SEND IN THE...SCHOLARS?:

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the creation and implementation of the 1961 Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act. Specifically, this thesis focuses on the Fulbright program as it was implemented as part of U.S. foreign policy from 1961-1970. It looks at the ways in which educational exchanges were used in U.S. foreign policy to meet Cold War pressures and restore the U.S. image abroad, and investigates the means in which short-term political goals disrupted policies that required time to fully develop.

Throughout the 1960s, there were many attempts to reorganize and coordinate educational and cultural activities, but the different views on the purpose of these activities kept at bay any type of effort to consolidate them into one Bureau. I argue that policymaker’s inability to come to a solid consensus on the purpose for educational and cultural exchange stunted the development of the Fulbright program and significantly contributed to its large budget reduction in 1970. Overall, this is the historical account of a period when the U.S. took multi-faceted approaches to public diplomacy and went to great lengths to branch out with international person-to-person exchanges.
To God and my Family
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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INTRODUCTION:
Send in the…Scholars?

“The fundamental requirement for a world community of good neighbors is that all different peoples achieve a broader and deeper mutual understanding of each other. Such an understanding can be promoted through people to people contacts outside formal diplomatic channels. We may not be able to buy friends even if we tried—and our policies have at times invited such criticism—but we can win them through programs which allow foreigners to get to know us and us to know them.”¹ –Senator J.W. Fulbright

Since 1946, there have been over 300,000 people, both Americans and foreign nationals, sponsored by the Fulbright program under the United States government. From a dozen countries in the late 1940s, the U.S. has expanded the Fulbright exchange program to reach over 150 countries in recent years.² This program can be seen as the “trend setter” for international educational exchange and is one of the oldest and most renowned international programs of the U.S. government.

The Fulbright program had its beginnings in the early 1940s. Having witnessed the devastating consequences and tragedies of World War II, J. William Fulbright, the persuasive Senator from Arkansas, devoted himself to creating ways of avoiding similar catastrophes. The fundamental idea of the Fulbright Act was to channel funds from the sale of surplus military into educational scholarships, literally swords into plowshares.³ The initial legislation, however, provided no funding for bringing citizens of other countries to the United States. It would take separate legislation to make it a true exchange. The United States Information and Educational

Exchange Act of 1948 (also known as the Smith-Mundt Act) established the programming mandate that still serves as the foundation for U.S. overseas information and cultural programs.  

The Fulbright program became an instant success and received critical acclaim from both participants and government officials in its early phases. Efforts to expand educational and cultural exchanges were first initiated by the Eisenhower administration. Eisenhower’s establishment of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) in 1953 assisted in the expansion of mutual educational and cultural exchange programs, but by 1960 these programs were starting to lose support abroad in response to Eisenhower’s propaganda operations. President Eisenhower’s informational and educational propaganda campaigns were seen as U.S. ideological endorsement programs rather than exchange programs. The Kennedy administration attempted to restore apolitical educational and cultural exchanges with the promotion of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961.

On September 16, 1961, Congress passed the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act (also known as the Fulbright-Hays Act) in order “to strengthen the ties which unite the U.S. with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations.” This new act differed from those of the past, because it stressed “mutual understanding between the people of the United States and other countries” rather than “a better understanding between people of the United States and other countries (Smith-Mundt Act)”. This legislation consolidated all operating educational and cultural exchange activities under one umbrella with the intention of preserving their apolitical nature.

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The 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act became the basic law through which all U.S. government-sponsored educational and cultural exchanges were carried out with other countries. The tasks of operating educational and cultural activities under this act were shared by four existing bodies of government: the State Department, United States Information Agency (USIA), the U.S. Agency of International Development (AID), and the Office of Education (OE). Each of these agencies defined the use of educational and cultural activities by its own criteria, purposes, mandates, and self-image. Throughout this period, U.S. policymakers bickered over the structure, funding, and purposes of mutual educational and cultural activities. Nevertheless, these programs received an unprecedented amount of support and funding throughout the first five years of its inception. From 1961-1965 the U.S. sent over 9,900 Fulbright grantees to various countries, and the government dedicated over $189,000,000 to mutual educational and cultural exchange activities. But by end of 1965, unfortunately, this good fortune would take a turn for the worse, as the U.S. increased their intervention in Vietnam.

U.S. involvement in Vietnam swiftly drained funds from various U.S. government agencies and programs, and placed them into the U.S. Department of Defense. Along with the Vietnam War, U.S. government spending was also tied up with a number of social welfare programs that were connected with President Johnson’s “War on Poverty” legislation, which was a direct response to the national poverty rate. During this period mutual educational and cultural exchange activities witnessed major setbacks as a result of the lack of funding for their programs. In 1969, after the largest reduction of the decade, the budget for educational and cultural exchange activities hit an all time low of $31,309,000. During the Nixon administration, government funding for cultural activities never recovered from the slash of 1969. From a high point of $53,007,000 in 1966, government support for mutual educational and cultural activities
would dwindle down to $32,125,000 by 1970. International educational grants awarded to U.S. citizens by the U.S. government greatly expanded during the decade of the 1960s, but by 1969 government support of U.S. citizens going abroad reached its lowest point since 1949.

Figure 1: Total Grants Awarded to US Citizens, 1949-1970

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In recent years, the term public diplomacy has been associated with the Fulbright program, but this term has been continually defined and redefined throughout the years.

According to Nicholas J. Cull, a prominent professor of public diplomacy at University of Southern California, the term public policy was “first applied in 1965 to the process by which international actors seek to accomplish the goals of foreign policy by engaging with foreign
publics and has gained international currency only since the end of the Cold War.”  

In his article, he establishes a simple taxonomy of public diplomacy, dividing its practices into five elements: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international broadcasting. According to Cull, “listening is an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by collecting and collating data about publics and their opinions overseas and using that data to redirect its wider public diplomacy approach accordingly.” He believes that this element precedes all successful public diplomacy. Advocacy refers to “the actor’s efforts to manage the international environment by undertaking an international communication activity to actively promote a particular policy, idea, or that actor’s general interests in the minds of a foreign public.” Cultural diplomacy is “an actor’s attempt to control the international environment through making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad.” Exchange diplomacy refers to an “actor’s attempt to direct the international environment by sending its citizens overseas and reciprocally accepting citizens from overseas for a period of study and/or acculturation.” Cull states that exchange diplomacy’s element of reciprocity “has tended to make this area of public diplomacy a bastion of the concept of ‘mutuality’.” And finally, “international news broadcasting is an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by using the technologies of radio, television, and the internet to engage with foreign publics.”

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7 Ibid, 33-35.
Placing the Fulbright program under the element of exchange diplomacy, Cull contends that “exchanges often overlap with cultural work but are also used for specific policy and/or advocacy purposes as when targeted for development...” He continues, “When housed within a cultural diplomacy agency, the aspect of mutuality and two-way communication within exchange has sometimes been subordinated to the drive to project national culture.” Authors Liping Bu and Frank Ninkovich share the same belief as Cull, and, through their historical works, have demonstrated how this has taken place throughout the Cold War.

Liping Bu provides a deep look into Cold War fears by examining how culture played a unique role in the contention for international power politics and how such contention reshaped the relationship of the American state and society. In her article, Educational Exchange and Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War, Bu explains how cultural relations programs began to be organized and designed in accordance with national security interests. She argues that the “immediate political objectives of the Cold War shaped government exchange programs.” Her article demonstrates how policymakers came to support educational exchange when they saw the usefulness of exchange in fighting the Cold War from the mid-1940s throughout the 1950s. Similarly, Frank Ninkovich contends that public diplomacy is a “quite fuzzy” concept. In his book *U.S. Informational Policy and Cultural Diplomacy*, he argues that “although cultural diplomacy has been part of U.S. foreign policy since before World War II and information programs have existed since 1942, Americans have never felt fully at ease with either. Never has there been unanimous agreement on their propriety or usefulness.” By examining the development of public diplomacy from the early 1930s to the late 1970s, Ninkovich illustrates

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8 Ibid, 33.
10 Ibid, 408.
the how government-run educational exchanges were altered to meet wartime goals throughout the Cold War.\textsuperscript{11} This thesis expands upon the existing literature by examining the political thought process behind the development of educational exchanges within the U.S. government throughout the 1960s.

It is important that the elements of public diplomacy remain distinct from one another. Recent developments in public diplomacy have attempted to place the elements of advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international news broadcasting into one concept called soft power. “Soft power” is a term coined by Joseph Nye who defined it as “the ability to affect others to obtain what one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment.” He states that “soft power is not merely influence…it is also the source of influence…it is also the ability to entice and attract.” Advocates of this concept believe that soft power derives from culture if that culture is admired and respected. He contends that the most important sources of U.S. soft power are American music, films, television programs, and education.\textsuperscript{12} This concept substitutes “mutual understanding”, which is at the heart of exchange diplomacy, with “influence”. In doing so, soft power focuses on the unilateral aspect of educational exchange rather than its bilateral purposes. The premise of soft power is nothing new, though. All throughout the Cold War, policymakers looked to U.S. culture to influence the hearts and minds of various foreign citizens. In highlighting these policymaker’s efforts throughout the 1960s, this thesis will illustrate the consequences of associating bilateral educational exchange activities with concepts of influence.


No study exists specifically on the creation of the 1961 Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act and the reasons for its collapse in 1968. Such an analysis seems long overdue. There are numerous books on first-hand accounts of the “Fulbright” experience. The two pieces of literature that best capture the experiences of the two-way flow of international educational exchange from 1961-1970 are *The Fulbright Experience: Encounters and Transformations 1946-1986* and *The Fulbright Difference*. These works admirably demonstrate the effectiveness and benefits of having international educational exchange programs as a part of U.S. foreign policy, but they do not fully capture the overall history of the program. *The Fulbright Program: A History* written by Walter Johnson and Francis Colligan also provides an account of the creation of the Fulbright program from 1946-1961, revealing some of the trials and tribulations of getting exchange programs started, keeping them going, and maintaining morale during the dark and discouraging days of the McCarthy period. It is one of two known secondary sources that provide a fairly accurate non-biased view of the Fulbright program’s early beginnings. The second is *The Culture of Freedom: The Small World of Fulbright Scholars* written by Leonard R. Sussman. Published in 1992, this book provides the most up-to-date assessment of the Fulbright program. Sussman examines the accomplishments, problems, and promise of the Fulbright program. He argues that “America needs a cultural policy far more extensive than it has ever attempted. And it needs a revitalized Fulbright program as an integral part of that policy.”

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of why the funding decreased after 1968. They also fail to problematize the tensions between soft power and mutual understanding. This research intends to plug this missing piece of history into existing “Fulbright” literature.

In the chapters that follow is a historical study which examines the creation and implementation of the 1961 Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act. Specifically, this research focuses on the Fulbright program as it was implemented as part of U.S. foreign policy from 1961-1970. It looks at the ways in which educational exchanges were used in U.S. foreign policy to meet Cold War pressures and to restore the image of the United States abroad, and investigates the means by which short-term political goals disrupted policies that required more time to develop fully. A few forewarnings seem in order. First, since this study is centered on U.S. foreign policy, the focus of this research is exclusively on U.S. policymakers and U.S. “Fulbrighters” (lecturers and teachers) abroad. There is little attempt to address the issues involving foreign “Fulbrighters” in the United States during this period. Second, while most historical narratives use first-hand accounts of the “Fulbright” experience to capture the essence of the program, this treatment is interested in the program from the point of view of those in Washington (presidents, congressmen, senators, agency employees, etc).

The decade of the 1960s witnessed the largest worldwide educational exchange expansion in history. During this period there were many attempts to reorganize and coordinate educational and cultural activities, but the different views on the purpose of these activities kept at bay any type of effort to consolidate them into one Bureau. In summarizing the major problems that surrounded the implementation of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act, Charles Frankel, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (1965- 1967), claimed that there were three clashing governmental point of views, which prevailed for twenty years or more,
toward educational and cultural activities that prevented a consolidated effort in the direction of cultural diplomacy. The first believed that educational and cultural exchanges were “activities in which the government of the United States is interested only because they serve the purpose of winning friends and influencing people;” the second saw them as “instruments for producing the trained manpower that other countries need and thus promoting their economic progress;” and the third viewed them as a means which gave people more perspective on themselves as much as on others.14 I argue that policymaker’s inability to come to a solid consensus on the purpose for educational and cultural exchange stunted the development of the Fulbright program and significantly contributed to its large budget reduction in 1970.

The narrative is divided into three chapters. The first chapter opens up with an overview of the creation of the Fulbright Act in 1946 to its promotion by way of the Fulbright-Hays Act in 1961. It traces the influences that shaped the sponsorship of an international educational and cultural exchange effort within U.S. government, and explains how Cold War fears caused U.S. policymakers to reshape educational and cultural exchange programs to fit wartime goals. From the time the Fulbright program was developed, policymakers differed on its purposes and aims. Attempting to distance themselves from propaganda, which was a term that acquired a negative connotation after WWII, U.S. policymakers searched for different methods through which they could counter a clever Soviet propaganda campaign. In developing their methods, policymakers inadvertently linked government-run information, “technical assistance”, and educational exchange programs into one category. As a result, educational exchange programs were viewed to not only increase mutual understanding, but also to influence foreign publics in promotion of U.S. national interest and provide technical assistance.

Chapter two follows the creation, implementation and funding of the Fulbright- Hays Act from 1961-1965. It explains how policymaker’s failure to address the organizational relationships between the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) and the United States Information Agency (USIA) left the Fulbright program, along with other educational and cultural programs, in the hands of the USIA agents unconcerned with mutual understanding, only with U.S. national interest. This chapter draws attention to the bureaucratic disputes between agencies on the purpose of educational exchanges, the methods in which various policymakers measured the success of mutual educational and cultural exchange activities, such as the Fulbright program, and the congressional debates on the importance of having a government sponsored educational exchange program.

The third chapter explores the Fulbright program from 1965-1970. It examines how participants of the Fulbright program and policymakers reacted to the confusion surrounding government sponsored educational and cultural exchanges, as well as their response to the budget reductions of mutual exchange activities. To illustrate how educational exchange programs were compromised by the USIA, this chapter provides a case study of government-sponsored educational and cultural exchange programs abroad in Latin America throughout the 1960s. It also explores how the Vietnam War dealt a crucial blow to exchange activities, and explains why policymaker’s lost faith in educational and cultural exchanges throughout this period.

The recurring questions of funding, coordination, and purpose by policymakers have continued to disturb the progress of the Fulbright program well into the twenty-first century. Examining how the Fulbright program was organized and implemented from 1961-1970 will provide us with a clear understanding of how these recurring questions developed and will
hopefully supply tentative answers to aid in the betterment of the Fulbright program. Overall, this is the historical account of a period when the U.S. took multi-faceted approaches to public diplomacy and went to great lengths to branch out with international person-to-person exchanges. This research intends to highlight the value of having a strong educational exchange policy in U.S diplomacy, as well as the problems that arise from it.
CHAPTER I  
Plowshares into Swords:  
The creation of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act

“Of all the examples in recent history of beating sword into plowshares, of having some benefit come to humanity out of the destruction of war, I think that this program and its results will be most prominent.”

-President Kennedy at the White House ceremony on August 1, 1961 marking the 15th anniversary of the Fulbright Act

As the dust settled from World War II, the survivors took an opportunity to reflect on the self-destructive behavior they were passing on to future generations. The horrendous amount of lives lost from World War II, some 40 million soldiers and civilians, led politicians and intellectuals from around the world to search for ways to prevent another catastrophe like this from taking place. The war had established connections among different parts of the world that, up till then, remained apart. Determined to strengthen the international community and maintain peace, nations from around the world joined together in a concerted effort to safeguard the rights of humanity through international cooperation. In 1945, some fifty-one nations attended the first post-WWII meeting of the United Nations. Along with a number of different initiatives, the United Nations would create and support an array of international educational and cultural exchange opportunities.

In the United States, Senator J. William Fulbright took the lead in promoting educational exchange. In 1945, the Fayetteville, Arkansas native introduced a bill in the United States Congress that called for the use of proceeds from the sale of surplus war property to fund “the promotion of international good will through the exchange of students in the fields of education,

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1 The International Educational and Cultural Exchange Program, “Principal Features,” 14. – See Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, file EDX 5, box 103-11, Historical Collection, Special Collections Sections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
2 Bevis, International Students in American Colleges and Universities, 103.
culture, and science.” Such a program, he believed, would do much to help rid the world of the twin evils of parochialism and nationalism.

No sooner had the bill been introduced to Congress than the world experienced another war of a different nature, a war over the hearts and minds of the world. Prominent Cold War historian, Melvyn P. Leffler, describes the Cold War as “the struggle for the soul of mankind.” The two new superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, faced each other over a distraught world. Unlike the end of the First World War, when Americans faced the prospect of sharing their newfound authority with European allies who could bring themselves to acknowledge their time had passed, U.S. policymakers expected that other nations would beg for guidance and leadership from the New World. But the Soviets, apprehensive of American intentions and with aspirations of its own global leadership, were not cooperative.

Ideological differences would set the stage for a war that would be fought on the land of emerging nations. Both sets of leaders, in Moscow and Washington, believed that their form of government held the blueprint for a successful society. The nationalistic views and personal experiences of Soviet and U.S. officials affected their construction of “reality”- their perception of threats and opportunities in a tumultuous world. By 1947, the tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was evident among political leaders, diplomats, and publicists around the world. Known as the Cold War, this global ideological struggle, between Soviet style

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communism and Western capitalism and democracy, would influence foreign polices and shape domestic politics for the next forty five years.\(^5\)

During the Cold War, international educational and cultural exchange went from being viewed as the key to building an interdependent world community to being seen as major tools for victory. Feeling threatened by, in their opinion, an effective Soviet propaganda strategy, the U.S. embarked on seeking ways to counter Soviet propaganda with information efforts of their own. The father of containment policy, George F. Kennan, urged: “let us by all means have the maximum cultural exchange.” The mission of cultural contact, according to Kennan, was, “combating the negative impressions about this country [USA] that marks so much world opinion.” It would be in this world that the Fulbright program would develop. In order to compete with, in the mind of U.S. policymakers, a sophisticated Soviet propaganda, the U.S. would use educational exchanges as informational tools which projected favorable images of the United States as represented by its abundance in both wealth and knowledge. It is important to point out, however, that U.S. - sponsored educational exchange was not created to be a propaganda tool, but rather was transformed into one over time.\(^6\)

On September 16, 1961, Congress passed the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act (also known as the Fulbright-Hays Act) in order “to strengthen the ties which unite the U.S. with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations.”\(^7\) This act consolidated various U.S. international educational and cultural exchanges, including the translation of books and periodicals, and U.S. representation in international fairs and expositions. What inspired

\(^5\) Lefler, *Soul of Mankind*, 8; Schulzinger, *Cold War*, 162.
policymakers to increase the funding for the Fulbright program in 1961? How did this act differ from those of the past? What were policymakers expecting to gain from an increase in mutual educational and cultural exchange?

The following narrative will explore the classic policy issues behind the complexities of policy implementation. In all stages of the policy process there are various groups and individuals who try to influence what the policymakers and implementers do and how they proceed. Instead of being fixed in number, content, or duration, implementation activities constantly change during the lifetime of any policy or program. The successful implementation of a policy is dependent on a number of variables. Because of this, policies or programs, usually, never achieve all that is expected of them. This chapter will investigate the process of the bill after it becomes a law. It will follow certain political actors and agencies in order to emphasize the multifaceted routes of policy implementation. This chapter will argue that the 1961 Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act was signed into law based on misconstrued expectations of what “educational exchange” could cultivate. It will explain how these expectations of the Kennedy administration were not naive, but rather a result of past policymakers’ misinterpretation of the purpose of “exchange” and incorrect definition of “mutual understanding.” This chapter will follow the Fulbright program from its early inceptions in 1945 to its promotion by way of the Fulbright-Hays Act in 1961.8

At the dawn of the creation of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act President Kennedy stated that, “Of all the examples in recent history of beating sword into plowshares, of having some benefit come to humanity out of the destruction of war, I think that this program [the Fulbright program] and its results will be most prominent.” This chapter will explore how these same

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plowshares were gradually altered into weapons of cultural warfare against the Soviet threat. It will consist of three major sections; Section one will explore Senator Fulbright’s intention for promoting an exchange program and follow the Fulbright program’s early beginnings from 1946 to 1950. The second section will investigate the program’s amalgamation into President Truman and Eisenhower’s anti-communist campaigns, while the final section will examine the thought process behind the Kennedy administration’s endorsement of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays bill.

The Creation of the 1946 Fulbright Act

The early twentieth century marked a period in world history when media technologies and information resources were exploding everywhere. Public opinion expanded from the local arena to a worldwide stage as advancements in technology became more accessible to people around the world. As communication developed, more and more people became inter-connected with the world around them, which in turn led to the creation of mass media, mass politics, mass ideologies and mass societies. These mass movements had an effect on the way the world moved. By the end of World War I, nations throughout Europe and Asia became actively involved in using this new form of mass communication as a means of achieving favorable foreign policy outcomes. It was during this period the term “propaganda”- any technique or action that attempted to influence the emotions, attitudes, or behavior of a group, usually to serve the interests of the sponsor- fell into disrepute and received a negative connotation. Although “propaganda” was nothing new in the U.S. during this period, WWII marked the beginning of a concerted effort by the U.S. government to use this mechanism of information to attack the Axis.10

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During the 1930s, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration was actively involved in both propaganda and cultural exchange activities, mainly throughout Latin America, with the aim of creating hemispheric solidarity against the Axis (Germany, Italy, and Japan). On January 30, 1936, in response to Nazi propaganda efforts, President Roosevelt, sent letters to the presidents of the twenty Latin American countries suggesting they meet and discuss “how the maintenance of peace among the American Republic may be best safeguarded.” The meeting was followed by a number of proposed U.S. government cultural exchange and information programs throughout the hemisphere. Before WWII, informational and cultural exchanges operated under the auspices of non-governmental international agencies and commercial industries. The creation of various government information agencies, such as the Division of Cultural Relations, the Office of War (OWI), and the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), in the 1930s marked the beginning of U.S government involvement in information distribution. In the years of WWII, the State Department strengthened the Division of Cultural Relations with minimal expansions of cultural exchange to China, Africa, and the Near East. These projects were separated from other wartime information agencies that were associated with “propaganda” efforts. With the ending of WWII, the Truman administration raised the question to whether the United States government should revert to its traditional policy of nonintervention in overseas information activities and of indirect or limited participation in transitional cultural affairs. Propaganda and cultural exchange activities were very active during

WWII. But by the end of the war, government-run wartime information programs had run their course. It was uncommon for U.S. government agencies to provide information to foreign peoples in times of peace. Yet post-war realities would lead to the continuation of such activities, albeit in different form.

The post-war era witnessed the creation of an array of both intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations dedicated to economic and social progress through educational exchange. The Intellectual Cooperation Organization, the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) were just a few organizations that devoted considerable portions of their resources to continuing and expanding educational exchange. Going along with peacetime movements, the Truman administration wasted no time in dismantling their wartime agencies. On August 31, 1945 President Truman signed an Executive Order (No. 9608) which established in the Department of State an Interim International Information Service (IIIS), to which the sharply reduced overseas informational activities of the two wartime agencies (the OWI, and the CIAA) were transferred. Truman declared that “the nature of present-day foreign relations makes it essential for the United State to maintain informational activities abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs.” The “informational activities” of the Truman administration were “to provide a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the U.S. government.”

Within a year, a new agency was created to administer these expanding responsibilities. On January 1, 1946, guided by Secretary of State William Benton, the U.S. would establish its first post-WWII cultural/informational agency called the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC). This office expanded the IIIS and included five operating divisions.
Managed by the Department of State, this agency ran both cultural and information programs abroad. There were no major bureaucratic differences between the IIIS and the OIC. The IIIS was responsible for providing “a full and fair picture of American life and policies of the United States Government”, and the OIC’s fundamental aim was to “advance the cause of peace through fostering clearer reciprocal understanding between the people of the US and those of other nations.” Both the IIIS and the OIC were heavily involved in information activities concerning radio, press, and publications abroad, but the OIC had sole control of operating government-ran exchange of persons programs.

Entering a believed period of peace, American leaders were more favorable toward cultural than information activities (which they had rightly linked with propaganda). Since the American public and Congress expressed a deep opposition to any governmental propaganda activities during this time of peace, educational exchange and person-to-person relationships were encouraged and promoted throughout the country by both universities and administration officials. Ultimately displaying a commitment to international understanding through exchange only, Congress enlarged the participation of the U.S. government in inter-cultural relations with the Fulbright Act of 1946.

Senator J. William Fulbright’s experiences as a Rhodes Scholar, university president, and law school professor played an important part in his scripting of the Fulbright Act. In recalling his nightmares of World War II, (the Nazi display of cruelty shown toward the Jews, and the millions of lives lost), Senator Fulbright stated that, “it was my thought that if large numbers of people know and understand the people from nations other than their own, they might develop a

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capacity for empathy, distaste for killing other men, and an inclination to peace.”¹⁴ This view motivated the Senator to create a means of educational and cultural exchange without digging too deep in the government’s pocket. Instead of a mass U.S. information or propaganda endeavor, Senator Fulbright proposed a scholarship bill that would soon lay the groundwork for the first large-scale effort by the U.S. government in the field of international educational exchange. Senator Fulbright hoped that this program would remove cultural blinders and foster tolerance and a sense of public service to those who, like him, were dedicated to the promotion of peace and cultural understanding.¹⁵

The Fulbright Act of 1946 was met with little attention and no opposition in Congress. The act asked for no new tax dollars and proposed using the foreign currencies piling up in war-stricken countries for a good cause. Amending the Surplus Property Act of 1944, so that some of the currencies and credits of other countries acquired by the United States through the sale of surplus property abroad might be used for educational exchanges, the President of the U.S., on August 1, 1946, signed the Fulbright Act.¹⁶ Senator Fulbright convinced those in Congress to allow allied countries who owed the U.S. money for surplus American-owned aircraft, equipment, and buildings, to keep these assets in exchange for contributing to the establishment of a local Fulbright educational program.¹⁷ The U.S. government had no intention of providing U.S. funding for educational exchange. The act clearly states that “there are no American dollars available under the act.” Since all funds are in foreign currencies, “the act does not provide for exchange between the continental United States and its territories nor does it provide means of

¹⁵Woods, Fulbright Internationalism, 35.
¹⁷Bevis, International Students in American Colleges and Universities, 104.
The Fulbright Act was unique in that the U.S. government gave the Board of Foreign Scholarships substantial control of the program to make sure that policy was not distorted by short-term political convenience. This board had ten members who worked to elucidate both the public and private functions of government sponsored educational and cultural exchange. These members represented cultural, educational, student and war veteran groups. There were also representatives from the United States Office of Education, the United States Veteran’s Administration, State educational institutions, and privately endowed educational institutions. This body was responsible for:

1. Approving policies for the educational programs under the act.
2. Approving the types of programs and projects to be undertaken
3. Selecting institutions to be approved for participation
4. Selecting all candidates, both American and foreign.  

It is important to note, however, that the Fulbright Act provided no offices overseas to the Board of Foreign Scholarships. Instead, the Department of State managed all Fulbright program activities abroad.

The Fulbright program thrived under the Board of Foreign Scholarships, and was seen as a successful apolitical program with universal appeal. In just two years of existence, the number of international education exchange students drastically increased from 6,954 in the academic

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19 Ibid, 3.
year of 1944-1945 to 17,218 in the academic year of 1947-1948.\textsuperscript{20} The Fulbright program became the archetype for U.S. government-sponsored cultural activities abroad.

While the Fulbright program was thriving in the field, a debate took place in the House of Representatives as to whether the United States should carry on abroad a program of propaganda. Distrust of the Soviet Union had led to the adoption of the “containment” policy that committed the United States to an extraordinary degree of global activism and leadership.\textsuperscript{21} Strong Soviet propaganda efforts were very visible throughout the world during the post-WWII period, making the U.S. determined to meet these threats head on with propaganda efforts of its own. In a 1947 meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Assistant Secretary of State William Benton, Former Ambassador of the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman, and Congressman John Davis Lodge debated the issue of government-sponsored propaganda programs. Secretary of State George C. Marshall stated that, “the important thing is to have people believe implicitly what we say.” Congressman John Davis Lodge contested that, “the American point of view should be presented with dynamic enthusiasm, passionate conviction, and a burning faith in the American way of life. Was not propaganda, therefore, essential although it should be more subtle and adroit than that of the totalitarian Communists?”\textsuperscript{22}

In 1947, worried about losing the war of ideas, in what was perceived as a sophisticated Communist propaganda apparatus, Senators Karl E. Mundt (Republican, South Dakota) and H. Alexander Smith (Republican, New Jersey) introduced a bill that pushed for a more aggressive information and cultural exchange program. The advocates of the bill consistently made

\textsuperscript{20} Committee on Friendly Relations, \textit{The Unofficial Ambassadors} (New York, 1949).
\textsuperscript{21} Ninkovich, \textit{Informational Policy}, 17.
\textsuperscript{22} See \textit{United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1947}, House Hearings on H.R.3342, 80th Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} session (1947).
reference to combating the harsh Soviet propaganda attacks on the U.S. They argued that the Soviets have accused the U.S. of being economic imperialist, and the U.S. needed a strong information program to make clear that the $12 billion they contributed to Europe was for feeding and reconstruction of war-devastated countries. Disbelief of the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda on U.S. influence abroad prompted certain members of Congress to personally examine the claims of Senators Mundt and Smith before they backed the passing of this bill. From 1946 to 1947, curious about the gravity of the cold war, half of the members of Congress made trips abroad. They were astonished at the deliberate distortion by Soviet propaganda and amazed by the widespread misunderstanding of the United States among various nations. On January 27, 1948, convinced that the U.S. was being misrepresented abroad, the Senate passed the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act. This legislation became the new charter for cultural and informational activities. Signed by President Truman into law, the Smith-Mundt (as it was known) expanded exchange programs to the rest of the world. This act provided other nations the money and guidance needed to undertake educational exchanges like those endorsed for Latin America in the 1930s period. In 1949, the House appropriated the Smith-Mundt Act with over $31 million dollars, about double of what was spent on the foreign information program the previous year.

The Smith-Mundt Act authorized academic exchanges under bi-national agreements which, in the beginning, were financed only by foreign currencies paid to the U.S. Government for the purchase of war surplus materials that remained in the various signatory countries after

24 Ibid, 66.
26 Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 11.
the war. Under the Smith-Mundt Act, however, the Fulbright program became global in scope and was provided continued funding when the sale of the wartime surplus had been exhausted. The act also funded both public and private organizations with some programs covertly operated by the CIA. Programs like the Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, the National Committee for a Free Europe, and the American Committee for Liberation were information programs used as weapons to combat communist propaganda with U.S. government money.

Due to the controversy surrounding the propaganda programs, debate again arose in the Senate over the distinction between informational and educational activities. This issue had been addressed during the latter half of 1947, when the Smith-Mundt Act had passed the House but was still under consideration by the Senate. Numerous committee members of the Association of American Colleges, the National Education Association, and the American Council of Education urged the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to separate the information’s programs from other cultural exchange activities. They argued that the American tradition favored the divorce of educational and cultural activities from the control of federal government. These educators believed that cultural exchange activities should, at all cost, stay clear from being linked with U.S. propaganda efforts. Such an association, they believed, would be viewed as cultural imperialism and devastate all efforts of mutual educational and cultural exchange. Senator H. Alexander Smith heard the cry of the educators, and established two separate offices within the bill before it’s signing in 1948. These two offices

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were under the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs of the Department of State: an Office of International Information (OII) and an Office of Educational Exchange (OEE).

The Smith-Mundt Act defined the purpose of the Office of Information as to “disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people, and the policies promulgated by the Congress, the President, the Secretary of State and other responsible officials of Government having to do with matters affecting foreign affairs.” It defined the purpose of the Office of Educational Exchange, which administered the Fulbright program, to “cooperate with other nations in the interchange of persons, knowledge, and skills; the rendering of technical and other services; the interchange of developments in the field of education, the arts and sciences.”

By March of 1949, 123 grants had been awarded in China, Burma, Philippines, and New Zealand. India, Pakistan, Iran, Greece, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Belgium would sign educational agreements with the U.S. later that year. Scholarships were given for research fellowships, visiting professorships, foreign students coming to study in the U.S., and Americans going abroad to study. While the OII and the OEE began functioning fairly successfully during the first operational year of the Smith-Mundt Act, the objectives for the Office of Educational Exchange would drastically change in 1951.31

Change of Agendas: Spring of 1950

Foreign policy actions throughout the 1950s were fueled by the U.S. fear of Communist infiltration and revolution. The tradition of identifying adversaries in terms of capability rather than ideology eroded after the collapse of the Nationalistic government of China and the successful testing of a Soviet atomic bomb in 1949. While the Truman administration was

forging new containment policies throughout Asia, Senator Joseph McCarthy topped off the decade with an overambitious search for Communist penetration within the State Department, Hollywood, and beyond. McCarthy’s accusations of Communist infiltration throughout U.S. government agencies and various other institutions alarmed many Americans and created an atmosphere of hysteria and suspicion. This eerie Cold War mood would only intensify on June 25, 1950, when war broke out between the two Koreas. The Korean War marked the beginning of what would be the most explicit U.S. propaganda campaign since WWII. On April 20, 1950, The Campaign of Truth was launched in response to President Truman’s warning that “unless we get the real story across to people in other countries we will lose the battle for men’s minds by default.”

Edward Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State, formulated the plans for the Campaign of Truth and received an unprecedented level of congressional support for the program. Along with the $32.7 million already approved by the U.S. government for the 1951 fiscal year, a supplemental request gave an additional appropriation of $79 million plus $19.6 million in counterpart funds to the program. The dollar support for the program in 1951 almost tripled the 1950 appropriations. As the funding increased for Smith-Mundt Act, so did the expectations of policymakers. The Truman administration was eager to see what could be achieved in “getting the real story” of America across to people in other countries. The educational and cultural exchange programs within the Department of State were now a part of the larger psychological war whose aim was to rid the world of the communist threat.

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32 Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 14.
As U.S. policymakers feared the expansion of Soviet propaganda efforts, State Department officials began to lose patience with what they judged to be naive and idealistic assumptions about the nature of educational and cultural exchange. They visualized cultural and informational activities as part of an aggressive program that was in full support of U.S. foreign policy initiatives. For them, these programs were simply tools for favorably influencing attitudes and opinions within foreign countries. The word “understanding” was placed on the back-burner of U.S. educational exchange objectives in this period, with the promotion of American ideals becoming the primary political aim for these formerly apolitical programs. Even William C. Johnstone, Director of the Office of Educational Exchange in the Department of State from 1948 to 1952, gave into political objectives. In a hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations he stated that the educational exchange programs are a “political job.” He continued, “In its simplest form, the job of this program is to implant a set of ideas or facts in the mind of a person. When this is done effectively, it results in action favorable to the achievement of American foreign policy. It can help unite the free nations on the road to peace.”

Anticipating that his program would be coerced into meeting short time political objectives, Senator Fulbright had created a barrier that served as a last line of defense from such actions in the Fulbright Act. The Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS) was given substantial control of the Fulbright program to make sure that policy was not distorted by short-term political convenience. The BFS maintained responsibility of supervising the exchange programs, creating projects, and selecting qualified students and educational institutions for the exchange programs. Overall, the BFS was there to establish the standards of how a government-run exchange program should operate. The long range “mutual” educational and cultural exchange

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35 Overseas Information Programs of the United States, Senate hearings, Part 2, Committee on Foreign Relations, 83rd Congress, 1st session, (1953), 1027; 1450-52.
programs under the Fulbright program would be intact as long as the BFS did not bend under the demands of the U.S. government, but actions abroad eventually caused the board to meet immediate short term political aims also.

On January 13, 1951, a few weeks after Chinese Communists troops entered the Korean War, the Board of Foreign Scholarships changed the original objectives of the Fulbright program to fit the needs of U.S. policy goals throughout the world. When it seemed possible that United Nations troops might be driven from Korea, the Board of Foreign Scholarships approved objectives that were aimed toward convincing the “free peoples” of the world that only through cooperation with “free nations” can particular national and individual goals be achieved. The term “free nations” were linked to those countries which supported the United States. Relating U.S. foreign policy goals with their aims, the Board of Foreign Scholarships went on to highlight that the Informational and Educational Exchange Program of the Department of State wanted to demonstrate to other people, by every possible means, the evidence of American moral, spiritual, and material strength. By using phrases like “develop awareness” and “assist in strengthening attitudes” in their core objectives, the BFS, delicately, made it clear that the promotion of U.S. “goodwill” was now the main priority for all those involved in government operated educational and cultural exchange activities. 36

The Fulbright program administered some crucial adjustments to its original responsibilities during this period. The Board of Foreign Scholarship decided that those representing the Fulbright program overseas should be requested to develop their curricula in relation to the current world situation, the immediate needs of their countries and the achievement of immediate and short- range results. The Board also placed a great emphasis on

insuring that the foreign grantees in the U.S. were provided with an opportunity to “better”
understand the elements of U.S. democratic strengths, and the selection process of those
representing the U.S. abroad.

The Board made the educational programs more flexible and easily adjustable to include
new categories of persons, different kinds of projects and cooperative bilateral programs which
served to further our broad objectives during the emergency period. They even requested the
Foundations and Commissions that supported education and cultural exchange to allocate funds
in their budgets to provide for special and short-time projects.37 Lecturers and teachers from all
fields of study were encouraged to assist the BSF in implementing their new objectives. Keeping
with the adjustment to Cold War policy, the Board of Foreign Scholarships gave a special
emphasis to fields which would fulfill the nation’s needs and objectives. American Studies, U.S.
history, U.S. government, and literature saw a significant increase in overseas assignments for
teachers and lecturers.38 The Board knew that the government would not support an educational
and scholarly program unless it contributed to the national security and general welfare of the
American people. At the same time, most members of the Board were determined to keep the
Fulbright program from being associated with “propaganda” programs.39 While the members of
the BFS were fighting to keep educational and cultural exchanges apolitical in Washington, the
Fulbright program seemed to be thriving in the field. By 1952, seventeen additional countries
signed bi-national agreements with the United States. The Fulbright program flourished in
funding and participation. From 887 American Fulbright awards in 1949, the overall all number

37 For information on the shift in objectives by the Board of Scholarships see Ibid, 69-70.
38 Ibid, 70.
39 Walter Johnson, “The Exchange Program as seen from the Board of Foreign Scholarships,” Educational
Exchanges: Aspects of the American Experience (edited by Washington, D.C: National Academy of Sciences,
National Research Council, 1956), 64.
of American “Fulbrighters” going abroad greatly increased in participation with 1,284 awardees by 1952.40

Following the footsteps of the Truman administration, newly elected President Eisenhower embarked on a mission to significantly expand and consolidate overseas information programs. But the direction of overseas information programs would change under the Eisenhower administration. Eisenhower developed his belief in the power of propaganda during WWII, and closely linked psychological warfare with national security policy.41 Seeing Truman’s Campaign of Truth as “poor, disorganized, diffuse, and ineffective,” President Eisenhower involved himself personally to make U.S. propaganda more persuasive and credible by developing more skillful propaganda programs with the creation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953.

The USIA was a separate administrative entity that would tell “America’s story” to the world. Programs formerly under the Department of State’s supervision- including the Voice of America, overseas libraries and information centers, the motion picture service, and press and publication agencies- now came under the authority of the USIA.42 The main mission of the USIA was to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion of the national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and U.S. institutions, and their counterparts abroad. The USIA worked as a U.S. psychological tool of warfare to combat the Soviet bloc through the means of “information.” Without openly admitting it, the USIA was involved in a number of propaganda efforts in many countries throughout the world. By 1960,

41 See Osgood, Total Cold War.
42 For information on the programs that were under the USIA see Department of State Bulletin (June 15, 1953), 853; Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and The United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
the USIA oversaw more than 208 posts in 91 countries. Fifty of these posts were in Europe; thirty-four in the Middle East and South Asia; forty in Latin America; thirty-four in Africa; and fifty in the Far East. Seeking to influence rather than understand, the employers and programs under the USIA worked to advance viewpoints that served U.S. foreign policy goals.  

Senator Fulbright refused to allow his program to be taken over by an agency whose main purpose was to persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interests to take actions which are consistent with the national objectives of the U.S., so he fought in Congress for the State Department to retain full control over educational and cultural exchange. Senator Fulbright technically won his fight against the USIA. Educational exchange programs remained under the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) in order to maintain a distinction between cultural relations and propaganda. In the field, however, a single public affairs officer (PAO), taking orders from USIA officials, was responsible for oversight of both cultural and informational policy. Moreover, Public Affairs officers, which were managed by the USIA, hired, fired and, transferred cultural attaches, which were under the State Department, at will.

In addition, under the Eisenhower administration, the State Department added ideological content to the exchanges it administered. Before going abroad visiting scholars were required to attend orientation programs with officials who explained to them the fundamental principles of American society. The grantees sent abroad under State Department were brought to Washington for briefings on the ideological program by Foreign Service officers and USIA officials. Fulbright scholars were selected according to their abilities to contribute to the ideological program and overall U.S. foreign policy initiative. American Fulbright grant recipients were

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43 Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 90-93.
given grants to buy and donate books from their personal libraries to institutions abroad. In addition, United States Information Service (USIS) officers who managed the program from U.S. embassies used Fulbright recipients as personal contacts for distributing U.S. information to critical target groups. USIS Egypt reported, for example, that one American Fulbright professor distributed ‘innumerable’ USIS publications to approximately twenty different English-language clubs in secondary schools.45

Thus, despite Fulbright’s effort, the administration of the Fulbright Program was now inadvertently controlled by the USIA even though it remained formally housed in the State Department. Both information and cultural activities continued to be part of the same short-term governmental policies. This bureaucratic and strategic confusion would later play a large part in the Kennedy administration’s expectations of educational and cultural exchange in 1961.

The 1961 Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act

Between 1945 and 1960, approximately forty newly independent states, with a population of about 800 million had gained official independence from imperial control. Transforming from colonial to independent nations, decolonization had been encouraged by American policy before the start of the Cold War, but the U.S. government’s obsession with the advance of Communism, led to many contradictions in U.S. foreign policy. As the Cold War for the US went truly global, it brought with it crises in Cuba, the Congo, Laos, and Vietnam. Viewing the support of the “third world” as the key to winning the Cold War, the Kennedy administration shifted U.S. foreign policy priorities from Europe to these new underdeveloped and non-aligned nations. On January 20, 1961, in his inaugural address, President Kennedy pledged that the U.S. was ready to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, and oppose any foe to

assure the survival and success of liberty.”46 Determined to find solutions to, in their minds, the problems that plagued third world countries, Kennedy crowded his top posts with advisers whom were deemed the “best and the brightest.” Filled with enthusiastic, optimistic, academic intellectuals, the Kennedy administration brought with them a number of fresh, new policy ideas and suggestions. These political scientists, military strategists, and development economists spearheaded the operations that took place in the State Department, the White House, and the Defense Department in the early 1960s. McGeorge Bundy, former dean of faculty at Harvard, was appointed national security advisor. MIT professor of economic history, Walt Whitman Rostow, became the head of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department. MIT political scientist, Lucian Pye, was responsible for teaching courses in counterinsurgency theory for the Department of State and advised the U.S. Agency for International Development. Kennedy also appointed Lincoln Gordon, Harvard University economist, to his Latin American Task Force and U.S. ambassador to Brazil. Believing that the Cold War was too important to be left in the hands of politicians, generals, and diplomats, these academics were given the opportunity to apply the theories they developed in Cambridge, New York, and Berkley to the competition with the Soviet Union. Claiming that their expertise was essential to containing communism throughout the third world, these social scientists applied the theory of modernization to those countries on the brink of revolution. 47

Modernization theory, defined by Princeton University’s C.E. Black, “was the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man’s knowledge, permitting control over his environment.” By

47 For information on the new administration under Kennedy read Latham, Modernization as Ideology; Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900; Peter Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
1960, modernization theory, which was simply a theory that emerged from the field of social science, became the theory in which the Kennedy administration strengthened the connections between U.S. strategic concerns and assumptions about America’s role as a moral, benevolent world leader. The United States combated communism with a promotion of “development” or “nation building” in underdeveloped countries in order to prevent “wars of liberation.” It was believed that economic development held the key to bringing third world nations to political democracy. “Modernization”, it was thought, would create a middle class that would in turn promote democracy. The Kennedy administration, seeking favor among those who opposed Eisenhower’s policies, promoted social and economic development for third world nations through modernization. During the Eisenhower presidency, U.S. military interventions in Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, and Lebanon gave Soviet propaganda another angle through which to attack U.S. foreign policy. The Kennedy administration wanted to reverse these negative views and searched for more effective ways to implement a containment policy that stayed clear from open military intervention and overt propaganda.

Determined to defeat Soviet claims on all levels, President Kennedy, vying to gain superiority over Soviet technology, announced to place a man on the moon by the end of the decade. Competition with the Soviet Union in space exploration pushed U.S. technological and scientific education to the top of national priorities. The U.S. was determined to prove that their system of governing was superior to Soviet ideology in all aspects of life. Education, at home and abroad, became a major concern for Congress. The educational and cultural exchange programs under the Department of State, although impressive in range and variety, were unorganized. Representative Wayne Hays (Democrat, Ohio) believed, along with Senator Fulbright, that these programs needed to be positioned under a single piece of legislation that

48 Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 67.
could consolidate considerable funding and work toward a single objective.\textsuperscript{49} Senator Fulbright and Representative Hays took the lead in drafting a bill that expanded and organized the educational and cultural exchange programs under the State Department. However, before sending the bill through Congress, the issues surrounding how this bill would be implemented were addressed.

Effective implementation has different meanings in different situations. And there were many questions on how educational and cultural exchanges would be implemented out on the field. Noticing the confusion between the purposes of the USIA and the Department of State, Dr. Walter C. Laves, Former Deputy Director of UNESCO (1947-1950), confronted Senator Fulbright on the draft’s failure to address this major problem. In a letter to Senator Fulbright dated February 7, 1961, Laves stated that the bill “does not go far enough.” He contended that the bill “does not really come to grips with the basic problem hindering a rational implementation of these programs, namely, their haphazard relationship here in Washington, at overseas missions, and between Washington and the field.” Laves pointed out that the bill “does not recognize in its language the irrefutable fact that all these programs of academic exchange, cultural relations, educational development,—and in many respects the projection of cultural information—are, and are coming more and more to be, part of one-and-the-same-kind of governmental activity.” He requested that Senator Fulbright consider wording the bill in a way that clears up the confusion on the fundamental purpose of exchange. He ended the letter by stating that, “if, now that they have ‘come of age’ and their importance and contribution have become acknowledged, they are to function effectively in consonance with each other.”\textsuperscript{50} There

\textsuperscript{49} Coombs, \textit{The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy}, 50-51.
\textsuperscript{50} See Department of State, “Comments on Proposed Mutual Education Bill”, Letter from Walter Laves to Senator Fulbright, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, file EDX 5, box 172-1, Historical Collection, Special Collections Sections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
is no evidence that Senator Fulbright ever responded to this letter, but his failure to consider Laves’ recommendations proved costly during the program’s collapse in later years.

Although Senator Fulbright viewed educational exchange as a positive “instrument” of foreign policy, he had no intention of this bill being seen as a piece of legislation that would assist America in the psychological warfare against the Soviet Union. While Senator Hays was trying to rally support for the bill by conducting hearings before the Sub-Committee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations in the month of June, Senator Fulbright was fighting for clarification of purpose for his bill within Senate. In a Congressional proceeding on June 27, 1961, after acknowledging that educational exchanges were going to expand to the Soviet Bloc, Senator Fulbright stated to the president (Vice-President Lyndon Johnson) that, “I do not cite this surge of Communist bloc interest in educational and cultural programs in order to demand that we dramatically expand our programs on a crash basis and make them an instrument of the so-called Cold War.” He declared that he was “diametrically opposed” to the idea of having his bill linked with U.S. propaganda programs. He continued, “Of course we are concerned with men’s minds, but by the very nature of our view of the world we cannot be a party to any effort to capture those minds or convert them to a thesis which is not acceptable to the independent exercise of man’s judgment.” Senator Fulbright stated that “In short, I utterly reject any suggestion that our educational and cultural exchange programs are weapons or instruments with which to do combat, or that they should be adjusted in order to parallel conditions which have been imposed by other who hold a fundamentally totally different view of the world.” He reaffirmed that, “there is no room, and there must not be any room, for an integration of these programs as propaganda, even recognizing that the term covers some very worthwhile and respectable activities.” Shifting his attention to the theme of “mutuality”, which
was emphasized in the title of the bill, Senator Fulbright exclaimed, “Clearly we have as much to learn about and from other peoples as they do about and from us.” He added, “Our colleges and universities increasingly find that their resources are not adequate for the vital task of giving their students necessary information about new countries and cultures, much less about long-established lands with great traditions.” Concluding his speech, Senator Fulbright, speaking on the contributions of his bill, stated that “I believe that it provides the solid legislative base for advances toward mutual understanding which is so desperately needed in the decade ahead.” 51

It is important to note that, throughout the congressional proceeding, there was not a single mention of separating more clearly the information and cultural activities of the USIA and State Department. As a matter of fact, on the one occasion Senator Fulbright did mention these agencies, he referred to them as agencies which “contributed most clearly and profoundly to mutual understanding”. 52 Senator Fulbright’s failure to address this major issue was possibly due to the fear of having his bill contested, by supporters of the USIA, before the bill approached a vote. Nevertheless, the term “mutual understanding”, which was the primary objective of the new bill, was to serve as a blockade from any type of propaganda intentions of the USIA.

In 1961 in a New York Times article entitled “Fulbright Urges a Larger Program,” Senator Fulbright wrote that:

The [original] Fulbright program was enacted at a time when there was no foreseeable challenge in the world to our pre-eminent power. Now that power is facing unparalleled challenges, it follows that an educational-exchange program that was adequate for the world of 1946 must be substantially revised to adjust to the realities of the nineteen sixties…. We must recognize that educational exchange is not merely a laudable experiment but a positive instrument of foreign policy designed to mobilize human

51 For full statement see Congressional Record, Proceeding and Debates of the 87th Congress, 1st Session (June 27, 1961), vol.107, no.107, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, file EDX 5, box 172-15, Historical Collection, Special Collections Sections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville. 52 Ibid,10582.
resources just as military and economic policies seek to mobilize
physical resources.\textsuperscript{53}

Kennedy shared the same beliefs as Senator Fulbright, but took the programs a step
further. Kennedy, believing that the U.S. was the benevolent world leader, declared that the
educational programs under the Fulbright-Hays Act were to serve as programs of assistance, as
well as programs of mutual understanding. In a meeting with the Board of Foreign Scholarships
and the U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, Kennedy argued that:

There is no better way of helping the new nations of Latin
America, Africa and Asia in their present pursuit of freedom and
better living conditions than by assisting them to develop their
human resources through education. Likewise there is no other
way to strengthen our bond of understanding and friendship with
older nations than through educational and cultural interchange.\textsuperscript{54}

In 1961, as the bill was under consideration numerous U.S. ambassadors, diplomats,
congressmen, and Fulbright recipients praised the educational programs operating abroad.
Various State Department posts showered in comments of support. Ambassador to Panama,
Julian F. Harrington, stated that “the exchange of persons program for Panama is highly effective
and I would recommend it be carried on at its present scale.” Ambassador Frances Willis of
Norway boasted of the Exchange of Persons Program that “it is my belief it make the greatest
contribution of any of our programs toward increasing understanding and appreciation for the
social and cultural achievements of the United States. If any way could be found to increase this
program, make it more secure, more far- reaching, or more inclusive it would be great in
solidifying the already excellent interrelationships which exists between Norway and the United
States.” Ambassador John Clifford of Belgium acknowledged that “the Educational Exchange

\textsuperscript{54} Kennedy, as quoted in Ninkovich, \textit{Informational Policy and Cultural Diplomacy}, 28.
Program at this post is generally effective and efficiently administered. The bulk of programs come under the Fulbright Act (P.L.584) and the only real weakness is that it requires additional dollar support to become completely effective.”

With little or no opposition, the Fulbright-Hays Act was passed, by a vote of 79 to 5 in the Senate and by 378 to 32 in the House, and signed into law by President Kennedy on September 21, 1961. While the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act privileged the promotion of the U.S image abroad, the Fulbright- Hays Act centered its mission on the increase of mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries. It consolidated various U.S. international educational and cultural exchanges, including the translation of books, periodicals, and U.S. representation in international fairs and expositions. This act was also responsible for the establishment of government operated cultural and education centers abroad. Through multi-lateral exchanges, the U.S., as stated in the act, “would strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations.” The primary task of the Fulbright- Hays Act was to promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement. The programs under this piece of legislation were expected to, according to the language of the Act, “assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.”

56 Bevis, International Students in American Colleges and Universities, 156.
The Fulbright-Hays Act promoted a two-way flow of exchange rather than a mass information program. Still, different meanings could be attached to it. It was also perceived as a tool of technical assistance to developing nations, along the lines of modernization theory.

Further complicating the functions of educational exchanges, social scientists invoked theories of modernization to define exchange programs central purposes. They looked to exchanges as tools in which the U.S. could transform societies from within and create a “U.S. type” of culture that would guide communities on the road to development and progress. For President Kennedy, educational and cultural exchanges were to exemplify the virtues of American society through their humanitarian deeds and democratic values. This belief, consequently, distanced the goal of “mutual understanding” from educational exchanges, and would play a crucial role in the collapse of the Fulbright program, as well as programs like the Alliance for Progress, in the late 1960s.

The Fulbright program was just one part of Kennedy’s multi-faceted approach to public diplomacy during the Cold War. The Agency for International Development and the Alliance for Progress provided economic aid and funding for large infrastructure projects, while the Peace Corps and Fulbright program went to great lengths to branch out with international person to person exchange. A series of grants were provided to Americans studying abroad or foreigners studying in the United States; for cultural and special-visitor exchange; and for supporting modern foreign-language training and area studies in the United States by visits of American teachers to foreign countries. The Fulbright-Hays Act proved successful in expanding the reach of cultural exchange. It significantly increased the number of participants involved in international educational and cultural exchange. The number of foreign students coming to the

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60 Sussman, *Culture of Freedom*, 23.
U.S. increased from 1,578 in 1956 to 2,059 by 1962. The amount of lecturers increased from 81 in 1956 to 135 by 1962. The quantity of U.S. grantees abroad doubled by 1962, taking over 1,700 teachers, research scholars, lecturers, and students around the world. After, 1961 African enrollments to the U.S. increased 44%, Asian students enrollment to the U.S. increased 12%. Over one third of the foreign students in the U.S were from the Far East, 18% from Latin America, 15% from the Near and Middle East, 13% from Europe, 12% from North America (Canada) and 5% from Africa.\(^6\) During the Kennedy years the Fulbright program reached its peak in global exchange.

By the late 1960s, the Fulbright Program was operating in over 110 countries. The 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act, along with a number of Kennedy programs, completely contrasted the information operations of the Eisenhower administration. Rather than focusing on the promotion of U.S. ideals and democracy, this new piece of legislation promoted peace through “mutual” educational and cultural exchange. Policymakers of Washington in support of an international mutual education program could congratulate themselves for passing a bill that in no ways, in their minds, resembled Soviet propaganda campaigns. Yet, the failure to address the organizational relationships between the Department of State and the USIA left the Fulbright program, along with other educational and cultural programs, in the hands of the USIA agents unconcerned with mutual understanding, but rather U.S. national interest. The problems that emerged did not arise from the language in the legislation, but rather from the law’s implementation abroad and the multiple meanings attached to it.

The Fulbright program was judged as an “effective” program by the Kennedy administration, but, like most policies, “effective” does not necessarily achieve its desired

impact. Throughout the 1960s both scholars and policymakers addressed the various issues they faced abroad under the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act. Efforts to consolidate exchange programs into one agency were stopped short by policymakers who differed in opinion on the purpose for educational and cultural exchange. The following chapter will provide a deeper look into the problems that surrounded the implementation of the Fulbright program abroad.
CHAPTER II
“How Can They Be Affectively Coordinated?”
The Fulbright-Hays Act from 1961-1965

“Should all educational and cultural activities supported by Government be directed by one agency or should they be dispersed among various agencies; and if the latter, how can they be affectively coordinated?”


The 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act became the basic law through which all U.S. government-sponsored educational and cultural exchanges were carried out with other countries. The tasks of operating educational and cultural activities under the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act were shared by four existing bodies of government: the State Department, United States Information Agency (USIA), the U.S. Agency of International Development (AID), and the Office of Education (OE). Each of these agencies defined the use of educational and cultural activities by its own criteria, purposes, mandates, and self-image. Defining the role of the exchanges by each agency, Richard Arndt, former USIA cultural attaché (1961-1985), stated that “AID took what could be compromised under then-current definitions of technical assistance. The OE took charge of building the strength. The State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) handled the Fulbright program and all government-ran educational and cultural exchanges. And the USIA was given tools required for ‘telling America’s story.’”

A lack of personnel and the failure to address organizational issues in the field caused a confusion of purposes for what were to be apolitical programs. How did these organizational issues pose a threat to the Fulbright-Hays Act’s goal of increasing mutual understanding?

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1 Statement by John Royall Smiley of the U.S. Advisory Commission, the commission responsible for providing reports to the public about the developments and programs under the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act, is found in International Educational and Cultural Exchange 4, no.4 (Spring 1969): 2.
2 Statement by Richard Arndt found in Dudden and Dynes, The Fulbright Experience, 31.
By focusing on the CU’s budget and the bureaucratic structures operating educational and cultural activities, this chapter will examine the problems that surrounded the implementation of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act. It will highlight the efforts made to secure government sponsored educational and cultural activities into one agency, and illustrate how different views of policymakers on the purposes of educational and cultural activities kept at bay all attempts to consolidate these activities into one Bureau. In doing so, this chapter also provides an assessment of how the failure to correct the organizational issues for educational exchange in Washington later affected the exchange program’s credibility and budget. While Senator Fulbright was a central actor in expanding educational exchanges, after the passing of the legislation he remained uninvolved in the major discussions concerning the budget and the organizational independence from other public diplomacy agencies. Other actors from the ranks of the State Department and academia emerged as the key supporters of the Fulbright-Hays Act throughout the 1960s.

F.A. Young’s Letter

On September 21, 1962, in an evaluation of government-sponsored educational exchange programs abroad, F.A. Young, executive director of the Conference Board’s Committee on the International Exchange of Persons, wrote, to President of the Social Science Research Council, Dr. Pendleton Herring, explaining that, “as long as the overseas administration of the program is in the hands of officials whose main career attachment is to the Information Agency, we should not be surprised if they impress upon the programs, in the overseas sector, the objectives and the points of view of that agency.” He contended that the educational exchange programs are being, “deprived of the fruits of its hard-won victory when the state-side administration of the information programs and the exchange programs were
separated several years ago.” Seeing the complexities in rearranging administrations, Young stated that he is, “well aware of the many reasons why it would be difficult to separate the overseas administration of the information and exchange program”, but in his opinion, “this separation would do much to assure the long-term health and vitality of government sponsored educational and cultural exchange.” F.A. Young made a strong case for his conviction that “separation would do much to assure the long-term health and vitality of government sponsored educational and cultural exchange,” so what was keeping his idea from becoming a reality?

Point of Views: Conflicts between the USIA and the CU

In summarizing the major problems that surrounded the implementation of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act, Charles Frankel, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (1965-1967), claimed that there were three clashing governmental point of views, which prevailed for twenty years or more, toward educational and cultural activities that prevented a consolidated effort in the direction of cultural diplomacy. The first of these three conflicting views, was held by those who believed that educational and cultural exchanges were “activities in which the government of the United States is interested only because they serve the purpose of winning friends and influencing people”; the second group perceived educational and cultural activities as “instruments for producing the trained manpower that other countries need and thus promoting their economic progress.”; and the third believed that the purpose of educational and cultural relations “was to give people more perspective on themselves as much as on others.” 3 Frankel contended that the third view was the most civilized and realistic of the three. He argued that the only obstacle preventing educational and cultural activities from reaching the goal of mutual understanding was the fact that “Congress and the executive branch had never been

3 Frankel, High on Foggy Bottom, 20-23.
persuaded to support it on the proper scale.” He concluded by noting that “under the pressure of
the Cold War and of preoccupation with economic assistance to the poor countries, the third
point of view had always been submerged.”

Charles Frankel was correct in his assessment on how the goal of mutual understanding,
which was the primary objective of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act, was in contention with various
goals linked with cold war needs. Different views on the purpose of educational and cultural
activities during the cold war prevented these activities from being monopolized by one Bureau
during the 1960s. Richard Arndt wrote that the bill was “drafted in a period of potential
reorganization and consolidation…But its potential for shaping a single coordinated US effort in
overseas education and culture was killed by Congress in one day’s work when staffers and
agency representatives carved it up, gerrymander fashion, dividing responsibility for its functions
among four uncoordinated agencies- State, USIA, AID, and HEW (the U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare).” Comparing the language of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act to
the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act, Arndt argued that “although [the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act was]
tidier and less bicephalic than the old combination of Fulbright and Smith-Mundt, it turned out in
fact to mean little change for cultural diplomacy.” By divvying up the responsibilities of the
Fulbright-Hays Act, policymakers would only add to the confusion that surrounded the debate
between cultural relations and propaganda. The disputes between the State Department and the
USIA over the role of government- sponsored educational and cultural exchanges did not cease
with the signing of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961; it heightened them.

The establishment of an Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs
followed the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act. The Assistant Secretary was to act as the advisor to all

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5 Richard Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*
agencies conducting cultural activities under the U.S. government; he/she was responsible for helping untangle the complex frictions and tensions between agencies. This newly created position was to provide the direction needed to coordinate educational and cultural activities amongst agencies. The Assistant Secretary’s four main responsibilities were:

1) To direct the State Department’s own exchange programs
2) To give policy guidance in this field to all federal agencies and help harmonize their efforts.
3) To exercise U.S. leadership on policies and programs of international organizations concerned with educational and cultural affairs.
4) To foster increased cooperation between the government and the private sector, thus making educational and cultural exchange a two-way partnership between the government and the university.6

This position was designed to clarify, help harmonize, and provide guidance to all federal agencies involved in educational and cultural activities, but how was this supposed to happen when the Assistant Secretary is in charge of only one of the competing bureaucracies? Any efforts made by the Assistant Secretary to harmonize educational and cultural activities were limited to those under State Department, and would prove to be a difficult task. The personnel who were to work with the Assistant Secretary in carrying out the State Department’s educational and cultural exchange programs abroad were under the direction of the principal USIA Officer.7 The organizational chart, below, provides an illustration of the power structure of an U.S. embassy post abroad.

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6 Coombs, The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy, 2.
7 Thomson Laves, Cultural Relations, 188.
The United States Information Service (also known as the United States Information Agency) managed the Public Affairs Officer in embassy posts. The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) administered the activities for both the Cultural Affairs Officer and the Information Officer within embassies.

The Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO) and the Information Officer (IO) had very different functions. The Cultural Affairs Officer was the key interface with all cultural and educational activities (lectures, teachers, students, concerts, exhibits, etc…), while the Information’s Officer was more involved with distribution of material (film, radio, publications, photos, etc…). The IO’s functions were closely linked to the USIA’s mission, while the CAO’s tasks were dual. The
CAO was to work closely with the USIA in conducting a number of activities, but the exchange programs were to be delegated by the Department of State and these programs were to coincide with the mandate from the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act (which promoted the increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries). Being directed by a USIA officer abroad, the CAO, at times, applied the aims of the USIA to the exchange programs. This practice was common, because, in the field, the USIA had been the employer of the people who administered government exchange programs. Having no advocate, or coordinator, exchange programs were operating under the discretion of the USIA rather than the State Department. This, in turn, confused the principles for educational exchanges under the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act. It was the job of the Assistant Secretary to clear up this disorder and define objectives for educational and cultural exchange.

Moreover, as the Assistant Secretary attempted to coordinate exchange programs within the State Department, employees of the USIA viewed his work as a threat to their already established cultural programs abroad. Newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Philip Coombs, a seasoned CAO and a former executive of the Ford Foundation’s Funds for the Advancement of Education, would be the first to take on the task of coordinating the exchange programs within the State Department. Though already experienced within this field, Coombs soon realized the difficulties in executing his appointed tasks.

In 1963, speaking on the governmental problems between the CU and the USIA, Coombs, stated that “the Kennedy administration had inherited in this field an accumulation of long-standing bureaucratic rivalries and anxieties.”8 According to Coombs, the USIA viewed the Fulbright-Hays Bill with skepticism, if not alarm. Coombs contended that, instead of viewing the

8 Phillip Coombs as quoted in Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, 329.
bill as a way of strengthening cultural diplomacy, the USIA saw in the language of the bill “the threat of more State Department supervision than their experience had led them to care for, and the even greater threat that USIA might be stripped of its cultural programs and cultural affairs officers.”

Having worked as a Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO) in the field, the newly appointed, Coombs knew, all too well, the pressures that the CAO faced abroad. Describing the expectations of the CAO in the field, Coombs stated that they were expected to “serve as part-time filed agents for State, with two Washington bosses, yet on the USIA payroll and promotion ladder and under jurisdiction…of the Public Affairs officer (PAO)…” He added that the USIA officers and Cultural Affairs officers of the State Department “lived apart in Washington but together in the field.” This fact, he continued, was “a sure fire formula for perennial discord, and so indeed it has proved to be.”

Coombs took it upon himself, as Assistant Secretary of State, to try to create some kind of interagency coordination for educational and cultural activities. Rocking the boat of the already established sector of the USIA, Coombs would valiantly try to separate the CAO from the USIA’s propaganda activities abroad, but all to no avail. The USIA, under its new director, Edward R. Murrow, a national broadcasting icon for CBS, was more skilled in playing political hardball than Coombs. Coombs’ efforts were met with opposition by the USIA, which had overshadowed the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs with the expansion of the Voice of America radio network to emerging nations and the growing popularity of agency-produced films and television programs abroad. Since Coombs’ position as Assistant Secretary carried

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9 Coombs, The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy, 52.
10 Ibid, 34.
little executive authority, he found himself administratively helpless against more seasoned bureaucrats with established power bases.\textsuperscript{11}

Reflecting on his failures to make any significant modifications to the coordination of educational and cultural exchanges, Philip Coombs stated that “the main obstacle to getting things done in government, I became convinced, is not the bureaucrats but the bureaucratic system itself- the entrenched rules, regulations, and procedures which victimize everyone and over which no one seems to have control.”\textsuperscript{12}

On April 20, 1962, Under Secretary of State George Ball requested and received the resignation of Phillip Coombs, from his position as Secretary of Educational and Cultural Affairs for no readily apparent reason. One can only speculate on the reasons behind Ball’s request, but it is clear that Coombs’ forced resignation served as a warning to those future Assistant Secretaries of Educational and Cultural Affairs who wanted to take on the USIA. With Coombs’ out of office, the Kennedy administration handed the administrative duties of educational and cultural activities to the USIA. In a memorandum to the Director of the USIA, Edward Murrow, dated January 21, 1963, President Kennedy, disregarding the tasks given to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, made the USIA missions responsible for the conduct of public information, public relations, and cultural activities for every agency of the U.S. government except the Defense Department.\textsuperscript{13}

Having their primary duties stripped of them, Coombs’ successors, interim CU directors (serving, at most, two years in this position), Lucius D. Battle (1962-1964) and Harry McPherson (1964-1965), focused their attention on maintaining CU’s survival. Having practically no

\textsuperscript{11} Ninkovich, \textit{Informational Policy}, 29.
\textsuperscript{12} Coombs, \textit{The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy}, 49.
\textsuperscript{13} Charles Frankel, \textit{The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs} (Washington D.C: The Brookings Institute, 1965), 28.
experience within the field of international educational and cultural exchanges, Battle and McPherson strived to sustain the funding for CU programs for the duration of their short stints as directors of CU.

The broad expansion of person-to-person exchange programs within different government agencies caused tension amongst bureaus who were struggling for government funding. A number of CU exchange activities were in direct competition with the Peace Corps for funding throughout the early 1960s. The Peace Corps, created in 1961 as a government sponsored unilateral volunteer program which provided technical assistance (education, agriculture, business, etc) to countries abroad, were under instructions to avoid contact with the embassy, unlike participants of CU. This agency distanced themselves from mutual educational and cultural exchange activities sponsored by the CU. This distance, in turn, led to an overlapping of assignments in the field of international education, especially in the case of the American teacher being sent abroad. The Peace Corps, an agency that was renown and highly respected amongst nations for their humanitarian efforts, demanded increased government funding for their expansion. Culture was already a tough sell to Congress, having two agencies with somewhat related duties did not help CU’s cause. Throughout the budget hearings, educational exchange activities under the CU were constantly contrasted with Peace Corps activities; Congress found it difficult to delineate between the two agencies. Although the CU substantially grew after the creation of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act, the requested budget for exchanges and “cultural presentations” in the performing arts were continually falling short of their requested allocation.¹⁴

¹⁴ For more information on Battle and McPherson’s experiences as Assistant Secretaries of the CU see Arndt’s The First Resort of Kings chapter 15 entitled Battle’s Rescue and the Birth of the Peace Corps.
The CU Budget from 1962-1966

The budget for mutual educational and cultural exchange activities greatly expanded after the signing of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act. From a 1960 balance of $26,148,000, mutual educational and cultural exchange activities increased to $42,649,000 by 1963 under the CU.\textsuperscript{15} The significant development within this field caused many policymakers to turn their attention to these programs, and investigate how these activities were actually contributing to U.S. foreign policy. Senator John J. Rooney (New York, Democrat), Chairman of the U.S. Subcommittee on Department of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judicial, and Related Agencies Appropriations, was worried about how the U.S. was spending taxpayer’s money. He became annoyed with the continual requests, by the CU, for more funding in support of educational and cultural exchange activities, which, to him, were unorganized and overvalued. In a 1963 budget hearing for mutual educational and cultural exchange activities for the fiscal year of 1964, Senator Rooney, the sharp tongued former assistant district attorney of Brooklyn, expressed his frustrations with Assistant Secretary Battle.

On April 4, 1963, Lucius D. Battle, only having been Assistant Secretary for 10 months, approached the Appropriations Committee and requested $56,420,000 for educational and cultural exchange activities for the fiscal year of 1964. To justify this $10 million dollar increase from the previous year’s budget, Battle highlighted the development of the educational activities to third-world countries throughout Latin America and Africa, and elaborated on his plans for expanding the CU’s cultural exchange presentations program (jazz groups, ballet performances, Broadway shows, sports exhibitions, etc…). Battle also illustrated the efforts his Bureau was

\textsuperscript{15} The Department of State’s Funding Chart for Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Activities from the fiscal years of 1947 to 1971. This information can be found at the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, box 103-26, Historical Collection, Special Collections Sections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
making in coordinating all educational and cultural activities (under the CU, USIA, and AID) to fit with U.S. foreign policy goals. He stated that “we are trying very hard to be sure that we have programs that are clearly related to what we are trying to accomplish in various countries and in various areas of the world.” Emphasizing, to Chairman Rooney, that the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs was a fairly new organization, Battle stated that “we still have a long way to go in the field of coordination, Mr. Chairman, and much to accomplish, I think we have made some headway here.”

Chairman Rooney was unimpressed with Battle’s statements, and also aggravated with his comments on the Bureau having a “long way to go”. In his response to Battle, Rooney exclaimed:

You speak of a long way to go Mr. Secretary. I hope you are not referring to the use of taxpayers’ dollars, because here is a program before us for $56,400,000, and the legislation to which you previously referred was passed while I was sitting in the Chamber of the House of Representatives as chairman of the Committee of the Whole. If I am not mistaken, I heard a Member of the House assured that by merging these activities it would not cost the taxpayer more than $40 million a year. And now you are up to $56 million.

Senator Rooney was offended by Battle’s request for additional funding. He held the belief that the purpose of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act was both to consolidate educational and cultural activities under one umbrella and to cut down the overall costs for these types of programs. He did not see the differences between CU educational exchange programs and Peace Corps programs. When speaking with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Alfred V. Boerner, on the increasing cost of sending lecturers under the CU Fulbright exchange program to Africa, Rooney asked “Why wouldn’t it be better to let the Peace Corps

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17 Ibid, 1522.
handle this so it wouldn’t cost anything like this? Don’t they have college professors in Africa?” He continued, “I suspect that they have and this sort of thing in running a program such as yours that should be explored.” Boerner insisted that the Bureau in the Africa area “have been in close working contact with AID people and the Peace Corps people to insure that there is no overlap of the program or duplication.”

Rooney, skeptical of the contributions these activities bring to U.S. foreign policy goals, remained unconvinced of Battle’s explanations for more funding. He concluded the budget hearing by stating that “while we are not by any means convinced of the necessity of any amount such as is proposed in this budget, we do feel that the program is in better hands than it has been in all the years that I remember, and I have been with it a long time…” The 1964 budget for mutual educational and cultural exchange activities came out to be $42,649,000, an $110,000 increase from the previous year’s budget.

Assistant Secretary Battle was unprepared for Rooney’s meticulous examination of educational and cultural exchanges in 1963. He failed to present convincing evidence on the usefulness of the mutual educational and cultural exchange programs, and was unsuccessful in setting his program apart from those of AID and Peace Corps. The following year looked brighter for the Assistant Secretary. A full year’s experience as Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs and a complete report on the effectiveness of educational and cultural programs by the U.S. Advisory Commission provided Battle with the preparation he needed to face Rooney’s budget hearing the following year.

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18 Ibid, 1543.
19 Ibid, 1597.
A Beacon of Hope

Under the legislation of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act an Advisory Commission for Educational and Cultural Affairs was formed and given the task of submitting reports to Congress and the public on the effectiveness of programs that have been carried out in the past in the fields of educational and cultural exchange. Following the budget hearings in 1963, the Commission submitted their first report to Congress entitled *A Beacon of Hope*, which provided Congress with overwhelming testimony on the effectiveness of educational and cultural exchanges. Both Ambassadors and participants from all over the world recognized U.S. sponsored educational and cultural exchange programs as key components to the promotion of peace and mutual understanding. In 1963, the Ambassador to Japan stated that the exchange programs are “one of the major reasons why we are at present witnessing a gradual shift of Japanese attitudes and opinions away from doctrinaire Marxism toward a position we would regard as more desirable.” The Ambassador to Germany remarked, “I consider the development of greater understanding of the United States and its foreign policy, and the development of a greater mutual understanding between the people of the U.S. and the people of Germany to be the chief value of the program.” The Ambassador of Yugoslavia exclaimed that, “Under this program, individual exchanges…receive first-hand knowledge and an understanding of the country, its problems and aspirations, and help promote an understanding of their own country in turn.”

Participants of these educational and cultural exchange programs proclaimed that their experiences in the U.S. and abroad changed their lives and perceptions of others. Speaking on the exchange programs, a British researcher commented, “It just changed my whole life, the

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American attitude. They are more energetic and willing to try out more ideas.” A Japanese teacher remarked, “Up to now the materialistic side of America has been exaggerated through movies… I was able to see diligence and honesty of the American character. Through this experience, my image of American has been altered.” 21 By documenting the experiences of participants, the Commission was able to provide evidence of the impact mutual educational and cultural exchange had on people’s perception of the U.S.

This report also suggested a number of important policy considerations to make educational exchange programs more effective for the future. In their recommendations, the Commission suggested that the position of the CAO be re-examined, the funding for exchanges increased, and an improved coordination of all educational and cultural exchanges sponsored by the U.S. government. In concluding their report, the Commission wrote that “there is no international activity of our Government that enjoys so much spontaneous public approval, elicits such extensive citizen participation, and yields such impressive evidences of success.” They added, “In a time when most international activities seem almost unbearably complex, hazardous and obscure in outcome, the success of educational exchange is a beacon of hope.” 22 This report would play a key role in the increasing the budget for exchange programs the following years.

On February 8, 1964, Assistant Secretary Battle approached the Appropriations Committee with confidence, and requested $56,952,000 for educational and cultural activities for the fiscal year of 1965. Battle, better prepared to face Rooney’s thorough assessment of government sponsored cultural activities, provided the Committee with a full knowledge of all funds and all sources of funding that was at his Bureau’s disposal. Battle defended his request to

21 Ibid, 17-18.
22 Ibid, 61.
the Committee by stating that “the reason that an appropriation of this size is necessary is that certain sources of funding available in the past are being exhausted or decreased.” 23 Highlighting the growing needs for educational and cultural exchange activities in emerging areas of the world, Battle insisted on increasing the budget in order to sustain his program’s development. Chairman Rooney, still skeptical of how these programs contributed to U.S. foreign policy goals, questioned Battle on the effectiveness of exchange programs abroad. Speaking on the increasing number of American research scholars and lecturers being sent abroad, Rooney told Battle that “With the troubles we presently have on the African Continent, Zanzibar, which is right off it, Panama and all over the world, I wonder about spending money like this sending these people over there. I wonder what good they do us.” Battle, equipped with the Beacon of Hope reports and numerous testimonies on the effectiveness of his programs responded, “In the view of everybody who has looked at it, sir, they are of major help. I think it is certainly, on a long-term basis, one of the most effective weapons we have in the international field.” He continued, “That view is certainly held by the policy people in the Department and by the Secretary himself, who has made several statements on this subject.” 24

Although Battle was better prepared to justify his budget request to the Appropriations Committee, the Committee remained unconvinced that mutual educational and cultural exchange activities needed over $50 million dollars to function at a stable level. They awarded the CU with $44,965,000 for the fiscal year of 1965. This was a little over a $2 million dollar increase from the previous year.

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24 Ibid,1066.
Under Secretary Battle, the CU budget was slightly increased and tensions between the
CU and USIA were somewhat relieved. Battle succeeded in keeping the allocations of CU
programs at a stable level, and his success did not go unnoticed. When Lyndon Johnson moved
into the presidency, Lucuis D. Battle, after being in office less than two years, left the Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs and accepted the assignment to Egypt as ambassador in 1965.
His successor, Harry C. McPherson, a young Texas lawyer who worked for the Senate
Democratic Policy Committee and served as Deputy Under- Secretary for International Affairs in
the Department of the Army (1963-1964), was given the task of immediately finding someone
capable of filling this position. McPherson had no apparent qualifications for the position of
Assistant Secretary to Educational and Cultural Affairs. He himself admitted that he was of little
help to CU and that the post was attractive in part because it would beef up his CV.\footnote{Arndt,\textit{The First Resort of Kings}, 341.} Although
unqualified, McPherson’s short period as interim director of the CU surprisingly ushered in a
substantial amount of funding.

The CU budget would grow under the supervision of McPherson, from a budget of
$44,965,000 in 1965, to $53,007,000. This growth was due in large part to President Johnson’s
support of international educational and cultural exchange activities. In the budget hearings for
the 1966 fiscal year, McPherson presented Chairman Rooney with a letter from President
Johnson which requested increased funding. President Johnson wrote, “I am convinced that
exchanges of persons are uniquely appropriate and especially effective activities for the needs
and opportunities of these times. The Congress has fathered and fostered this activity.” He
continued, “I hope our exchange activities, public and private may grow. An enlarging
investment means an enlarging return, not merely from the understanding we acquired of those
with whom we share the hopes of these and the destiny of this planet.”

Although funding for the CU boosted under both Secretary Battle and McPherson (see chart below), the fundamental coordination issues and contradictions within the Bureau remained unsolved. Neither Battle nor McPherson addressed the split loyalty of the CAO abroad or the neglected responsibilities of the CU (which were eradicated by President Kennedy in 1963). As the coordination confusions deepened in Washington, USIA officers abroad enjoyed autonomous control over both information and educational/cultural activities. From 1963 to 1965, the USIA experienced uncontested management of both information and cultural activities abroad, but future Assistant Secretary of Cultural Affairs, Charles Frankel would lead a renewed battle over bureaucratic structuring.

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Figure 3: Educational and Cultural Exchange Budget, 1960-1965

Sources: Information from this chart was compiled from The Department of State’s Funding Chart for Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Activities from the fiscal years of 1947 to 1971. This information can be found at the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, box 103-26

Disturbing the peace: Charles Frankel…

The USIA proved to be too powerful of an agency for only one man to take on, but Coombs’ efforts did not go unnoticed. His emphasis on the need for coordination would be the battle cry of both scholars and CAO’s seeking organization in the field of educational and cultural activities. Coombs’ previous labors would intensify the conflict between the USIA and the CU. From 1963-1970, an influx of literature came about addressing the organizational issues surrounding educational and cultural activities abroad. None of these pieces of literature was more controversial and received more acclaim than that of Charles Frankel’s *The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs*.

In 1965, Charles Frankel, a well-known Columbia University philosopher, former Fulbrighter, and scholar on higher education and public diplomacy, published a book that encompassed how scholars were viewing the state of educational and cultural affairs throughout the 1960s. Receiving substantial funding from the Hazen Foundation, a foundation dedicated to
conducting in-depth research on cultural diplomacy, Frankel traveled to fifteen countries and consulted with a number of embassy officers over a two year period in order to produce this thought-provoking piece of literature on cultural diplomacy.  

Entitled *The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs*, this book provided a thorough analysis of government sponsored exchange programs and addressed the issues surrounding the organizational relationships between the State Department, USAID, and the United States Information Agency (USIA). Page after page, Frankel tackled the many problems that derived from linking USIA aims to educational and cultural exchange programs under the State Department. He examined the underlying principles for educational and cultural exchanges under the Fulbright-Hays Act and pointed out how these principles were contradicted abroad. He also addressed the problems that derive from linking USAID programs (which had terms like “technical assistance” and “development” as the primary objectives for their exchange programs) with educational and cultural activities. He declared that “It is difficult to quarrel with the proposition that economic and technical assistance to developing nations is in the interest of the United States and the world of peace, and that American international educational and cultural activities ought to contribute to this end.” Believing that the phrase “technical assistance” was a derogatory term that exuded American pretentiousness, Frankel warned against “force fitting” educational exchanges to the needs of “technical assistance” programs. He stated that “a narrow view of technical assistance narrows the scope of educational planning and the character of the education attempted.” He continued, “In turn, educational and cultural activities are prevented from playing their larger roles in the process of social development on which technical progress depends.”

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27 Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings*, 381.
Speaking on the confusions between the USIA and the CU, Frankel stated that “in sum, the separation of CU from USIA in Washington apparently exemplifies the principle that educational and cultural activities should be kept separate from propaganda activities.” But to his dismay, Frankel remarked that “the position of the Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO) as a member of the USIA mission in the field appears to exemplify the opposite principle.” Frankel’s book challenged the USIA by pushing for the reorganization of all educational and cultural activities and placing them within the State Department. Having interviewed a number of various Cultural Affairs officers (CAO) in various posts abroad, Frankel, assessed the contradictions between policy and protocol and criticized the USIA for using educational exchanges as tools for their organizational goals. He stated that the main purpose of his book was “to be a handbook that might be a useful guide to those who wish to think systematically about educational and cultural affairs…”

Two months before his book appeared, President Johnson appointed Charles Frankel as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. Frankel was reluctant to take the position of Assistant Secretary at first. Having done extensive study on cultural diplomacy for some time now, Frankel knew all too well the troubles behind this position. He stated that “the position of Assistant Secretary for Cultural Affairs is a troubled one, out at the fringes of the State Department, with no strong constituency behind it, and with a heritage of political and bureaucratic problems.” Frankel continued “…I’ve developed a commitment to the idea in my report (Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs). Now that I’m being given even a dim chance to try to put them into effect, how can I turn it down?” Frankel accepted the position, and with it, a chance to turn his handbook into a battle plan for reorganization. Speaking on his appointment to

this position, Frankel confessed that USIA officers, after reading his book, had every reason to fear his agenda. In his first year in office, Frankel would attempt to make some serious changes to the already established bureaucratic structure for educational and cultural exchange programs.

President Johnson laid forth the groundwork in which Frankel would attempt to build a new type of educational and cultural exchange structure. In September of 1965, President Johnson proposed the International Education Act (IEA) in a speech at the Smithsonian. This new act called for in increase in stimulating exchanges of students and teachers overseas, which included school- to-school partnerships, a reciprocal Peace Corps, and assistance to potential leaders from abroad studying in the U.S. President Johnson proposed that these programs be carried out by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), which would have the responsibility of maintaining long-term commitments to overseas educational enterprises. Frankel, seeing this act as an opportunity to separate educational programs from the USIA, suggested that an “education officer” be created, under IEA, within the HEW, to be the liaison between schools in the U.S. and abroad. Having these exchange programs conducted by the HEW meant, for Frankel, an educational diplomacy located outside both the USIA and State Department with its own budget and field officers, and staffed by education-sensitive administrators. Frankel believed that the direct connection between American and foreign universities would eventually begin to make international education central to foreign policy. He supposed that university control of these programs would finally put an end to the subordination of international education to public relations. As the drafting of the IEA was underway, however, Frankel met resistance from the USIA over his proposal.

32 Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, 385.
34 Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, 389-390.
The International Education Act was set to be introduced to Congress in 1966. But USIA members were not going to allow this bill to pass without a fight. Viewing the bill as a direct jab to their CAO position abroad, USIA representatives met with Frankel to discuss the new role of the education officer. Writing in his journal about the meeting, Frankel wrote:

Disagreement over the Education Officer proposal has become hotter...We had a heated meeting at the White House today about it with representatives of the USIA. They were worried, as they have always been, that the Education Officer would intrude on the prerogatives of their Public Affairs and Cultural Affairs Officer. I think we finally agreed on a job description, and also saved the fundamental principal, but the going was heavy. Each agreement that we make seems to come unbuttoned. 35

The IEA passed on October 29, 1966, and with it came the new position of the education officer. Frankel had succeeded in, what he believed to be, the first step toward separating educational exchanges from the USIA, but this success was short lived. Chairman Rooney never granted a penny to the IEA. A political party shift in the 1966 congressional elections (more republicans gained seats in both the House and Senate), limited funding, military interventions in the both the Dominican Republic and Vietnam, and a skeptical appropriations committee, prevented the IEA from ever being funded. Like Coombs, Frankel’s vision of coordination for educational and cultural activities was not well received by others. 36

Frustrated with the government’s lack of support for international education, Frankel remarked in his diary, after the IEA appropriations hearing, “I find that I am asking myself once again whether there is any point in staying on in the government.” He continued, “The prospects for what I have been trying to do look steadily dimmer, and the war, despite the official calls for

35 Frankel, High on Foggy Bottom, 123.
36 For a complete and thorough look at the challenges of Charles Frankel see Arndt’s The First Resort of Kings chapter 17 entitled The Ordeal of Charles Frankel.
peace and rumors of negotiations, grows steadily hideous. But I don’t like to back out after having given the effort so short a trial.”

Considering the thought of leaving, Frankel wrote that “I’ve made up my mind…that my staying in the government will depend on whether I can get the White House and the President himself to put on steam in relation to international education- for example, by pressing the case personally for the CU budget and the Education Officers with John Rooney. How much does the President really care about the program he’s recommended?” Frankel concluded his journal entry, “…as of now, dim though the prospect looks, I’ve still got a fighting chance to help accomplish some important and lasting things…I don’t want to have to say to myself that an opportunity was lost for lack of trying.”37

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk exclaimed in 1963 that “In these programs we have people of many nations coming together at their best, and I am optimistic enough to believe that when you have people at their best you have something very good indeed.” From 1961-1965 the U.S. sent over 9,900 Fulbright grantees to various countries (see chart below), and the government dedicated over $189,000,000 to mutual educational and cultural exchange activities. Both high government officials and grantees of these exchanges commended the program’s contributions to mutual understanding and the promotion of peace. Looking back on his experience in Taiwan, Robert Irick of Missouri, in 1964, stated that, “The China that I’ve found is definitely not the China I read in stateside textbooks. Perhaps the greatest result of my grant is this realization that no one picture or judgment of China today is a true one.” Dorthy Getty, an American Fulbright teacher in India commented, “Although I personally feel much more pride in my own way of life, I have far deeper respect for simple non-Western ways…I believe many

U.S. teachers are provincial in outlook. This experience makes one more open-minded.\textsuperscript{38} Even Senator Fulbright himself, speaking on the progress of the Fulbright program, stated that the results from these endeavors “have exceeded our fondest expectations.”\textsuperscript{39} Despite all the contradictions and conflicts over the structure and funding for mutual educational and cultural activities, these programs received an unprecedented amount of support and funding from 1961-1965. By the end of 1965, unfortunately, this good fortune would take a turn for the worse.

**Figure 4: Annual Fulbright-Hays Awards, 1960-1966**

![Yearly Totals of Awards Granted to U.S. citizens under the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act from 1960-1966](image)

Sources: Joyce Jean’s “An Overview of International Educational Exchange, 1946-1966,” Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, box 325-18 and box 103-11, Historical Collection, Special Collections Sections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

From a high point of $53,007,000 in 1966, government support for mutual educational and cultural activities would dwindle down to $32,125,000 by 1970. Assistant Secretary

\textsuperscript{38} Extracts from *Teacher and Scholar Abroad*, First-Person Reports of the U.S. Exchange Programs, a report by The Board of Foreign Scholarships, (September 1964).

\textsuperscript{39} Remarks of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Senator Fulbright are found in a report from a factsheet of the International Educational Exchange Program. This source can be found at the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, box 103-11, Historical Collection, Special Collections Sections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
Charles Frankel courageously attempted to increase funding and coordinate CU activities the following years, but as U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia deepened, support of educational and cultural activities quickly faded to the U.S. government’s periphery. Senator Fulbright, occupied with condemning Johnson’s foreign policy operations in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam, was not present to defend the program he created in 1946. From 1965-1970 policymakers, universities, and participants in support of international educational exchange refused to sit quietly as this took place. Debate on the structures, purposes and funding for educational and cultural exchanges heated up throughout this period. How did these disputes parallel with the larger debates over the Vietnam War? The next chapter will explore the various causes behind the decrease in funding for educational and cultural exchanges.
CHAPTER III
One One - Hundreth of One Percent:
The Fulbright-Hays Act from 1965-1970

“It’s some kind of commentary upon your Congress and upon you who send us to Congress that we can approve in one afternoon, with a minimum debate, a budget of from $40 to $60 billion for defense- and I vote for it because I believe in defense. With a minimum of debate and no argument we can approve this vast expenditure for a machine that we hope we will never have to use... And yet that same House of Representatives and Senate will spend a week arguing whether they should spend one one-thousandth or, if you will, one one-hundredth of one percent as much for the act which I had the honor to co-author.” 1

– Congressman Wayne L. Hays (co-author of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act)

Although the U.S. never officially declared war on Vietnam, the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, a joint resolution that was passed by Congress which gave President Johnson the authorization to use military force against North Vietnam, provided the President with enough power to begin, what would be, a ten year military effort in Southeast Asia. The Vietnam War proved to be another obstacle for which mutual educational and cultural exchange activities would have to contend throughout the mid to late 1960s. This war would swiftly drain funds from various U.S. government agencies and programs, and place them into the U.S. Department of Defense. Already having to deal with unyielding bureaucratic structures, a relentless appropriations committee, and national spending efforts to relieve the war on poverty, Assistant Secretary of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Charles Frankel, now faced a war policymakers expected his programs to prevent.

This chapter will explore the issues that surrounded the implementation of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act from 1965-1970. It illustrates how the failure to define the purpose for educational and cultural activities in Washington caused tensions amongst scholars and embassy

1 Remarks of Congressman Wanye L. Hays taken from convocation held at Ohio University on December 2, 1966 to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Fulbright – See Memorandum of J.Manuel Espinosa’s, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, box 172-6, Historical Collection, Special Collections Sections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
officers abroad. By focusing on the appropriations hearings for educational and cultural exchange programs, this chapter will also demonstrate that although the Vietnam War drained funds from many federal programs and foreign affairs agencies such as the Peace Corps (see appendix A) and AID, the drastic decrease in funding for international educational and cultural exchanges under the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) were due in large part to the ways policymakers viewed the role of the exchanges within U.S. foreign policy.

“What Results Have We Gotten?” : The 1966 Appropriations hearing

On February 22, 1966, Frankel, only five months in office, addressed the appropriations committee on the budget for mutual educational and cultural exchange activities for the fiscal year of 1967. Frankel understood all too well the skeptical views Sub-Committee Chairman on Appropriations for the Department of State, John Rooney, held toward these exchange activities. Attempting to please the Chairman, Frankel decreased the request for exchange programs by $3 million dollars and drew the budget up in full realization of the over-riding national necessities that were involved in Vietnam. Unfortunately, he was unsuccessful in easing the Chairman’s attitude toward the programs.

Writing about the 1966 hearing with Chairman Rooney, Frankel commented, “I had hardly taken my seat when he [Chairman Rooney] asked me how I could possibly justify a ‘grandiose’ exchange program, which had been going on for twenty years and was supposed to be winning us friends.” ² In view of the Vietnam War and the overall negative world view of the U.S., Chairman Rooney asked Secretary Frankel “What results [from educational and cultural exchange programs] have we gotten?” Rooney continued, “The going is pretty rough right now for the Vice President out in Manila, is it not, and everywhere one of our officials goes he is

² Frankel, *High on Foggy Bottom*, 118.
practically attacked by the students in these foreign countries. What effect, if any, has the expenditure of these huge sums had to do with this? Encourage it?”

Chairman Rooney, linked protests of U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia and Latin America to U.S. mutual educational and cultural exchange activities, believing that these exchanges failed to serve their only purpose: to win favor toward U.S. foreign policy. For Rooney, government-sponsored exchange activities were only as valuable as their ability to contribute good will in the world’s perception of the United States. Faced with a number of anti-American protests throughout the world, Rooney supposed that if U.S. educational and cultural programs were not preventing these demonstrations from taking place then they were encouraging them. Frankel responded to Rooney’s comment by reassuring the Chairman that the people in his exchange program went back to their home countries and, reported what the United States really is, how much it means to them, and were not among the people who lead protests. He later wrote that he had to restrict himself from telling the Chairman “that demonstrations against the United States were part of the general political climate in the world, and that our programs had neither the purpose nor the capacity, by itself, to change people’s reactions to the policies of the U.S. government.”

Throughout the budget hearing, Secretary Frankel pleaded his case for the continuation of stable funding for educational and cultural exchanges. In his closing remarks to the committee Frankel proclaimed:

I do not say that this is a program which is a panacea or which can bring peace to the world… I think without this program and, indeed, without the whole range of educational activities being

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5 Frankel, High on Foggy Bottom, 118-119.
presented to Congress this year...our foreign relations will be in much worse state. This is the creative, constructive, affirmative supplement to Vietnam. Precisely because we have the difficulties now in Vietnam, it is the wrong time, it seems to cut back on what the United States really represents overseas, which is a faith in education and a faith in mutual understanding through education.6

The committee responded to Frankel’s final comment by stating that they were not in agreement with him, and did not think that they would be in agreement with him at the table that morning. Secretary Frankel was not surprised at their response. He believed that Chairman Rooney had his mind made up about the programs before the budget hearing even started. Commenting on Rooney’s gestures during the hearing, Frankel wrote, “…after he asked me a question he would turn to his staff assistants and talk to them while I was giving my answer. The question was from him to me; the answer was from me to the stenographer.”7 Keeping his frustrations with the Chairman and the committee to himself, Frankel could only sit idly by as the appropriations committee dealt one of the harshest blows to his program.

The end of the 1966 budget hearing for mutual educational and cultural activities was followed by the first slash to the program’s budget. From a highpoint of $53,007,000 in 1966, mutual educational and cultural exchanges activities were cut about 10%, resulting in a budget of $46,465,000 for the 1967 fiscal year. This budget cut caused uproar amongst supporters who wholeheartedly believed in mutual educational and cultural activities. Following the budget cut for 1967, a number of scholars and embassy officers weighed in on the problems facing the state of educational and cultural exchange programs.

7 Frankel, High on Foggy Bottom, 119.
The budget cuts could also be seen as a reprisal against constituencies that publicly and actively opposed the Vietnam War and favored cultural internationalism. Some of the first signs of opposition in the United States to the Vietnam War came out of the civil rights movement. By mid-1965, 380 prosecutions were begun against men refusing to be inducted to serve in the military; protests of the bombings in North Vietnam were taking place in universities, city halls, and churches all across the United States; participants involved in government-sponsored international educational and cultural exchanges abroad (Peace Corps and Fulbright programs) spoke out against the war.  

A View from Embassy Officers and Scholars: 1966-1968

As the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) struggled for funding in Washington, employees and participants of educational and cultural exchanges began to voice their complaints with the way educational exchanges operated abroad.

The debates on the purposes and the coordination of educational and cultural exchanges were as lively in the field as they were in Washington. As the funding for educational and cultural exchanges slowly decreased after 1965, Fulbright scholars from various posts abroad began to question government’s dedication to mutual understanding. Viewing the government sponsored overseas tours of jazz icons such as Dizzy Gillespie, Muddy Waters, Gerry Mulligan, Louis Armstrong and comedian Joey Adams as pure products of the USIA propaganda campaign, American Fulbright scholars were curious on what was expected of them in the field.  

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Were they to be seen as “cultural ambassadors” of the United States or were they to be independent thinkers dedicated to mutual exchange and understanding? In a 1966 article entitled “The Darkest Fulbright,” American Fulbright research grantee in London (1965) and editor of Horizon: A Magazine of the Arts, Richard Kostelanetz addressed various issues hindering the program’s success. Although Kostelanetz believed that the lack of money was the biggest threat to the Fulbright scholar, he viewed the government officials operating the program abroad as a major problem, too. He contended that the purpose of the Fulbright scholars was to be an independent thinker not a sub-diplomat or cultural ambassador for the U.S.; who will “spread good cheer, become model citizens and sprout the American point of view on all occasions.” Kostelanetz wrote that “if the Fulbright program considers itself an adjunct of diplomacy, it should select red-cheeked fraternity presidents rather than scholars.” Frustrated with the ways government officials view the functioning of educational exchange, Kostelanetz wrote, that “the program’s bureaucrats often mention this ‘purpose’ (referring to Fulbright’s connection with U.S. diplomacy) to discipline behavior they find recalcitrant, to justify asking Fulbrights to give gratis lectures (often, ‘humorous after dinner talks’) up and down the land, and to support their own presence in the country.” Calling the bureaucrats who administer the Fulbright program abroad “major thorns of the Fulbright” and “nuisances to the scholar,” Kostelanetz urged these officials to stop “cajoling” the Fulbrighter “into participating in all sorts of official functions, invading their lives with the freedom and impatience of the police, and even threatening to withhold the monthly….” Voicing his agitations of those who ran the Fulbright program abroad, he added, “To make matters worse, officials tend to be failed academics…thus, they exhibit resentment toward those young scholars who, talented and productive, have free time to develop their interests.” He concluded, “As a rule, when a charitable program exists more for the sake of
the officials than the recipients, the beneficiaries become dupes in the perpetuation of the bureaucratic machine, and despite its honorable intentions, the Fulbright program is no different.”

To address these problems, Kostelanetz proposed a five-point program for reorganization of the Fulbright program and contended that anything less than a general overhaul of the program would only bring disrespect to both American and foreign scholars. Within this five-point plan, Kostelanetz requested that bureaucrats “stop insisting that the scholars should be cultural ambassadors; American students are gregarious enough to be fine emissaries without being self-conscious missionaries.”10 Criticism by Fulbright scholars on their purpose did not end with Kostelanetz. Throughout the late 1960s articles began to sprout up throughout the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs’ publications. Launched in June of 1965, *International Educational and Cultural Exchange* became the platform in which both scholars and government officials voiced their discontent with educational and cultural activities. Its publication was a response to the growing concern for the future of educational and cultural activities.

The Commission invited government agencies, private organizations, and individuals to submit articles for the journal in order to report to the public in the United States and abroad about the programs authorized by the Fulbright-Hays Act. The Commission used this journal to serve as a forum for the discussion of “the most pressing issues” in the field of educational and cultural exchange. Voicing opposition to those trying to separate information and educational/cultural activities, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information (USACI), which advises the

10 Richard Kostelanetz was an American Fulbright Scholar who did research at the University of London in 1965. Richard Kostelanetz, “In Darkest Fulbright,” *The Nation* (June 13, 1966): 725-726. – See Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, box 172-21, Historical Collection, Special Collections Sections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
Director of the USIA, addressed advocates of reorganization, like Charles Frankel, and used excerpts from their 1965 report to Congress in the 1966 Spring Issue. Within this article, the USACI reaffirmed their stance on keeping cultural activities with information activities. They contended that “the information and cultural activities should not be separated from one another as if they were contagious and required separate aseptic rooms.” They continued, “They [information and cultural activities] should be coordinated and, where appropriate, blended together by PAO’s and CAO’s…who are sufficiently sensitive to appreciate the potential power of both these instruments of human communication in the development of international understanding.”

It did not take Frankel, then Assistant Secretary of Educational and Cultural Affairs, long to respond to this article with one of his own. The 1966 Winter Issue featured an article by Frankel entitled “Man in the Middle: Cultural Affairs Officer,” reprinting the first chapter of his book (The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs). Frankel illustrated through a composite portrait of the Cultural Affairs Officer why information and cultural activities needed to be separated. His article took direct shots at the USIA and highlighted the problems that arose from working in between two agencies that viewed the purposes of educational and cultural activities differently.

While agency representatives publicly bickered over the organizational issues of educational and cultural programs, scholars and CAO’s addressed the Fulbright programs dedication to mutual understanding. In an article entitled “Is the Fulbright Program Genuinely Bi-national?” author Olive I. Reddick wrote of her experiences working with the exchange

program in India. Her article discussed the difficulties that needed to be overcome if the Fulbright program was to be a truly joint effort with responsibility equally shared by the two nations which have signed an agreement to cooperate in educational exchange. Reddick attacked those USIS’ (other name given to the United States Information Agency) Cultural Affairs officers who were not recruited from the academic world. She stated that if a Foreign Service Officers who had no background in the academic world was hired to the position of CAO then it is “very unlikely that he will have, or be able to acquire” a true bi-national point of view. She added, “At one extreme, the USIS may look upon the foundation [of the Fulbright program] as a branch of itself. This may be unconscious, or the fact protested but real all the same.” Reddick contended that the officers who operated the Fulbright program in New Delhi were far from having any bi-national consciousness or commitment. Adding evidence to this statement, she asserted that “At a 3-day regional USIS conference of cultural affairs officers in New Delhi where the Fulbright program was on the agenda along with information and other programs, there was not a single reference to its being bi-national or to India’s stake in it….” She ended by pointing out that the “Indian government does not see this [the Fulbright program] as a program in which it is directly involved.” Reddick’s call for a bi-national balance and attack on CAO’s in India did not sit well with the bureaucrats operating the program abroad.13

When asked, by the editors of the *International Educational and Cultural Exchange* for his comments on Dr. Reddick’s article, Robert R. Brooks, the CAO at New Delhi since 1963, was not exuberant about Reddick’s piece. He stated that “I don’t believe that the question ‘Is the Fulbright program genuinely bi-national?’ is a genuine question.” Contending that the funding for the program is certainly not bi-national, Brooks supposed that if Reddick’s definition of “bi-

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national” means serving the genuine intellectual cultural, educational, and development interests of both countries, then the Fulbright program was, without a shadow of a doubt, bi-national. Referring to Reddick’s critique on the USIS, Brooks stated that “the American liberal fixation on seeing propaganda, or sinister foreign policy, or USIS ‘hard line’ intentions in the Fulbright program was as tiresome as the Communist monomania for CIA agent in every woodpile.” He continued “the real problems are not unilateral financing, or the sinister influence of U.S. foreign policy, or the ‘appearance of evil’ in the close working relationships between USIS and Fulbright foundations…..” Linking the real problems of the Fulbright program to the selection process by the Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS), the lack of dedication by scholars, insufficient money, and competition with private agencies, Brooks unreservedly disagreed with Reddick’s premise.¹⁴ Contrary to Brook’s belief, however, Reddick’s position was held by many others in the field of international educational and cultural exchange.

In a 1968 report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, Dr. Seth Tillman presented information that demonstrated Fulbrighter’s from all over Asia were just as concerned with the bi-nationality and coordination of the Fulbright program as much as Olive Reddick.¹⁵ Dr. Seth Tillman, consultant to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, reported to Committee members his experiences from his observations of the Fulbright program and the Peace Corps throughout Asia in a “Diary of a trip to Asia: The Peace Corps and the Fulbright Program.” In Japan, Tillman reported that “the Japanese are concerned exclusively with educational exchange.” He declared that the Japanese believed that the U.S. differed with them over the basic concept of educational exchanges. In providing leadership grants which financed brief visits to

¹⁴ Robert R. Brooks’ response to Olive I. Reddick’s is found at the bottom of Reddick’s article “Is the Fulbright Program Genuinely Bi-national?,” International Educational and Cultural Exchange (Winter 1967): 76.

the United States by people who are judged politically promising, the Fulbright programs were seen by the Japanese as proponents of propaganda rather than academic exchange. Tillman wrote that the “Japanese want bi-national administration and an emphasis on serious, long-term academic exchanges rather than short-term leadership grants….“ Affirming that the Fulbright program was still seen by many in Japan as the most reputable educational exchange program in the field, Tillman warned against linking this program with propaganda and ruining its reputation.

Tillman explained that the frictions in Washington over the purposes for educational exchanges “derogates from the purposes of the Fulbright-Hays Act, one of which is to promote good will and understanding.” Blaming influential people in both the executive branch and Congress for orienting the Fulbright program to propaganda and other political purposes, Tillman recommended that the program not be used or viewed as an instrument for fighting communism. In Bombay, Tillman spoke on how Fulbrighters were confused on their objectives. In interviewing one American Fulbright alumnus living in Bombay, Tillman stated “The critical question, said one alumnus, is whether the United States is still committed to the aims, broadly conceived, of the Fulbright program.” Tillman told the Committee that, in Bombay, “the confusion about objectives is apparent in the uneasy relationship between the USIS and the United States Educational Foundation in India (USEFI)”, which both were ran by the Public Affairs Officer of the USIA in the same building. When Tillman asked an USIS officer about the problems they faced with the USEFI, the officer responded “What’s the difference? Those Fulbright people don’t seem to realize that the money all comes from the same place.” In an interview with an American Fulbrighter in Bombay, Tillman noted that “One of the young
Fulbright tutors described USIS as an attempt to make the United States appear as much as possible like the Soviet Union.”

Throughout his report to the Committee, Tillman, time and time again, insisted on some kind of distinction between programs like the Fulbright program and USIA/USIS propaganda efforts. He stated that “Like the Peace Corps, it [the Fulbright Program] absolutely cannot be treated as an operating tool of foreign policy without being corrupted and destroyed.” In concluding his report, he brought up his distress with the position of the CAO, who works for both the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) but is under supervision of the USIA in the field. Tillman, like many others, believed that this contradiction in the field “reduces the educational and cultural programs to a subordinate role in which exceedingly important distinction between education and propaganda is at the mercy of the propagandists…”

Tillman’s proclamation was closer to the truth than even he might have expected. The two-way flow of information and the increase of mutual understanding were second to the main U.S. priority of the promotion of U.S. democratic intuitions and ideals. By examining the order of objectives expressed in the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) country program plans, one can see how the CU programs were manufactured to fit the aims of the USIA.

A case study: CU Country Plans in Latin America throughout the 1960s

The failure to address the organizational issues of exchange programs allowed the bureaucrats in charge of operating the Fulbright program abroad to bring exchange programs in

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16 Ibid, 2, 21-27.
closer relation with the USIA’s mission. After all, the CAOs’, in charge of these programs’ aims, had careers dependent on the USIA offices abroad. Therefore, their divided loyalty tended to lean toward the USIA’s mission rather than the Assistant Secretary of State’s aspirations for educational and cultural exchanges.

Latin America makes for the perfect case study, because during the 1960s, this region became a primary target for reform under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Seeking to gain favor and support of Latin American nations, Kennedy committed $20 billion dollars over a ten year period under the Alliance for Progress, promising to enhance education, eliminate adult literacy by 1970, and raise the per capita income of the region. Along with a number of economic aid and social reform programs that came with the Alliance, Kennedy proposed an increase in educational and cultural exchanges between the U.S. and Latin America. Under the Alliance, educational and cultural exchanges became linked with USIA efforts. Throughout Latin America, public affairs officers and cultural affairs officers directed participants in exchange programs toward USIA goals of promoting U.S. foreign policy and influencing foreign peoples to support U.S. national interest rather than participating in the two-way flow of mutual understanding.18

CU country plans, approved by the USIA and directed by the USIA public affairs officer abroad, defined the purposes and goals of the information and exchange programs in each country. Throughout Latin America, these country plans were designed to correlate with the Alliance for Progress and promote U.S. foreign policy abroad.

In Venezuela, where angry crowds displeased with U.S. foreign policy publicly assaulted Vice-President Nixon in a visit to the country a few years earlier, CU country plan objectives expected participants to promote understanding of U.S. foreign policy trade agreements and assist in the comprehension of the bilateral problems between the two countries. According to the plan, participants in exchange programs were given the task to correct the impressions that the U.S. was only an advanced industrial nation without cultural or artistic achievements, and to provide situations where key Venezuelan leaders could discuss problems of common concern with high-level U.S. specialists. Instead of promoting peace through “mutual understanding”, the CU wanted their participants to foster sympathetic understanding of the U.S. and encourage the acceptance of democratic solutions to political, social, and economic problems. CU objectives for Venezuela, although far from the mandate of the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act, were not as deliberate toward the USIA’s mission as those objectives for Latin American nations who had established communist ties.

For Bolivia, where communist parties were established and fears of revolution began to grow, the U.S. embassy placed special emphasis- in its educational and cultural programs- on securing an intellectual dialogue between Bolivia and America, advancing the goals of the Alliance for Progress, and supporting democratic and constitutional government. Throwing the apolitical concept of educational exchanges out the window, the CU country plan urged U.S. participants in Bolivia “to demonstrate that communism endangered the welfare of the Bolivian

19 CU country program plans and objectives for Venezuela found Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, box 105-8, U.S. Department of State, Historical Collection, Special Collections Sections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
people,” and encouraged the cultivation of “respect and (where practical) the emulation of America’s educational and cultural organizations.”  

Other countries of South and Central America were targeted. Political instability, labor disputes, and contractual rights disagreements with U.S.-owned companies in the 1960s throughout Peru caused many problems in U.S.-Peruvian relations. Hoping to use educational and cultural exchanges to sway opinion, the CU program’s two major objectives in Peru were “to influence the Peruvian political scene and Peruvian foreign policies in accordance with U.S. interests” and “to influence and shape elements of the academic, government, policymaking, and private business circles associated with economic affairs.”

Throughout Costa Rica, CU objectives of the exchange programs were designed “to further continuance of a democratic stability.” The program plans continued to be aimed toward training and influencing present and future young leaders, especially those possessing potential for contributing to the progressive economic, social, and political development of the country within the framework of the Alliance of Progress.

In an airgram sent from the desk of the Embassy in Santiago, Chile to the State Department in Washington, CU officers boasted of their success “in demonstrating the sympathy

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22 CU plans for Costa Rica were taken from two annual reports. The first, an airgram from the Division of Americans Abroad entitled “Educational and Cultural Exchange: Revision of Educational Exchange Program for FY-1968”. Dated June 5, 1967. Full report found at Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, box 235-24, U.S. Department of State, Historical Collection, Special Collections Sections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
Americans have for Chileans’ aspirations for social and economic reforms through educational and cultural exchange.”23 Even in countries like Ecuador, Panama and Colombia, where there was a minimal threat of communist revolution, the CU used exchanges to “support and explain U.S. foreign policy and project an accurate image of the U.S.”24

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Linking the aims of the USIA to the Department of State’s CU programs, public affairs officers in Latin American embassies used apolitical exchange programs as instruments of the Cold War. Figure 5 reveals that the objectives for exchanges in Latin America were intended to foster the U.S. image, influence young leaders, and, in some countries, used blatantly for countering communist influence. Although the goal of mutual understanding was mentioned in the CU plans, they were usually second (and at times third and fourth) to the aims mentioned in the objectives above. While CU country program plans do not necessarily reflect what was actually taking place abroad, the CU plans show the government’s intentions for educational exchanges. In reading personal experiences from Fulbright scholars, it is safe to say that participants in these exchange programs did not always conform to the objectives the CU placed forth. Yet, the organizational issues of exchange programs placed pressures on the Fulbright participant to assist the USIA with their efforts. Throughout the late 1960s scholars and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Anti-Communism</th>
<th>Foster U.S. Image</th>
<th>Economic Progress</th>
<th>Influence Young Leaders</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Demonstrate Sympathy</th>
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Notes: The education section under this table refers to both the improvement of educational development and mutual understanding (both mandates under the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act).

Sources: CU Country Program Plans for Latin America throughout the 1960s. All available CU plans for Latin America can be found at the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, Historical Collection, Special Collections Sections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville
policymakers bickered over how educational and cultural programs were run and for what purposes, but nothing was changing. The USIA maintained control over educational and cultural exchange programs abroad, and the bi-nationality of the Fulbright program was continually questioned. Moreover, the funding for government sponsored educational and cultural activities diminished at a rapid rate.


From a budget of $46,465,000 in 1967, government funding for mutual educational and cultural exchanges were slashed, once again, resulting in a budget of $43,683,000 for 1968. Along with a major reduction, educational exchange activities would also lose a major defender of their programs. Assistant Secretary of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Charles Frankel, restless over the government’s lack of support for international educational and cultural exchange and unwilling to keep silent on the U.S. policy toward Vietnam, resigned from his position a few months after the appropriations hearing. Frankel would be replaced by Edward D. Re, a well established lawyer, judge, and Chairman of the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (1961-1968). Edward Re was the interim secretary for eleven months. Having no prior experience in educational and cultural diplomacy, Re could only serve as spectator to the largest reduction in the history of educational and cultural exchanges the following year.

Although a number of policymakers and government agencies in Washington held the belief that the budget cuts for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs were connected to the growing defense budget for Vietnam, many of them began to suspect that these drastic reductions were connected to other grounds outside of the cost of the Vietnam War after the funding for exchange programs dwindled.
When asked if the Fulbright Program proceeded as he had envisioned it, Senator Fulbright answered, “It did, until 1965. Then Lyndon Johnson fell out with me over the Vietnam War and –I can’t say whether he called attention- anyway they cut back the Fulbright program severely, from about 6,000 grants a year to about 2,000.” He continued, “…the appropriation then was very small. I can’t help but think he [President Johnson] said, ‘Oh well, that’s Fulbright’s- no good anyway.’ He wasn’t particularly interested in the program.”

Senator Fulbright openly opposed the war in Vietnam and raised some problems in Congress over this matter. He viewed President Johnson’s cutting of the funding for his program as a means of paying him back for opposing his judgments. Senator Fulbright’s claim was supported by President Johnson’s adviser, Clark Clifford. Clifford quotes the president saying, “It’s easier to satisfy Ho Chi Minh [the Vietnamese enemy leader] than Bill Fulbright.”

Although a contributor to the funding collapse of the Fulbright program, Senator Fulbright and President Johnson’s “fall-out” was just one of many reasons why the funding for this program drastically decreased by 1969. Even Senator Fulbright would admit that although his program was sabotaged by the Johnson administration “in the White House and the upper echelons of the State Department,” the reasons behind the drastic reduction of his program’s funding were “varied and complex.”

Frankel believed that the slashes for the funding of educational exchange program were due in large part to Congress’ lack of belief in these programs. In a 1969 New York Times article, he stated that “The cuts in our cultural relations programs around the world were about 33 percent. They come against a long history of indifference to these programs. The reason given for the cuts was cost of the war in Vietnam.” Calculating the cost of Vietnam and comparing it to

25 Senator Fulbright as quoted in Sussman, The Culture of Freedom, 56.
the exchange programs, Frankel stated “the annual ‘savings’ effected are about equivalent to the cost of four hours of that war.”

The Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS), which is the board partially responsible for supervising and setting the policies for government-sponsored educational exchange programs, also shared Frankel’s views. They too blamed Congress’ lack of commitment to culture for the reduction in funding. In their 1968 annual report to the Congress, the BFS declared:

> Members of the Board (BFS) are so concerned…about certain attitudes and developments that have greatly weakened and substantially reduced educational exchange activities of the U.S. government, that they feel obliged to comment on this trend so that Members of Congress will be fully apprised of their consequences.

The BFS believed that Congress’ reduction for these programs mislead those who invested their time and money into a “long-term” effort. They exclaimed that, “It is false economy to have invested, and to have encouraged others to invest, so much energy and resources in programs and activities whose full potential in many cases cannot be realized because of a reduction or withdrawal of Federal support.” Viewing Congress’ attitude toward educational exchanges as the main culprit for the cuts, the BFS reinstated the fact that “educational exchange should not be thought of or measured merely as an ‘instrument of foreign policy’, although it appears to us that both the Congress and the Department sometimes take the view.” They believed that educational exchanges should not be judged by the same standards as

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other areas of foreign policy. The BFS was not the only organization that voiced their aggravation with Congress over the funding.

In their spring 1969 issue entitled “Is Anyone Listening”, the U.S. Advisory Commission remarked that members were frustrated with their ineffectiveness in convincing Congress of educational and cultural programs’ importance. They exclaimed, “We have assumed that when the Congress asks us to write an annual report, it also wants us to make recommendations. Our recommendations to the Congress concerned with funding have not been heeded.” The Commission contended that the fluctuations in government funding for educational and cultural exchanges illustrated how much Congress actually believed in government-sponsored educational and cultural programs. They argued that this lack of belief is “simply unbecoming of a nation.”

They also addressed the unanswered questions that surrounded the implementation problems of the Fulbright program in the field. They asked, “What administrative pattern, both in Washington and in the field can best facilitate the Government’s performance of its role?” They continued, “Should all educational and cultural activities supported by Government be directed by one agency, or should they be dispersed among various agencies; and if the latter, how can they be effectively coordinated?” Pressing the U.S. government to address these questions before educational and cultural exchanges become a thing of the past, the Commission exclaimed that if the U.S. government is not committed to these international exchanges then they should just say so, but if they are then they should “begin to move forward.”

Policymakers and educational foundations were very particular in their criticism to why the funding for educational exchanges was cut. Most of them blamed the attitude that Congress

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32 Ibid, 6.
held toward educational exchanges as the major cause for these reductions. It is interesting that the ridiculously high funding for the Vietnam War (over $100 billion dollars) was rarely mentioned in their critique. This might have been possibly due to the fear of having educational exchanges linked with the anti-Vietnam movements taking place during this period and also due to the fact that cuts were expected.

Francis A. Young, Executive Secretary of the Committee on International Exchange of Persons, admitted in 1969 that while moderate reductions in appropriation for the educational exchange programs were expected as a part of the retrenchment policy brought about by the Vietnam War, he too was shocked at the severity of the cuts.33 Young questioned America’s commitment to cultural exchange, but never mentioned how the U.S.’ devotion to war was hurting the stability of the exchange programs abroad created to promote peace. Relying heavily on federal support to keep educational exchange programs afloat, supporters of the Fulbright program were very careful not to criticize the Johnson administration for its actions abroad lest they lose more funding, but their strategy did not work.

By 1969, the budget for educational and cultural exchange activities hit an all time low of $31,309,000; the largest reduction of the decade. From a total of 1,898 grants awarded to U.S. citizens going abroad under the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act from 1966-1967, the grants were cut over 50%, resulting to a total of 817 grants awarded to U.S. citizens for the 1969-1970 fiscal years. As you can see from the chart below, all regions, with exception to Africa, experienced major setbacks in their exchange programs from 1969 to 1970. The number of Americans going abroad under the Fulbright-Hays Act greatly reduced in just two years. In the American Republics the number of U.S. citizens going abroad deceased 54%; in Eastern Europe 9%; in the

Far East 60%; in Near East and South Asia 78%; and in Western Europe the numbers of U.S. citizens going abroad under this act decreased 59% when compared to the fiscal year of 1966-1967. The reaction overseas to the 1969 slash in appropriations was widespread and deep. This was first reported in detail in the New York Times on September 27, 1968.\textsuperscript{34} The article reported that many members of the bi-national commissions (established by diplomatic agreement to administer the exchange programs in participating countries and composed of prominent American and foreign nationals), after hearing about the budget cuts, were “something in a state of shock” and were “considering how to keep operating-if at all”. The article stated that “Many commission members believe, in fact, that it would be best to resign- on the ground that there is really nothing left for these men…to do.”\textsuperscript{35}

Throughout different regions of the world, bi-national commission members were astonished at the ways in which the U.S. would weaken one of their most valuable international programs.\textsuperscript{36} Speaking on the cuts, Robert L. Shinn, Dean of Instruction and Fulbright Adviser of the Union Theological Seminary, stated that “This is the kind of foolish economy that weakens a nation.” He continued, “…If Congress had tried to damage the American future, it might have done deliberately what its crude budgetary priorities are doing in actual practice.” \textsuperscript{37} On top of the drastic cuts for exchanges, 1969 would also mark the year in which the U.S. would undergo a presidential makeover in the White House.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.3.
\textsuperscript{36} For more information on worldwide reactions by various bi-national commissions see Francis A. Young, \textit{Educational Exchanges and the National Interest} (New York: American Council of Learned Societies, 1969). This article contains information on the reactions by bi-national commission members in Japan, India, and all throughout Europe.
Figure 6: Reduction of Fulbright-Hays Grants from 1966-1967 to 1969-1970

Comparison of Yearly Regional Totals of Academic Grants Awarded to U.S. Citizens Under the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act

Sources: This information was compiled from Exchange Scholars: A Dimension in International Understanding. 3rd through 10th Annual Reports, 1965-1972. The Board of Foreign Scholarships’ Annual Reports on Academic Exchanges to the U.S. Congress from 1965-1972.

The year 1969 marked the end of the Kennedy and Johnson era in the White House, and ushered in the presidency of Richard Nixon. The Nixon administration was not as supportive of educational and cultural exchanges as their predecessors. At a meeting with congressional leaders held on February 1970, President Richard Nixon said he “eschewed gushy optimism of any kind,” adding, “some Americans think that we can rely on peace by sending a few Fulbright scholars abroad…but that doesn’t bring peace. We can avoid war if we are realistic and not soft-headed.”

Unlike Kennedy and Johnson, President Nixon believed that cultural and educational programs needed minimal support from the government and that these activities should be undertaken by private channels.

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38 Iriye, Global Community, 160.
Without support from the President, government-sponsored educational and cultural activities suffered at the hands of the appropriations committee. Chairman Rooney of the Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Department of State sliced away at the remaining funds of the exchange programs for 1970. Dismissing the exchange programs as wasteful, Rooney and his staff refused to restore even partially the Fulbright program. During the 1970 appropriations hearing on mutual educational and cultural exchange activities, Rooney, justified the severe budget cuts for exchange activities the previous year, stating that, “It seems we have too many of these leeches who have attached themselves to the Federal payroll under this program who are living on it.” He explained, “It does not mean a darn thing because our relations with countries are worse than they ever were.” Speaking on the ineffectiveness of exchange programs, one of Rooney’s seasoned staff assistants commented that “… I have yet had anybody explain to us any real accomplishment for this program…after the 18 years I have been sitting here making appropriations. What have I contributed to the American taxpayer through this program?”

President Nixon was not hopeful of what could come from a strong international exchange programs. His election ended an era of a period when the government went to great lengths to reach out to different nations through educational and cultural exchange. Under the Nixon administration, government funding for cultural activities never bounced back from the slash of 1969

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CHAPTER IV
Conclusion:
End of an era?

The decade of the sixties witnessed one of the largest government efforts in the field of international educational and cultural exchange in U.S. history. Under the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act, a series of grants were provided to Americans studying abroad and to foreign students in the United States for cultural and special-visitor exchange and for supporting modern foreign-language training and area studies in the United States through sponsored trips abroad for American teachers. Along with the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress, the Fulbright program went to great lengths to reach out to Third World developing countries with economic aid and person-to-person exchange. The 1961 Fulbright–Hays Act consolidated various U.S. international educational and cultural exchanges, including the translation of books and periodicals, and U.S. representation in international fairs and expositions. It also established government operation of cultural and education centers abroad. This program was truly worldwide in scope and size, but its achievements did not come without its share of trials and tribulations.

Born in the wake of the devastation following WWII, the 1946 Fulbright Act was endorsed out of the belief that if large numbers of people know and understand the people from nations other than their own, they might develop a capacity for empathy, distaste for killing other men, and an inclination to peace.1 The Fulbright program was designed as an apolitical educational exchange program which supported peace through mutual understanding. But no

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sooner had the bill been introduced to Congress than the world experienced another war of a different nature, a war over the hearts and minds of the world. ²

During the Cold War, the United States, seeking ways to counteract, in what was perceived as a sophisticated Communist propaganda, looked to educational exchange programs for support. These programs went from being viewed as the key to building an interdependent world community to being seen as major tools for U.S. victory. Attempting to distance themselves from Soviet propaganda tactics, U.S. policymakers assumed that the allocation of U.S. culture, through person-to-person exchange, would win the ideological war against Communists, but their attitudes soon dulled as the war heated up.

As the Cold War heightened and Soviet propaganda efforts expanded and ensued, U.S. officials began to lose patience with what they judged to be naive and idealistic assumptions about the nature of educational and cultural exchange. They visualized cultural and informational activities as part of an aggressive program that was in full support of U.S. foreign policy initiatives. For them, these programs were simply tools for favorably influencing attitudes and opinions within foreign countries. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the word “mutual understanding” was placed on the back-burner of U.S. educational exchange objectives, with the promotion of American ideals becoming the primary political aim for these formerly apolitical programs. As opposition to U.S. foreign policy amplified and anti-Americanism grew, policymakers, justifying U.S. military actions abroad, condemned educational exchanges for not doing their jobs, which, for them, were to change people’s reactions to the policies of the U.S. government and bring peace.

The disputes between the USIA and the State Department, the Appropriations Committee and the Assistant Secretary of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and the exchange participant and

embassy officials all were linked to one question. What is the purpose of a government sponsored educational exchange program? Signed into law in 1961, the Fulbright- Hays Act was designed “to strengthen the ties which unite the U.S. with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations.” ³ The programs under this piece of legislation were expected to, according to the language of the Act, “assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.”⁴ Although the language of the legislation sounded wonderful, putting this idea in action proved to be a very difficult task throughout the decade of the 1960s. Different views and opinions on how the U.S. would carry out this Act warded off all efforts to consolidate educational and cultural programs into one bureau.

Throughout the 1960s, policymakers and participants debated on the coordination, funding, and importance of government-sponsored educational exchanges. Although never coming to a unanimous agreement, they each played a significant role in the largest expansion of worldwide educational exchanges in history.

By the end of the 1960s, though, the Fulbright program had been eclipsed by its own success. Although this era proved frustrating for administrators such Phillip Coombs or Charles Frankel with high hopes for a major rethinking of American cultural diplomacy, the recipients of the era’s exchanges were a resource in waiting for the future.⁵ It inspired a host of complementary, mostly private programs to the point where Fulbrighters now amount to only one percent of the total annual educational exchange traffic. The Fulbright program remains to be a highly acclaimed and world renowned program for the United States. Jeffery Gayner,

⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Cull, The Cold War and The United States Information Agency, 492.
former board member of the BFS (1981-1987), stated that “The total number of grants may diminish, but the Fulbright program can foster academic exchanges that would not otherwise occur, especially in newly emerging democratic countries. Just as the Fulbright program contributed to the reconstruction of post-WWII Europe fifty years ago, so can it assist today in the construction of a post-Cold War free-world.” This program has revolutionized the meaning of global exchange. Now, over half a million people from over two hundred countries participate in international educational exchange throughout the world.6 Since 1946, a total of over 300,000 “Fulbrighters”, both Americans and foreign nationals, have been sponsored by the Fulbright program.7 Although receiving its fair share of criticism, these numbers would have been impossible if it was not for the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act.

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7 Ibid, 2.
Bibliography

Archives and Manuscript Collections
A number of my sources came from the University of Arkansas’ Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection from 1938-1978. This archive contains correspondence, memoranda, reports, minutes, agenda, background papers, program proposals, exchange agreements, lists, and related materials documenting the history, organization, and effectiveness of the Fulbright Program; the role of the Board of Foreign Scholarships; the role of the Fulbright commissions (foundations); programs for U.S. and visiting grantees; as well as a number of collections pertaining to government sponsored educational and cultural exchange.

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**Secondary Sources**


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Appendix A: Funding of Peace Corps and Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Activities under the CU

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Peace Corps Funding</th>
<th>Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Activities under CU</th>
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Notes: The numbers on this table represent U.S. government funding for each program. They do not include the donations received by various private organizations.

Sources: The Department of State’s Funding Chart for Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Activities from the fiscal years of 1947 to 1971. This information can be found at the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, box 103-26.