural policies (Mokre, 2007). This shows that the EU carefully coined the slogan while being conscious not to provoke the reactions of national or local cultures, which is basically why the common European heritage is fostered by the official EU cultural policy and its slogan (Sassatelli, 2002). Clearly the slogan was
self-consciously conceived as an instrument to build a common cultural identity for all the European Union member states.

Shore (2006) suggested that, “‘unity in diversity’ is a bureaucratic formula fraught with ambiguities and problematic assumptions about the nature of culture, central to which is the question of how far, if at all, cultural diversity can be reconciled with the quest for unity” (p. 10). The slogan suggests that the EU offers a new layer of identity under which the regions and nations can unite. The rationale underlying EU cultural policies appears to be less about celebrating "difference" or embracing multiculturalism than about promoting the idea of Europe's overarching unity through that diversity (Shore, 2006). The EU represents national and sub-national cultural differences as the fragmented elements of a shared "civilization," whose origins are located in ancient Greece, Rome, and Christendom. Thus, the essential European identity and unity according to the EU policy makers resides in certain "core values" and in the shared legacy of classical civilization.

For Shore (2006) "unity in diversity offers EU policymakers a convenient rhetorical mediation between the incompatible goal of building a singular European consciousness and identity, on the one hand, and claims to be fostering cultural pluralism on the other. One of the key problems with this claim is the assumption that "culture" can be harnessed as a tool for advancing the EU's project for European construction. Moreover, this is overly problematic as a cultural policy since it invents Europe at the level of popular consciousness by unifying European citizens around a supposed common cultural heritage or civilization that invariably results in excluding non-Europeans, i.e. those that fall outside the EU's selective representations of Europe’s cultural heritage (Banjac, 2011; Shore, 2006).
Other critical scholars have addressed the contradictions and hidden problems in “unity in diversity” as a policy objective of the European Union (Delanty, 2005; 2007; Holmes 1996; McDonald, 2005; Sassatelli, 2002). Sassatelli (2002) offers an even more radical critique, claiming that the ambiguity of the content reinforces the exact reproduction of the form. In creating a style of thought, institutions not only frame the reality they control, but also set the limit and the style within which ‘resistance’ will be possible. The ambiguity of the EU discourse about cultural identity and about the very meaning of ‘Europe’ does allow for different, contrasting uses, which helps to successfully maintain the status quo surrounding problematic cultural issues within the EU. Ambiguity thus does not mean confusion or weakness, but it can work for opposite ends. “What ‘Europe’ actually is remains contentious and its positive connotation can sustain both its conflation with the EU and a critique of the same” (Sassatelli, 2002, p. 443). The EU is not inventing the language of “unity in diversity” in a void, but it appropriates discourse most suitable to the type of multiple identities, which is the more likely to accept a European ‘layer’ of allegiance. Thus, Sassatelli (2002) suggests that Europe is becoming more and more like an icon, whose ambiguous content seems to reinforce the possibilities of identification with it.

The idea of “unity in diversity” was further developed through various EU-funded initiatives to design textbooks that portray history from a "European perspective" which contain extremely Eurocentric construction of the past, and largely ignore the darker side of European modernity, including Europe's legacy of slavery, imperialism, and racism (Shore, 2006). This EU historiography is both teleological and highly selective in what it includes and excludes from this canon of elite references. It is even more surprising that EU
documents virtually do not mention the contribution of writers, artists, scholars, and cultural practitioners of “non-European” descent. As a result, EU’s approach to culture contains some fundamental contradictions that violate the very telos of European integration that was enshrined in the preamble to the EU’s founding treaties. In practice, ideas of popular culture, multiculturalism, cultural pluralism, and hybridity appear to be anathema to official conceptions of European culture. Thus, Shore (2006) concluded that according to this, the goal is not "diversity" but "unity," and this is not as liberal or pluralistic as it seems. But, in spite of the tensions between singular and pluralist visions of European identity that it conveys, this concept is being drawn on and acted on not only by EU administrators, but by those who have engaged EU cultural policy in diverse local settings throughout Europe.

The concept of culture is conceived and positioned contradictorily in EU official discourses, “a confusion that is perhaps symptomatic of a more profound philosophical ambiguity over the status and definition of the Union and its people(s)” (Shore, 2006, p. 7). The contrast between Europe conceived as a unified and singular cultural entity, and Europe conceived as a space of diversity, an amalgamation of many cultures, and by implication, of many people and interests, also underlies some of the key political divisions in the way European integration is imagined. EU’s slogan of "unity in diversity," and it’s synonymous phrases of "cultural mosaics," or "family of cultures" adequately address this fundamental contradiction between the foundational idea of Europe as an "ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe," understood as a plurality, and the idea of integration as a process leading to a "European people."
In short, the European Union is struggling to find a balance between the whole and
the parts, between unity and diversity, coordination and autonomy. It is contested how much
unity and how much diversity the Union can live with (Swiebel, 2008). Sdrobiş (2009)
asserts that the answer for the Europeans who lived a far from pacifist past was
multiculturalism, which would mark the end of classifying the values and stands in
juxtaposition to “unity in diversity.” However, this answer was inappropriate at the period
when the cultural policy was created, a time when people were tempted to state that the
violent history among the nations living in Europe has ended (Sdrobiş, 2009).

The current state of “multiculturalism” in the EU

The character of the European Union is multinational and multicultural, which raises
the questions of multiculturalism. Can Europe survive if it’s conceptualized primarily as
multicultural? Identification with the EU and common European consciousness can only
develop to the extent to which the citizens of the member states can feel and consider,
through their immediate experiences, that the EU is their real common home (Lendvai,
2008). It seems inevitable that the world and Europe in it can be or rather stay multicultural,
but Europe should strive to find a way to extract some common spiritual cohesive force in a
political formation that will keep it together. This is the only way for the citizens of Europe
to give “emotional consent” to the EU project, and offer chances for integration to the new
member states and immigrants. But, Lendvai (2008) rightly asserts that the cultivation of
such common identity is impossible without the presence of “democratic publicity” (p 126),
which will be developed through dialogue and discussion of the European people. At
present, nobody knows which kind of common identity will help to solve rather complicated problems of communication in Europe.

An estimated 17 million Muslims live within the EU, but as Yasmin Alibhai Brown (1998) argued, "they do not yet see themselves as part of the European project in any meaningful sense" (p. 38). This is hardly surprising, she adds, when Europe's identity is being constructed around assumptions about shared Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian roots, and Beethoven's Ninth symphony. What is called the European spirit today is based on the legacy of Hellenic rationality and beauty, Roman law and institutions and ethics; or, stated even more generally: freedom, civilization, democracy and science (Sassatelli, 2002). Most importantly, modernity itself is referred to as a metaphor of Europe. Critics argue, the flip side of Eurocentrism today is "Islamophobia" and a right-wing agenda that seeks to exploit fears about the threat to Europe posed by criminals, Muslim fundamentalists, illegal immigrants, and asylum seekers.

Aggestam and Hill (2008) analyze identity and multiculturalism in the EU by focusing on the meaning that the EU has attributed to the ethical value of ‘tolerance.’ Tolerance represents one of the key concepts accompanying the ‘peace building’ discourse of the EU (Solana, 2007). It is seen as both a means to and as a condition of peace (Gray, 2000), which makes the EU identity to be conceived in two distinct ways, each with its own ethnical consequences. Thus, for Aggestam & Hill (2008), the EU identity “is a rational outcome based on tolerance leading to an ultimate convergence on a set of values, derived from individualism” (p. 100). The tolerance approach to diversity is directed toward identifying what people share and have in common, which represents “the ideal of the
‘universal common good’” (p. 100). From this liberalist perspective, tolerance ultimately enables individual freedom to flourish and makes it possible for people to liberate themselves and choose their own identity. As a result, European secularism personifies these universal aspirations: “the dignity and autonomy of the individual, human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (p. 100). According to Aggestam & Hill (2008), this approach views the EU as a carrier of Universalist values, and is a basis behind the idea that the EU should be a civilizing role model or an example to the world.

It should be noted that such emphasis on tolerance, also implies a view that Others are in need of change (Aggestam & Hill, 2008). Paradoxically, rather than unifying, this notion of European identity leads to an essentializing process of identity contestations between “us” and “them” and ends up undermining efforts at mutual tolerance as a means to peace. Aggestam & Hill (2008) rightly claimed that if Europe wants to be perceived as a global ‘peace builder’ it should strive to promote dialogue in a plural world, not present itself as an example of how everyone should be. As a result, “rather than trying to shape others in the image of Europe, it would project a European identity ready to listen and treating others as a source of insights from which Europe might learn” (p. 102).

However, the EU is currently immersed in deeply contested political debates about the roles of culture, religion, ethnicity and identity (Aggestam & Hill, 2008). One of the reasons for this is that the element of international terrorism has raised questions about European models of multicultural integration. Whereas, another relevant issue is the prospect of Turkish membership of the European Union, which has given rise to intense debates about the role of Islam in Europe and the impact it will have on the EU. These issues
are significant at a time when the EU is trying to have a more proactive role in the world and articulates its role in terms of being an ethical power, a ‘peacebuilder,’ promoting the values of tolerance, accommodation and reciprocity.

In the case of the ideograph of “multiculturalism,” this concept, just like its root term “culture” has become an extremely contested and abused term that entails a diversity of meanings and conceptions (Aggestam & Hill, 2008). For instance, Barry (2001) differentiated between “multiculturalism” as ideology about the acceptance of diversity and the rights of different groups or minorities and “multiculturality” as the existence of cultural diversity with many groups defining themselves separately from nation-state and even emphasizing on their right to a higher loyalty. Depending on who uses it, the concept of “multiculturalism” both within Macedonia and in the dialogue with the EU entails the two meanings of “multiculturalism” and “multiculturality” as defined by Barry (2001).

Moreover, Aggestam & Hill (2008) assert that while the EU was founded under an inherently multicultural idea of “unity in diversity”, imagining the promotion of cultural diversity of its member states and at the same time promoting common values for all, EU’s idea of “unity in diversity” is quite ambiguous for the purpose of making it acceptable to all the member states. The concept of multiculturalism in EU entails many tensions between “the European and the national, and between the national and the individual” (Aggestam & Hill, 2008, p. 99). The EU members states differ greatly in their minority policies and the tension for having a unified concept of multiculturalism are becoming even more prominent with the EU membership expansion. This kind of contested conception of multiculturalism within Europe also arises from the rising homegrown terrorism and the prospects of Turkish
membership to European Union which further intensifies the debates about the role and impact of Islam in EU.

For Bogdandy (2008) even though “diversity depends on unity” it is “always about groups desiring to preserve themselves against a coherent unit” and therefore the concept of cultural diversity or multiculturalism is used in various different contexts with various meanings and not so clear intentions. Thus, due to all the above mentioned issues, the EU currently is promoting an identity that has more to do with the continuous process of self construction rather than with the projection of universality of values, envisioning more a community of inclusion than exclusion which implies a continuous negotiation over the precise meaning of European identity and the understanding of multiculturalism (Aggestam & Hill, 2008).

However, EU’s ability to poorly articulate issues of human rights and minority rights in several occasions enables EU member states to hold differing positions on issues of multiculturalism and interpretation of minority rights, and illustrates an incoherent conception of the ideograph. The multiculturalism approach is far from universal, and this is mostly because of the distinct national experiences of state-building and concepts of citizenship of the member states. Aggestam and Hill (2008) differentiate between three different models existing within EU member states. France for instance, has an assimilationist model of multiculturalism favoring solidarity and acculturation while expecting that minority groups assimilate to the dominant culture of the host society (Aggestam & Hill, 2008; Carmon, 1996). The state, nation, people and culture are seen as an integral whole, captured in the phrase La République, une et indivisible (The Republic, one
and indivisible). Even though, France is in the top rank of countries in Europe with a high percentage of first- and second-generation immigrants, most coming from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, minorities are basically denied their official existence, and the state pursues an assertively assimilationist policy centered on the French language, Republican history and a deeply secular distrust of the role of religion in public life.

Germany and Austria on the other hand have a more exclusionary model of multiculturalism, treating minorities as *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) with very limited rights with the belief that they will ultimately return to their countries of origin (Aggestam & Hill, 2008; Angendent, 1997). However, Germany is home to one of the largest immigrant populations of any EU state, largely because of a big number of guest workers mainly from Turkey but, as well as former Yugoslavia. The German reunification and the development of a more restrictive EU policy framework on asylum created more pressures for a more coherent German policy of immigrant integration and opened up space for the emergence of a more civic and republican model of citizenship based on a ‘post-national identity’ and constitutional patriotism. This gave the large immigrant communities that had been resident in Germany for several decades the right to acquire citizenship if they so wished. But, despite the profound reforms to the country’s citizenship laws, according to Schiffauer (2006) there is a persistent feeling of cultural insecurity about an increasingly heterogeneous society in Germany, a feeling which is reflected in an ambivalent policy towards social integration.

The third model of multiculturalism according to Aggestam & Hill (2008) is defined as *multiculturalism proper* and practiced in some European countries like Britain,
Netherlands and Sweden, which recognize the increasing levels of multiculturality within and celebrate diversity as well as consider it a permanent rather than a transitory model. This model of multiculturalism grants rights not only to individuals but also to collective ethnic and religious groups and promotes civic unity only under the condition that it seeks to accommodate the multicultural diversity of the society. Sweden took a more conscious decision to follow this path in 1975, but countries like Britain for example adopted it due to incremental change. “In Britain, there has been an uneasy coexistence between an anti-racist commitment to the color-blind, equal treatment of all before the law, and an increasing tendency from the 1980’s to believe in cultural relativism and the right to separate development of those whose religious customs led them not to embrace the various icons of British social life” (Aggestam & Hill, 2008, p. 104).

Moreover, Aggestam & Hill (2008) assert that the treaties of the Union do not provide explicit protection for minorities, but rather safeguard against racial discrimination. At the same time though, the protection of minorities has nonetheless become a central issue in recent EU membership negotiations with candidate states to which political conditionality has been applied (the ‘Copenhagen criteria’) (Sedelmeier, 2006). As a consequence of its growing role in the formulation of a common EU immigration policy, the European Commission has also been active in asserting a ‘holistic approach’ that stresses that immigrants should be granted equal rights (legal, economic, social and cultural) without being expected to give up their cultural distinctiveness.

The examples above illustrate the differing approaches to the concept of multiculturalism within the EU as well as the reasons for its ambiguous definition and
conception in their foreign policy. They show that even between the most important EU countries that have more power in the union, there are three different approaches to multiculturalism. Besides, the three models of diversity outlined above are increasingly contested in domestic debates and seen as inadequate to meet the challenges of multiculturalism in the EU. As a result, one is left to wonder what models of multiculturalism do other countries apply and what happens to the newer countries that recently got membership within the union. While older EU states are very preoccupied with the problem of multiculturalism, the younger EU states, which mainly belong to eastern bloc, are barely touched by it and multiculturalism is not one of their main priorities.

This situation within the EU makes the ambiguity within the EU as to what multiculturalism is and how it should be practiced more than evident. This coupled with the issue of securitization, which arises from the fear of terrorism, but inevitably destroys relations among ordinary citizens of all faiths complicates the way multiculturalism is viewed within the EU. As a result, one can rightly conclude that while being seen as an answer to all the difficulties of accommodating a multiracial society, the multiculturalism model is increasingly criticized on the grounds of having encouraged the alienation of minority groups within the European society.

Studies conducted in the Netherlands and Germany, have found that minority group members are more supportive of multiculturalism than are majority-group members (See Berry and Kalin, 1995; Sprague-Jones, 2011; Verkuyten and Brug, 2004). While minority members view multiculturalism as being in their best interest, the majority group members view it as a potential threat. Berry and Kalin (1995) assert that people are in favor of
multiculturalism when they perceive it as benefiting to their group and oppose it when they think it might hurt the interests of their group. Moreover, majority group members even tend to view multiculturalism as a threat for losing their cultural and economic rights (Berry and Kalin, 1995; Rapley 1998; Sprague-Jones, 2011).

Moreover, various incidents that have occurred in the EU countries in the past several years have initiated a discussion about multiculturalism in the EU, and have forced EU leaders to express deep concern about multiculturalism policies (These discussions are fully elaborated in Chapter 1). Critical moments such as the riots and violent clashes that occurred in a number of French cities in 2005, the London bombings in July 7, 2005, Norway attacks that occurred in July 2011, and many more have caused politicians to question whether official “tolerance” of diversity was ultimately leading to social divisiveness (Rodríguez-García, 2010). As a result of the perceived failures and shortcomings multiculturalism, the validity of this approach is being re-evaluated both by the politicians and the public in the EU. While big leaders such as Angela Merkel, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy have already categorized multiculturalism as a failure, many authors claims that nationalism is on the rise in the EU (Giddens, 2012, January 25; Walker & Taylor, 2011, November 6; Rodríguez-García, 2010) and national cultural identity in many EU countries is perceived as being under threat as a result of the immigration. Walker & Taylor (2011, November 6) noted that new study conducted by the British think-tank, Demos, has found that new generation of young, web-based supporters, embrace hard-line nationalist and anti-immigrant groups. Moreover, a recent poll conducted in the UK found that a total of 48 % of British citizens said that they would support a group that vowed to
crack down on immigration and Islamic extremists, and 52% of them agree that ‘Muslims create problems in the UK’ (Daily Mail Reporter, 2011, February 27).

Besides the rise of nationalism due to skepticism toward multiculturalism and concerns about immigration, the acclaimed British sociologist Antony Giddens (2012, January 25) claimed that the EU is facing a formidable list of problems. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the EU is currently facing the deepest economic crisis in 60 years, which goes beyond the euro fiasco and the enormous tide of debt that some of the member countries such as Greece and (more recently) Italy are facing (Rice-Oxley, 2012, January 25). This has resulted in the raise of euro-skepticism across the continent (See Brambilla, 2012, January 26; Głuchowski, 2012, January 26; Rice-Oxley, 2012, January 25; Prieto, 2012, January 26) and national stereotyping and scapegoating between member state nations (Rice-Oxley, 2012, January 25). As a result Giddens (2012, January 25) claimed that, “it isn't surprising that confusion seems to reign and that many citizens are turning away from the union.” Moreover, the acclaimed German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (2011) complained that Europe has moved into a “post-democratic” era, as a result of the monopolization of the EU by political elites (2011, November 10). In a recent interview published in The Guardian, the acclaimed cultural theorist Stuart Hall, usually referred to as the “godfather of multiculturalism” asserted that due to the troubles that the left–wing political parties are facing in the EU, he is “more pessimistic about politics than he's been for 30 years” (Williams, 2012, February 11).

Many scholars have written on the rise of extreme right-wing parties in the EU, (See Givens 2005; Ignazi 2003; Rydgren 2007; Sprague-Jones 2011). Golder (2003) asserts that
extreme right-wing parties have used the issue of immigration to gain increasing support and influence, explicitly linking immigration to unemployment and characterizing calls for multiculturalism as dangerous to national cohesion since the 1980s. Extreme right-wing parties cast multiculturalism as something that will make the majority groups lose their power within the mainstream, and as a result they have managed sizeable electoral gains in many EU countries (Sprague-Jones 2011). Moreover, scholars have noted that these extreme right-wing parties have succeeded in changing the nature of the debate surrounding multiculturalism and immigration and have managed to move mainstream parties to the right (Sprague-Jones 2011; Givens 2007). As a result, many studies report a strong evidence for the link between the extreme right-wing vote and anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism sentiment (Sprague-Jones 2011; Semyonov, Rajman, Gorodzeisky, 2006; Golder 2003).

Moreover, Žižek claims that while progressive liberals in the EU claim to be appalled by the populist racism of the right-wing parties, they too would prefer “to keep others at a proper distance” (Žižek, 2010, October 3). This is a result of the liberal multicultural model that has been used in the EU so far and which has received so much criticism by critical cultural scholars (this is further elaborated in Chapter 2). As a result, Žižek was right when he said that, “liberal multiculturalism masks an old barbarism with a human face” (2010, October 3). He goes on to say:

After righteously rejecting direct populist racism as "unreasonable" and unacceptable for our democratic standards, they endorse "reasonably" racist protective measures or, as today's Brasillachs, some of them even Social Democrats, tell us: ‘We grant ourselves permission to applaud African and east European sportsmen, Asian
doctors, Indian software programmers. We don't want to kill anyone, we don't want to organize any pogrom. But we also think that the best way to hinder the always unpredictable violent anti-immigrant defensive measures is to organize a reasonable anti-immigrant protection’ (Žižek, 2010, October 3).

Such categorization of the immigrants, for Žižek “suggests a clear passage from direct barbarism to barbarism with a human face” (2010, October 3). Such claims refer to the Orientalization of the immigrants, which has been prevalent in the EU lately, the “privileging of our tribe versus the barbarian Other” as Žižek best categorizes it (2010, October 3).

Orientalizing the “Balkan Other”

After the 2001 ethnic conflict, international presence in the country has created a new dynamic between the Macedonian population and the various international diplomatic offices and NGOs overlooking the process of the OFA implementation, as well as the country’s progress in the achievement of the conditions set by the EU. Graan (2010) asserts that “foreign diplomats oversaw fifteen amendments to the Macedonian constitution” (p. 838) and as formal signatories to the Ohrid Framework Agreement, “both the United States and the EU had an ambiguously defined warrant to oversee the treaty’s full implementation” (p. 838). Due to their role in domestic affairs, popular representations of a mighty but distant EU and United States diplomats flourished, and critical depictions of the EU diplomats contrasted with a mass enthusiasm
directed at Macedonia’s future membership in the EU (Graan, 2010). As a result, the Macedonian public is well aware that Macedonia’s ultimate fate will be decided by these outside powers and that in their international rhetoric, Macedonian politicians are constantly striving to be liked by these diplomats who are perceived to shape their future as well.

Gechev (2004) argues that the Balkans have been one of the most dynamic regions of political developments in Europe. This highly multicultural region stands at the crossroads of the world's major religions, cultures and economic systems. Gechev (2004) asserts that the violence that started after the break-up of Yugoslavia has been worsened by outside interventions and misplaced economic and political policies by the great powers such as the US, EU and UN. The Balkan peninsular region has always been situated in a luminal position between the West and the East, part of Europe but at the same time located at its periphery. Hence, Europe and the West had continually created an Orientalist-like perception of a semi-barbarian Balkans as geographically part of Europe but culturally excluded from it (Todorova, 1997). Scholars such as Maria Todorova have demonstrated how eastern Europe and the Balkans were constructed during the Enlightenment as backward, semi-civilized Others (Todorova, 1995). Such construction of negative characteristics against this region allowed for a creation of “self-congratulatory” and positive image of the ‘European’ and the ‘West’ (Iordanova, 1998, p. 264).

According to DuBois (1991), Western cultures like to believe that barbarism exists somewhere else, and is part of the Other world, “unenlightened,
steeped in medievalism and bloody cruelty” (p. 155). By displacing torture on a non-Western setting, Western nations like to maintain their superiority through Eurocentric ideological positioning, thinking that they are protected from barbarism lurking somewhere else. At the same time Western nations express a strong desire in wanting to sustain their roles as leaders and rescuers in maintaining world ‘order’ under the slogan of humanitarian intervention (DuBois, 1991).

Western discourses have always portrayed the Balkans as a region at odds with European values and traditions (Batt, 2004). During the wars of former Yugoslavia, Western journalists looked for gruesome stories to show the violence of the Balkan people who were associated with violence, chaos, and authoritarian regimes (Neofotistos, 2004; Juncos, 2005). Juncos (2005) asserts that these negative images of the Balkans served as a screen used to reflect the positive values represented by the West. Todorova (1997) calls this metaphorical phenomenon “Balkanism,” a term that gained prominence in the 1990s as the conflicts there were constructed in the media to be a continuation of centuries-long historical bloodshed. According to Wisler (2009), the concept of “balkanism” was also utilized to defend various external policies toward the region by assisting advocates of non-intervention, who suggested that the conflict was a continuation of ancient hatreds. Particularly significant is that the Balkanism discourse has infiltrated the region’s deep culture, the concept Galtung (2002) uses to refer to the
collective, meaning-shared subconscious of a group, thus creating a widespread belief in the region’s destiny for violence (Wisler, 2009).

Moreover, the term “balkanization” has entered dictionaries around the world meaning the division of a territory into small, hostile units, and stems from the historical partitioning of the Balkan region of southeastern Europe (Wisler, 2009). This negative, pessimistic meaning has awarded the region of the Balkans, and especially the now seven independent states formerly comprising the country Yugoslavia, with a reputation as a site of backwardness and tribal warfare, resisting modernization.

Although stereotypes of the West European “civility” and Balkan “incivility” shift across contexts of use, most scholars acknowledge that people in these regions have often internalized these stereotypes and commonly deploy them in a self-Orientalizing fashion (See Graan, 2010; Iordanova, 2000; Juncos, 2005; Lindstrom, 2003; Neofotistos, 2006; Vučetić, 2001; Wisler, 2009). As a result, the Orientalizing (See Said, 1978) of the Balkan peninsula should not be acknowledged as a pure Western project, since intellectuals and filmmakers of the region have made their own contribution to the portrayal of the “Balkan Other” as semi-barbarian as well (Iordanova, 2000), and the term is constantly being exploited by political elites in order to dismiss their enemies within the region (Juncos, 2005; Wisler, 2009). Such terms are constantly used as a political weapon within former Yugoslav republics, because of the derogatory connotations associated with them. Political leaders usually detach themselves from such labels,
claiming to be truly “European,” while designating other neighbors as representing “balkanism” (Juncos, 2005). Consequently, countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, seeking to make a distinction between themselves and the former Yugoslav Republics and avoid the negative images linked to the term Balkans, have utilized the term Southeastern Europe over the last few years. Even, Slovenia and Croatia who are former Yugoslav republics, have been seeking to detach themselves from their Balkan neighbors and trying to represent themselves as more “European” (Lindstrom 2003, Juncos, 2005).

Orientalist discourses about east and west are commonly reproduced within Macedonia as well (Graan, 2010). For example, interethnic relations in Macedonia are often cast in terms of “nesting Orientalisms,” what Milica Bakic´-Hayden (1995) described as the recursion of Orientalist distinctions across larger and smaller fields of analysis. Moreover, Neofotistos (2006) has also elaborated on this notion, showing how ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanians in Macedonia each employ stereotypes that cast the other group as the uncivilized other preventing the country’s entrance into Europe.

Unfortunately, with all the ethnic tensions from within and tensions with its neighboring countries, twenty years after the brake-up for Yugoslavia, Macedonia still remains at the core of what it means to be in the Balkans. Between more than three religions and a highly diverse ethnic composition, the country remains on the borderline between Western and Eastern cultures, representing the best and the worst of the “imaginary” Balkans. However, neither the ideal “multicultural”
coexistence in Macedonia during the time of Yugoslavia, nor the negative stereotyping of violent “Balkans” can capture the reality of everyday life in this small territory. But, a more complex picture should be drawn, acknowledging the existence of both ethnic tensions and pacific coexistence of the different ethnicities and religions that constitute this country.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the rhetorical context and rhetorical history of the concept of multiculturalism in the EU. The chapter touched upon several events that have shaped the current multiculturalism discussions within the EU member states and answered question sub-set #2: How is “multiculturalism” defined in the EU? What are the rhetorical challenges with this concept within the EU countries? How is the immigration debate on both sides of the Atlantic impacting the understanding of this concept? How does the ambiguous conception of such term affect EU’s foreign policy and enlargement process?

Since the primary goals of the European Union were economic cooperation, lasting peace and later, integration, cultural issues were later added to the union agenda and still to some extend remain secondary. This chapter showed that multiculturalism is an ambiguous concept within the EU without any clear definition. Due to the recent troubles that the EU is facing with immigration, terrorism and security, multiculturalism is mostly used in relation to issues of immigration, and discussions surrounding multiculturalism rarely address issues of
national minorities like it is the case in Macedonia. Also, different EU countries
differently define the concept of multiculturalism and use different models to
regulate it. Such differences present a real challenge in finding a common
approach for multiculturalism within the EU, and designing common policies for
all EU member states.

The chapter also touched upon the challenges that the EU has faced with
multiculturalism in recent years and rise of the right-wing political elites who have
greatly influenced the debates surrounding multiculturalism in the EU. In fact,
many of these political elites have already said that multiculturalism has failed and
Europe should move to more assimilationist principles and make it clear to all the
‘outsiders’ that either they adopt EU standards or they leave the country. This has
received enormous criticism by many cultural theorists and scholars, but so far no-
one is listening as polls show that right-wing politicians are greatly influencing the
political discourse in the EU.

The next chapter will focus on the methodology for the study, and will
outline the most important rhetorical theories that will be used for the analysis of
the speeches.
CHAPTER V
METHODOLOGY

“By learning the meaning of ideographs...everyone in society,
even the ‘freest’ of us, those who control the state,
seem predisposed to structured mass responses.”

(McGee, 1980, p. 18)

This chapter overviews the methodology used in analyzing the speeches of the EU and Macedonian political representatives in their dialogue for EU accession. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the methodology for this study is rhetorical criticism, and the study turns to the theory of ideological criticism by Michael McGee (1980), more specifically his notion of “ideographs.” Other influential theories of intercultural rhetoric and rhetorical criticism are invoked as well (See Bitzer, 1968; Conquergood, 1991; Lake, 1991; Mailloux; 1997; Terrill, 2009). This chapter also explains the procedures of this study and touches upon broader discussions of cultural criticism by discussing theories of intercultural rhetoric, the role of the researcher as “the Other,” and the role of “ideographs” (McGee, 1980) in cultural understandings. The discussions in this chapter basically highlight the importance of McGee’s (1978; 1980) ideological criticism for the study of intercultural communication issues such as the use of the concept of multiculturalism in the dialogue between the EU and Macedonia.
Theories of intercultural rhetoric

One of the best-suited areas for examining intercultural interactions such as the dialogue between the EU and Macedonia, in this case, is intercultural rhetoric. Rhetoric is a multi-layered process that accomplishes multiple functions simultaneously. Rhetoric is the medium through which community understandings and priorities are expressed and shared and culture “becomes visible only as interests collide and struggle” (González, 1997, p. 4). As such, rhetoric is fundamental to the creation, negotiation and contestation of culture. Intercultural rhetoric has as its focus the intersections of cultural interests.

Rhetoric relies on verbal and nonverbal symbols that intentionally influence social attitudes, values, beliefs, and actions. Herrick (2009) claims that, “rhetoric is, among other things, the study of how we organize and employ language effectively” (p. 2). Rhetoric is thus simultaneously ‘situated’ and ‘dialogic.’ Situated, since it is crafted as a response to a set of circumstances (including temporality, location, exigence and audience), and dialogic because it invites response from someone with opposing views (Herrick, 2009). Moreover, discourse is rhetorical only if it functions as a response to a situation that invites it (Bitzer, 1968). Foss (2009) claims that we use rhetoric both to persuade others and invite them to understand our perspective.

The practice of rhetoric is a fundamental social human activity that carries power and responsibility (Lucaites & Condit, 1999). The art of rhetoric has both a practical and a moral component. As a result, rhetoric is of the utmost importance to me because my research seeks praxis. Aristotle found rhetoric especially important
when faced with practical questions about matters that confronted everyone, and about which there were no definite and unavoidable answers (Herrick, 2009). I believe that research should have a practical goal and we should design research topics that are of value to the community as well as try to apply our findings and give back to the community. This goal coincides with belief that democratic citizenship is based on reciprocity (Terrill, 2009).

As McGee (1980) asserts, it is through rhetoric that we as intercultural communication researchers can reveal the interpreting systems or structures of public motifs. These structures have the capacity to both control power and influence the constructed realities of community members. The use of ideographs can help to explain either unity or division, and as such represents a concept that cements rhetorical criticism as perhaps the best-suited perspective from which to approach the study of intercultural interaction.

The ideal form of communication is the notion of genuine dialogue. This is why critics are concerned with the stories told in a particular community. The ultimate goal of intercultural communication research is understanding what happens when the differing ontologies and epistemologies intersect. Multiple constructed realities often lead to conflict, but potentially also to dialogue. This dialectical approach to conflict and dialogue is critical for achieving a solution to the kinds of conflict that I have personally experienced in the Balkan region. People in conflict are trapped in a vicious circle without listening to each other’s opinions and beliefs. By believing that multiple truths and opinions hold value, and that
everyone has as right to their own truth and opinion, rhetorical criticism helps
interrogate the vicious cycle and potentially change the ethnocentric or nationalistic
mindset.

Conflict occurs at the intersections of cultures when multiple rhetorical
meanings become incommensurable (Carbaugh & Wolf, 2000). The reasons for
such can be rooted in ontological, epistemological and teleological assumptions that
represent opportunities to find understanding and interpreting rather than
persuading. To see others as comparable is to understand their perspective as
legitimate, even as they differ from your own. As Terrill argues, understanding
ourselves, the other and the interactions between us, occurs in the context of
cultural opportunities and limitations (2009). For this reason, we are not required to
abandon our own perspective in order to appreciate the other. Rather, we should
strive to understand history while creating a future of new relations.

Often, intercultural conflict occurs within rhetorical constructions of
memory and history. Lake asserts that language permits memory, prediction and
meaning (1991). From a Burkean perspective, societies produce history through the
process of naming. This naming encompasses multiple temporal existences and
attitudinizes them (Lake, 1991). Through the rhetorical distinction between past and
present, societies create history and tradition, inventing time, and consubstantially
creating a sense of togetherness in time with a common history. As Conquergood
(1991) observed, communication is about shared time. Such a shared time is never
achieved without a struggle between the multiple contradictory experiences of time (Lake, 1991).

Since communication examines the way humans make meaning about the world, we can achieve a deeper understanding of those meanings through rhetorical criticism. The goal of my research as a communication scholar is to construct, interpret and assess the contingent aspects of communication experiences. Knowledge is constructed and subjective, and insights about communication can only be achieved from the subject's perspective. I believe that the ultimate test of research should not be the truth but the consequences. I see myself, as Griffin so eloquently stated, “as a curious participant in a pluralistic world” (2003, p. 72). Being a participant rather than an observer allows me to be actively involved in what I study.

Intercultural rhetoric and rhetorical criticism comprise the best methodological approach to examine the way people manage their interactions at the intersections of cultures, the way they create and present their social identities and societal roles, and how they respond to the creation and presentation of others. This is particularly important to conflict resolution and dialogical communication in any kind of setting. It can lead to a deeper understanding of the way culture affects the creation of reality in society in general, but also in organizations, relationships, etc. Moreover, this kind of research can give back to the communities and help societies deal with conflict.
Rhetorical criticism involves the analysis of rhetorical acts and artifacts from the perspective of a rhetorical theory (Brock, et. al., 1990; Foss, 2009). Such an analysis helps us understand the processes of persuasion as well as the rhetorical acts themselves. Traditional rhetorical criticism focuses on logos, ethos, and pathos, allowing scholars to investigate the way in which orientations to the world are discursively constructed (Foss, 2009). Contemporary rhetorical critics examine the interaction among audiences, exigencies and contingencies that create opportunities for a response appropriate to the situation (Bitzer, 1998). Critical rhetorical scholars examine relations of power, ethical and societal impacts of discourse to understand how human beings perceive and respond to the world. We must understand rhetoric critically and evaluate its ethical and moral characteristics to achieve a functioning democratic society.

Rhetorical criticism allows for an understanding and evaluation of how symbols act on people by way of exploring how individual choices and ideological assumptions shape patterns of cultural expression. Also, I take into account that rhetoric does not happen in a vacuum, but occurs in a specific point in time and culture (which in turn influences the way a specific rhetorical act or artifact came about and the way audiences interpret it). Scholars have argued for a conceptualization of culture from a critical perspective in order to addresses the relevance of power in historical, social and political contexts as well as the hidden and destabilizing aspects of culture. If dialogue is the ideal form of communication,
framing intercultural communication as politically and historically shaped is more than necessary in today’s multicultural world.

Rhetorical criticism offers the most appropriate approach to examining culture within this framework and it is the best perspective for investigating discourses of multiculturalism between the EU and Macedonia. It offers an opportunity to talk issues of power, ideology, leadership and social change (Lucaites & Condit, 1999). It offers a qualitative research method, designed for the systematic investigation and explanation of symbolic acts and artifacts toward the understanding of rhetorical processes (Foss, 2009). Since human beings are continually responding to symbols, rhetorical criticism allows us to investigate and understand symbols and our response to them. Nevertheless, we must take into account that rhetoric does not happen in a vacuum, but occurs in a specific point in time and culture (which in turn influences the way a specific rhetorical act or artifact came about and the way audiences interpret it).

Kenneth Burke is considered to have had the greatest impact on the way rhetorical criticism is practiced today (Foss, 2009). He rejects the speaker orientation of traditional rhetoric, shifting the focus from persuasion to an analysis of motives (Brock, et. al., 1990). This rhetorical perspective views language as a strategic response to a situation (Burke, 1957). For Burke, people assess the “human situation,” shaping appropriate attitudes in the construction of their conceptualizations of the world and selecting strategies for coping with it using symbols to reflect attitudes (Burke, 1957, 1961). Thus, the function of rhetoric is
through “the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents” (Burke, 1950, p. 41). By way of this definition, Burke makes an explicit connection between symbols and actions, asserting that symbols are meaningful acts from which motives can be derived (Burke, 1961). These motives form the substance of a rhetorical act.

Burke views human society as a dramatistic process that includes “elements of hierarchy; acceptance and rejection; and guilt, purification, and redemption” (Brock et al, 1990, p. 185). Social, economic and political power is unevenly divided in society, defining relationships among people. This process establishes hierarchy as the structural principle of society (Burke, 1954). Language enables people to accept and reject their position in the hierarchy as well as the hierarchy itself (Burke, 1952). By rejecting the traditional hierarchy, people acquire a feeling of guilt due to reduced social cohesion. This guilt is inherent in society because it is impossible to accept all of the impositions of a hierarchy. In order to alleviate this guilt, members of society purge themselves, either through establishing a scapegoat or through self-mortification (Burke, 1961). The interrelationships between the concepts of hierarchy; acceptance and rejection; and guilt, purification and redemption explain the dramatistic nature of society, or as Burke states poetically: “Order, through guilt, to victimage, (hence cult of the kill)” (Burke, 1961, p. 4-5).

The dramatistic approach to rhetorical criticism offers a language describing people as they respond to their world. In order for this rhetorical approach to be useful in analysis however, the concept of identification is developed as a tool for
discovering attitudes in the dramatistic process (Brock et al, 1990, p. 185). Through identification, rhetoricians can analyze discourses that induce humans to act in ways that encourage peaceful relations. Burke sees identification as social action growing out of an ambiguous situation.

Burke claims that “man is the symbol using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal, inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative), separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making, goaded by the spirits of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order), and rotten with perfection” (Burke, 1966, p. 16). This statement acknowledges the animal nature of human beings and emphasizes the unique human ability to create, use and abuse language. By using the phrase “inventor of the negative,” Burke claims that the possibility of choice comes into being only through man-made language. Therefore, this theory provides awareness of the importance of symbolic interaction as a precondition for knowing. According to Burke, nature does not provide us with the rules of what is wrong and what is right. Rather, the rules of the society come from our usage of symbols and interaction with others.

Burke understands that communication in the contemporary world is much more complex than what classical rhetoricians perceived it to be. Therefore he doesn’t dismiss those conceptions of rhetoric, but builds upon them while introducing the concept of identification as a fundamental process of human experience and communication. According to Burke, people are born biologically separated and constantly seek to identify through communication in order to
overcome that separateness. Burke believes that the need for identification rises from our division, that we are "both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another" (Burke, 1969, p. 21), and that “identification is compensatory to division." (Burke, 1969, p. 22). Moreover, due to our intrinsic human separateness, we constantly feel guilt. To overcome our guilt, we look for ways in which our perceptions, interests, attitudes, values and experiences are shared with others, or appear to be shared, so that we can identify and become a part of a group. We are constantly in a search to find groups of individuals to be associated with, achieve some position in the society and hierarchy of social relations, and alleviate the guilt we feel. However, while we identify with one group we consubstantially differentiate ourselves from other groups, and this is the basis of conflict and misunderstanding.

Furthermore, Burke views language as a strategic response to a situation and rhetoric as the use of language for inducing cooperation in human beings that by nature respond to symbols (Burke, 1966). Language is rich with attitudes and understandings, and creates social reality. When used as a method, Burke’s theory of dramatism explains the way people make sense of their actions and others, the cultural and social influences in these explanations and the way connotations among motivational terms influence both the explanation and action itself. Thus, Burke’s theory helps us learn the way we as humans use and abuse language to obscure our vision, create misunderstandings or excuse our ever-present inclination for conflict,
war and destruction (as well as our equally present inclination for cooperation, peace and survival).

In his essay “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle” first published in 1939, Burke analyzes Hitler’s usage of language tactics that lead his nation to WWII. Burke (1989) shows how Hitler created a common enemy—the Jewish people by his “unification device” and scapegoat mechanisms used to personalize the initially vague threats posed by the common enemy. Most importantly, Burke (1989) explains the power of language in Hitler’s propaganda which achieved its peak by the repetition of his slogans. He claims that with the repetition tool, “Hitler provided a ‘world view’ for his own people who had previously seen the world but piecemeal?” Although Burke’s theory and ideas have many limitations, most of it because of the broadness of his theory, but also because of his usage of theological terms which make some of his most important concepts inapplicable or unsuitable for analyzing rhetorical artifacts from cultures that do not belong to the Christian religion, I find his ideas extremely useful in the study of conflict and war which include my primary interests for research.

Mailloux (1997) also considers language use and interpretation as inseparable parts of discourse that must be considered together in order to make sense of the activities described through communication. He insists that rhetoric itself is based on interpretation and interpretation is then communicated through rhetoric, in effect making them both “practical forms of the same human activity” (Mailloux, 1997, p. 4). According to him, interpretation is focused on establishing
textual meaning and translates one text into another, while rhetoric is transformative and translates one position into another through psychological stimulation of emotions. Therefore, “successful interpretation depends on the interpreter’s prior web of beliefs, desires, practices, and so forth” (Mailloux, 1997, p. 7) that limit the interpretation to what the interpreter already understands.

Borrowing from Derrida’s deconstructivist perspective, Mailloux argues that the reception of rhetoric is the point at which an author’s intended meaning is interpreted. Further, he assumes that the reader’s presuppositions and previously held understandings provide the very foundation of interpretation, without which such an act cannot be undertaken. This is what makes interpretation problematic when cultures run into each other. The task of the intercultural researcher, according to Mailloux, balances on this collision. Moreover, Mailloux asserts that simple description of cultural activities provide the basis from learning from another standpoint that is incommensurable to the interpreter. This provides a way to avoid ethnocentric assertions of cultural superiority, but such a supposition begs the charge of “nihilistic solipsism” (p. 8). According to Mailloux, “interpretative judgments and rhetorical articulations are woven together within a culture’s social practices even when the topic of articulated judgment is another culture’s practices” (p. 14). Since the author feels ethnocentrism in inescapable, our interpretative agency occurs “within and because of our enculturation” (1997, p. 16). This makes approaching intercultural interpretation impossible from either an objective point of view or through somehow adopting the point of view of the other. Thus,
intercultural incommensurability allows for an explanation of how competing understandings and explanations may occur both within and outside of our cultural groups. Hence, Mailloux concludes that inter and intra-cultural understandings are inescapably connected through the interpretations of the reader.

**Rhetoric and ideological criticism**

Michael McGee (1980) is one of the many scholars who have contributed to the development of ideological criticism (See McKerrow, 2010; Foss, 2009; Saindon, 2008). He draws from Marx to explore ideology and its manifestation through the vocabulary of *ideographs*, a concept that he believes was ignored in the Burkean approach to rhetorical criticism. Being primarily inspired from Kenneth Burke’s reflections on "terministic screens" and "identification" (1969; 1966), McGee (1978; 1980) is mostly concerned with terminology that allows political groups to organize themselves around terms such as *liberty* or *freedom*. In western political discourse, it is very common for different political groups (on the right or left) to employ the concept of *liberty* or *freedom* even while their more developed ideas about what precisely that terminology means for practical action may vary or conflict. Even with wide variation in ideology and action, the concept of *liberty* or *freedom* are agreed upon or assumed. The "ideograph" (McGee, 1978; 1980) draws upon ordinary meanings of a specific concept such as *liberty* for example, and moves toward analyzing how language is used in the context of social practices as well as how social practices bind together with language use.
McKerrow (2010) argues that while Bitzer’s (1968) *The Rhetorical Situation* significantly changed the rhetorical scholarly landscape by highlighting rhetoric’s relation to context, McGee’s (1978) essay titled The ‘Ideograph’: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology also contributed to changing rhetoric’s trajectory of scholarship by highlighting “the power of words in orienting world views” (p. 200). McGee’s ideological criticism doesn’t only refer to the power of language, but most importantly addresses the ideological commitments that are contained within ideographs. In McGee’s words, the analysis of the usage of ideographs in political rhetoric “reveals interpenetrating systems or ‘structures’ of public motives. Such structures appear to be ‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’ patterns of political consciousness which have the capacity both to control ‘power’ and to influence (if not determine) the shape and texture of each individual’s ‘reality.’ (1978, p. 5).

McGee (1980) argues that political language, characterized by slogans and a vocabulary of *ideographs*, has the capacity to dictate decision, control public belief and discourse, and shape reality. Ideographs are defined as historically and culturally grounded commonplace rhetorical terms that sum up and invoke identification with key social commitments. Ideographs provide a link between rhetoric and ideology, and present a means through which ideologies are unconsciously shared to organize consent to a particular social system (Cloud, 2004). The “ideograph” is defined as an ordinary language term found in political discourse that represents a collective commitment to a particular, but not well defined, normative goal (McGee, 1980).
McGee's primary purpose was to reveal the way ideology works in political discourse, and his primary argument is that ideology operates with words, rather than ideas, thoughts or arguments. McGee writes:

Though words only (and not claims), such terms as 'property,' religion,' 'right of privacy,' 'freedom of speech,' 'rule of law,' and 'liberty' are more pregnant than propositions could ever be. They are the basic structural elements, the building blocks, of ideology. Thus they may be thought of as 'ideographs,' for, like Chinese symbols, they signify and 'contain' a unique ideological commitment; further, they presumptuously suggest that each member of a community will see as a gestalt every complex nuance in them. (1980, p. 6-7).

To further explain this, he uses the concept of equality as an example of an ideograph’s capacity to define a collectivity. McGee claims:

So, in the United States, we claim a common belief in “equality,” as do citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]; but “equality” is not the same word in its meaning or its usage. One can therefore precisely define the difference between the two communities, in part, by comparing the usage of definitive ideographs. (p. 8)

With this kind of analysis of comparative ideology, McGee analyses each culture’s synchronic affiliations of equality. The example above shows that different communities might have different ideologies attached to the same word,
and as a result studying such ideologies becomes an imperative when studying intercultural political dialogue.

Ideographic analysis looks at words, phrases, as well as "visual ideographs" in some cases, along with actions, agendas, policy statements, etc., in order to illuminate their role in the creation of ideology in political discourses. In a way "ideographs" represent a scientific language, and it is up to the rhetorical scholar or critical analyst to "reveal" the deep and wide meanings of a given ideograph in order to clarify its operations. Ideographic analysis points to the ideographic nature of the ordinary use of language, which is less reductionist and precise, compared to other scientific methods used in communication research. McGee (1980) believes that ideology is the key concept for understanding the reproduction of the means of production, “the trick-of-the-mind which deludes us into believing that we ‘think’ with/through/for a ‘society’ to which we ‘belong’” (p. 4). In this way he links the idealist study of myths and ideas to a materialist account of the modes of production.

McGee's ideographic analysis is extremely important in rhetorical and social analysis, especially as it relates to political discourse. Ideographic analysis directly applying McGee's work has analyzed major terms such as “equality” (Condit and Lucaites 1993), “progress” (Short 1994), “atrocity” (Hasian, 2008) and ideographic clusters such as “good moral character,” “intelligence” and “competency” (Martin 1983). It has also been applied in Delgado's work on the rhetoric of the Chicano movement (1995) and the rhetoric of Fidel Castro (1999) and Clarke's analysis of
“Native American sovereignty” (2002), as well as in Happanen’s (2011) analysis of the “May Fourth Movement”. Some scholars have also focused on the visual implications of ideographic analysis, either ideographs being in an indexical or referential relationship to images or the images functioning themselves as ideographs (see Moore, 1996; Edwards & Winkler, 1997; Cloud, 2004; Palczewski, 2005; Hayden, 2009). For example, Moore (1996) identifies the cigarette as an ideograph.

In analyzing different genocidal events in Africa, such as the ones in Rwanda, the Congo, and Sierra Leone, Hasian (2008) conducts an ideographical analysis of the meaning of "atrocity" in the creative usage of traditional international law vocabularies. His analysis offers an important example in understanding how legal discourses operate as sites of deliberation and the ways in which ideology conditions our relationship to human suffering. Whereas Cloud (2004) goes further to discuss the way images function as ideographs, in analyzing the widely circulated images of the Afghan women in building public support for the 2001-2002 U.S. war with Afghanistan. She argues that these representations participate in the more general category of "the clash of civilizations" (p. 286) which constitutes a verbal and a visual ideograph linked to the idea of the "white man's burden" (p. 286). Claud (2004) claims that such images played an important role in justifying the war in Afghanistan, which is contradictory to the actual motives for the war.
Ideographs and cultural understandings

For McGee (1979), rhetoric is central to the constitution of collective life. It is a multi-layered process that accomplishes multiple functions simultaneously, and forms the medium through which community understandings and priorities are directed. As such, rhetoric is fundamental to the creation, negotiation and contestation of culture. As McGee (1980) asserts, it is through rhetoric that we as intercultural communication researchers can reveal the interpreting systems or structures of public motifs. These structures have the capacity to control power and influence the constructed realities of community members (McGee, 1980). The use of specific vocabulary can either unite or divide, and thus represents a concept that cements rhetorical criticism as the best-suited perspective from which to approach the study of intercultural interaction.

Foss (2009) grounds McGee’s ideological criticism in the basic conceptualization of ideologies and how they function. Every culture is composed by multiple ideologies with the potential to manifest in rhetorical artifacts. Discovering and interrogating the ideology embedded in an artifact becomes the primary goal of rhetorical criticism. The role communication plays in creating and sustaining ideology must be understood, and the interests represented in that ideology discovered. In this study I draw from studies in ideological criticism that focus on how relationships of power within societies are embedded and reproduced in acts of cultural creation in order to examine the ideology behind the concept of “multiculturalism” examining the impeded ideologies in it. I believe that culture
consists of everyday discursive practices that embody and construct ideology. Speeches given by official representatives of states thus become legitimate sites for interrogation because that is where ideological struggles take place.

As a result, ideographic analysis is extremely useful for the study of concepts such as “multiculturalism” that are used by various parties engaged in conflict in dialogs of negotiation. The processes creating and sustaining ideology, and the interests represented in the ideology, must be discovered and understood in order to uncover oppressive relationships in the usage of this concept and find opportunities enabling emancipation. Ideographs generate a series of usages that unite the communities that use them, but consubstantially function to separate communities implementing them by holding certain meanings and intentions unacceptable to other groups. This is precisely why I decided to conduct an ideographical analysis of the concept of “multiculturalism,” and will especially focus my attention on the points of separation that this ideograph generates between the communities that use it. I will focus on the way the ideograph of “multiculturalism” guides behavior and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable or unacceptable (McGee, 1980).

Ideographs are crucial concepts for understanding cultural and historical influences within the intercultural dialogue between diverse groups living in Macedonia, and their relationship with the EU. They act as forms of political rhetoric that shape the realities of the people living in Macedonia. The ideographs are historically and culturally grounded commonplace rhetorical terms invoking
identification with key social commitments (McGee, 1980). In the case of Macedonia, the ideograph of multiculturalism invokes identification to the commitment of a multiethnic and multicultural society that is a full member of the EU. Differences in historical interpretation, geographical and ethnic understandings of multiculturalism – within Macedonia and in the dialogue with EU – produce different conceptions of the term, and highlight the necessity for a more thorough analysis of the different meanings and ideologies that these groups attach to the concept of multiculturalism. While the aim of the ideograph introduced by the EU was to unite these communities, different conceptions of multiculturalism has further separated them and contributed to the vague and contested nature of the ideograph for various groups in the Macedonian context.

Researcher and/as the Other

As discussed earlier, as an Albanian ethnic minority living in Macedonia during a time of ideological, economic and social transition, issues of social justice, democracy, emancipatory discourse and self-reflexivity permeate the lens through which I view the world. Negotiating the terrain of division and marginalization, fraught with issues of power and ideology, demands a critical and reflective interrogation. At the heart of these issues, differing ontologies and epistemologies intersect producing injustice, colonization, Western domination and hegemony. This is why I, as researcher, am concerned with the stories told in a particular community and what happens when differing cultural and political ontologies and
epistemologies intersect. The subject position from which I conduct my research operates under the assumption that all knowledge is subjective or intersubjective, morally responsible, and local. This perspective views the world as a rapidly changing, highly complex entity. Because my subject position situates me within the communities I study, interpretation becomes an act that integrates my voice with those in the community. The significance of this positioning is that it is more inclusive toward difference and makes us tolerant to others and their differences both in terms of research and real life. Instead of trying to find the ‘truth’ and impose it on others, I try to understand multiple meanings and truths so that I may, as Pearce (1989, 1995) recommends, enter them into the social conversation so that the others can interpret them and find their own understanding in ways that are still accurately representative of the voices in the communities I study. Reality is not fixed, but changes according to the symbols we use to talk about it. Our ontological and epistemological assumptions about the world depend on how we choose to label and talk about things. This view does not deny the existence of material things, but asserts that the symbols used in discourse filter our view of the world and how we are motivated to act toward it (Foss, 2009).

Moreover, because my subject position stems from value assumptions associated with my study interest in discourses surrounding multiculturalism, peace and conflict, it becomes an active extension of my axiological motivations. It also reflects the choices I make in my methodological approach to research. The rhetorical perspective views disagreement as a natural result of competing worlds
symbolically constructed by different social, political and ethnic groups (Lucaites & Condit, 1999). These symbolic constructions express different logistics, interests and values interacting together and competing for limited and scarce resources. Lucaites & Condit (1999) assert that struggle, not consensus, becomes the defining characteristic of social life. Because I situate myself as a researcher at the intersections of intercultural discourse struggles, I am able to interrogate and experience these competing social discords, not as pathology to be cured, but a condition to be productively managed (Pearce, 1989; 1995).

Being able to experience different cultures and identities in my everyday life, as well as having experienced conflict and war, understanding the way people make sense of the world and the way sense-making affects communication is a vital component of my research. I base my epistemological assumptions in Rorty’s (1989) assertions that we as humans lack the capacity to explain the world and that objective reality does not exist. According to Rorty (1989) the world is there, it exists, but by the mere fact that we use language to describe it, the description does not correspond to the world itself as it is due to the influence of language and the available vocabularies of a particular language. In this sense, language determines the way we see and experience the world and therefore we can never claim to be able to reach an objective truth. For Rorty (1989) language is a tool of seeing and explaining the world, not a tactic, and once we describe the world with language we do this by identification, constantly trying to find a connection to our previously held world views.
This approach to rhetoric is crucial in understanding the differing social worlds that people live in and their differing perceptions of reality. Ethnic conflicts like the ones I have experienced in the Balkans serve as prime examples of the differing social worlds crashing. These conflicts often render the situation among parties involved closed for discussion since one side considers its position so obvious and true that discussing seems equal to giving credibility to the opposing position. Individuals in ethnic conflicts are often stuck in destructive patterns of interaction, often calling each other racists, ethnocentric, liars, etc, and describe the other side’s actions as criminal, cruel or crazy. People in conflict are trapped in a never-ending vicious circle without even listening to each other’s opinions and beliefs. Believing that there are multiple truths and opinions out there, and everyone has as right to their own truth and opinion, changes the mindset of whose position or opinion is better and more worth. Prejudices and stereotypes can diminish only by understanding each other’s differing positions, and only then we can achieve appreciation of our differences.

Procedure

In order to answer the primary research question — “How does the EU rhetorically construct ‘multiculturalism’ as a way to mediate the political and cultural tensions between Albanians and Macedonians to facilitate the accession process?” — this study analyses the following artifacts: Speeches from the office of the European Commission Delegation to the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM), and the Macedonian Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Prime Minister's office for European Affairs and the Vice Prime Minister representing the Albanian political party in government. Artifacts can be placed into two major categories: speeches by EU representatives and speeches by the Macedonian government. The speeches by the Macedonian government further can be placed in two categories: those of the Macedonian and Albanian officials.

The rhetorical construction of multiculturalism is drawn from forty-two speeches delivered by the European Commission Delegation to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia high representatives. The speeches were delivered in the period from 2006 to 2009 and they were all retrieved from European Commission Delegation to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia website. The majority of these speeches were delivered in Macedonia, while some of them were delivered in other EU countries tackling relevant issues in Macedonia especially as it pertains to the EU accession process. Some of these speeches address issues of multiculturalism directly and some of them indirectly, but they all represent the EU perspectives on this issue and give directions to the country and its people on how to become an integrated multicultural society.

The rhetorical construction of multiculturalism among Macedonians is drawn from eighteen speeches delivered by the Macedonian Prime Minister, Macedonian president, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs and the Vice Prime Minister representing the Albanian political party in government delivered in the period of 2006 to 2009. These speeches were
delivered by Macedonian officials when they traveled to EU countries on special conferences for EU integration, enlargement, and security and diversity issues. They all tackle issues of multiculturalism and represent both the Macedonian and Albanian perspectives about this issue. While I have been facing some challenges finding a complete list of speeches online, I believe I will complete the list upon my return to the country since I will be able to meet with some of these officials in person and obtain their speeches.

Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the critical methodology and procedures that are used in analyzing the speeches of the EU and Macedonian political representatives in their dialogue for EU accession. The methodology employed in this study is rhetorical criticism, more specifically Michael McGee’s (1978; 1980) notion of “ideographs” considered to be the most useful for analyzing intercultural political discourses, such as the one between the EU and Macedonia. The chapter also discussed Burke’s theory of rhetorical criticism, as one of the main influences behind McGee’s ideographic analysis, as well as other influential theories of intercultural rhetoric and rhetorical criticism (See Bitzer, 1968; Conquergood, 1991; Lake, 1991; Mailloux; 1997; Terrill, 2009).

The chapter primarily focused on the role of “ideographs” (McGee, 1973; 1980) in cultural understandings, making the claim that such methodology is most useful for the study of the use of the concept of multiculturalism which is used by
various parties engaged in conflicting dialogues of negotiation. This methodology allows us to discover the processes creating and sustaining ideology surrounding the concept of multiculturalism, both in the EU and in Macedonia, as well as it will expose the interests of the different parties involved in the dialogue. Such analysis will allow us to understand and uncover the oppressive relationships in the usage of the concept of multiculturalism and will give us an opportunity to possibly find opportunities enabling emancipation surrounding this concept.

The chapter also discusses the role of the researcher as “the Other,” having experienced “Othering” and marginalization both within her own community and in an international context. The researcher situates herself at the intersections of intercultural discourse struggles, and views knowledge as subjective or intersubjective, morally responsible, and local. As a result, the researcher explains that instead of trying to find the ‘truth’ about the use of multiculturalism in the dialogue between the EU and Macedonia, she will try to understand the multiple meanings and truths surrounding this concept so that the others can interpret them and find their own understanding in ways that are still accurately representative of the voices in the communities she studies. This approach to rhetoric is crucial in understanding the differing social worlds that different ethnic groups experience in Macedonia and their differing perceptions of reality, especially as it pertains to discourses of multiculturalism.
CHAPTER VI
IDEOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECHES DELIVERED BY THE EU REpresentatives IN MACEDONIA AND THE MACEDONIAN GOVERNMENT

“The EU embodies one of history’s most successful attempts to enable countries and peoples to overcome division, to shape a future based on partnership and cooperation.”

Erwan Fouéré (2009, June 6)

This chapter presents the ideographical critique of “multiculturalism” and clustering concepts such as “interethnic tolerance,” “interethnic dialogue,” “interethnic cooperation,” “interethnic stability” and “interethnic dialogue.” The chapter answers question sub-questions #3 and #4. The first part of the chapter titled Analysis of the EU Speeches answers the question sub-questions #3: What is the EU’s ideological conceptualization behind the ideograph of “multiculturalism” when EU representatives present it to the Macedonian audience? How do EU representatives define multiculturalism when they speak to audiences in Macedonia, and how do they define it when they speak to audiences in the EU? What, according to the EU and its representatives, is the importance of multiculturalism in Macedonia? The second part of the Chapter titled Analysis of
the Speeches given by the Macedonian Government answers question sub-questions #4: What are the Albanian and Macedonian perspectives and responses toward the ideograph of multiculturalism? How do these definitions shape the identity of the minorities in Macedonia and whose interests are upheld? What does the upholding of the discursive status quo surrounding the issue of multiculturalism mean to those who are of an ethnic minority in Macedonia?

The chapter concludes by analyzing the similarities and differences in the conceptualization of the ideograph of multiculturalism by the Macedonian government and by the EU, and touches upon the different nuances in the conceptualization of multiculturalism by the Macedonian and Albanian political elites forming the Macedonian government.

Ideographic clusters in political dialogue

As discussed in earlier chapters, concepts such as “multiculturalism”, “interethic tolerance”, “interethic dialogue”, “interethic cooperation,” “interethic stability” and “interethic dialogue” form an ideographic cluster in the political dialogue among the major ethnic groups in Macedonia, as well as in the country’s dialogue with the EU. These concepts are constantly invoked in political speeches both by the national and EU leaders, national and international media, and everyday conversations. The question is however, whether those vocabularies have the same meanings for all the parties involved in the dialogue, or whether different parties attach different meanings and ideologies to them. Since the discourse with the EU is
so important to Macedonia’s future, answering this question is critical. It is vital to also understand the way a particular vocabulary is used and defined by all the parties involved and how it might affect the accession process.

This chapter undertakes a rhetorical analysis of the ideograph of “multiculturalism” together with the cluster of terms mentioned above for the purpose of raising awareness about the importance of the diverse cultural conceptualizations of such terms, as well as the meanings that arise as a result of the differing cultural values, experiences, and perceptions among all the parties involved. Forty-two speeches given by the head of the EU delegation in Macedonia, Ambassador Erwan Fouéré, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn and Joan Pearce, Minister Counselor of the Delegation of the European Commission in Macedonia, as well as eighteen speeches from Macedonian Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Antonio Milosovski, the former president of Macedonia, Branko Crvenkovski and the former Vice Prime Minister for the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement representing the Albanian political party in government, Abdylaqim Ademi as well as the Vice Prime Minister for EU Integration, Gabriela Konevska-Trajkovska. These speeches directly address the issue of multiculturalism and multiethnic stability of the country and discussion of this issue reveals the ideographic status of these terms. The speeches sometimes refer to the main ideograph of “multiculturalism,” and at other times the speeches invoke the related terms.
Analysis of the EU speeches

As mentioned in Chapter IV, the EU established the Delegation of the European Union office in Skopje, the capital of Macedonia, since May 2000, and after granting Macedonia the candidate status in 2005, the EU appointed its own Special Representative and Head of the EU Delegation with residence in Macedonia, the Irish diplomat Ambassador Mr. Erwan Fouéré who served until the end of 2010. The Danish diplomat Ambassador Peter Sørensen was appointed in 2011 as the new Head of the EU Delegation, but later that year left the position to became Head of the EU Delegation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The current Head of EU Delegation in Macedonia is the Estonian diplomat, Aivo Orav, who was appointed on December 22, 2011.

Since the analysis of the speeches covers years 2006 to 2009, the speeches analyzed in this section are mostly speeches delivered by the Head of the EU Delegation Mr. Erwan Fouéré who executed this position during that period. The analysis includes speeches from other EU diplomats as well, such as the former EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn and Joan Pearce, Minister Counselor of the Delegation of the European Commission in Macedonia. All the speeches analyzed in this part were retrieved from the website of the EU Delegation in Macedonia, were originally written in the English language and more information about them can be found in Annex B. The speeches of the Head of the EU Delegation in Macedonia are vital for this analysis since the main goal of this position is to facilitate communication between the EU Commission and the Macedonian government for membership negotiations with the EU, and maintain regular dialogue with governmental and academic institutions, the private sector, and civil society. In order to understand the
ideology that the EU diplomats attach to the ideograph of “multiculturalism” it is vital to analyze the speeches of the Head of the EU delegation who in a way serves as a messenger of the ideas of the EU when it comes to issues of multiculturalism in Macedonia. The speeches of the EU Commissioner for Enlargement are also important due to the fact that he addresses the specific conditions that the EU had set on Macedonia in order to set the date for negotiations.

As mentioned in Chapter IV, EU’s rhetoric addressed to the Macedonian leaders and the general public plays a significant role in the process of sanctioning and rewarding the country in relation to the goals set for membership. This is usually carried out through various public pronouncements and visits by influential EU actors, issuing reports in which clear and detailed expectations are conveyed to politicians, and setting time frames within which reforms are expected to be accomplished. Whenever Macedonia appears to move away from the desired course of action, the EU rhetoric is focused on moving the government into action through formal statements of concern and criticism, coupled with clear guidelines on what they needed to do to address satisfactorily the problem as it was defined. Whenever the desired changes are adopted, the EU responds by praising the government, and making it aware that their reforms had brought the country a step closer to fulfilling the goal of membership.

It is these statements that are analyzed in this section and such EU rhetoric becomes more than evident in the analysis of the speeches below. The analysis of the speeches has shown that the rhetoric of the EU diplomats in Macedonia can be organized by the following three categories: praise for progress being made, reminder about the remaining challenges,
and comparison between the EU and Macedonia, EU being the example that Macedonia can or should follow. The praise for the implementation of the reforms that mostly are conditioned through the Ohrid Framework Agreement usually appears at the beginning of their speeches which shows that they prefer to start the speech on a positive note, offering the government and the people of Macedonia encouragement for the progress made as well as motivation to do more. The reminders for the remaining challenges facing the country which mostly include extracts of the Progress Reports published each year by the European Commission represent the most negative parts of the speeches and are usually concentrated toward the end, just before the conclusion. The comparison between the EU and Macedonia is used either in the beginning of the speeches, or toward the middle, when Macedonia is compared to the EU due to its multicultural composition and the EU is represented as an example where multiculturalism is thriving between nations, ethnicities and religions. The speeches are also used to inform the Macedonian public about major EU laws and regulations, as well as provide guidelines for setting the way forward in order to sustain the achievements and address all remaining challenges that Macedonia is facing in order to set a date for EU negotiations for accession.

Praise for Progress Being Made

The EU frames its discourse mostly within the strategy of a “carrot-and-stick” (Bechev, 2006, p. 28) that proceeds from its conditionality policy. When addressing the conditions set by the EU, the EU diplomats usually mention the positive progress made in the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, and state that Macedonia received
the candidate status as a reward for this progress. Such rhetoric basically gives the Macedonian government and the general public a guideline on how to proceed next, and shows that for every progress made there will be a fitting reward by the EU.

Explaining how Macedonia got the candidate status from the EU, the former EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn, said the following at the Conference for the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Skopje, Macedonia:

The decision taken by the EU was also a tribute to all those who contributed actively to make possible the progress in the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the Stabilization and Association Agreement. We were hoping then, as much as your own citizens, that the progress would accelerate. (Rehn, 2007, February 8).

Whereas, in the following year in the same conference held for the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Skopje, Macedonia, he further elaborated on the achievements of the country and EU’s decision to grant the candidate status.

Less than 14 months ago, your country was recognized as a candidate country. It was the result of determined efforts undertaken by you to establish the necessary conditions for a stable democracy based on rule of law. The agreement signed in 2001 in Ohrid was key in this context. The commitment of its signatories and its progressive implementation brought you out of an acute crisis. It allowed for reconciliation and for the building of mutual confidence. It transformed the state by taking full account of the multiethnic and multicultural character of your country. Instead of falling into the instability that has plagued so much of the recent history of
the Balkans, this country moved in the direction of stability. You were moving towards becoming a model for this region, and could count on the full support of the EU. (Rehn, 2008, February 7)

He went on to say that besides meeting the needed reforms regarding OFA, the government should know that “this process needs to be sustained.” He made it clear that it won’t be possible to get EU accession only by meeting the reforms, but that the EU will look for their sustainability as well. He said that “the respect for democracy, rule of law and respect for minorities is the glue that holds EU together” and that this represents “an essential criteria of the accession process” (Rehn, 2008, February 7).

Similar remarks were made several times by the Head of the EU Delegation in Macedonia, Mr. Erwan Fouéré who has used the opportunity to praise the Macedonian government for the implementation of the reforms regarding the Ohrid Framework agreement in several of his speeches analyzed in this chapter. In fact, from the thirty six Erwan Fouéré speeches analyzed, he mentioned this in four of them. On a speech delivered at the Graduation Ceremony of the South East European University (SEEU) in Tetovo, he said: “The granting of candidate status in December 2005 was recognition of the enormous efforts made by the leaders to overcome the divisions of the past and open a new chapter in the country's history” (Fouéré, 2009, June 6). Also, in his address to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium he said:

This decision was recognition of the commitment of the political leaders for the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement confirming the multiethnic character of the country. It was also recognition, that, through the sheer
determination of its citizens and with EU support together with other members of the international community, the country was able to move from a post conflict to a pre-accession environment. (Fouéré, 2007, February 27).

Such an approach by the EU diplomats that focuses on rewards and punishments was also mentioned in Chapter III. Vasilev (2011) and Giandomenico (2009) claim that the only reason the EU decided to grant candidate status to Macedonia was to reward the country for it progress in the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and to motivate the leaders to move further in this respect. Giandomenico (2009) asserts that even though the country had not fully implemented the required reforms, the EU felt obliged to give the candidate status to Macedonia as a motivation to move forward. The EU’s approach has always been to use conditionality with the aim of bringing about favorable changes relationship between ethnic groups (Vasilev, 2011; Giandomenico, 2009).

Reminder about the Remaining Challenges

Besides praising the government on the achieved reforms, the EU diplomats never forget to remind the government about all the remaining challenges that the country was facing, sometimes by expressing criticism for stalling back with the progress, and in some instances even reminding the government about the consequences due to the lack of progress. Ensuring continued inter-ethnic cooperation, intra-ethnic stability, and a relationship of trust and confidence between all the political forces in the country is mentioned as one of the main challenges still facing Macedonia. The EU diplomats insist that the government still needs to ensure a continued dialogue between all political forces in
order to attain a broad consensus on crucial reforms and succeed in implementing them. Other concerns have to do with securing fair and democratic local and general elections, equitable representation of minorities in the state administration, fight against corruption, fair and democratic judiciary system, especially in regards to the civil service legislation which still suffers from political interference in the public administration, and many more.

The Copenhagen criteria for membership established in 1993 by the European Commission provided conditions for future accession and were presented to the candidate countries early in the process (Koinova, 2011). They require that the candidate countries ensure stability of the institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law and human rights. The European Union, follows all issues relevant for the political criteria for membership with particular attention on the rule of law and on the protection of human rights which are described as the “fundamental values of the EU” (Fouéré, 2008, March 6). These criteria are further underlined and explained in the Communication from the European Commission to the Western Balkans countries issued every year and represent the main conditions set by the EU.

Schimmelfennig (2005) defines political conditionality as “a strategy of reinforcement used by the international organizations and other international actors to bring about and stabilize political change” (p. 1). Conditionality on human and minority rights represent one of the most important parts of the Copenhagen criteria, and is tied to an entire package of requirements in order to get EU membership. Thus, by making a significant contribution to the implementation of the reforms, more specifically by granting the
candidate status and providing financial aid (Fouéré, 2008, April 9; Fouéré, 2009, February 4; April 21), the EU was fierce in demanding full implementation of the reforms.

This is how the former Commissioner for Enlargement, Ollie Rehn further explained the conditionality process in a speech delivered at the opening of the exhibition Hani-Balkan Ante Portas, in Brussels, Belgium.

The Union recognizes the candidates' European vocation, and the candidates recognize the need for reforms. Not for the sake of Brussels, in the first place, but for the sake of their own citizens. So there we stand – both at the same gate. With our joint efforts we can make the gate open wider up every day. And meanwhile, we learn to know each other better. (Rehn, 2009, November 23).

The EU is described as a soft power “to transform its nearest neighbors into functioning democracies, market economies, and true partners in meeting common challenges” (Fouéré, 2006, October 27). The perspective for EU accession is described as a tool used to help Macedonia maintain its peace and continue to serve as an example for the rest of the region. Fouéré asserts that “the perspective of the EU membership has proven to be the single most effective instrument to sustain stability and to achieve much needed reforms across the region” (2006, October 27). According to Fouéré, the EU has proved to serve as a “uniter” in the Western Balkans, as the perspective for EU membership has united all the ethnic and religious groups in the region in their desire to join the EU (Fouéré, 2007, February 27; Fouéré, 2009, April 21).

Moreover, progress and stability in the Western Balkans means progress and stability in the EU as well. The EU leaders never forget the benefits that their countries will be
getting by securing peace in the Western Balkans. The former Commissioner for Enlargement, Ollie Rehn said that “cementing democracy and the rule of law in these countries and encouraging their progress towards the EU is all the more important for stability and security in Europe” (Rehn, 2008, September 18). So, the idea is that besides the EU bringing peace and stability to the countries of Western Balkans, the Western Balkans will in turn bring peace and security to the EU as well.

Thus, as already mentioned in Chapter IV, the EU prefers to imagine its neighboring countries as possible European spaces of influence yet to be Europeanized (Boedeltje, 2012). Such Eurocentric beliefs that neighboring states can be ‘Europeanized’ through the idea of conditionality and socialization but without the prospective of becoming an EU member have provoked a heated debate all across Eastern Europe and have a serious impact on the way these countries meet the criteria set by the EU. Krajina (2009) and Kuus (2004), have gone even further to claim that EU’s enlargement is also highlighted by a broadly Orientalist discourse that assumes essential difference between Europe and Eastern Europe, especially to countries of Western Balkans trying to get accession.

Since concerns over security and stability trumped concerns about democratization in Macedonia, the Ohrid Framework Agreement became a reference point for meeting the conditions set by the EU (Koinova, 2011). This is more than evident in the speeches of the EU diplomats to the Macedonian public. In fact from the thirty-six Erwan Fouéré speeches analyzed in this chapter, OFA is mentioned in eight of them. OFA is also mentioned in speeches delivered by the former EU commissioner for Enlargement, Ollie Rehn and by the Minister Counselor of the Delegation of the European Commission in Macedonia, Joan
Pearce. In a speech delivered at the annual conference on the Ohrid Framework Agreement the former Commissioner for Enlargement, Ollie Rehn said:

The EU is a community based on shared values. The respect for democracy, rule of law and respect for minorities is the glue that holds EU together. It is an essential criteria of the accession process. No candidate country can be allowed to start accession negotiations until this criteria is fulfilled. In the context of your country some of these values have taken form in the Ohrid Framework Agreement which makes it a core part of the political criteria. (Rehn, 2007, February 8).

Ambassador Fouéré also emphasized that the Ohrid Framework Agreement is “a vital framework for reconciliation and for fostering a multi-ethnic society” (2009, January 19). In a speech delivered at the Committee of Foreign affairs of the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium. He said that “continued efforts will be required for its effective implementation, particularly as regards equitable representation in public administration” (Fouéré, 2009, January 19).

OFA is described as a “successful model for protecting the multiethnic character of a country” (Fouéré, 2008, July 7) and a necessary strategy for establishing “a truly multi-ethnic democracy” (Fouéré, 2006, October 27) based on “the spirit of determination that unites the entire country” (Fouéré, 2008, April 9). Furthermore, the effective and timely implementation of the relevant provisions of the Ohrid Framework Agreement are described as necessary for “building trust” between the different ethnic communities in Macedonia (Fouéré, 2008, May 22). Fouéré said that OFA was devised with the aim of “fostering a multiethnic society based on reconciliation and respect for the rights of communities and
minorities” (Fouéré, 2008, July 7) and requires a consistent effort by the Government to ensure that this model works in practice at every level of the government. Consequently, “OFA commitments remain crucial for the country’s stability and for fostering a positive environment for future reforms” (Fouéré, 2006, October 27).

Arguably, the Ohrid Framework Agreement is bound to offer benefit to all parties in Macedonia. In a speech delivered at the Resumption of the 3rd NCEI meeting in Skopje, Macedonia, Ambassador Fouéré clearly described the benefits that Macedonia will gain by meeting the conditions set by the EU. He said:

By meeting these key priorities the country will have demonstrated its readiness to undertake accession negotiations. You will have shown to the Commission and to the Member States that you have the political will and the administrative capacity to adopt important and difficult reforms. (Fouéré, 2008, April 9).

Whereas, in another speech delivered at a Panel Discussion organized by the former president Branko Crvenkovski, Fouéré further explained the needs for these reforms:

These reforms are important because without them the country would not achieve long term political stability; without them the country would not have a well functioning democracy where all sections of society are represented and the independence of the media fully respected; without them the country would not have a strong professional public service which remains essential for continuation of the reform process; without them the country would not be able to achieve sustained economic development nor benefit from the advantages of being an integral part of a wider union and single market. (Fouéré, 2009, April 21).
But candidate states do not forget that power costs for local political elites are higher when EU conditions negatively affect the security and integrity of the state or erode the government’s domestic power base. Such is the case with the Macedonian political elites, whose power base decreases due to the implementation of OFA set as one of the main conditions by the EU. As a result, sometimes they try to downplay and dismiss such EU conditions as mere technicalities, so that they evade their responsibility in implementing them. Responding to the pessimism expressed by the political actors in the country, and their continual efforts to engage in self-interested interactions in order to maximize their own political gains, in a speech delivered at a conference about the Western Balkans in Berlin, Germany, Fouéré said that the recent statements by the political leaders in Macedonia are “wrong and are deceiving the public opinion.” He added that “we all know Macedonian citizens are not stupid, they are intelligent and they must be told the truth.” (Fouéré, 2006, October 27).

Such statements are used as a warning by Fouéré, who wants to show the political leaders in the country that their petty politics focused only on short-term gains rather than long-term ones, will be ultimately judged by their own people, not only by the EU. Besides, Fouéré ensures the Macedonian political elites and the people that they believe that the required reforms are easily achievable as long as there is a political will to do so. With the reforms implemented before gaining the candidate status in 2005, the country has demonstrated that it does possess the capacity and the political will to do so. As a result, he assures the Macedonian public that if the conditions are fulfilled in time, recommendation
on the start of accession negotiations will depend on the achieved results (Fouéré, 2009, April 21).

Nevertheless, Fouéré makes sure to encourage the Macedonian public to hope for the future and not to be discouraged by the requirements of the EU. "It is our duty to hope" said Fouéré (2009, June 6) in a speech he gave at the SEEU Graduation Ceremony. In this way, while informing the Macedonian public that there are still many challenges remaining to be met, he makes sure that they are not discouraged by all the requirements for EU accession. Making sure that the Macedonian citizens are interested in EU accession is one of the most important goals of the EU. The desires of the citizens are of course a drive for the government to meet all the needed criteria.

Fouéré insists that dialogue between the ethnic groups and political leaders is the major requirement for achieving consensus in order to implement the reforms and meet the necessary criteria. Rising above party politics and promoting a spirit of consensus as well as engaging in a permanent dialogue with civil society is described as crucial for achieving results. Thus, the EU pays special attention to the promotion of a constructive and inclusive dialogue between all the parties involved with the aim of restoring public confidence and fostering a climate of trust between the citizens and their elected leaders. In a speech delivered in Berlin, Germany in 2006, Fouéré said that it is his task to remind the Government and all the political parties in Macedonia about what is expected from them. He maintained that “there can be no excuse for rejecting dialogue” and that “dialogue is the only option for continuing the journey ahead without hindrance” (Fouéré, 2006, October
27). Whereas in a speech delivered in Skopje, Macedonia, he further explained the conditions for achieving consensus through political dialogue:

> It will require stretching a hand across the political spectrum and embracing all the ethnic communities, big and small. It will require a spirit of dialogue with all sectors of society. It will require a spirit of compromise in resolving issues with one's neighbors. It will require willingness to accept criticism and to take the time to listen to opposing views. By embracing such an approach, the government emerges enriched by independent thinking and facilitates the building of a spirit of consensus between all the political parties and actors in society (Fouéré, 2009, April 21).

Ambassador Fouéré also lectured the Macedonian public on the many opportunities they had for reconciliation in order to achieve peace and prosperity between all the communities living in the country. On the promotional conference of Projects for Cultural Heritage Rehabilitation titled “LJUBLJANA PROCESS” in Skopje, Macedonia, Fouéré said that the conference provides “an opportunity to find ways to protect the cultural heritage of the country on the path towards further development, prosperity and tolerance” (2008, September 28). He continued to say that this

> …will be investing in the long term future of the region as a haven for tolerance and respect between the multi-ethnic communities present here. You will also be contributing in a real way to the much needed reconciliation process in overcoming the wounds of this region's troubled past. (Fouéré, 2008, September 28)

Fouéré often referred to Nelson Mandela and his own country Ireland as examples for the possibility of reconciliation between groups with a troubled past. On a speech
delivered on the World Conference on Dialogue among Religions and Civilizations in Ohrid, Macedonia Erwan Fouéré categorized Nelson Mandela as a “living example of what can be achieved from coming to terms with the past” (Fouéré, 2007, October 26). He said that “if one wants lasting peace and reconciliation, one has to sit at the same table with one's enemies or political opponents and through dialogue find common ground” (Fouéré, 2007, October 26). Also, in a speech delivered at the International Conference for Globalization in the region, held in Skopje Macedonia, Fouéré took the example of his own country Ireland as “an excellent example of how much can be achieved through political consensus” (Fouéré, 2008, May 30). He said that when Ireland was preparing to join the European Community, “all political parties put their party interests aside and worked together in a spirit of consensus to achieve the ultimate goals the country had set itself. The resulting success is there for all to see” (Fouéré, 2008, May 30).

Finally, almost all the speeches of the EU diplomats analyzed in this part of the chapter emphasize on the multicultural composition of Macedonia and stress on the importance of embracing multiculturalism. In a speech delivered in Skopje, Macedonia, Fouéré said that “the rich cultural and religious heritage which this country possesses should also act as a strong force in giving greater confidence to the people” (Fouéré, 2008, May 30). Whereas in another speech given later the same year he reiterated the same idea saying that the “rich [cultural] heritage” of the country “must” make the people of this country proud (Fouéré, 2008, September 28). He went on to say that this makes up the “true picture of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural character of the country” (Fouéré, 2008, September 28).
Comparison between the EU and Macedonia

The EU has made it clear that they attach great importance to diversity and consider Macedonia’s multiethnic character as a crucial element for preserving and strengthening the cultural links between the EU and Macedonia (Fouéré, 2008, September 28). They consider Macedonia’s multicultural composition as a “blessing” for the country and this conceptualization comes up in several speeches delivered by Ambassador Fouéré. On a speech delivered at the promotional conference of Projects for Cultural Heritage Rehabilitation, in Skopje, Macedonia, Fouéré said that South Eastern Europe “is a region that possesses cultural values of unique diversity, following centuries-old cultural exchanges which have survived despite the many conflicts suffered by the region.” (2008, September 28). Whereas, in a speech delivered on the Panel Discussion organized by former President Branko Crvenkovski, in Skopje, he said that Macedonia is “blessed” with a beautiful nature and a “rich and diverse cultural heritage represented in the many ethnic communities” (Fouéré, 2009, April 21).

It is precisely due to its multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition that Macedonia is often compared to Europe and described as a country that belongs to Europe. This was clear in Fouéré’s address to the SEEU Graduation Ceremony in June 6, 2009, when he said: “There are many assets [Macedonia] will bring to the European Union – a multiethnic society and a strong spirit of determination of all the people united in the aspiration of joining the EU” (Fouéré, 2009, June 6). The European Union is often described as a multicultural society, whose multicultural dimension has increased with the recent enlargement in 2004 and 2008, adding to the number of languages, religions, ethnic and
cultural backgrounds within the existing EU. As a result, the EU is described by Fouéré as a society that “values intercultural dialogue”, “fostering identity and citizenship” with a “tradition of celebrating [cultural] diversity” (Fouéré, 2008, December 15). The ambassador also acknowledges the challenges that came with the enlargement and says that they

…require greater focus on the core values of tolerance and respect, knowledge and understanding which underpin European integration. Hence the crucial importance of the inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue promoted successively by Presidents Delors, Prodi and Barroso, bringing together political and religious leaders from the EU, the Southern Mediterranean, Central and Eastern Europe and further afield. (Fouéré, 2007, October 26).

However, the EU diplomats never forget to mention the EU’s fifty years of “historic success” whose “members have enjoyed unprecedented levels of peace, prosperity and stability” (Pearce, 2007, March 24). According to Ambassador Fouéré “The EU embodies one of history's most successful attempts to enable countries and peoples to overcome division, to shape a future based on partnership and cooperation” (2009, June 6). Whereas, the Minister Counselor of the Delegation of the European Commission in Macedonia, Joan Pearce said that the experience of the EU integration process “teaches us how much can be achieved by nations working together, how seemingly insurmountable problems can be overcome through the pooling of resources and sharing of sovereignty” (2007, March 24).

As a result, the EU and its multicultural dimension are presented as a model for other countries to follow as well, as an example that peace and prosperity is achievable through cooperation and dialogue among different cultural communities. Joan Pearce says that EU’s
“50-year long togetherness demonstrates how a troubled past can be overcome and how people of different nationalities and ethnic backgrounds can live together in peace and prosperity (2007, March 24). As a result, the EU diplomats emphasize that Macedonia is expected to exhibit a same level of commitment and concerted efforts that the member states have devoted to building Europe, in overcoming the divisions among the various ethnic and religious groups in the country. Pearce said that, “not only does the EU expect reforms to continue, it also expects them to intensify and to be translated into reality on the ground, to every citizen's benefit” (Pearce, 2007, March 24).

“Tolerance” and dialogue are often referred to as the core of what Ambassador Fouéré calls a “European spirit” which according to him should be promoted and encouraged by all parties in Macedonia (2007, October 26; 2008, September 28). As mentioned above, respect for democracy, rule of law and respect for minorities are defined as the “glue” that hold the EU together (Rehn, 2007, February 8), and this is expected to be modeled by Macedonia as a country aspiring to gain EU membership. “The European spirit” of tolerance, dialogue and respect for diversity comes up often in the speeches of Ambassador Fouéré, who expects form the government of Macedonia to strive to achieve the same in the country. He says:

This means listening to others, being open to dialogue and making an effort to understand others. Of course being open minded and treating others as equal partners is something we work towards every day but never really attain. But we must never give up. Perseverance is what gives meaning to life. (Fouéré, 2007, October 26).
Fouéré sees the European Union at the “forefront of the promotion of peace” and that the challenge of the EU now is “to extend the frontiers of peace and stability to include all the Balkan countries, thereby guaranteeing their future, based on the respect for fundamental rights and human dignity” (Fouéré, 2007, October 26). He asserts that

…lasting peace is only achieved when the roots of reconciliation between former enemies gets firmly entrenched. That requires maturity from people: it requires forgiving the past without forgetting it; agreeing to set aside ancient battles and to move forward on the basis of shared common goals. (Fouéré, 2007, October 26).

As mentioned in Chapter IV, tolerance represents one of the key concepts accompanying the ‘multiculturalism’ discourse of the EU (Solana, 2007). According to Aggestam & Hill (2008) the tolerance approach to diversity is directed toward identifying what people share and have in common, which represents “the ideal of the ‘universal common good’” (p. 100). This approach views the EU as a carrier of Universalist values, and is a basis behind the idea that the EU should be a civilizing role model or an example to the world, which is very much evident in the analysis of the EU speeches above. Aggestam & Hill (2008) rightly assert that such emphasis on tolerance also implies an Orientalist perception of the Others in need of change. Rather than unifying the “similarities” between the EU and Macedonia, such rhetoric by EU diplomats leads to an essentializing process of identity contestations between “us” and “them” and ends up undermining efforts at mutual tolerance as a means to peace. Thus, Aggestam & Hill (2008) suggest that if Europe wants to be perceived as a global ‘peace builder’ it should strive to promote dialogue in a plural world, not present itself as an example of how everyone should be.
While the EU leaders clearly promote dialogue in Macedonia, they are doing so in a top-down approach by presenting the EU as a model that Macedonia should follow, which becomes an Orientalizing problem. Also, since the EU still lacks a self-identifying European public (Shore, 2006), it becomes problematic to understand what can be considered a truly “European spirit.” As a result, this kind of discourse draws a boundary between “us” and “them” in comparing the EU and Macedonia and it encourages an imperialist, Eurocentric vision of Macedonia from the outside.

As mentioned in Chapter IV, Europe creates itself by marginalizing its Others and easily forgets its dark side in order to claim the universal character of its good one. Sassatelli (2002) rightly argues that the EU should strive to acknowledge its diversity rather than strive to imagine a shared cultural identity. Once culture is seen as a ‘glue’ of European integration, the idea of a European identity risks to be presented as endangering the cultural multiplicity indicated as the key feature of Europe.

Ambassador Fouéré also acknowledges the challenges that the EU is facing due to the global economic crisis. He asserts that in difficult times such as these, “solidarity is of great importance, and it is essential that the EU, its member states, and its candidate and potential candidate countries take a comprehensive approach to the current global economic crisis” (Fouéré, 2009, February 19). For him, the global economic crisis has emphasized the interconnection between the EU members and non members such as Macedonia. As a result, “the EU has shown its solidarity towards the countries involved in the enlargement process by offering them a tailored package” (Fouéré, 2009, February 19). Fouéré said that the EU is “strongly committed to fostering economic prosperity and growth opportunities” in
Macedonia, and wants to “make the best use of the financial tools available” in order to help the country move forward (Fouéré, 2009, February 19).

Ambassador Fouéré also mentioned the problems that the Roma are facing in the EU and Macedonia in several occasions. At a speech delivered at the International Conference titled Roma – (Southeast) Europe’s unknown minority he said:

The European Commission has for some time now highlighted the difficult conditions faced by the Roma communities in EU Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries. Roma communities all over Europe continue to experience particularly severe forms of exclusion and discrimination in areas, such as education, employment, housing, and healthcare. 77% of Europeans think that being Roma is a disadvantage in Europe. (Fouéré, 2008, December 1).

He emphasized on changing the mindset for Roma in Europe, since it is clear that the implementation and enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation is not enough to tackle the multifaceted and deep-rooted patterns of inequality experienced by this community. He characterized the Roma community as an “asset to the European civilization” and stressed on their “rich and valuable cultural heritage” that contributes to the EU multicultural spirit (Fouéré, 2009, October 28). He also informed the Macedonian public about all the legislative actions that the EU has undertaken to address the issue of discrimination, especially as it pertains to the Roma community. As a result the EU proclaimed 2008 “the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue” with the aim of giving special attention to these issues and “inform people of their rights to protection against discrimination under European and national law; celebrate diversity as an asset for the EU; and to promote equal
opportunities for all in economic, social, political and cultural life (Fouéré, 2008, December 1). Such actions are presented as a model for Macedonia to follow in relation to the Roma community, as the 2008 Commission Progress Report for Macedonia gave a rather grim picture of situation of the Roma in the country.

While the majority of the speeches delivered by the EU diplomats confirm DuBois’ (1991) claims that Western cultures like to believe that barbarism exists somewhere else, and is part of the Other world, Fouéré made some progress in the two speeches about Roma to show that issues of discrimination and intolerance are still very much present in the EU as well. Still, Fouéré fails to mention the problems that the EU is facing with the Muslim communities, fears of terrorism, and immigration which were already discussed in Chapter IV are very much prevalent in the EU today. Rather, Fouéré and the other two EU diplomats strategically chose to focus only on the positive picture of European multiculturalism, presenting the EU as a utopian model that Macedonia should follow. Such rhetoric confirms DuBois’ (1991) claims that Western nations like to maintain their superiority through Eurocentric ideological positioning, by displacing torture on a non-Western setting which allows them to think that they are protected from barbarism lurking somewhere else. At the same time Western nations express a strong desire in wanting to sustain their roles as leaders and rescuers in maintaining world ‘order’ under the slogan of humanitarian intervention. Such approaches to “peace building” are very much evident in the analysis of the speeches above.

Also, it is well known that the Balkans has been the EU’s test ground for conflict resolution and promotion of democratic values (Juncos, 2005). The EU has for the first time
tried to introduce a comprehensive approach towards conflict management in the countries of Western Balkans, especially focused in Macedonia. This has been a slow process of learning from failure, while implementing political tools for conflict mediation, humanitarian aid and long term economic assistance, police and peace-keeping missions (Juncos, 2005; Guzina, 2009). The experimental nature of the EU’s Delegation in Macedonia is confirmed in the speech that Ambassador Fouéré gave at a conference held in Berlin, Germany, where he said:

My presence in Skopje marks the first time that the posts of Head of Delegation and EU Special Representative are assumed by one person. I guess you might say I am an experiment! (Fouéré, 2006, October 27).

Analysis of the speeches by the Macedonian Government

The first part of this chapter showed that the EU rhetoric toward Macedonia was organized around three main categories identified as praise for progress being made, reminder about the remaining challenges, and comparison between the EU and Macedonia. The analysis also showed that such EU rhetoric was rather consistent in all the speeches presented to the Macedonian public by three different EU diplomats whose speeches were analyzed. However, the analysis of the speeches delivered by the Macedonian government shows that their rhetoric is rather unorganized, inconsistent, and focuses on diverse issues concerning multiculturalism and EU integration. As a result, we are not able to conclude that there is one ideology behind the ideograph of multiculturalism in the rhetoric of the
Macedonian government, but that there are several ideologies behind it depending on whose interests are on the line.

While some governmental officials are extremely positive toward the idea of EU integration, and try to please the EU with their rhetoric, others are not so eager to set the date for accession and would prefer to focus on EU’s failure to address the name dispute with Greece, rather than focus on achieving real progress with the implementation of OFA. Also, while some members of the government would like to focus on the benefits of OFA for the country’s EU perspectives, others prefer to mention OFA shortly and claim that multiculturalism is thriving in Macedonia, even making the claim that the EU should use Macedonia as a “model” for multiculturalism. Finally, while some political official see OFA as the solution to all the problems surrounding multiculturalism in the country, others are not so sure and claim that while OFA was instrumental in stopping the armed conflict in 2001, it didn’t manage to build a truly functional multicultural society in Macedonia and as a result a new Agreement is needed to achieve that.

Such inconsistent rhetoric surrounding OFA and multiculturalism in Macedonia has become a daily routine in the discourses of the political elites and the general public in the country. In the recent years, people have even become cautious of mentioning OFA in their discourse due to fears that they will be linked to a political party whose agenda is focused on the implementation of OFA. As a result, OFA and multiculturalism have become two highly politicized terms used strategically in the political discourse for the sake of gaining political points either with the international actors or with the electorate.
This is mostly a result of the fact that OFA has always been perceived “as a zero-sum game, where the gain for one community inevitably signifies the loss for another” (Bieber, 2008, p. 209). The Macedonian majority usually considers the agreement as a “loss” which was “won” by Albanians, and as a result OFA is not very popular for the Macedonian electorate. So, politicians strategically avoid it when they address their own voters. It is very common for these Macedonian politicians to show pride on the implementation of OFA when speaking to the international diplomats, while totally dismissing it or even judging it as a technicality when speaking to their own voters. Also, while OFA is perceived by the Macedonian community as “a ceiling for the accommodation of Albanians in the state” the Albanian community tends to look at it “as the floor for building future relations” (Bieber, 2008, p. 209). So, besides the inconsistent conceptualizations surrounding OFA and multiculturalism, there are also very different expectations by political actors in regards to these two terms that are sometimes considered as synonymous by the Macedonian political actors.

There is also another level of treating OFA as a zero-sum game, and that is played out in the rhetoric between the Albanian political party currently in government and the one in opposition. The Albanian party in government usually considers the agreement as a “win” for them since they are the ones that initiated it during the conflict in 2001, while the Albanian political party in opposition considers OFA as a “loss” due to the fact that every time the EU diplomats mention the success in the implementation of OFA, the party in government gains favorable points by the electorate and as a result continues to win elections. Thus, it is the opinion of the Albanian political party in opposition that OFA is no
more sustainable and that another agreement is needed to create a functional multicultural society where the Albanian community will have the rights that it deserves. This Albanian opposition party even rejected their invitation to the Conference organized on the 10th anniversary of OFA by SEE University in June 2011. They said that they no longer recognize OFA as a viable solution to the problems faced by the Albanian minority in Macedonia.

The inconsistency of the rhetoric of the political elites in Macedonia is also due to the structure and composition of the Macedonian government, which is often described as a “forced marriage” between a Macedonian political party representing the majority and an Albanian political party representing the minority in the Government. In fact, from the formation of the first government after Macedonia was granted independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 until today, there is an "unwritten gentlemen agreement that the coalition forming the Government must be a multi-ethnic"(Taleski, 2008, p. 130). Since then, each Government coalition was consisted of parties representing ethnic minorities. After the elections, each party gaining the majority of the seats enters the government and gains several ministries to lead. Except the Albanian political party which gains more seats in the parliament and as a result more ministries, other minority groups become part of the government as well, gaining deputy-minister positions or other high ranking official positions.

It is precisely due to such composition of the government that the discourse surrounding OFA and its implementation is extremely inconsistent and sometimes even contradictory. For example, the ruling political party is VMRO- Democratic Party for
Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) led by Nikola Gruevski, who is the Prime Minister of Macedonia since 2006. While this political party doesn’t reject OFA, it has become very clear over the years that OFA and its implementation is not in their political agenda, so they are the ones who usually represent Macedonia as a “model” for multiculturalism in the EU as well as they use EU’s inability to mediate the conflict with Greece surrounding the name dispute as the reason for their lack of progress surrounding the implementation of OFA. VMRO-DPMNE is considered as a highly right-wing political party who has contributed to the raise of the nationalistic discourse in the country, and their rhetoric has initiated many incidents of conflict between Albanians and Macedonians, hate speech and discord in recent years. Most of these incidents are mentioned in Chapter I as the main motivation behind this study.

The main Macedonian oppositional political, Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) is considered left wing, and they maintain that EU integration is the primary goal in their agenda, stressing on the fulfillment of the conditions set by the EU in order to set a date for EU negotiations. While OFA is not very popular with them as well, due to it being considered as a “loss” by the general Macedonian electorate, this political party is more willing to work on the full implementation of OFA for the sake of pleasing the EU and fulfilling their conditions to gain EU accession. SDSM even advocates flexibility in the dispute with Greece over the country’s name in order to enable Macedonia to join the EU and NATO. They are often accused by the ruling political party VMRO-DPMNE as not being patriotic enough or as a party that will enable the loss of Macedonian identity if they gain power.
Paradoxically, the ruling Albanian political party sharing the current government with VMRO-DPMNE is the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), formed in June 2002 by former Albanian guerrilla leaders who had taken part in the 2001 conflict. The main leader for the Albanian guerilla in the conflict in 2001, Ali Ahmeti, is the leader of DUI and is ruling a considerable section of the Government, with two Deputy Vice-Prime Minister positions such as the one for EU integration and the one for the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and five minister positions such as the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning, and Ministry of Local Self-Government. This political party has first shared the government with SDSM from 2002 to 2006 and after great negotiations and political turmoil they managed to enter the current government with VMRO-DPMNE since 2008 until now. DUI is considered left wing, whose main agenda is the implementation of OFA and integration within the EU. This party usually defines OFA and its implementation as the key to Macedonia’s future, and as the only way for achieving economic and political stability in the country. OFA and multiculturalism is so prevalent in their discourse, that these terms have even become synonymous to DUI as a political party. As a result, the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) who’s the main oppositional Albanian political party has decide to reject the OFA, and has raised the need for another agreement (Lebamoff & Iliievski, 2008) as well as has mentioned federalization as the main solution to solve the problem of the Albanian community in Macedonia.

The description of the government given above provides and additional context to the highly complex situation surrounding the OFA and multiculturalism discourse in.
Macedonia. As mentioned previously, this chapter will analyze eighteen speeches from Macedonian Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski, leader of VMRO-DPMNE, heading the Macedonian government from 2006 until now; the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Antonio Milosovski, from VMRO-DPMNE; the former president of Macedonia, Branko Crvenkovski and a former and current leader of the Macedonian oppositional political party SDSM; the former Vice Prime Minister for the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement representing DUI as the Albanian political party in government, Abdylaqim Ademi; as well as the Vice Prime Minister for EU Integration, Gabriela Konevska-Trajkovska, from VMRO-DPMNE and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zoran Petrov from VMRO-DPMNE. While all the speeches delivered by the EU diplomats were archived in the website of the EU Delegation in Macedonia, it was extremely hard to find the speeches of the Macedonian government representatives online. Most of the speeches were found in the websites of various international organizations such as the EU commission, EU parliament, OSCE, UN, UNESCO and others, while very few were found in the website of the Secretariat for the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the Ministry for International Affairs.

For the sake of clarity, I will organize the analysis of the speeches of the Macedonian government in three main sections: Macedonia as a “little Europe”, EU integration imperative for Macedonia’s future and OFA key to Macedonia’s existence. The first part of the analysis titled Macedonia as a “little Europe,” consists of speeches delivered mainly by the representatives of the ruling Macedonian political party and includes speeches by the Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, the Minister of International Affairs, Antonio Milososki,
the former Vice Prime Minister for EU integration, Gabriela Konevska-Trajkovska, and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zoran Petrov. The second part of the analysis titled EU integration imperative for Macedonia’s future consist of speeches by the former President of Macedonia, Branko Crvenkovski, who is currently the president of the major Macedonian oppositional party, SDSM. And the last part of the analysis titled OFA key to Macedonia’s existence consist of speeches delivered by the former Vice Prime Minister for the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, Abdylaqim Ademi, member of the ruling Albanian party currently in government.

Macedonia as a “little Europe”

The rhetoric of the Macedonian ruling party in government mostly relies on the comparison between the EU and Macedonia, with which they intend to prove that Macedonia is nothing different from the EU, and therefore it deserves to become a member. With such rhetoric they are downplaying the conditions set by the EU surrounding the implementation OFA and multiculturalism and imply that it is not fair for the EU as a larger force to condition Macedonia on something that it has already “achieved.” This rhetoric sees multiculturalism as a natural trait of Macedonia, due to the century-long presence of diversity in this region. As a result, this government feels that the country has nothing more to prove in order to gain EU accession. Besides, this government likes to believe that the different ethnic and religious groups in Macedonia already live in full harmony with each other, despite the complaints of the EU diplomats and the negative Progress Reports received by the EU Commission each year on this matter. This shows that the political party
representing the Macedonian majority in government believes that the implementation of
OFA and multiculturalism is a finished business, so there’s nothing left to be done.

In a speech presented at the London School of Economics in London, Milososki said
that the “Macedonian society is qualified as small Europe, with diverse cultures, diverse
religions, diverse languages and successful togetherness” (Milososki, 2007, October 18).
Whereas in a speech delivered at the French Institute of International Relations (IFR) in
Skopje, Foreign Minister Milososki stated:

Macedonia in all its diversity is - Europe in a nutshell. In Macedonia, we differ by
many things - ethnicity, language, religion, alphabet and other cultural traits. Yet,
fully respecting our differences, we endeavor and even more importantly, we have
succeeded in finding modalities to foster and develop our various traditions and
cultural values. Macedonia has built a functional model of democracy in its multi-
ethnic and multicultural society, which is our essential, visible and recognizable
contribution in building the common European home. (Milososki, 2008, February 4).

In the same speech, Milosoki goes on to say that despite the occasional turbulence,
people in Macedonia have always found ways to continue to live together, “in mutual
tolerance and respect” (Milososki, 2008, February 4). He describes multiculturalism in the
country as “functioning through agreement and always relying on reaching compromises
about issues of critical importance (Milososki, 2008, February 4). Such claims represent
rhetoric of denial about the inter-ethnic conflict still very much prevalent in the country as
described in Chapter III. Moreover, this is yet another proof of the pervasiveness of rhetoric
of denial in this region, and besides denying past crimes during the war, the government of Macedonia is engaging in yet another denial of the present conflict in the country.

Milososki does not hesitate to criticize the EU and its member states for Orientalizing the Balkans and representing it as a region that doesn’t belong in the EU. He claims that there have been constant misunderstandings between the EU and the Balkans, which is often experienced by the older member states as “as the enfant terrible, as a source of crisis, as a chronic patient that needs to be under constant observation, with a view to avoiding repetition of undesired consequences on the remaining part of the Continent” (Milososki, 2008, February 4). On the other hand, he says that the people in Balkans “often experiences Europe as the magic wand solution to all problems or as club of the fortunate and of the privileged where there is much talk about values, but where political pragmatism and economic interest at times lead to applying double standards” (Milososki, 2008, February 4). This kind of simplistic imagination of each other, has contributed to the creation of mistrust in one another says Milososki, adding that “when one says Balkans the immediate association in Europe is Balkanization” and “when one says Europe, the association in the Balkans is integration, but immediately followed by arrogance” (Milososki, 2008, February 4).

Milososki believes that the Balkan nations are “the genuine Europeans” and “the Balkans is Europe” (2008, February 4). He says that Balkans and Macedonia is an epitome of “intercultural dialogue” (Milososki, 2008, February 4). Moreover, the former Vice Prime Minister for EU Integration, Gabriela Koneska- Trajkovska said that Macedonia is an
example of peace and stability in the region. She added that the country “has always tried to be an exception and succeeded in it” (Konevska-Trajkovska, 2007, January 29).

It was the only country of the former Yugoslavia that succeeded in gaining independence peacefully with patience and wisdom rather than war. Despite all pressures, blockades and inner crises, Macedonia has always been a factor of stability in the Balkans. (Konevska-Trajkovska, 2007, January 29).

Thus, Foreign Minister Milososki concludes that it “is high time we put an end to such views” (2008, February 4) as they are not true and politically damaging to both sides. He adds that “it would be much more important that Europe recognize the vast potential that the Balkans offers as a value for the European idea, for the European cohesion, and last but not the least for the European economy” (Milososki, 2008, February 4).

The conflicts in the past are described as an unfortunate history, adding that the country has always been able to face adversity. In a speech delivered at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich, Germany Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski said that “it is a tragic part of our past that the first and last wars of the 20th century both started in the Balkans” (2009, September 2), but he added that “the Macedonian people have never escaped from their problems” but have rather “learned to face them” (Gruevski, 2009, September 2). This quote shows that even though the government changed the preamble of the constitution as part of the Ohrid Framework Agreement to recognize that Macedonia is a country all the citizens living in it, the Prime Minister doesn’t apply this rule when he speaks in public. Instead, he always tends to address the Macedonian people (i.e. his own ethnic
This analysis showed that the ruling Macedonian political party rarely mentions OFA when speaking to the public. In fact, from the seventeen speeches analyzed in this section, OFA was mentioned only twice. When the Foreign Minister Milososki mentions OFA he characterizes it as a document that includes “the centuries-built tolerance and mutual respect” (2007, October 18) in Macedonia, implying that multiculturalism has always existed in Macedonia, and it’s nothing new. Milososki says that “our functional multiethnic democracy is our greatest added value of which we can be proud in Europe” and that OFA has only “made us more stable, more democratic, and stronger” (2007, October 18). He adds that:

…with the Framework Agreement [Macedonia] has found a modern form of valorizing the centuries old tolerance between the Macedonian nation and the other minority communities living on the territory of Macedonia. … Yet a warning note: the issue of identities and of harmonious coexistence of differences of cultural, religious or linguistic type has not been resolved once and of all – not in Europe, not in the Balkans, not anywhere else. … The EU integration of the Balkans should be a challenge for the EU member-states equally as it is for us in the Balkans. (Milososki, 2008, February 4).

This kind of rhetoric by the Macedonian political party in government makes it clear that they are well aware that the EU itself is not a perfect multicultural society, and that just like the other EU member states that face problems with multiculturalism, and were able to
get membership, Macedonia too deserves to be a member. Such rhetoric normalizes intercultural conflict, denies the present reality in the ground and comes to a bandwagon conclusion that if the EU has problems with multiculturalism and can still pride itself at being a model society, so can we completely ignore our divided society, hatred and intolerance and ask to become members too. Even though the existing inter-ethnic conflict in Macedonia is constantly discussed by international and local scholars and institutions, which was clearly shown in Chapter III, this government decides to ignore them and presents the country as a “model multicultural” society that can be compared to the EU.

Nevertheless, the EU Integration is described as vital for Macedonia, as it will generate foreign investment which makes integration valuable despite the costs that Macedonia might have to pay. The Prime Minister, Gruevski said that “the security and stability of the Western Balkans clearly and undeniably lie in NATO and EU” (2009, September 2) and the foreign Minister Milososki said that the government “remains strongly committed to the country’s membership in the Alliance, being fully aware that its full Euro-Atlantic integration has no alternative” (Milososki, 2008, December 1). Milososki is fully aware that EU integration will “have positive influence on the entire region and will increase the trust of foreign investors” and “that the attraction of foreign investment is one of the priority goals of the present Macedonian government” (2007, October 18). As a result, he says Macedonia is doing its “homework assignments” and being patient (Milososki, 2007, October 18).

The Foreign Minister, Antonio Milososki is certain that Macedonian has made a considerable progress in terms of implementing the reforms required by the EU. In a speech
delivered before the Foreign Policy Committee at the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia in Skopje he said:

We succeeded in almost entirely achieving the top priorities we have set for ourselves in 2009: (1) a positive report by the European Commission on the implemented reforms, obtaining a recommendation for starting the accession negotiations and setting a date for their actual start, (2) liberalization of the visa regime; and (3) accreditation of our institutions for the decentralized IPA fund assistance management. (Milososki, 2009, December 29).

Success in the implementation of the reforms required by the EU, was further confirmed by the former Vice Prime Minister for EU integration Gabriela Konevska-Trajkovska who said that Macedonia is “harmonizing its laws with the European legislation and reforming its institutions to foster economic growth” (2007, January 29) and by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zoran Petrov, who said that the government continues to work on the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, “in particular the equitable representation and decentralization” and that a “functional multi-ethnic society” is their primary goal (Petrov, 2006, December 4).

With this rhetoric the Macedonian government wants to prove that the EU is incomplete without the Balkans. Gabriela Konevska-Trajkovska said that “Europe is incomplete without all its integral elements, the Balkan countries” (2007, January 29) and Antonio Milososki said that “we can speak of united Europe only when the entire Balkans becomes part of the European Union” (2008, February 4). As a result, Prime Minister Nikola
Gruevski tried to persuade the EU leaders at the conference in Munich, Germany that integrating the Balkans in the EU will be valuable despite its risks or costs. He said:

There is a strong current against expansion of both NATO and the E.U. I ask that policymakers keep an open mind to greater membership and integration. Will it come with a cost? Is it difficult? Unquestionably, yes to both questions. However, what price can you place on peace, stability and an expansion of democratic values? On completing Europe? (Gruevski, 2009, September 2).

This kind of rhetoric by the current Macedonian government sees the EU as incomplete without Macedonia, and the Balkans. The EU’s inability to integrate Balkan countries is used as a scapegoat for the unaccomplished reforms by the government required to get EU membership. This approach directs equal pressures to the EU to accept Macedonia as a member, as the EU directs to the government to implement the needed reforms.

Milososki said that “the successful completion of the Balkan odyssey with the integration of the regional countries into the EU will be at the same time a victory for Europe” and Gabriela Konevska-Trajkovska said that “the people of this region are convinced that the European Union has the power and potential to be a visionary, to demonstrate leadership and not to neglect the enlargement process. (2007, January 29).

Even though the government recognizes the EU’s role in the peace and security of the country, this government doesn’t forget to mention the disappointment of the country for not getting NATO membership due to Greece’s veto. Prime Minister Gruevski said that
It is unfortunate that, despite meeting all NATO requirements and receiving recognition from NATO for our military, political, and social reforms, the Macedonian NATO invitation was placed on indefinite ‘hold’ (2009, September 2).

Gruevski says that due to the focus of the international actors in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East, the international community should not forget that “there is still unfinished business” (2009, September 2) in the Balkans. As a result he makes it clear that Macedonia still needs EU’s & NATO’s help, and if there is still no prospect of EU integration there will be major disappointment by the people of the country which might in turn lead “to a decline in the popularity of the [EU integration] process, stagnation in conducting reforms…hitting the bottom” (Konevska-Trajkovska, 2007, January 29).

According to Milososki, the government claims to remain “committed to the talks on the overcoming of the differences with Greece regarding our constitutional name” (2009, December 29), and that they will “accept any initiative which concerns the promotion and the intensification of the bilateral cooperation” (Milososki, 2009, December 29). However, the Prime Minister Gruevski asserts that Greece is unfair with its requests and conditions. Gruevski said:

The reason for leaving more than two million people outside NATO’s sphere of freedom, security and democracy? Our constitutional name. The assertion by Greece that the Republic of Macedonia threatens their national sovereignty is simply not true. We have changed our constitution and our national flag to meet their concerns and we remain committed to working with them on a compromise. (Gruevski, 2009, September 2).
According to Nikola Gruevski, Greece has put an unreasonable condition on Macedonia which is cannot be acceptable. Addressing the EU diplomats at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich, Germany, Gruevski said asked “... is Europe’s diversity possible without freedom? How to explain to the Macedonian people that their entry in the European home, a home of diversity of identities, will cost them their freedom to express who they are? Will cost them their identity? (Gruevski, 2009, September 2). As a result, “losing the national identity” for the sake of gaining EU membership is unacceptable for this government and they are not ready to compromise. Instead, their major rhetorical tools seem to be rhetoric of denial and scapegoating when they address the EU diplomats. Rhetoric of denial is used whenever they need to address the incomplete implementation of OFA and as a result, failure to achieve an inclusive multicultural society, whereas scapegoating is used in relation to Greece’s veto against Macedonia’s membership in NATO and the EU’s inability to act against Greece and assist Macedonia in this process.

EU integration imperative for Macedonia’s future

In contrast to the ruling Macedonian political party, the rhetoric of the oppositional Macedonian political party revolves mostly around the vitality of gaining EU membership, and focuses on the benefits that the country will be getting once it becomes a member of the EU. This party often criticized the current government for stalling back on the reforms, and for not being able to find a compromise with Greece in order to set the date for EU membership negotiations. The former Macedonian president, Branko Crvenkovski, who is now the leader of the oppositional party SDSM said:
European Union integration is of enormous significance for the Republic of Macedonia. Determination of EU membership as the highest state priority since the country’s independence, along with the absolute citizens’ support, represents a huge responsibility and obligation, but at the same time a benefit for use of the entire potential in order to succeed. Moreover, taking into account the ethnic, political and economic-social consensus, our integration in the EU enables long-term internal integration of the country itself. (Crvenkovski, 2007, November 22).

This political party sees EU integration as the solution to all the problems that Macedonia is facing. They maintain that besides the economic benefits, the EU membership will bring Macedonia peace, security and stability and a once and for all solution to the conflict between the Albanians and Macedonians. Crvenkoski maintains that the conditions set by the EU are ultimately good for the “democratic development of the country” and are not “imposed from above” (Crvenkovski, 2008, September 2). Referring to the implementation of OFA, Crvenkovski said that “all ethnic communities in the country had improved their legal and political status and used the opportunity to deeply integrate into the society and the system” (Crvenkovski, 2008, September 2).

Crvenkovski represents Macedonia as a success story especially when addressing issues surrounding OFA and the conflict in 2001. He says that the people of Macedonia stand united in the common goal to join the EU, and the Macedonia’s success story has contributed to breaking the Western stereotypes on the Balkans. In a speech delivered at the Regional Economic Forum of South East Europe in Dubrovnik, Croatia, Crvenkovski said:
…our committed efforts have been successful in transferring from the past decade of disintegration and divisions into a decade of regional networking and integration process…Breaking up outdated, but rooted Balkan stereotypes, affirmation of mutual values opposite to isolated interests represented a huge effort and sacrifice. Still, the result is more than positive. (Crvenkovski, 2007, November 22).

Crvenkovski also said that “integration is no longer perceived as the necessary evil or an imposed instrument for resolution of past problems” (Crvenkovski, 2007, November 22). EU integration for Crvenkovski “represents an obligation to move forward with the policy of joint and permanent security and stability through the concept of economic development and full acceptance of democratic standards (2007, November 22).

Similar to his oppositional leader Nikola Gruevski, Crvenkovski makes the claim that Macedonia and the Balkans belong in the EU. In a speech delivered in Munich, Germany, Crvenkovski asserted that “from the historical standpoint Balkan certainly belongs to the natural patterns of the broader European and Western legacies” (Crvenkovski, 2008, September 2). He maintains that while “some challenges are still present the most important thing for Macedonia “is to fully focus and meet, without delay, the obligations, resulting in added quality and accelerated tempo on the EU path” (Crvenkovski, 2007, November 22).

Still, Crvenkovski is concerned about the level of security in the region and expresses concern about the unresolved issues at the neighboring country of Kosovo. Thus he believes in order to “preserve long term stability it should be of utmost importance to address key dimensions of the Kosovo issue”, which is the direct neighbor of Macedonia.
With this, Crvenkovski requests more support from the EU and more active action in the region. He said that “having in mind history and burden of the past the contribution by the transatlantic community of nations is going to be vital for the future of the region. What is needed is moderation and calmness by the local players, but, dedication and strategic leadership of the Atlantic community, as well” (Crvenkovski, 2008, September 2).

While Nikola Gruevski’s rhetoric toward the EU was more confrontational, relying on rhetoric of denial and scapegoating to achieve his goals, Crvenkovski’s rhetoric to the EU is more pleasing, focusing on all the benefits that Macedonia will be gaining from the EU membership. As far as multiculturalism and the implementation of OFA is concerned, similar to his oppositional leader Nikola Gruevski, Branko Crvenkovski also considers the implementation of OFA as a done deal, and presents Macedonia as a success story implying to have solved all the conflicting issues with the Albanian minority. Normally, as already discussed in Chapter III, and above in this chapter, this rhetoric is a result of OFA’s unpopularity at the Macedonian electorate.

OFA key to Macedonia’s existence

The analysis of the speeches shows that Albanian political party sharing the government with VMRO-DPMNE believes that OFA and its implementation is the key to Macedonia’s existence. As mentioned above, DUI is a party that was formed by the leaders of the Albanian guerilla that fought against the Macedonian forces in the 2001 conflict, and they are one of the main initiators and signatories of OFA. It is natural that their rhetoric is focused so much on OFA as their main political interests rely on its success. Besides, the
speeches analyzed in this section as delivered by the Vice Prime Minister for the Implementation of OFA, so it was his duty to focus on this topic.

The former Vice Prime Minister, Abdylaqim Ademi defines OFA as the key that opens the EU and NATO’s doors for Macedonia. This for Ademi automatically means that the implementation of OFA presents and imperative for Macedonia. He says that OFA “marked the end of the 2001 conflict, and the beginning of the great hope of the Macedonian citizens that their country would further move toward the right way of Euro-Atlantic integration processes”(Ademi, 2008, September 1).

OFA is also seen by DUI as the key to building a multicultural society that will incorporate “European values.” Vice Prime Minister Ademi says that OFA …proves that Macedonia has successfully overcome all obstacles during its journey to building a multiethnic, multicultural, multi-religious, society which meets the prerequisite of the realization of collective rights, without which individual rights cannot even be imagined”(Ademi, 2008, September 1).

According to the Vice Prime Minister Ademi, OFA provides the basis of equal rights and opportunities for all members of ethnic communities, and as such it determines the fate of all citizens of this country. Ademi maintains that besides other conditions, “the Macedonian government has the obligation to close the battle for equal citizenship in Macedonia, regardless of the ethnic and religious background, and creating a country all citizens will feel equal” (Ademi, 2008, September 1).

Addressing the concerns of the Macedonian majority over OFA, Vice Prime Minister Ademi says that no one has lost anything upon singing OFA, but all the people of
Macedonia have won with this agreement. In a speech delivered in relation to employing new state employees in Skopje Macedonia, Ademi said that it will be a mistake to look at OFA through the prism of “who won and who lost,” but that it should be looked at “from the angle of providing a resolution to a conflict, which came as a result of the institutionalization of an ethnic state, that in reality was multiethnic” (Ademi, 2009, December 30). Thus, when it comes to OFA, we must consider “what the Macedonian citizens won from it” (Ademi, 2009, December 30). Ademi claims that with OFA Macedonia and its citizens won peace and avoided the risk of a future ethnic conflict...received a guarantee for a new constitutional order, which will give all the citizens equal rights and duties toward their country…. [and] paved the way toward Euro-Atlantic (Ademi, 2009, December 30).

As a result, Ademi cautions the Macedonian political elites not to use OFA for their own short-term political gains. The full implementation of OFA is long overdue for Ademi, and rather than talking about our achievements in our daily life, “we are still talking about OFA due to the fact that the agreement has not yet been fully implemented” (Ademi, 2009, December 30). Thus, for Ademi OFA defines the future of the country, as …its failure would mean termination Macedonia’s existence, and would lead its citizens at an unpleasant crossroad, without knowing how and where to go next” (Ademi, 2008, September 1).

According to Ademi, Macedonia outside the EU and NATO, will mean ethnic dispute all over again. But, Ademi is convinced that “even though there have been clear tendencies by the Macedonian political elites to minimize the importance of the Ohrid
Framework Agreement,” it is still not too late to capture “the lost opportunity of fully implementing OFA” and continuing forward toward EU integration Ademi, A. (2008, September 1).

Conclusion

This chapter presented the ideographical analysis of the concept “multiculturalism” and other cluster concepts such as “interethnic tolerance,” “interethnic dialogue,” “interethnic cooperation,” and “interethnic stability.” The first part of the chapter titled Analysis of EU Speeches answers question sub-sets #3 and concludes that the ideological conceptualization of the ideograph of “multiculturalism” by the EU is based in the liberalist multiculturalism model discussed in Chapter II. Such ideology sees cultural groups in Macedonia as static, without considering their century-long inter-relation among each other and the past histories that deeply influence the way both parties understand the concept. The EU uses a top down approach, enforcing the concept of multiculturalism through their strategy of “conditionality” set upon all potential member states in order to gain accession. Multiculturalism in Macedonia is considered as an achievable objective, especially when the EU diplomats take into account the “positive” experiences of the EU countries with this concept. The EU presents itself as a model of multiculturalism that Macedonia should follow.

The second part of the Chapter titled Analysis of the Speeches given by the Macedonian Government answers question sub-sets #4 concludes that the Albanian and Macedonian perspectives and responses toward the ideograph of multiculturalism is very
much inconsistent due to the highly politicized nature of this concept. As a result, we are not able to conclude that there is one ideology behind the ideograph of multiculturalism in the rhetoric of the Macedonian government, but that there are several ideologies behind it depending on the political interests being served. While the major political party in the government uses rhetoric of denial about the still existing interethnic conflict in the country and scapegoats the name dispute with Greece as a reason behind its failure to implement OFA, the oppositional Macedonian party emphasizes on meeting the conditions set by the EU in order to get membership. Most importantly, while both Macedonian political parties avoid mentioning OFA in relation to the EU integration processes, the ruling Albanian party insists on the full implementation of OFA, while putting Macedonia’s very existence on the line.

To conclude, this analysis showed that there is a significant misunderstanding between the EU and the Macedonian government, and between the Macedonian and Albanian political parties surrounding the concept of multiculturalism. The concept is highly politicized in all of the possible levels of the discourse surrounding EU integration, and political parties mainly use it for their own political benefits. Besides, such conceptual misunderstandings of the ideograph, there are also language problems, as the three parties engaged in the dialogue speak three different languages. While most of the speeches analyzed in this chapter were written in English Language, the language still plays a role in the way the three parties understand the concept and the way they present it to their own constituents. What’s more, the experience on the ground shows that the content of the speeches delivered by the same people drastically changes when the political actors address
their own constituents in their own native language. As a result, it can be concluded that besides the differing ideologies and approaches to multiculturalism in the country, local political actors are totally dismissing multiculturalism when they address their own voters.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

"Between the fear that something would happen
and the hope that still it wouldn't,
there is much more space than one thinks.

On that narrow, hard, bare and dark space a lot of us spend their lives."

Ivo Andric (Signs by the Roadside, 1979)

The importance of ideographs in political rhetoric

This study advanced a rhetorical analysis of ideographic terms embedded in
the speeches delivered by the EU and Macedonian government. The main purpose
was to raise awareness about the importance of the diverse cultural
conceptualizations of critical terms such as multiculturalism, and the meanings that
arise as a result of the conflicting cultural values, experiences, and perceptions of the
different parties involved in the discourse. By focusing on the function of ideographs
and the influence of their normative use on the discourse of EU accession, the study
raised awareness of the importance of ideographs in political rhetoric and their
impact on important decisions that affect whole communities. The ideographical
analyses of multiculturalism in the discourse between the EU and Macedonia helps
reveal the interpreting systems that underlie Macedonian and EU public motives, and
exposes the way these ideographs act as forms of political rhetoric to both reveal and
shape the reality of the people living in Macedonia. This process is crucial in understanding cultural and historical influences in the intercultural dialogue between the diverse parties living in the country as well as the dialogue between the country and the EU.

The study identified the concept of multiculturalism as a rhetorical condition that the EU has enforced upon Macedonia. It systematically examined the range of ways in which this ideograph has been employed in the political dialogue between the EU and Macedonia, and Macedonian and Albanian political elites. As mentioned in Chapter V, McGee asserts that “political language which manifests ideology seems characterized by slogans, a vocabulary of ‘ideographs’” (1980, p.5). The ideograph has several characteristics, including: it is an ordinary language term, it represents a collective commitment to a normative goal; it warrants the use of power, and it guides behavior acceptable to the community. Multiculturalism consists of all these characteristics and therefore should be treated as an ideograph which guides the behaviors of all the ethnic groups living in Macedonia.

To explain the rhetorical force of a given ideograph, McGee (1980) suggests that both synchronic and diachronic dimensions of the term be explored. This allows for the visualization the chronological evolution of rhetorical terms as well as explores its contemporary relationship with clusters of related rhetorical terms. This study has analyzed the chronological evolution of multiculturalism in the scholarly discourses, by the Macedonian Government and by the EU, and has explored the relationships of the main ideograph with its cluster terms. The study showed that
multiculturalism was rhetorically constructed for the Macedonian public by the EU, and within by Macedonian and Albanian ethnic groups, particularly under conditions of inter-ethnic conflict and EU and US pressures. The study provided an understanding of how ideographs such as multiculturalism impact individual choices and ideological assumptions that shape patterns of cultural expression, and discussed the processes of creating and sustaining ideology. It explored the interests represented in the ideology and uncovered oppressive power structures between the parties engaged in the dialogue. Black (2003) and Delgado (1999) assert that the use of rhetoric through ideographs has the potential to influence social change. Accordingly, this study also offers an opportunity for emancipation of the political discourse surrounding multiculturalism.

Summary of the chapters

The principal research question posed for this study was: “How does the EU rhetorically construct ‘multiculturalism’ as a way to mediate the political and cultural tensions between Albanians and Macedonians to facilitate the accession process?” As mentioned in Chapter I there were five question subsets that were answered in the chapters above.

Chapter I primarily focused on the motivations behind this study and explained the state of multiculturalism in the EU and Macedonia today. The chapter highlights the paradox of the enforcement of multiculturalism in Macedonia as one of the main preconditions for joining the EU, while it is widely
considered as a failure by the EU leaders in the main EU member states (Agence France-Press, 2011, February 10; Burns, 2011, February 5; Hall, 2010, October 18; Siebold, 2010, October 17; Smee, 2010, October 18; Weaver, 2010, October 17; Wright & Taylor, 2011, February 5). This situation raised questions about the expectations of the EU diplomats for Macedonia to apply this highly ambiguous concept, which is rejected in their own countries. Ironically, despite the conflicting discourses surrounding multiculturalism both in the EU and Macedonia, the EU still continues to enforce this concept in Macedonia, and both parties remain largely “unaware” and indifferent of the differing conceptions of the term.

The lack of any coherent definition and understanding of the concept of multiculturalism in the EU has led to its rejection by the various ethnic groups living in Macedonia, who continue to lead segregated lives defined by various stereotypes and prejudices against each other. The language and the religious differences between the groups make the implementation of any multiculturalist policies even harder. Lack of trust, tension and hate speech between the Albanians and Macedonians is on the rise, proved by the various recent incidents discussed in Chapter III that attracted both national and international attention (Marusic, 2012, February 10; Marusic, 2012, January 31; Marusic, 2012, January 27; Reuters, 2012, January 31).

Despite the situation on the ground, multiculturalism is widely used by political leaders in the country, who are eager to gain credits with the international community and the various EU diplomats that visit the country often to observe the progress in the
implementation of the reforms required for EU accession (see Chapter VI). However, when the same political actors address their own constituents, multiculturalism is quickly substituted with nationalism and ethnocentrism. The language barriers between the three groups certainly make such contradicting discourse very difficult to detect, and this issue remains largely unexamined (Reka, 2007). Consequently, the conflicting discourses of the political actors have become normalized in everyday conversations, which provides an opportunity for political leaders to manipulate such discourses for their own gains (Koinova, 2011).

Chapter II defines and contextualizes multiculturalism in both political and cultural studies discourses. The first part of the chapter discusses the conceptualization of multiculturalism by political sciences scholars in the 1990s and their influence in multicultural policies in various liberal democracies around the world. A central focus is given to three areas of multiculturalism identified by Kymlicka (1989; 1995): indigenous peoples, immigrant rights and concerns, and national minorities. This is followed by a critique of the liberal multiculturalism model (Kymlicka, 1995; Taylor, 1994) presented by cultural studies scholars and the conceptualization of critical multiculturalism and interculturalism as a response to the liberal multiculturalism model. The literature review showed that two decades after its conceptualization, the liberal multiculturalism model that was initially created in response to assimilation policies, has instigated exactly the same thing it was meant to fight—assimilationist ideals in political discourses (Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 2008). The chapter discloses the vast critiques of the liberal multicultural model both from the right and the left of the political spectrum.
Thus, while the right-wing political thinkers claim that it is giving too many rights to the minorities, the left-wing political thinkers think that this model is actually discriminatory for minorities. Such contradicting scholarly discourses show how ambiguous and undefined this concept is even in academic debates, and different fields and approaches attach different meanings to it.

Multiculturalism research was motivated by the ongoing complexities in seeking to obtain peaceful coexistence among different ethnic groups in countries around the world. The break-up of communism in 1989, the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in South Eastern Europe, and the conflicts that occurred in former Yugoslavia are usually mentioned as the main motivation behind researching issues of multiculturalism (Inglis, 1996). More recent motivations behind the study of multiculturalism and its adoption in official policies in different countries are: the growing numbers of political refugees and asylum seekers in Western Europe, concerns about immigration in the EU and US, the ways in which immigrants assimilate or integrate in countries of Western Europe, as well as concerns about "unassimilated" immigrant groups after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Rex, 2003). Due to the differing motivations behind the study of multiculturalism, there is still no single definition or single way of thinking about multiculturalism (Parekh, 2000). Some notions of multiculturalism focus on a common culture shared by all in a society, while others acknowledge the role of race and ethnicity in a society and, therefore, highlight the dominance and subordination of groups, or the power relations among cultural groups.

As a result, cultural studies scholars moved to suggest other concepts to replace multiculturalism, such as critical multiculturalism (Castles, 1999; Chicago Cultural Studies...
Group, 1992; Gunew, 2004; Hage, 1998; 2003; Kalantzis, 1990; O’Regan, 1994; Stratton, 1998) and interculturalism (Jiang, 2011; McDonald, 2011; Ghorayshi, 2010; Rodríguez-García, 2010; Abdallah-Pretceille, 2006) which are supposed to resolve the issues surrounding this term. Some scholars have even decided to ignore the term altogether replacing it with “politics of difference” (Young, 2000) and “transformative politics of recognition” (Fraser, 1998).

While both critical multiculturalism and interculturalism have the potential to provide answers to the problems that liberal multiculturalism is facing, they remain unknown concepts for policy makers, which makes it difficult to apply them in any real policies. The ambiguity of the concept of multiculturalism in political sciences and cultural studies has important implications for this study and provides a background to the problem that both the EU and Macedonia are facing with this concept. As a result, instead of moving toward more inclusion and tolerance, just like in the case of Macedonia, Western societies have moved toward the very concepts they were rejecting two decades ago, and that is assimilation, discrimination and intolerance for ethnic minorities and immigrants which are discussed more thoroughly in Chapter IV.

Chapter III explored the rhetorical history and contexts of the concept of multiculturalism in Macedonia. The chapter discussed several events that have shaped or led up to the current multiculturalism discussions, such as the breakout of Yugoslavia, the wars in the region, the armed conflict in Macedonia in 2001, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) that ended the conflict, and other development that occurred in Macedonia in the past 10 years after its signing. This chapter
answered question sub-set #1: What is the rhetorical context and history of “multiculturalism” in Macedonia? What are the main tensions between the Albanian and Macedonian ethnic groups and what has been done so far to resolve them? What is the significance of multiculturalism in the EU accession process? How has the multiculturalism debate become a discursive arena in which ethnic anxieties are examined and resolved?

The chapter concluded that the most important rhetorical context of multiculturalism in Macedonia is its conceptualization and enforcement under conditions of warfare in Macedonia, more precisely upon signing the Ohrid Framework Agreement which ended the armed conflict in 2001 (Staniševski & Miller, 2009). Also, multiculturalism in Macedonia is mostly used in reference to the inter-ethnic relations between the Albanian and Macedonian ethnic groups, ignoring the other ethnic groups living in Macedonia, such as Turks, Serbs, Roma, etc. The usage of this concept in Macedonia also ignores other dimensions of multiculturalism such as race, gender, class, sexuality, etc.

The concept of multiculturalism remains largely un-implemented in Macedonia, and the reason for this is the fact that it was enforced upon the two parties in conflict (Macedonians and Albanians), by OFA. While the Albanian minority is more accepting toward this concept, the Macedonian majority views it as a foreign import that has nothing to do with the reality of life in Macedonia (Reka, 2007; Bieber, 2008). Some of the main tensions between the Macedonians and Albanians have to do with the EU accession, for which the Macedonian majority seems to have lost its enthusiasm in the recent years.
(Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010), whereas for the Albanian community EU integrations presents the only solution for Macedonia (Vasilev, 2011). Due to the identity crisis that Macedonia is facing in relation to the name dispute with Greece, and the interethnic conflict within the country, between the Macedonians and Albanians, the right-wing Macedonian political elites tend to fear the “intentions” of the Albanians as they get more rights within the country. They believe that once the Albanian community gains more rights, they will ultimately want to join with Albania and Kosovo, and form the “dreamed” Big Albania (Vasilev, 2011).

The historical and rhetorical context discussed in Chapter III shows the importance of the concept of multiculturalism in the EU accession dialogue, deriving from the full implementation of OFA which guarantees a peaceful inter-ethnic co-existence between the ethnic groups in Macedonia and represents one of the main conditions set by the EU in order to start the process of negotiation for EU accession. However, the interdisciplinary academic discussions presented in this chapter, as well as the progress reports published by the European Commission every year, point out that many of the conditions pertaining to OFA and multiculturalism have not yet been met. This shows that the liberal multiculturalism model enforced upon the country by the EU has largely been unsuccessful. As a result, instead of creating tolerance and understanding, it seems that the process of OFA implementation and the multiculturalism discourse have created more tensions between the two ethnic communities.

Chapter IV discussed the rhetorical context and rhetorical history of the concept of multiculturalism in the EU. The chapter touched upon several events that
have shaped the current multiculturalism discussions within the EU member states
and answered question sub-set #2: How is “multiculturalism” defined in the EU?
What are the rhetorical challenges with this concept within the EU countries? How is
the immigration debate on both sides of the Atlantic impacting the understanding of
this concept? How does the ambiguous conception of such term affect EU’s foreign
policy and enlargement process?

This chapter showed that the main ideology behind the creation of the EU was
economic cooperation and lasting peace between the member states, whereas issues of
culture were considered later in the process, initiated mostly by EU’s enlargement agenda.
Even though the EU has invested a considerable amount of energy in cultural issues in
recent years (Shore, 2006), cultural problems are still considered very much secondary in
relation to the economical crisis that the EU is facing lately (Mokre, 2007; Sassatelli,
2002; Shore, 2006).

Besides the secondary treatment of cultural issues in the EU, this chapter showed
that multiculturalism represents an ambiguous concept within the EU member states
without any coherent definition or consistent application in their policies. Due to the
recent troubles that the EU is facing with immigration, terrorism, security and
enlargement, multiculturalism in the EU is mostly used in relation to issues of
immigration. As a result, discussions surrounding multiculturalism in the EU rarely
address issues of national minorities like it is the case in Macedonia. Also, different EU
countries define multiculturalism differently, which greatly contributes to its
ambiguousness. This shows that besides the ambiguous definition of this term in the EU,
the conceptualization of multiculturalism in the EU differs greatly from its conceptualization in Macedonia, which provides a ground for misunderstandings between the two parties.

As mentioned in Chapter I, the EU has faced many challenges with multiculturalism in recent years and the right-wing political elites have greatly influenced the debates surrounding multiculturalism in the EU. Since the main political leaders of the EU members states such as Germany, Britain and France have already proclaimed multiculturalism as a failed concept, many of them have proposed to move toward more assimilationist principles and make it clear to all the ‘outsiders’ that they should either leave or adopt the EU standards and EU values. These political discussions have received vast criticism by cultural scholars in Europe such as Antony Giddens, Jürgen Habermas and Stuart Hall (Giddens, 2012, January 25; Habermas, 2011, November 10; Williams, 2012, February 11). However, polls show that nationalism is on the rise in the EU and right-wing politicians are still influencing the political discourse (Givens 2005; Ignazi 2003; Rydgren 2007; Sprague-Jones 2011).

Chapter V provided an overview of the methodology that is used in analyzing the speeches of the EU and Macedonian political representatives in their dialogue for EU accession. The methodology used in this study is rhetorical criticism, more specifically Michael McGee’s (1975; 1980) notion of “ideographs” considered to be the most useful for analyzing intercultural political discourses, such as the one between the EU and Macedonia. This methodology allows us to discover the processes creating and sustaining ideology surrounding the concept of multiculturalism, both in the EU and in Macedonia,
as well as it exposes the interests of the different parties involved in the dialogue. It also allows us to understand and uncover the oppressive relationships in the usage of the concept of multiculturalism and might give us an opportunity for emancipation. Burke’s theory of rhetorical criticism is discussed as one of the main influences behind McGee’s ideographic analysis, as well as other influential theories of intercultural rhetoric and rhetorical criticism (See Bitzer, 1968; Conquergood, 1991; Lake, 1991; Mailloux; 1997; Terrill, 2009).

This chapter also discussed the role of the researcher as “the Other,” having experienced “Othering” and marginalization both within her own community and in an international context. The researcher situated herself at the intersections of intercultural discourse struggles, and views knowledge as subjective or intersubjective, morally responsible, and local. As a result, the researcher explained that instead of trying to find the ‘truth’ about the use of multiculturalism in the dialogue between the EU and Macedonia, she tries to understand the multiple meanings and truths surrounding this concept so that the others can interpret them and find their own understanding in ways that are still accurately representative of the voices in the communities she studies. This approach to rhetoric is crucial in understanding the differing social worlds that different ethnic groups experience in Macedonia and their differing perceptions of reality, especially as it pertains to discourses of multiculturalism.

Chapter VI presented the ideographical analysis of the concept “multiculturalism” and other cluster concepts identified as “interethnic tolerance,” “interethnic dialogue,” “interethnic cooperation,” and “interethnic stability.” The
first part of the chapter answered question sub-sets #3: What is the EU’s ideological conceptualization behind the ideograph of “multiculturalism” when EU representatives present it to the Macedonian audience? How do EU representatives define multiculturalism when they speak to audiences in Macedonia, and how do they define it when they speak to audiences in the EU? What, according to the EU and its representatives, is the importance of multiculturalism in Macedonia?

This chapter concluded that the ideological conceptualization of the ideograph of “multiculturalism” by the EU is based in the liberalist multiculturalism model (See Kymlicka, 1995 & Taylor, 1994 discussed in Chapter II). Such ideology sees cultural groups in Macedonia as static, without considering their century-long inter-relation among each other and the past inter-related histories that deeply influence the way both parties understand the concept. The analysis shows that the EU uses a top down approach, enforcing the concept of multiculturalism through their strategy of “conditionality” set upon all potential member states in order to gain EU accession. Multiculturalism in Macedonia is considered as an achievable objective, especially when the EU diplomats take into account the “positive” experiences of the EU countries with this concept. This is evidence to the “template-like fashion” that the EU is using in the region, “rather than tools that should be fine-tuned to fit the concrete conditions in the area” (Guzina, 2001, p. 7). Moreover, the analysis shows that the EU presents itself as a utopian model of multiculturalism that Macedonia needs to follow, completely denying the issues they are facing with this concept in their own countries.
The second part of Chapter VI answers question sub-sets #4: What are the Albanian and Macedonian perspectives and responses toward the ideograph of multiculturalism? How do these definitions shape the identity of the minorities in Macedonia and whose interests are upheld? What does the upholding of the discursive status quo surrounding the issue of multiculturalism mean to those who are of an ethnic minority in Macedonia? The chapter concludes that the Albanian and Macedonian perspectives and responses toward the ideograph of multiculturalism are highly inconsistent which is a result of the differing conceptualizations of the term by the two parties (as discussed in Chapter III and IV) and due to the extremely politicized nature of this concept both in Macedonia and the EU. As showed in Chapter III, multiculturalism in Macedonia is only used in reference to national minorities, in contrast to the EU where it is used only in reference to immigrants, immigration policies, and more recently in reference to issues of security and enlargement. Also, the concept is highly politicized due to the power relations between the three groups involved in the discourse (EU, Macedonian and Albanian political elites), and the interests that each one of these groups has invested in this concept. As a result, besides the existence of differing ideologies between the EU and the Macedonian government surrounding the concept of multiculturalism, there are also differing ideologies behind the ideograph of multiculturalism between the Albanian and Macedonian political elites. The analysis of the speeches shows that the ideology that these different groups have about multiculturalism is closely linked to their political interests in
this situation. Taking the leading role in the design of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and trying to promote itself as a peace builder in the world the EU has great interests in achieving success in Macedonia, and as a result is willing to invest time and money to do this. While the major political party in the government uses rhetoric of denial about the still existing interethnic conflict in the country and scapegoats the name dispute with Greece as a reason behind its failure to implement OFA. The oppositional Macedonian party emphasizes on meeting the conditions set by the EU in order to get membership. Most importantly, while both Macedonian political parties avoid mentioning OFA in relation to the EU integration processes, the ruling Albanian party insists on the full implementation of OFA, while putting Macedonia’s very existence on the line.

To conclude, the ideological analysis showed that there is a vast misunderstanding between the EU and the Macedonian government, and between the Macedonian and Albanian political parties surrounding the concept of multiculturalism. The concept is highly politicized in all possible levels of the discourse of EU integration, and political parties mainly use it for their own political benefits. Besides such conceptual misunderstandings of the ideograph, there are also language problems, as the three parties engaged in the dialogue speak three different languages. While most of the speeches analyzed in this chapter were written in English Language, the language still plays a role in the way the three parties understand the concept and the way they present it to their own constituents. What’s more, the experience on the ground shows that the content of the speeches delivered by the same political actors drastically changes when they address their own constituents in their own
native language. So, besides the differing ideologies and approaches to multiculturalism in the country, local political actors are completely dismissing multiculturalism when they address their own voters.

**Implications of the divisive rhetoric**

This study suggests that the implications of the divisive rhetoric used by all the parties involved in the multiculturalism discourse has been incredibly negative, and I conclude that the discourse of multiculturalism has indeed failed in Macedonia, just like in the EU. The multiculturalism discourse linked to the implementation of OFA managed only to stop the armed conflict in 2001 and prevented further escalation of the conflict in the neighboring countries. However, Macedonia’s current peaceful situation cannot be considered entirely peaceful, or in Galtung’s (1996) words, we cannot consider Macedonian society as an example of “positive peace.” This study has shown that the divisive rhetoric surrounding the discourse of multiculturalism has only brought “negative peace” (Galtung, 1996) to Macedonia. This means that while there is absence of violence in the country, the relationships between Albanians and Macedonians still remain unrestored, and the country has failed to create any social systems that will serve the needs of the whole population, or provide any constructive conflict management or transformation between the parties involved. As a result, the two communities in conflict before the 2001 armed clashes remain highly divided.

A recent study conducted by the daily newspaper “Дневник” in cooperation with the agency “Rating” showed that Macedonians and Albanians are deeply divided on the
question of the direction in which the country is lead by this Government (Дневник, 2012, February 3). The study revealed that the Albanians and Macedonians basically live in two different planets when it comes to dominant foreign and domestic political issues in Macedonia. While, the majority of the Macedonian participants (52 %) in the survey declared that things are moving in the right direction, the vast majority of Albanians (81 %) think that the country is headed in a wrong direction. “Дневник” concludes that such opinions are a result of the thinking by the majority of Albanians in Macedonia that the current government is not interested in gaining EU membership. This is further proven by the results of the survey, which show that 79% of the Albanians think that the current government does not want Macedonia to receive the EU membership, while 73% of the Macedonian participants claimed that this is not true (Дневник, 2012, February 3). Also, a survey conducted by Balkan Monitor in 2010, showed that more Macedonians (28% ) than any other ethnic group living in the country felt that there was still a danger of an armed conflict. These respondents felt that a war would ‘certainly’ or ‘probably’ happen (Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010). As a result, more respondents in Macedonia (58%) than in any other country in the region believed that better opportunities could be found abroad (up 4 points from 2009) (Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010).

These polls justify the loss of enthusiasm by the Macedonian political elites for EU accession as well as the fears that the Macedonian ethnic group is still experiencing in relation to future potential armed clashes with the Albanian ethnic group in the country. Such fears, are closely linked with the fear of the Albanian “intentions” (Vasilev, 2011) mentioned above as well as the avoidance of the political elites to fully implement OFA and
achieve multiculturalism in the country. This situation has contributed to the conceptualization of ethnic, religious and language differences between the Albanians and Macedonians to become rhetorical anchors for nationalistic appeals promoting incompatible political aspirations locked in a struggle for dominance. The current governments’ medieval stories about the historical heritage of the Macedonian nation with Alexander the Great’s empire support the insistence of the Macedonian ethnic group to maintain their leading role in Macedonia. The decoration of the capital city of Skopje with statues of medieval rulers associated with Macedonian history invokes memories of a glorious past and provides options for an alternative reality that appeal to Macedonian ambitions to define the country as exclusively theirs. The stories currently prevalent in the media draw upon myths of origin, tales of grievance, or confrontation to promote a sense of national exclusivity along ethnic lines. As a result, even though the preamble of the Macedonian constitution had to change due to OFA, the Macedonian majority still tends to define Macedonia as their country, while excluding everyone else that lives there.

In a truly multicultural country national identity should be understood in relational terms to achieve inclusive solidarity. Regrettably, the Macedonians and Albanians have found themselves speaking a language that reduces their identity to ethnicity. Ignatieff (1993) rightly asserted that Yugoslavia’s conflicts were not produced by the historical differences among the different ethnic groups, but through the manufactured fables and ideologues that portrayed the other side as committing monstrous acts of genocide, and their own as untainted victims. Alas, one can rightly conclude that behind the façade of peaceful co-existence of the ethnic groups, the manufactured stories and ideologues created by the
current Macedonian government contributed to the continuation of the conflict between the
two groups.

Further, due to the lack of tradition for open political dialogue, nationalism presents
the only language available for political appeal of the various political parties in Macedonia
whose membership is characterized strictly among ethnic lines. Such ethnic narratives that
fuel competing rhetoric of nationalistic aspiration are antithetical to a discourse of common
understanding that is required by multiculturalism. Also, such mythos of conflicting cultural
memories that portray neighbors as the menacing “Other within” produce vicious cycle of
nationalistic paranoia and provide mutually exclusive justification for avoidance in the
implementation of OFA as well as distort rhetorical possibilities for experiences that support
multicultural tolerance.

Thus, despite the high EU involvement in the country after 2001 to 2009, Macedonia
managed to advance minimally in terms of interethnic relations in the country. This study
cocludes that the EU has been unable to address the underlying dynamic of relationships
between the local elites and the international community, as well as the underlying dynamic
of relationships between the Macedonian and Albanian local elites. As mentioned in Chapter
III, local political actors were exposed to conditionality by the EU diplomats, who were here
to guide the local actors on the needed paths for EU accession. However, local actors
learned fast that concerns regarding security and stability matter more to the EU (Koinova,
2011) rather than any real advancement on multiculturalism. EU’s ambiguous rhetoric
regarding multiculturalism, and the contradiction of that rhetoric with their own
multiculturalism problems in the EU member states, influenced the local political actors to
play a two-level game. More specifically, their rhetoric selectively addressed certain issues regarding multiculturalism, as it was the case in the speeches analysed above, while resisting reform of others or using democratic procedures to further advance their nationalistic goals.

Also, the analysis of this study clearly shows that the local political elites and the EU political actors are engaging in self-interested interactions, in order to maximize their own benefits in regards to the multiculturalism discourse in the country and reduce their own costs. Schimmelfennig (2001) rightly claims that the EU political actors have used norm-based arguments strategically in order to justify their self interested preferences. This means that the EU diplomats often invoke both preservation of security and the need for democratization as part of the EU’s normative basis (Koinova, 2011). Such mixture of normative political concerns sends a message to the local political actors that political criteria for future membership are not clearly measured (Koinova, 2011). As a result, the Macedonian political elites understood that the costly implementation of OFA and other reforms related to multiculturalism do not really represent a priority for the EU.

Besides, The Ohrid Framework Agreement did not manage to establish any new forms of group autonomy or instruments for aggregating community interests beyond political parties (Bieber, 2008). The dominance of political parties in the sphere of interethnic relations further problematizes the ethnic relations in the country, as it inherently politicizes any form of interethnic debate and prevents for the articulation of non-party based community interests. As a result, Macedonia has become the subject of political bargaining among the main political parties representing the Macedonians and Albanians (Kreci & Ymeri, 2010). Political bargaining on nationally sensitive issues has become a
norm among the political parties which has negatively contributed to the implementation of OFA or any other multiculturalism policies. The country’s political environment is such that any demand coming from the minority would, is first interpreted according to how it affects the majority position, or vice versa. Such ethno-political justifications present the most fundamental deficiency in the Macedonian politics, and it has greatly contributed to the current state of multiculturalism in the country. Also, besides influencing inter-ethnic conflict, such politics often results in intra-ethnic discrimination as well, as it transforms ethnic representation in institutions into party representation (Bieber, 2008).

As a result, the rhetoric of the Macedonian nationalists and right-wing politicians highly contributed to EU’s lack of success in making the government fully implement their conditions. The nationalists’ main argument is that the EU does not have any credibility to put such conditions (Koinova, 2011). The EU’s failure to implement its own minority-rights policies, is used as the main argument among Macedonian local elites in order not to implement the requirements deriving from OFA. The lack of credibility in the EU conditionality rhetoric “is often tied to the debate with Greece about Macedonia’s name, and with Greece and Bulgaria with respect to recognition of their Macedonian minorities” (Koinova, 2011, p. 826). Since both Greece and Bulgaria are EU member countries, the Macedonian nationalists argue that if neither country was able to change its narrow historical vision with regard to the Macedonia nationality, then Macedonias should not be obliged to further support ethnic diversity in their own country.

The decisions of the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest not to offer membership to Macedonia due to the name dispute with Greece, and the decision of the EU not to give
Macedonia a date for the start of accession talks gave significant signals to the Macedonian right-wing politicians, and helped local Macedonian elites to exploit the nationalist card in relation to the interethnic relations in the country. As a result, tensions between the two communities remain high. Besides, according to Koinova (2011) it is becoming more and more evident that there are small chances for Macedonia to be offered EU membership in the near future. One of the reasons for this is the “emotional fatigue” (Koinova, 2011) that the EU is experiencing after adding 12 more members between 2004 and 2007, while the other reason is of course the global economic crisis that the EU is experiencing since 2008. Such problems are prompting the EU politicians to prioritize domestic affairs over international concerns. This will no doubt increase the heightened tensions between the ethnic groups in Macedonia, and thus we cannot expect any success of multiculturalism any time soon.

Consequently, Guzina (2001) rightly asks if it is logical for the EU elites to expect that the western practices of liberal pluralism and ethnocultural justice be promoted as means to solving ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans. This is in line with Rustow’s (1970) claim that a country can successfully transition to democracy as long as it has achieved a certain level of national unity. Since there is lack of national unity in Macedonia, it is hard to achieve a full democracy and the multiculturalism discourse is used by the government only for tactical purposes of legitimizing the country’s position in international circles (Guzina, 2001).

Moreover, the clash between achieving democracy and nation building presents a major roadblock to achieving multiculturalism in Macedonia. Guzina (2001) asserts that it is
a common practice for the EU to use failed countries like Macedonia as experimental grounds for learning about conflict management and democratization techniques, by applying external pressures in order to “democratize” them and ingrain multicultural values. As a result, the Macedonian majority views multicultural integration as an ideological export that is either completely out of context or just a catchy phrase replacing the old fashioned policies of ethnic control. This perception is mostly due to the fact that EU uses approaches in a “template-like fashion rather than tools that should be fine-tuned to fit the concrete conditions in the area” (Guzina, 2001, p. 7).

This study shows that this represents the main problem with the issue of the ideograph of multiculturalism and other cluster analysed in this study. From the speech analysis it is evident that while the EU has imposed the ideograph of multiculturalism on Macedonia as one of the main preconditions for EU accession, it has done so by utilizing the same strategy they use in imposing all the other reforms the country needs to make to get accession, and that is by providing a template-like conception of the ideograph of multiculturalism. It is more concerning that the EU representatives in Macedonia, or the other diplomats involved in the dialogue ignore their differing understandings and conceptions of the ideograph of multiculturalism and the way such ambiguity affects Macedonia’s implementation of the main preconditions for starting the negotiations for EU membership. The study showed that while the EU diplomats require Macedonia to reach a certain level of multiculturalism, they completely ignore the great conceptual differences of multiculturalism in their own states, and the fact that their own leaders have already dismissed this term as a failed concept.
Conclusion

This chapter answers question subset #5: What are some rhetorical and cultural opportunities for the further development of the concept of multiculturalism in Macedonia? How can cultural rhetoric further mediate the dialogue between EU and Macedonia, as well as the dialogue between the two major ethnic groups, the Albanians and Macedonians?

The analysis of the concept of multiculturalism in Macedonia represents a selection of key issues important to examining discursive processes, systems and institutions of war and peace. Because rhetoric represents social, cultural and political knowledge shaping the creation of our social reality and behavior, its analysis enables an understanding of the way language and culture can limit the influence of aggression and war (Gorsevski, 2004). It is my belief that understanding rhetoric increases our potential to communicate with diverse audiences, particularly those in conflict, in order to persuade them to adopt a peaceful and nonviolent approach. This praxis of rhetorical criticism allows us to use the analysis of ideographs to offer peaceful and more inclusive alternatives for dialogue and peacebuilding.

In conclusion, I argue that in line with Hauser’s (2008) arguments for thick moral vernaculars in the adoption of the human right policies by the UN, the EU should strive to provide a thick moral vernacular of the ideograph of multiculturalism in Macedonia if it wants to achieve success in the democratization of the country and a unified understanding and acceptance of the ideograph by all parties. For Hauser (2008) “a thick moral vernacular summons cultural memory embedded in a people’s language, national history, and significant expression of tradition and belief to inspire allegiance and support” (p. 458). Such an approach would rely on native assertions of identity and right and might provide an
alternative authority about their human rights and the national interest in respecting them. As Houser (2008) asserts a thick moral vernacular represents a “rhetoric of conscience” calling for personal genuineness and group solidarity and is “translated into the culture of individual rights, collective identity, historicity, and the primacy of agency of being a human” (p. 459).

A thick moral vernacular of multiculturalism in Macedonia can represent a call for both civility and responsibility. EU should strive to use concepts and terms closer to multiculturalism that are consistent with the cultural memory, history and tradition of all the ethnic groups living in Macedonia. Such concepts should strive to tackle the identity issues within and with the neighboring countries and give the parties involved the authority to reinvent them and use them. This approach has the potential to provide the parties involved a feeling of inclusion by the superior power of the EU and a say in achieving something that will benefit themselves and their own country first, not only the European Union. In this way, the conceptualization of the ideograph of multiculturalism can represent and urge for responsibility for a common good, not only for one group’s interests over another.
REFERENCES


Agence France-Presse. (2011, February 10). Multiculturalism has failed, says French president. *Agence France-Presse*. Retrieved from http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jR1m5BpdMrD ES3u4Cso1v3FwQRUg?docId=CNG.6b096ac0cdefce7a0f599fbb1c85e27.911


has been transformed into a real golgota]. Retrieved from


http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9315937


European Commission. (2005). *Council decision on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the European Partnership with the former Yugoslav*


Juncos, A. (2005). The EU’s post-conflict intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (Re)integrating the Balkans and/or (re)inventing the EU? Southeast European Politics, 6(2), 90–108.


Lengel, L. (1996). Diversity in practice: Intercultural communication training in multicultural environments (pp. 135-146). In D. Evans (Eds.), *Communicative Ability and Cultural Awareness*. Lille, France: EDHEC.


and hermeneutics in our time: A reader (pp. 378-394). Newhaven, CT: Yale University Press.


http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/26/marine-le-pen-french-euroscepticism


Risteska, M. (2011, June). Opening of the conference. Presented at the One decade after the Ohrid Framework Agreement: Lessons (to be) learned from the Macedonian experience conference, Center
for Research and Policy Making (CRPM) and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, office Skopje, Skopje, Macedonia, June 24, 2011.


Smee, J. (2010, October 18). *Merkel's rhetoric in integration debate is “inexcusable”*. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,723702,00.html


Skopje, Macedonia: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.


APPENDIX A:

THE OH RID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

Framework Agreement
13.08.2001

The following points comprise an agreed framework for securing the future of Macedonia's democracy and permitting the development of closer and more integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community. This Framework will promote the peaceful and harmonious development of civil society while respecting the ethnic identity and the interests of all Macedonian citizens.

1. Basic Principles

1.1. The use of violence in pursuit of political aims is rejected completely and unconditionally. Only peaceful political solutions can assure a stable and democratic future for Macedonia.
1.2. Macedonia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the unitary character of the State are inviolable and must be preserved. There are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues.
1.3. The multi-ethnic character of Macedonia's society must be preserved and reflected in public life.
1.4. A modern democratic state in its natural course of development and maturation must continually ensure that its Constitution fully meets the needs of all its citizens and comports with the highest international standards, which themselves continue to evolve.
1.5. The development of local self-government is essential for encouraging the participation of citizens in democratic life, and for promoting respect for the identity of communities.

2. Cessation of Hostilities

2.1. The parties underline the importance of the commitments of July 5, 2001. There shall be a complete cessation of hostilities, complete voluntary disarmament of the ethnic Albanian armed groups and their complete voluntary disbandment. They acknowledge that a decision by NATO to assist in this context will require the establishment of a general, unconditional and open-ended cease-fire, agreement on a political solution to the problems of this country, a clear commitment by the armed groups to voluntarily disarm, and acceptance by all the parties of the conditions and limitations under which the NATO forces will operate.

3. Development of Decentralized Government

3.1. A revised Law on Local Self-Government will be adopted that reinforces the powers of elected local officials and enlarges substantially their competencies in conformity with the Constitution (as amended in accordance with Annex A) and the European Charter on Local Self-Government, and reflecting the principle of subsidiarity in effect in the European Union. Enhanced competencies will relate principally to the areas of public services, urban and rural planning, environmental protection,
local economic development, culture, local finances, education, social welfare, and health care. A law on financing of local self-government will be adopted to ensure an adequate system of financing to enable local governments to fulfill all of their responsibilities.

3.2. Boundaries of municipalities will be revised within one year of the completion of a new census, which will be conducted under international supervision by the end of 2001. The revision of the municipal boundaries will be effectuated by the local and national authorities with international participation.

3.3. In order to ensure that police are aware of and responsive to the needs and interests of the local population, local heads of police will be selected by municipal councils from lists of candidates proposed by the Ministry of Interior, and will communicate regularly with the councils. The Ministry of Interior will retain the authority to remove local heads of police in accordance with the law.

4. Non-Discrimination and Equitable Representation

4.1. The principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment of all under the law will be respected completely. This principle will be applied in particular with respect to employment in public administration and public enterprises, and access to public financing for business development.

4.2. Laws regulating employment in public administration will include measures to assure equitable representation of communities in all central and local public bodies and at all levels of employment within such bodies, while respecting the rules concerning competence and integrity that govern public administration. The authorities will take action to correct present imbalances in the composition of the public administration, in particular through the recruitment of members of under-represented communities.

Particular attention will be given to ensuring as rapidly as possible that the police services will generally reflect the composition and distribution of the population of Macedonia, as specified in Annex C.

4.3. For the Constitutional Court, one-third of the judges will be chosen by the Assembly by a majority of the total number of Representatives that includes a majority of the total number of Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia. This procedure also will apply to the election of the Ombudsman (Public Attorney) and the election of three of the members of the Judicial Council.

5. Special Parliamentary Procedures

5.1. On the central level, certain Constitutional amendments in accordance with Annex A and the Law on Local Self-Government cannot be approved without a qualified majority of two-thirds of votes, within which there must be a majority of the votes of Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia.

5.2. Laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, and use of symbols, as well as laws on local finances, local elections, the city of Skopje, and boundaries of municipalities must receive a majority of votes, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia.
6. Education and Use of Languages

6.1. With respect to primary and secondary education, instruction will be provided in the students’ native languages, while at the same time uniform standards for academic programs will be applied throughout Macedonia.

6.2. State funding will be provided for university level education in languages spoken by at least 20 percent of the population of Macedonia, on the basis of specific agreements.

6.3. The principle of positive discrimination will be applied in the enrolment in State universities of candidates belonging to communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia until the enrolment reflects equitably the composition of the population of Macedonia.

6.4. The official language throughout Macedonia and in the international relations of Macedonia is the Macedonian language.

6.5. Any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also an official language, as set forth herein. In the organs of the Republic of Macedonia, any official language other than Macedonian may be used in accordance with the law, as further elaborated in Annex B. Any person living in a unit of local self-government in which at least 20 percent of the population speaks an official language other than Macedonian may use any official language to communicate with the regional office of the central government with responsibility for that municipality; such an office will reply in that language in addition to Macedonian. Any person may use any official language to communicate with a main office of the central government, which will reply in that language in addition to Macedonian.

6.6. With respect to local self-government, in municipalities where a community comprises at least 20 percent of the population of the municipality, the language of that community will be used as an official language in addition to Macedonian. With respect to languages spoken by less than 20 percent of the population of the municipality, the local authorities will decide democratically on their use in public bodies.

6.7. In criminal and civil judicial proceedings at any level, an accused person or any party will have the right to translation at State expense of all proceedings as well as documents in accordance with relevant Council of Europe documents.

6.8. Any official personal documents of citizens speaking an official language other than Macedonian will also be issued in that language, in addition to the Macedonian language, in accordance with the law.

6. Expression of Identity

7.1. With respect to emblems, next to the emblem of the Republic of Macedonia, local authorities will be free to place on front of local public buildings emblems marking the identity of the community in the majority in the municipality, respecting international rules and usages.

8. Implementation

8.1. The Constitutional amendments attached at Annex A will be presented to the Assembly immediately. The parties will take all measures to assure adoption of these amendments within 45 days of signature of this Framework Agreement.
8.2. The legislative modifications identified in Annex B will be adopted in accordance with the timetables specified therein.

8.3. The parties invite the international community to convene at the earliest possible time a meeting of international donors that would address in particular macro-financial assistance; support for the financing of measures to be undertaken for the purpose of implementing this Framework Agreement, including measures to strengthen local self-government; and rehabilitation and reconstruction in areas affected by the fighting.

9. Annexes
The following Annexes constitute integral parts of this Framework Agreement:
A. Constitutional Amendments
B. Legislative Modifications
C. Implementation and Confidence-Building Measures

10.1. This Agreement takes effect upon signature.
10.2. The English language version of this Agreement is the only authentic version.
10.3. This Agreement was concluded under the auspices of President Boris Trajkovski. Done at Skopje, Macedonia on 13 August 2001, in the English language.

ANNEX A
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Preamble

The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, taking over responsibility for the present and future of their fatherland, aware and grateful to their predecessors for their sacrifice and dedication in their endeavors and struggle to create an independent and sovereign state of Macedonia, and responsible to future generations to preserve and develop everything that is valuable from the rich cultural inheritance and coexistence within Macedonia, equal in rights and obligations towards the common good -- the Republic of Macedonia, in accordance with the tradition of the Krushevo Republic and the decisions of the Antifascist Peopleís Liberation Assembly of Macedonia, and the Referendum of September 8, 1991, they have decided to establish the Republic of Macedonia as an independent, sovereign state, with the intention of establishing and consolidating rule of law, guaranteeing human rights and civil liberties, providing peace and coexistence, social justice, economic well-being and prosperity in the life of the individual and the community, and in this regard through their representatives in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, elected in free and democratic elections, they adopt . . . .

Article 7
(1) The Macedonian language, written using its Cyrillic alphabet, is the official language throughout the Republic of Macedonia and in the international relations of the Republic of Macedonia.
(2) Any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also an official language, written using its alphabet, as specified below.
(3) Any official personal documents of citizens speaking an official language other than Macedonian shall also be issued in that language, in addition to the Macedonian language, in
accordance with the law.
(4) Any person living in a unit of local self-government in which at least 20 percent of the population speaks an official language other than Macedonian may use any official language to communicate with the regional office of the central government with responsibility for that municipality; such an office shall reply in that language in addition to Macedonian. Any person may use any official language to communicate with a main office of the central government, which shall reply in that language in addition to Macedonian.
(5) In the organs of the Republic of Macedonia, any official language other than Macedonian may be used in accordance with the law.
(6) In the units of local self-government where at least 20 percent of the population speaks a particular language, that language and its alphabet shall be used as an official language in addition to the Macedonian language and the Cyrillic alphabet. With respect to languages spoken by less than 20 percent of the population of a unit of local self-government, the local authorities shall decide on their use in public bodies.

Article 8
(1) The fundamental values of the constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia are:
- the basic freedoms and rights of the individual and citizen, recognized in international law and set down in the Constitution;
- equitable representation of persons belonging to all communities in public bodies at all levels and in other areas of public life;

Article 19
(1) The freedom of religious confession is guaranteed.
(2) The right to express one's faith freely and publicly, individually or with others is guaranteed.
(3) The Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, the Catholic Church, and other Religious communities and groups are separate from the state and equal before the law.
(4) The Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, the Catholic Church, and other Religious communities and groups are free to establish schools and other social and charitable institutions, by ways of a procedure regulated by law.

Article 48
(1) Members of communities have a right freely to express, foster and develop their identity and community attributes, and to use their community symbols.
(2) The Republic guarantees the protection of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of all communities.
(3) Members of communities have the right to establish institutions for culture, art, science and education, as well as scholarly and other associations for the expression, fostering and development of their identity.
(4) Members of communities have the right to instruction in their language in primary and secondary education, as determined by law. In schools where education is carried out in another language, the Macedonian language is also studied.
Article 56

(2) The Republic guarantees the protection, promotion and enhancement of the historical and artistic heritage of Macedonia and all communities in Macedonia and the treasures of which it is composed, regardless of their legal status. The law regulates the mode and conditions under which specific items of general interest for the Republic can be ceded for use.

Article 69

(2) For laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, and use of symbols, the Assembly makes decisions by a majority vote of the Representatives attending, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the Representatives attending who claim to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia. In the event of a dispute within the Assembly regarding the application of this provision, the Committee on Inter-Community Relations shall resolve the dispute.

Article 77

(1) The Assembly elects the Public Attorney by a majority vote of the total number of Representatives, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the total number of Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia.

(2) The Public Attorney protects the constitutional rights and legal rights of citizens when violated by bodies of state administration and by other bodies and organizations with public mandates. The Public Attorney shall give particular attention to safeguarding the principles of non-discrimination and equitable representation of communities in public bodies at all levels and in other areas of public life.

Article 78

(1) The Assembly shall establish a Committee for Inter-Community Relations.

(2) The Committee consists of seven members each from the ranks of the Macedonians and Albanians within the Assembly, and five members from among the Turks, Vlachs, Romanies and two other communities. The five members each shall be from a different community; if fewer than five other communities are represented in the Assembly, the Public Attorney, after consultation with relevant community leaders, shall propose the remaining members from outside the Assembly.

(3) The Assembly elects the members of the Committee.

(4) The Committee considers issues of inter-community relations in the Republic and makes appraisals and proposals for their solution.

(5) The Assembly is obliged to take into consideration the appraisals and proposals of the Committee and to make decisions regarding them.

(6) In the event of a dispute among members of the Assembly regarding the application of the voting procedure specified in Article 69(2), the Committee shall decide by majority vote whether the procedure applies.
Article 84
The President of the Republic of Macedonia

- proposes the members of the Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations; (to be deleted) . . .

Article 86
(1) The President of the Republic is President of the Security Council of the Republic of Macedonia.

(2) The Security Council of the Republic is composed of the President of the Republic, the President of the Assembly, the Prime Minister, the Ministers heading the bodies of state administration in the fields of security, defence and foreign affairs and three members appointed by the President of the Republic. In appointing the three members, the President shall ensure that the Security Council as a whole equitably reflects the composition of the population of Macedonia.

(3) The Council considers issues relating to the security and defence of the Republic and makes policy proposals to the Assembly and the Government.

Article 104
(1) The Republican Judicial Council is composed of seven members.

(2) The Assembly elects the members of the Council. Three of the members shall be elected by a majority vote of the total number of Representatives, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the total number of Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia.

Article 109
(1) The Constitutional Court of Macedonia is composed of nine judges.

(2) The Assembly elects six of the judges to the Constitutional Court by a majority vote of the total number of Representatives. The Assembly elects three of the judges by a majority vote of the total number of Representatives, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the total number of Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia.

Article 114

(5) Local self-government is regulated by a law adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the total number of Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia. The laws on local finances, local elections, boundaries of municipalities, and the city of Skopje shall be adopted by a majority vote of the Representatives attending, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the Representatives attending who claim to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia.

Article 115
(1) In units of local self-government, citizens directly and through representatives participate in decisionmaking on issues of local relevance particularly in the fields of public services, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, local finances, communal activities, culture, sport, social security and child care, education, health care and other fields determined by law.

Article 131

(1) The decision to initiate a change in the Constitution is made by the Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives.
(2) The draft amendment to the Constitution is confirmed by the Assembly by a majority vote of the total number of Representatives and then submitted to public debate.
(3) The decision to change the Constitution is made by the Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives.
(4) A decision to amend the Preamble, the articles on local self-government, Article 131, any provision relating to the rights of members of communities, including in particular Articles 7, 8, 9, 19, 48, 56, 69, 77, 78, 86, 104 and 109, as well as a decision to add any new provision relating to the subject matter of such provisions and articles, shall require a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the total number of Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia.
(5) The change in the Constitution is declared by the Assembly.

ANNEX B

LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATIONS

The parties will take all necessary measures to ensure the adoption of the legislative changes set forth hereafter within the time limits specified.

1. Law on Local Self-Government
The Assembly shall adopt within 45 days from the signing of the Framework Agreement a revised Law on Local Self-Government. This revised Law shall in no respect be less favorable to the units of local self-government and their autonomy than the draft Law proposed by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia in March 2001. The Law shall include competencies relating to the subject matters set forth in Section 3.1 of the Framework Agreement as additional independent competencies of the units of local self-government, and shall conform to Section 6.6 of the Framework Agreement. In addition, the Law shall provide that any State standards or procedures established in any laws concerning areas in which municipalities have independent competencies shall be limited to those which cannot be established as effectively at the local level; such laws shall further promote the municipalities' independent exercise of their competencies.

2. Law on Local Finance
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of the term of the present Assembly a law on local self-government finance to ensure that the units of local self-government have sufficient resources to
carry out their tasks under the revised Law on Local Self-Government. In particular, the law shall:
- Enable and make responsible units of local self-government for raising a substantial amount of tax revenue;
- Provide for the transfer to the units of local self-government of a part of centrally raised taxes that corresponds to the functions of the units of local self-government and that takes account of the collection of taxes on their territories; and
- Ensure the budgetary autonomy and responsibility of the units of local self-government within their areas of competence.

3. Law on Municipal Boundaries
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of 2002 a revised law on municipal boundaries, taking into account the results of the census and the relevant guidelines set forth in the Law on Local Self-Government.

4. Laws Pertaining to Police Located in the Municipalities
The Assembly shall adopt before the end of the term of the present Assembly provisions ensuring:
- That each local head of the police is selected by the council of the municipality concerned from a list of not fewer than three candidates proposed by the Ministry of the Interior, among whom at least one candidate shall belong to the community in the majority in the municipality. In the event the municipal council fails to select any of the candidates proposed within 15 days, the Ministry of the Interior shall propose a second list of not fewer than three new candidates, among whom at least one candidate shall belong to the community in the majority in the municipality. If the municipal council again fails to select any of the candidates proposed within 15 days, the Minister of the Interior, after consultation with the Government, shall select the local head of police from among the two lists of candidates proposed by the Ministry of the Interior as well as three additional candidates proposed by the municipal council;
- That each local head of the police informs regularly and upon request the council of the municipality concerned;
- That a municipal council may make recommendations to the local head of police in areas including public security and traffic safety; and
- That a municipal council may adopt annually a report regarding matters of public safety, which shall be addressed to the Minister of the Interior and the Public Attorney (Ombudsman).

5. Laws on the Civil Service and Public Administration
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of the term of the present Assembly amendments to the laws on the civil service and public administration to ensure equitable representation of communities in accordance with Section 4.2 of the Framework Agreement.

6. Law on Electoral Districts
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of 2002 a revised Law on Electoral Districts, taking into account the results of the census and the principles set forth in the Law on the Election of Members for the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia.

7. Rules of the Assembly
The Assembly shall amend by the end of the term of the present Assembly its Rules of Procedure to enable the use of the Albanian language in accordance with Section 6.5 of the Framework Agreement, paragraph 8 below, and the relevant amendments to the Constitution set forth in Annex A.

8. Laws Pertinent to the Use of Languages
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of the term of the present Assembly new legislation regulating the use of languages in the organs of the Republic of Macedonia. This legislation shall provide that:
- Representatives may address plenary sessions and working bodies of the Assembly in languages referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Constitution (as amended in accordance with Annex A);
- Laws shall be published in the languages referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Constitution (as amended in accordance with Annex A); and
- All public officials may write their names in the alphabet of any language referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Constitution (as amended in accordance with Annex A) on any official documents. The Assembly also shall adopt by the end of the term of the present Assembly new legislation on the issuance of personal documents. The Assembly shall amend by the end of the term of the present Assembly all relevant laws to make their provisions on the use of languages fully compatible with Section 6 of the Framework Agreement.

9. Law on the Public Attorney
The Assembly shall amend by the end of 2002 the Law on the Public Attorney as well as the other relevant laws to ensure:
- That the Public Attorney shall undertake actions to safeguard the principles of non-discrimination and equitable representation of communities in public bodies at all levels and in other areas of public life, and that there are adequate resources and personnel within his office to enable him to carry out this function;
- That the Public Attorney establishes decentralized offices;
- That the budget of the Public Attorney is voted separately by the Assembly;
- That the Public Attorney shall present an annual report to the Assembly and, where appropriate, may upon request present reports to the councils of municipalities in which decentralized offices are established; and
- That the powers of the Public Attorney are enlarged:
  - To grant to him access to and the opportunity to examine all official documents, it being understood that the Public Attorney and his staff will not disclose confidential information;
  - To enable the Public Attorney to suspend, pending a decision of the competent court, the execution of an administrative act, if he determines that the act may result in an irreparable prejudice to the rights of the interested person; and
  - To give to the Public Attorney the right to contest the conformity of laws with the Constitution before the Constitutional Court.

10. Other Laws
The Assembly shall enact all legislative provisions that may be necessary to give full effect to the Framework Agreement and amend or abrogate all provisions incompatible with the Framework
Agreement.

ANNEX C
IMPLEMENTATION AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

1. International Support

1.1. The parties invite the international community to facilitate, monitor and assist in the implementation of the provisions of the Framework Agreement and its Annexes, and request such efforts to be coordinated by the EU in cooperation with the Stabilization and Association Council.

2. Census and Elections

2.1. The parties confirm the request for international supervision by the Council of Europe and the European Commission of a census to be conducted in October 2001.
2.2. Parliamentary elections will be held by 27 January 2002. International organizations, including the OSCE, will be invited to observe these elections.

3. Refugee Return, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

3.1. All parties will work to ensure the return of refugees who are citizens or legal residents of Macedonia and displaced persons to their homes within the shortest possible timeframe, and invite the international community and in particular UNHCR to assist in these efforts.
3.2. The Government with the participation of the parties will complete an action plan within 30 days after the signature of the Framework Agreement for rehabilitation of and reconstruction in areas affected by the hostilities. The parties invite the international community to assist in the formulation and implementation of this plan.
3.3. The parties invite the European Commission and the World Bank to rapidly convene a meeting of international donors after adoption in the Assembly of the Constitutional amendments in Annex A and the revised Law on Local Self-Government to support the financing of measures to be undertaken for the purpose of implementing the Framework Agreement and its Annexes, including measures to strengthen local self-government and reform the police services, to address macro-financial assistance to the Republic of Macedonia, and to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction measures identified in the action plan identified in paragraph 3.2.

4. Development of Decentralized Government

4.1. The parties invite the international community to assist in the process of strengthening local self-government. The international community should in particular assist in preparing the necessary legal amendments related to financing mechanisms for strengthening the financial basis of municipalities and building their financial management capabilities, and in amending the law on the boundaries of municipalities.

5. Non-Discrimination and Equitable Representation

5.1. Taking into account i.a. the recommendations of the already established governmental commission, the parties will take concrete action to increase the representation of members of communities not in the majority in Macedonia in public administration, the military, and public
enterprises, as well as to improve their access to public financing for business development.

5.2. The parties commit themselves to ensuring that the police services will by 2004 generally reflect the composition and distribution of the population of Macedonia. As initial steps toward this end, the parties commit to ensuring that 500 new police officers from communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia will be hired and trained by July 2002, and that these officers will be deployed to the areas where such communities live. The parties further commit that 500 additional such officers will be hired and trained by July 2003, and that these officers will be deployed on a priority basis to the areas throughout Macedonia where such communities live. The parties invite the international community to support and assist with the implementation of these commitments, in particular through screening and selection of candidates and their training. The parties invite the OSCE, the European Union, and the United States to send an expert team as quickly as possible in order to assess how best to achieve these objectives.

5.3. The parties also invite the OSCE, the European Union, and the United States to increase training and assistance programs for police, including:
- professional, human rights, and other training;
- technical assistance for police reform, including assistance in screening, selection and promotion processes;
- development of a code of police conduct;
- cooperation with respect to transition planning for hiring and deployment of police officers from communities not in the majority in Macedonia; and
- deployment as soon as possible of international monitors and police advisors in sensitive areas, under appropriate arrangements with relevant authorities.

5.4. The parties invite the international community to assist in the training of lawyers, judges and prosecutors from members of communities not in the majority in Macedonia in order to be able to increase their representation in the judicial system.

6. Culture, Education and Use of Languages

6.1. The parties invite the international community, including the OSCE, to increase its assistance for projects in the area of media in order to further strengthen radio, TV and print media, including Albanian language and multiethnic media. The parties also invite the international community to increase professional media training programs for members of communities not in the majority in Macedonia. The parties also invite the OSCE to continue its efforts on projects designed to improve inter-ethnic relations.

6.2. The parties invite the international community to provide assistance for the implementation of the Framework Agreement in the area of higher education.
APPENDIX B:
SPEECHES PRESENTED BY EU REPRESENTATIVES


Fouéré, E. (2007, June 27). Speech delivered at the marking of Promotion of the Programme for Stimulating Investments in RM 2007-2010, Skopje,


Rehn, O. (2008, September 18). Speech delivered at the Czech MFA conference on the EU and Western Balkans “The EU and the Western Balkans: the
Critical Year of 2009,” Prague, Czech Republic. Retrieved from
http://www.delmkd.ec.europa.eu/en/key-information/key-
speeches/Speech%20Commissioner%20Rehn.pdf

Rehn, O. (2009, November 23). Speech delivered at the opening of the exhibition
Hani-Bal-kan Ante Portas, Brussels, Belgium. Retrieved from
http://www.delmkd.ec.europa.eu/en/key-information/key-
speeches/Speaking%20points%20-%20Rehn%20ANTE%20PORTAS.pdf
APPENDIX C:
SPEECHES PRESENTED BY REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE MACEDONIAN GOVERNMENT


Milososki, A. (2007, October 18). “The Republic of Macedonia – Tests passed and challenges ahead.” Speech presented at the London School of Economics, London, UK. Retrieved from https://docs.google.com/a/seeu.edu.mk/viewer?a=v&q=cache:kYwd8yzQ9scJ:www2.lse.ac.uk/assets/richmedia/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/transcripts/20071018_Macedonia_tr.pdf+&hl=en&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESg_Cov8ObMrxYYgEO_WS47F1oxcdPy0xkHzz_G8RZhOAMdfztdeEDWJPe359e-pK1BOtfuG1yv8bKgQX - hebQGlpMrxsSHPyHrfy_veqYp36qNbEYWPNoiOLIER_Lcmuqf58PCL&s ig=AHIEtbRnrPXTCwmY8Uv9mUuEoreRyTelJw


