“A CORRECT AND PROGRESSIVE ROAD”: U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS, 1945-1964

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A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 2011

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This historical investigation of U.S.-Turkish relations from the end of World War II to 1964 provides a greater understanding of the challenges inherent in the formation and implementation of U.S. policy in Turkey at a time when the Turks embarked on multiparty politics and a determined campaign to become a modern and distinctly European nation through ambitious economic development programs. Washington proved instrumental in this endeavor, providing financial support through the Marshall Plan and subsequent aid programs, and political sponsorship of Turkey’s membership in international organizations such as NATO and the EEC.

U.S. policymakers encountered various quandaries as they forged bilateral relations with the Turks, specifically reconciling democratization with Turkey’s development and participation in the containment of communism. The Turkish government under Adnan Menderes demonstrated its reliability as a U.S. ally, providing troops to fight in the Korean War and cooperating in the construction of NATO bases and the modernization of its military, but it came under increasing pressure from the political opposition when its economic policies failed to secure long-term economic growth and stability. Starting in the mid-1950s the Menderes government adopted increasingly authoritarian measures to control dissent, a problematic situation for Washington, as it desired greater Turkish democracy while at them same time did not wish to compromise the growing American military presence in Turkey. The U.S. solution to dealing with Turkey’s political tensions was one of nonintervention and detachment, an approach that produced greater Turkish resentment and compromised Washington’s ability to manage the frequent crises of the 1960s including 1960’s coup and the 1964 Cyprus crisis.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is impossible to overstate the contributions made by my advisor, Dr. Douglas J. Forsyth, in the completion of this dissertation. At every juncture in the process, be it research, writing, or revisions, he has been equally generous with his time and his insight. I must offer thanks and praise to Dr. Gary Hess and Dr. Tiffany Trimmer for their assistance throughout the last few years, as well as to Dr. Mark Simon of the Political Science Department for his counsel and recommendations. Dr. James Miller came aboard late in the journey, but offered encouragement and sound guidance that I only wish I might have heard earlier. No less important are the contributions made by Dr. Scott Martin, Dr. Don Rowney, Dr. Rebecca Mancuso, Dr. Andrew Schocket, and Dr. Amilcar Challu. A special mention needs to be made of Tina Thomas and DeeDee Wentland. Thanks also to my friends, Rob MacDonald, Joe Faykosh, Ian Mladjov, Peter Kuebeck, David Kuebeck, Norma Flores, William Smith, Dustin McLochlin, Andy VanCamp, Jay Perry, Jeff Zalewski, Beth Dutridge-Corp, and Stephanie Gaskill. Finally, I must recognize the unfailing support and love from my parents; my sisters, Laura and Jane; my brother-in-law, James; and my nieces, Maria and Veronica.
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Abbreviations in the Text

AKEL – Progressive Party of the Working People (Cyprus)
CEE – Committee of European Economic Cooperation
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency (United States)
CNU – Committee of National Unity (Turkey)
ECA – Economic Cooperation Administration (Marshall Plan)
EEC/EC – European Economic Community/European Community
EOKA – National Organization of Cypriot Freedom Fighters
ERP – European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan)
DP – Democratic Party (Turkey)
EIB – European Investment Bank
EPU – European Payments Union
EU – European Union
GATT – General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
GNA – Grand National Assembly (Turkey)
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IBRD – International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
IRBM – Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
ISI – Import Substitution Industrialization
JAMMAT – Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States)
JP – Justice Party (Turkey)
JUSMMAT – Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
MAP – Mutual Aid Program (Marshall Plan)
MDAP - Military Defense Assistance Program (United States)
MEC – Middle East Command
MLF – Multilateral Force (NATO)
MRM – Medium Range Missile
MSA – Mutual Security Agency
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEA – Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (U.S. State Department)
NKEK – Mechanical and Chemical Industries (Turkey)
OCB – Operation Coordinating Board (United States)
OEEC – Organization of European Economic Cooperation
OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
RPP – Republican Peoples Party (Turkey)
SANACC – State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (United States)
SEE – State Economic Enterprise (Turkey)
SOFA – Sate of Forces Agreement
SPO – State Planning Organization (Turkey)
TJP – Turkish Justice Party
TL – Turkish Lira
INTRODUCTION: IMAGINED NOSTALGIA

“If the party in power takes a correct and progressive road, all of us will help it, because this country is not one party or another; it is the entire nation.”

-Kasim Gülek, Secretary General of the RPP
November 20, 1955

At one time Turkey’s robust support of American security policy in the Middle East was one of the few unchanging variables in an otherwise unpredictable region. But events preceding and subsequent to the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted and broadened an existing rift between the allies. Turkey’s loyalty to the U.S. is no longer a constant, a reality made all too clear on March 1, 2003 when the Turkish Parliament, after several months of pressure from Washington, voted against American requests to utilize Turkey as a staging area for the offensive against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power. 2 Of the rejection, former president George W. Bush noted dolefully, “On one of the most important requests we had ever made, Turkey, our NATO ally, had let America down.” 3 Such a refusal of an American request by Turkey would have been unthinkable in earlier decades, particularly if it risked a scaling back in U.S. support and funding. Bush briefly recounts the assurances offered in exchange for the permission sought by Washington: “We promised to provide economic and military aid, help Turkey access key programs from the International Monetary Fund, and maintain our strong support for Turkey’s administration to the European Union.” 4

As this study shows, a similar such pledge might easily have been made in previous decades by the Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson administrations: the twin assurances of

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4 Ibid.
American dollars to boost Turkey’s economy and military, and American support in
strengthening ties with international organizations such as the IMF and the EU. Bush’s specific
mention of Turkey as a NATO ally borders on the ironic; by the mid-1960s Turkey found itself
being routinely let down by a fellow NATO partner, the United States, particularly in 1964 when
President Johnson threatened to do nothing if a crisis in Cyprus enticed the Soviet Union to
become involved in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey learned that NATO members,
specifically the U.S., could ignore their defensive duties to other members on an apparent whim.5

With the rupture between Turkey and the U.S. conceivably widening, some circles in
Washington bemoan that the U.S. has “lost” Turkey. Such assertions lead to the question, at
what point was Turkey securely America’s possession to lose? While there’s no denying that the
Turkish Grand National Assembly’s (GNA) 2003 vote shows all too well how much U.S.-
Turkish relations had deteriorated since the cold war, it should not have been wholly
unanticipated by the Bush administration. The GNA’s action was part of a steady decline rather
than an unforeseen turning point, one that began in the mid-1960s.

Most historical accounts of Turkish-American relations cite the period of 1945 to 1964 as
the years of greatest closeness and synchronicity of goals between the two countries, when
American and Turkish fears of Soviet expansionism in the Near and Middle East reached their
height. At the close of World War II dealings between U.S. and Turkish officials reflected
shared security concerns regarding the Soviets until the prospect of détente in the mid-1960s
promoted a reexamination of policy goals by the leaders of both countries. The loss of this
common enemy in the early 1990s made it all the more difficult for each side to justify the
continued closeness of the previous four decades. Additionally, Turkey increasingly pursued

5 For an examination of the current state of the Turkish public’s jaundiced view of U.S. policy see Giray
closer political, economic, and institutional ties to Western Europe with the active
couragement and facilitation of the U.S., in the hopes of the Turks seeing themselves as
distinctly “European” and less reliant upon American support.

Beyond the enticement of financial support, Turkey’s interest in stronger bonds with the
U.S. may be viewed as part of a larger pattern of Turkish self-interest and self-preservation
dating back centuries and included associations and alliances with Great Britain, France,
Germany, and even its traditional enemy, Russia, when circumstances justified it. As the
Ottoman Empire began to disintegrate during the 19th century both the Turks and a succession of
European powers found it mutually beneficial to form temporary alliances. For countries such as
England, France, and Germany an alliance with the Ottomans provided as a means of projecting
power into regions such as the Balkans and the Middle East. These alliances enabled the Turks
to play one European nation off the other, particularly against their Russian nemesis, and ensure
the continued existence of their shrinking empire.

Close relations with European allies also permitted Western political, economic and
military ideas would continue to enter Turkey, allowing a modicum of modernization and
enlightenment to take root in Turkish society, primarily among the elite military class, as
evidence by the Young Turks’ attempted revolution in 1908. Such a cycle commenced after
World War I, when the Turks sought to defend what remained of their empire, Anatolia and
Thrace, from invading armies of Allied countries planning to divide the remainder of their
territory amongst themselves. Turkey emerged from its fight for independence victorious but
fearful of possible future designs on its sovereignty, and therefore willing to seek a temporary
affiliation with the newly established Soviet Union and rekindled relationships with Germany
and Great Britain. At the close of World War II, with Germany crushed, Britain crippled, and
Russia seeking to guarantee its post-war security by dominating bordering nations, the victorious United States emerged as the obvious power for Turkey to seek closer relations with. Anxious about continuing Soviet expansion and infiltration in the Mediterranean and Middle East, the U.S. began to supply the Turks with economic aid and military support. Turkey’s military, long an esteemed and powerful institution, gained loftier standing as America provided the advanced weaponry and training deemed vital to resisting the Soviets.

A Turkish-American “honeymoon period” of sorts did exist from 1947-1955, beginning with the inauguration of the Truman Doctrine. Yet, according to some accounts, even at the height of the Cold War the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey “was never as real as is now nostalgically imagined.” The purpose of this study, written primarily with the use of documents from the U.S. and British archives, is to ascertain how relations between representatives of the American and Turkish governments changed from 1945-1964, how perceptions and expectations transformed over time in response to developments during the cold war and regime changes in Turkey and the U.S. The goal is to determine how dramatic a recalibration of nostalgia is required after examining the events and personalities of these years. But even without the benefit of wistful hindsight, it is apparent that the United States exerted tremendous influence over Turkey in the period after World War II, with each country in the midst of a process of redefinition, the U.S. as a hesitant superpower and Turkey as a democratic nation engaged in multiparty politics. America assumed a position from which it could reshape the global framework, and Turkey grappled with determining where it would fit within this rapidly changing structure.

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Turkey’s growing dependence upon American financial assistance during the 1950s, beginning with the Marshall Plan, occurred at a time when the government came to be dominated by a political party other than the one that had ruled since Turkey became a republic in 1923. In many regards, the year 1950 proved the most momentous for the Turkish Republic since its establishment more than a quarter century before. Turkish voters took part in a fair and open multiparty election, resulting in a new political party coming to power, the Democratic Party (DP) under Adnan Menderes. This meant the end of Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party’s (RPP) unchallenged lock on Turkish government. Having replaced the long-ruling RPP, the DP, led by Menderes as prime minister and Cemal Bayar as president, keenly felt the need to legitimize its authority. Overseeing Turkey’s full membership to NATO became one avenue to greater legitimacy for the DP, and sending a contingent of Turkish soldiers to Korea demonstrated the new government’s commitment to achieving this goal. In 1950 Turkish troops dispatched to Korea fought in a foreign war for the first time in the republic’s history when Turkey committed itself to take part in the UN military action.

The U.S. provided its new ally with the military and economic aid required to maintain armed forces capable of discouraging or, if need be, repulsing Soviet antagonism. Washington planned to encourage the development of an economy able to provide for Turkey’s defense needs and promote military self-sufficiency. Even without the full support of the U.S., Turkey pushed to become an industrialized nation with a productive capacity comparable to the nations of Western Europe, particularly once its agricultural sector appeared to reach its limits of growth in the mid-1950s. Washington lobbied Turkey to increase mechanization and efficiency in agriculture before making a full commitment to industrialization. Ankara did as was expected
with frequently unsatisfactory results in order to placate American officials and lobby for more financial assistance.

From a quantitative standpoint, the American approach to Turkey’s developing in the late 1940s and early 1950s read as a smashing success; Turkey’s exports of grains and other crops to Western Europe and other foreign markets reached impressive levels. But the economic growth subsided once the prices of Turkish cotton and tobacco dropped after the Korean War and weather conditions stymied Turkish agricultural production. This sudden reversal of fortune challenged the Menderes administration’s policy of correlating economic success and its political legitimacy. To hold off economic disaster Menderes actively sought American and then international funds to pay for a host of development projects including hydroelectric facilities, factories, and seaports, with the promise that the investment money would yield significant dividends in the near future. With his personal prestige and the standing of his government pegged against the success or failure of the Turkish economy, Menderes painted himself into a corner. Securing pledges of financial assistance from the U.S. became imperative to the political survival of the Menderes regime, which kept an obsessive eye on short-term productive capacity at the expense of sweeping and fundamental reforms to the Turkish economy that would lead to long-term stability.

The DP intended many of its policies to represent the long-ignored demands of the rural population, the majority population, for political as well as financial reasons. Since the days of Atatürk the RPP consistently overlooked agrarian interests as it promoted industry in quest of greater modernization. In 1950 these marginalized farmers voted the RPP out of power, forcing the DP to be cognizant of their demands in exchange for their loyalty. In making a number of concessions to the agrarian class in regards to taxes and subsidies, the DP entered into a pact that
guaranteed its short-term political survival, but led to economic and then political disaster.

Denied a source of substantial revenue in the form of taxes, the DP leaned increasingly upon Turkish industry and commerce, leading to resentment in these sectors. Academics, journalists and eventually the military also grew disenchanted with the increasingly repressive policies of the DP, and specifically Menderes, who relied upon authoritarian measures to silence the opposition and retain his position. These various groups’ umbrage and growing resistance towards Menderes goaded the Turkish military into eventually unseating the government in 1960.

Other problems stemmed from the Menderes regime’s heavy reliance upon financial aid from the United States to assist it in development projects. Menderes and Bayar came to power at a time when Marshall Plan aid began to manifest itself in Turkey. American planners working under the auspices of the European Cooperation Administration (ECA) supervised the use of Marshall Plan funds in programs designed to increase the mechanization and productivity of the Turkish agricultural sector in order to boost production and increase Turkey’s foreign currency reserves. ECA funds also went into road construction and improvement to facilitate the movement of troops and equipment to the border in the event of a Soviet incursion, and also to facilitate the transport of goods and people from Turkey’s rural interior to urban areas located in the West. The ECA’s primary goals were increasing Turkey’s production of agricultural exports to a recovering Western Europe, thereby strengthening the Turkish economy to the point where it could shoulder military expenditures and become increasingly integrated into the Western European economy. U.S. officials in Washington and Turkey further insisted that the Turks abandon its decades-long economic policy of statism, or state-guided economic participation, most evident in the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) that dominated the steel, cement, and
other key heavy industries, and the practice of import-substitution industrialization (ISI). In place of the SEEs and ISI the U.S. expected Turkey to embrace private enterprise and export-driven growth.

Closer relations between Turkey and the U.S., the unquestioned leader of the west after World War II, meant Turkey’s gradual drift from Britain. In the post-war British security model, London expected Turkey to serve primarily as a source of security and stability in the Middle East. Although the DP wished for Turkey to take on a more active role in the Middle East than the RPP did, Britain’s designs ran contrary to Turkey’s desire to break free of its Ottoman past and draw closer to Western Europe. Ankara scrupulously attempted not to intervene in the political matters of the Arab nations it once ruled as colonies unless circumstance demanded it.7 This made the U.S. security model more enticing than the one championed by the British. American planners saw Turkey first and foremost as a bulwark against Soviet interests in the Mediterranean, and in doing so pulled Turkey closer into the orbit of Western Europe. In the early days of the cold war, as tremulous relations between East and West gave way to tectonic shifts that separated Washington and Moscow into the hubs of two regional blocs, Turkey found itself thrust from the back of the theatre to center stage. Standing astride the geographic, cultural, and now political crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa gave the Turks a measure of importance that formerly did not exist, particularly once the U.S. assisted the Turkish military in its modernizing efforts.

The economic policies of the Menderes government made the financial support of the U.S. increasingly important in funding the Turkish military and increasingly costly development projects intended to improve the quality of life for all Turks. This approach proved successful so

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long as Washington approved the expenditures, but when the Eisenhower Administration looked to scale back the generosity of the Truman years and replace conventional military deterrents with nuclear weapons, Turkey faced a new set of challenges. It met them by looking to European nations and international organizations to provide short-term loans and credits and enthusiastically agreeing to the construction of NATO missile installations provided by the U.S. on Turkish soil. Turkish leaders assumed the missiles would serve as an ironclad guarantee of Turkey’s importance to NATO and keep Turkey an important destination for American funds.

The mid-1950s was also a time of transition for Turkish-British relations, due in large part to mounting problems on the British colony of Cyprus. A moment to join with Greece spearheaded by the Greek-Cypriot population grew progressively violent and placed the minority Turkish-Cypriot population in harm’s way, drawing the attention of Turkey in the process. When Britain granted Cyprus its independence in 1959, Turkey, Britain, and Greece, became the three guarantor powers charged with protecting Cyprus’ sovereignty. The British also sought to keep Turkey a part of their Middle Eastern strategy by including them in the Baghdad Pact and selling warships. By decade’s end Turkey was caught between the competing expectations of the Americans, who desired Turkey to focus its efforts on maintaining the security of Western Europe with modern weapons, and the British, who anticipated that the Turks would continue to exert influence in the Middle through more conventional means.

Turkey’s growing prominence in Western security increased the importance of the Turkish military and also invited it to become increasingly involved in politics. In response to the Menderes regime’s increasingly repressive and reckless measures that invited economic collapse and social instability, the Turkish military unseated the DP government in a May 1960 coup. The military then established a provisional government intended to rule until the drafting
of a new constitution and overturning of DP legislation deemed to be undemocratic. After that point a new civilian government could be elected. Turkey’s economic and foreign policy under the provisional government and the coalition government that followed it remained largely the same as it had been under the DP, with some exceptions, such as increased criticism of the U.S.’s expectations for Turkey. America remained Turkey’s most vital ally and source of financial aid, although two events compelled Ankara to reassess its previous assumptions about its guaranteed security as a NATO member. 1962’s Cuban Missile Crisis proved that Turkey’s membership in NATO did not guarantee it not being thrust in harm’s way as a result of a potential conflict beyond the scope of the Alliance. It further showed that Washington would broker a deal directly affecting Turkey’s defenses without consulting Ankara. The renewed conflict on Cyprus in 1964 also challenged Turkey’s beliefs in NATO’s functions. In the face of renewed violence between the Turkish and Greek-Cypriot populations, Turkey threatened invasion and partition of the island, an act that might have precipitated war with fellow NATO member Greece. President Johnson, alarmed at such a dangerous precedent, fired off a diplomatic message to Prime Minister İnönü vaguely threatening that should such a conflict result and draw in the Soviets, he could not guarantee that NATO would intervene on the Turks’ behalf.

Johnson’s note confirmed to many Turks the capricious nature of America’s Turkey policy, and challenged the assumptions of those who believed that the bilateral agreements between Turkey and the U.S. and its membership in multilateral defense organizations would guarantee Turkey’s safety. By the time of the Cyprus crisis in 1963 and 1964 no one could deny Turkey’s discernable disenchantment with the patron-client relationship that existed. Washington’s Turkey policies and the presence of American military personnel stationed in Turkey came under increasing scrutiny in the Turkish press. A steady flow of American
financial support to Turkey took place concurrently with the increasingly visible presence of U.S. and NATO military installations. Washington and Ankara viewed financial assistance and military support as inseparable, but often as cross-purposes: American officials anticipated Turkey reaching a level of economic development to allow it to maintain its military without U.S. funds; Turkey seemed to assume that making itself available to the needs of the U.S. military would then justify greater financial support from Washington. Relations between the two countries would never again be as harmonious as before 1964, but Turkey’s association with the U.S. allowed the Turks to draw closer politically and economically to Western Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany became a crucial source of loans and a destination for Turkish workers, and the U.S. also played a critical role in shepherding Turkey into an associate membership into the European Economic Community.

The existing body of literature on Turkey’s relations with the United States in the immediate post-war era is rather meager. The first monograph to examine the period is Richard D. Robinson’s *The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development*, published in 1963. Richardson, a Harvard-trained economist, lived in Turkey for several years during the 1950s as a correspondent for the American Universities Field Staff, an independent organization of academics created in the mid-1920s for the purpose of collecting and distributing information for U.S. colleges and universities. His reports from 1953-1957 have been compiled in four volumes of useful information in addition to the longer, more detailed supplemental reports he produced.

One of the earliest studies to take stock of the complexities of America’s dealings with the Turks is the aptly titled *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective, 1945-1971* by George S. Harris, an official at the American Embassy in Turkey.
from 1957-1962. Harris’ book first appeared in 1972, at a time when the United States at last grasped that its relationship with Turkey had fundamentally changed in the wake of student protests, anti-America rhetoric spewed forth by a growing leftist movement and an increasingly distant and calculating Turkish Government. Harris demonstrates that the basis for this dissent originated in the flawed alliance that developed between the two countries in the aftermath of World War II that officials on both sides failed to recognize or chose to ignore.

The most recent monograph on the topic is Nasuh Uslu’s *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: A History of a Distinctive Alliance* from 2003. Uslu examines U.S.-Turkish relations as a patron-client relationship, with America’s superior economic and military capabilities allowing it to freely influence the policies of Turkey to the point where Turkey became economically dependent upon the United States. Washington, recognizing this state of affairs, used its power to intervene in Turkish political matters with little consideration for the possible long-term consequences, as proven by the Johnson letter of 1964. Turkey’s realization of this initiated a growing resistance to U.S. requests to make available military resources and facilities to assist in American activities in the Near Eastern and Middle Eastern regions.

The sole monograph in English dealing with the post-war triangular relationship between the U.S., Britain and Turkey during the early cold war period is Ekavi Athanassopoulou’s *Turkey – Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952: The First Enlargement of NATO*. Athanassopoulou’s study examines how the expansion of NATO into the eastern Mediterranean brought Turkey closer to the West and at the same time meant the end of independent British policy in the Near East. From this time on American policies in the region would take precedence over the British, to their surprise and annoyance. Athanassopoulou focuses more on security
matters than on the economic developments of the period and her study concludes in 1952 with Turkey and Greece becoming full members of the Atlantic Alliance.

More monographs have been produced on British-Turkish relations than those between the United States and Turkey. *Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, 1940-45* by Nicholas Tamkin covers a period preceding the scope of this particular study, but is quite useful in laying out how World War II reshaped Britain’s attitude towards Turkey from modernizing ally to unstable nation unable to quell its “Oriental” impulses. An increasingly pejorative view of Turkey in London as the war ended helps to explain Britain’s gradual disengagement from Turkish affairs and the necessity for the United States to take up the slackening financial and military support in the late 1940s.

Mustafa Bilgin covers the same period as Athanassopoulou in *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era*, and also devotes much of the book with security matters, particularly in regards to Turkey’s role in Middle Eastern security. Bilgin’s study begins with the end of World War II as Turkey and Britain found themselves drawing closer together after nearly a decade of estrangement when their security concerns regarding the Soviet Union synchronized. After 1947 London increasingly expected the U.S. to assume a more prominent economic role in the Near East, but continued to maintain a prominent diplomatic and political role. This too changed after 1953, the date Bilgin’s narrative concludes, with the British realization that their plans for making Turkey a key participant in their plans for Middle Eastern defense were no longer feasible. After accepting this reality the British agreed to take part in a “Triangular Strategy” that provided a more prominent role and then the Washington-approved “Northern Tier” defense plan.

Cihat Göktepe picks up the narrative in his *British Foreign Policy Towards Turkey, 1959-*
Göktepe’s work is framed by two key developments, the military coup of May 1960 that brought down the Menderes Government and the escalating violence on Cyprus in 1964. 1959 provides a useful starting point for the study, as it marked the conclusion of seven years of violence directed by the Greek-Cypriot resistance against British rule of Cyprus. When London recognized the futility of maintaining possession of Cyprus, it worked with the governments of Turkey and Greece to determine the status of the island. Representatives of the three nations agreed to serve as guarantor powers to ensure the autonomy of the newly created nation of Cyprus. Conflicting interpretations of this role provided a great deal of friction between London and Ankara throughout the early 1960s as inner-communal conflict between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities began to escalate, prompting Turkey to consider an invasion as a means of bringing the violence directed towards the Turkish-Cypriots to a close.

The intent of this study is to use American and British archival materials to construct a chronological narrative of the relationship between the United States and Turkey from the end of the Second World War to Ankara receiving President Johnson’s devastating diplomatic note in 1964. Between these years Turkey experienced its first open multiparty elections; took part in a foreign conflict for the first time since World War I; joined the OEEC, NATO, and other international organizations; and endured a military coup. Throughout this period specific patterns of interaction between Turkey and the U.S. emerged, one in which domestic and international factors altered dealings between the two countries. The years 1947-1952 are ones in which the reasons for cooperation, Soviet containment and increased Turkish agricultural production, were most distinct. After 1952 the relationship changed; the Korean War brought about an American fixation on preparing its allies for war rather than promoting economic development and Turkey’s agrarian sector gradually reached its productive capacity. To revive
the Turkish economy, the Menderes government embarked upon a series of development projects it could not afford, and began to use its full NATO membership to justify a continuance of U.S. aid and welcomed the growing number of American military personnel to be stationed in Turkey. When the DP’s economic policies proved unfeasible and the political opposition exploited this fact to gain an advantage in the elections of 1954 and 1957, the Menderes government passed strict measures to silence its rivals. By the spring of 1960 the Turkish military judged the government to be outside the limits of acceptable conduct and resolved to remove Menderes and his supporters from power in a coup. After the coup, perhaps in part to distance themselves from the memory of the DP, Turkish leaders adopted more assertive policies regarding the U.S. The unsatisfactory resolutions of the Cuban Crisis, which ended in the removal of nuclear missiles from Turkey, and the Cyprus Crisis two years later, in which Johnson proved the comparative triviality of Turkey’s NATO membership, convinced the Turks of the need to reassess their relationship with Washington, to pursue closer relations with Europe, and to embrace greater autonomy.

The first chapter provides some historical background of the period before 1949, just prior to the elections of 1950 that brought the Democratic Party to power, replacing the Republican People’s Party after more than a quarter century of governance. The chapter looks at the last days of the Ottoman Empire, and the specific economic and political policies formulated by the Turkish Republic during the 1920s and 1930s, under the guiding and often firm hand of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In these formative years the state stressed national sovereignty, self-preservation, and the need to convert Turkey into an industrialized, western nation. This required the wide-scale participation of the state, as Turkey lacked an entrepreneurial class with the sophistication and experience to shoulder such an endeavor. The chapter continues with a
brief overview of Turkey’s diplomatic agenda during the interwar years and its relations with the Soviet Union, an unlikely supporter and ally, until Turkey’s neutrality during World War II destroyed this brittle alliance. The Soviets’ post-war Soviet demands of Turkey to share control of the Straits sparked American interest in Turkey and encouraged the development of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. American military representatives arrived in Turkey to oversee the modernization of Turkey’s armed forces. Two years later Washington launched the Marshall Plan, a concerted economic effort to rebuild the economies of Western Europe and insure political stability. In becoming a recipient of Marshall Plan aid, Turkey made a commitment to integrate its economy with that of Europe’s and allowed U.S. officials representing the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to involve themselves in the formation and implementation of Turkish economic policies. American guidance imprinted itself onto the Turkish landscape in the form of modern roads and coastal ports, and the combination of increased mechanization and good weather brought about tremendous production increases in agriculture.

Chapter II charts the political changes sweeping through Turkey as control of the government passed from the RPP to the DP. Turkey’s participation in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 demonstrated its willingness to spill blood in defense of the free world from the perceived dangers of communism. The performance of the Turkish brigade in Korea acted as a bloody try-out for Turkey’s possible membership in NATO; a British official in 1953 wryly noted: “the dispatch of a Turkish brigade to Korea was probably the best investment that any modern Turkish Government has ever made.”8 Making Turkey a full NATO member in 1952 represented the West’s, specifically the U.S.’s, commitment to protecting Turkey, and led to a number of military installations being constructed on Turkish soil.

8 FO 371/117720, Turkish Attitude to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Obligations Under the North Atlantic Treaty, Sir K. Helm to Sir W. Churchill (Received May12).
The years 1953-1959 receive relatively little consideration in the existing literature, but are significant as a period of transition in Turkey. In America significant changes were also afoot. 1952 saw the end of the Truman administration and the beginning of the Eisenhower years, in which Soviet containment would be dealt with using new rationales and new strategies to impact American relations with Turkey. After 1953 the weather in Turkey experienced a downturn, as did the economy. Growing economic instability induced Menderes to repress the Turkish press and his political opponents in order to remain in power, only to bring about his eventual descent and demise. These years are covered in Chapters III-VII.

Chapter III takes stock of the growing U.S. military presence in Turkey, and the legal challenges of U.S. personnel accused of crimes. The failure to adequately address this issue resulted in bitter feelings among the Turkish people in regards to Americans charged with an offense seemingly receiving preferential treatment by virtue of U.S. aid. Other challenges came in the form of America’s policy concerns changing from Turkey’s economic development to its ability to pay for its defense. Stalin’s death in 1953 and Eisenhower’s election produced American openness to considering détente and reduced spending on military expenses. Out of concern that the flow of U.S. money into its coffers would stop, the Menderes government played up Turkey’s membership in NATO to justify continued funding by Washington. U.S. and British officials began to wonder if Turkey’s only reason for joining the Alliance was to gain access to greater funds. The Turks did continue to move forward with their efforts to enlarge their mining and petroleum sectors, as well as to increase privatization in the hopes of encouraging economic development.

Chapter IV continues with Turkey’s economic regression and its impact on U.S.-Turkish relations. As the Turkish economy steadily declined in the mid-1950s, political opposition to the
DP and its flawed policies grew, spearheaded by the RPP. The Menderes government muzzled its potential critics by restraining the activities of labor unions, universities, and the bureaucracy through forced retirements, mass firings, and laws restricting political activity. Fortunately for Menderes, long-simmering discord between the Turkish and Greek populations living on the island on Cyprus escalated into armed conflict, providing Ankara with a cause around which all Turks could temporarily set aside their differences and come together.

The consequences of the enlarged U.S. military presence in Turkey during the late 1950s is covered in Chapter V, as well as the second phase of the crisis on Cyprus. The Menderes government managed to win a third election in 1957 with less support than its previous two victories in 1950 and 1954. Secure in power for the interim, the DP negotiated with the U.S. for missile facilities to be built in Turkey as yet another means of justifying future funding, but such arrangements increasingly became overshadowed by their drawbacks, particularly the transgressions of American servicemen perpetrating increasing numbers of sexual assaults against Turkish women, and taking advantage of a weakened economy to engage black market activities. By the late 1950s rumors of a military coup became rampant.

Chapter VI is devoted to the circumstances that brought about the military coup of 1960 that brought an end to the Menderes government, and the period 1959-1963, during which Turkey applied and subsequently gained associate membership status in the European Economic Community. Military leaders created a provisional government to oversee the transition period and introduced a readiness to challenge Washington’s policies if they did not correspond with Turkey’s best interests. The provisional government’s political inheritance from the Menderes regime included an economy needing substantial corrections and Turkey’s application to the European Economic Community. The intricacies and complexities of Turkey’s accession
process to the Community are covered in detail in the remainder of the chapter. Turkey’s membership in the Community initially meant little more than a way of keeping apace with its Mediterranean rival, Greece, but became increasingly important as a symbolic victory that continues to define Turkey’s relationship with Western Europe.

Chapter VII covers a trio of events that culminated in recognition by the Turks of just how much their relationship with the U.S. had become fraught with uncertainty: the U-2 Crisis of 1960, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and the Cyprus Crisis of 1964. Turkey, now a custodian of nuclear weapons, confidently assumed itself to be an integral part of the NATO Alliance, only to discover that Washington could all too easily make decisions that could catastrophically affect Turkey without the Turks’ consultation. Events on the island nation of Cyprus in the mid-1960s, a country legally and culturally divided into Greek and Turkish-Cypriot elements, brought even greater challenges to U.S.-Turkish relations. An increasing number of violent acts carried out against the Turkish-Cypriot population by the Greek-Cypriots preceded a call to action in Turkey for military intervention to protect the Turkish-Cypriot population, a move that would likely lead to war with Greece. The prospect of a war between NATO allies alarmed the Johnson administration, as it would rupture the West’s southeastern bulwark against the Soviet Union and cause potentially irreparable damage to the Alliance. Johnson fired off a ruthlessly worded diplomatic note to the Turkish Prime Minister threatening that the U.S. and NATO would do nothing should an invasion of Cyprus draw the attention of the Soviets. In doing so he negated the importance with which Turkey viewed its NATO membership and tipped the scales in favor of seeking less tense relations with the Soviets and the non-aligned countries.

Throughout this period, Washington’s goals for Turkey becoming a developed nation with closer economic and political ties to Western Europe remained consistent, even if the level
of American commitment on display did not; it waned over time. During the late 1940s Washington embarked on an unprecedented series of ambitious projects intended to rebuild the smoldering economies of Western Europe and secure peace with the North Atlantic Treaty Association. The programs created for this mammoth endeavor, the Truman Plan and the Marshall Plan broke with the precedent of isolation in the hopes of restoring economic and political stability to West Europe. Doing so would discourage European voters from electing socialist and communist parties friendly to the Soviets. A restored West Europe meant a loyal and capable ally ready to man the barricade going up around the Soviet Union. American government and military officials descended upon Europe, including Turkey, to carefully supervise how their recipients used U.S. funds. The unique precedent embodied in America’s efforts leant itself to administrative vigilance and close cooperation with the officials from the participating countries to determine the individualized goals and strategies unique to specific economic and political needs. In Turkey, American officials concentrated their efforts on increasing agricultural production and modernizing the military, with the ultimate goal being that the former would result in enough money from exports to provide for the latter.

In 1952 the Marshall Plan expired and Turkey joined NATO, a pair of events with far-reaching consequences. Washington, shaken by the unforeseen brutality and length of the Korean War, grew less concerned with Turkey becoming economically developing and more determined to prevent the Near East from becoming the site of another confrontation with the communists. The U.S. continued to spend money on Turkey, but funds were increasingly earmarked exclusively for defense needs, markedly higher now that the Turks had NATO duties to carry out. With Turkish agriculture declining due to poor weather conditions and a drop in market prices, the Turks threw themselves into a series of costly and poorly conceived
development projects intended to be completed quickly. Washington scaled back the number of civilian advisors in Turkey while the increasing number of military personnel began walled themselves off from their Turkish opposites to the detriment of previously harmonious working relationships. This general trend of American emphasis on Turkey’s military and lack of concern for the country’s economic situation continued throughout the late 1950s and into the 1960s. Washington desired to see European countries and international organizations to assume more of a role in providing for Turkey’s needs. This did take place, but the singularly close relations that developed between Americans and Turks under the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine faded over time, as did the Turks’ view of the United States as a gracious benefactor and close military ally.

Taking America’s major policy goals for Turkey into consideration, specifically preventing the spread of Soviet influence in the Near East and encouraging Turkey to become more integrated into the economy and security framework of Western Europe, the U.S. succeeded. Turkey’s visibility and prestige did increase through its participation in NATO, the OECD, and the EEC, memberships largely facilitated by the U.S. Washington and Ankara did travel down “a right and progressive road” together from the end of World War II until the mid-1960s, a road that would take some unexpected turns towards an ominous destination.
CHAPTER I. “NYLONIZING”: AN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO 1949

Introduction

In Life in Modern Turkey, a slim volume published in 1946, English author E. W. F. Tomlin observed, “The modern Turk likes to think that he has cut himself completely off from the past. To be modern and Turkish is his aim. Yes, but in order to be so, he must first know how he became Turkish; and if we are to understand him properly, we must know that too.”

During the 1950s and 1960s Turkish officials frequently complained of American bureaucrats’ inability or unwillingness to understand the Turks and the unique obstacles that barred them from ascending the heights of modernity as readily as the nations of the West. Contrary to Tomlin’s analysis, the Turks did not see themselves as beyond the reach of the past. Older Turks could readily recall the period before World War I as one in which Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Germans dominated Ottoman banks, railroads, and shipping. Memories of Italy, Greece, and Britain’s attempts to conquer what remained of the Ottoman Empire after 1918 were even fresher in the Turkish collective remembrance. Sensitivity to these antecedents led some Turks to perceive of the growing American presence in their homeland during the 1950s and 1960s as potentially hegemonic in character.

This chapter provides a narrative of events preceding and immediately following the Truman administration’s commitment to secure Turkey from Soviet machinations in order to provide some understanding of how the Turks “became Turkish.” It begins with a consideration of the factors that helped to bring an end to the Ottoman Empire, with particular emphasis on the period after World War I, during which Turkey survived a determined foreign effort to occupy the remainder of its territorial possessions. This contentious period defined much of the Turkish character as embodied by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, particularly a determination to remain self-

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reliant and free of outside influence. To this end, during the 1920s and 1930s the newly created Turkish government created a variety of industries and utilities owned and operated by the state at the expense of private industry. This statist economic model in some respects resembled the Soviet command economy, and Russia, for so long the Ottomans’ most feared enemy, became an unlikely source of counsel and financial support until Turkey’s neutrality during World War II severed these ties. Turkey cited its military’s lack of modern equipment as the reason for refusing to enter the fray, but its divided loyalties to the war’s participants also played a major part in keeping the Turks out of the bulk of the war. The one million men summoned to serve in the armed forces during the war years to protect their homeland diverted resources and labor away from the Turkish economy and continued to be a drain after the German surrender. At war’s end, Russia, displeased with Turkey’s neutrality, returned to its traditional role as aggressor by demanding a more prominent role in monitoring the Bosporus that included the presence of Soviet bases.

These two factors, possible Soviet aggression in the Near East and the crushing costs of Turkey’s military preparedness, prompted Washington’s decision to become involved in Turkey and remained the foremost concerns in the years that followed. The defeat of Nazi Germany marked the start of a new conflict in Europe, one in which Turkey was determined to play a more active role by taking its cues from the United States. At the same time, Washington became embroiled in Turkish affairs in an incremental fashion, initially hoping the British would remain the primary custodian of the Near East until economic and political realities precluded Britain from doing so. With British funds becoming unavailable to fund Turkish defense, the U.S., under 1947’s Truman Doctrine, offered to put up the money needed to improve the fighting capacity of Turkey’s armed forces. The passage of the Marshall Plan two years later set the
stage for American officials from the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to come to Turkey and assist in improving the country’s economy, just as the Turks began their first foray into multiparty politics. The Turks’ initial mistrust of America’s motives gave way to an acceptance and then near dependence upon American assistance that defined and challenged U.S.-Turkish relations in the coming years. American planners oversaw construction projects to modernize Turkey’s roads and seaports in order to facilitate the movement of troops and military equipment in the event of war. Other U.S. efforts went towards increasing Turkey’s agricultural production for exports to sell to Western Europe and more fully integrate Turkey into the European economy, as well as scaling back the level of state involvement in the economy. The years 1947-1949 proved to be the years during which the U.S. gained Turkey’s trust, and the Turks’ growing sense of loyalty to America became evident in their 1950 decision to participate in the Korean War. These early years of interaction, once Turkish wariness subsided, paved the way to increasing comfort with the presence of Americans working inside Turkey that reached its height in the early 1950s.

From Sultanate to Nation-State

The English and the Turks first mingled diplomatically in the late 16th century as the Ottomans entered their fourth century of overseeing an empire and England’s colonial aspirations just began to stir. The two became allies in the 1600s on the basis of their shared fears of an expanding Tsarist Russia, a phobia that would justify the partnership for the next century. In January 1583 the first English Ambassador, William Harborne signed a commercial treaty with Sultan Murad III. The English sought closer relations with the Muslim Ottomans as a counterbalance to the naval strength of the Spanish; Harborne’s efforts helped to convince the Ottomans to refuse to renew an armistice with the Spanish in 1587. Susan Skilliter “William Harborne, The First English Ambassador 1583-1588” in William Hale and Ali İhsan Bağış, eds. Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations: Studies in Diplomatic Economic and Cultural Affairs (North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1984): 23.
three centuries. Throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries the British looked to the
Ottomans to provide a defensive barrier against their Russian rivals, particularly in the Straits
and the Caucasus where Russian expansion through the Mediterranean posed a potential threat to
Britain’s colonial possessions in India. Britain’s commitment to this policy reached its height
during the Crimean War of 1853-56 with both the British and the French doing what they could
to succor the agonies of the so-called Ottoman “sick man of Europe.” The Turco-Russian War
of 1877-78 marked Britain’s gradual disengagement from Ottoman affairs; after the Revolution
of 1908 when the Young Turks anticipated British assistance in curbing growing German
influence in the Near East, they could not convince the British Foreign Secretary to sign a treaty
of alliance. Britain rebuffed the Turks’ request for an alliance once again in 1913 following the
disastrous Balkan Wars. Out of growing desperation, the Ottomans signed a secret treaty with
Germany in August 1914, just in time to be pulled into a war against the Triple Entente. Now
facing its former ally on battlefields in Anatolia and Arabia, the British’s conception of the
Ottomans degenerated into something approaching the 15th century idea of the “Terrible Turk,” a
degenerate Muslim contagion requiring either subjugation or destruction.

At the close of World War I Washington’s interest in the fate of the Turks expanded
following a period of marginal contact begun by American missionaries and traders. American
missionary organizations in Turkey pressed their government to make a more formal

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11 Mustafa Bilgin Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era
12 David J. Alvarez Bureaucracy and cold war diplomacy: the United States and Turkey, 1943-1946
(Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1980): 15. Interaction between the United States and Turkey began with
the first dealings between American merchants and Ottoman traders in 1785. Expanding economic ties and
spreading of the Christian faith motivated most of the early dealings between Americans and Turks. American
Missionaries in Turkey during the 1820s and 1830s established colleges, hospitals, and trade schools in port cities
such as Izmir and Istanbul. The information provided by missionaries piqued the interest of the American business
community. In the early 1900s a handful of American capitalists looked to explore possible commercial
opportunities abroad including the Ottoman Empire. The Turks welcomed American investment, perceiving it to be
largely free of the political ambitions they associated with European capital. Uras 8.
commitment to the weakened region. James L. Barton, the Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, advocated that the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, Armenia in particular, become an American protectorate. Some in Washington backed the idea, but ultimately President Woodrow Wilson decided to support British plans to internationalize both the Straits and Istanbul.\textsuperscript{13} The victorious Allies forced the defeated Ottomans to accept the castigatory Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, a document designed to reduce the empire to a rump state in Anatolia.\textsuperscript{14} American officials opted to refrain from acting when the British, French, and Italians set about creating occupation zones in Turkey, and Greece invaded in 1919 with the ardent support of British Prime Minister David Lloyd George.\textsuperscript{15} Greece intended to found an empire consisting of Greek-speaking regions built upon the ruins of the Ottoman Empire with the capital at Istanbul. A Turkish nationalist movement commanded by the war hero Mustafa Kemal challenged Greece’s goals. Following years of brutal fighting that ruined Turkey’s brittle economic infrastructure and cemented Kemal’s status as the savior of Turkey, Turkish forces expelled the Greeks out of Anatolia. The Turks repatriated thousands of Turks of Greek, Armenian, and other “Christian” ancestry to Greece while Athens ejected thousands of Muslims into Turkey. Having proved their staying power, the Turks obliged the British to sign a modified peace treaty at Lausanne, Switzerland in late 1922 establishing the national boundaries of the Turkish Republic.

\textsuperscript{13} In 1915 the Entente governments held a clandestine meeting intended to decide how the Ottoman Empire would be partitioned at the conclusion of the conflict and decided to give Russia control over the Straits and the Ottoman capital of Constantinople. The Russian Revolution of 1917 forced the remaining Allies to reassess what would be done when the war concluded. Nicolas Tamkin \textit{Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, 1940-45: Strategy, Diplomacy and Intelligence in the Eastern Mediterranean} (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 7.

\textsuperscript{14} Specifically, the Treaty of Sèvres would have paved the way to Britain gaining control of Istanbul, given Greece the port city of Izmir, the Italians control of Antalya in southern Turkey while the French claimed Silesia. Turkey would then cease to exist as a free nation. Tomlin 15.

\textsuperscript{15} Alvarez 18-19.
Free from foreign occupation after three years of fighting, the victorious Turks remained wary of their former enemies. The Sèvres Treaty signed by the acquiescent Sultan following the Ottoman Empire’s defeat became a touchstone for Turkish suspicions of European motives for decades to come. Scholars frequently refer to the so-called “Sèvres mentality” or “Sèvres phobia” that shaped Turkish foreign policy after 1919, based on fears that Western European nations plotted to divide and subjugate Turkey. Dubious of Western Europe’s motives, the Turks struggled to determine where they fit in the post-war era and found an unexpected ally in the newly formed Soviet Union as both fought to survive as former empires surrounded by hostile neighbors. The two countries established diplomatic ties in June 1920 in order to “establish amicable relations and permanent friendship between Turkey and Russia,” but disagreements over the possession of the Turkish territories of Batum, Kars, and Ardahan prevented the two from signing a treaty of alliance.

 Atatürk’s concerned himself more with domestic than foreign matters, assembling a coalition of progressive members of the military and government with more conservative members of the rural provinces. The new government’s influence tended to dissipate as it moved outwards from Turkish cities into the more tradition-bound countryside. Britain doubted that the newly dubbed Kemal Atatürk could transform Turkey into a modern secular republic,

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16 Philip Robins Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003): 103.
while Washington, still leaning towards nonintervention, sent a delegation to the Lausanne Conference to protect American business interests and resist British and French plans to create economic zones in Turkey.\textsuperscript{19} State Department officials demanded an Open Door policy be applied to Turkey. In recognition of this advocacy and American support of Atatürk’s crusade to modernize and westernize his country, the Turkish Republic allowed five U.S. oil companies to take part in the Turkish Petroleum Company in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{20} Despite this overture the U.S. opted not to pursue closer economic or political ties with the Turks.

Atatürk needed to shrewdly assess which foreign interests to accept help from in the rebuilding of Turkey at the risk of reintroducing outside intervention. As he set about assembling what remained of the Ottoman Empire into a modern nation-state he did so in defiance of prevailing attitudes regarding democratization and development in the Near East.\textsuperscript{21} Atatürk enjoyed some advantages in this quest for modernity. First, Turkey did not cling as tenaciously as other Middle Eastern cultures to tribal loyalties that might deter the formation of homogeneous national identity.\textsuperscript{22} Second, prior to its demise, the Ottoman Sultanate provided centralized rule that prepared the new Turkish Republic for the frequently authoritarian governance of the Atatürk regime and subsequent governments. In Atatürk’s estimation, the Ottoman Empire’s failure to modernize could be attributed to its inability to adopt modern industry; under the Sultanate two industrial revolutions passed by with little impact on the Ottoman Empire’s economy. Atatürk hoped to correct this oversight by overseeing two

\textsuperscript{19} Robins 20.
\textsuperscript{20} Uras 8.
\textsuperscript{21} Lord Cromer summarized his contemporaries’ attitude in 1908 when he observed that “free institutions” in the Western sense were “wholly unsuitable” to the East. In succinct terms, “it will probably never be possible to make a Western silk purse out of an Eastern sow’s ear.” Should such a transformation be attempted, Cromer assured that, “the process of manufacture would prove extremely lengthy and tedious.” Earl of Cromer Political and Literary Essays, 1908-1913 (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1913): 26.
\textsuperscript{22} Charles Issawi “Economic and Social Foundations of Democracy in the Middle East” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944-) Vol. 32, No.1 (Jan., 1956): 27-28.
centuries’ worth of development in two decades using a modernization program that included relocating the nation’s capital from Istanbul to the center of Anatolia. In 1920 he selected the remote mountain village of Angora as the site of the new capital city and leveled it to make way for modern roads and government buildings. The newly dubbed capital of Ankara became the literal geographic and administrative center of the new Turkey. Atatürk ordered existing railway lines be extended eastwards to connect the new capital to cities developing in the Anatolian interior.

Building a solid infrastructure and banking system came next. During the late Ottoman period foreign interests owned the main public utilities in Turkey, including telephone lines, water and gas supplies, railways, electricity, as well as the harbor in Izmir and the Istanbul dockyards. British and French bankers controlled the country’s primary bank, the Ottoman Bank, and foreign mining companies used concessions granted by the Turks to extract coal and other minerals. Domestic trade and private business lay largely in the hands of small merchants and dealers from the Greek, Jewish, and Armenian minorities, most of whom had been repatriated out of Turkey in 1922, depriving the struggling country of the business skills and experience that would have been of vital benefit.

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26 Dodd 2. A Greek census conducted in 1928 found that 914,300 Greeks emigrated from Turkey during the years 1912-1923. In 1923 the passage of the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations cleared the way for another 189,916 Greeks to be expelled from Turkey over the next two years. An even more population reduction took place among the Armenian inhabitants in Turkey. During the World War era as a result of conflict, reprisals and deportations Turkey’s Armenian population dropped from 1.3 million to 100,000. Richard D. Robinson The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963): 99.
lead the way to prosperity the state groomed the public sector to transform Turkey’s agricultural economy into an industrialized one.

Until Turkey completed industrialization the state remained wholly dependent upon the peasantry for taxes, while at the same time being resentful of the peasants who dominated Turkey’s population for being a perceived hindrance to progress. Isolated, independent, and marginalized for generations, the peasants regarded the central government at Ankara with mistrust. A top-down approach to enlightening the masses through paternalistic leadership to direct enlightenment and progress became a prominent component of the Atatürk reforms. The Atatürk government and subsequent regimes attempted to educate, modernize, indoctrinate, and westernize the peasants, hoping to transform them into enlightened and productive members of a modern nation. Their collective efforts did little to change Turkey from a largely agrarian nation with isolated urban islands with limited industrial capacity and few manufactured items to sell on the world market. Hoping to bring about Westernization and increase the production of domestic manufactured goods, Atatürk promoted industrialization and self-sufficiency by encouraging the development of private enterprise. But without a viable entrepreneurial class, adequate capital, technical knowledge, and organizational skills this policy failed to bring about Atatürk’s vision. Rather than submit to failure, the Atatürk government resolved to encourage the development a modern industrial infrastructure through the use of public funds.

28 Turkish farmers and miners labored as primary producers providing the minerals and foods for industrialized nations. Turkey’s primary exports included tobacco, hazelnuts, raisins, figs, wool, raw cotton, oilcakes, licorice, and other nonessential or low demand goods readily cut out of international trade during times of economic uncertainty. The domestic market, hampered by inadequate roads, archaic farming methods, and little industry, also required attention.
30 In 1924 the government created the İş Bakani for the purpose of providing capital to private enterprise in industry, and a 1927 law made land and structures available to industrial firms in order to promote investment.
In the mid-1930s the Turkish Republic founded its first state-owned enterprises under the protectionist banner of statism. Statism would become the dominant economic policy of Turkey during the 1930s and 1940s, particularly during the years of the Great Depression when exports to Turkey tapered to a trickle. As the largest possessor of capital the state assumed responsibility for creating large-scale industries such as steel, alcohol, chemical and match production, and mining. Once these public industries developed Turkish leaders’ initial enthusiasm for private enterprise began to wane; they came to regard private initiative warily for fear that greater independence in the economic sphere might spread to politics and dilute centralization. For technical and financial support in its industrial endeavors Turkey looked to the newly created Soviet Union, a nation also seeking to modernize as a means of justifying the new government in power. Various factors ensured that the Turkish state would be the country’s leading economic actor for years to come, with monopolistic control over critical industries. Although statist industrialization frequently lacked proper organization and leadership, it allowed Turkey to create a mixed economy and gradually break free of the pre-war cycle of foreign debt, influence, and reliance.


31 Alexander 350, 352.
33 From Turkey’s first tentative steps down the road to national independence and industrial development the Soviet Union provided financial assistance and moral support. In 1921 the two countries concluded what became known as “the treaty of friendship and brotherhood.” Atatürk acknowledged and justified the importance of the growing relationship by stating, “We are friends with Russia. For Russia recognized our national rights and showed respect for them earlier than anyone else. Under these conditions, both today and tomorrow and always, Russia can be certain of Turkey’s friendship.” FO 371/117723, March 5, 1955, SECTION A, PRAVDA, WHAT NATIONAL INTERESTS OF TURKEY REQUIRE, (By V. Medvedev).
34 Turkish industry had not always been in such high regard. Turkey’s industrial sector derived from a long tradition of producing handicrafts by a small group of urban artisans. Domestic handmade items dominated the Turkish market until the 1800s when rapidly industrializing Europe began to export large quantities of cheaper manufactured goods. Artisans, most from Armenian and Greek communities, co-opted new technology and techniques in order to compete with Europe, establishing the first embryonic industries in Turkey. They limited their output to textiles and basic products made from leather, wood, and metal. The top tiers of Ottoman society looked upon the business community with disdain; the only way to advance in the Ottoman Empire was as military
The advent of large-scale industry in the Turkish Republic brought with it new social stratification and advancement as the few remaining merchants and a handful of larger landowners and craftsmen became industrial entrepreneurs. Their growing political and economic prominence of industry dulled the stigma attached to those involved in business that existed under the Ottomans. The state promoted those in industry as agents of modernity with specialized knowledge that allowed them to rise above their once-inferior status. They also became agents of the Turkish state, lending their talents and skills to the creation of new industries became the groundwork for a modern industrial base.

Throughout the 1930s and 1940s Turkish industry developed steadily under state ownership and control in the form of state economic enterprises (SEEs). The Soviets proved critical in encouraging Turkish industrialization by granting Turkey credit in 1932 to obtain equipment assembled in Soviet factories; within five years 40% of Russian machine-technical products went to Turkey. Emulating their Soviet sponsors, the Turkish government passed its first five year plan in 1934 to map out the creation of heavy-goods industries to produce the building blocks of a modern Western-style state: iron, steel, chemicals, cement, and construction materials. In adopting statist policies, the Turkish government hoped to make their budding

officer or a government official. A vital if marginalized merchant class existed for centuries in minority communities and conducted trade with Europe and the Near East. These pioneers dominated the production of manufactures until the mid-1920s when the Greeks living in economically vital cities such as Izmir and Istanbul were forcibly repatriated to their “homeland” of Greece in the aftermath of the Turkish War of Independence. The drain of commercial experience and knowledge out of the country partially slowed Turkey’s ability to industrialize without substantial government sponsorship. Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye The United States and Turkey and Iran (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951): 85.

Ibid 356.


FO 371/117723, March 5, 1955, SECTION A, PRAVDA, WHAT NATIONAL INTERESTS OF TURKEY REQUIRE, (By V. Medvedev).

Robinson, “Introduction to Turkey” (New York, American Universities Field Staff, 1952 American Universities Field Staff 522 Fifth Ave., New York 36 N.Y.): 17. Turkish planners did not address one of the more pressing problems in statist industry, the seasonal migratory workforce that journeyed into the urban areas to work at
nation more self-contained, self-reliant, and able to compete with other modern industrial states. This approach often resulted in the construction of expensive and often unproductive industrial plants owned and managed by the state with little energy or funds devoted to the agricultural sector.\(^{39}\) Even limiting its efforts to industrialization the state found it difficult to monitor all aspects of production.\(^{40}\) At the start of World War II Turkey’s few heavy industries and light industries offered more in symbolic value than productive capability. With relatively little to show from the first plan, Ankara scrapped its plans for a second five-year plan in 1938, the year of Atatürk’s death.\(^{41}\)

Britain found Turkey’s march towards modernity an impressive if haphazard affair. London looked on admiringly as Turkey signed a non-aggression pact in 1934 with former enemies Greece, Yugoslavia, and Romania, and hoped the Turks might assume a more prominent leadership role in the Balkans to deter Soviet or German expansionism in the region.\(^{42}\) London’s growing goodwill towards the Turkish Republic convinced Turkish diplomats of the feasibility of restoring diplomatic relations with Britain, France, and Germany while retaining its closeness to the Soviet Union, an unnerving political balancing act.\(^{43}\) Relations between Moscow and Ankara remained generally stable until Atatürk’s death with the main point of contention centering on the status of the Straits. The Russians desired to be more prominent in the factories long enough to earn a satisfactory wage before returning to their duties on the family farm. Such workers proved difficult to train and did not provide the foremen to potentially supervise production. Thomas and Frye 121.\(^{39}\) Ibid 34.


\(^{41}\) Ibid.

\(^{42}\) Ibid12. Turkey had few dealings with the Arab regions she lost after World War I. Save a quarrel with Syria that began in 1938 when France gave Turkey the contested former Syrian province of Alexandretta, the Arab States and Turkey tolerated one another with steady distrust. C.P. (51) 94, 29\(^{th}\) March, 1951 Cabinet: Political Problems of the Middle East, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, The British Foreign Archives 2: Tamkin 11.

regulation and protection of the waterway. The end of the Ottomans presented Moscow with the opportunity to fill they left void as the supervisors of the Straits with military bases to discourage Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean. Unfortunately for the Russians, this did not come to pass. The signers of the 1936 Montreux Conference, a meeting called to settle who would oversee the security of the Straits, agreed to eliminate the International Straits Commission created after immediately World War I and entrust Turkey with full sovereignty over the Straits as its “guardian.” Turkey assumed primary responsibility for monitoring and blocking ships belonging to non Black Sea Powers during wartime, an arrangement Moscow found dismaying. Turkish-Soviet relations increasingly showed signs of strain. Out of growing concern that Moscow was returning to its previous antagonism towards Turkey, Ankara redoubled its efforts to form closer relations with the British and French. The French and British likewise decided an alliance with the Turks would be to their benefit, particularly after the Italian occupation of Albania in the spring of 1939; in October of that year the Anglo-Franco-Turkish alliance came into being.44 Moscow watched as the Turks moved closer to the West, but its insistence on altering the Montreux Convention mellowed on the eve of World War II. On August 10, 1941 Britain and Russia pledged to follow the terms of the Convention and respect the sovereignty of Turkish territory, but Turkey’s decision to remain neutral throughout much of the conflict altered Moscow’s vow considerably.45

Turkey during World War II

With Great Britain, its closest political ally, locking horns with Germany, its closest trading partner, Turkey hesitated to take sides when war came in September 1939 and decided to follow a nonaligned course as best it could. The Turks soon realized a policy of neutrality has its dangers. Once France and Britain halted shipments of arms to Turkey Ankara had little choice but to sign a Pact of Friendship with Germany in June 1941.46 Turkey kept its armed forces in a state of partial mobilization in the event of invasion, sapping the Turkish economy of much of its resources and labor, and remained in a state of suspended animation during the war with a ring of defenses drawn around its borders. To maintain these precautions the Turkish state commandeered men and resources in the name of national security but at the expense of economic development and political freedom: By 1942 over one million men were in uniform while only 650,000 remained in Turkish industry out of a total population of less than 18 million. Barring a direct attack by the Germans, Turkey would not enter the fray and claimed it lacked the military capacity to do so.47 In 1943 President İsmet İnönü, Atatürk ‘s former lieutenant, insisted that the British would have to completely rearm and reequip the Turkish military before it could take part in the fighting.48 To discourage hoarding and black marketeering, the government assumed control over much of the economy by controlling prices, managing product distribution,

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46 Economic turmoil abounded during the conflict as Turkey’s opportunities to import and export shifted in relation to the fortunes of war. The warring nations had little to export to neutral Turkey, cutting deeply into available consumer goods, but allowing Turkey to accumulate trade surplus and reserves in gold and hard currency totaling $262 million by the end of the war. William Hale “Anglo-Turkish trade since 1923: experiences and problems” in Four centuries of Turco-British relations: studies in diplomatic, economic and cultural affairs (North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1984): 110-111.
48 Harris 13.
and holding a monopoly on grain purchases.\textsuperscript{49} State economic enterprises came to control more than one-half of industrial production by the end of the war.\textsuperscript{50} The economic upheaval and reduced political freedoms wrought during the war years increased the Turkish people’s receptiveness to governmental change.

Turkey initially supplied the Nazi war machine with such critical materials as iron and chrome, but withheld its political support to Germany and slowly scaled back trade before severing diplomatic ties in August 1944.\textsuperscript{51} Turkey found it rather difficult to support either Germany or Russia. Early in the war many Turks hoped that a Soviet defeat would mean greater security for Turkey and welcomed the first Nazi victories. This approval of Germany in some Turkish quarters combined with what Moscow viewed as the Turks’ negligence in protecting the security of the Straits earned them the growing enmity of the Soviet Union. After the decisive battle of Stalingrad the Soviets publicly criticized Turkey’s failure to restrict German and Italian combat vessels passing through the Straits.\textsuperscript{52} Turkey’s eventual entry in the war on the side of the Allies on February 23, 1945 did little to dull the Soviets’ hostility. That same month Soviet Foreign Secretary Vyacheslav Molotov informed Ankara of Moscow’s desire to amend the Montreux Convention by extending control of the Straits to all Black Seas powers, allowing free passage of Soviet warships, and preventing warships of other nations from entering the Straits.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} Gültekin 40. In 1944 in an attempt to raise revenue, the Turks fell back upon an Ottoman practice of leveling heavy taxes, or \textit{varlik}, on non-Muslim minorities. The end result was widespread bankruptcy for many, particularly those from the Greek community who continued to dominate private industry in Turkey. Lawrence Ziring \textit{Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan: A Political Chronology} (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981): 76.
\textsuperscript{51} Thomas and Frye 91. In 1941 Turkey rejected Berlin’s request to cross Turkey to assist the pro-Nazi uprising sparked by Rashid Ali al-Gaylani in Iraq, thus allowing the British to successfully quell the revolt.
\textsuperscript{52} Current Intelligence Study Number 11, Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, R & A 3040S, 13 April 1945, Soviet Denunciation of Neutrality Pact with Turkey, \url{http://www.foia.cis.gov/browse_docs_full.asp}, accessed on May 16, 2010.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
Such sweeping changes to the Convention would necessitate closer coordination and cooperation among the Black Sea nations with the Soviet Union likely to emerge as the region’s hegemon.

Although the United States still considered the security of the Near East to be primarily Britain’s responsibility, it found the growing Soviet presence in the region, including Russian troops occupying much of Iran, and its demands for greater control over the Straits to be disquieting.\(^{54}\) The end of World War II found Britain still in possession of much of her empire, but with precious few economic and financial resources to maintain pre-war levels of imperial control. Not wishing to abandon its military interests in the Middle East, the British looked to bilateral treaties with regional powers such as Jordan and Iraq as a means of managing its domain on a shoestring. London also desired a comprehensive defense pact to include any compliant Middle Eastern countries, the United States, and Britain.\(^{55}\) Without the military and financial support of the U.S. such a regional alliance could never succeed. This concept initially carried little weight in Washington until growing Russian intervention in Near and Middle East in early 1945 spurred the U.S. to action. On March 19, 1945 Molotov announced Moscow’s intended to annul the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression between Turkey and Russia, thereby abandoning two decades of sporadic cooperation between the two nations. When Ankara inquired what should be done to renew the treaty, Moscow insisted upon a pair of compromises: first, the return of Ardahan and Kars, the large and populous territories in eastern Turkey bordering Georgia and Armenia; and, second, an amending of the 1936 Montreux Convention to provide for increased Soviet participation in the defense of the Straits including the establishment of military bases. In April Moscow informed the Turks of its plans to allow


the existing neutrality pact between the two countries to lapse in November and replace it with a new treaty. Turkey reluctantly approved the Soviet proposal for a new pact “better confirming actual interests.”\footnote{Current Intelligence Study Number 11, Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, R & A 3040S, 13 April 1945, “Soviet Denunciation of Neutrality Pact with Turkey”, http://www.foia.cis.gov/browse_docs_full.asp, accessed on May 16, 2010.} In June 1945 the Soviets commenced a yearlong propagandistic assault via state press and radio calling for a Russian base in the Straits and adjustments to the frontier.\footnote{Howard Jones, “\textit{A New Kind of War}”: \textit{America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece} (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989): 8.}

These vocal Soviet demands did not catch all of Washington off guard. During the war the State Department’s Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA) closely monitored developments in the region and came to advocate Turkey as a future source of balance in the Balkans and the Near East to offset Russian influence.\footnote{Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, \textit{The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece} (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980): 218.} The NEA sounded an alarm in the spring of 1945 when it uncovered rumors of a planned Soviet occupation of Thrace.\footnote{Ibid 256.} Edwin Wilson, the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to Turkey, urged for greater resolve against the Russians, whom he argued were using their interest in the Straits as a “pretext” to obscure the “real Soviet objective, to control [the] Straits and dominate Turkey.”\footnote{Secret: Secretary of State, Washington, 1592, December 19, 1 p.m. (December 19, 1945) \textit{Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1945-1949} The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service.} Initially rejected in many quarters, Ambassador Wilson’s warnings seemed less hysterical by late 1945, given Moscow’s pressure on Turkey, its support of Greek communist rebels fighting the monarchy, and its occupation of Iran to within twenty miles of Tehran. The NEA confirmed Ambassador Wilson’s warning of an imminent takeover of Turkey by Russia with intent to use it to launch strikes against the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.\footnote{NEA – Loy W. Anderson, Enclosure: Memo re Policy on Turkey proposed for JCS adoption (October 21, 1946) \textit{Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1945-1949} The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service. Howard Jones 7.}
In contrast to the Truman administration’s growing nervous, British officials responded to Turkey’s predicament as just desserts for failing to come into the war on the Allied side in a more timely fashion. Britain’s favorable view of Turkey faded during the war years, beginning in the summer of 1941 when Ankara refused to assist the British in eliminating the Iraqi and Syrian governments sympathetic to the Axis powers. With its hesitant foreign policy; its economy faltering under widespread profiteering, graft and black market activities; and its slowness to provide electricity and industry to the rural areas, Britain realized the error of its previous opinion of the Turkish Republic as a nation on the fast track to modernity. The British now viewed the Turks as backsliding, unable to modernize, and possibly susceptible to old Ottoman impulses to dominate the Caucasus and the Middle East. Few in London believed the Soviets would attack Turkey over the Straits issue, especially with the advent of new international institutions such as the United Nations as venues in which to solve international crises. But the Russians’ increasingly obdurate tactics did not bode well for future negotiations with Moscow on postwar matters. At the Postdam conference in the summer of 1945 a number of American and British officials shared the same grim outlook: that open collaboration with Moscow was no longer feasible. The three sides failed to reach an agreement on the Straits and pushed the issue aside until the next round of negotiations at the Berlin Conference later that summer. Churchill and Truman supported making the defense of the Straits a multinational affair. Truman reported on August 9, 1945 that the U.S. advocated “free and unrestricted navigation” of European waterways such as the Danube, the Rhine and the Black Sea Straits as a

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62 Tamkin 189-190.  
63 Ibid 196.  
64 Kürkçüoğlu 94.  
66 Denise M. Bustdorff Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008): 30.
means of ensuring future peace and security.\textsuperscript{67} Washington offered vague plans of international agencies made up of the U.S., Soviet Union, France, Britain, and the nations bordering the waterways to provide equal treatment for all countries.\textsuperscript{68} The Soviets continued to insist upon substantial alterations to the Montreux Convention and the construction of Soviet military installations along the Turkish Straits.\textsuperscript{69} Stalin might have found the potentially dangerous gamble well worth the risk by factoring in the relative weakness of the British and the lack of American interest and activism in the region. In the end Stalin’s tactic justified Washington officials’ fears of the Soviet Union as an expansionist power rather than a possible postwar partner.\textsuperscript{70} Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent a note to Moscow alerting the Soviets of the Truman administration’s high regard for Turkey’s sovereignty and its right to remain the sole defender of the Straits.\textsuperscript{71}

\textit{Growing security concerns in the Mediterranean}

In the early spring of 1946, as the standoff between the Turks and Soviets over the Straits continued, Washington dispatched the battleship \textit{U.S.S. Missouri} to Istanbul bearing the remains of the recently deceased Turkish Ambassador, Melmet Munir Ertegun. Sensing a unique diplomatic opportunity, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal suggested making the \textit{Missouri} flagship of a larger flotilla to indicate America’s interest in the security of the Near

\textsuperscript{67} Truman’s interest in internationalizing European waterways predated his presidency; he envisioned a unified Europe with its industrial centers and its agricultural regions connected by a network of rivers and canals that would function as trade waterways. He concluded that unrestricted would create a greater sense of economic and political unity in Europe, and provide for its longer-term peace. At Potsdam, Truman’s first proposal was to internationalize the Danube, which Stalin rejected thereby incurring Truman’s wrath almost immediately. Truman’s similar plan to internationalize the Straits probably reflected this same pattern of thinking and desire to avoid future conflict. \textit{Harry S. Truman Memoirs}, I. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955): 236.

\textsuperscript{68} Department of State \textit{The Problem of the Turkish Straits} 36.


\textsuperscript{70} Ibid 37.

\textsuperscript{71} Bustdorff 30.
East; the Truman administration agreed. To the Turks watching the mighty warship enter Istanbul Harbor on April 5, the gesture showed America’s growing support for their nation’s sovereignty. The presence of the Missouri also heralded a gradual swing in Turkish policy from away from London towards Washington as Moscow continued to demand greater access to the Straits. On August 7, 1946 Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson received a note from Fedor Orekov, the Soviet Change d’Affairs, reminding him of the collective agreement the American, British, and Soviet governments agreed to at Berlin regarding a revision of the Montreux Convention. Orekov asserted that both Turkey and Soviet Union “shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by any other countries for aims hostile to the Black Seas powers.” Such an arrangement might include Soviet bases in the Straits, an alarming prospect to President Truman and his staff Once dismissive of Soviet intentions, State Department officials became convinced that the Kremlin desired to secure bases in Turkey before taking it over completely with Greece, the Middle East, and then the entire Eastern Mediterranean toppling thereafter. President Truman appraised a possible Soviet takeover of Turkey to be the greatest crisis his administration faced since the decision to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. On August 15, 1946 Truman, Undersecretary Dean Acheson, Army Undersecretary Kenneth Royall, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to inform Moscow of Washington’s unease with the Soviets’ sharing defense duties of the Straits with

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72 Melvyn P. Leffler A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992): 123. Yugoslavian leader Josip Broz Tito had recently announced his intention to take control of Trieste and the Soviets demanded trusteeship of former Italian colonies.

73 Alvarez 75.


76 Leffler 123-124.

Turkey, and demand that any changes to the status of the Straits not be limited only to Black Sea powers. 78 On August 19 the State Department advised the Greek and Turkish governments to reject the Soviets’ demands and sent a message to Moscow underlining Turkey’s role in defending the Straits; the British sent a similar note the following day. 79

U.S. policymakers generally agreed that the Soviets did not intend to act aggressively against Turkey in the near future; dissipating British influence in the Middle East and Southeast Asia kept American policymakers up at night rather than an impending Soviet offensive against Turkey. A gradual disengagement by Britain of these regions would create a vacuum to be filled over time by the Soviets and pro-Soviet governments. Washington refused to entertain the possibility of the Soviets assuming control of Middle Eastern airfields and petroleum, but remained unprepared to commit military resources; the Truman Administration still regarded Great Britain as the primary promoter of security in the Near East. 80 As late as the fall of 1946 Secretary of State James F. Byrnes informed Britain’s Minister of Defense, A.V. Alexander, that the U.S. would attempt to support Turkey economically and “hoped that the UK would furnish the necessary military aid.” 81 Following Byrne’s notification the British Government undertook a study of the costs of supporting Turkey’s armed forces. Two things became evident: Turkey’s military strength could not stand up against an aggressive Soviets attack without extensive modernizing, and Britain’s battered postwar economy could not stand up to the expenditures of

78 Leffler 124.
79 Howard Jones 9.
81 Copy of Communication, dated July 10, 1943, to British Ambassador.
reequipping and reorganizing the Turkish armed forces. Britain’s study should have alerted the State Department that Britain could no longer continue to guarantee the security of the Near Eastern, yet until early 1947 the State Department continued to shunt most Near East issues to London.

Possessing greater foresight than their Foggy Bottom counterparts, the War Department increasingly integrated the Turks into their planning. On August 15, 1946, American military planners completed a study of the defense of the Mediterranean code-named GRIDDLE. The plan called for Turkey to serve with “every possible means” as an Allied base of operations in a war with Russia. GRIDDLE envisioned Turkish forces halting a Soviet advance toward Egypt and the Suez Canal long enough for the U.S. to launch an air offensive from Turkish airfields against enemy targets. The White House approved the plans and dispatched a naval task force led by the newly commissioned aircraft carrier U.S.S. Franklin Roosevelt to rendezvous with the Missouri, thereby laying the foundation for what would become America’s most visible and powerful military component in the Near East, the Sixth Fleet. In September 1946 Secretary of the Navy Forrestal declared that the U.S. Sixth Fleet would be a permanent fixture in the eastern Mediterranean, an alarming development for the Soviets, given their lack of naval units in the region, and another stirring show of support to the Turks. With Forrestal’s announcement the Soviet pressure on Ankara lessened considerably, and in October Moscow officially retracted its demands regarding the Straits.

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82 Ibid.
83 Bustdorff 49-50. In November 1946 Acheson contacted the U.S. ambassadors to Greece and Turkey and advised them to discourage Greek and Turkish requests from American military equipment and take such appeals to the British.
84 Leffler 124-125.
85 C.T. Sandars America’s Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire (Oxford University Press, 2000): 242. Over the next two decades the Sixth Fleet’s strength averaged approximately 40 vessels housing upwards of 1,800 assault troops prepared for deployment in short order.
While fears of a forthcoming conflict in the Near East subsided, vigilance in Washington remained, this time regarding the Turkish economy. Turkey’s expenditures to maintain a state of military preparedness shoved it closer to bankruptcy, leading White House officials to worry that the U.S.’s failure to provide Turkey with financial support might make Ankara more amenable to future Soviet demands.\(^86\) The JCS advocated providing Turkey with economic aid to strengthen its peacetime resolve against the Soviet Union, and military aid to fortify it in the event of a war. Planners in Washington increasingly viewed Turkey, Greece, and Iran as a potential bulwark against communism.\(^87\) Constructing such a bulwark would not come cheap; the Turks desperately needed modern arms, aircraft, and fuel storage sites.\(^88\) The Turkish military needed to be brought up to modern standards and provided with new weapons. Members of the Truman Cabinet spilt over what the U.S. should do: Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson feared that U.S. funding Turkish defense would rile the Soviets, but Undersecretary of State William L. Clayton supported the JSC’s plans and forwarded them to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.\(^89\)

Following consultations with the British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, Byrnes decided that Great Britain should continue to sponsor military aid to Turkey while the U.S. would offer additional financial assistance and, if needed, combat equipment.\(^90\) American officials decided that the U.S. would offer arms to the British for later transfer to Turkey, essentially assuming the British’s responsibility. Failure on the part of the U.S. to do so “might be interpreted as an indication of a lack of determination to back our policies to the hilt.”\(^91\) For the time being, the U.S. continued to look to Britain as the direct provider of military arms of equipment; however,

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\(^{86}\) Ibid 52.  
\(^{87}\) Ibid 13.  
\(^{89}\) Ibid 125.  
\(^{90}\) NEA – Loy W. Anderson, Enclosure: Memo re Policy on Turkey proposed for JCS adoption.  
\(^{91}\) Ibid.
the NEA judged it “not inconsistent” for America to supply Turkey with technical advice and military instruction.\textsuperscript{92}

In October 1946 a new crisis struck an ominous chord: the deteriorating situation in Greece due to the civil war and the possibility that a victorious Greek communist minority could place Athens under Moscow’s thumb and encircle Turkey with Soviet influence. U.S. planners saw the potential fall of Greece as the first step in a chain reaction as emboldened communist parties throughout Europe made their own bids for power.\textsuperscript{93} U.S. military leaders pointed out that while Greece was on the “flank” in the region, if Turkey fell under Soviet influence the situation would become far more dangerous. Transportation routes through the Eastern Mediterranean would be severed, putting the oil-rich Middle East within Moscow’s reach. In such an event, argued Navy Secretary Forrestal, “you have an impossible military situation.”\textsuperscript{94}

The United States would have to be prepared to resist any aggression against Turkey including the use of force.\textsuperscript{95}  

\textit{Development of the Truman Doctrine}

The start of 1947 brought a new set of challenges for the Truman administration to face and a reassessment of America’s responsibilities in the postwar world that first became manifest in the Truman Doctrine. Adopting the Truman Doctrine provided Washington’s hardening attitude towards the Soviets with an ideological framework. In providing economic and political support through the Marshall Plan in 1949, the United States became crucial in mentoring Turkey as it came to draw ever closer to the West. According to Şaban Çaliş, with the Truman Doctrine the U.S. provided Turkey with “a theoretical understanding for the West,” while the

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{93} Leffler 143.  
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid 144.  
\textsuperscript{95} Kuniholm “Turkey and the West Since World War II” 46.
Marshall Plan demonstrated “how to put this theory into practice,” namely through European economic integration. This had the effect of bringing Turkish foreign policy in line with the U.S. in regards to defense, while at the same time making it more receptive to the concept of establishing stronger political and economic ties to Western Europe. These policy goals evolved slowly over time as America increasingly justified its involvement in international affairs after more than a century-and-a-half of relative isolation.

American participation in Near Eastern affairs became justifiable once it became all too evident that the British could no longer continue with their pre-war duties. In 1947 Great Britain’s primary foreign policy concerns consisted of overseeing the rearmament of Germany and its integration into Western defense; coping with the spread of insurrections in colonies such as Kenya, Malaya, and Cyprus; and reinterpreting the geopolitical rules rewritten by the atomic bomb. Its foreign policy came to be dictated largely by a post-war economy in shambles following a significant drop in manufactured exports, an overvalued pound, and the loss of exclusive access to protected Commonwealth markets. Under such pressures the British had little choice but to scale back the size of their empire, beginning with the 1947 liberation of India and Ceylon. Britain’s cost-cutting measures did not end with limiting imperialism; on February 24, 1947, the U.S. State Department received a note from London stating that Britain could no longer provide financial assistance to Greece and Turkey. The British suggested the United States shoulder the major share of Britain’s burden to prevent Greece and Turkey from falling to the Soviets. Though not completely unforeseen in Washington, the announcement elicited no

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99 Office Memorandum, United States Government, To: S – Mr. Secretary, From: NEA – Mr. Henderson (February 24, 1947) Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1945-1949 The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service.
small astonishment. The stakes increased on March 3 when the State Department intercepted an urgent plea from Athens for financial and economic support. The Greek Civil War threatened to become a communist infection in the Near East, one the U.S. feared might spread to Iran, India, or southern Europe if not speedily contained.

U.S. officials reacted to London’s dramatic news quickly. On March 12, 1947, President Truman convened a joint session of Congress to request $400 million in economic and military subsidies for the Turkish and Greek governments, $150 million for Turkey and $250 million for Greece. Truman faced an uphill battle against a largely unreceptive Congress and a disinterested American public, neither eager to embroil the U.S. in the complexities of foreign affairs. In a speech to Congress on March 15 Truman famously declared, “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Although Greece faced more urgent peril than the Turks, Truman noted that should Greece “fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.”

Turkey proved a harder sell, a fact Truman acknowledged by citing that Turkey’s wartime neutrality “spared [it] the disasters that have beset Greece.” But Turkey still needed to be bolstered with economic aid should Greece fall to communist forces, causing an “immediate and serious” impact on Turkey and precipitating disruption and disorder throughout the region. Truman equated Turkey’s modernization with its national integrity and security. In the absence of outside funding to keep up its modernization efforts and defense capabilities,

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100 Brown, Jr. and Opie 123.
Truman argued that Turkey ran the risk of losing sovereignty “essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.”

Turkey’s underdeveloped economy and its one-party government, which to many smacked of authoritarianism, deterred some in Washington from supporting assistance to the Turks, including Secretary of War Patterson and the head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, George F. Kennan. Providing support assistance to secondary powers such as Turkey and Greece did not fit Kennan’s concept of international security as one in which the U.S. only supported economically and politically critical areas such as Western Europe and Japan. Kennan could not justify the expense and the risks the U.S. would face in attempting to counter communist threats outside of these essential regions. Kennan advised resurrecting West Europe’s economy and undermining the influence of communist and socialist political movements in West Europe as better uses of American resources. Kennan’s arguments did not sway the Truman administration from assisting Greece and Turkey. When acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson appeared before the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations he reinforced his point with words spoken by Daniel Webster in the House of Representatives in 1824 in support of Greece during its fight for independence from the Ottomans: “I will not stand by and see my fellow man drowning without stretching a hand to help him, till he has by his own efforts and presence of mind reached the shore in safety, and then encumber him with aid. With

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103 Recommendations on Greece and Turkey, Message of the President to the Congress The Department of State bulletin Supplement: Aid to Greece and Turkey, A Collection of State Papers Vol. XVI, No. 409 A (May 4, 1947): 829.
104 Bustdorff 114-115.
suffering Greece, now is the crisis of her fate – her great, it may be her last, struggle.” 107

123 years later Greece looked to be drowning again, this time alongside its former Turkish oppressor. Acheson’s history lesson came after four weeks of discussing various proposals for the two nations, including sending American troops to the region. The Truman Administration opted to dispatch small missions of observers and advisers to Greece and Turkey to assess the local needs of military equipment and to make sure the deliveries of arms arrived to their intended recipients. 108

As the U.S. moved forward in providing Turkey with military assistance, Turkish economic planners hoped to channel some of the anticipated U.S. aid into the development of the industrial sector. 109 During the lean war years the country’s GDP declined as its deficit grew; taxes and other measures injured the middle class, and farmers and industrial workers faced income losses that widened the chasm between rich and poor. 110 By 1945 Turkey’s agricultural output stood at 70% of the 1939 total and per capita income sank by 25% while inflation levels rose to distressingly high levels. Some pockets of industry and modern commerce existed in urban areas, contrasting strongly with the 40,000 surrounding villages populated with farmers using agricultural tools familiar to the ancient Sumerians. 111 Silver linings edged some of these gloomy economic clouds: thanks to a trade surplus during the war, Turkey held over $260 million worth of gold and dollar reserves, and had a positive trade balance to allow it to meet

107 Assistance to Greece and Turkey: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eightieth Congress, First Session on S.938: A Bill to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey 8.
both internal and external obligations.\textsuperscript{112} Such indicators of economic wellbeing and the lack of wartime destruction led some in the U.S. House of Representatives to balk at providing Turkey with financial assistance comparable to Greece’s allotment. To silence these naysayers Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson pointed out the draining effect the constant mobilization of Turkey’s military since the start of World War II had on the nation’s economy and developmental capabilities.\textsuperscript{113} Acheson reiterated that in accepting to provide aid to Greece and Turkey the U.S. was not “assuming British obligations or underwriting British policy there or elsewhere.” The State Department proposed a program “designed by this Government to promote stability in Greece and Turkey, and the Middle East generally, and thereby to pave the way to peaceful and democratic development.”\textsuperscript{114} Ensuring Turkey’s independence would allow it to assert a stronger role in the deterrence of Soviet expansion and infiltration in the Near and Middle East, and help to protect American interests and the communications facilities and bases located in the Mediterranean area.\textsuperscript{115} Congress approved U.S. aid to Turkey; the Turkish military was to receive yearly appropriations, but the precise totals and purpose of the funds could only be vaguely sketched out, primarily because Washington planners viewed Turkey and Greece as a single entity, rather than separate nations with distinct security needs.\textsuperscript{116}

The Greek-Turkish Aid Act, the military assistance program created for Greece and Turkey, was the first large-scale program of its kind in the postwar period. It largely achieved the intended objectives of preventing a communist takeover in Greece and reinforcing the

\textsuperscript{112} Athanasspoulou 70.
\textsuperscript{113} U.S. House of Representatives, Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 18\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 1947, 3.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid 7.
\textsuperscript{116} Harris 28.
Broadly sketched out, the Greek-Turkish Aid Act specified that Greece and Turkey would grant representatives of the American government free access throughout both countries to ensure the proper utilization of U.S. assistance. Turkey and Greece further pledged to allow American journalists to report on the use of the assistance without interference. The relatively modestly sized military assistance program to both countries called for the steady modernization of their armed forces and accompanying training in the use of modern weapons and equipment. Turkey would be provided with enough assistance to train 19,000 officers and enlisted men at facilities in Turkey, Germany, and the U.S. staffed by American military personnel.

By earmarking most funds for security purposes Washington thwarted Ankara’s plans to use some of the funds for Turkey’s economic development. The Agreement on Aid to Turkey, signed in Ankara in July 1947, specified that assistance from the U.S. would be used to fortify Turkey’s security forces to ensure its independence and stabilize its economy. Turkish leaders countered that U.S. aid to Turkey reflected its sponsor’s fears of Soviet expansionism, not the realities of an underdeveloped nation striving to adopt a liberal economy and more democratic political institutions. Washington shrugged off Turkish grumblings that only the Turks fully understood how U.S. aid could be most effectively spent. Aside from concerns regarding Turkey’s military expenditures, American officials perceived the Turkish economy on the whole

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120 Aid to Turkey TIAS 1629, 11 Bevans 1163 (July 12, 1947, Date-Signed; July 12, 1947, Date-In-Force).
to be healthy if comparatively underdeveloped. The State Department predicted that Turkey would achieve self-sufficiency after five years of military aid.

Ambassador Edwin Wilson assumed overall command of the military mission charged with distributing the aid in Turkey, the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT), and U.S. Army Major General Horace L. McBride acted as the mission’s top military adviser. Military officers attached to JAMMAT headquartered in Ankara would provide instruction in the use of U.S.-provided arms and equipment as part of modernizing the Turkish military. JAMMAT consisted of four components: a Navy group, an Army group, an Air group, and a Highway group. With the American military largely devoted to the defense of Western Europe, Washington deemed it more prudent to train and modernize the Turkish armed forces rather than supplementing or replacing them with U.S. personnel. In early 1948 Turkey began to receive surplus American military equipment and assistance in improving its transportation infrastructure. JAMMAT officials felt confident that American dollars spent on defense could be stretched farther in Turkey than anywhere else. The head of the Mission’s Air group, U.S. Air Force Major General Earl S. Hoag, enthused that the Turks “have a spirit of cooperation and purpose that is amazing. The money will pay big dividends to America.”

Turkey and the Marshall Plan

While the Turkish government appreciated such rhetorical support, it desired American financial assistance even more. Their aspirations came closer to reality with the passage of the Marshall Plan. On June 5, 1947 Secretary of State George Marshall delivered his famed

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123 Shaw & Shaw 400.
125 Scholars have spilt no shortage of ink debating whether or not the Marshall Plan marked a break with America’s tradition of isolationism or extended from previous programs intended to encourage Western European
speech at Harvard University outlining a post-war European aid program that became the basis for the Marshall Plan. U.S. officials realized the necessity of rebuilding the economic and financial infrastructures of Western Europe in order to restore material wellbeing to the war-ravaged areas and invalidate the growing influence of socialist and communist political parties threatening to pull West Europe into Moscow’s orbit. American planners transformed the content of Marshall’s June 5 speech into a rough plan by early November 1947 to go to Congress at the start of 1948 as the Economic Cooperation Act. The Act represented “not only the most important single factor in our trade relations with the world,” but whether or not it succeeded would “determine our political and economic relations with western and eastern Europe.”126 The dollar financing estimated over the next four years stood at $12.5 to 17.2 billion in grants and loans from the U.S. Treasury and an additional $5.8 billion from the World Bank and other financial institutions.127 American planners expected these funds to get Europe’s economy back on its feet rather than merely providing a crutch in the immediate future.

Turkey’s economic situation resembled Western Europe’s with living standards below pre-war levels due to the combined effects of inflation, low production, and a lack of foreign multilateralism and economic integration. According to Michael J. Hogan the Marshall Plan offered a tattered Europe “an American brand of corporative neo-capitalism that went beyond the laissez-faire political economy of classical theory but stopped short of a statist syndicalism.” This middle way entailed America’s encouragement of Europe adopting and utilizing such mechanisms as economic planning, increased cooperation between public and private leaders, greater economic coordination and control and economic integration. Hogan views the Marshall Plan as representative of an approach to post-war Western Europe that addressed multiple issues simultaneously. Michael J. Hogan The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 3. Taking a more cynical tack, Geir Lundestad sees the Marshall Plan as a means that allowed the U.S. after 1945 to assemble an informal empire. Lundestad concedes that the American model of empire departed from the traditional form utilized by the Great Powers in that it encouraged the formation of a supranational community designed to bring people together rather than dividing and ruling them. Such an integrationist approach to hegemony differed from the traditional British approach to empire-building in which the Pax Britannica became an unintended consequence of pursuing national interests rather than a desired end. Geir Lundestad “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford University Press, 1998): 33.

127 Price 43-44.
currency to purchase badly needed imports.128 But Turkey differed from Western Europe in its lacking a well-developed industry; instead its agricultural sector fed and employed most of the Turkish people. Although Marshall Plan aid would be used to assist Turkey, U.S. officials tailored the plan to suit Western European economic needs. If anything, Washington expected Turkey’s relatively untouched economy to play a part in Europe’s recovery as an exporter of the agricultural products and minerals Europe desperately needed.129 American planners did not want Turkey to eliminate state economic controls in its economy, but rather to utilize them in such a way that would attract foreign investments. This included careful coordination of trade, fiscal and monetary policies, and credit that would benefit industries producing manufactured goods for the domestic market. What remained would be an adjustment rather than an eradication of Turkey’s policy of import-substitution industrialization.130 As a first step towards increasing economic cooperation between Turkey and Western Europe, Turkey gained entry into the Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC), later to become the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The CEEC’s 16 member nations vowed to increase production levels, reduce tariffs and any trade obstacles, modernize industrial equipment and transportation, increase employment, encourage the free movement of workers throughout Europe, and work towards internal financial monetary and economic stability.131

128 Price 27, 29.
129 Ibid 31.
131 Throughout 1946 and much of 1947 Turkish exports maintained high levels, allowing depleted gold reserves to be replaced with sterling. This state of affairs faced a challenge in August 1947 when the British brought the convertibility of silver to an end. In response, Ankara decided to scale back exports to sterling countries in order to halt the growth of its sterling holdings. Soon after, the Turkish Government began to restrict dollar purchases, setting off a chain reaction ending in an unfavorable balance of trade that cost Turkey $66,000,000 in soft-currency by the end of 1948. Western goods continued to pour into the country from purchases made before the restrictions could be implemented; while at the same time the sale of Turkish goods slowed in the face of price competition and the gradual revival of European export markets. Revived European economies did suggest the possibility of growing demand for Turkish products and a reversal of the imbalance, if Turkey could increase the productivity of
Marshall Plan assistance contained as many political implications as economic ones.\textsuperscript{132} In establishing valid rates of exchange and removing trade barriers between European nations, the U.S. intended to shepherd Western Europe towards greater internal stability and closer economic cooperation while discouraging socialist and communist movements. European nations, including Turkey, signed the Convention for European Economic Cooperation in Paris on April 16, 1948 and thereby “agreed to undertake as their immediate task the elaboration and execution of a joint recovery program.”\textsuperscript{133} Per the specific agreement between the U.S. and Turkey, Washington would provide the Turkish government or a state-sponsored organization or individual with U.S. government-approved commodities, services, or other aid. In return Turkey agreed to cooperate with the CEEC in achieving independence from “extraordinary outside economic assistance” before the Marshall Plan expired in 1952.\textsuperscript{134} American support would then go towards developing Turkey’s agricultural and industrial production “on a sound economic basis” while the Turks provided the U.S. with specific information pertaining to future projects requiring American funding, particularly increased production of food and coal. The agreement also obligated Turkey to cooperate with other CEEC member nations in increasing the exchange of goods and services. The governments of these cooperating nations also agreed to work towards reducing existing private and public trade barriers that might slow progress.\textsuperscript{135} In making multilateral trade cooperation a requisite for receiving U.S. aid, Washington helped to


\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid 3-4.
promote European economic integration, even pressing for the creation of a Western European customs union years before one would be put in place by the European Economic Community.  

Economic development did not initially factor into the American aid project to Turkey as much as in other places, primarily because U.S. officials found Turkey to be without an existing infrastructure upon which to build an industry-driven economy. Turkey lacked adequate capital and investment funds, as well as a managerial class with the experience, education, or desire to collaborate with American representatives for the purposes of economic development.  

Public road expansion and reconstruction began prior to Marshall Plan arrangements, and Turkey’s successful application accelerated the process, but the scarcity of modern roadways and transport facilities stymied economic development. The U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, represented in Turkey by the Public Roads Group attached to the JAMMAT Mission, and the Ministry of Public Roads of Turkey worked out a plan to expand work being done on the State Highway System to the Provincial System and eventually to the level of towns and villages. In 1948 Washington set aside $5 million for the purchase of road building equipment and the Turkish Government provided TL 30 million to cover local currency needs during the first year of construction. The Turks agreed to cooperate with American planners in amending existing plans for road construction and determining the priorities and procedures prior to using U.S. aid for and projects. The Public Roads Group trained Turkish engineers and workers in the proper use and maintenance of construction equipment, while the Ministry of Public Works assumed control of

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the storage, protection, and repairs of the tools and machinery purchased with U.S. loans.140 For its first project, the Public Roads Group decided upon a road network of 23,000 km to be finished in nine years.141

*The Turkey Mission arrives*

In 1948, just as American aid to Turkey increased from a trickle to a torrent, a recent graduate of the Harvard School of Business Administration named Richard D. Robinson arrived in Turkey. As an associate of the Institute of Current World Affairs, Robinson resided in central Anatolia over the next year to learn about village life first-hand.142 Robinson witnessed the wary dynamics between the Turks and the first batch of U.S. officials. Many in Turkish government were just growing comfortable with the presence of British emissaries in their country as U.S. officials began to arrive. American military officers, officials and diplomats arriving in Ankara in 1948 set a bad precedent by laying claim to some of the city’s most cosmopolitan sites. Most nights at *Karpich’s*, a posh Russian restaurant popular with the Turkish bureaucracy, American patrons easily outnumbered the disgruntled Turkish regulars.143 Some Turks opted to dine at the Ankara railroad station rather than rub elbows with their foreign guests.144 British officials compared the Americans to the Germans working in Turkey in the years before World War I as committing the same “German mistake of being too much in evidence and of giving orders instead of advice. Their manners and conduct are sometimes resented and on occasion

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140 Ibid.
143 Operating under the namesake of its owner, a White Russian expatriate, *Karpich’s Lonkanta* was the site of considerable intrigue during World War II prior to Turkey’s decision to sever diplomatic ties with Germany, a rendezvous of diplomats and spies alike. Tomlin 58.
 contrasted with our own.”145 The growing presence of U.S. emissaries in Ankara bitterly reminded of Turks of their growing dependence on the United States. Some Turks protested their country’s “nylonizing,” that Turkey’s supposed development would prove artificial rather than authentic in nature.146

The Turks found other reasons to resent the Americans beyond the loss of a few choice eateries, specifically disagreeing over how much money Ankara needed to cover its defense spending until it reached economic independence. In the spring of 1948 Ankara submitted a report to U.S. officials estimating a baseline cost of $85 million for the next year’s military expenses and $300 million over the next four years. The “Economic Cooperation Agreement Between the United States and the Republic of Turkey” ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNA) on July 8 provided substantially less: $10 million for the first three months of the aid program. While some Turks could not hide their displeasure with the final arrangement and their fears that Turkey had forfeit some of its sovereign rights, most drew comfort from Turkey’s relationship with Washington becoming more tangible and formalized.147 An official commitment of financial support from the U.S. did make Turkey more of a partner, even if Turks had precious little to say where the money ended up. U.S.-funded projects to develop Turkey’s defenses did reap some economic benefits, such as the $5 million designated to improve the country’s few highways. American engineers worked to improve the roads connecting Erzurum and Trabzon, a military headquarters near the Soviet border, to the northern port of Iskenderun with primarily military considerations in mind, but improved transport brought economic and

social advantages as well. Ankara had other development ventures in the works, including flood control and irrigation projects, and hydroelectric plants to revitalize and improve village life. Some Turks lobbied for U.S. aid to be used to fund these regional development projects rather than military upgrades, arguing that the Turkish government lacked the experience and ability to centrally plan effectively, and that no amount of military aid could possibly hold back a Soviet advance. How Turkey spent U.S. funds would not be decided by Ankara; those decisions lay largely in the hands of the Economic Cooperation Administration’s (ECA) Special Mission to Turkey.

From its coordinating office in Paris the ECA directed the special missions stationed in each participating country overseeing the usage of Marshall Plan aid to promote independence from long-term economic assistance by the termination date of June 30, 1952. The ECA devised a three-tiered approach to reach this: encouraging European countries’ agricultural and industrial production, working to reinstate or continue sound the nations’ currencies and finances, and promoting the development of international trade among participating countries and beyond through reduced or eliminated tariffs or barriers. Truman initially chose Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson to head the ECA, a choice that did not sit well with the Republican majority in Congress which preferred someone with the business experience to head

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149 There was some debate as to the suitability of the name “Economic Cooperation Administration” during its planning stages in early 1948. The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, deemed it to be “clumsy” and “kind of a tough mouthful.” Other committee members agreed with Vandenberg, but their dislike for the name was not strong enough to merit considering a name change after the first discussion of the ERP after February 9. Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, Hearings held in the Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighteenth Congress, Second Session on United States Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Aid to China, Continued Assistance to Greece and Turkey, Additional Money for the International Children’s Emergency Fund, and the Nomination of Paul G. Hoffman as Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973): 3-4.
up an organization carrying out sweeping economic policies. Truman acquiesced by tapping Paul G. Hoffman, head of Studebaker Automobile Corporation and a Republican. Hoffman became the ECA chief in April 1948 to supervise affairs from Washington. Former Secretary of Commerce Averell Harriman, himself an experienced and respected business leader, served directly under Hoffman as the Special Representative in Europe, the ECA’s primary diplomatic post. Harriman oversaw the implementation of ECA projects in the field and worked as the primary American representative to the OEEC. Heads of special projects in the participating countries rounded out the ECA’s leadership with a rank just below the Ambassador to each country. ECA mission chiefs cooperated closely with the government agencies and officials of the country in the proper implementation of the recovery program.

Hoffman believed the ECA’s most critical task to be guiding Europe in devising and implementing a program that would pave the way to economic recovery. Europe’s “economic salvation” had to begin with increased production and greater intra-European trade to end shortages and raise the quality of life. In Hoffman’s view, the ECA needed to function “as a kind of investment banker” that drew up a plan of action that reflected the individual needs and conditions of each country and could then be carried out by the recipient countries. By becoming a recipient of Economic Recovery Program (ERP) assistance Turkey agreed to cooperate with other participating European countries in bringing about economic conditions that promoted peace and independence from “extraordinary outside economic assistance.”

The ECA expected Turkish officials to provide the information needed in the decision-making

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151 Price 69, 71.
152 Hoffman had little enthusiasm for taking the position until Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations, assured him he was the man for the job.
153 Stone 70.
154 Ibid 73-74.
process and to extend every courtesy to the staff of the Special Mission to Turkey. Russell J. Dorr, a 43-year old diplomat, Columbia Law School graduate, and former naval intelligence officer in the OSS during World War II, headed the Turkish Mission’s four man staff. The Mission established its headquarters in Ankara in the fall of 1948. The Mission’s responsibilities included tracking and reporting the progress of U.S. aid to Turkey, keeping detailed financial records, providing technical input, and making adjustments to policies as needed. The Mission could give permission to projects up to $1 million. The Turkish government chose Nurullah Esat Sumer to serve as the Minister to oversee the coordination of ECA aid in Turkey. Over the coming months Dorr found his Turkish liaison to be unreceptive to ECA advice and all-too willing to run his undermanned staff ragged with mounting responsibilities.

Turkey presented the ECA with a special case; the U.S. intended Marshall Plan aid to restore economies damaged by war, but in Turkey the emphasis shifted to capital investment to encourage economic development and expansion. As had been the case with the Truman Doctrine, Turkey was once again linked with Greece in determining how it should benefit from American funds. Secretary Marshall testified that Turkey confronted a similar threat as Greece, “but not in so active a manner” given its comparative military and economic strength. For Turkey’s particular needs the ECA planned to provide the guidance and resources needed to allow the Turks to restart the development program begun before the war. ECA officials hoped

156 Ibid.
158 Thornburg 5.
160 Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, Hearings held in the Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighteenth Congress, Second Session 383.
to see Turkey strengthen its economy so that it could more easily pay for its military expenditures. The ECA program additionally called for integrating Turkey’s developing economy with Western Europe’s.\textsuperscript{161} The sectors of Turkey targeted for increased production included agriculture and minerals with the resultant exports exported to the other countries participating in the Economic Recovery Program.\textsuperscript{162} Profits from the sale of these exports would then enable Turkey to use the earned foreign currencies to fund continued economic development and purchase industrials good from a recovering Western Europe. Thus, rather than directly funding the development of Turkey’s industry, Washington would provide the impetus to allow the Turks to do so on their own, although the ECA expected such a transformation to be slow to show visible results before the Marshall Plan expired in 1952.\textsuperscript{163} The ECA was not responsible for purchasing aid supplies on behalf of participant countries; instead the recipient governments as well as private firms and nationals of the member nations carried out this task. ECA officials made sure that the nations’ commodity applications did not exceed their specific allotment, determined that it obeyed the set criteria, verified if more affordable exchanges could be made, and assessed the potential effect on the American economy.\textsuperscript{164} The ECA missions’ ability to decide the ultimate size of aid allocations and to either grant or deny authorizations for desired commodities gave them a measure of political influence in the nations they operated in.

\textit{Modernizing Turkey’s Military and Agriculture}

JAMMAT, as it continued to monitor the Turks’ utilization of funds from the Mutual Aid Program (MAP), expanded from a handful of U.S. military officers to 245 personnel in 1948. In

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{161} Economic Cooperation Administration \textit{Turkey: Country Data Book} (March 1950): 1.
\item \textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{163} Ibid 2.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Price 78.
\end{itemize}
1949 it became the Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT) and grew to 410 and then to 1,250 officers, enlisted men and government officials by mid-1951, making it one of the largest advisory groups operating outside of the United States. U.S. officials expected Marshall Plan funds to modernize a largely antiquated military, one with a long and checkered past. Atatürk rose to power from the Turkish army and wielded it during the 1920s to implement and enforce many of his policies, yet it continued to cling tenaciously to certain traditions and outlooks including an aversion to political matters. In modernizing the military during the 19th century, the Ottomans took their cues largely from the caste-like Prussian model, which lingered on into the post-war era to defy easy alteration. Every twenty-year old Turkish male served in the military for upwards of three years of rigorous and disciplined training. Until the post-war period only college graduates and Muslims could become officers while non-Muslim conscripts made up the ranks of Labor Battalions. Many enlistees languished as menservants tending to the needs of their officers instead of taking part in critical training. American officials determined the Turkish military to be too large at 700,000 men and lacking in the equipment and training necessary to be an effective and modern ally. The Turkish army of 1948 was largely a horse-drawn one, with few tanks and other mechanized vehicles. U.S. officials found Greece’s army to be similarly sized and equipped; they prescribed a smaller and more efficient force with updated weapons and education for the armed forces of both countries. American military personnel assumed control of much of the training to the frequent embarrassment of their Turkish counterparts who disliked handing over such

165 Altinay and Holmes 272. Wolfe 43.
166 Tomlin 11.
167 Thornburg 6.
168 Hauser 110.
responsibilities. Initial resistance to American interference in the Turkish military gave way to gradual acceptance and enthusiasm: American style uniforms gradually replaced the German style uniforms previously worn by Turkish officers.\(^{170}\)

Turkish agriculture received the most economic assistance after the military, primarily in the form of imported farming machinery, so that it might increase export production; agricultural commodities made up roughly 90% of Turkey’s total exports. In the long-term the ECA agricultural program called for rises in the production of cereals, cotton, oil seeds, and livestock and their byproducts, but little consideration went into formulating a broader plan of effective land use. Instead, planners dealt with Turkey on a commodity-by-commodity basis.\(^{171}\) U.S. officials envisioned Turkey becoming a key source of food to Western Europe, but made little attempt to understand how existing technical limitations and socioeconomic problems might impact such a transformation. Issues regarding the upkeep and expense of agricultural equipment soon became evident, including the fact that the larger landowners who could afford such an investment put smaller village farmers at a distinct disadvantage.\(^{172}\) In 1948 just over 6,000 farms of 125 acres or larger existed in Turkey; the remaining farms consisted of small plots of ten to fifteen acres upon which farmers toiled with makeshift tools made primarily of wood.\(^{173}\) Most farmers used traditional Anatolian farming practices, such as allowing plots to

\(^{170}\) Letter to Mr. Walter S. Rogers from Richards D. Robinson, Institute of Current World Affairs (February 16, 1948).


\(^{173}\) Rural Turks were not wholly ignorant of modern agricultural practices and other means of improving the quality of life. From its inception the Turkish state carried out policies intended to educate rural villagers in improved hygiene, disease control and small-scale industry at Köy Entitüleri (Village Institutes). Money and seeds courtesy of the Ziratt (Agricultural) Bank and the Ziraat Kurumu (Agricultural League) provided smaller farmers with the means of improving their holdings. More advice and new crops came as a result of experimentation conducted at the number of Örnek Bahçeleri (Model Farms) owned and operated by the government. During the late 1940s thirteen state-run farms located on 700,000 acres of virgin wheat land and using up to date techniques and equipment yielded impressive harvests. In 1942, the Turkish Government tried its hand at large-scale mechanized
fallow one out of every three years, leaving only roughly 15% of Turkey’s total land cultivated. These small-scale farmers lived a life of self-sufficiency, producing their own food and clothing with little need for commercial outlets or consumption goods, and little available cash to make such purchases with. Some small-scale industries existed in Turkey’s 40,000 villages, including gristmills and hand-loomed textile production. Few farmers supplemented their efforts with modern equipment, insecticides, herbicides, or fungicides. Limits on transportation prohibited the large-scale movement of grain to urban areas for export, limits being partially overcome with the modernization of Turkey’s highways and roads. Crops such as cotton and sugar beets could barely stay ahead of domestic consumption and population expansion, and Turkish wheat farmers depended upon the state to purchase harvests for the military at prices well above those of the world market. ECA planners hoped to bring Turkish agriculture up to date and increase production through instruction and education as well as mechanization. In 1950 the ECA sent twenty-eight Turkish agricultural technicians from a variety of fields to the U.S. to study for a year and then return home to transmit their newly acquired knowledge of modern farming techniques via state programs.

After Turkey’s military and agricultural sector Washington determined to invest the remaining ECA funds in specific Turkish industries and services, namely SEEs. Outside of agriculture the ECA estimated state-owned enterprises to control 70% of all business and 

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174 Thomas and Frye 24.
176 “ECA in Action on the Food and Agricultural Front” 335.
industrial activities with monopolies on railroads, shipping, iron and steel, gasoline, liquor, insurance, opium, playing cards, and a number of other diverse items. These monopolies employed a large number of Turks earning wages set by the state inconsistent with living expenses. The influence of the SEEs resulted in what Richard Robinson identified as a “non-equilibrated economy” dominated by the state monopolies artificially determining the general price levels without regard for potential supply and demand or potential inflationary impact. “Rather,” observed Robinson, “maximum government income appears to rule the price formula and production schedule of these government-owned concerns.” The accepted practices of Turkey’s SEEs continued to deter private initiative and the flow of private capital into the country.

The ECA Mission expected technical assistance funds to improve existing industries supervised by the Sümer Bank by lowering costs and improving both the volume and quality of production, but in general developing new Turkish industries remained a secondary concern. With the exception of mining, Turkey had few private industries of any significant size, due in large part to the continued impact of statism. The lack of private enterprise translated into a lack of competent managers and laborers, even in the larger SEEs, able to oversee and implement the sort of dramatic expansion and modernization American officials envisioned. The ECA Mission planned to streamline Turkey’s existing industries, specifically those controlled by

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179 Letter to Mr. Walter S. Rogers from Richards D. Robinson, Institute of Current World Affairs (February 16, 1948).
181 One sector that bucked the state-ownership trend was the mining industry, specifically chrome, iron and manganese ores, with almost three-fourths of the industry in private hands. Mining in Turkey remained a primitive affair, conducted with the “pick, shovel and crowbar method” and with little mechanization. C. H. Day and C. W. Ryan, “A Plan for Increasing Production of Certain Ores in Turkey: CHROME, MANGANESE, IRON ORE” (July 17, 1953) Records Group 469, Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, Turkey Division, 1948-1953.
the Sümer Bank, by providing technical assistance to reduce manufacturing expenses while improving both the quality and volume of production. Ankara could explore new industrial fields funded by outside sources provided these additional endeavors conformed to the stipulations of the Turkish Assistance Program. ECA officials and the Turks haggled over how Turkey’s existing industrial potential should be best utilized. More developed countries receiving U.S. aid, such as France, Italy and Britain, enjoyed industrial potential far greater than Turkey’s, which, from JUSMMAT’s perspective, left them torn between having to choose between the critical task of strengthening defense capabilities or the equally important task of reclaiming their share of the world market. JUSMMAT’s encouraged these countries to focus on the former task at the expense of the latter. Turkey had neither a well-developed export trade sector nor a manufacturing base, forcing it to rely extensively on imported manufactured goods. What little Turkey could produce for its defense came out of a dozen state-owned factories controlled by civilians and working on behalf of the Turkish Ministry of National Defense. Organized as “The Mechanical and Chemical Industries” (NKEK), these twelve factories manufactured small quantities of equipment required for Turkey’s military and used its excess capacity to produce civilian goods. In attempting to fulfill two roles at once, the NKEK could not to justice to either one, leading to future headaches in the early 1950s when Washington insisted on Turkey taking on a larger share of its defense burden by manufacturing such basic items such as shells and ammunition.

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183 Makina ve Kimya Endustri Kurumsu.
Throughout all of these U.S.-supervised efforts one of Mission Chief Dorr’s top priorities in running the ECA mission in Turkey became convincing the Turkish people that the Mission’s presence was justified by economic rather than solely strategic reasons, a concern felt by a number of participating countries.\textsuperscript{185} Turkey exhibited no signs of organized opposition to the activities of the ECA in early 1949. A few members of the political opposition and opposition press regurgitated Soviet claims that the Turks were giving up their sovereignty in order to become “a mere vassal of the US,” but the opposition intended such claims to frustrate the Turkish government rather than the ECA, and few Turks placed any stock in the allegations.\textsuperscript{186} Turkey’s intolerant laws regarding subversive activities and an effective gendarmerie discouraged organized resistance against the ECA from developing, but in coming years the political opposition would frequently raise the question of the U.S. encroaching upon Turkey’s autonomy.

\textit{Turkey’s Growing Part in Western Security}

The outlook of the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) for the U.S.’s security concerns in early 1949 in Turkey echoed those of the JCS from the previous November.\textsuperscript{187} SANACC expected Turkey’s military to continue to reduce its number of personnel in order to cut down on expenditures while increasing it effectiveness in resisting a possible Soviet incursion long enough for the United States to intervene. How well the Turks held out against a Russian invasion would depend to a large extent on the strength of the Turkish economy, which remained dominated by the state and too underdeveloped to contribute

\textsuperscript{185} “Turks Are Fearful of ECA’s Motives.”


significantly to Europe’s recovery. Within its statist confinements the Turkish economy tended to “develop and maintain costly and uneconomic ventures for strategic, military, or other reasons” and continued to be “top-heavy, with highly modern industries superimposed upon a generally primitive and primarily agricultural economy, with insufficient intermediate light industry.” Additional impediments to economic growth included inadequate roads and storage facilities for crops, and the high cost of sustaining a large military to discourage Soviet aggression.

To map out how to improve the Turkish economy and assist in reducing military costs the U.S. Special Representative in Europe for the ECA, W. Averrel Harriman, met with President İsmet İnönü and much of his cabinet. The Turks impressed Harriman with their “effective use of U.S. funds under our direction” and gave every indication of recognizing the need to expand the Turkish economy, specifically by enlarging Turkey’s agricultural and mining sectors. Harriman noted the Turks’ ability and willingness to follow the United States’ tutelage, which seemed to signal a reversal of their earlier xenophobia, at least in regards to Americans: “They recognize the need, not only [for] our physical aid, but even more essentially, our technical assistance in developing programs for their backward people.” American representatives assured Harriman that the Turkish people were fast learners and “have an enthusiasm and determination, spurred on by fear of Russian aggression.” Harriman concluded his meeting with İnönü convinced that American aid to Turkey would continue to be used productively.189

Other U.S. officials remained wary of military projects in Turkey that might arouse further suspicion and rancor in Moscow. The Soviets’ development of an atomic bomb and the rise of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 greatly complicated relations between East and West. These developments and the increased aggression they suggested made it all the more difficult to formulate U.S. defense plans in the Near East and justify greater expenditures.¹⁹⁰ Throughout 1949 representatives of the Departments of State and Defense discussed the merits and drawbacks of constructing airfields and stockpiling aviation fuel in Turkey and Greece. Such undertakings would strongly imply including the Greeks and Turks in a Western defensive framework, thus paving their way to formal inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty or a similar Mediterranean pact.¹⁹¹ The JCS considered the airfields and stockpiles to be in line with its strategic requirements but Acheson advised caution. Until the United States was willing to make a formal guarantee to protect the territorial integrity of Turkey, he feared that such undertakings would only expose Ankara to greater Soviet pressure.¹⁹²

Ankara embraced the challenges and invited a more prominent role in Western security, feeling more than qualified to join any regional defense organization centered on Europe.¹⁹³ At the same time such responsibilities would be costly and place greater stress on existing economic pressures. Closer relations with the U.S. and increased military assistance meant that Turkey could continue to bankroll its defense expenditures; it did not mean greater quantities of money being channeled into other endeavors. In 1947 46% of the total national budget went towards

¹⁹⁰ Kuniholm 46. Turkish officials presented the news of Russia’s new weapon to the people of Turkey with a measure of insoucianc; the semi-official Ulus newspaper made a routine RPP speech its leading story the day the news broke. Some in Turkey hoped that the Soviets’ new weapon would increase the U.S.’s desire to encourage Turkey’s economic development. “Turks Are Cautious Over News of Blast” New York Times (Sep 25, 1949): 9.
¹⁹² Ibid.
¹⁹³ Eridein C. Erkin “Turkey’s Foreign Policy” Proceedings of the Academy 1952 569.
military expenditures, 41% in 1948, and 39% in 1949. Though the percentage showed gradual reductions, it remained too high to impact the development of Turkey’s economic resources.

On February 2, 1949 Turkish Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak reported to the Grand National Assembly (GNA) after returning from Paris and a round of negotiations with U.S. officials who declined Turkey’s request for $615 million in financial aid, due to a U.S. report claiming that Turkey could comfortably fund its own development program. The report cited factors such as Turkey’s ample supplies of foreign currency and gold reserves, the lack of wartime destruction, and a well-developed industry with output levels that exceeded pre-war numbers. Ankara disagreed with the assessment. “As for America’s statement about Turkey,” Sadak stated to the GNA, “namely that we are in a position to pay for equipment and machinery, we made it clear to the Americans that they are mistaken in this.” On March 14 Turkey requested an additional allocation of $30 million from the U.S. government to cover the purchase of items of current military consumption otherwise covered by the Turkish national budget. U.S. government officials considered such goods to already be a part of the regular charges covered by assistance programs. Any additional Turkish requests for foreign assistance needed to be processed by the OEEC or the ECA.

U.S. State Department officials committed themselves to a peacetime policy of providing enough military and economic aid to preserve Turkey’s independence and ensure its continuance as a safeguard against communism. They also hoped to increase the process of democratization and economic development to further deter Soviet influence in the Near East. American

194 Economic Cooperation Administration 1.
197 Ibid 1658.
economic strategy for Turkey did not include industrialization, but other more profitable venues, such as multilateral trade.198 The Turks had long been attempting to industrialize their nation, and pursuing this plan primarily through their SEEs since the late 1920s. This, argued the State Department, had led to a series of “ostentatious adventures in production for which the country is not ready.” Prior to industrialization, Turkey required improvements in its agricultural methods, modernized transportation, and modern training for its technicians.199 In spite of this setback to its industrialization plans, the Turks remained adamant that they needed constant financial assistance from the United States in order to stand resolute against the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine officially brought Turkey into the anti-Soviet cohort, but Ankara argued that a stabilized economy was necessary in addition to military aid, particularly as the nation entered the unfamiliar territory of multiparty politics.

Washington greeted such arguments with increasing incredulity by 1949. Congressmen argued increasingly for aid from the U.S. to be used to strengthen Western European organizations that encouraged economic integration rather than continuing to support individual national economies for the indefinite future. Washington expected the ECA missions to work towards greater coordination between member nations as a means of increasing dollar earnings in order to develop more “critical sectors” of each country’s investment plan. Greater competition and liberalized commercial guidelines became the order of the day.200 To assess how American money would be best utilized in Turkey, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the Turkish government co-sponsored a mission to undertake an economic study of the country. The IBRD recruited economist James M. Barker to serve as the

199 Ibid 1666.
200 Price 113.
mission’s leader. In late 1949 Barker departed for Turkey on a preliminary investigation of Turkey’s economic development potential. He first wanted to see the Karabuk Iron and Steel Works, the Zonguldak coalmines, and the port of Izmir. Barker returned in June of 1950 with a team of experts to collect and compile data for three months before returning home to produce a report for submission to the IBRD. The Barker Report pinpointed statism as the primary reason for Turkey’s state of economic imbalance. In a mixed economy the state could not oversee industrial development of the country singlehandedly while the private sector stayed undersized and marginalized. The Second World War amplified these problems by causing inflation and higher prices. Barker and his staff identified the Turkish state’s overstressing of industrialization at the expense of agriculture as a wrong needing correction. Following the law of comparative advantage, Turkey needed to recognize that “the quickest path to that goal (of industrialization) is through increased emphasis on agricultural development.” Before Turkish industry could expand Turkey needed to increase mechanization and efficiency in agriculture and scale back the usage of raw materials in superfluous industries such as rayon production.

The Turkish government did not welcome the Barker Mission’s prognosis. As an implement of the state, many elite Turks continued to equate industrialization with modernization and Westernization, while agriculture still denoted the backwards peasant class doing nothing to assist in development. Statist industrialization often lacked good organization and leadership, but it had allowed Turkey to gradually break free of the pre-war system of

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203 Ibid 3.

204 Ibid 46.
foreign debt, influence and reliance. The Barker Mission’s analysis did resonate with members of the business class and advocates of multiparty politics who desired to see reduced state involvement in economic matters.

_Growing American Frustrations_

Even when the state did assume an active role in matters, it did not guarantee competence. As Turkish officials worked on Turkey’s submission to the OEEC during the summer of 1949, Dorr grew frustrated with the fact that the Turkish Minister of State Sumer “has taken virtually no responsibility for the job” while his subordinates “have been so snowed under that to discuss any details means holding up work on another portion of the submission.” These circumstances prevented ECA officials from monitoring the progress of the submission formulation as closely as was desired; at four men, the Turkey Mission had its own personnel limitations. High-ranking Turkish officials exhibited a lethargy regarding OEEC membership that piqued Dorr. The general memorandum the Turks submitted to the ECA regarding the OEEC left Dorr “badly shocked and extremely disappointed by its poor quality. It does not seem to touch on or even show any realization of the basic problems which do exist here” and lacked information regarding Turkish investment programs requested by the OEEC. Regarding the Turks’ minimal efforts Dorr mused:

One’s first reaction is to say that if the Turks can’t do any better than this, they shouldn’t attempt to participate in the European Recovery Program, and I am sure that this will be the feeling of a number of people in Washington and Paris when they have waded through this unhappy presentation.

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205 Thomas and Frye 85.
206 In mid-June the staff doubled from four to eight, allowing for a more equal distribution of duties. Letter from Russell H. Dorr to James E. Victory (June 4, 1949) Records Group: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, Turkey Division, 1948-1953.
207 Ibid.
Despite growing impatience and the apparent inability of Turkish officials to grasp the economic conditions in their homeland, Dorr decided to not be discouraged, but allow “the Turkish failure” to serve as evidence of the need for firm counsel and guidance. Dorr reasoned an appropriate lesson would be to secure funds from the OEEC, but refuse to authorize their spending until the Turks provided the requested information thus giving them a chance “to retrieve their blunder and to avoid being permanently prejudiced by their present inadequacies.” The perceived need for a more paternalistic approach by the ECA in its dealings with Ankara grew out of the Turkish government’s hesitance to radically reform the economy and the resultant political fallout that would result.

Demands from Washington to increase taxes, impose price controls, and ensure that U.S. aid reached private as well as public hands might have precipitated growing social unrest and accelerated dissatisfaction with the İnönü government, dissatisfaction the İnönü administration wished to avoid. 1950 would bring a national election; the party in control, the Republican People’s Party (RPP), could not lose traction with the political opposition gradually closing in. At best, the RPP could pay lip service to the ECA by extolling the virtues of privatization until the end of the election with İnönü hopefully still at the helm. Concerns over the upcoming election made it all the more difficult to impress upon Ankara the fact that the Marshall Plan could not be treated as “a mere windfall to be used by them without relation to action taken in regard to the rest of their resources and practices.”

Representatives of the ECA in Turkey realized very early on that the plan to provide Turkey assistance on a loan basis would not be feasible in light of the burden defense expenditures placed on the state budget. The ECA Mission insisted that Washington consider

\[208\] Ibid.
providing support to Turkey on a grant rather than a loan basis to allow the Turks to utilize the money in ways that would provide the most immediate economic benefit.\textsuperscript{210} Justification for this proposed shift grew out of the ongoing problem of not enough consumer goods, such as petroleum and foodstuffs, being available for purchase in Turkey because ECA loans could not be spent on such consumables. Ankara proposed to meet the growing demand by making the purchases on its own, thus diverting funds from projects the ECA wanted to receive the most attention. Russell Dorr argued that allowing the Turks to use their loans to purchase consumables would be better in the long-term, as it would “tend to produce a fundamental improvement in the economic situation which will enable the interest and principal of the loan to be paid when they fall due.”\textsuperscript{211}

In other instances the ECA wished the Turks from refraining from making purchases, such as wheat, a commodity in short supply following a particularly disastrous harvest in 1949. Dorr believed that despite this setback Turkey could soldier on to next spring without importing foreign supplies of wheat. He identified “peasant psychology” as the reason why adequate amounts of wheat failed to reach urban areas; the farmers of Anatolia, long accustomed to drought conditions, appeared to be hoarding their crop and refused to sell to the state, even at prices substantially higher than the world market.\textsuperscript{212} Dorr realized that Ankara might have no

\textsuperscript{210} Turkish officials further clouded the loans vs. grants issue by insisting that Washington had promised to provide them with grants when Mission representatives had no evidence of this being true and could not substantiate these Turkish claims, many of which proved to be false.


\textsuperscript{212} Letter to Mr. Carter de Paul, Acting Chief, Program Development Section, Program Review and Recovery Division, Office of the Special Representative and Mr. James E. Victory, Greece-Turkey Branch, Program Coordination Division, Economic Cooperation Administration from Russell H. Dorr, U.S. Minister, Chief of Mission (14 July 1949) Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948- 1961, Turkey Division, 1948-1953.
choice but to purchase 300-450,000 tons of exported wheat, but advised the Turks wait until more data could be collected to give a more accurate picture of the situation.

The piecemeal flow of information from ECA-supported project remained a problem for the Mission and their Turkish mediators. From the Karabuk coalmine to the oil fields at Raman Dagh, the ECA wondered if the Turkish government ran its development projects as effectively as it could. The limited effectiveness of the state apparatus made encouraging private enterprise projects that much more appealing. Requests for ECA loans to fund these projects reached the Mission on a regular basis, and though Dorr found most of them to be sound, the ECA could only fund those with the greatest potential. This required ECA officials to carefully scrutinize each and every loan request, a task that would soon prove to be “an intolerable burden,” particularly since each request then required ratification by the Turkish Parliament. Given these conditions, Washington providing the ECA with a line of credit would be a more expedient measure than the existing system of loan provisions.

ECA displeasure with the Turkish government yielded one victim in the person of Minister of the State Sumer, forced to resign due to his insufficient handling of Marshall Plan aid. Ankara chose Cemil Sait Barlas, a 45 year-old former judge and legal advisor educated in Germany, to be Sumer’s replacement. Described as “rather pompous” by Richard D. Robinson, Barlas served in the Turkish Parliament, the Grand National Assembly (GNA), as an RPP deputy and as both Minister of Commerce and Minister of Commerce and Economics before becoming Minister of State. Barlas dismissed nearly everyone working in the Ministry of State, despite

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214 Ibid.
215 An interview of Barlas in November 1949 left Robinson unimpressed with the Minister’s lack of openness and forthrightness. Robinson contended that ECA officials found the overall Turkish administration of Marshall Plan aid to be lacking.
ECA efforts “to slow down the thoroughness of the new broom.”\textsuperscript{216} These mass firings compounded the existing disorganization, although the Ministry successfully prepared the investment data analysis the ECA desired for Turkey’s OEEC submission, albeit in a poor Turkish translation.\textsuperscript{217}

On November 2, 1949 Senators Ellender, Ferguson, Green and Jenner of the Senate Appropriations Committee arrived in Ankara to ascertain the effectiveness of the ECA Mission. The quartet expressed concern that providing large concessions of American aid to an economy dominated by SEEs was tantamount to Washington “underwriting of a socialist government.”\textsuperscript{218} Without tangible improvement in the Turkish private sector the ECA faced the prospect of reduced aid. Encouraging the development of privatization in Turkey remained a top ECA concern without an easy resolution. Most Turkish officials in late 1949 remained too preoccupied with the upcoming national elections that could potentially shift the balance of power in Turkey to worry about privatization. U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, George Wadsworth, put a more optimistic spin on the situation in Turkey when he arrived at New York in January 1950, extolling the growing cooperation and the shared realization between both Turks and Americans that the aid assistance program was yielding impressive results for Turkey’s economic and military potential.\textsuperscript{219} The conflicting perspectives on the effectiveness of American efforts in Turkey hinted at the political complications to come.

\textsuperscript{216} Letter to Colonel John L. Tappin and Mr. James E. Victory from Russell H. Dorr (June 18, 1949).
\textsuperscript{217} Letter to Mr. Carter de Paul and Mr. James E. Victory from Russell H. Dorr (June 29, 1949) Records Group: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, Turkey Division, 1948-1953.
Conclusion

The combined impact of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan economically and politically bonded Turkey closely to the U.S., a nation with which it had little in the way of a sustained affiliation. In Turkish eyes the United States seemed a “friendly but remote power,” one whose victory in World War II and postwar prosperity clearly indicated its global prominence.\textsuperscript{220} With America’s global prestige at its height during the late 1940s, the influence of American political and military officials assigned to Turkey reached its pinnacle. By emphasizing greater economic liberalism, U.S. advisors compelled many Turkish leaders to reexamine the effectiveness of Turkey’s traditional economic policy of state intervention.\textsuperscript{221} The Turkish government did not completely abandon its policy of statism, as some American officials advised, but did begin to explore the possibility of greater private enterprise while at the same time maintaining and improving the activities of the SEEs.\textsuperscript{222} The Turks remained adamant that they needed continual financial assistance from the United States to remain resolute against the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine officially brought Turkey into the anti-Soviet cohort, but Ankara lobbied for assistance in stabilizing its economy, particularly with the nation about to enter the unfamiliar territory of multiparty politics. The United States did not insist upon multiparty politics but undoubtedly hastened its acceptance in Turkey by encouraging the development of an economy and military with a more recognizably Western character. Adopting a more Western-style approach to politics seemed wholly consistent with these changes, if not

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\textsuperscript{221} Between April 1948 and March 1950 the ECA authorized Turkey’s purchasing of nearly $24 million in machinery and equipment, close to $13 million in bread grains, $1.8 million in motor vehicles and engines, and $1.4 million in petroleum and products. Totaling $46 million, shipments to Turkey placed as the third smallest of the 15 countries taking part in the OEEC, just ahead of Trieste and Iceland. “A. European Recovery Programme” in \textit{Keesing’s Contemporary Archives: Weekly Diary of Important World Events with Index Continually Kept Up-to-Date}, Volume No. VIII, 1950-1952 10852-10853.

\textsuperscript{222} “Impact of American Military and Economic Assistance Programs in Turkey: A Report from Richard D. Robinson” 16.
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necessary to appease a growing popular movement clamoring for greater representation in the upcoming elections.

Less than two years into its four-year existence the Turkey Mission could already cite substantial progress to validate its creation. The Soviet Union, although not completely removed from the picture and now armed with atomic weapons, was no longer the frightening specter of late 1945 and 1946 and the improvements being made to the Turkish military suggested that the Turks would hold their own in the event of a Soviet invasion. The initial perception among some Turks of the Americans in their midst as potential occupiers had been replaced with an impression of the U.S. as a kind benefactor deserving of praise and emulation. In encouraging the Turks to participate in international organizations such as the OEEC, as difficult as the process frequently was, the ECA instructed the Turks in the importance of data accumulation and interpretation, skills that would be of paramount importance in the years to come when Turkey undertook concerted efforts to develop its economy. Every indication seemed to suggest that the Turkey Mission would continue to accrue success in its remaining two years. But the seismic political changes about to rock Turkey’s political landscape with a major regime change would pose unforeseeable challenges to the Turkey Mission and its successor agencies during the coming decade. The economic and military aid provided by the U.S. came to be used by the incoming Menderes administration as a barometer to measure its political success and promoting a sense of economic dependence.
CHAPTER II. “A MOST WONDERFUL THING FOR TURKEY”: 1949-1952

Introduction

The Turkish government’s acquiescence to the growing demand for multiparty politics in the mid-1940s represented a major milestone in Turkey’s political development, symbolizing a significant step towards becoming a modern Western nation and unleashing all manner of debates and conflicts to impact U.S.-Turkish relations. Turkey’s toleration of multiparty politics took quite some time to develop. The possibility of Atatürk’s Republican Peoples’ Party (RPP) losing its monopoly on state control since the mid-1920s concerned both those in power and citizens who feared that without the RPP in control Turkey would stray from Atatürk’s vision of the republic. Earlier efforts to introduce political competition met with little success; in 1930 the RPP banned the first opposition party, the Liberal Republican Party, and refused to allow another party to form for the next fifteen years until two new parties emerged in 1946, the National Development Party and the Democratic Party (DP). Within five years’ time the DP managed to unseat the RPP in the national elections of 1950 by taking the majority of seats in the Turkish Parliament, the Grand National Assembly (GNA), and with it the positions of Prime Minister and President. The DP’s victory indicated the wishes of large segments of the Turkish population long under-represented or ignored by the government, in particular the 75-80% of Turkey’s population working as in agriculture.

Advocates of the overlooked masses emerged from the ranks of the RPP leadership to establish the DP; future Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and President Celal Bayar both hailed from rural backgrounds and represented a new breed of Turkish politician different from those belonging the RPP, one younger, less likely to have military service, more likely to hail from the countryside, and better attuned to the concerns of the rural farmers and landowners they
represented. DP policies diverted from the RPP’s traditional emphasis on industrialization by stressing an expansion of Turkish agriculture, a fortuitous policy shift dovetailing with Washington’s vision of Turkey as the breadbasket of Western Europe. To increase the efficiency of Turkish farms the ECA brokered the importation of thousands of U.S.-produced tractors and other pieces of farm machinery. Although primarily wealthy landowners could afford to buy and maintain this equipment, enough mid-range farmers pooled their resources to purchase tractors and other implement to drastically improve agricultural production in the early 1950s and the Turkish economy. American corporations assumed the ECA would help open up the Turkish market to U.S. products, but the Turkish Mission, hoping to bind Turkey closer to the European market, discouraged the sale of U.S. commodities. American business interests began to apply pressure on politicians in Washington, placing the Mission in an awkward position. The Mission intended initially to introduce a select number of makes and models of European made farm machinery, but ultimately imported a bewildering array of U.S.-built tractors and other implements from American companies looking to get a slice of the Turkish pie. So many different machines made locating spare parts and technical know-how difficult in the coming years.

With its economic policies in step with Washington’s expectations, the Menderes government further underscored its relationship with the U.S. by sending a brigade of troops to participate in the UN action in Korea in 1950. The admirable conduct of these soldiers proved a test run of Turkey’s ability to participate in a potentially larger conflict, and demonstrated Turkey’s fervor when it came to containing communist expansion around the globe. American news outlets seized upon tales of the brigade coming out of Korea and created a mystique in

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224 Ibid 8.
America’s popular imagination that in no small part encouraged a view of Turkey as a valuable ally and a worthy addition to NATO. Washington agreed and elbowed aside resistant European members of the Alliance to clear a place for Turkey as a full NATO member in 1952. The Korean War changed America’s perception of Turkey and also altered its perception of itself. The U.S. moved from functioning as a promoter of economic development in Europe to being the provider of military preparedness. In 1952 the Mutual Security Agency replaced the Economic Cooperation Administration, a bureaucratic reshuffling that embodied this change in thinking and change in policy. Turkey, now meeting U.S. expectations to increase its exportation of cotton, copper, coal and other products, and enjoying the rising demand brought about by the war, was a perfect candidate for America’s determination to increase its military presence in Europe and to oversee improvements in Turkey’s armed forces.

In the midst of this period of fast changes visible signs of growing tension between the DP and the RPP grew increasingly apparent. With the DP’s economic policy changes yielding significant gains in Turkey’s economy the RPP recognized that the resultant popularity of the opposition would lengthen Menderes and Bayar’s time in office for an indefinite period. The RPP began to step up its criticism of the DP and warned that drawing close to the United States created a climate of dependence and endangered Turkey’s hallowed sense of autonomy. Each party drew its battle lines in anticipation of the political struggles to come.

The Development of the Democratic Party

The arrival of ECA officials and U.S. military personnel in Turkey occurred just prior to the inauguration of multiparty politics and a steady escalation of Turkey’s participation in international affairs. Since its inception in 1923 the Republican People’s Party (RPP) ran virtually unopposed in every election, and its dominance could not continue in the face of socio-
economic realities and international events.225 During World War II the Turkish people endured steeply rising living costs, food rationing, and dwindling consumer items.226 After the war the Turks remained dissatisfied with the scarcity of consumer goods available only on the black market while private business interests decried the continuing dominance of SEEs in the mixed economy. Some Turks bristled at the state’s repression of Islam and rural peasants did not care for the frequent excess exhibited by the gendarmerie in the countryside.227 The changing international climate emboldened and encouraged domestic discontent. America’s willingness to provide funding for reconstruction and development piqued the interests of an emergent middle class and precipitated a closer identification with Western characteristics such as liberal capitalism and multiparty politics.228 Larger landowners and members of the middle class expressed concern with state policies that seemed socialistic in character, particularly those regarding land reform.229 Once President İsmet İnönü recognized the RPP’s failure to address the political aspirations of the burgeoning educated professional class and the rural peasantry he did much to help end its monopoly on power. 230 İnönü, a magnetic elder statesman and former soldier with a sterling reputation among members of the army and bureaucracy, loomed large in Turkish government since the beginning and would continue to do so over the next two decades.231 A trusted lieutenant of Atatürk’s, he became the first Turkish Foreign Minister in

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225 The Progressive Republican Party and the Liberal Republican Party each offered a short-lived alternative to the RPP in 1924 and 1930 respectively before being banned. The National Development Party created in 1945 met a similar fate.
226 Thomas and Frye 94-95.
227 Dodd 9.
228 Faucompret 7.
229 Dodd 9.
231 Ahmad, 111.
1922 and served as Turkey’s prime minister from 1923-1937 and president following Atatürk’s death.  

Those who came to challenge and eventually defeat the RPP as the Democratic Party (DP) defected from the RPP, such as Adnan Menderes, a former lieutenant of Atatürk’s and scion of a wealthy landowning family. Born in 1899 in the village of Aydın near Smyrna, now Izmir, Menderes lost both his parents and sister shortly after his birth. The young orphan went to Izmir to be raised by his grandmother. At 13 he attended the city’s International American College. In 1917 Menderes joined the army and reached the rank of lieutenant during Turkey’s fight for independence against Greece. After the war Menderes returned to Aydın to manage the family farm. In 1928 he married Berrin Hanım, a young woman from a prominent political family. In 1930 Menderes, with the support of Atatürk, went to serve for several years in the Grand National Assembly (GNA), the unicameral legislative body, as a representative of Izmir and then Kütahya. In his off hours he studied for a law degree at the University of Ankara. Unimposing in stature at five foot six, Menderes compensated with a dry and often scathing wit that hinted at a latent brutal streak. Like many prominent Turks, particularly those whose wealth lay in agriculture, Menderes grew frustrated with the RPP’s economic and political policies. As a large landowner Menderes stood to be financially impacted in 1945 by the proposed “Agrarian Law” intended to redistribute land to small farmers.

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236 “Turkey: The Impatient Builder” 20.
237 Orga 192.
238 Sabri Sayar “Adnan Menderes: Between Democratic and Authoritarian Populism” 68.
In growing frustration, on January 7, 1946 Menderes, the banker and politician Celal Bayar, and two other deputies, Refik Koralı and Fuat Köprülü, resigned from the RPP to establish a separate party. İnönü promised officers of the Turkish military that the creation of an opposing political party would not challenge Atatürk’s reforms, an indication of the military’s implicit role as guardians of Atatürk’s legacy that became increasingly evident. For their part, the DP’s founders viewed the party as a return to the Kemalist tradition rather than a menace to it. “The party was founded with the aim of serving the realization of democracy in the Republic of Turkey;” the DP program announced, and “to adopt a broad and modern understanding and to implement general policies with a democratic vision and mentality.” In recognition of the largely conservative rural areas of Turkey, the DP advocated for less state interference in religious matters. DP representatives also supported a reduction in statist activities to be replaced with greater privatization, particularly in industry, but the party could only offer a rallying cry rather than a well-developed plan of action. This absence of an approach became evident and cost the DP increasing numbers of the business elites who initially supported the party during its ten years of rule.

Bayar emerged as the DP’s leader and Menderes the fledgling party’s organizational boss, in charge of travelling through Turkish cities and villages to communicate the party’s agenda. Once founded the DP set off across a political tightrope, trying to tap into the growing dissent with the RPP without incurring the wrath of the state, while at the same time proving it

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239 Heper The State Tradition in Turkey 53.
242 Barkey 52-53.
243 Foto Mahabirleri Derneği, Cumhuriyetin 80 65
was a legitimate opposition party and not a tool of the RPP. Bayar seemed the most qualified to shepherd the emergent party, with a political career stretching back to 1923 that included stints as prime minister under Atatürk and İnönü. Bayar became the new party’s chairman while Menderes, Kortalan and Köprülü occupied the second tier of leadership.

The DP made modest gains in Turkey’s first multiparty elections in 1946 by winning 65 seats in the GNA to the RPP’s 390. Between 1946 and the elections of 1950 the DP worked to set itself apart from the RPP by appealing to younger, disillusioned voters. Both parties vowed economic development but whereas the RPP preferred a slow, steady pace towards prosperity using traditional state capitalism, the DP extolled free enterprise as the means of gaining untrammeled expansion. The DP painted the RPP as the tortoise to its hare, a holdover from an earlier age that eschewed free market competition in favor of a stagnant state-directed economy overseen by an unwieldy bureaucracy more concerned with maintaining political

244 Sabri Sayarı “Adnan Menderes: Between Democratic and Authoritarian Populism” 68.
246 Sayarı “Adnan Menderes” 68.
247 Feroz Ahmad The Making of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge, 1993): 106. The slow start may have been due to difficulty Turkish voters had in differentiating between the RP and the new challenger. Like the RPP, the DP committed itself to a platform of maintaining or expanding Atatürk’s reforms and keeping Turkey a secular nation. In other, more isolated areas of Turkey voting could be more dangerous than farcical. Those who dared to vote for the DP faced coercion and beatings, often, reportedly, by soldiers and gendarmes loyal to the party of Atatürk. It also proved difficult to determine whether the cities harbored more DP supporters than the countryside, or vice versa. Many villagers who identified themselves as loyal to the DP remained uncertain as to what the party stood for; they were simply weary of the RPP government and desired any sort of change. At informal discussion groups, or oçaklar, (hearthside meetings) in villages across Turkey, men gathered to discuss the political issues of the day or host a speech by a DP representative. Robinson, Letter to Mr. Walter S. Rogers, Institute of Current World Affairs (July 31, 1948): 6. DP candidates also had to negotiate the established political machinery of the RPP that permitted it to control the outcome of elections. Istanbul voters awarded all 23 of the city’s parliamentary seats to the DP, but Ankara balked at the sweep and insisted on retaining five seats for the RPP. Clement H. Dodd “Developments in Turkish Democracy” in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation, eds. Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); 132.
248 Hauser 27. A growing generation gap between older Turks retaining vivid memories of the struggle for independence in the 1920s and younger Turks lacking such historical memory resulted in political differences. Youthful Turks were less familiar with the sorts of religious and ethical indoctrination prominent in Turkish society in past generations. A sense of disconnect drew many Turks to traditional Islam, as well as older Turkish music and literature, in an attempt to find a sense of identity. American observers in Turkey commented on the similarities of these Turks and members of the “Lost Generation” during the 1920s.
control of the country than improving the lives of its rural citizens.\textsuperscript{250} An editorialist for the 
Cümhuriyet newspaper captured the frustration with the RPP: “Everything from A to Z is 
defective in the administrative machinery of the country, and unless something is done to 
 improve conditions we can never free ourselves from chronic bureaucratic disease.”\textsuperscript{251} The DP 
 argued that Turkey’s future depended upon attracting foreign capital to spur rapid economic 
growth. The new party wooed Turkey’s few private industrialists and peasants alike with 
 promises of liberalized trade, reduced state ownership of large industries, a renewed focus on 
 agriculture including agricultural credit, infrastructural development, and the promotion of 
 foreign capital.\textsuperscript{252} Growing enthusiasm for the DP’s party platform forced the RPP to a reassess 
 its policies, particularly with private Turkish business interests pushing for reduced statism. The 
 RPP government grudgingly complied by looking at ways to encourage the private sector and 
 foreign investment.\textsuperscript{253} Recognizing the growing political power of rural voters the RPP promised 
 them more access to education, housing, credit, roads, electricity, farm machinery and other 
 amenities.\textsuperscript{254}

\textsuperscript{250} Robinson, Letter to Mr. Walter S. Rogers, Institute of Current World Affairs (July 31, 1948): 5-6. 
 Newspapers, relatively new in Turkey and limited to larger cities such as Ankara and Istanbul, became one crucial 
 instrument to the DP. American journalistic and advertising techniques influenced Turkish men of the press deeply 
 who co-opted them in their work to promote the DP in the elections of 1950. 
\textsuperscript{252} Ziya Öniş “The State and Economic Development in Contemporary Turkey” in Vojitech Mastny and R. 
 Craig Nation, eds. Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power (Boulder: 
\textsuperscript{253} Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür Turkey: Challenges of continuity and change (London and New 
 enterprise, improved systems of transportation, modern agriculture, and the gradual transfer of most SEEs to private 
 hands. The RPP did not implement the plan, but it provided a blueprint to the DP. Richard Robinson reported to 
 ongoing incredulity of many Turks on the authenticity of the Democratic Party. Such critics decried the DP as 
 “merely a sham conceived by President İnönü himself so as to enable Turkey to claim a two-party government and 
 thus be in a position, as part of ‘democratic’ Europe, to share the mixed blessings of American aid.” Bayar and 
 Menderes’ former positions in the government gave such a viewpoint certain credence. For his part, Robinson 
speculated the DP to be a tool of “wealthy business interests” opposed to current state economic policies that 
deprived them of larger profits. Letter to Mr. Walter S. Rogers, Institute of Current World Affairs from Richard D. 
\textsuperscript{254} Shaw & Shaw 404. The RPP had a number of ambitious projects already in the works, including a 
 facelift for Istanbul to commemorate the city’s upcoming 500th anniversary of Turkish rule in 1953. Throughout
The DP Takes Control

The RPP’s growing emphasis on liberalization forced the DP to refine its platform in the elections of 1950 in order to stand apart. In addition to its usual call for greater political and economic freedom, the DP promoted the use American aid to raise the living standards of Turks, not just to increase the strength of the military. The DP criticized statism for keeping prices high and the standard of living low while encouraging the growth of unwieldy and inefficient bureaucratic institutions. DP representatives found an eager audience in subsistence farmers and their families, 20.9 million strong, alienated by the RPP and seeking a change. The party that won the majority of the 475 seats in the GNA up for grabs would be the party backed by the Anatolian peasantry. Most Turkish farmers desired greater representation at the national level and less government regulation, including control over farmers’ cooperatives, and handling the marketing, price, and often transport of agricultural products. The RPP recognized these demands and attempted to alter its policies accordingly. In 1949 the GNA exempted agricultural

the late 1940s construction crews widened boulevards and avenues, built plazas and parks, demolished labyrinths of old and rotting bazaars and neighborhoods, and restored or excavated places of religious and cultural significance. This haphazard renovation effort resulted in a city with an identity crisis, suspended architecturally between its glorious Ottoman past and its uncertain future as a modern metropolis.

255 Thomas and Frye 109.
256 Shaw & Shaw 404.
257 Thomas and Frye 35.
258 Economic Surveys by the OECD: Turkey (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1963): 9. Relatively few landless peasants lived in Turkey; in 1946 more individuals owned the land they resided on it than any other European nation, a point of pride for a people who continued to regard land ownership as a guarantee of independence. The farms of central Turkey grew primarily wheat while the principal export crops of tobacco, olives, nuts, figs, and cotton thrived in the coastal regions along the Aegean and the Mediterranean. Tomlin 44.
260 Robinson, Letter to Mr. Walter S. Rogers, Institute of Current World Affairs (November 1, 1948): 7. The state’s overzealousness and its adherence to a mixed economy suggested a socialistic bent that the growing opposition called attention to.
incomes from tax collection and created programs to increase agricultural productivity and highway development.\textsuperscript{261}

The RPP’s efforts proved to be too little too late. In the elections of May 14, 1950 DP candidates received 53.3\% of the popular vote and the RPP 39.9\%. Some RPP supporters grumbled that such a stunning and largely unexpected victory could only have been possible with the support of the U.S. More reactionary RPP politicians expressed their determination to remain in power, perhaps with the support of the military. İnönü insisted upon honoring the democratic process and forbade any such intervention.\textsuperscript{262} Speculation persists as to precisely what part İnönü played in the transfer of power from the RPP to the DP. Having been present at the inauguration of the Turkish Republic and actively involved ever since at the highest level, he possessed a political perspective that perhaps made it clear that it was time to permit a changing of the guard, particularly with mass dissatisfaction potentially giving way to revolt. If the lesson of World War II was the inadequacies of dictatorships compared to democracies, then perhaps Turkey needed to learn as well.\textsuperscript{263}

The outcome of the election confirmed to the DP that they embodied the \textit{milli irade} or “national will” enabling them to change the traditional face of Turkish government.\textsuperscript{264} The newly elected DP deputies to the GNA tended to be younger and more connected to their local districts compared to their RPP counterparts.\textsuperscript{265} They generally had less university training, military service, or bureaucratic experience, and most were not old enough to have been involved in the National

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{261} Robinson \textit{The First Turkish Republic} 126-127. The DP strengthened these programs after coming to power the following year rather than start from the ground up. Kemal H. Karpat, \textit{Turkey’s Politics: the Transition to a Multi-Party System}, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959): 297-300.
\item \textsuperscript{262} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{263} William Hale \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000} (London: Frank Cass, 2000): 110-111.
\item \textsuperscript{264} Zürcher 232.
\item \textsuperscript{265} Ibid 231.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Struggle of the 1920s like many of the RPP deputies.\footnote{266} This lack of historical memory presented an impediment to working relations between the DP’s progressive “underdeveloped bourgeoisie” and the more conservative and tradition-minded “intellectual bureaucratic elite” of the RPP.\footnote{267} Ostensibly the DP’s leader, the GNA elected Party Chairman Bayar president and Menderes prime minister, but Bayar saw to it that the prime ministry developed substantial powers that came to overshadow his office.\footnote{268} As an early sign of this power shift Menderes appeared before the GNA on May 29 to present the new government’s political agenda. Turkish foreign policy would remain anchored to an alliance with Britain and France while pursuing closer relations with the U.S. Agriculture would be promoted, as would the development of roads and irrigation projects, and the state would hand SEEs over to private enterprise.\footnote{269} Menderes blamed “bureaucratic and monopolist state capitalism” for driving Turkey so deeply into debt and vowed that, with the exception of public utilities, the state would remain outside the realm of corporate ownership.\footnote{270} Of the RPP deputies present only former President İnönü applauded Menderes’s speech.\footnote{271} True to its promise of seeking closer relations with the U.S., the DP government

\footnote{266} Frederick W. Frey *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1985): 351, 354.  
\footnote{268} FO 371/136453, RK 1015/59, CONFIDENTIAL, 1018/119, No. 127, BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA, (October 23, 1958).  
\footnote{270} “Turkey to Reduce National Spending: Premier Says His Government Plans Cuts in Expenditures of Every Department” *New York Times* (May 30, 1950): 8. The DP did little to endear themselves to the military when in January it purged the High Command of officers deemed disloyal to the incoming administration. Rumors of a coup emerged later in the month after İnönü declined their offer to annul the election results.  
\footnote{271} Feroz Ahmad *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977): 150. The DP did little to endear themselves to the military, a most crucial and revered Turkish institution, and one in the midst of structural imbalances extending from the 1920s. Lower-ranking officers dominated the ranks while middle and upper-ranks remained sparse, creating a sense of competition and animosity. Matters did not improve as military officers experienced a loss in real income and social prestige throughout the 1940s. The RPP government offered a final parting shot to the Turkish military in 1949 when it passed a law making the chief of general staff subordinate to the minister of defense. Menderes made no effort to address these problems as he came to office. This would not be the last time Menderes would find himself at odds with the Turkish military. Gürsoy 308.
almost immediately offered Washington land for the construction of military bases, airfields, and electronic listening centers. Such an offer and the content of Menderes’s GNA speech boded well for future U.S.-Turkish dealings. As a champion of greater privatization and liberalization, Menderes seemed to be just the sort of leader Washington could work with, one who would follow the stage direction offered by the Americans. A British observer in 1952 noted that the DP’s economic policy was not their own creation, rather the party “adopted as their own the view, which has been constantly pressed on them by the American E.C.A. Mission, that an improvement in the standard of life and in the economic health of the country can be brought about only by increasing the productivity of Turkish agriculture.”

The DP’s Early Attempts at Reform

The ECA Turkey Mission came to regard 1950 as a productive year during which Turkey made considerable progress in improving its military and developing its economy. Myriad reasons propelled the country’s gains: increasingly liberal economic policies, free trade, and rising foreign loans and investments. Turkey disposed of its exportable surpluses with relative ease, thanks in part to its decision to join the European Payments Union (EPU), a move that enabled to move it past the bilateralism of the immediate post-war period. Renewed prosperity raised all boats in Turkey for a time, both in the urban and the rural areas, as Turks from isolated and underdeveloped regions tapped into a consumer economy for the first time. The DP hoped to keep the economic growth going by relaxing state controls on the economy, promoting private enterprise, and giving industrial workers greater freedom, including the right

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Before the end of the year the Menderes government began to lay the legislative framework for greater privatization and foreign investment to take place. Overall, Turkey’s foreign trade for 1950 was its best since 1946. The foreign trade deficit fell from TL 219 million in 1948 to TL 62 million in 1950, thanks in large part to revived trade with Germany and OEEC trade liberalization. But a sizable investment program added to Turkey’s deficit in its overall external accounts. With less than two years of Marshall Plan aid remaining, the ECA remained

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274 TO: Department of State, FROM: Ankara, REF: Required Report (Code 00A59), SUBJECT: ANNUAL ECONOMIC REVIEW – TURKEY, 1950 (February 15, 1951). The nascent labor movement in Turkey was just beginning to organize into semi-official entities after being outlawed since the 1920s; it lacked the legal right to strike, but as its ranks grew, so did its political power.

275 The achievements made in Turkey by the close of 1950 after being a member of the ECA “family” for two-and-a-half years caught the attention of Life Magazine. The publication ran an article in its December 10 issue titled “We’re living the ECA Way.” Turkish foreign correspondent Nerin E. Gun penned the piece after living for a month in Ankara with a Turkish civil servant named Kamil Nuruman and his family. The Nuruman clan provided American readers with an accessible example of how upper-middle class Turkish families with a recent influx of disposable income, thanks in large part to investments from “Sam Amca” (Uncle Sam) had “gone American.” Gun’s article chronicles the average day for the Nurmans as a sort of Turkish “Father Knows Best” with the hopelessly square Kamil standing by as his progressive children, 14-year-old daughter Güzin and 25-year-old son Cahid, enjoy modern conveniences such as showers, electric razors, canned food and radio, and demand that the traditional Turkish breakfast of goat’s cheese and olives be replaced with American-style cereal, bacon, eggs and “that amazing delicacy,” waffles. Best embodying the embrace of all things American is 20-year-old daughter Selma who appears at breakfast wearing, to her father’s dismay, slacks and thickly applied make-up as demonstrated by American fashion magazines. Father Nuruman had little room to complain, given the fact that since the advent of ECA assistance he had received three pay raises to pay for these new luxuries. Nerin E. Gun “We’re Living the ECA Way: Since the plan of “Bey Marshall” a Turk’s day includes baked beans, ‘Küçük Abner,’ democracy” Life (December 11, 1950): 13. Gun’s article caught the attention of Nuri Erin, the Director of the Turkish Information Office, who immediately fired off a testy letter to the editors of Life published on January 8, 1951 to inform them that the article “is completely misleading.” Instead of providing an accurate picture of the ECA’s accomplishments in Turkey the article managed to do “the exact opposite: it gives a totally wrong picture of the excellent aims and work of the ECA; it contains a false list of items which allegedly constitute part of ECA aid to Turkey; it ends up as an excellent of how best to undermine the confidence of the American public in the work of the European Recovery Program.” Letters to the Editors, “Living the ECA Way” Letter from Nuri Eren, Director, Turkish Information Office, New York, N.Y. Life (Jan. 8, 1951): 4. The ECA did not provide the consumer goods Gun’s article lavished so much attention to, nor had ECA aid provided raises to any Turkish civil servants. Robert R. Mullen, the director of the ECA’s Office of Information, emerged from Gun’s article with a different set of impressions, praising it as “a pleasant portrayal of things as things are.” Mullen admitted that while the ECA had not exported any luxury items to Turkey, it had “helped stimulate economic conditions so that the Turks can now enjoy many more material benefits of the Western world.” Letters to the Editors, “Living the ECA Way” Letter from Robert R. Mullen, Director, Office of Information, ECA, Washington, D.C. Life (Jan. 8, 1951): 4. The editors of Life expressed their gratitude at receiving Mullen’s letter, which “indicated that, in general, the article was a fair description of effects [the] ECA has had in Turkey.” They also revealed that the “Nurman” family described in such detail in the Gun article did not exist; it was an imagined composite family. Letters to the Editors, “Living the ECA Way” Editorial correction, Life (Jan. 8, 1951): 4.

confident that it could complete projects in irrigation, energy production, and transportation. It looked to expand a variety of existing industries including fish and meat, as well as steel and concrete production, iron mining, and salt creation to increase Turkish exports.\textsuperscript{277} Though Washington still wanted Turkey to scale back statism, it became clear that Ankara’s ambitious investment program would not be possible without some inflation or ongoing state control. The ECA judged greater investment in Turkish industry to be “desirable” but as yet unfeasible. Private investors preferred to put their savings into real estate and commercial endeavors the ECA dismissed as “unproductive fields” instead of agriculture and private industry.\textsuperscript{278}

\textit{Improvements to the Agricultural Sector}

Menderes, himself a large landowner and mindful of the fact that their votes made his party’s victory possible, followed through on his campaign promises to the agrarian class. The DP sketched out its agricultural policy according to two guiding concepts: making more resources obtainable to farmers through more credit and high minimum prices, and increasing the amount of area under cultivation. With the support of Marshall Plan funds the DP intended to modernize Turkish agriculture as quickly possible through increased mechanization, but not all Turks would benefit equally from this approach.\textsuperscript{279} Vendors sold farm machinery to purchasers for cash or on an installment basis if the buyer could procure a letter of credit from the Agricultural Bank assuring that the bearer had opened a credit line equaling 80% of the item they

\textsuperscript{277} Economic Cooperation Administration 4-5. In order to assist Turkish development the ECA planned to cover any balance of payments deficits up to 1952. After the termination point the IBRD forecast that Turkish exports would reach levels that would allow import levels to drop by 20-25%. The IBRD further speculated that as Turkish trade returned to its prewar pattern with more goods becoming available in recovering Europe, and particularly Germany, Turkey would find itself less dependent on dollar imports. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development “The Creditworthiness of Turkey” (March 15, 1950) Record Group 469, Records of US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Mission To Turkey, Economic Policy & Program Division, Program Subject Files, 1951-54.

\textsuperscript{278} ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION, DATE SUBMITTED: October 1950, DATE RECEIVED: December 1950, SUBJECT: Turkish Investment Team Report.

\textsuperscript{279} Thomas and Frye 120-121.
wished to buy at an interest of 2½%. Typically only the very wealthy could procure such credit.280 Those who purchased tractors faced the challenge of maintaining and servicing them. The state owned fourteen permanent and six mobile repair shops and private hands owned 74 permanent and 40 mobile repair shops to service the 35,000 tractors imported in the early 1950s, located almost exclusively in densely populated areas.281 Underdevelopment affected nearly every facet of Turkish agricultural industries: livestock herds tended to be unhealthy and pastureland overgrazed; existing storage and packing facilities could not adequately handle rising production levels.282

Most landed peasants saw improvements in their living standard thanks to increased mechanization. They took advantage of their growing prosperity to increase their holdings by pushing smaller farmers off their land. With fewer incentives to stay in the rural areas of Turkey, many, especially the young, migrated to the cities travelling the new modern highways. Rather than serving as tendons to strengthen the body politic, new roads hemorrhaged disaffected peasants looking for work into urban centers such as Adana, Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul. The rural emigration created a newly available and inexpensive workforce the cities’ expanding industrial sectors could absorb. Urban areas offered greater employment and educational opportunities, modern public transportation, and health care than the underdeveloped countryside. News of improved conditions in the city to the rural areas compelled still more landless peasants to move into the cities. Urban populations subsequently doubled from three million in 1950 to six million at the end of the decade, and cities became political indoctrination

280 Robinson The First Turkish Republic 139.
282 Robinson, “Introduction to Turkey” 15-17.
centers where rural migrants shed themselves of their allegiance to the DP and sought other parties to represent their demands.\textsuperscript{283}

\textit{Turkey’s Decision to Fight in Korea}

As ECA officials made inroads meeting their goals for Turkey’s economy the Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT) continued its efforts on strengthening Turkey’s military. JUSMMAT’s goal remained providing the Turks with the arms and training required to slow down a Soviet invasion long enough to permit American divisions to defend Western Europe.\textsuperscript{284} By March 1950 U.S. military assistance to Turkey reached $236 million, $86 million more than the $120 million Truman extended in 1947. The Turkish armed forces stood at 300,000, down from a half million, indicating American efforts to reduce numbers and increase fighting capability.\textsuperscript{285} With its modernizing military the Turks increasingly expected to be offered membership in the NATO Alliance. During the Alliance’s planning stages, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Necmeddin Sadak, argued that Turkey’s exclusion from NATO would divide Turkish public opinion the Soviets could exploit.\textsuperscript{286} A CIA report from February 1949 substantiated Sadak’s remarks: “The implications of the Atlantic Pact and the development of a systematic program of military aid would afford further encouragement to the Turks provided they were assured that there would be no consequent diminution of US support

\textsuperscript{283} Robinson, “Introduction to Turkey” (New York, American Universities Field Staff, 1952 American Universities Field Staff 522 Fifth Ave., New York 36 N.Y.): 17. The DP sponsored labor legislation intended to improve working conditions and more labor groups had formed, but without the right the strike there was little point in their existence. Some rural, industrial and mining areas witnessed the formation of labor “syndicates” made of “communistically inclined individuals” with few members and little opportunity to avoid the watchful eye of the Turkish police and gendarmerie. Central Intelligence Agency, Opposition to ECA in Participating Countries, ORE 68-48, Published 10 February 1951, \url{http://www.foia.cis.gov/browse_docs_full.asp}, accessed on May 16, 2010.
\textsuperscript{284} Wolfe 36.
\textsuperscript{285} McGhee 32.
\textsuperscript{286} Telegram to the Secretary of State from the Embassy in Turkey, \textit{FRUS}, vol. IV, 1949, 234.
American officials took Turkey’s request to be made a NATO member under advisement, but stopped short of letting the Turks “regularize the legal aspects” by joining the Alliance.\textsuperscript{288} Geography motivated Washington’s hesitance to support Turkish membership, as it would extend the Alliance well beyond its Western European jurisdiction, and the defense capabilities of the Alliance did not yet lend themselves to protracted involvement in the Near East. But if Italy, a Mediterranean power, gained membership it would prove difficult to deny Turkey and Greece the same privilege without significant political repercussions.\textsuperscript{289}

While it waited for a satisfactory resolution to the NATO issue, Turkey proved its support of Western efforts to contain communism by sending a brigade of troops to serve in the Korean War. The brigade’s conduct did much to convince American policymakers of Turkey’s value as a military partner against Soviet Union. At the onset of the Korean Conflict during the summer of 1950 the Menderes government showed little interest in becoming involved.\textsuperscript{290}

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\item[287] Central Intelligence Agency, Effects of a U.S. Foreign Military Aid Program, ORE 41-49, Published 24 February 1949, \url{http://www.foia.cis.gov/browse_docs_full.asp}, accessed on May 16, 2010. CIA analysts did not anticipate the Soviets going to war over the inclusion go Greece and Turkey in NATO, nor would the Soviets remain silent over the creation of a barrier to Russian expansion in the Near East and Europe but rather react to such an enlargement “with intensified psychological warfare, various modes of political and economic pressure…diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, increased anti-Western propaganda, and threatening gestures.” Central Intelligence Agency, Special Estimate: Probable Soviet Reaction to the Inclusion of Greece and Turkey in Western Defense Agreements, SE – 7, Published 15 June 1951, \url{http://www.foia.cis.gov/browse_docs_full.asp}, accessed on May 16, 2010.
\item[288] Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the Office of the Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs (Rountree), \textit{FRUS}, Vol. III, 1951, 469-470.
\item[290] Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) \textit{FRUS 1950 Volume VII: Korea} (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1976): 434. Turkish Foreign Minister Mehmet Fuat Köprülü told U.S. Ambassador George Wadsworth on June 28 that Ankara considered the North Korean invasion to be a political ploy by the Soviets who had no intention of participating themselves. Both Turkish officials and the press downplayed the possibility of an immediate Soviet threat, but did raise the issue of “Soviet-inspired moves” in the Balkans or Iran.
\end{footnotes}
Turkish authorities viewed Korea as a local affair the United States could handily resolve. Less than a month later, Ankara’s interest in the burgeoning conflict deepened markedly. On July 22 UN Secretary General Trygve H. Lie distributed a circular to 50 member nations encouraging them to pledge of assistance to oppose North Korea, such as a contingent of troops, as provided in the UN Security Council resolution of June 27. Turkish Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü contacted U.S. Ambassador George Wadsworth to explain that his government intended to “bear witness to its sincere desire [to] manifest by practical action its loyalty to [the] UN and to Turkish-US collaboration” but did not know what the gesture should be. Wadsworth, Lt. General Horace McBride of JUSMMAT, and visiting Senator Republican Henry P. Cain from Washington State advised providing a fully equipped regimental combat team to assist in the military effort. McBride estimated such a unit should consist of approximately 4,000 to 4,500 troops armed and equipped by the United States. Wadsworth presented this “strictly personal suggestion” to Köprülü to assist Turkey in making “its most important post-war decision.” On July 25, 1950, the Menderes government announced plans to send a 4,500-man brigade Turkish soldiers to Korea. While the Turkish people greeted the announcement with enthusiastic support, İnönü and the RPP did not share in the elation: the Menderes cabinet reached its decision to end nearly three decades of Turkish neutrality without consulting the GNA or the RPP and refusing to gain concessions from the U.S. prior to committing Turkish troops to the defense of South Korea. Menderes assured Ambassador Wadsworth that such dissent from the

293 Ibid.
opposition was due to hostility towards his domestic policies rather than resistance to the conflict. To Menderes and much of Turkey, the participation of Turkish soldiers in the Korean War would become an anti-communist crusade allowing Turkey to prove its Western identity and rapprochement with the United States.

The Turkish Brigade in Korea

Menderes claimed that sending the Turkish brigade to Korea “has opened [a] new era, one in which we must strive harder and work faster towards common objectives,” including potential NATO membership. Ankara argued that its ongoing vulnerability to Soviet machinations made full membership in NATO all the more necessary; it could end up being a Near Eastern Korea without the proper defensive measures in place. Menderes’ claims did not seem so far-fetched, particularly with U.S. intelligence indicating a possible Soviet strike against Europe in the near future. In the hopes that contributing to the defense of South Korea might justify Turkey’s inclusion in the North Atlantic security pact, on August 1 Ankara announced its intentions to formally apply to NATO. Foreign Minister Köprülü told a reporter for the Agence France-Presse that the Atlantic Pact remained incomplete without the Eastern

298 Other nations also volunteered their armed forces to take part in the crusade. In late July, the British cabinet approved the formation of a brigade to serve in Korea, despite the destitute condition of its economy. Other allies remained diffident about committing soldiers and equipment without entering into a formal alliance with the United States. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan rebuffed Secretary Acheson’s request for troops. Khan would only comply when the U.S. offered an official commitment to Pakistan’s defense and backed its stand on the Kashmir dispute. Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines pledged to send a battalion to the Korean peninsula, but similarly voiced their desire for a treaty of alliance with the U.S. in exchange. William Stueck The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995): 72.
301 Miller 30.
Mediterranean’s incorporation into NATO strategy. Over the coming days Köprülü met with government officials in Britain, France, and Italy to drum up support for his country’s entry into the Alliance. On September 11 the Defense Department and JCS recommended granting Greece and Turkey associate membership in NATO. The North Atlantic Council agreed that Turkey and Greece “be associated as appropriate with such phases of military planning work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as are concerned with the defense of the Mediterranean.” Greece and Turkey would serve as consultants on issues pertaining to the defense of the Mediterranean rather than as full members. After initially rejecting what it perceived to be inferior status in NATO, Turkey grudgingly agreed to this peripheral role on October 5, but continued to aspire to a larger role in the Alliance. Menderes believed that the Turkey’s willingness to fight on Korean battlefields amply demonstrated that: “No country now in the Atlantic pact is more determined to fight for its survival against Russian imperialism and for the collective security of freedom-loving states. Most countries are considerably less determined and less comparatively incapable of an all-out military effort, being half-hearted at best.”

305 Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) FRUS, vol. III, 1951: The Near East and Africa 22. Britain, while not supportive of Turkey in NATO, advocated Turkey joining or even leading a regional pact or a regional command in the Middle East. When such an organization, the Middle East Command (MEC) failed to materialize NATO membership became all the more critical to Turkey.
306 C.P. (51) 130, 17th May, 1951, Cabinet: Admission of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, The British National Archives 1.
The JCS initially had little confidence in the fighting capabilities of Turkish soldiers, due to language and weapons limitations. Some U.S. military leaders speculated that the Turkish troops would be of greater use defending their homeland, particularly if the Soviets decided to take advantage of the Korean distraction by moving its forces into the more exposed areas in the Mediterranean. The JCS advised the State Department to reject military assistance from Turkey until General Douglas MacArthur contended the brigade “would be quite welcome” though potentially unnecessary with a UN victory in Korea seemingly close at hand. After a summer of setbacks culminating in North Korean forces trapping the U.S. Eighth Army and South Korean Army at the city of Pusan, American air power turned the tide by destroying the North Koreans’ oil depots and supply lines. Bolstered by an influx of equipment and weapons, the U.S. and its allies counterattacked from Pusan in mid-September while MacArthur directed his audacious amphibious assault at Inchon. This summer turnaround began with the Turkish brigade still at home; it did not depart the Turkish city of Iskenderun until September 28.

Brigadier General Taşin Yacizi, a division commander with a service record extending back to World War I, commanded the first contingent of troops, made up primarily of young Anatolian farm boys aged twenty to twenty-one and a handful of older non-coms. The brigade wore American-style uniforms and carried new U.S.-made Garand rifles to replace their bolt-

312 “Brigade of Turks Leaves for Korea” The New York Times (Sept. 29, 1950): 3. Colonel Celal Dabra served the General’s assistant commander and Majors Faik Turun and Recai Baturalp rounded out the general staff.
action Mauser-type rifles. Brigadier General Yazici could only speak Turkish, French and a smattering of German and English. Yazici’s staff included some English-speakers acting as liaison officers, but very few to serve in the field. On the morning of October 18 the first of five ships carrying the brigade, members of the 241st Infantry Brigade, arrived at Pusan after twenty-two days at sea. The Turks’ spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Natik Poyrazoglu revealed his disappointment upon hearing that the Communist capital of Pyongyang was close to falling: “We are jealous. We wish we could be there to join the fighting.” It seemed likely that the brigade would become part of a garrison and protective force in North Korea until the conclusion of democratic elections.

Events did not bear this out. The momentum of the UN advance into North Korea coupled with MacArthur’s bellicose overtures threatened to bring China into the fray. In early October Chinese leader Mao Zedong called for the creation of a “volunteer army” drawn from the ranks of the People’s Liberation Army to defend China. By late October UN forces and Chinese troops battered each other throughout North Korea, destroying hopes of a speedy resolution. UN commanders called up the Turkish brigade to move northward towards the

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313 Before its fighting prowess could be called into question other distinctive aspects of the Turkish brigade had to be addressed by the United Nations Command (UNC), one being the Turks’ diet. The Muslims faith strictly forbade Turkish soldiers from eating pork rations and any meat had to be boiled. Due to the particulars of the Turkish diet, the brigade consumed a disproportionately larger amount of bread, dehydrated onions, salt, olive oil, and vegetable oil. After arriving in Korea, the UNC provided the brigade with winter uniforms to replace the summer attire they wore when departing their homeland. It was soon discovered that the Turkish soldiers’ feet were wider than most of the UN soldiers, causing some difficulty in finding appropriately sized boots. The Turks reportedly adapted to the harsh Korean climate with little difficulty, due to its many similarities to Anatolia’s. Concerns that the Turks and their former enemies from World War I, the Australians and New Zealanders, might find a reason to provoke one another remained unfounded. Within days of their arrival, the Turkish brigade camped alongside the descendants of their former foes; any animosity left over from the cliffs of Gallipoli was swept away by the bone-chilling winter wind. Paul M. Edwards The Korean War (Westbrook Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2006): 82. “Turkish Brigade” in Stanley Sandler, ed. The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1995): 354.

314 “Brigade of Turks Leaves for Korea” 3.


316 Ibid.
fighting. At the Yalu River along a 60-mile front, 300,000 Chinese soldiers faced an army of
247,000 consisting of seven American divisions, six South Korean divisions, two brigades from
the British Commonwealth, the Turkish brigade, divisions from the Philippines and Thailand,
and a British commando company. The UN forces had the advantage of superior weaponry
and firepower, particularly in regards to artillery and tanks, and uncontested control of the air.
This proved particularly invaluable in bombing runs by B-26s and B-29s that destroyed many of
the North Korean lines of communication along the Manchurian border. On the morning of
November 24 the UN offensive commenced with MacArthur at the frontlines to personally direct
the fighting. Just before leaving, the general voiced the perennial hope of military leaders to
have the G.I.s home in time for Christmas.

These hopes went unrealized. Intelligence reports far underestimated the strength of and
numbers of the enemy. The Chinese rolled over a number of UN divisions and forced a mass
retreat. In the midst of the melee UN commanders ordered the Turkish brigade to move forward
and assist a shattered South Korean unit. As the brigade advanced it encountered a Chinese
roadblock and withdrew. During the retreat the Turks stumbled upon the South Koreans they
had been coming to assist and mistakenly killed and captured two hundred of their number.
Despite this outcome and the fact that during the fighting the brigade lost all of its vehicles and
suffered several hundred casualties, UN commanders somehow saw this preliminary action as
confirmation of the brigade’s fighting capabilities. Whether misconstrued, misreported, or
covered-up, this initial blunder became overshadowed by the authentically heroic deeds

318 Lindesay Parrott “7 Divisions Strike: Attack on a 60 Mile Front from Pakchon on West to Tokchon on
319 Ibid.
320 Stanley Weintraub MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero (New York: The
performed by the Turks throughout the fighting in late November and into December, particularly incidents of ferocious hand-to-hand combat carried out by vastly outnumbered Turks against the Chinese. Such skills served the Turkish brigade well as the Chinese maintained their winter offensive into the beginning of 1951, taking Seoul from UN forces as they pushed southward. The Turks took part in action regularly into the spring and garnered praise along the way for their sacrifices. Major General William H. Arnold, the Head of the United States Military Mission, gushed, “In a pitched battle I’d be as pleased to have the Turks on my flank as any troops in the world.” Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs further praised the “tremendous fighting qualities of the Turkish troops.” Foreign Minister Köprülü assured Ambassador Wadsworth that such admiration was worth the brigade’s 25% casualty rate: “This is a most wonderful thing for Turkey. Since World War II, the world has been saying that Turkish soldiers were no good. Now the world will know we can fight, and will fight.”

On June 5, 1951 1,800 Turkish soldiers departed for Korea aboard a U.S. transport ship to replace the 1,500 returning, the 420 killed or missing, and the 400 wounded of the original 4500 members of the brigade. The Turkish brigade continued to make its mark as a fighting force of distinction and racked up its share of honors. They became a microcosm for Turkey’s

321 A.C. Sedgewick “Turks War Deeds Please U.S. Aides” New York Times (December 30, 1950): 6. While General Arnold could be counted upon to provide words of praise for the Turkish Army at press conferences and in interviews, his private conversations with British officials displayed a less ebullient side. He and other American officers regularly expressed their impatience and disappointment with the general “slowness, inflexibility and lack of technical ability in the Turkish Army.” FO 371/101880, Letter from A.K. Helm to Anthony Eden, Despatch No. 46. 1194/7/52G. SECRET. British Embassy, Ankara. (11th February 1952).


323 “Foreign News: Turkey: Strategic & Scrappy” 32.

324 “More Turks on Way to Korea” The New York Times (Jun 6, 1951): 11. Some Turks did not see the high casualty rates among the brigade’s members as mere collateral damage necessary to sustain in order to gain NATO membership. In later years, particularly as U.S.-Turkish relations grew more contentious, the cynical phrase Kore yolunda öldü (He died on the way to Korea) gained popularity, essentially meaning, “He died for nothing.” Holmes and Altinay 272.
will to resist aggression at home and abroad, and did so with little modern equipment and even less pay. On July 6, the brigade received the Presidential unit citation for its “gallantry and extraordinary heroism,” specifically for a series of bayonet assaults made against Chinese resistance during late January. The Turks’ fondness for engaging in what they referred to as “breast-to-breast” fighting with bayonets made headlines again in early August. A two-week long fight with Chinese Communist troops for a crucial hill ended after a contingent of Turkish troops made a frontal assault that killed twenty-five of the enemy. On the battlefield and in the popular press, the Turks earned a reputation as fearless fighters willing to accept dangerous missions in order to escape the ennui of patrolling. Even with such displays of commitment the Truman administration deemed it “unwise” to press Ankara for more soldiers, given the lack of a formal defense agreement, but to instead “encourage a voluntary offer on their part.”

Until a security pact existed, such as full membership in NATO, the United States would have to continue to essentially purchasing Turkish soldiers to serve in Korea with financial aid.

Washington continued to worry that denying Turkey full NATO membership could end in Turkish neutrality even as efforts to reinforce Turkey’s armed forces went on. In the spring of 1951 the ECA financed the creation of the Career and Specialist Non-Commissioned Officer Corps and the expansion of the Turkish Army by an additional 40,000. The conflict in Korea

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325 The typical Turkish foot soldier received a monthly stipend of roughly twelve cents.
326 “Turks Receive U.S. Citation” The New York Times (July 7, 1951): 3.
327 George Barrett “Turks Win Battle in Korea: Regiment Seizes a Key height After 15-Day See-Saw Fight With Chinese Reds” The New York Times (Aug. 9, 1951): 3. Years after the war Army psychiatrist Major William E. Mayer noted the markedly different survival rates of American and Turkish prisoners held captive. Under nearly identical conditions more than one-third of U.S. prisoners died in captivity while Turkish prisoners “survived almost to a man.” In investigating this phenomenon Mayer discovered that even in captivity Turkish soldiers maintained “an extremely strict system of military organization and discipline.” A detail of Turkish soldiers “often bathed, spoon-fed and cared for their sick and wounded with a tremendous degree of devotion” until their comrades had recovered. In contrast to this nurturing attention imprisoned Americans did not look after their sick and wounded, and instead “struck out for themselves...simply because of a failure to understand that only by a community of effort among them would the largest number survive.” U.S. News & World Reports (February 24, 1956): 56.
329 Ibid 199-200.
convinced American planners to reconsider the scaling back the size of Turkey’s military. The ECA set aside funds for specific capital improvements to the Turkish military so that it could purchase “common use” items such as uniforms, shoes and aviation fuel. In the spring of 1951 when the U.S. Engineering Group began construction on a 10,000-foot runway. The American company Metcalfe, Hamilton, and Grove began similar construction at a former fig grove outside of Adana on what became Incirlik Air Base. Specialist schools in the U.S. and Germany churned out graduates with improved technical training for junior officers and other ranks, but British observers criticized the schools for processing graduates too quickly, and that “it is doubtful whether American mass-production methods are entirely suitable for a predominantly peasant soldiery, who are not given enough time to absorb what they are taught.” The young officers emerging from these schools tended to be more receptive to modernization in contrast to their older predecessors. To ease the generational tension the state forced a number of resistant senior officers into retirement to make way for those less likely to make waves. Turkey’s military production capacities remained underdeveloped until new and renovated factories came online. ECA officials earmarked counterpart funds close to $1.4 million to increase the 

331 Gül and Holmes 272.
332 Ibid.
333 Turkey’s Air Force had no frontline aircraft in 1952 with the exception of surplus and obsolete Spitfires, Mosquitoes, Thunderbolts and B-26s left over from World War II. The U.S. had been promising to provide F-84E jet aircraft for some time, but Turkish airfields continued to be inadequate for the upgrade and the air force also lacked the necessary pilots and maintenance crews. The situation became more complicated when the U.S. ceased production on the F-84E altogether to make way for the F-84G. Washington promised to provide eight of these new fighters in late February 1952 and then an additional 10-15 each subsequent month so long as the Turks had sufficient pilots to fly them and mechanics to maintain them. The Turkish Navy was in an even more dire position, receiving only one-twelfth of aid for FY 1952. It lacked sufficient offensive capabilities and had yet to participate in any exercised with the U.S. or Britain. FO 371/101880, Letter from A.K. Helm to Anthony Eden, Despatch No. 46. The Turkish Army remained below Western military standards for artillery and armor, and hampered by a lack of non-commissioned officers; in late 1951 the army lacked approximately 22,000 regular NCOs. To remedy this, the GNA passed a measure to increase the pay of NCOs that succeeded in stimulating enlistment, but many more years would be needed to correct the imbalance. 1194/7/52G. SECRET, British Embassy, Ankara. (11th February 1952).
production of military items in Turkey. Of the estimated TL 100 million needed to keep the Turkish military running annually, American planners did not foresee Turkish factories capable of assuming half of the load until the next year.

The ECA Looks to Improve Turkey’s Production

The experience of Korea stirred Washington to think increasingly of Western Europe’s security rather than economic development. Signs of this shift appeared in Turkey in 1949 when the Truman Administration compiled its European aid proposals to Congress and substituted “economic cooperation” with “mutual security.” In a presidential message to Congress on May 24 Truman endorsed a Mutual Security Program as “another vital step along the road to real security and lasting peace.” In late 1951 the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) prepared to replace the ECA the following year. This new thinking did not end with changes in terminology. Washington, frustrated with Europe’s slowness to rearm and participate in collective defense, wished to encourage an increase in Western Europe’s defense spending without destabilizing the continent’s economic and social institutions, and allow for the gradual disengagement of American troops stationed in Europe. The State Department and the Defense Department issued directives during the summer of 1951 stressing the need for countries receiving U.S. aid to increase their own military production and strengthen defense capabilities thereby reducing the drain on American raw materials and capital. JUSMMAT and the ECA proposed a program specifically tailored to Turkey’s lack of capital and abundance of production potential.

334 The Economic Cooperation Administration Special Mission to Turkey, Results of the ECA Program in Turkey: A Supplementary Report.
335 Ibid.
336 Wolfe 43. Stanley Scott 47.
ECA specialists working with representatives of the Turkish military and factory personnel found that despite one-third of the Turkish National Budget going towards defense expenditures and the growing availability of skilled workers and managers, Turkey’s military factories failed to provide the Turkish military with basic items such as ammunition. In 1950 the Turkish Ministry of National Defense handed over 16 plants formerly owned and operated under the banner of “The Mechanical and Chemical Industries” (NKEK) to the Ministry of State Enterprises for reorganization as an independent industry. The underfunded plants ran at 25-30% productive capacity with too many workers working too few hours without adequate machinery. Even newer plants outfitted with modern machinery, such as the airplane factories run by the Turkish Aviation Society, produced very little. ECA attempts to encourage orders from private businesses to increase the workload of the NKEK factories met with little enthusiasm. The factories could not compete for business on the open market due to little operating capital, leading to a deficiency of raw material stockpiles, difficulty in procuring the raw materials, long-term delivery dates, and little to spend on advertising.
government saw little need to improve the NKEK factories. So long as international conditions warranted it, the U.S. could be relied upon to provide the necessary capital to keep Turkey’s defense production going. Turkey’s commitment to Western security, the size of its armed forces, and its strategic importance ensured that it would continue to receive U.S. financial support into 1952.

Though its underdeveloped industry precluded it from contributing significantly to arms production, Turkey did export significant quantities of copper and chrome to the U.S. and Europe, and of cotton, oil seeds and a variety of foodstuffs to Europe exclusively.\(^{343}\) ECA planners foresaw U.S. assistance in the years ahead leading to Turkish mines producing considerably larger quantities of coal, manganese, sulfur, lead, iron and iron ore, but only “if vigorously pursued.”\(^{344}\) It remained to be seen how much available American aid or vigor would be available after the termination of the Marshall Plan; the ECA could offer fewer definitive answers regarding future funding.\(^{345}\) Some preliminary data suggested that U.S. funding might not be necessary in the long-term; thanks primarily to agriculture, Turkey’s gross national

\(^{343}\) ECA Special Mission to Turkey, Justification of Continuing Economic Aid to Turkey (July 14, 1951) Records Group 469, Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, Turkey Division, 1948-1953.

\(^{344}\) Ibid.

\(^{345}\) Some members of the Menderes Government chaffed at what they perceived to be less Marshall Plan aid compared to other countries. At a meeting in late July 1951 at the GNA Budgetary Commission to discuss the effectiveness of Marshall Aid, Fatin Zorlu, the Acting Deputy Secretary-General of the Foreign Office and the Secretary-General of the Organization for International Cooperation, mentioned that the $144 million given to Turkey since 1948 made up only 1.2% of the total appropriations to all participating countries. Zorlu argued that Denmark’s percentage of Marshall Plan aid stood at 2.2% and Greece at 4.4%, nearly four times Turkey’s amount. One Turkish deputy maintained the apparent American stinginess resulted from the report used to determine aid levels that described the Turkish economy, while the assertive Zorlu rebuked him and maintained that Washington had rebuffed Turkey’s initial request for half a billion dollars in aid. The debaters failed to mention that the ECA did not intend its assistance to be used to reconstruct a devastated economy, but to bolster the GDP of a country in need of capital development. ECA Special Mission to Turkey, Translation Services, Turkish News Items of Interest, Ankara Papers (July 26, 1951) The Economic Cooperation Administration Special Mission to Turkey, Results of the ECA Program in Turkey: A Supplementary Report. Memorandum from Paul Porter to D. K. Hopkinson (8/17/51) Records Group 469, Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, Turkey Division, 1948-1953. Zorlu routinely exasperated American and British officials alike with his frequently blunt approach negotiations and his unwillingness to reveal the true position of his government or under whose authority he was acting. A British personalities report described Zorlu as: “Ruthless and cynical, but certainly able, he is conscientious to the point of fanaticism in upholding Turkish interests. His knowledge of economics is limited, but he has unlimited faith in his own quick decisions.”FO 371/12400, Personalities Report (2-27-56).
income rose 20% from 1945 to 1951.\textsuperscript{346} While the incomes of urban residents changed very little during this same period and industrial productivity remained stationary, the income per head of the agrarian population rose from TL 285 in 1935, to TL 297 in 1950, and TL 357 the following year.\textsuperscript{347} Mission Chief Dorr and his staff believed they had finally convinced the Turks that their nation required a balanced economy; meaning that agriculture would outweigh industry for the next several years while industrialization remained a long-term goal.\textsuperscript{348} ECA officials praised educational programs and improved agricultural practices for increasing production and helping to remove the stigma connected to farming.

When it came to financing larger development projects that would not be completed for years, such as the Sariyar Dam, the Turkey Mission debated the worthiness of continuing financial support. From the Turkish perspective, the economic and political investments Ankara put into such projects more than justified their completion, even at the expense of the military budget, leading to a deficit Washington would have to cover. ECA officials decided it would be more prudent to complete the Sariyar Dam, a project judged to be financially sound, and enjoy the resultant praise it would bring.\textsuperscript{349} The dam’s completion would also deter the Turks from using their military budget to fund economic development, lest existing investments go to waste. Otherwise the U.S. would be left with “as large an increased military burden as we save on economic aid and the result would be merely to destroy our leverage with [the] Turks in trying to rationalize their development plans.”\textsuperscript{350} Both military and economic planners agreed that the

\textsuperscript{346} During the poor harvests of 1949 gross national income dipped slightly before roaring back in subsequent years.
\textsuperscript{347} FO 371/101868, CONFIDENTIAL, No, 56, Letter from the British Embassy, Ankara. (21\textsuperscript{st} March, 1952).
\textsuperscript{348} Ankara, Turkey (October 5-8, 1951) Interviewed Ambassador Wadsworth, his principal staff members; Russell Dorr, Mission Chief, his principal staff members; General Arnold and his staff and several Turkish officials, Records Group 469, Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, Turkey Division, 1948-1953.
\textsuperscript{349} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{350} Ibid.
U.S. could not conceivably remove military support from Turkey in the near future and expect the Turks to cover the costs with a still comparatively weak economy. Because Turkey would still rely heavily on foreign borrowing over the coming years in order to cover development costs, Dorr raised the possibility to finding ways of improving small industry, specifically cottage industry, in the years ahead.

ECA officials debated and analyzed budget levels of counterpart funds for 1952-53. The main issue boiled down to the Turks’ determination to maintain high levels of military spending, while at the same time raising the Turkish people’s standard of living. American funds had significantly modernized the Turkish military without Turkey having to expend its own internal resources. And Turkey had successfully implemented an investment program larger than any to come before in the country’s history, while continuing to navigate according to the twin stars of economic development and greater military strength. In doing so, the interrelation between the two became more evident to the ECA during 1951, a year of economic successes and continuing weaknesses, with Turkish exports, driven by increases in agriculture, up to TL 879 million from TL 738 million in 1950, but a foreign trade deficit up to TL 62 million to TL 234 million during the same period. Ankara needed to undertake “future economic development at a steady and moderate rate which permits of proper integration of new production facilities.” British officials in Turkey argued that the ECA had yet to confront Turkey’s fundamental economic issue, the need “to change from a static economy into a dynamic one, and … to implant the desire for economic expansion and to teach western techniques. Unless this can be achieved, the whole of the progress which has been made might easily be lost within a few years of the

withdrawal of American aid.”353 From this standpoint, the technical training the ECA provided might be more critical in the long run than the more expensive material assistance.

While Turkey expected the U.S. to continue to provide guidance in its future economic development, Washington was in a state of transition that might endanger this munificence. On October 10 the Mutual Security Act of 1951 went into effect bringing the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) to life with W. Averell Harriman, the former ECA Special Representative in Europe, as its director. Much of America’s aid to recipient countries remained unchanged; the Department of Defense continued to manage direct military aid to recipient countries and the State Department remained responsible for technical aid. The MSA, however, was not the same organization as the ECA, which had enjoyed a level of autonomy and independence during its brief existence; the MSA would be more directly integrated into the State and Defense Departments and therefore less able to make decisions without formal permission from Washington. The MSA would operate with reduced administrative funds and 10% and then 17% fewer personnel while the workload increased.354

Attempts at Privatization

Employees of the MSA found their tasks all the more difficult as ferment in Turkish politics increased less than a year after the DP’s victory. The changing of the guard in Ankara threw open the floodgates holding back years of resentment and bitterness, with the DP accusing the RPP of years of corruption and the RPP chastising its opponents with claims of election fraud and manipulation of the masses. On March 8, 1951 Menderes and his cabinet angrily resigned in

response to mounting criticism of its budget policy, but President Bayar convinced Menderes to retain his post and reassemble a new cabinet to move forward in drafting laws to encourage privatization and development. On August 1 the GNA passed a progressive bill to provide foreign investment to projects designed to increase economic development in industry, hydroelectric projects, communications and tourism, manufacturing, mining, and public works. The law guaranteed for the transfer abroad of profits, dividends, and interest not in excess of 10%, and the repatriation of capital after a certain period of time. The GNA subsequently passed legislation to transfer the public State Maritime Administration from the Denizcilik Bankasi, a semi-public corporation, to private hands. Alcoholic beverages and matches became the next state monopolies to be transferred to private enterprise in early 1952.

Privatization efforts occurred in the midst of an economic windfall brought about by 1951’s harvests of cereals and cotton, the highest on record. Both wholesale and retail markets flourished during the year, spurred on by favorable prices, good harvests, and the increased demands for Turkish goods created by the Korean conflict. After squaring their debts, Turkish farmers began to take part in the consumer and capital goods market by purchasing useful items such as hand tools and agricultural equipment, and more non-essential like appliances and automobiles. There were no signs of a flagging demand for goods in the coming years, the bulk

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355 “B. Turkey – Cabinet Reshuffling” in *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives: Weekly Diary of Important World Events with Index Continually Kept Up-to-Date*, Volume No. VIII, 1950-1952 11396. Mud-slinging notwithstanding, signs of growing tolerance in Turkey seemed tangible. In February a DP opponent heckled Menderes while the President addressed a DP congress. In years past such an offense meant immediate jail time, the heckler was instead removed and then released.


357 Foreign capital could be in the form of currency, or as facilities, equipment, construction materials, as well as trademarks and patents. “B. TURKEY. – Facilities for Foreign Investment” in *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives: Weekly Diary of Important World Events with Index Continually Kept Up-to-Date*, Volume No. VIII, 1950-1952 11811.


of which came from Europe rather than the U.S. as Washington intended. In 1951 West Germany surpassed the U.S. as the largest importer of Turkish goods and the largest exporter of goods to Turkey. The United Kingdom likewise came to outperform the U.S. in both fields, proving the success of Washington’s strategy to bind Turkey’s economy closer to Western Europe’s.

American planners hoped that the expansion of primary agriculture would lead to the development of private industries processing agricultural commodities. Industry during 1951 was active in both the state and private sectors, although production remained behind demand, in part because Turkish industrialists believed that a new transaction tax would increase centralization. With a continuing lack of capital, private industry tended to be light in nature while the state still dominated heavy industry through its SEEs. Menderes insisted that his party’s victory in 1950 represented a moratorium on the continuance government control of business and took every opportunity to emphasize this point. In an address on April 19, 1952 he claimed: “It was the Government and the State which used to take action and the citizens used to participate later on. Now we leave the initiative with the citizens and private enterprise.”

The Dispute over Future Funding

Menderes’ public support for wider Turkish privatization may have been influenced to an extent by the appointment of a new American ambassador to Turkey in late 1951 to replace the retiring George Wadsworth. In Wadsworth’s stead Truman selected George McGhee, a vigorous Texan with a doctorate from Oxford, millions from his oil business, and decorations for

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bravery as an aviator in the Pacific Theatre. McGhee previously served as the head of the U.S. Aid Mission to Turkey, a post that gave him an understanding of the country’s political and economic fortunes. He sought out the cooperation and insights of Turkish leaders in finding ways to maximize the use of U.S. funds.\textsuperscript{364} Ankara expected to continue to receive military and economic assistance on the basis of Turkey’s strategic importance, its commitment to the defense of the West, and its strong investment potential.\textsuperscript{365} The Americans seemed to be listening. In late January 1952 the MSA Mission allowed for the release of TL 163,524,000 of counterpart funds for the Turkish armed forces by signing three agreements with the Turkish government. The first agreement provided TL 80 million for military expenditures on equipment and construction for the current fiscal year. The remaining TL 83,524,000 would be released under the other two agreements for similar expenses. Speculation mounted that the funds would go towards improving the technical training and pay of NCOs (which continued to be in short supply), enlarging the standing army and increasing the local production of military equipment.\textsuperscript{366}

By signing the agreements U.S. officials admitted that 1940s estimates forecasting Turkey reaching military self-sufficiency by 1952 or 1953 had been far too optimistic. In the summer of 1950 evidence already existed that Washington had decided to increase the scale and scope of equipment and training provided to the Turkish military rather than reducing aid or settling on an expiration date. By late 1950 the performance of the Turkish brigade in Korea had caught the attention of the American press and, according to the British, “aroused American

\textsuperscript{364} McGhee’s love for Turkey compelled him to purchase the former residence of a Greek merchant in the coastal city of Alanya, a residence he used for many years before handing it over to Georgetown University. 
\textsuperscript{366} FO 371/101880, 1162/2/52. Letter from David S.W. Fox, Despatch No. 32. CONFIDENTIAL. British Embassy, Ankara. (29\textsuperscript{th} January 1952).
interest in the Turkish Army and produced an inflated idea of its value.” This in turn made the Turks, in the words of former Ambassador Wadsworth, “the good boys” of Washington compared to Western Europe’s less ardent supporters of U.S. foreign policy. American interest in Turkey’s military showed no sign of abating; the U.S. spent close to $400 million in military aid in the previous four years and would likely spend $240 million in 1952 alone.

With military assistance from the U.S. guaranteed, the Turks tried their luck at gaining more direct assistance. In February Ambassador McGhee received an aide-memoire from the Turkish Foreign Secretary requesting $86 million in direct aid for non-military purposes. The Turkish people believed that Turkey utilized U.S. aid more effectively than other countries, and could not understand how Washington could blithely differentiate between aid intended for the military and economic fields. As an example of this riddle, Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu cited requests for liquid fuel, which the U.S. refused to consider as an import that fell under the economic field, but only for military purposes. Zorlu insisted, “it will be observed that all of these aids are of a nature to effect not only the economic life but also are of a character to increase the military power.” The production of power and coal, and the construction of airfields and highways had economic as well as military implications; therefore the Turks believed money Washington slated for military use exclusively could just as easily be utilized for economic development. In the Turkish view, Turkey’s military importance and its EPU deficits more than justified both an increase in aid and more aid made available in the form of grants rather than loans. 48% of Turkey’s total economic aid came in the form of loans, almost 30% more

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368 Ibid.
than Iceland, the next highest recipient. EPU and ECA loans added to the crushing weight of Turkey’s foreign currency indebtedness accrued since 1949 due to loans from the World Bank, the use of Export-Import Bank credits, and resources of the IMF. Another loan, according to Ambassador Erkin, “will limit the availability of long range investments by private and International lending agencies and will further curtail the margin of the flow of USA exports to Turkey on account of the heavy debt service.”\textsuperscript{370}

MSA officials dismissed such arguments as “factually faulty, weakly reasoned, and generally unconvincing.” Turkey’s imbalance of payments problems could be linked directly to the reckless activities of the Turkish government, in particular purchasing large quantities of capital equipment, including agricultural equipment, to drive economic development. In years past the Turkey Mission encouraged this practice, but implored the Turks “to carry out their investment and import program in a manner that would take a realistic cognizance of priorities and financial availabilities. This has not been done.”\textsuperscript{371} Turkey’s “unmanageable” import program for 1951-52 stood at 40% higher than the previous one, and loaded with items “the procurement of which is highly questionable or the necessity of which is doubtful.” At the same time the Mission believed that the Turks continued to hold back between $90 and 100 million worth of commodities desperately needed on the world market. This made it relatively easy to deny the Turks $86 million they requested.\textsuperscript{372}

Taking a firmer line with the Turks reflected the new goal of U.S. foreign aid operations as one emphasizing defense support rather than economic development, and “making the


\textsuperscript{371} RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION, COMMENTS WITH REGARDS TO AIDE-MEMOIRE HANDED TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR ON FEBRUARY 1, 1952 BY THE TURKISH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS Group 469: Records of US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948-1961, Europe, Turkey Division, 1948-1953.

\textsuperscript{372} Ibid.
military the objective the keynote of the American effort.”373 Turkey’s impressive gains in agricultural production convinced some in Washington that it could easily reduce the levels of assistance, particularly with the American people protesting higher taxes and inflation, and the estimated budgetary deficit for FY 1953 stood at $15 billion. Anxious to trim the deficit while at the same time maintaining defense expenditures, a total close to 75% of the budget, the Congress targeted non-defense expenses, in particular foreign financial aid. Ambassador McGhee described Congress’ attitude to Menderes and Foreign Minister Zorlu as being that “since the United States is making such great sacrifices in the economic field, other countries should do likewise.”374 Turkey continued to receive close to $100 million in economic aid annually while aid to other countries such as Great Britain and France had been drastically reduced or eliminated entirely. With the Marshall Plan about to end, Turkey needed to accept the fact that some cuts would be forthcoming. Unfazed by this line of reasoning, Menderes pointed to Turkey’s instrumental role in protecting the Middle East from the Soviets, and that in order to continue to maintain this protective role Turkey required to strengthen its economy. Menderes argued that Turkey needed to raise its low industrial potential and standard of living not only for its own survival but the whole of the Middle East. According to the Prime Minister, Turkey’s untapped resources and unharnessed potential made it an excellent investment opportunity for the U.S.; in little time with technological advancements Turkey could double or even triple its national income and strengthen its economy. McGhee emphasized immediate steps that might be taken to catalyze economic growth, such as ending the practice of withholding crucial export

items like chrome, coal, cotton, and grain desperately needed by other members of the OEEC in order to drive up the prices.375

McGhee’s desire for the U.S. to actively develop Turkey’s economy did not complement the Mutual Security Program’s emphasis on military preparedness over economic assistance. Congress favored short-range projects and the military over long-term projects that would strengthen Turkey’s infrastructure such as dams and electrification, and, for the most part, the MSA followed in kind, doing its utmost to deter the Turks from expensive projects unlikely to yield any immediate economic benefits.376 With Washington unlikely to put up the capital for more ambitious long-range projects Turkey needed find ways of encouraging private capital investment in Turkey. It could cite some limited success in this endeavor by 1952, with multinational corporations such as General Electric, E. E. Squibb & Son pharmaceuticals, and the British-Dutch margarine company starting to construct branches in Turkey. Many other firms from Italy, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Britain, and the United States sought authorization from the Turkish Government to manufacture items as diverse as egg powder, DDT, sewing thread, medical gas, and artificial fertilizer.377 Turkey’s own industry, both private and public, also grew in 1952. Ankara continued to devote much of its investment program to state industry, but also continued to encourage private enterprise by removing obstructions to private activity.378

The Debate over Turkish Petroleum

A new openness to foreign corporations and the opportunity to generate revenue led to Ankara’s consideration of how outside assistance might assist Turkey in developing its

375 Ibid.
376 McGhee 123.
377 Letter to Willard L. Thorpe from George McGhee.
378 RESTRICTED, Mr. Guy Trancart, RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN TURKISH ECONOMY, (April 6, 1953).
petroleum field, a venture that yielded little success in the past three decades. By developing its oil reserves Turkey could increase the self-sufficiency of its military and help its balance of payments. Previous exploration uncovered petroleum deposits near Turkey’s border with Syria, but Turkey’s largely mountainous topography discouraged further searching without more outside capital and technical assistance. If Turkey could develop its own petroleum resources, it might cut back on the $50 million in precious foreign exchange spent annually on oil imports, costs that were steadily rising as Turkey’s economy expanded.

Turkish leaders ignored members of the opposition against foreign involvement in oil development and turned to an American with experience in oil for advice on the issue, Ambassador George McGhee. McGhee knew of the low quality and yield of the oil deposits found near Syria, but harbored some optimism that other areas might prove more favorable. He advised the Turks to sponsor legislation to encourage foreign oil companies to seek the rights to search for and refine oil discovered in Turkey. Undertaking the creation of such legislation required a cooperation and coordination between the various ministries of the Turkish Government that did not exist. According to MSA Mission’s newly appointed head, M. Leon Dayton, the Turks’ problem resulted from “their lack of experience, preconceived notions growing out of centuries of considering anything commercial as beneath the better class Turk and finally an imbalance on the production side which has permitted this element to overrun both facilities and policies.”

Undaunted by these setbacks, on November 12 the Council of Ministers discussed Turkey’s petroleum issue and the best means of quickly developing the

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379 Ibid.
380 McGhee 126.
381 Ibid 127-128.
country’s oil resources to increase profitability. In a decree the Council announced its desire to attract capital “under conditions most advantageous for our military and economic conditions-as well as such persons who would be willing to cooperate in this respect-and to make possible conclusion of [a] contract between said persons and our government.” The Council decided to secure the services of specialists knowledgeable in international oil legislation as well as the various technical and economic aspects needed to attract foreign capital.383

News of the Council’s decision first appeared in the opposition newspaper Ulus on November 23. The following day Cahit Zamangil, a RPP deputy in the GNA, introduced an interrogatory motion demanding that the Menderes Government clarify its petroleum policy to the Turkish people. It was not the prospect of foreign capital being used to develop Turkey’s petroleum resources that troubled the RPP, but the possibility that the RPP would not be consulted or provide input prior to the final decision being made. RPP deputies wondered if the law would deprive Turkish citizens of the right to engage in oil exploitation in favor foreign interests. Requesting a public statement of clarification would create a degree of accountability. The Ministry of State Enterprise obliged by releasing a statement to the press covering the concerted efforts by the Turkish state to develop the nation’s petroleum resources since 1933 with efforts costing TL 50 million that yielded little. Large amounts of foreign exchange for oil imports could be saved if domestic supplies could be made available with the participation of foreign experts and capital.384 The prospective law would expand oil production without barring Turkish citizens from exploring for oil individually or in league with foreign interests. Foreign

as well as Turkish experts “versed in the implementation of world legislation, in management and prospecting” were expected to be of tremendous value to Turkey in the upcoming endeavors.\footnote{STATEMENT BY MINISTER OF STATE ENTERPRISES IN GNA ON DECEMBER 3, 1952, Group 469: Records of US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948-1961, Europe, Turkey Division, 1948-1953.}

RPP Deputy Zamangil took exception with the unclear wording of much of the text of the decree, specifically how the government would permit prospecting to be conducted, how Turkey’s oil industry would be run according to “world oil policy,” and why the decree failed to mention the use of Turkish capital in the exploration and operation of Turkey’s petroleum resources. Beyond these matters of clarification Zamangil wondered why the decree, given its substantial national importance, roused so little interest in the Turkish press: “It appeared to have been overlooked.” Zamangil pressed the Ministry of State Enterprises to make its position public by making an interrogatory motion. Zamangil asked the Ministry of State Enterprises to comment on the lack of any minimum requirements that would accompany invitations to foreign capital. Some knowledge of Turkey’s conditions on foreign capital would be of great use to Turkish officials and potential foreign investors.\footnote{STATEMENT BY RPP DEPUTY CAHIT ZAMANGIL IN GNA ON DECEMBER 3, 1952, Group 469: Records of US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948-1961, Europe, Turkey Division, 1948-1953.} Zamangil did not wish the petroleum issue to become so politicized so as to bar the GNA from taking part in future discussions or negotiations. No one doubted the veracity of the Menderes government’s commitment to improving the country’s interests and the input of the GNA “should be taken into consideration in order to assure this. Therefore, I implore the Government not to engage in any undertakings without taking into account the inclinations of the GNA, and without taking its vote after honest, dignified and earnest discussions at the GNA.”\footnote{Ibid.}
Others contended that rolling out a red carpet for foreign interests violated the spirit of Atatürk and his intended economic reforms. An editorialist for the Millet newspaper observed that Turkey’s founder utilized statism as a means of delivering Turkey from semi-colonialism and to allow it to “operate its resources by mobilizing its own means and establish a self-sufficient economic system.” Leaders of the DP that desired to encourage foreign capital to assist in the operation of Turkish petroleum would be engaging in “a very dangerous game.” The difficulties associated with Atatürk’s struggle towards Turkey’s self-sufficiency did not disprove the effectiveness of his principle. The editorialist condemned the DP for steering Turkey “towards capitulations, oriental mentality, exploitations of foreign capital aiming at sabotaging the economic self-sufficiency of the country.” The editorial concluded that, “disloyalty to these factors is disloyalty to Ataturk’s reforms. But unfortunately nobody is aware of it.”388

Turkey Joins NATO

While the Turkish press and members of the GNA chose sides in the debate over oil the NATO members continued to discuss making Turkey a full member of NATO. Geography remained the crux of the issue: the British regarded Turkey as a Middle Eastern power to serve Britain’s regional interests while the U.S. viewed Turkey as a Mediterranean nation providing a southeastern flank against the Soviets. NATO’s European members did not want to stretch their already thin military resources so far from the North Atlantic region. Britain feared that Turkey’s membership in NATO would end the chances of it serving as the focal point of its planned Middle Eastern alliance.389 In the spring of 1950 London pondered the feasibility of a defense pact such as NATO relocated to the Middle East, one that would include Turkey and the United States. With fewer resources at its disposal, Great Britain’s plans emphasized defending

the Middle East’s “inner ring” with the focus at the Suez garrison. The State Department and the JCS refused to even consider its feasibility. At the same time, the fighting in Korea convinced American policymakers that the British could not keep the Soviets out of the Middle East in the event of a war in the region.\textsuperscript{390} The U.S. advocated a more ambitious and tactically difficult plan to protect the Middle East with an “outer ring” defensive perimeter running along Turkey and into Iran.\textsuperscript{391} Such a plan reflected concerns that the Middle East would be the stage of the next act in the bipolar drama between East and West after Korea, especially with the growing influence of the communist Tudeh Party in Iran.\textsuperscript{392}

This “outer ring” proposal grew out of the mindset shaped by the NSC-68 document of 1950 and its emphasis on Soviet containment reshaped U.S. policymakers’ concept of international security; specifically that a loss to the Soviets anywhere was tantamount to a defeat everywhere.\textsuperscript{393} Adopting this zero-sum attitude the State Department predicted an initial Soviet invasion of Thrace, which would become the site of a delaying action, before a retreat to Anatolia and a long-term guerilla campaign by Turkish forces behind the “outer ring.” In the interim the U.S. and its NATO allies would mobilize its forces to come to the Turks’ rescue. Such a scheme underscored the necessity of Turkey being a part of NATO, particularly if it became the site of a protracted battle with the Soviets. The JCS eventually accepted Turkey as a full NATO member, but opposed any defense arrangement that would result in the commitment of American soldiers to the defense of the Middle East.\textsuperscript{394} Few NATO members shared

\textsuperscript{390} Yeşibursa 72.
\textsuperscript{391} Kuniholm 47.
\textsuperscript{392} Yeşibursa 73.
\textsuperscript{394} Yeşibursa 78. It took China’s decision to become involved in the Korean War to compel the State Department to reassess a rivalry that resembled the crisis in Asia, that between Bulgaria and Turkey. In the post-war years the United States’ relationship with Bulgaria remained in steady decline due to the Soviet satellite’s policy of prosecuting Protestant leaders and other dissenters as agents of the West involved in espionage or treason. Like the
America’s growing enthusiasm for Turkey’s membership. At a September 1950 meeting of NATO’s council of deputies, representatives from Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway argued that such an expansion would run contrary to NATO’s purpose as “a closely-knit community to a widespread anti-Soviet alliance.”\textsuperscript{395} Expanding NATO’s security vision into the Near East would challenge an organization already stretched thin holding back the Soviets in Europe. London, for its part, still desired a Middle East Command (MEC) in which Turkey, with its strategically crucial location and large army, would assume leading responsibility.

The State Department did not question Turkey’s overall loyalty to the West; such loyalty represented “its only hope of effectively resisting Soviet pressures.”\textsuperscript{396} But the CIA still speculated that if the U.S. failed to formally guarantee Turkey’s security the Turks might gradually favor a more neutral or concessionary foreign policy, particularly if the Soviets managed to consolidate their control over Greece, Iran, Iraq and Syria.\textsuperscript{397} Such concerns lent greater credence to the possibility, if not necessity, of Turkey joining NATO in the minds of U.S. policymakers. In the event of a Soviet invasion of the Near East only Turkey, with its

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impressively sized land forces, seemed capable of effectively countering a Soviet threat.\textsuperscript{398} As the Korean War raged most military representatives NATO countries came to support Turkey and Greece as Alliance members in order to successfully carry out possible military operations in the Near East. European politicians were less compliant than their military counterparts and clung to the assertion that Turkey remained first and foremost a Middle Eastern country unnecessary to the defense of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{399} In April 1951, officials from Britain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway agreed to refuse Turkey and Greece full NATO membership in their group of “like-minded group of Atlantic, liberal democracies.”\textsuperscript{400} The addition of two members with social and political concerns out of sync with the current “North Atlantic” members would complicate the responsibilities of NATO agencies. Additionally, bringing Turkey into the fold meant having a NATO ally sharing a border with the Soviet Union, possibly raising the stakes of an armed confrontation that would obligate all of NATO to stand firm. France in particular voiced in its concerns Moscow would see Greece and Turkey in NATO as a confrontational act of encirclement. The French further fretted over the possibility of war would be increased with the application of NATO’s military provisions to yet two more members.\textsuperscript{401} The British Ministry of Defense pointed out that Turkey’s possible NATO responsibilities would preclude it from defending the Middle East. Britain intended its military aid to Turkey to be used to protect the Middle East, not Europe. The Ministry also speculated

\textsuperscript{398} Political Problems of the Middle East: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, C.P (51) 94, 29\textsuperscript{th} March, 1951, The British National Archives 1.
\textsuperscript{399} C.P. (51) 132, 17\textsuperscript{th} May, 1951, Turkey and Greece and the North Atlantic Treaty: Note by the Ministry of Defense British National Archives 1.
\textsuperscript{400} Gheciu 42.
\textsuperscript{401} C.M. (51), 36\textsuperscript{th} Conclusions, Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 22\textsuperscript{nd} May, 1951 at 11 a.m., The British National Archives 25-26.
that Turkey’s admission might inspire other Middle Eastern countries to follow suit and apply for NATO membership.402

A CIA report published in June highlighted different threats by pointing out that because the U.S. had “publicly proposed that Greece and Turkey be admitted to NATO, a refusal by Britain or France to undertake firm security commitments to those countries would be interpreted by the Kremlin as revealing weaknesses and dissention among the members of the Western Alliance,” thus making future security commitments to the Greeks and Turks “appear to the Kremlin less formidable.”403 Military leaders such as General Omar Bradley and politicians like Senator Robert Taft gave the impression of supporting the two countries’ membership, and American public opinion came to fell in line. Eisenhower observed, “You do not have to be a great soldier to know the great value which would accrue to freedom within the United States by including these countries.”404

Turkey certainly had the resources and training to be of value to NATO. Five years’ worth of American funds had provided Turkey’s military with tanks, submarines, jeeps, radar and medical supplies to the tune of a half-a-billion dollars. To learn how to properly utilize this influx of modern equipment, 25,000 Turkish officers and men attended newly created Army, Navy and Air Force schools overseen by JUSMMAT. The combined impact of the modernizing and strengthening efforts yielded a military able to enhance NATO’s fighting capabilities. To the U.S., Turkey had satisfactorily “demonstrated her alignment with the principles of the United Nations and her friendship with the United States. The Turk contingent in Korea has again demonstrated dramatically the historic fighting ability of the race. Turkish representatives in the

404 Cabinet (51) 130, 17th May, 1951 2.
United Nations have consistently supported the principles of collective security. The Turkish military proved its ability to forego its backwards ways and become a viable fighting force in contemporary conflicts. Under American guidance the Turkish military abandoned its antiquated horse carts for modern weapons. American concepts of defense of the mid-1940s predicted that in the event of a Soviet invasion, the Turks could do little more than mount a static defense along the border to the last man.

Britain softened its position in order to circumvent resentment in Ankara towards London and the U.S. supplanting British influence in the Middle East. London remained unsure if making Greece and Turkey full partners in NATO would be the best way to guarantee their security, as only the U.S. could now make such a pledge, but Washington asserted it could only be done under the NATO umbrella. Because London could not guarantee Greek and Turkish security, resisting U.S. offers of NATO membership placed the British in an awkward position. British relations with Turkey also factored into Britain’s gradual relenting on the issue. The Turkish public increasingly viewed the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Italy as their champions for full NATO membership. French and British resistance risked alienating the governments and people of Greece and Turkey. As the only power in a position to ensure the long-term security of Greece and Turkey the U.S. alone could make the final call. American leaders decided that NATO should be the mechanism through which the security of Greece and

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406 Ankara, Turkey (October 5-8, 1951) Interviewed Ambassador Wadsworth, his principal staff members.
407 Cabinet 36 (51) 25.
408 C.M. 36 (51), 22nd May, 1951 64-65.
409 Cabinet (51) 130, 17th May, 1951, 2.
410 FO 371/107552, Letter from David Scott Fox to H.A.F. Hohler, Esq., Foreign Office, London, S.W.1. (November 11, 1953). The closer Turkey moved towards joining NATO, the more it infuriated the Soviets who feared the Turks would cede bases to the Alliance. Ankara denied such a development would occur, but did pledge that Turkey would grant its NATO allies access to its military installations in the event of war.
Turkey could be guaranteed. As much as Britain wished to keep Turkey attached to its Middle Eastern concerns, the U.S. determination to link Turkey to the defense of the West prevented London from averting such a shift. British and French officials realized that continued antagonism would compel the U.S. to seek the concurrence of other NATO members at their expense; their opposition faded.

London drew solace from that fact that America’s commitment to defending Turkey by default would oblige it to oversee the defense of the Middle East, thereby reducing British financial responsibilities. The British had long hoped to find a way to compel the U.S. to permanently commit itself militarily to the Eastern Mediterranean; Turkey and Greece in NATO seemed to be the price to be paid. Additionally Turkey in NATO would prevent the U.S. Military Mission in Ankara from deterring the Turks from assuming a more active role in the Middle East. The ability and dedication of Turkish forces fighting in Korea amply demonstrated to London that Turkey would fight against communism and perhaps encourage other Middle Eastern powers to do the same. In August 1951 the British government publicly supported Turkey and Greece’s full membership, provided assurances could be made that Turkey would not become so fixated on the security needs of the West that it neglected its Middle Eastern duties. France diffidently conceded to the U.S. while the Scandinavian and Benelux countries continued to hold out, convinced the “Atlantic concept” of NATO would be corrupted by Eastern Mediterranean members.

411 C.M. 36 (51) 22nd May, 1951, N.A.T.O. Association of Greece and Turkey, British National Archives 64.
412 C.M. 36 (51), 22nd May, 1951 67.
413 Cabinet (51) 130, 17th May, 1951 3.
414 Ibid.
416 N.A.T.O. Association of Greece and Turkey C.M. 36 (51) 65.
Ankara assured London that it would be able to keep up its role in the existing Middle East defense arrangements even with its additional responsibilities in NATO. Turkish military officials felt less obligated to answer to London. The loss of Britain’s empire meant a loss of prestige as well. By early 1950 some in the Turkish General Staff did not believe that that the British would come to their aid in the event of an invasion or offer much in the way of military support. Clearly, the United States, not Britain, directed defense policy in the Middle East and Turkey’s place within it, but Britain remained committed to establishing a Middle East Command (MEC), and Washington agreed to jointly invite Turkey to join it. The recent coup in Egypt led by a young Abdel Nasser made Turkey more important to protecting Britain’s interest in the Middle East. American officials still found little about the MEC concept to like, or the idea of Turkey as an integral part of the defense of the Middle East rather than Europe. Washington wanted to ensure that the Turkish military would be on hand to serve the West; whether or not it was as part of the Middle East Command or NATO’s European Command was of secondary importance. In late 1951 the governments of the U.S., France, Britain and Turkey announced their intentions of founding the MEC in the name of long-term regional defense, that by ensuring the peace and security of the Middle East, the MEC would help to bring about both economic and social developments as well. The MEC would serve as a defense framework through which the nations of the Middle East could develop the ability to defend the region from external aggression without supplanting any existing bilateral or multilateral security

418 Ibid.
420 C.P. (51) 266, 22nd October, 1951, Bilateral and Tripartite Talks in Washington and Atlantic Council Meeting in Ottawa, 10th-20th September, 1951, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of Defense, British National Archives 4.
agreements. Although the American officials remained less than keen on the MEC, they agreed to dispatch General Omar Bradley to accompany Field-Marshall William Slim to Ankara to make the proposal to Ankara, and to invite Egypt to become a founding member as well.

Washington had its own concept for Middle Eastern security based on the creation of a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), a regional defense association akin to NATO made up of Britain, the U.S., France and Turkey. With these four nations serving as MEDO’s core Middle Eastern nations would eventually become members. Such an idea could work, provided the governments of the Middle East had the stability and backing of their people, neither of which was in ample supply in the early 1950s, particularly after the founding of Israel in 1948. Egypt, angry over the status of the Sudan and Suez, and Iran, unhappy at the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, objected to closer cooperation with Britain. Such obstacles and other disincentives forced U.S. officials to delay MEDO’s establishment until the Eisenhower administration abandoned the idea altogether in 1953 in favor the northern tier concept that stressed the strengthening of Turkey, Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Iran.

Turkey welcomed any opportunity to become part of a regional defense organization, but until MEC or MEDO moved from the proposal stage to reality, NATO represented the only viable prospect. At the Lisbon Conference in February 1947 Turkey and Greece at last became full members of NATO.
period for the Turkish military, one involving significant and costly changes to its organization and equipment in order to reflect the demands placed on it by NATO planners. The conversions would take time and patience, and absorb much of the country’s internal resources. In order to prove its value to NATO, the Turks sought to draw on its greatest asset to the Alliance, their manpower, by increasing troop totals to sizes beyond the scope of NATO demands and current U.S. funding. From late 1952 to late 1953 the size of the Turkish Army increased by 70,000 to 303,000. American officials needed to be vigilant to preventing Turkish military planners from allowing their ambitions to exceed the aid available to them, without dampening Turkey’s enthusiasm for the Alliance and risk a gradual slide towards neutrality. The constant vigilance of JUSMMAT following Turkey’s becoming a full NATO member showed that little had fundamentally changed; in the years to come the foreign military presence in Turkey continued to be overwhelmingly American rather than European in character, leading more than one Turkish scholar to characterize Turkey’s relationship with NATO as a bilateral relationship rather than a multilateral one.

Full NATO membership gave Turkey the assurance of American military support it craved for so long. It also placed Turkey in one of a series of international organizations intended to solidify its place in the West as a nation with similar economic and political

Contemporary Archives: Weekly Diary of Important World Events with Index Continually Kept Up-to-Date, Volume No. VIII, 1950-1952 12039.


426 Gül and Holmes 272. Turkey’s NATO membership complicated a thorny dispute between Britain and Turkey regarding the repayment of armament credits the British offered the Turkish Government in 1938 and 1939 totaling £39,300,000. The Turks defaulted on the loan in July 1951 after repaying only £8.9 million of capital and £7.7 million in interest. When London insisted on an additional £16 million the Turks balked and offered only £2.5 million. Cabinet Memorandum: Turkish Armament Credits: CAB 129/55 (14th October 1952). With Turkey in NATO and the British in need of Turkish support in achieving their goals in the Middle East, there was little Prime Minister Eden could do but ask for £3 million, particularly when the Turks threatened to reduce British imports if the pre-war debts issue was not reconcile to the Turks’ satisfaction. The apparent resolution left the British with a bitter aftertaste and a feeling that the Turks had “treated us with contempt.” Cabinet Secretary’s Notebook: Minutes and Papers: CAB 195/10 (15th October 1952).
outlooks. As part of the EPU, the Council of Europe, OEEC, NATO, and eventually the European Economic Community, Turkey continued to make obvious its desire to be seen as a part of Europe. Becoming a NATO ally also augmented an existing tendency of the Turks to insist upon impractical and grandiose plans to expand their military rather than attempting to solve existing disadvantages. As long as American aid showed no signs of subsiding, there was little prospect of Turkey making any concerted effort to address its logistical limitations.427

NATO also provided another venue in which Greece and Turkey could work through their centuries-old animosity. Just prior to becoming NATO members, Turkish and Greek leaders met in Ankara to discuss ways to resolve existing disputes and bind their militaries together within the NATO framework.428 The Alliance created a pair of joint Greek-Turkish regional headquarters in Izmir, the Allied Land Forces Southeast Europe, activated in early September 1952, and the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force, activated in October of the following year.429 The two bases brought together military representatives from Greece and Turkey to cooperate in the planning and execution of security measures in the region.430 After years of distrust and rivalry, frequent visits by Greek and Turkish delegations to their respective nations during the early 1950s helped to repair some of the damage. During a state visit to Turkey in June 1952 King Paul of Greece laid a wreath at Atatürk’s tomb and dined a banquet given in his honor by Bayar. At the ceremony Paul referred to the new air of conciliation between Greece

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430 Ibid.
and Turkey as, “a useful example of political maturity.” In October 1953 Greek and Turkish troops led by a Turkish commander took part in a NATO exercise called “Operation Weldfast,” the first instance of such close cooperation between the militaries of the two countries.

Turkey’s NATO membership raised concerns regarding the available civilian manpower being able to meet both agricultural and industrial needs. MSA officials did not know of any manpower restrictions to potentially hamper Turkey’s participation in NATO, and Ankara did not yet have a complete picture of Turkey’s labor demand; the recently created Turkish Employment Service continued to refine its operating methods, and to compile and review the labor market data. It would not have information available until the summer of 1953. Turkish agriculture did not lack laborers; agricultural mechanization reduced the prestige of many agricultural workers who slipped from tenant farmers to laborers hired largely on a seasonal basis. When underemployment developed, individuals had the choice of migrating to other areas or seeking part-time employment in village industries. Turkey did lack skilled and supervisory workers such as mechanics capable of fixing the imported tractors beginning to break down in larger numbers. Underemployment took precedent over any other issue in discouraging the full utilization of Turkish manpower, mainly because the seasonal nature of agricultural employment.

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432 FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH, FROM: USIS ANKARA, TO: USIA, WASHINGTON, REF: USIS-MSA Information country plan for Turkey – Department’s draft revision of November 18, 1952, SUBJECT: Semi-Annual USIS Report – Turkey (February 1, 1954) Records Group 469, Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, Turkey Division, 1948-1953. In 1955 Nikita Khrushchev assessed how the Soviet Government pushed Turkey into the arms of NATO: “It is known that when Atatürk and Ismet İnönü were at the top of Turkish leadership we had very good relationships with Turkey but later on they were darkened. We can not say that it happened only due to Turkey; there were inappropriate statements made on our side which darkened these relations.” Gökay 70.

The MSA predicted this problem would grow as mechanization on farms increased and only future industrialization might provide full time employment to those seeking it.\textsuperscript{434}

NATO had specific force goals for its members to reach and Ankara took the opportunity to use its new membership as a pretext to request more aid and military equipment in the late summer of 1952, including a major overhaul of the Turkish Air Force. American jet aircraft, primarily F-84s and F-47s, gradually replaced older British machines, but not in numbers large enough to do more than providing support for the army. The American military oversaw the construction of airfields capable of accommodating jet aircraft. While Turkey’s Air Force made these small strides, its navy remained “the Cinderella of the Turkish armed forces” without a submarine force able to carry out offensive maneuvers in the Black Sea or a force of destroyers capable of defending the Straits. Rather than expanding the existing fleet, American advisers stressed the technical improvement of it.\textsuperscript{435} A preliminary analysis by JUSMMAT determined the additional equipment requested by the Turks for its NATO duties to be “far beyond realistic possibilities of aid within MDAP and well beyond the current capabilities of the Turk economy to maintain or the Turk armed forces to operate.”\textsuperscript{436} JUSMMAT’s report drove home the Turks’ failure to consider making adjustments to the defense infrastructure to support the immediate changes they requested and advised continuing the improvements program already in place. Rather than continue to devote so much of the national budget to their already substantial military, American analysts advised the Turks focus on economic development and raising the

\textsuperscript{434} Some progress had been made in using workers on a rotational basis at state-owned mines where workers lived in dormitories near the mines for two to three months before returning to their villages to be replaced by a neighbor or relative. The great drawback to this system was its inability to provide a stable and skilled workforce to maintain high levels of production.


\textsuperscript{436} SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF TURK REPLY TO NATO ANNUAL REVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE, Group 469: Records of US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948-1961, Europe, Turkey Division, 1948-1953.
standard of living as a means of creating a stronger base to support Turkey’s defense and drawing it closer to the West. U.S. estimates for the rise in Turkey’s GNP placed it at 7% annually for the next three years, a large enough percentage that Turkey could increase its defense spending by 4% annually and still have enough left over resources for greater investment and consumption.  

Ankara could not be deterred from bulking up its armed forces. Turkey’s already enormous land forces, the largest in the Near East, consisting of 19 divisions totaling 424,000 men, made up a large percentage of NATO’s available manpower and could be readily enlarged with members of the unemployed. Even with these large numbers and the overall failure to meet the NATO standards of training and technical knowledge, Turkish leaders intended to expand the size of the military by 7,000 officers, 1,600 non-commissioned officers, 2,100 specialist sergeants and 14,000 conscripts. Ambassador McGhee pointed out that an increase in troops needing to be clothed, fed and armed by the state would result in significant expenditures on items costing more on the world market than in years past. America intended to provide Turkey with modern jet aircraft, enough to form thirteen squadrons, but not the costly fuel or long-term maintenance these planes would require, and Ankara had yet to make the proper provisions to pay for them. The Turks’ vision exceeded their ability to intelligently plan ahead, but with American aid continuing to come in, they could afford to dream on an epic scale.

Conclusion

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Turkey’s twin gambles of 1950, the first truly free general elections and its involvement in the Korean War, seemed to yield substantial benefits for the Turks. The victory of the DP did not indicate Washington’s meddling to bring an end to the RPP’s domination of Turkey’s so much as it pointed to the leaders in the RPP, specifically İnönü, recognizing that it was time to step aside and allow a new party to come to the fore or risk growing dissent and hostility. The timing of the DP’s victory could not have been more providential to the new regime. The Turkish economy continued to enjoy growth and full membership in NATO held the promise of expanded American military and financial support, as well as the long-sought promise of protection an international alliance provided. Perfect weather conditions combined with mechanized farm equipment resulted in a bounty of harvests sold on a seller’s market as a result of wartime demands. The Menderes government had every reason to assume that nothing but good times lay ahead for Turkey. Realities would soon prove otherwise. The DP blithely overlooked the fact the largely artificial nature of Turkey’s recent economic growth, specifically the higher prices caused by a wartime market and that Turkish agriculture, with the addition of machinery, insecticides, herbicides, and improved methods of planting and harvesting was quickly reaching its productive limits. Promoting greater privatization and foreign investment in Turkish industry held the promise of eventual growth in Turkey’s industrial sector, but it would take some time before a managerial class with the requisite skills and knowledge developed. Becoming a “little America,” as Menderes promised, would take significantly more time than was politically feasible for the DP government, and significantly more funds than was economically feasible for the U.S.
CHAPTER III. “IF ALLAH DOES NOT PROVIDE...”: 1952-1953

Introduction

In five years American influence in Turkey could be seen in its closer economic relations with Western Europe, scaled back statism, and a strengthened military. Turkey could breathe easier with its NATO membership providing the long-sought guarantee of Western protection. Shortly after Turkey became a full NATO member, Turkish soldiers stationed along the border Soviet Union put up a poster proclaiming, “We Turks are proud of our freedom, and we are ready to die for our freedom.” Such defiant gestures indicated that Americans should “congratulate themselves on having recognized the courage and love of freedom of the Turks when they were hard pressed by the Soviet Union after World War II” and be “thankful that we were able to offer them our friendship and help.”440 Turkey’s NATO membership manifested itself in accelerated construction on advanced military installations to house and service U.S.-provided jet warplanes, intermediate range missiles, and electronic listening stations, and facilities to house the growing numbers of American servicemen and their families.441 American and Turkish officials signed the Exchange of Letters and Memos in January 1952, a public agreement regarding the creation of U.S. bases in Turkey. Such agreements governing American bases differed from country to country, depending upon existing diplomatic ties and the security goals; the installations in Turkey posed specific challenges due to the country’s comparative poverty and authoritarian governments; Turkish political elites of the late 1940s and 1950s fully

441 Harris 56.
intended to utilize the economic and political advantages offered by the basing agreements to advance their own agendas.442

Turkey’s NATO membership provided the added sense of security and guarantee of U.S. funds coming into Turkey to update existing military facilities and erect new ones. It also meant a growing presence of American military personnel based in Turkey, and questions as to how they should be viewed by Turkish law. In smaller groups U.S. servicemen were more likely to regularly engage with the Turkish people, creating relationships a sense of belonging and sensitivity to local laws and customs. As the number of Americans grew it became increasingly easier for them to turn inwards and remain close to bases, thereby failing to build relationships with Turks and creating an impression of being aloof and insular. This changing perception from friend to outsider became a greater liability when Turkish legal authorities accused Americans of crimes.

A similar alteration in perceptions took place as the ECA completed its operations in 1952 and gave way to the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), an organization far more devoted to Turkey’s military preparedness than economic improvement. The MSA Mission headquartered in Ankara carried out its duties with fewer personnel and a growing emphasis on suggesting policy changes to the Turks rather than making outright demands. The combination of bureaucratic obliqueness and lighter manpower made for increasingly contentious interactions between Turkish officials and the MSA, all the more so when Turkey’s economy experienced a downturn after 1952. The Menderes government asserted its continued devotion to greater liberalization and weaker statism, but had yet to inaugurate sweeping changes on either front.

Stalin’s death in 1953 and Eisenhower coming to office that same year further clouded matters. The Soviets, hoping to come out from under Stalin’s dark shadow, attempted to mend fences with the Turks by withdrawing the demands that initially drove the Turks into the arms of the U.S., and by offering substantial economic relief; a well-timed offer given Eisenhower’s insistence that the U.S. reduce its military spending. The possibility of diminished American funds alarmed the Menderes government at a time when its opposition called attention to what it viewed as Turkey’s growing financial dependence upon the goodwill of the United States. Menderes fought back with attempts to control the opposition’s finances and close its newspapers. Ankara continued to soldier forward with various reforms intended to develop Turkey’s mining and petroleum sectors through greater privatization and the encouragement of foreign investments and expertise. American officials praised such efforts in the hopes that Turkey would be in a position to offer lucrative exports in the near future and become independent of U.S. assistance. These numerous challenges and changes demonstrated just how quickly Turkey’s fortunes had changed.

*Signs of Strains between Turks and Americans*

America’s growing military presence in Turkey validated its security commitment to Turkey’s, but also raised questions regarding how the Turkish legal system and the U.S. military legal authority should handle American servicemen accused of crimes. An early example of this quandary occurred in the summer of 1951 when a Turkish court charged Kenneth Roberson, a 33-year old warrant officer from the Air Attaché’s office in Ankara, with two counts of black market activities and sentenced him to a year’s imprisonment and a $73,000 fine. When Roberson failed to pay the fine he received an additional three to four years in prison.

Roberson’s fate troubled U.S. personnel who initially believed that the higher-ranking officers

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443 Ibid 36.
running black market schemes set up Roberson to protect themselves. They found the lack of political support from the Embassy additionally troubling. Ambassador Wadsworth refused to involve himself in the matter because Roberson voluntarily turned himself over to the Turkish police, thereby spoiling U.S. authorities’ original plan to remove Roberson from the country and avoid undesired publicity. When an American journalist investigating black market activities sought to interview Roberson the Ankara District Attorney agreed to the meeting, provided the Ambassador also approved. Wadsworth refused, claiming it would result in excessive intervention in Turkish matters.

Roberson’s plight proved the exception rather than the rule for the American servicemen attached to NATO in Turkey during the early 1950s. Interactions between American soldiers and the local Turks remained generally amicable with few instances of blatant hostility. The people of Izmir enthusiastically welcomed a new NATO base in their city, although most mistook it as an American rather than a NATO outpost. A British official noted two years later of the base in Izmir that the Turks “had since consistently refused to see it as one cog in the NATO machinery for the defense of Europe as a whole” and believed it to be solely for Turkey’s defense. Regardless of interpretation, the base provided proof of America’s commitment to Turkey’s defense and showed just how closely linked NATO and the growing presence of U.S. military installations had become. Ankara was anxious for more, with development plans for another NATO military installation located in southeastern Turkey to defend the Suez Canal.

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444 Letter to Mr. Walter S. Rogers, Institute of Current World Affairs, from Richard D. Robinson (June 1, 1952): 9-10.
445 Ibid 10.
447 FO 371/108017, NAT.7/211 (26th March, 1953).
448 Criss “U.S. Forces in Turkey” 331.
449 MEMORANDUM, SUBJECT: Trip Through Southwestern Turkey by Livingston Satterthwaite and Edward Rivinus – October 5-16, 1952. RG 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948-
While Egypt rebuffed British proposals to construct a Suez base, the Turks gladly consented to a greater NATO presence and a more active role in Near Eastern security. Turkey’s economic progress and political stability transformed it from “a threatened outpost” to a developing nation able to exert greater hegemony over other Muslim states like Pakistan and Iran, and Ankara actively promoted its growing importance.\(^{450}\) The U.S.-directed coup in Iran the previous year paved the way for an anti-communist government and Pakistan continued to express interest in assuming a greater role in regional defense. These developments, according to Ankara, indicated that the locus of Middle Eastern defense was Turkey and not the Arab states and should be strengthened as such. To this end, Turkish officials asserted that existing air and naval bases located in southeastern Turkey could be expanded and incorporated into a network of defenses able to furnish troops to the northern Middle East.\(^{451}\)

With Turkey actively lobbying for an enlarged role in regional defense, relations between U.S. and Turkish military personnel showed some signs of growing strain. In 1953 JUSMMAT personnel stood at 1,300 officers and men, but as the numbers grew regular interactions between Turks and Americans declined. U.S. military officials found their Turkish counterparts to be increasingly remote and less receptive to American advice.\(^{452}\) Out-and-out hostility remained rare and generally American servicemen had little to fear from Turkish legal institutions so long as aid from Washington flowed into Turkey. A British official noted sourly

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\(^{451}\) Welles Hangen “Turkey Projects New NATO Base; Plan Would Compensate for Suez.”

\(^{452}\) Wolfe 43.
in late April 1953: “In Turkey Americans are allowed to get away with actions which, if taken by others, would arouse the strongest opposition, and such is likely the case so long as American aid continues on anything like its current scale. In the Turkish eye the price is well worth paying.”

Such alleged bribery did not preclude Washington from seeking to formalize the legal status of Americans inhabiting Turkey. When the U.S. stationed a large a group of military personnel on foreign soil Washington typically negotiated a treaty with the host nation permitting the U.S. Government to oversee the discipline of its soldiers and to establish immunity from local laws. Under 1951’s NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) treaty, foreign military and civilian personnel agreed to respect the laws of the host country and avoid illegal conduct or activities. On the matter of military personnel breaking the law in the host country, SOFA allowed military authorities of the “sending State” to have “the right to exercise within the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military law of that State.” Additionally, the authorities of the receiving State retained jurisdiction over “the members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offences committed within the territory of the receiving State and punishable by the law of that State.” Military authorities of the “sending State” would have the right to “exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending State, but not by the law of the receiving State.”

453 FO 371/117720, Turkish Attitude to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Obligations Under the North Atlantic Treaty, Sir K. Helm to Sir W. Churchill (Received May12).

454 4 UST. 1792, MULTILATERAL, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY Status of Forces, TIAS 2846, 4. UST., June 19, 1951, Date-Signed, August 23, 1951, Date-In-Force, usembassy turkey.org accessed February 1, 2010.
rights. JUSMMAT therefore operated without the treaty and encountered few problems during the first five years of its existence, but concerns lingered. U.S. officials feared that Turkey’s harsh laws and punishments might damage the morale of American personnel stationed in Turkey. Washington hoped to convince Turkey to ratify the SOFA as soon as possible to avoid these contingencies.

*From the MSA to the ECA*

Emphasis on military matters such as SOFA showed Washington’s shift from Turkey’s economic development to its military preparedness. In the remaining days of the ECA during late 1951 American and Turkish newspapers featured stories of modest farmers improving their lives by adopting new farming techniques and equipment made possible by the Marshall Plan and ECA efforts. Even Richard D. Robinson, who authored some of the more critical critiques of American policies in Turkey, commended ECA officials in Turkey for bringing about closer Turkish-U.S. relations. Robinson found their success all the more remarkable given the large number of Americans working in assorted capacities, the number of different agencies charged with carrying out U.S. goals, and the fact that “American influence lays a heavy, though subtle, hand on many fields of Turkish administration as American ‘adviser’ urge and cajole” in matters

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455 The lack of cases involving US servicemen may have been greatly influenced by the notorious (and well-earned) reputation of Turkish jails and prisons. Twenty prisoners typically shared one room and were forced to do their own cooking in an area all too close to the rugged sanitary facilities. US officials and soldiers knew that American prisoners used to comparatively better conditions in US correctional facilities would find the adjustment psychologically taxing. Because an automobile accident could result in serving jail time, many American personnel opted not to drive while stationed in Turkey.


457 In 1952 Richard Robinson became a representative of the American Universities Field Staff, a cooperative enterprises created in November 1951 consisting of a group of American colleges and universities sponsoring the activities of a cadre of “professional foreign observers” assigned to observe and report any noteworthy economic, political, social, or cultural trend. Participating institutions included Brown University, California Institute of Technology, Carleton College, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, Michigan State College, Tulane University, University of Hawaii, and University of Kansas. Numerous business and professional groups as well as universities subscribed to the newsletters produced by the Field Staff.
ranging from road construction to meat packing. MSA officials remained reasonably sure that U.S. aid would both provide Turkey with the financial resources needed to carry out its military goals and oversee a reasonable rate of economic development. But the MSA would not force suggestions regarding the economy down the throats of the Turks. So long as the Turks carried out their financial affairs without glaring mismanagement, MSA officials considered it reasonable to inform the Turks “what we think about their general economic policies, but, if unable to convince them of a particular point, we should not try to badger or bludgeon them into doing what we think is wise regardless.”

The transition from ECA to MSA did not go smoothly. From 1948-1950 the ECA carried out its tasks admirably until the morale of its personnel began to erode and its responsibilities grew less distinct during the Korean War. The untrammeled optimism once embodied in the Marshall Plan flagged in the face of geopolitical realities the fighting in Korea illustrated all too vividly, and the impossibility of the ECA meeting its goals of European economic recovery within the prescribed timeframe sapped the ECA of some of its initial buoyancy. Most European nations required substantially more than four years before their

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458 Letter to Mr. Walter S. Rogers, Institute of Current World Affairs, from Richard D. Robinson (June 1, 1952): 1.
460 Price 224.
461 Throughout late 1952 and early 1953 the various arms of the MSA compiled final reports drawn on experiences of the ECA during the previous five years. From town planning to farm mechanization, irrigation to port development, the various experts and analysts compiled their various findings in what amounted to a vast recipe for continuing modernization in Turkey. One thread interweaves through these various reports: a call for greater state involvement through a combination of reorganization or recombination of existing bureaucracies and the creation of new ones. Another common theme: increased education and technical assistance, primarily in the rural areas. Most of the reports’ authors highlighted the dizzying successes of the past years. “The wooden plow and brush harrow have disappeared from the now modernized cotton farms in Turkey,” boasted one report, replaced with “more than 6000 tractors … brought into the country through Marshall Plan aid, along with the necessary planting and cultivating equipment.” David T. Killough “Final Report on Cotton Production and Quality Improvement Programs for Turkey” Record Group 469 Economic Cooperation Administration, Special Mission to Turkey, Office of the Technical Assistance Officer, Mission to Turkey, Technical Assistance Division, Records Relating to Technical Assistance Projects, 1950-1955.
economies would be strong enough to function without foreign assistance. Turkey was no exception. American officials continued struggled to meet fundamental policy goals in Turkey after four years. While Turkey and the U.S. still shared the same general objectives and basic policies, breakdowns in cooperation tended to occur at the technical level. Haydar Görk, Secretary for the Turkish Organization for International Economic Cooperation, observed that Turkish Ministers not fully conversant with the Marshall Plan and the ECA/MSA programs often made mistakes and failed to coordinate policies with one another.462 Miscommunication between Americans and Turks often foiled policy implementation. MSA officials found that conveying the meaning of the term “productivity” to Turkish officials at the Ministry of Agriculture and farmers alike to be a difficult undertaking, because of its limited use in the language and its failure to inspire an “emotional reaction.” The Turks could easily grasp that improved agricultural efficiency had its rewards in money and national strength, but couldn’t articulate how this new productivity worked to the MSA’s satisfaction. The concept of productivity seemed to be even more intangible in the field of industry. The Turks utilized more efficient operating procedures in the construction and maintenance of state railroads and highways, sectors that received large scale or long-term American technical assistance and guidance, but the knowledge accrued by Turks remained limited to a handful of administrators. The MSA looked to place more emphasis on the fields of industry and management through increased training, seminars, and the distribution of instructional materials.

The MSA Mission planned to continue many of the responsibilities of the ECA Mission, to study and analyze the development of Turkey’s economy with particular emphasis on the impact of the Turkish military on future prospects for growth, to guide Turkey in utilizing American economic and technical assistance, and to promote economic planning. The MSA hoped to encourage Ankara to formally request the technical assistance needed to encourage private American capital and stimulate Turkish private industrial enterprises. The MSA would carry out its duties with significantly fewer personnel and a faster turnover rate than the ECA; in December of 1952 the MSA Turkey Mission could only muster a staff of six to negotiate the primary workload. Vacant positions in the Mission remained unfilled and angry cables to Washington met with stony silence. Russell H. Dorr, the outgoing ECA Mission’s Chief after four years’ service, observed: “virtually nothing gets done in the field of economic coordination of the broad general objectives except insofar as these are contributed to by specific projects which we can handle on an ad hoc basis.”

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466 Except from a letter by Russell H. Dorr to N. C. de Paul (6-29-52) RG 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948-1961, Turkey Division, 1948-1953. In late 1952 the State Department organized teams of business executives organized to assess MSA programs and personnel operating in Europe and Southeast Asia. The Turkey team consisted of four executives from the Corn Products Refining Company. Frederick Morris Sayre, the head of the evaluation project in Turkey, unfortunately passed away during the evaluation survey. The findings of the each team found that each country participating in the Mutual Security Program had experienced economic growth and military strengthening within budget. Because of these improvements the teams advised that future financial assistance for economic purposes be reduced over the next year and, with some specific exceptions, generally brought to an end by June 1954. In the teams’ view the US needed to “apply practical action to the realization that friendship cannot be bought and must be earned” and “stop trying to operate the economies of other countries - - meddling, as it is so often called, in their internal operations.” The survey teams lacked the proper background to assess the effectiveness of military expenditures, but did find
M. Leon Dayton, Dorr’s replacement as head of the Turkey Mission, and the former leader of the Mission in Italy, believed that the MSA could build upon the ECA’s successes, so long as the MSA maintained amicable relations with Ankara and its representatives projected an air of assurance. “The Turks are unlike any other people in Europe in that they have absolute confidence in themselves,” Dayton wrote in September 1952, in that “they can neither be threatened nor cajoled into doing anything. They can, however, in my judgment, be persuaded to do many things if we establish close enough working relations with them.” When attempting to convince the Turks of the necessity of economic reforms to fix the deficit and balance of payments problems, the MSA “must deal with it from strength and confidence rather than an attitude of passing responsibility to someone else, even an international agency” such as the OEEC or NATO.  

_Dissent over Turkey’s Economic Conditions and Statism_

during the course of their travels that in many countries the armed forces and civilians differed in what levels of military preparedness with the military unsurprisingly being more vocal for preparation for any emergency at any time. The survey teams’ findings conflicted with the MSA Mission’s complaints of limited manpower: “We saw ample evidence of too many people doing too many things and too many of them of a very minor nature. It indicates lack of overall planning and a proper evaluation of the various projects.” Evaluation Report, Executive Office of the President, Office of the Director for Mutual Security, Washington 25, D.C. (24 March 1953): 3-4. Dorr cited Turkey’s ongoing negotiations with NATO as a sore point, that until the Turks managed to become full members in the Alliance their associate membership status precipitated “a strong sense of exclusion from the free world community which of course militated strongly against the acceptance of any ideas of mutual economic interest and cooperation.” Except from a letter by Russell H. Dorr to N. C. de Paul (6-29-52).

467 CONFIDENTIAL – Security Information, Letter to William H. Draper and Paul R. Porter from Leon M. Dayton (September 13, 1952) RG 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948- 1961, Turkey Division, 1948-1953. Memorandum for the Files (October 23, 1952) Group 469, Records of US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Mission to Turkey, the Chief of Mission Administrative Records, 1948-56. Ankara found dealing with international organizations when making aid requests to be something of a challenge. With Congress expected to cut back on foreign aid and Turkey continuing to run up sizeable deficits, the Turks decided to look to venues other than the U.S. for help. In August, 1952 the Turkish Government asked the OEEC for a credit to cover its deficit of $34.2 million in the EPU for the month, a request the MSA Mission supported. The EPU Managing Board rejected the request and decided against offering the Turks any more temporary credits, while the MSA supported a short-term loan, provided the Turks made available information that would allow the lender to make advice on steps that could be taken to ensure the loan’s safety. Turkey’s continuing negligence in meeting its EPU payments discouraged Washington from committing to specific amounts of aid until it had concrete proof of the Turks’ willingness to use the aid for more constructive and immediate purposes, such as its deficit and balance of payments problems. Otherwise, given their recent history with the EPU, the Turks seemed likely to squander US funds and then return hat in hand to request still more. PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, Letter to M. L. Dayton from Paul R. Porter (September 13, 1953) RG 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948- 1961, Turkey Division, 1948-1953.
Getting the Turks to listen to MSA suggestions proved difficult. The opinions of Turkish and MSA officials regarding the severity of Turkey’s economic situation conflicted considerably, particularly when it came to EPU debts. In September, 1952 Paul R. Porter, the MSA’s Deputy Special Representative in Europe, met with Turkish leaders to discuss the deficits Turkey accrued in the EPU during July and August. Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan argued that imports from EPU nations strengthened Turkey’s economy and military, and helped to raise the standard of living. In essence, an EPU deficit should be viewed as “normal” until the completion of Turkey’s development. Domestic production continued to rise, and Polatkan cautioned that restrictions such as deliberalization might slow progress by creating a sense of “confusion and uneasiness in the Turkish people.”

Thanks to U.S.-provided machinery and cooperative weather conditions the peasants could produce enough to move past mere subsistence. Any attempt to hold back their progress might bring about the collapse of the development program and possibly all of Turkey, giving the Soviets greater freedom to gain influence in North Africa and Asia. Porter offered a “friendly suggestion and not a formal proposal” that Turkey allow an OEEC mission to objectively investigate the economic situation. Turkish insistence that the August deficit could not be viewed as an omen of future economic

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469 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION, MSA MISSION, ANKARA, TURKEY, MEETING WITH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (September 9, 1952) RG 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948-1961, Turkey Division, 1948-1953. Menderes reiterated the same points: the “temporary difficulties” had been brought about by a fear of deliberalization and “psychological factors.” Menderes gently chided his American guests’ fears of the size of the August deficit and their failure to take into account the fact that the government recently sold large quantities of wheat that would eventually cover the deficit. Conservative American estimates of 1.3 million tons of exported wheat were overshadowed by the actual totals of 1.6-2 million tons. Menderes also boasted of $60 million worth of goods sitting in Istanbul warehouses waiting to be exported. Should Turkey decide to make deliberalization a necessary measure, the Prime Minister guaranteed that the flow of imports into Turkey could be halted at any time to create surpluses, but feared that doing so might diminish the results of American aid. SECRET, MUTUAL SECURITY AGENCY, Ankara, Turkey, MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION at the PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, Tuesday-September 9, 1952 – 5:00 p.m., RG 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948-1961, Turkey Division, 1948-1953.
upheaval did not solve the immediate problem of paying the deficit. Ambassador McGhee cautioned Menderes that Turkey’s failure to cover its standing debts would jeopardize its internal domestic stability and push the country closer to bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{470} Porter cited successful OEEC missions to Germany and the Netherlands that ended in successful recommendations for improving the internal financial positions of both countries and eventual surpluses.\textsuperscript{471} The Menderes Government rejected an OEEC study with such hostility that Dayton feared that the Turkey Mission might lose much of its bargaining ability and require substantial personnel changes. The Turkish leaders could not grasp why the OEEC should send a team to carry out a study of the Turkish economy when the Turkey Mission could do so. Ankara refused to believe the situation to be as dire as the Americans claimed, and feared any action to suggest so might jeopardize national confidence.\textsuperscript{472} Although not opposed in principle to an OEEC survey, the Menderes regime feared that its presence would seem to portend economic disaster, playing into the hands of the political opposition by suggesting that the Turkish government could not handle its financial affairs without outside assistance.\textsuperscript{473}

Compounding American worries was the fact that the Turkey’s could not move larger numbers of exportable commodities, especially wheat, now selling at prices lower than those in the previous two years.\textsuperscript{474} A British official diagnosed the Turks’ ills to Enver Güreli, the newly

\textsuperscript{470} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{471} SECRET – SECURITY INFORMATION, MSA MISSION, ANKARA, TURKEY, MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION at the MINISTRY OF FINANCE (September 8, 1952).
\textsuperscript{473} SECRET – SECURITY INFORMATION, MSA MISSION, ANKARA, TURKEY, MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION at the MINISTRY OF FINANCE (September 8, 1952).
\textsuperscript{474} These conditions led to the development of an extreme trade imbalance between Turkey and Britain; from January to August of 1952 British imports totaling £25.4 million entered Turkey and £4.9 million worth of Turkish exports entered the British market. FO 371/101878, ANGLO-TURKISH TRADE (Written by the Board of Trade) to Sir R. Makins (30\textsuperscript{th} September, 1952). Turkish officials requested the British Government to address the issue. London, while aware of the situation, could do nothing, contending the problem extended from the higher prices of Turkish products compared with other countries. The Turks had overestimated Britain’s willingness to purchase raisins and cotton too early in the season and the price adjustments came too late to make any impact. FO
appointed Minister of Economy and Commerce: “it was only too noticeable that Turkey tended to sit back and wait until people came to buy her produce rather than to go out and positively sell it by making known its quality and offering it at an attractive price.” The MSA advised price reductions and perhaps restrictions on agricultural credits until export earnings began to rise. Turkish officials scoffed at such suggestions. When Minister Güreli heard these recommendations from Dayton in late October 1952, he “went into a tirade about the unrealistic attitude of the US towards Turkey and to some extent the unfair apportionment of help to a country so important in the Middle East.” Güreli viewed Dayton’s proposal’s as indicative of the American tendency to “eulogize Turkey’s efforts and her courageous position in the face of possible Russian invasion” while at the same time ignoring the expedient and effective application of U.S. aid and always placing Turkey “at the bottom of the list” when it came time to dole out fresh funds. Menderes echoed Güreli’s sentiments regarding American officials misjudging “the temperament and character of the Turkish people.” Menderes claimed that MSA officials relied too much upon statistical information and economic theory when making assessments of Turkish economic trends, rather than recognizing the true causes for the state’s failure to sell more exportable goods: the continuing hesitance of governmental agencies to follow Menderes’s recommendations on pricing policies, and the growing fear generated by rumors that international organizations and the U.S. sought to coerce the Turkish government into selling exportable commodities at prices below the international market. Menderes refused to consider deliberalizing measures such as lowering the prices of agricultural goods.


475 Ibid.

476 Memorandum for the Files (October 23, 1952).

477 Ibid.

478 FO 371/101878, RESTRICTED, 1121/41/52, Letter to R. Burns, Esq., Board of Trade, Horse Guards Avenue, London, S.W.1., from J.G. Barney, First Secretary (Commercial), (25th September, 1952).
Menderes referred to Turkish farmer to justify his reasoning, explaining that prior to 1950 they received less than one-third the price for their harvests, keeping them below subsistence-levels for centuries. Implementing policies that lowered the farmers’ standard of living would be detrimental to the nation’s political and social stability. The Americans need not concern themselves with such issues because they would lead to Turkey’s eventual independence from American assistance.

The state continued to purchase crops from Turkey’s farmers prior to export by rationalizing that it was better to “suffer an internal loss and increase Turkey’s exportable surplus than adapt internal prices to world market prices and lose the stimulus to the farmers.” The Turks expected to receive higher prices for their exports without considering their customers’ expectations in regards to cost, quality and reliability of supply. In the face of rising inflation Ankara grudgingly reduced the price of wheat and cotton, its two leading exports, to make them more competitive on the increasingly aggressive world market. Even with increased production Turkish agriculture still required improvements in harvesting practices, and the grading and standardization of both grain and livestock. Turkey’s failure to adopt grade and quality standards enabled foreign buyers to offer the price of the lowest grade, leading to a loss of foreign exchange.

Turkish leaders gave every indication of wanting to embrace the free market and forsake

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479 Memorandum for the Files (October 23, 1952).
480 Ibid.
481 RESTRICTED, Mr. Guy Trancart, RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN TURKISH ECONOMY, (April 6, 1953).
482 FO 371/101878, ANGLO-TURKISH TRADE (Written by the Board of Trade) to Sir R. Makins (30th September, 1952). To Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Office, Whitehall, S.W.1., from Turkish Embassy, London, No:875/182/3243, (24th September, 1952).
483 TO: Department of State, FROM: Ankara, REF: Required Report (Code 00A59), SUBJECT: ANNUAL ECONOMIC REVIEW – TURKEY, 1951 (February 25, 1952). Turkish wheat had been selling for $136 per ton, $40 above the world market cost, and cotton at $.35 per pound, down from $.60 per pound. Part of this was due to market readjustments following a sharp rise in demand during the Korean War when Turkish cotton could readily be sold for $1.20 per pound.
statism for good. Even President Bayar, an economist and the Menderes government’s most ardent supporter of statist policies, regularly declared that statism had no place in the modern Turkey and should be abandoned in favor of private enterprise. This did not convince Ambassador McGhee that Turkey could make the leap to a free-enterprise market system without continued state initiative.\textsuperscript{484} Even with the creation of the Industrial Development Bank (IDB) in March 1952 to encourage development projects, Turkey’s progress towards a more open investment atmosphere remained painfully slow. Many Turks refused to consider handing over their extra earnings for others to manage or to even make deposits in banks.\textsuperscript{485} Available private investment capital came almost exclusively from wealthy individuals and families who invested in their own enterprises, the IDB, or real estate ventures.\textsuperscript{486} The MSA advised foreign companies to cooperate closely with Turkish capitalists and through existing Turkish companies to give branches of foreign companies in Turkey “a genuine Turkish character and point of view.”\textsuperscript{487}

Public and private American business ventures met with limited success in Turkey. In early July 1953, The Turkish government granted the Morrison-Knudsen International Company, Inc. of San Francisco a $35,700,000 contract to build a hydroelectric station in southern Turkey’s

\textsuperscript{484} McGhee 123-124.


\textsuperscript{486} Report on Domestic Investment in Turkey, Prepared by: DSMacdonald Contributor: EAÖzardaşlar (date unknown) RG 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948- 1961, Turkey Division, 1948-1953. The MSA regarded Turkey as the “Frontier” Country in Europe, lingering on the periphery of Western Europe in a political, economic as well as geographic sense with half of its cultivatable land still in pasture and most of its mineral wealth untapped. Informative brochures on Turkey produced by US government agencies took great pains to describe the hardscrabble conditions of the average Turkish peasant who dwelled in a pre-industrial world not unlike “the manor villages of medieval Europe,” sleeping on the floor while his animals “sleep nearby, sometimes in the same room.” Office of Public Affairs, Department of State “Turkey: Frontier of Freedom” 2-3.

Seyhan River valley with construction to commence the following October. Several American
tire companies scrutinized the Turkish market to assess the potential profitability of building
rubber tire plans in Turkey. But the lack of raw materials such as rubber, the high cost of
electricity, the limited number of skilled workers, and the absence of a standardization system
forced the companies to shelve their plans.\textsuperscript{488}

The MSA created an investigative mission to look into what sorts of legislative and
administrative means could be used to increase foreign capital investment from the US and other
countries.\textsuperscript{489} The investment mission emphasized creating economic conditions in Turkey not unlike those in America, so as to put U.S. investors at greater ease, such as reducing competition from state enterprises. The mission advised the Turks learn to solicit American capital and
demonstrate new initiative to make investment opportunities known to Americans because “no
one can do it for you.” If Turkey desired American capital, “it must convince Americans that the
opportunity is greater in Turkey than in America, and they must make it easy for American
capital to enter Turkey” by turning away from collectivist and statist policies.\textsuperscript{490} Turkey needed to convince American investors of its concerted efforts to wean itself off collectivism, “by the
will of its people, and to turn squarely toward private initiative and free enterprise with bold and
daring action. America will love that when they understand it.”\textsuperscript{491} With the backing of the
majority of the Turkish people the Menderes government intended to limit the influence of
statism through the conversion of SEEs into holding companies with the shares sold on the

\textsuperscript{488} RESTRICTED, MEMORANDUM, Private Views of a Leading Merchant-Industrialist on Current
Economic and Commercial Developments in Istanbul, (April 17, 1953) Group 469: Records of US Foreign
\textsuperscript{489} AIRGRAM, MUTUAL SECURITY AGENCY, SUBJECT – Terms of Reference for the Private
\textsuperscript{490} REMARKS MADE BY MR. RANDALL TO A REPORTER AT HIS DEPARTURE FROM ANKARA
\textsuperscript{491} Ibid.
market. Turkish officials drafted the bill for this measure to go before the GNA for debate and a vote. Menderes assured the investment mission that their work heralded the start of a new era in collaboration between Turkey and the U.S.

MSA officials found it challenging to assess development patterns in Turkey in light of the demographical, topographical, economic and climatic variety present from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Anatolian interior. Great diversity existed in the types of development projects, ranging from the larger national-level SEEs to provincial state projects and modest private capital enterprises. SEEs continued to dominate large mining ventures such as the coal mines near Tavsanli and the Eti Bank’s sulfur mine at Keciborlu, and hydroelectric power projects at Lake Egridir and Lake Kavara. Smaller provincial projects included providing rural areas with water and electricity, and constructing roads and public buildings. Ankara oversaw the construction of roads that linked neighboring provinces while provincial governments monitored the building of roads connecting villages. The DP remained keen to keep up its paternalistic efforts to bring roads, electricity and drinking water to remote areas of Western Turkey in a bid to assure popular support in the coming 1954 election.

The pattern of a marked divergence between the urbanized Western and underdeveloped Eastern parts of Turkey continued, but MSA representatives saw satisfactory proof of economic progress in even the least developed parts of Turkey. But the simplest things continued to hold back economic development; the two coal mines located near Tavsanli had newly installed modern machinery, courtesy of the MSA, intended to increase their output by 25%, but couldn’t maintain the pace

493 Ibid 39.
due to a lack of spare parts, a similar problem in other mines. The scarcity of spare automotive parts forced mechanics to cannibalize old cars in order to keep running the few that were in Turkish hands.

The Eisenhower Administration Comes to Power

Much of the MSA’s desire to hasten Turkey’s economic independence resulted from shifting security concerns. In 1951 the ECA could cite Turkey as an Asian nation oriented toward the West and democracy while rejecting socialism. By virtue of culture, religion, geography, and history, Washington assumed that many Asian nations possessed “natural bonds of sympathy” with Turkey, and looked to her as a leader and example worthy of emulation. The ambiguous conclusion of the war in Korea called into question the Truman administration’s treatment of international communism as a monolithic threat. Trotting out a prosperous and stable Turkey to be “the West’s Exhibit A in the struggle the free world is waging…for the minds and souls of hundreds of millions of people of Asia” made sense in 1951 but bordered on naïveté two years later. Given such alterations in American thinking, Ankara reacted with alarm to the possibility of more distant relations with the United States once the Korean War officially came to an end in July 1953.

Dwight Eisenhower’s victory in 1952’s bitter presidential election and the subsequent personnel changes in both Washington and diplomatic posts overseas suggested the incoming administration’s policy goals. On June 19, 1953, George McGhee resigned as Ambassador to

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497 ECA Special Mission to Turkey, Justification of Continuing Economic Aid to Turkey.
498 Ibid.
Turkey in order to make way for his replacement, Avra Warren. In less than two years McGhee demonstrated sensitivity to Turkey’s economic aspirations, and a willingness to provide measured and well-considered advice. The British Embassy did not react to McGhee’s departure with disappointment; one official, A.K. Helm, noted that under the former ambassador, “flattery was the keynote of [the] American attitude to Turkey. Since, however, the departure of Mr. McGhee six months ago, and the change of the heads of both the United States military missions, and of the economic mission, a somewhat less sycophantic note seems to be beginning to be sounded.” Helm believed a reduction in American flattery of the Turks “which has done so much to inflate their idea of their self-importance” would prove helpful in the long-run by leading to an era of realistic dealings between Turkey and the US leading to a relationship grounded “on a more solid and maturer basis than that of the irritating relationship of paymaster and dependent.”

While Eisenhower did not propose to completely abandon Turkey and its financial concerns, he did not intend to continue America’s wanton military spending. During the Korean War the U.S. defense budget expanded by nearly 400%, much of it going to America’s allies. Eisenhower feared that a policy of containment made the U.S. seem overbearing in the eyes of the world, while being unproductive and unjustifiable at home by causing higher inflation and the potential for need for state-enforced economic controls. Eisenhower requested that all FY 1954 programs be scrutinized for possible cuts. The MSA made its case

501 Ibid.
before the Bureau of the Budget in the spring of 1953 and “encountered some unexpected and vigorous opposition to the Turkish program” compared to earlier meetings with the Bureau.504

In a late April meeting with the Senate Appropriations Committee, MSA Chief Dayton emphasized Turkey’s gradual democratizing and continued resistance to the Soviets. The main problem the U.S. faced in funding Turkey’s future defense needs was “whether to tailor the Turkish defense effort to the help that we can give or alternatively, to tailor the help we give Turkey to necessary defense goals.” Dayton estimated Turkey would be able to fund its defense needs independently within five to six years at a cost of $70-100 million from outside sources, including the MSA.505

Ankara still expected Washington to cover future expansions of the Turkish defense establishment in the face of tightening controls over such aid. Turkey’s nagging payments imbalance with the EPU compounded this dilemma. The Turks found it increasingly difficult to pay for imports and to refuse advance payments for exports, leading to a deficit far exceeding its EPU quota of $50 million. Gold reserves grew scanty, and despite promises from Turkish

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505 Letter from Kay Shorter to N. Carter de Paul Jr., Discussion on Turkey with Renssaeeler (April 20, 1953) Record Group 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies Europe, 1948-1961, Turkey Division, 1948-1953. Two major development projects in Turkey were not to receive future MSA funding, the Zonguldak Coal Mines and the Sariyar Hydroelectric Facility. Neither project was close to meeting its original completion date; the slowness of progress seemed to suggest to Dayton that these projects were not being “implemented on a sound engineering and economic basis.” Following an investigation by the MSA, Washington decided to end any financing on these projects and request a refund of $5 million for the direct dollar aid expenditures that had gone towards the Sariyar project. The dam's original estimate had been $45 million; the new cost of completion stood at $65 million. Slowing the production of electricity could potentially cost the DP votes in the upcoming national elections. Facing a possible political backlash, Menderes had the option of rescheduling and reassessing the costs of the two projects and then enlisting the assistance of a reputable American engineering firm to supervise subsequent construction as a means of encouraging the MSA to reconsider its decision to cut off its funds. Dayton supported this option, particularly because should the two projects stall out, it would become that much more difficult to secure future assistance from the MSA, the IBRD and other lending groups. Ankara needed to acknowledge the limits of its current project administration and “devise and administrative procedure which would assure that the projects were carried out with maximum efficiency and minimum cost.” Menderes agreed to the prospective solution.

leaders that it would rebalance their accounts through major increases in exports, a significant grain sale had not occurred in months by late 1953 while imports continued to climb. The MSA worried that limits on Turkey’s imports would lead to a gradual loss of its money supply and Turkish exports losing competitiveness because of higher prices. The U.S. might step in before this cycle of economic upheaval began, but as in the case of encouraging Turkey to modify its military, it would have to provide the funds to do so.

In late May, 1953, John Foster Dulles, the new Secretary of State, stopped in Ankara to unveil plans for his “Northern Tier” model for the defense of the Middle East, whereby Turkey, rather than the British choice, Egypt, would become the leader in regional defense. Even with the proposed Northern Tier Defense Project the Menderes government still assumed the British to be more committed to the long-term in the security of the Middle East than the U.S. Ankara would look to the U.S. as the primary source of weapons and financial aid, but could not be convinced that Washington would make long-term commitments to the Middle East as evidenced by America’s refusal to join the Baghdad Pact. With Turkey in MEC the British viewed its relationship with the Turks as “more cordial as they had been for many years,” and of paramount value to resolving many issues in the Middle East. Because Turkey doubted that the Arab countries could be relied upon to pull their full weight in the Northern Tier model, Menderes planned to expand his nation’s military from 330,000 personnel to 410,000 by the fall. By that point he believed Turkish military’s infrastructure would be more than capable of absorbing an

506 Ibid.
508 C.C. (52) 102nd Conclusions, Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Thursday 4th December, 1952 at 11.30 a.m.
additional half a billion dollars’ worth of additional military equipment from the U.S.

Menderes’s sales pitch to Dulles boiled down to more containment value for the dollar: “it is clear that dollars spent in Turkey will buy more for defense than those expended in any other country.”510 Menderes assured Dulles of his commitment to raising the national standard of living, but his foremost goal remained maintaining a strong army using its own resources, a position it would be able to reach if economic development could continue with the continuance of American aid.511

The Soviets’ “Peace Offensive” Against Turkey

Washington growing drive to cut domestic defense appropriations and defense programs overseas made American aid to Turkey increasingly harder to justify.512 A conflict such as the Korean War was “an effort of a magnitude which [the U.S.] cannot sustain forever” and the death of Stalin in March offered the promise of improved East-West relations.513 As a sign of this Moscow began a concerted effort to mollify the Turks soon after Stalin’s passing, a campaign the Turks reacted to with the utmost cynicism. On May 30, 1953 the Soviets dispatched a formal note recognizing the sovereignty of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan and rejecting previous demands for bases in the Straits. Moscow agreed to honor the tenets of the 1936 Montreux Convention and “deemed it possible to ensure the safety of the USSR from the side of the Straits on conditions acceptable alike to the USSR and Turkey.”514 Menderes, in

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511 Ibid 142.
513 Ibid 149.
514 “C. TURKEY-SOVIET UNION. – Soviet Renunciation of Territorial Claims on Turkey” in Keesing’s Contemporary Archives: Weekly Diary of Important World Events with Index Continually Kept Up-to-Date, Volume No. IX, 1952-1954 13101. The statement Molotov read to the Turkish Ambassador alluded to 1925’s Russo-Turkish Treaty of Amity, which the Soviets denounced two decades later, as well as their offer to give up its claims to Kars
London at the time, urged that the British, French, and U.S. Embassies in Moscow keep the matter secret and refrain from making any public statements. The British and French decided against imparting any advice as to the correct response. Moscow’s sudden show of clemency contrasted sharply with its bellicose notes to Turkey after it joined NATO the year before. Ankara viewed the Russian overture as inauthentic and possibly dangerous, but sent Moscow a note expressing wishes for renewed cooperation between the two countries. Ankara regarded Moscow’s so-called “peace offensive” of 1953 as merely a ploy to lull the West into a false sense of security before separating the allies from one another. The Turks urged their Western allies to remain vigilant and adherence to the existing policy. Stalin’s death should not

and Ardahan and to accept the status quo of the Straits. In their past policies the Soviets had combined these three subjects together while the Turks strove to keep them each separate to be negotiated singly. FO 371/107552, SOVIET STATEMENT OF 31ST OF MAY TO THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR AT MOSCOW, Historical Note, Foreign Office (10th June, 1953).

515 FO 371/107552, FROM ANKARA TO FOREIGN OFFICE, Cypher/OTF, Sir K. Helm, No. 236. (June 3, 1953).

516 FO 371/107552, Letter to Western & Southern Dept. (June 5, 1953). Officials at the British Foreign Office poured over the note to glean its meaning and Soviet intentions. A.C. Maby could not make sense of Russia’s timing in sending the note. Just as the Russian campaign of 1945 against Turkey had focused on multiple fronts including Turkish journalists and statesmen, the Soviets were once again making wide-ranging overtures. As to the note’s timing, Maby concluded that it may have been due to the Balkan Pact or Turkey’s present quandary regarding MEDO or that “Russia feels that Turkey as America’s staunchest supporter (so they think) in Europe requires special attention.” FO 371/107552, Soviet Note to Turkey, (A.C. Maby) June 5, 1953, H.T. Morgan viewed the note as the first significant application of Russia’s “new look” foreign policy in Europe since Stalin’s death. The note “also follows the principle of extracting the maximum credit from concessions that cost nothing - a principle visible in most of the Soviet conciliatory gestures so far.” Soviet leaders knew full well that their territorial demands or a base on the Straits would only be possible if war came. While Stalin never compromised on this issue, the current leaders “are willing to make a virtue of necessity.” Morgan cautioned that the note might be part of a larger Soviet plan to weaken NATO’s southern flank and might be the prelude to a more concerted effort to lure Turkey away from the Alliance, including dissuading the Turks from allowing foreign troops to be stationed in their land. FO 371/107552, Soviet Note to Turkey, (H.T. Morgan) June 4, 1953.


518 FO 371/107552, Cypher/OTP, No. 2298, June 4, 1953. An internal crisis in Moscow began even before Stalin’s death with a three-way conflict over who should take his place. Malenkov and Beria made up one group, Molotov and the old guard the second, and the army added to the tension.

convince NATO to scale back its efforts, but instead “should be handled in a more dynamic
manner.”

Menderes and other Turkish leaders believed that the death of Stalin inaugurated a more
perilous stage of the Cold War rather than a safer one. At a meeting between Ambassador
Warren and Foreign Minister Köprülü, Köprülü shared his view that the new Soviet regime’s
supposedly “peaceful” approach to diplomacy to be “much more guileful and dangerous than
Stalin’s bumbling bluntleness, while Western Europe’s morale [was] still low and susceptibility
high.” Köprülü derided the “Western European penchant for expert theories and analyses of
Soviet intentions” blocking a reality “simple enough to be understood by every Turkish
peasant.”

Most Turkish newspapers expressed satisfaction that the Soviets apparently no
longer desired Turkish territory, but at the same time called attention to the fact that previous
Russian intransigence pushed Turkey into the arms of NATO. Turkish officials assured
London that the Turkish Government “would never be susceptible to Soviet pressure and
propaganda and would stand firmly by their agreements with the Western Powers” and continue
to carry out its obligations to the Alliance.

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520 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION, FROM: Ankara, TO: Secretary of State, NO: POLTO 1733
(SECTION TWO OF TWO) (May 13, 1953) RG 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe,
521 INCOMING TELEGRAM, Department of State, SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION, FROM:
Ankara TO: Secretary of State, NO: 581, (December 8, 1953) Group 469: Records of US Foreign Assistance
522 FO 371/107552, FROM ANKARA TO FOREIGN OFFICE, Sir Knox Helm, No. 26 Saving. Dated
June 17 1953.
523 FO 371/107552, Sir F. Roberts, The Question of the Straits, (August 11, 1953). Even with the paranoid
Stalin no longer in power the American military’s flurry of activity in the Near East, Middle East and the
Mediterranean seemed to weigh heavily on the Soviets in late 1953. Russian newspapers carried articles criticizing
the “aggressive plans of the American imperialists” for these regions and particularly Turkey. Moscow wondered if
the U.S. and Turkey had reached a secret agreement placing Turkey’s naval and air bases and its armed forces at the
disposal of American command. Turkey had not given the U.S. free rein to use military installations it had assisted
in building, such as the recently opened naval base at Iskenderun, and only six U.S. naval personnel were attached to
the base to serve as advisors. NATO installations did exist in Turkey, in spite of Russia’s protests, and American
personnel commanded and dominated both the Army and Air Headquarters at Izmir, a situation the Soviets
frequently cited to foment dissent. FO 371/107552, T. Belashchenko, “Turkish Fleet in Plans of American
Disputes over Foreign Policy and NATO Membership

In general, American aid programs remained relatively free of Turkish criticism, thanks to the changes it had funded. Turkish schools renounced curricula based on the more theoretical French system in favor of a “more practical” American model. Under the aegis of the Technical Assistance Program, the Exchange of Persons Program, and the United States Information Service young Turks trained in the U.S. to become engineers and technicians. English came to replace French and German as the most popular second language among educated Turks.\footnote{FO 371/107552, Letter from David Scott Fox to H.A.F. Hohler, Esq., Foreign Office, London, S.W.1. (November 11, 1953).}

Most crucially, American aid made it possible for the Turkish Government to invest in economic development. Some MSA officials believed that the cumulative effect of U.S.-provided electric generators, tractors, and construction and mining equipment helped to initiate great changes in Turkey and paved the way to “a genuine Turkish feeling of friendship and admiration for the United States.” With the U.S. and Turkey serving as “equals and allies” in NATO, the relationship had been “enhanced and qualified” to the point that Turkey’s no longer viewed itself as an “‘underdeveloped’ outsider receiving magnanimously given aid from on high.”\footnote{FO 371/101868, CONFIDENTIAL, No, 56, Letter from the British Embassy, Ankara. (21st March, 1952).}

Not everyone viewed the continuing closeness between the U.S. and Turkey with zeal. İnönü spent the late summer of 1953 in Istanbul giving speeches at a several public meetings. Although İnönü refrained from directly attacking the DP’s foreign policy, he warned that Turkey had potentially forfeited its economic independence and self-sufficiency in exchange for national security funded by the U.S.\footnote{UNCLASSIFIED, FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH, TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, FROM: AmConGen, Istanbul, Turkey, SUBJECT: İnönü’s Political Activity in Istanbul (October 7, 1953) Group 469: Records of US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948-1961, Europe, Turkey Division, 1948-1953.} Menderes fired back, claiming that the RPP’s continuing...
stubbornness compromised the government’s ability to meet its security and democratization goals. He specifically condemned the RPP for embarrassing Turkey abroad by drawing attention to the country’s supposed financial instability and balance of payments problems and promoting civil strife through the use of agents acting as “incendiaries” active in “poisoning the public with lies, accusations, intrigues.” U.S. Embassy officials theorized that Menderes’s sudden indulgence in rhetoric was “based more on personality conflicts than on domestic political issues” and did not suggest the Menderes government’s prohibition of multiparty politics in the near future.

The Menderes government moved beyond mere rhetoric in exploring ways to cripple its political opposition and ensure victory in the national elections of 1954. In late 1953 the DP inched towards passing legislation that would allow the confiscation of assets the RPP supposedly obtained illegally and thereby stymie the participation of the RPP in the 1954 election. The American Embassy worried that the seizure of RPP assets, particularly the official newspaper, Ulus (Nation), “would have unfortunate repercussions” in Turkish politics.

528 Ibid.  
529 Zürcher 233. Seeking to eliminate its political rival the DP explored the possibility of bankrupting the RPP out of existence. Soon after coming to power the Menderes administration discussed charging the RPP with 7,000,000 TL ($2.5 million) for the public funds and properties that it supposedly “illegally” obtained during nearly three decades of rule. Most of the money the DP claimed has been misapplied by the RPP went into the construction and maintenance of a number of People’s Houses (Halk Eviler) and Rooms throughout Turkey. In the 1930s the RPP developed these sites for the purpose of cultural centers. Few with any acquaintance with the nature of Turkish politics doubted that some of funds or properties intended for these cultural centers ended up serving non-political ends; political corruption and graft marked the Republic from the beginning, and Atatürk himself both tolerated and engaged in corrupt activities until his death in 1938. The RPP drew upon this when they defended themselves against the DP’s charges by contending that criticizing their past transgressions amounted to an attack against Atatürk and his form of governance. A fee of 7,000,000 TL would have emptied the RPP’s coffers, and the party fought against the DP’s threats for almost two years until the Menderes government appeared to have dropped the issue. “The Opposition and the Press in Turkey: A Letter from Richard Robinson” American Universities Field Staff 1-2, 4.  
On December 14, 1953 the GNA passed a law that, with few exceptions, “all moveable and immovable properties, moneys, titles, claims and other valuables held in possession by the Republican People’s Party at the time of the enforcement of this law shall be invested in the Treasury.” The Ulus newspaper became an early target in the spring of 1954 when the state seized its property and assets, effectively closing the paper’s offices. Repression became the watchword of the DP to silence dissent in Turkish universities, newspapers and opposition parties. The RPP opposition claimed that the DP used American money to prop up inefficient development programs in rural areas to maintain its loyalty, even in the base of inflation and rising prices. Disgruntled members of the RPP began to grumble that, “If Allah does not provide, America will” and complained about being barred from official functions at the American Embassy and excluded from consultations with US officials. Though marginalized and insecure with the Menderes government in power, the RPP was hardly impotent and retained impressive stockpiles of currency, landholdings, and a minority stake in the Türkiye İş Bankası (The Turkish Workers Bank).

532 Repressive measures such as these betrayed the democratic nature the DP depicted itself as embodying beginning in 1946 and continued to stress up until 1950. One of the crucial planks in the DP’s platform had been to remove all undemocratic laws blighting the Turkish statute books. During his inaugural address to the GNA on May 29, 1950 Bayar made it clear that, “Major laws of ours which are not compatible with progressive life, thereby giving rise to difficulty in application, shall be studies carefully and altered so as to conform to the needs of civilization.” To this end, in mid-1951 the newly elected Menderes government selected officials to serve in the Commission on Undemocratic Laws, an extra-parliamentary group that would pinpoint laws requiring alteration. On February 1, 1952 the Commission submitted its findings and recommendations to the Prime Minister, who then promptly filed to report away, explaining that the statutes the Commission deemed undemocratic were no longer enforced. To the DP’s early detractors, Menderes’ lackadaisical reaction to the Commission’s report suggested his true identity as a strongman. “Turkey’s ‘Undemocratic Laws’: A Letter from Richard D. Robinson” American Universities Field Staff 522 Fifth Ave., New York 36 N.Y. 1-2.
533 Other opposition parties lacked such resources and solidarity. During the summer of 1953 the Nation Party became paralyzed following a schism between the party’s progressive and conservative elements. In early June Hikmet Bayur, one of the party’s founders resigned, prompting Party members throughout Turkey to follow his lead. Soon after, reports surfaced of radical members of the Istanbul branch of the Party conspiring to restore the Caliphate. The state immediate carried out investigations and interrogations of the Party’s Central Committee, then used the information it garnered as justification to suppress the Party on the grounds that it intended to use Islam in order to undermine Turkey’s republican and secular traditions. Ultimately the state charged thirteen leaders of the
Criticizing the DP’s West centric foreign policy cost the RPP dearly; it would have to wait until the 1960s before such a tactic would work. In the interim Menderes benefitted from equating his party with NATO as its network of bases expanded. NATO sponsorship came to replace U.S. auspices in projects such as the growing network of roads, railway lines, and oil pipes linking a new military base in the Anatolian interior. A new naval base at Iskenderun funded, designed, and constructed by the U.S. passed into Turkish hands in October and made immediately available to NATO. Turkish, Greek, and American units came together at a base near Izmir to form NATO’s 6th Allied Tactical Air Force to coordinate the air defenses of Greece, Turkey, and nearby NATO member countries. Evan as the bases opened the Turks continued to struggle with increasing domestic defense production in numbers comparable to other NATO members. Foreign capital remained in woefully short supply, and the tax structure for industry was so unfavorable that potential military goods were priced far beyond comparable items on the world market. Rifles and ammunition produced in Turkey cost far more than those purchased from the U.S., and Turkish armament factories still lacked modern machinery, skilled laborers, and competent managers. Besides ammunition and some basic engineering equipment, all modern equipment required of a modern fighting force had to be imported.

Party as religious reactionaries including the Party’s president, Mustafa Kentli, and an Ankara court ordered the Nation’s Party to disband. This event kicked off a series of trials involving political parties attempting to challenge the government, including one conducted in October in which 167 individuals faced a military court on charges of attempting to create a Turkish Communist Party. More trials involving accused leftist and communist saboteurs and propagandists continued in the months to come. Robinson Development Respecting Turkey, July 1953-October 1954 1-2.


535 Ibid.

536 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN EUROPE AIRGRAM, NO: TOREP A-171, FROM: MSA/ANKARA, TO: MSA/SRE PARIS, SUB: Defense Production Study, OSP FY 54 (April 28, 1953) Group 469: Records of US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948-1961, Europe, Turkey Division, 1948-1953. From a tactical standpoint, this was not troublesome, as facilities in Turkey that produced anything beyond standard military goods might provide critical data to the enemy if captured during an invasion.
U.S. officials in Washington and Ankara impressed upon the Turks the necessity of drawing a distinction between “NATO requirements based on NATO objectives” and “national goals which actually can be achieved.” The Turks continued to believe that a “NATO requirement” of their military meant they would automatically receive the upgrade on the U.S.’s dime. Rather, “NATO requirements” reflected a “desirable but unachievable” long-term goal, such as a Turkish air force of 772 jet fighters, rather than the reality of 417. Until Ankara recognized that these requirements did not necessarily reflect the realities of U.S. funding capacities or Turkey’s economic and absorptive ability, American officials worried the position of the U.S. in Turkey might suffer.537

Some British officials in Turkey regarded the Turks’ motivations for NATO membership with suspicion, and wondered if the Turks viewed NATO solely as a military alliance rather than a political one. A number of developments seemed to indicate Turkey viewed its obligations to the Alliance much differently from other members. The largely exposed frontier Turkey shared with Russia explained much of the difference in perceptions; the need to maintain an attentive watch along the border precluded sending Turkish troops out of the country in the event of a crisis. An example of this hesitance occurred in February 1953 when the Turkish armed forces refused to send any soldiers to assist in the defense of the Straits and Thrace.538 Such hesitation raised fears that Turkey would cling to neutrality if the Soviets attacked the West and deny their Western allies access to Turkish military resources and facilities. British Embassy official Sir A. Knox Helm questioned whether or not the Turks “take their rights under the treaty more seriously than they do their obligations.” Helm identified three main reasons behind Ankara’s

538 FO 371/108017, NAT.7/211 (26th March, 1953).
“burning anxiety” to join NATO: a firm American guarantee, increased economic and military support from the US as a result of NATO membership, and the belief that NATO membership pushed Turkey closer to belonging to the Western “club,” allowing the DP to claim the prize that had eluded its RPP opponents. 539 Helm did not doubt the Turks’ commitment to active participation in NATO so long as Turkey provided little of a direct contribution: “It is flattering to the vanity of the present Turkish leaders to play a prominent role on the N.A.T.O. stage, and far from lagging, they have at times even been inclined to advance too quickly.” However, he conjectured that reduced American aid to Turkey might cause a consequent dampening of Turkey’s enthusiasm for the Alliance. This lack of commitment suggested that self-interest largely governed the Turks’ attitude towards NATO, though Turkey was not the only nation motivated less by altruism than by a desire to survive. What set Turkey apart, in Helm’s analysis, was her focus on the defense facets of the North Atlantic Treaty and lack of regard for the Treaty’s supposed loftier principles. In essence, “though Turkey is a full-hearted and enthusiastic member of N.A.T.O., I regard her attitude toward it as essentially selfish and materialistic.”540

American officials in Turkey received some of the British blame for fostering the Turks’ unrealistic view of their importance in NATO. Endless American flattery and lip service had left the Turks with “a misguided view as to the geographic importance of Turkey in European strategy and therefore, the importance of defending Turkish territory.” According to the British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir James Bowker, Americans seemed to perceive Turkey as being of imperative strategic importance or intended to increase the U.S.’s hegemony in Turkey through the supply of aid; in either respect the adulation had resulted in Turkey regarding itself as “the

539 FO 371/117720, Turkish Attitude to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Obligations Under the North Atlantic Treaty, Sir K. Helm to Sir W. Churchill (Received May12).
540 Ibid.
United States’ principal ally and the strongest element in Europe of NATO” and unwilling to avail itself of British advice.\footnote{FO 371/108017, NAT.7/211 (26\textsuperscript{th} March, 1953).} Given Turkey’s economic flourishing of the last few years Bowker observed that “the Americans regard Turkey as their best advertisement for military and economic assistance” while ignoring the fact that a firm economic foundation existed prior to the Marshall Plan windfall.\footnote{FO 371/104258, Confidential, British Embassy, Ankara, (June 23, 1953).} Bowker found that U.S. officials tended to “propagand crudely and perhaps too much” and all-in-all:

\begin{quote}

there is far too much \textit{va-et-vient} and in fact they are inclined to make themselves rather cheap, thereby perhaps hardly building up respect. But these and other weaknesses are endemic in the American character and temperament, though they attract neither respect nor popularity, they do not affect the main issue, which is the general success of American policy vis-à-vis Turkey.\footnote{Ibid.}

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Bowker concluded that the Americans could help themselves and their British friends by “weakening their doses of flattery which have given the Turks an exaggerated idea of their own importance.” He noted that since the bureaucratic alterations that occurred as the ECA gave way to the MSA and the Eisenhower administration came to power “flattery has become less and I think that towards the end George McGhee had become a little less fulsome.”\footnote{Ibid. The Counselor of the US Embassy Livingstone Satterthwaite identified the Turks’ four basic misapprehensions about NATO: that it was purely a military alliance; that NATO membership worked in only one direction with Turkey not needing to pull its own weight and assist other members, but rather functioned as an expansion of US aid by offering the possibility of assistance from eleven countries; that the size of Turkey’s army ensured that it would be “the spear-head of European defense” and entitled Turkey to certain privileges; and that should Turkey experience a frontal Soviet attack, the Turks would look to the defense of their homeland as the primary responsibility of both the Turkish military and NATO, but there was no guarantee that Turkey would permit access to Turkish military installations should the attack come to a different place or throw its lot in with the other NATO allies. FO 371/108017, NAT.7/211 (26\textsuperscript{th} March, 1953).} The continued generosity of American aid indicated to the British that “Turkey remains in the American good books; her stalwart attitude to Russia and the virtual absence of communism in the country, her internal political stability and her economic potentialities, and the vaunted fighting qualities of
the Turkish soldier, all commend her to the Americans as an ally with whom the investment of
American aid is likely to bring in good dividends in the cold war period.”

British displeasure with American sycophancy aside, Ambassador Bowker could
dentify “no real rivalry between the Americans and ourselves” and little of U.S. policy in
Turkey “which can properly be criticized.” From what Bowler could tell, the Turks did not
intend to weaken their connection to the British but instead hoped to draw closer to both the U.S.
and Britain. Bowker cautioned: “the Turks are so anxious to profit to the maximum extent
from American aid that they will not lightly take a line on any important matter which conflicts
with that of the US.” The British held their ground on retaining the Suez Base until a sufficient
replacement could be found, on all other matters the Americans would be the ones likely to
dictate policy terms to the Turks without feeling to need to consult with London.

Turkish Efforts to Enlarge its Mining and Petroleum Sectors

Menderes still planned to expand Turkey’s military from 320,000 to 500,000, regardless
of projected U.S. aid levels for the next fiscal year. How the Turks would pay for the
enlargement became a topic of American speculation. Although the Turkish GNP continued to
rise, the bulk of it went towards economic development rather than defense measures. The MSA
had no plans of increasing its funds to the Turkish defense budget, and actually planned to cut
back in the future. Turkey had yet to confront its most acute economic problem, the large
balance of payments deficit it financed largely with American aid. The intended military
expansion would rely largely upon a sizable increase in imported items to lead to even larger

545 FO 371/107572, (11617/1/53) British Embassy, Ankara, Letter from A.K. Helm to Anthony Eden, M.C.,
547 Ibid.
548 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION, FROM: Ankara, TO: Secretary of State, NO: 1442 (SECTION
ONE OF TWO) (May 29, 1953) RG 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, 1948- 1961,
Turkey Division, 1948-1953.
deficits. State Department officials did not anticipate the Turks being able to properly maintain and operate the military equipment already in their possession. If Turkey could develop its exploitable resources, such as mining and oil, it might break free from its dependence upon American funds to cover defense expenditures. By late 1952 Turkish mining concessions were extracting fifteen commercially important minerals at several hundred different mines, most with little to no modern equipment assisting in the extraction efforts. Because by law the state owned all of Turkey’s sub-soil, it could seize potentially valuable mineral deposits from private hands. The Menderes government conceded it needed to move away from this statist approach and encourage the growth of the mining sector by handing over public lands to private hands for mineral exploration. In May 1953 the GNA reviewed a draft of a new Turkish Mining Law in anticipation of enacting it before the end of the year. The U.S. Embassy knew the bill would be similar to the Oil Bill in that it permitted Turkish companies created with foreign capital to develop mines with the same rights and privileges as Turkish citizens and full Turkish companies. American mining engineers hypothesized that Turkey could increase its European currency earnings by becoming an exporter of iron ore to NATO allies such as the Netherlands and Italy where affordable iron ore remained in short supply.


551 Office of the Special Representative in Europe Airgram, FROM: SRE, Paris, TO: Washington, Subject: Extracts from Report IR/SRE (Mr. Samuels, Director) on BMP Discussion between Mac Goodman and MSA/Turkey (Dec. 22, 1952) Records Group 469, Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Europe, Turkey Division, 1948-1953. The Turkish Government awarded mining concessions to exploit deposits for periods that ranged from 40 to 99 years. Such concessions were granted only after an operator managed to extract a specific tonnage of ore within a two year period.

supply. Doing so would be useful to these countries’ defense production, draw Turkey closer to the European market, and help to stimulate Turkish private enterprise that continued to dominate the mining sector.553

Increasing the scale of production of the mining industry required more involvement from existing Turkish financial institutions such as the Industrial Development Bank (IDB) to make loans available, courtesy of American funds, to mining operators.554 The MSA Mission remained unconvinced of the Turkish government’s ability to map out a program that brought together the MSA and private Turkish citizens; the main concern was that state officials would attempt to use the money for political purposes such as cronyism and bribery.555 The IDB, with which American officials had established a good working relationship, would act on behalf of the MSA in making available development and production loans of up to $25,000. The MSA proposed that the IDB create a Mining Branch to provide the Turkey Mission with occasional progress reports on how their loans were being utilized.556 Additionally, the IDB’s responsibilities would deflect potential political pressure and criticism connected to the mining industry away from the Turkey Mission.557

553 C. H. Day and C. W. Ryan, “A Plan for Increasing Production of Certain Ores in Turkey: CHROME, MANGANESE, IRON ORE” (July 17, 1953). The nature of mining in Turkey had changed very little in regards to the implementation of mechanization since the beginning of the Marshall Plan. This resulted partly out of concern that it would displace the workforce, but mainly due to an ongoing lack of machinery such as compressors and jackhammers that might have increased productivity. Small-scale operators oversaw most mining operations while the larger, more sophisticated operations were state-owned, yet another hindrance to the industry’s development.
555 Office of the Special Representative in Europe Airgram, FROM: SRE, Paris, TO: Washington, Subject: Extracts from Report IR/SRE (Mr. Samuels, Director) on BMP Discussion between Mac Goodman and MSA/Turkey (Dec. 22, 1952).
557 Office of the Special Representative in Europe Airgram, FROM: SRE, Paris, TO: Washington, Subject: Extracts from Report IR/SRE (Mr. Samuels, Director) on BMP Discussion between Mac Goodman and MSA/Turkey (Dec. 22, 1952)
The State Department looked at 1953 as yet another year in which basic American policy goals for Turkey had been met. Funds and training provided by the U.S. kept Turkey’s military strong against the threat of Soviet invasion and helped to push Turkey closer to “meeting NATO standards in military mechanization, tactics, logistics, procurement and supply functions, and military administration.”558 Turkish troops gained greater insight into the weaponry and methods of effectively waging a modern war through education at Turkish Service Schools.559 Demonstrations and lectures provided by the MSA showed Turkish farmers new and effective methods of feeding their livestock and protecting them from disease, and how to more effectively grade and market their agricultural goods.560 Although the MSA lacked complete and adequate data field observers reported that in most rural areas the people showed “marked evidence of shaking off the traditional lethargic attitude with aroused interest in taking advantages of the newer technologies and services to improve their social and economic status and with relatively increasing confidence in government and governmental agencies to maintain policies that are in the interest of village and agricultural welfare.”561

Developments in Turkey’s oil potential also accelerated in early 1953 following the decision in November 1952 to denationalize oil and create an environment that encouraged private foreign oil companies to assist Turkey in discovering and producing oil. The Menderes government continued to carry out its oil policy and negotiate with foreign companies without


seeking the counsel of the political opposition or engaging in inter-party discussions. Ankara had not yet publicly announced what sort of conditions foreign companies would be expected to operate under.\textsuperscript{562} Turkey required a petroleum law to effectively end the state’s monopoly on oil and offer a share of the profits to foreign companies. Ankara requested Max W. Ball, an esteemed oil and gas consultant, to spend ten days in Turkey and advise the Turks on how to draft a prospective oil policy that reflected current international petroleum conditions. Ball reached Ankara on May 13 to meet with Menderes and the Minister of State Enterprises Sitki Yircali, who made it clear that Turkey’s oil needed to be developed as rapidly as possible. Ball established contacts with local experts at the Mineral Research and Exploration Institute who shared information on Turkey’s general oil conditions and the current regulations.\textsuperscript{563} Ball asserted that Turkey could not join the ranks of these countries so long as the state dominated the oil industry and blamed Turkey’s underdeveloped nationalized oil industry on “the nature of oil exploration” rather than faulty political theory. The largest deposits of oil had been founded in short order by independent wildcatters willing to risk competitive exploration rather than an unwieldy bureaucracy with “but one determining judgment” hampered by fears of risking public

\textsuperscript{562} (Item in CUMHURIYET, Istanbul, January 12, 1953) OUR NEW OIL POLICY HAS CREATED INTEREST ABROAD, The announcement that cooperation will be undertaken with foreign capital for the operation of our petroleum (resources) created repercussions in the world press close to those created by our Korean decision.

\textsuperscript{563} TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, FROM: AmEmbassy, Ankara, Translation From Zafer of May 23, 1953, TURKEY’S PETROL RESOURCES TO BE URGENTLY DEVELOPED, Minister Yircali’s Statements to the Press at a Press Conference Where M. Ball, World Renowned Petrol Expert, Participated.
funds in a project that might yield little to no oil.\textsuperscript{564} Turkey had bucked the trend with officials who proved willing to adopt a wildcatter mentality and been rewarded with some oil, but not enough. This proved Ball’s point that a monopoly “is the poorest known instrument for finding oil, and of all monopolies a government monopoly is the poorest.”\textsuperscript{565}

Ball’s brief time in Turkey convince him that it would be “most unlikely that large-scale petroleum resources, possible of being developed, should be found lacking in Turkey. This is quite impossible.” Sections of southeastern Turkey in particular exhibited geologic structures suggesting the presence of substantial deposits of oil. Ball based much of his conclusion on the research information the state provided, but a firm confirmation could only be reached after the Turkish Government expended the necessary money and resources.\textsuperscript{566} The Turks entrusted Ball with a “surprisingly good” draft of the petroleum law he agreed to look over and suggest changes. In September he would return to Ankara to put a polish on the final draft of the law for the GNA to vote upon before it convened for the winter session.\textsuperscript{567}

\textit{Ominous Economic Indicators}

The development of profitable petroleum reserves would be a windfall by late 1953 with the Turkish climate and the market exhibiting signs of decline. Turkey needed to break free of its economic dependence upon agriculture. A. Knox, Helm of the British Embassy observed the

\textsuperscript{565} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{566} TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, FROM: AmEmbassy, Ankara, Translation From Zafer of May 23, 1953, TURKEY’S PETROL RESOURCES TO BE URGENTLY DEVELOPED, Minister Yircali’s Statements to the Press at a Press Conference Where M. Ball, World Renowned Petrol Expert, Participated. Minister Yircali asked Ball if he believed that foreign companies would attempt to seek out oil in Turkey. Ball hesitated to offer a firm answer, but did reply that the present reconnaissance being conducted by foreign oil companies and the imminent legislation to encourage greater participation by foreign interests indicated a “lively interest” that would likely grow. Ball referred to Israel which in the summer of 1952 had passed a petroleum law that he had assisted in drafting. Following the bill’s passage Israel subsequently granted exploration licenses to six different oil companies, each of which announced intentions to spend at least $5 million in carrying out initial searches.
\textsuperscript{567} FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH, FROM: AmEmbassy, Ankara, TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, SUBJECT: Recent Turkish Petroleum Developments (June 25, 1953).
Turkish economic year “has always been regarded as running from harvest to harvest,” and despite a recent notable increase in Turkey’s mineral resources providing year-round exports, the post-harvest months continued to be a “dead season.” The Turkish government made advances in production and maintenance of a high rate of capital investment, but had proven disappointing in regards to many of its policies, specifically its balance of payments problems, problems that would have been insurmountable without considerable outside aid. These increasingly pitiful harvests had political ramifications. In August 1953 Turkey signed a protocol with West Germany agreeing to export 2,100,000 metric tons of cereals starting in June of 1954. In exchange for these exports Germany agreed to step up its shipments of industrial machinery, chemicals, and optical equipment in return. Without sufficient totals of grains to export, the protocol could not be followed, threatening Turkish development programs and discouraging closer economic relations with West Germany. Agriculture, as the primary source of profits in Turkey, also became the greatest source of tension between the U.S. and Turkey. To ensure farmers’ loyalty through rising incomes, the DP utilized price controls and subsidies. This approach did not complement American desires to keep farm prices low by improving agricultural cost efficiency as a means of funding industrialization. Turkey’s policies led it down a tricky path, forcing it to keep its main agricultural exports off the market if...

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569 Robinson Developments Respecting Turkey, July 1953-October 1954 39.
570 Maxfield and Nolt 69.
international prices were not satisfactory. This tactic worked rather effectively up until the end of the Korean War when the price of two of Turkey’s key agricultural products, cotton and wheat, began to drop.

When the prices of these two exports had been at their highest, from 1948-1952, Turkey’s GNP experienced grew by an impressive 35%. But Ankara’s gargantuan investment program coupled with liberal internal credit policies eventually resulted in inflation. Turkey’s economy remained agricultural and extractive in nature, meaning nearly all capital goods needed for economic growth came from foreign sources. Intensive funding from the U.S. had not yet enabled the Turks to afford the imports necessary to keep its investment program going, thus forcing them to fall on reserves of gold and foreign exchange to remain afloat. From 1947 to 1953 Turkey’s gold reserves dropped from $208 million to $137 million. Turkey deliberalized imports; negotiated bilateral agreements to unburden imports in exchange for short-term credits; and, most damagingly, accrued arrearages in payments to exporters in the EPU totaling $100 million.571 To extract itself from this morass, Turkey needed to immediately expand its exports of surplus commodities, mainly cereals, but faced a number of challenges including a lack of market contacts, few modern ports, competition from other countries, and a poorly graded product. Ankara decided to sell its cereals at the market prices, but could only do so by subsidizing Turkish farmers, putting additional tension on the government revenues, of which 60% went to national defense.

Balancing Economic Needs with Military Demands

At the start of 1954 American officials for the MSA in Turkey sounded slightly less triumphal than during the previous year. MSA officials predicted an annual increase in the

Turkish GNP of 8-9% over the next two years, provided prices remained stable and conditions for crops remained favorable. Neither of these preconditions would be borne out in the long-term. Developing an economy capable of supporting the Turkey’s defense establishment without American aid continued to be the MSA’s other overarching objective. But pursuing such goals led to the conundrum of America overseeing the development of a Turkish military that could not be sustained with existing Turkish financial resources. MSA planners believed the matter could be remedied, “but only through realistic defense support measures involving increased rather than decreased funds to permit the creation in the shortest possible time of an economic base which will support the defense establishment.” Alternatives included scaling back Turkey’s military or reducing American support until the Turkish economy grew strong enough to bear defense expenditures. MSA officials instead advocated expanding their program of “direct and guided support” over the next four to five years before severing the umbilical cord. As another solution Washington proposed finding the means of promoting the European members of NATO to become self-supporting for the bulk of their military equipment needs, an arrangement that would allow the US to gradually disengage itself from the role of provider.

Efforts to modernize the Turkish military rather than enlarge it led to the increased expenditures. Programs to reorganize and reequip the various army units coupled with an educational system to teach soldiers the skills necessary in modern warfare did not come cheap. Boosting its mobility and firepower would allow Turkey to be much more useful as a NATO participant, but placed a greater strain on the Turkish economy. JUSMMAT estimated that the coming fiscal year starting in March 1954 and ending in February 1955 would cost Turkey’s

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574 Ibid.
575 PLAN OF ECONOMIC ACTION FOR TURKEY IN 1954 (date unknown).
ministry of National Defense $312.5 million, $71 million more than MSA officials advised should be spent in order to maintain economic equilibrium. The MSA advised that the budgetary shortfall be covered by a supplement of $25 million and an additional defense support program approaching $52 million. MSA officials anticipated greater demands on America’s support of Turkey’s military due to its NATO membership. In its willingness to work more closely with NATO in order to strengthen its armed forces and meet its service requirements within the Alliance, Turkey was sure to press for more support from the U.S.

MSA officials zeroed in on two prevailing problems requiring solutions: determining the appropriate level of defense expenditures and the steps required to fix Turkey’s external payments position. Turkey’s level of defense expenditures became an issue of pressing concern to the MSA due to the Turks’ “tendency to treat any increase in defense expenditures as a marginal use of resources,” which had the potential of maneuvering the U.S. “into a position of accepting responsibility for financing any increased defense expenditure which it suggests” and discouraging the Turks from providing greater defense contributions. U.S. officials ultimately decided it would be prudent to refrain from encouraging the Turks to expand their defense capabilities unless Washington was prepared to pick up the tab. Turkey had no glaring payment problems in the dollar area, but continued to miss payments on imports from EPU countries and remain in excess of its EPU deficit limit of $50 million. As a result Turkey relied upon outside sources of credit wherever available in exchange for its ever-shrinking gold resources.

In making every effort to secure funds for Turkey’s military, the MSA had to tighten its

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577 Ibid.
fists when it came to other sectors. As the Technical Assistance Budget shrank, the MSA became wary about which projects merited continued funding. For FY 1954 the Turkish Government requested $1.7 million for Technical Assistance Funds Technical; the MSA could only provide $1.1 million. 581 Technical training and expert management initially promised to such industries as meatpacking was reduced or excised altogether. 582 With Turkey a NATO member the main objective of American foreign policy in Turkey became the continuing development and maintenance of “an effective military machine, firmly oriented to the Western World and a strong NATO partner in the eastern Mediterranean.” 583 Funding reflected this objective; for FY 1954 aid was set at $76 million, $46 million for support of the Turkish military so that the Turks could continue economic development, and $30 million for “common use” items required by Turkish defense. 584 The U.S. Government dutifully arranged for the sum to be made available to the Turks by early spring.

Conclusion

The Menderes government, confident in the belief that it had discovered the proper formula for ensuring ongoing economic development, looked to increase agricultural production, expand roads, enlarge industry, find basic materials, and further develop the tax system. 585 The strategy appeared to be a sound one, but the coming year would bring with it the national elections and greater challenges to the DP from the RPP. Challenges would also arise

584 Ibid.
increasingly from Turkey’s friendship with the U.S. beginning with the growing impact of American servicemen and their families coming to populate the military facilities popping up throughout Turkey. Whereas the first Americans to live in Turkey arrived in numbers small enough necessitating the formation of personal relationships with Turks as they found places to live in Turkish cities, dined in Turkish restaurants, and shopped in Turkish stores, the Americans arriving after 1952 could isolate themselves on military housing and base stores. Turks came to view the Americans in their midst less as welcomed guests and more as remote outsiders enjoying a degree of extraterritoriality when they committed crimes.

The growing number of American military personnel in Turkey was consistent with the Eisenhower’s administration’s emphasis on Turkey’s ability to contribute to the defense of the Near East and Mediterranean. In line with this stress on security rather than economic development one could find fewer Americans in the MSA carrying on the duties of the ECA. Compounding the smaller numbers of MSA officials with less funding to use was an unclear agenda to follow and a hesitance to make clear exactly what Washington’s recommended in regards to Turkey’s economic reforms. Eisenhower’s desire to cut military spending tested Turkey’s dealing with the U.S. and the death of Stalin in 1953 led to concerted efforts by the Soviet Union to mend fences with Turkey through diplomacy and trade relations. Everywhere Turkey looked simplicity and clarity of purpose of the previous few years was disappearing.

The Menderes government continued to chip away at the legacy of statism left behind by the RPP and to encourage foreign investors as best they could. The RPP continued to warn of the impending domination of Turkish financial institutions similar to what had occurred under the Ottomans. Turkey, with its reflexive compliance of American suggestions was exhibiting signs of a subaltern state. To silence it critics in the opposition and to thwart their aspirations of
returning to power in the upcoming elections the Menderes unleashed a series of repressive measures in 1953. Such an approach became more necessary after 1953 when harvests began to drop markedly and prices on the European market for Turkish goods began to fall with the end of the Korean War and the improved performance of European producers. But criticism of the Menderes was no longer be confined to members of the RPP once the DP’s policies began to adversely affect the lives of most Turks.
CHAPTER IV. “PROFESSIONAL INCOMPETENCY”: 1954-1956

Introduction

From the Truman Proclamation in 1947 to the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953, Turkey received nearly one billion dollars in military assistance from the U.S. and an additional $405,000,000 in economic aid intended to relieve Ankara of some of the financial pressures caused by its growing defensive duties. In exchange for this $1.4 billion, Washington received a regional ally that eagerly rolled out its welcome mat for NATO military installations but showed no signs of breaking free from a cycle of economic dependence. Washington’s top priority remained supporting Turkey’s military establishment through the Military Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) rather than direct sponsorship of Turkish economic development, which they left largely to Ankara. The Menderes government continued to be frustrated by its inability to use American money in its agricultural and industrial sectors to bolster export production.

Starting in 1954, Ankara exhibited a growing tendency to use its NATO membership as leverage in order to justify maintaining or increasing U.S. aid levels. By signing the secret Military Facilities Agreement (MFA) on June 23, 1954, the first of many agreements regarding the construction of U.S. bases in Turkey, the Menderes government showed its eagerness to assist in military efforts and increased Turkey’s indispensability to NATO to refer to when Washington determined how much money to spend. With the Soviets actively courting Turkey with promises of economic support in exchange for closer diplomacy, the Menderes government’s vows to remain steadfast against Moscow carried an additional weight. When American officials offered their standard warnings that Turkey’s hasty economic development efforts and generous

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subsidies to farmers would eventually end in financial disaster, the Menderes government justified the practices by warning a drop in living conditions might make the Turkish people more amenable to dealing with the Soviets. The real fear of the Menderes government was less that the people of Turkey would insist upon Russian support and more that they would look to the RPP if the DP could no longer guarantee days of prosperity. Sliding agricultural production and rising consumer demands would catalyze a return of the RPP without swift and sustained economic improvement or measures to curb the activities of the opposition.

Ankara and Washington clung to hopes that efforts to expand Turkish petroleum production would deliver Turkey from an uncertain economic future. Washington wanted international organizations such as the IMF, the IBRD, and the OEEC to take assume more active role in lending Turkey a hand only to find the Turks sabotaging these efforts by refusing to provide information requested by these organizations or refusing to follow established protocol. With frustration mounting, U.S. and U.K. administrators wondered if the Menderes government was swindling American and European governments out of funds to keep a short-term crisis at bay with little concern for a potentially long-term economic disaster.

Bayar’s Travels to the U.S.

At the start of 1954 President Bayar announced his intentions of travelling to the U.S. to inform Eisenhower that American aid to Turkey required restructuring. Bayar told reporters that: “In order to achieve our military objectives we must make provision in the budget to supply required financing. If our normal budgetary resources are not adequate we must obtain direct military assistance.” Should Washington permit Turkey to utilize U.S. funds to expand export production, it could then use the resultant foreign exchange to purchase its own military
equipment, per Washington’s expectations. In the interim Turkey wanted the U.S. to expand its financial support of the Turkish military or risk force reductions that could potentially compromise its participation in NATO. Bayar hoped to convince Eisenhower that the line between military and economic support was artificial, that stimulating Turkey’s primary export fields such as grains, cotton, and mining products would provide long-term funding to the military establishment and allow America to gradually extricate itself financially. Washington preferred the more immediate and domestic solution of taxing the rural populations, a solution the Menderes government considered politically unfeasible.

Bayar took every opportunity during his trip to pledge his country’s support for American policies while cautioning that the free world remain wary of a seemingly placated Soviet Union using “mere words and empty gestures” to hide its true intentions. In an address to Congress he praised the unparalleled economic and military assistance of the U.S. provided its allies. “Your aid has been used entirely in the effort to resist the destructive forces that threaten our civilization,” Bayar assured, “I can assert without equivocation that Turkey has been at least one of the recipients who put your aid to the best possible use.” Apparently impressed by Bayar’s sentiments, Eisenhower, Stassen, and Dulles decided to reward Turkey with an additional $30,000,000 for the fiscal year 1954-55 to further relieve the pressures of military upkeep. This raised the total for the year to $106,000,000.

Turkey’s Economic Forecast

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589 Ibid.
592 “Bayar Visit Adds to Aid for Turkey” 5.
Bayar’s ability to draw upon Washington’s ongoing security concerns secured continuing American generosity, and NATO’s plans to construct five naval bases and eleven airfields in Turkey over the coming years could only increase Turkey’s strategic importance. This did nothing to address certain economic ills needed immediate attention. High prices during the Korean War helped to fuel a 90% growth of Turkish exports from 1950-1954, and wheat and cotton production doubled and tripled respectively during the same period, but the end of the war stifled demands for these products. Turkey still lacked the infrastructure needed to effectively transport goods out of the country, but U.S. experts remained generally optimistic that by harnessing its natural resources Turkey would grow steadily.\(^{593}\) To curb inflation they suggested an approach that included devaluing the Turkish lira to promote the export of cotton and wheat, raising interest rates to limit internal credit, and scaling back payments to the peasantry for their agricultural goods in order to better reflect the international market.\(^{594}\) IBRD representatives likewise supported a halt in payments to the peasants while Ankara throttled back the pace of investment and development. While Foreign Minister Zorlu acknowledged that wheat purchased from the peasants by the state failed to compete on the international market, he refused to consider altering the policy because the peasants “had never had any sort of break in life.”\(^{595}\) Irreconcilable differences between the IBRD and Turkish officials compelled the Bank in March to close its branch office in Ankara at the behest of the Menderes government.\(^{596}\)

\(^{593}\) Ibid.
Lawmakers in Turkey paid closer heed to American advice on economic liberalization. Menderes claimed that SEE's controlled roughly one-fourth of Turkey’s industrial production, down from one-half in 1940, and he intended to reduce their control and encourage foreign investors. In late January 1954 the GNA enacted a law authorizing foreign private investors to return home with up to 100% of the net profits, dividends, and capital base they made from commercial ventures in Turkey. The law removed existing restrictions on the employment of foreigners in private corporations, and permitted them to convert a portion of their salaries into foreign currency. Even while making good legislative progress the state still made such fundamental missteps as making investments in industry that exceeded available domestic savings, and investing in projects lacking the proper planning and coordination needed to be successful. Turkish industry struggled forward without an experienced managerial class; one with the talent and ability to stuff a half-century’s worth of economic development in the space of half a decade. Missteps and miscalculations abounded. The state constructed new factories prohibitively far from the power plants needed to run them and erected sugar-processing plants more on the basis of where it could find voters to work there rather than sugar beet fields.

Menderes seemed to operate under the misguided assumption that simply throwing money at development projects, such as enormous hydroelectric facilities, would alleviate Turkey’s financial ills, and he refused to listen to reason. He could not be dissuaded either by his advisors or the political opposition hoping that the beleaguered prime minister would lose face in pursuing his agenda. American experts hesitated to offer advice out of fear that they might offend Menderes. “Americans here in the Foreign Operations Administration do not make it any

597 Respecting Robinson, Developments Turkey, July 1953-October 1954 27.
598 Ibid 5.
easier for Menderes to change policy, so timid have they become,” reported Richard D. Robinson in late 1954, who further speculated that, “the Turks would be much more inclined to listen to high-level Western businessmen than to government experts.”

The Political Costs of Development

Menderes faced other challenges from an increasingly demanding network of village farmers with a higher standard of and higher expectations for the future. Rural stores stocked their shelves with once-costly consumer goods such as coffee, tea, sugar, fabrics, kerosene, and radios, and Turks all over the country clamored for still more. As demands for economic improvement grew louder, Richard Robinson mused that, “The masters of contemporary Turkey are, in reality, the political slaves of the village masses and the new lower-class urban class” increasing the size of their families, thereby adding to demand and consumption. In 1954 the Turkish Government found itself having to import 400,000 tons of coal to meet the growing demand. Turkish peasants demonstrated growing economic savvy by early 1954 by investing in state industrialization projects. Teaming up with small urban investors and foreign interests, members of the peasantry became investors in the state-owned cement, sugar refining, and textile industries. This marked a shift from the traditional practice of hoarding and raised the prospect of private funds being used to sponsor the development of large industries rather than the state.

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601 Robinson, “Introduction to Turkey” 15.
602 One American observer making a tour through western Anatolia was amused to find all the shops located along highways and railway lines to “laden with inexpensive Istanbul and European manufactured items of virtually every color and description. Many of these shops are very, very old and were obviously originally designed for the display of less frivolous commodities than plastic pink combs and Mickey Mouse alarm clocks and the spectacle they now present is incongruous to say the least.” FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH, FROM: IZMIR, TURKEY, TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, SUBJECT: Observations on Recent Economic Developments in the Turkish Provinces of Balikesir, Kutahya, Afyon, Isparta, Burdur, and Antalya (March 2, 1953).
604 Robinson, Developments Respecting Turkey, July 1953-October 1954 38.
Their investments also gave the peasantry still more leverage in dictating Turkish political affairs.

State-funded development projects helped to generate support for the Menderes government and could also be used to repress the opposition. Voting districts that failed to support the DP party could lose proposed development projects that might jumpstart or sustain a local economy. The Iller (Provincial) Bank of Turkey typically loaned money to municipalities to construct an electric power plant or water supply system. If a village did not want to risk losing possession of common pasturelands, it could pool its resources with other villages to form a municipality to seek out sources from elsewhere and then request the remainder from the provincial government.606 This enabled provincial officials to punish villages for past political transgressions by refusing to provide the additional aid. Kasim Gülekd, Secretary General of the RPP, grimly noted: “If you don’t vote Democrat, you will get no water, roads, school, agricultural credit; your city will become a town, your province a county, your county a district, your district a village – as the case may be.”607

Passage of the Petroleum Bill

Ankara and the MSA looked hopefully to petroleum as an economic cure-all to break Turkey free from foreign funding. Turkish legislators spent late 1953 working to enlist foreign financial and technical assistance in finding and extracting oil reserves. Geologists from foreign oil companies conducted surveys of Turkey’s petroleum resources and found encouraging data. The Ralph M. Parsons Company’s findings submitted in November to the Ministry of State Economic Enterprises following a field study of the Batman-Garzan Oil Field estimated of 400

million barrels of oil in one location and a far less impressive four million barrels at another.\footnote{608}

In October Maxwell W. Ball and a fellow oil consultant, Elmer E. Batsell, a lawyer and former General Counsel of the Petroleum Administration for Defense, arrived in Turkey to consult in planning an oil bill to denationalize Turkey’s petroleum.\footnote{609} The proposed bill ended up being very similar to the bill recently passed by the law Ball had authored for the government of Israel.\footnote{610} Turkey decided to adopt Israel’s strategy of approving exploratory work prior to the petroleum law being enacted so that concessionaires could start drilling almost immediately. Geologists had located seven sedimentary areas where oil might be located, one coincidently roughly the size of Israel.\footnote{611} Representatives of the Ministries of Finance, State Enterprises, and Economy and Commerce reviewed the bill before it went to the GNA, urged on by Menderes to complete their task as quickly so that a vote may be taken and the law put into effect.\footnote{612} By early


\footnote{609 FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH, FROM: AmEmbassy, Ankara, TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, SUBJECT: Draft of a Proposed Petroleum Law for Turkey (November 2, 1953) RG Group 469, Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Mission to Turkey, The Chief of Mission Administrative Records, 1948-56. American officials found the Turks to be resistant to the idea of granting individuals or small oil companies the same information and privileges that it granted larger petroleum companies. Representatives of the Embassy impressed upon the Turks that smaller operators in the United States usually drilled more exploratory or wildcat wells annually than all the major oil companies combined. Washington instructed the Embassy to impress upon the Turks to consider the creditworthiness, reputation and technical abilities of American operators applying to undertake exploratory reconnaissance in Turkey. NO: A-73, TO: The American Embassy, ANKARA, SUBJECT: Turkish Policy Towards Exploration by Small Oil Companies and Individuals. (October 9, 1953) RG Group 469, Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Mission to Turkey, The Chief of Mission Administrative Records, 1948-56.}


\footnote{612 FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH, FROM: AmEmbassy, Ankara, TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, SUBJECT: PETROLEUM LAW FOR TURKEY (December 18, 1953). The proposed law provided incentives to encourage foreign operators and promote the full development of Turkey’s oil resources, while at the same time protecting the existing Turkish rights and interests. The bill included a 50-50 division of net income between foreign companies and Ankara, after the foreign operators recovered their initial investment.}
March enough support for the denationalization of the country’s petroleum reserves existed in
the GNA to push the bill through, albeit with some modifications limiting the size of areas under
exploration and the amount of time exploitation concessions held by foreign companies lasted.613
American business interests took notice of the new law; companies such as General Tire and
Minneapolis-Moline Company planned to construct plants in Turkey from which they could tap
into the Middle Eastern market. Sears, Roebuck announced its intent to build an outlet in Ankara
and Istanbul.614 Ford Motor-Car Company decided to build a new tractor factory in Ankara.615
Minneapolis Moline pushed ahead with its plans to manufacture tractors and spare parts at a
plant near Ankara by early 1955, and the General Tire Company intended to construct a tire and
tube plant in Istanbul.616

The successful enactment of the petroleum law provided Menderes with more proof of
his commitment to economic liberalization and development in the lead up to the 1954 elections.
To prospective voters Menderes pledged continued resilience against the Soviets, enduring
collaboration with the West, and his intent to gain economic self-sufficiency so that Turkey
could maintain its military without American aid. Should he be reelected, Menderes assured

Pending the recovery of the investment, foreign operators would be responsible for the payment of all fees, rentals
and taxes equal to those paid by other corporations in Turkey. One half of the operators’ income would be set aside
for the Turkish Government and include the paying of fees, rentals and taxes. FROM: AMERICAN EMBASSY,
ANKARA, TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, SUBJECT: Turkish Petroleum Law
(December 20, 1953).

613 Robinson Developments Respecting Turkey, July 1953-October 1954 6-7.
614 Ibid.
615 FO 371/112935, UNITED NATIONS: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN TURKEY,
Report of Mr. Marshall E. Dimock, Acting Resident Representative of the U.N. Technical Assistance Board, to Mr.
David Owen, Executive Chairman of the U.N. Technical Assistance Board, for the period 1 March – 31 May 1954,
(1 June, 1954).
616 “Ankara Licenses Alien Investors” The New York Times (Jan. 4, 1955): 86. To adequately supply the
demands of foreign interests the U.S. Foreign Operations mission with the collaboration of Ankara created an
Industrial Assistance Commission. The Commission provided technical and legal advice to new and established
entrepreneurs looking to make the most of their investments. To further enlighten and hearten U.S. investors
pondering projects in Turkey, the Turkish Unions of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchanges
planned to open a branch office in New York and sought the counsel of a group of respected American businessmen
in ways to make the country appear more enticing
Washington that the next four years would be devoted to finding the ways to reach this goal. In May Turkey experienced its second completely free general election. More registered voters, nearly 80%, visited the polls than in the previous election and voting transpired without major incident. Menderes secured a more commanding victory than in 1950 by taking 58.4% of the votes and 503 out of the 541 seats in Parliament compared to the RPP’s 35% of the popular vote. On May 24 Menderes addressed the GNA to reaffirm his commitment to agricultural development, hastening national industrialization, and encouraging private enterprise and foreign investment. He noted with pride the increases in agricultural production and exports, and promised the completion of the state’s road and bridge-building program in four years’ time, while electrification, dam building and hydroelectric projects would bring clean drinking water and electricity to the countryside. The GNA reelected Bayar as president by a vote of 504 against the 36 representatives of the opposition. Bayar in turn appointed Menderes to act as prime minister and establish a new cabinet. Menderes appointed Rüştü Fatin Zorlu to be his Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State. A recent deputy to the GNA, Zorlu made a name for himself first in the Foreign Office and then as Turkey’s permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council. In each of these capacities Zorlu gained a reputation among American officials for being shrewd in solving economic problems as well as “extremely difficult to work with.”

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618 328. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President Eisenhower FRUS, 1958-1960 Volume X, Part 2: Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey 789.
620 Robinson, Developments Respecting Turkey, July 1953-October 1954 10.
Curtailing Academics, the Press, and Civil Servants

Soon after the election the Federation of Turkish Labor Unions publicly demanded the new government to legally recognize the right to strike without success.622 Menderes had made legalizing the right to strike a campaign promise in 1950, but failed to follow through. In mid-July 600 Izmir dockworkers refused to work until the Port Authority agreed to wage increases and a new form of payment. The state moved quickly to suspend the two participating unions and keep the port functioning with outside labor, but agreed to the unions’ demands.623 State and local officials downplayed the incident by claiming it was a “stoppage” carried out by workers oblivious to the fact that their act amounted to a strike. Regardless of terminology the Izmir dockworkers fed anxieties that the Communists would attempt to encourage future striking and political upheaval.624

Growing paranoia in the Menderes government led it to pass legislation restricting the rights of other groups. In March, 1954 the GNA adopted a bill allowing for substantial prison sentences and fines for journalists whose writings were found to be “harmful to the political or financial prestige of the State.”625 Older government officials including university professors and judges also became increasingly powerless under the DP. In mid-June the GNA received government-endorsed draft law that would make all government officials subject to retirement upon completion of 25 years of service to the state or reaching the age of 60 without the right of appeal. This reduced the time of service from 30 and the age of 65 provided for in the original

The State Department hypothesized that his desire to be “treated as a personage of great consequence” may have been influenced by his wife being a first cousin of Menderes.

622 Robinson, Developments Respecting Turkey, July 1953-October 1954 11.
624 Robinson, Developments Respecting Turkey, July 1953-October 1954 11.
625 Robinson, Developments Respecting Turkey, July 1953-October 1954 7. In September 1954 seven journalists languished in Turkish prisons and twelve or more faced indictment; by October twenty journalists were serving sentences. The most prominent of these was Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, an 80 year old editorialist for the opposition sentenced in late September to 26 months for a series of pre-election editorials in the Millet newspaper judged to be slanderous against Menderes and Bayar, and damaging to the government’s prestige.
law, targeting tradition-minded bureaucrats, judges, and teachers whose loyalties more likely rested with the RPP rather than the DP, leaving the government with less resistance to contend with.626 The law passed easily in the GNA and the restrictive legislation did not end there. The DP passed a series of laws intended to limit the political activism of government officials. In July a temporary parliamentary group drafted a law that would subject government officials to summary dismissal by the state, presumably for undesirable political activity. After little debate the GNA approved the law by a vote of 309 to 25. In its final form the bill granted the Government discretionary power to remove civil servants without appeal, and to suspend and fire any civil servant when deemed expedient. Some in the parliamentary group resisted including university professors and judges in the law, but it came to include all government officials. Menderes dismissed the possibility of the law being used for political purposes, claiming it served as an “important remedy against the terrible disease of bureaucracy aggravated by inefficient employees who remain in the ranks of the civil service.”627

*Menderes Meets with Eisenhower*

During his presidency Menderes increasingly adopted the sorts of strong arm and tactics he once accused the RPP of using, but his primary focus continued to be economic development. Inspired by the success of Bayar’s earlier visit to the U.S. earlier in the year and the results of the election, Menderes decided to travel to Washington in order to present his proposed economic program.628 Having secured another four years in office, Menderes promised to take the necessary steps to put the Turkish economy in order and to convince Washington to commit to at least four more years of support of the Turkey’s economy and military to allow the development

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626 Ibid 13.
627 Ibid 15.
of an economic base able to sustain the military autonomously.\textsuperscript{629} The State Department concluded that an official visit would both encourage Menderes to commit to this course of action and recognize Turkey’s important role in the defense of the Middle East.\textsuperscript{630} MSA representatives agreed that such ambitions could come to fruition, but not until the Turks could afford to purchase the spare parts needed to maintain a military dependent upon American-made equipment, particularly its air force.\textsuperscript{631} Turkish newspapers and statesmen took great pains to emphasize that it was in America’s best interests to transform Turkey into a stronghold in the Middle East. Such obsequious comments, according to one Russian journalist, were “far from appropriate to a state aspiring to independence” and proved the policy of the Menderes Government was “to proceed from US interests and scorn national needs, particularly in the matter of peacefully developing their economy.”\textsuperscript{632}

Menderes arrived in America on June 1 for an official visit with President Eisenhower to discuss the continuing drains of Turkish resources and the prospects of future assistance.\textsuperscript{633} He

\textsuperscript{629} FO 371/111288, Telegram from Sir J. Bowker to Western and Southern Department, No. 254, (May 25, 1954).

\textsuperscript{630} FO 371/111288, Department of State, Policy Information Statement for USIS, May 27, 1954, \textit{Visit of the Turkish Prime Minister in Washington – June 1-4}.

\textsuperscript{631} As the most modern of military branches the Menderes Government keenly felt the need for an air force comparable to the world’s finest and found the going rough. The British Air Attaché, W. T. Brooks, stationed in Turkey since 1950 noted in early 1955 that it was “clear that the realisation of the Turkish Government’s ambition to have an Air Force equipped with first class modern tools has far outrun the supply of efficient and suitable human material.” Turkey lacked qualified pilots, less than one per available aircraft when the advised ratio was 1.5 per aircraft. Turkey possessed 300 front line fighter aircraft that were only capable of participating in a military action for a perilously short period of time. To remedy this in 1954 NATO allocated the Turks with 82 F-86 Sabre fighters courtesy of Canada. The planes shipped without the necessary spare parts and proved difficult to service. Even with an influx of fighters Turkey lacked the pilots needed to fly them; Turkish pilots in U.S. training programs exhibited a high wastage rate prompting the Turkish Air Force to too hopefully to vacancies available in Canada under the NATO training scheme. NATO Headquarters was at last waking up to the Turks’ limitations and making it clear that the Air Force would need to make more efficient use of their existing equipment before it could expect to receive an increase in funding. Brooks summed up the year with, “1954 cannot be called a year of accomplishment for the Turkish Air Force” or for the United States Air Mission. FO 371/117735, Annual Report on the Turkish Air Force (1\textsuperscript{st} January 1955).

\textsuperscript{632} FO 371/112936, \textbf{SECTION A, INVESTIA, CONCERNING A CERTAIN TRIP ACROSS THE OCEAN}, (By V. Kudryavtsev) June 15, 1954.

\textsuperscript{633} Howard 41. Menderes traveled with an impressive entourage including newly appointed Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister Zorlu, the resident expert on the problems associated with U.S. economic aid;
brought with him an estimate for more than $900 million of added military and maintenance items that would be required before the Turkish Military would be up to NATO’s standards.\footnote{Report on the Mutual Security Program in Turkey for the Six Month Period Ending June 30, 1954.} Ostensibly, he hoped to secure an American guarantee that Washington would cover the Turks’ military deficit over the next four years before they reached financial independence.\footnote{FO 371/111288, Cypher/OTP, Sir. J. Bowker, No. 257, May 25, 1954, SECRET, Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 257 of May 25. The British Foreign Office suspected the Turks’ requests for coverage of defense costs to be a ruse; Menderes instead hoped to gain U.S. financial support for Turkey’s economic development program. Once securing such aid the Turks might forget their outstanding commercial arrears of debt to the OEEC nations. London advised British officials in Washington to remind the Americans of the ongoing negotiations in Paris to reach a multilateral solution to Turkish arrears and that “the effect of the defence support aid may well be to encourage the Turks to put off the measures of internal economic reform which all the interested parties, O.E.E.C., I.B.R.D. and I.M.F., consider necessary.” FO 371/111288, FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON, By Bag, M, DEFENCE PROGRAMME DISTRIBUTION, No. 1879 Saving, May 28, 1954. According to Ambassador Warren, Menderes acted as the sole spokesman of his party while in Washington at meetings with Eisenhower, members of both the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Senate Defense Committee, and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. The Prime Minister “had handled himself extremely well and made a particularly good impression by his directness” at all the meetings. Nuri Birgi provided historical background on issues when called upon to do so, while Etem Menderes, Zorlu and General Baransal “practically never opened their mouths, and in fact were not present at some of the talks.” Warren found such behavior from Zorlu to be “rather exceptional” in light of previous encounters. Zorlu appeared to have “little political existence independently of Menderes.” \footnote{FO 371/1112936, Letter from James Bowker to G.W. Harrison, Esq., G.M.G., Foreign Office, London, S.W.1. (June 18, 1954).}} When asked what his specific economic policy during this time period would be, Menderes could not offer any specifics. The Americans requested that Ankara prepare an economic policy by November, a chore Menderes summarily passed on to Zorlu.\footnote{From the Soviet perspective: “It turns out that the main and only theme of the Turco-American negotiations in Washington was military. The theme was how, with the services of Turkey, to forge a military bloc in the Middle and Near East as part of the American aggressive system of military blocs and agreements.” The nucleus of this prospective bloc would be the Turco-Pakistan military alliance around which other willing Middle and Near Eastern nations would become part of a larger alliance, giving the U.S.-led NATO bloc ever eastwards. FO 371/112936, SECTION A, INVESTIA, CONCERNING A CERTAIN TRIP ACROSS THE OCEAN, (By V. Kudryavtsev) June 15, 1954. FO 371/112936, Message from James Bowker to Anthony Eden, 1196/5/54G. Delivery had been held up due to a lack of sufficiently trained Turkish personnel to use the shipments effectively, and because Turkey did not receive a higher priority than other NATO countries.} After four days of negotiations, the Eisenhower Administration agreed to increase military aid to Turkey in the next fiscal year from $87 to $200 million and to hasten the delivery of equipment and arms promised in 1952 worth close to half-a-billion dollars.\footnote{FO 371/112936, SECTION A, INVESTIA, CONCERNING A CERTAIN TRIP ACROSS THE OCEAN, (By V. Kudryavtsev) June 15, 1954. FO 371/112936, Message from James Bowker to Anthony Eden, 1196/5/54G. Delivery had been held up due to a lack of sufficiently trained Turkish personnel to use the shipments effectively, and because Turkey did not receive a higher priority than other NATO countries.} Pending Congressional approval, $200 million would be
made available annually until the end of 1957 when Turkey’s military should reach their NATO-approved force goals. An allocation of $30 million was set aside to provide the Turkish military with items such as clothing, tires, batteries, jet fuel and lubricants in addition to the $46 million originally slated for Turkish defense. This raised the amount of economic assistance provided by the U.S. to Turkey since 1948 to $353 million and many more millions to direct military assistance. Menderes justified the spending increase to a group of reporters prior to leaving Washington for New York: “In spite of the misleading indications, the danger menacing the peaceful nations is far from diminished. And time is running short.”

Time was also running short for Turkey’s ongoing economic development. Menderes succeeded in relieving some of the financial pressures connected to the military, but failed to secure other desired funds, such as a loan for economic development. While Turkey’s reputation as a Middle Eastern stronghold against communism grew, its reputation for economic mismanagement became an increasing liability. MSA head Harold Stassen reminded Menderes of the need to undertake economic reforms if Turkey expected future American aid. The Turkish group caved into pressure from U.S. officials to temporarily discard plans to seek a loan of $300, which Washington agreed to reconsider in the fall. Menderes promised to cooperate with the MSA in identifying the sources of economic stress and strain and use appropriate and expedient measures to correct them. In short, “the cost of the Turk defense establishment has expanded much faster than the Turk ability to pay.”

638 Howard 42.
639 Schmidt 1.
642 Report on the Mutual Security Program in Turkey for the Six Month Period Ending June 30, 1954. It became clear to London that from this eroding position Turkey could not be expected to agree to a multilateral settlement in the OEEC. The British, like the French and Germans before them, would have to negotiate a bilateral
Attempts to Internationalize Turkey’s Economic Woes

Menderes returned to his homeland on June 9 to find the Turkish press uniformly in a laudatory mood, content with assurance that U.S. aid would continue to be available to develop Turkey’s military and economy. The Turks wanted to ascertain their longer-term economic policy for the coming six to seven years and prepare an analysis for review by the U.S. by mid-November. Leon Dayton advised the Turks putting off ambitious projects in telecommunications and railway electrification until their viability and expenses could be accurately determined. Dulles advised devaluing the lira to bring about stabilization, and suggested MSA officials casually bring up the matter in the course of meetings with Turkish leaders. His overall message stressed that the “Turks should understand optimum development [of] their economy depends on appropriate internal measures rather than additional external financial aid.”

Richard D. Robinson criticized the Turkey Mission’s usage of such roundabout

settlement with the Turks that would allow for the organized payment of commercial arrears. In turning away from the prospect of a multilateral arrangement, the Turks deprived themselves of British assistance in stimulating Turkish exports, depriving the Turks of the funds it needed to begin paying off their arrears. FO 371/112936, Message from James Bowker to Anthony Eden, 1196/5/54G.


Ibid. MSA representatives did not always find the Turks to be the most attentive of audiences; they had other concerns to discuss. At a January 15 meeting Stassen, head of the soon-to-be defunct Foreign Operations Administration; Ambassador Hughes; Dayton; Dawson and Deputy Prime Minister Zorlu convened to discuss economic matters. Zorlu touched on the need for further assistance in order make Turkey’s standard of living comparable to the neighboring Soviet satellites of Rumania and Bulgaria. He also voiced his distaste with a supposed “campaign” waged by the American press, the New York Times, in particular, against Menderes and
tactics in dealing with the Turks and its growing lack of professionalism.\textsuperscript{648} He cited “the professional incompetency of many of the so-called economic experts” and the unhelpful advice they dispensed to the Turkish Government; the Mission’s diffidence in conveying clear and obvious solutions to Turkey’s economic travails; the failure of the Mission to make public the ways American funds were being used in Turkey; a lack of a coordinated Mission program, clearly stated objectives, or project evaluation; a breakdown in human relations between the Mission and the Menderes Government; the Mission’s failures to cooperate with European interests in Turkey and to adequately address the growing black market activities in Turkey overseen and promoted by Americans.\textsuperscript{649} To redress these problems Robinson advised that Stassen consider creating a small mission under the Foreign Office staffed by representatives of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, or the Harvard Business School. Such practical individuals Robinson assumed would be of more use to the Turkish leaders who did not want to heed advice from the MSA’s staff of “academically-oriented and inexperienced economists and administrators who seem unable to see and understand the human problems involved in the accelerated economic revolution through which Turkey is now passing.”\textsuperscript{650}

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\footnote{Turkey intended to foster animosity between the US and Turkey. Memorandum of Conversation (January 15, 1955) Records Group 469, Records of US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Mission to Turkey, the Chief of Mission Administrative Records, 1948-56.}
\footnote{In early December Richard D. Robinson visited the Mission in Ankara and asked to study a report on Turkish investments and economic development prepared jointly by Turkish and U.S. officials. Dayton agreed to the request, provided Robinson did not remove it from the premises of the Mission. An MSA official cautioned Robinson that the report dealt with devaluation and issues of foreign exchange, sensitive items that continued to gall the Menderes Government, but the report itself was not classified. When the Report became the basis for a critique of MSA policies in Turkey authored by Robinson, he found himself under fire by Dayton and his staff. Dayton refused to allow Robinson access to any more material that contained evaluation or opinion in the future. A bewildered Robinson made his case in a letter to Harold Stassen in March 1955, arguing that the situation had been personally embarrassing and prevented him from making thorough assessments of the FOA Mission. Jack L. Philippot Interview with Mr. Richard D. Robinson, April 11, 1955. Letter from Richard D. Robinson to Harold E. Stassen.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
Robinson’s censure of the Turkey Mission illuminates the frequently nebulous ways American officials dealt with the Turks, but also Washington’s growing determination to make solving Turkey’s economic travails an international affair. After months after the MSA made the suggestion, Ankara agreed to allow a special liaison group of the OEEC to assess Turkey’s economic conditions and determine means of increasing coordination with other agencies, such as the IMF and IBRD, and European governments. Though not a formal participant in the proceedings, the U.S. retained crucial interests in any future developments between the OEEC and Turkey; should the Turkish economy continue to backslide, it would damage Turkey’s NATO commitments and affect America’s providing of economic and political support. The Turks quickly demonstrated they would not comply so readily with the organization’s requests. At the OEEC’s Annual Review in late January, the Turkish delegation initially refused to be examined by OEEC representatives. When they finally did agree, the Turks refused to provide basic information regarding Turkey’s balance of payments for 1953 or any future projections, ending in “the last and least satisfying” of the reviews, one with “no useful conclusions.” The Turks claimed to have made progress in the realm of taxation, including a land tax and “annual tax” to be paid by Turkish farmers and peasants, but the potential impact on the standard of living and agricultural output hamstrung Ankara from pursuing tax collection beyond this. An American observer of the Turks’ appearance before the OEEC described their conduct:

Their inability to follow an argument frequently appears to underlie their suspiciousness and slowness to compromise an agreement. This factor, together with their unwillingness to disclose information on certain matters for policy reasons, has won for the Turkish

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delegation the reputation in [the] OEEC of being the most difficult with which to deal. 652

The Turks’ less than sterling repute in the OEEC carried over to attempting to settle their commercial debts, which by early 1954 amounted to $150 million. The OEEC established a high-level Coordinating Group that recommended a “package” deal in which the Turks would take steps to minimize and control domestic demand and to make arrangements to settle their commercial debts within a given period of time. At the same time the other OEEC nations would extend technical help in bettering the quality and price of Turkish exports, encourage the importing of Turkish goods, make credit to Turkey more readily available and possibly make available medium and long-term loans. 653 The success of the Group’s plan hinged on individual OEEC countries refraining from brokering any bilateral agreements with Turkey providing for the favored treatment of their own arrears, something many OEEC members, including France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland had not done. 654

Representatives of the OEEC found the Turks highly resistant to the idea of a multilateral solution to Turkey’s commercial arrears. At a meeting between Bowker and Zorlu on May 29, 1954 Zorlu insisted that the OEEC did not understand Turkey’s economic ills and would attempt to impose recommendations that would infringe upon the Turkish Government’s economic policy. Because Turkey’s balance of payments crisis varied with the volume of trade with each of her partners, Ankara argued only a series of bilateral solutions, rather than a multilateral one, would be possible. 655 As a solution Zorlu offered goods to settle existing debts; in the case of the United Kingdom Zorlu suggested liquidating $26 million worth of Turkish cotton and wheat to

654 Ibid.
settle Turkey’s debt to Britain. With no sign of Turkish cooperation, the British doubted the likelihood of the OEEC and Turkey coming to a satisfactory agreement on the liquidation of commercial debts to OEEC members.

Turkish Foreign Policy

If the Turks proved to be something of a nuisance in the OEEC, they proved a compliant NATO ally. In May the U.S. and the NATO Department of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs negotiate a package proposal that included the use of the recently built Adana air base on a “common user” basis. The package proposal would resolve jurisdictional questions regarding U.S. servicemen and questions connected to customs’ exemptions on imported equipment and material. The U.S. would be granted access to the Adana airfield for training flights and to store fuel and supplies. American ground staff and mechanics would be stationed at the field while its overall command would remain in the hands of the Turks. The U.S. refused to assume responsibility of the radar and anti-aircraft defense of the Adana airfield, despite Turkish requests to do so, and there were also no immediate plans to station American aircraft at Turkish bases. With the agreement close to complete British officials in Ankara presupposed that the Americans did not put stock in earlier British Embassy claims that Turkey would be unlikely to throw its lot in with its NATO allies in the event of a war, claims the British remained “generally valid.” To Embassy officials the negotiations merely proved that the Turks desired the U.S. to increase its commitment to Turkey, but when push came to shove the Turks would take part in

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656 Ibid.
659 Ibid.
“some pretty hard thinking” before committing to NATO’s defense.660 The Foreign Office took a more sanguine position on the matter, contending that any conflict with the Soviet Union would mean a general rather than a localized war that would plunge Turkey into the fighting from the onset: “If hostilities started with a local attack on, say, Norway there might be some hard thinking in Turkey – and the same would no doubt be true in other N.A.T.O. countries. But even then if the Americans came in promptly our feeling is that their influence would probably be powerful enough to get the Turks in too.”661

The Menderes Government agreed to sign the Status of United States Forces in Turkey Agreement in June 1954, just before that the Eisenhower administration formally committed itself to the creation of the Northern Tier defense concept by approving the latest Middle Eastern policy paper. NSC 5428 indicated the Eisenhower Administration’s new approach to Middle Eastern security, one that would individually strengthen Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey in order to strengthen the region as a whole.662 In April the US and Iraq signed a bilateral agreement that would provide Iraq’s military with $33 million over four years. Pakistan signed a similar agreement for $29.5 million the following month. Turkey and Pakistan made a pact shortly thereafter, signaling the potential start of a defense organization consisting of northern tier countries. Both Iran and Iraq were both guaranteed a place in the organization provided greater political stability developed, as was Egypt.663

London looked upon Turkey’s increasingly autonomous foreign policy with little enthusiasm. There was little else they could do. Egypt refused to agree to the British demand

660 Ibid.
663 Watson 345-355.
for the automatic reactivation of the Suez Base should Turkey come under attack. With little to show for negotiations with the Egyptians Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery suggested that Britain abandon all hope of retaining possession of the Suez Base and instead focus on the security of Anatolia, Israel, Jordan and the Sudan. Montgomery believed that the defense of these locations would deter the Soviets from menacing the Suez Canal. The Turks endorsed Montgomery’s suggestion of the British’s main Middle Eastern base relocating to southern Anatolia. When Montgomery raised the issue of Turkey’s continuing its existing defense efforts in the event of reduced or eliminated funds, the Turks assured him that U.S. aid was on the rise and Turkey’s ongoing economic development did much to help defense. Turkey needed American aid to produce the equipment that would raise Turkish units to NATO standards, but after reaching these standards, maintaining these units would prove easy.

With both the U.S. and Britain finding new ways of making Turkey a valuable ally, Turkish foreign policy took on an increasingly assertive quality. Turkish and Pakistani officials in late 1953 discussed closer collaboration on economic and political issues in an association to which Britain would be invited to join. Britain had little reason to consider membership as it would do little to advance British interests in the region and more likely antagonize the Soviets. Prime Minister Anthony Eden informed Ankara that while London was not averse to the plan it doubted the “wisdom of the timing,” referring specifically to Washington’s recent interest in Turkish-Pakistani relations. Although Turkey and Pakistan’s prospective partnership did not include a military alliance, discussions coincided with American plans to provide military aid to Pakistan. The U.S. project seemed to be part of a larger scheme for encouraging closer bonds between Pakistan and Turkey as a first step for the collective organization of the defense of the

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664 FO 371/117720, BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA (at Istanbul) September 25, 1953.
665 Ibid.
Middle East. Just how much military support the U.S. planned to extend to Pakistan was unclear. To London it seemed officials in Washington “evidently attach great importance to the closer association of Turkey and Pakistan, not merely as an occasion for their offer of military aid to Pakistan, but for its own sake.” This would seem to indicate a growing desire in Washington to advance its Northern Tier plans. Menderes reacted favorably to the scheme while Britain disliked the absence of Western input and speculated that such an arrangement would do little to provide regional security. Although the British welcomed the idea of closer Turkish-Pakistani relations they did not consider that any “collective organization for Middle East defence can in the near future be militarily effective without our participation.” Prime Minister Eden surmised that the creation of a military association between Turkey and Pakistan might be to Britain’s benefit by establishing a new defense grouping located north of the Canal Zone. Should the British and Egyptians fail to negotiate a defense agreement it might be necessary for Britain to seek out a new base of operations in the Middle East to give the Northern Tier concept some credence. London recognized the futility of resisting Washington’s outer ring security model and decided to back the concept in the summer of 1954.

“A Couple of Unscrupulous Foxes”

On January 8, 1955 Dayton met with a British official named Malcolm Gale. A “clearly embittered and pessimistic” Dayton displayed a candor that rarely appeared in the memos and

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667 Cabinet Memorandum: United States Project to associate Military Aid to Pakistan with Middle East Defense, CAB 129/65 (5th June 1954). If so, the U.S. arrived at the decision in a roundabout fashion. In October 1953 the US decided after much prodding to grant Pakistan $25 million in military aid. Britain urged for secrecy but when news of the project leaked it sparked a great furor in India, China, and Russia, and rumors that the aid to Pakistan was in exchange for allowing U.S. bases to be built. Washington decided to placate India by attempting to associate the military aid offer to Pakistan with plans for military collaboration between Pakistan and Turkey leading to a system of collective defense in the Middle East.

668 Ibid.

669 Cabinet Memorandum: United States Military Aid to Pakistan and Talks between Pakistan and Turkey, CAB 129/66 (16th February 1954).

reports he submitted to Washington. Dayton once believed that Turkey would struggle with external payment and internal economic issues for approximately three years beginning in 1948 with the advent of Marshall Plan aid before reaching relative prosperity in five to seven years’ time. With the passage of seven years Dayton found himself “thoroughly disillusioned by the lack of constructive effort by the Turkish Government to put their house in order” and convinced that “the present inflationary policy pursued by both Menderes and Zorlu was deliberate, calculated and unscrupulous.” The duo was “gambling on the strategic position of Turkey, on the recent bilateral arrangements on defense which tied the United States to Turkey, on the European long-term trading interests” and particularly on “the conviction that whatever economic errors they might commit and however far the country was sliding downhill, the United States would bail them out.”

Turkey had massive debts and a cumulative accounting EPU deficit of 206.2 million units, more than four times greater than its 50 million-unit quota. Menderes and the DP obsessively sought to catch up with the West’s material wellbeing; failing to do so meant lost credibility and the threat of the RPP’s return. To prevent such a contingency Menderes and Zorlu, “a couple of unscrupulous foxes” in Dayton’s opinion, had developed a strategy whereby they blackmailed the U.S. and European nations into offering credit and aid in order to stave off an economic crisis. Washington needed to recognize this state of affairs and sanction irresponsible investments such as constructing cement and sugar plants at a prohibitively far distance from coal production centers, thus allowing for them to run at partial capacity.

Ankara continued to look to reap the benefits of private investment, and also to promote the continuance of U.S. economic aid. But the year started on an ominous note for Ankara when the Associated Press reported that a “responsible administration” official for the Eisenhower administration...
government revealed that the U.S. was about to curb funding of Turkey. Washington sought an effective strategy that would facilitate an eventual termination of its economic aid to Turkey. During Menderes’ trip to the U.S. the previous spring Turkish and American officials discussed the possibility of Turkey becoming autonomous by 1958, the year his second term ended. This scenario now seemed overly optimistic and 1960 now seemed to be the earliest possible date of ending U.S. financial support. This could only be achieved once Turkey adopted a more conservative approach to its development program and sought out more credits from Europe or the increasingly reticent IBRD, particularly if the U.S. Congress grew wary of continuing financial support in the near future.

*The Debate over U.S. Economic Aid Levels*

Securing more economic assistance continued to largely define U.S.-Turkish relations as the greatest source of tension and miscommunication. The Turks remained frustrated at Washington’s refusal to extend the loan of $300 million Menderes requested during his trip to America in the spring of 1954. In April 1955 Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, now Minister of State, on behalf of Menderes met with American leaders to discuss a possible long-term loan.

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674 Kilic 147.
676 Ibid.
677 The precise function of the joint U.S.-Turkish Consultative Group created in 1955 was one such example of conflicting expectations. Menderes assumed the function of the Consultative Group to be determining the state of Turkey’s economy and the steps required “to meet the increased burden being carried by Turkey on behalf of the rest of the free world” and result in increased funding. For its part, Washington expected the data culled by the Consultative Group to offer recommendations of how Turkey could best utilize available resources rather than more aid. Menderes already anticipated the suggestions of reduced investments and defense and testily called into question the utility of the Consultative Group if it failed to provide more funds. The Prime Minister countered that Turkey’s duties to defending the West kept 300,000 able men in uniform and out of useful employment. Menderes argued that the current aid program of $70 million could not cover the added costs of Turkey’s defense effort, and added that if the U.S. refused to assist Turkey in meeting its needs, then Washington could “take away all your economic aid.”Memorandum of Conversation (February 19, 1955) Records Group 469, Records of US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Mission to Turkey, the Chief of Mission Administrative Records, 1948-56.
678 Memorandum of Conversation (March 4, 1955).
sniffed that Menderes’ unfamiliarity with economics forced him to rely “entirely on the advice of Zorlu” a man “himself equally devoid of economic knowledge and experience.” Zorlu’s having obtained the loan “by making use of largely irrelevant political and military agreements” and was summarily rejected. Zorlu’s disappointing failure highlighted the growing strains in U.S.-Turkish relations over Turkey’s economic failings. The Turks increasingly saw themselves being taken for granted by the U.S. Turkish newspapers ran increasingly outspoken and spiteful editorials in the spring of 1955 by authors claiming that the U.S. intended to cut back aid to Turkey so as to make the Turks wholly dependent upon America. Turkish pundits reviled American officials in Turkey for having overstepped their bounds, for betraying a marked ignorance of European affairs and for displaying “a know-it-all attitude.” Turkish papers contended that Washington’s refusal to provide $300 million more in aid was the result of concerted efforts by specific American representatives with a marked anti-Turkey bent.

680 Ibid. “Turkey to Shift Envoy” The New York Times (Apr. 27, 1955): 6. In late April the Menderes regime recalled its Ambassador to the U.S., Feridun Cemal Erkin, due to his failure to adequately present the Turks’ economic case to Washington. In his stead Ankara tapped Haydar Gork, an economic expert and head of Bayar’s staff. During the previous years, Gork demonstrated the sort of economic know-how Erkin seemingly lacked as Turkey’s representative in negotiations with the OEEC and the EPU.
681 Kilic 147.
682 The most militant of anti-American editorialists wrote for the DP newspaper Zafer. Burhan Belge, a Turkish journalist dismissed by the British Embassy in Ankara as “completely amoral,” waged a one-man crusade against the U.S., Jews and the New York Times. In all likelihood he was responsible for the venomous attacks published in Zafer in 1953. Many professional Turkish journalists took offense at American publications including the Times, Time, Life and the Associated Press agency for misrepresenting conditions in Turkey. Belge took his accusations quite a bit farther by contending that the Times sought to discredit the Menderes Government and bring about its downfall by depicting Turkey’s economic crisis as insurmountable. To this end, the Times dispatched correspondents to Turkey with the intention of undermining Ankara’s official policy. Belge also contended that the American media consistently demonstrated a blatantly pro-Greece slant in any articles related to Cyprus while paying little heed to the Turkish side of the issue. Complicating the turmoil caused by Belge was the fact that apparently Menderes “relies at present on Belge more than on anyone else for guidance about the foreign press. Belge’s influence, however, is much resented and regretted in Turkish official circles, by other members of the Government and by the more intelligent members of the Democrat Party.” The U.S. Embassy did not regard Belge’s attacks as worthy of official comment or action. Letter from Chancery to the Southern Department, Foreign Office, London, S.W.1. (May 23, 1956). FO 371/124012.
684 In early 1956 British official Anthony Nutting reported to London following an eye-opening luncheon with a pair of fellow Brits. One of them, Sir Charles Hambro, told Nutting that he “had it on very good authority indeed that the American Government were working for the downfall of the present Turkish Government and trying
Economic conditions in Turkey in 1955 degenerated to the point where the Soviets could make a serious case for the destructive impact that had resulted from Ankara’s orientation towards Washington. Turkey’s foreign debt continued to grow unabated while its gold reserves diminished alarmingly while the US insisted on greater military spending “at the expense of the Turkish budget, or more precisely – at the expense of the Turkish people.” With Washington’s greater emphasis on preparation for future conflict Turkey had been forced to subordinate its economy to American war plans and its armed forces to the U.S. military, and “the longer this is the case, the more it loses its national character.” In becoming an integral part of America’s containment policy Turkey “has been turned into a firing ground for the American military. Manoeuvres are conducted here regularly, taking into account the possibility of utilising the atomic weapons.”

In June 1955 Turkey found itself without the $50 million it needed to pay four oil companies to unload their cargoes held in tankers anchored tantalizingly offshore. With only a week’s work of oil reserves left, the Turkish government managed to scrape together the

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685 FO 371/117723, March 5, 1955, SECTION A, PRAVDA, WHAT NATIONAL INTERESTS OF TURKEY REQUIRE, (By V. Medvedev).
necessary funds.\textsuperscript{686} Such were the hardscrabble day-to-day conditions in Turkey by the mid-1950s. With the prospect of bankruptcy becoming a stark reality, the DP became increasingly autocratic and Turkish officials fled their posts in protest. Resistance to the Menderes Government’s policies grew more resolute.\textsuperscript{687} The depth of the Menderes Government’s growing crisis became grimly apparent in late November when ten members of the DP serving in the Grand National Assembly resigned their positions and an additional ten were removed from office. Much of the authoritarian conduct and policies of Menderes seemed little different to those of the RPP before the 1950 elections. As dissenting voices in the Turkish press grew louder Menderes sought to silence them by having journalists dismissed and censoring or closing down dissenting newspapers such as the RPP’s \textit{Ulus}. Universities continued to be hotbeds of opposition activity. In September the state suspended Osman Okyar, an economics professor at the University of Istanbul, for authoring an article questioning the usefulness of American assistance.\textsuperscript{688}

As 1955 unfolded, economists recognized that conditions in Turkey were no longer conducive to growth. Reserves continued to dwindle leaving no cushion for Turkey to fall upon in early 1956 after the profits of the harvests of the autumn of 1955 had been spent. The looming prospects of deficits did little to compel the government to scale back the construction of hydroelectric plants, sugar refineries, or factories. At the November 1 opening of the GNA

\textsuperscript{686} “Turkey: A Friend in Trouble”

\textsuperscript{687} In July Kasim Gülek, the RPP’s Secretary General faced possible charges for criticizing the state’s economic policy while conducting a tour of the country. After being prevented from speaking at a public meeting by the police Gülek risked being charged by the State Prosecutor with his rhetoric causing an artificial increase in the cost of essential items. Gülek relished the possibility of facing a trial and told a British official of his plans to employ 200 “volunteer lawyers” to defend him. Should he be convicted Gülek would willingly “go to prison and play the martyr” although his stature was such that the United States would be unlikely to accept Gülek’s imprisonment without some sort of intervention. FO 371/117716, Confidential, letter from A. Arcalus (July 27, 1955). The opinions of less prominent Turkish citizens were likewise becoming intolerant of the DP’s policies in 1955. British officials visiting the seaport of Çanakkale had never seen its residents more outspoken or its local DP deputies more apprehensive at the change in public opinion. FO 371/117716, IMPRESSIOSN OF A VISIT TO ÇANAKKALE.

\textsuperscript{688} Shaw & Shaw 411.
President Bayar revealed in his opening remarks that neither the size nor the pace of development would be scaled back. Minister of State Zorlu remained in Washington seeking a loan of $300 million for defense expenditures, but the Eisenhower Administration refused to even ponder such a sum until Ankara began to take steps to put its wavering economy back on the right track. This refusal did not sit well with the Turks who apparently assumed that “as long as they had done everything we asked them to do from a military point of view, we should give them economic aid without any strings attached.” Washington compromised by agreeing to provide a grant of $30 million in the current fiscal year if Ankara promised to implement reforms that would stabilize the State budget and SEEs and to potentially devalue the lira. While in Washington Zorlu did little to improve his reputation with the U.S. A British official after conferring with a State Department representative noted “Zorlu’s manner does not apparently endear him to the American negotiators” who were unsure if he knew “more about economic matters than he pretends.”

From a strategic standpoint America could not simply stand aside and complacently watch an invaluable NATO ally drown in debt. Its army provided NATO its single largest contingent of troops at 22 divisions and continued to be “thoroughly anti-Communist, and seem at times to be anxious to get in a fight with the Soviets.” The Turks continued to comply with every American military request and waited patiently when promised U.S. armaments took months longer to be delivered than the promised date of delivery. Such patience and cooperation came at a price in the form of continuous military support. Washington’s refusal to provide the

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690 Report of Study Mission to Europe and the Middle East, Tuesday, January 24, 1956, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C. in Committee on Foreign Affairs 575.
692 “Turkey: A Friend in Trouble”
Turks with loans coupled with its refusal to take sides on the Cyprus issue risked undermining relations between Turkey and the U.S.

*The Cyprus Crisis, Act I*

Ankara’s growing distress with what it viewed as Washington’s dismissive attitude by Washington coincided with the status of Cyprus becoming a bone of contention plaguing relations between Turkey, Greece, Britain and the U.S. A British protectorate since the late 19th century, Cypriots of Greek extract lobbied with varying degrees of vehemence for incorporation with Greece, or *enosis*, and Athens encouraged such a vision. Turkey did not wish to see Cyprus fall into the hands of Greece and extend Greek influence worryingly close to Turkish borders. In 1948, in an attempt to snuff out the drive for *enosis*, London offered Cyprus a form of representative government only to be roundly rejected by a Greek-Cypriot collation led by the Orthodox Church and the AKEL communist party holding out for unification. 693 The odd bedfellows found much to disagree about; in April 1949, the Church’s governing body, the Ethnarchy, condemned the AKEL as a threat to Cyprus, the Church, and the future of *enosis*. 694 The animosity lifted the following year when the AKEL assisted the Church in collecting the needed signatures for unofficial plebiscite to determine if the Greek-Cypriots favored the existing state of affairs or *enosis*. An overwhelming 96% of the voters chose the latter, spurring the newly elected archbishop, Michael Christodorelou, to lead their cause.

Christodorelou took up the *enosis* cause in 1931 young as a young monastery student. In 1950, at age 37, he became the Archbishop of Nova Justiniana and Cyprus and took as his new name Makarios III, meaning “blessed,” and set about increasing international awareness of the

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693 McDonald 8. It seemed an odd pairing, but the Church was forced to recognize the growing power of the communist movement in Cyprus, particularly the AKEL communist party, which won control of all six of the town councils during the 1946 elections. Newsinger 85.

694 Mayes 35.
plight of his homeland. Dismissing the fragile alliance between the Greek Orthodox Church and the AKEL, Makarios determined to consolidate the Church’s influence over other Greek nationalist groups in Cyprus. He focused on the island’s youngest residents by creating the Pancyprian National Youth Organization in 1951 as a means of instilling awareness of Cyprus’ ties to the Greek mainland, the need for enosis, and the inherent evils of communism. Colonel George Grivas, a grizzled, if diminutive, veteran of the Greek Army came to supply the martial component of the growing resistance movement. Grivas grew up in Cyprus and participated in the ill-fated 1922 Greek invasion of Turkey. During World War II, Grivas led a secret group of Royalist officers and NCOs known as “Khi” (X) in the fight against the Communist-led EAM resistance group and the Germans. Makarios first established contact with Grivas during a trip to Athens in July 1952. Unsure if the Greek-Cypriots would support a terrorist operation and leery of a violent campaign himself, Makarios held out for support in the UN. Grivas had so such qualms about using violence. Shortly after the two met he drafted plans for a protracted terrorist campaign against the British, and completed several trips to Cyprus to do reconnaissance and find recruits. During the next three years, Grivas assembled a support network of volunteers drawn primarily from the Cyprus Farmers’ Union (PEK) and two youth movements. 300 of these recruits became a well-armed main strike force based in the mountains, supported by a 700-man auxiliary operating in the villages. Grivas prepared his Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA), or the National Organization of Freedom Fighters, for an extended campaign.

695 Ibid 41.  
696 Ibid 43.  
697 Mayes 24.  
698 Newsinger 88.  
699 Ibid 89.  
700 Ibid 90.
Neither Makarios nor Grivas entertained the illusion that their tiny resistance movement could successfully unseat the British from Cyprus; rather they gambled on generating international pressure on Britain to grant them their independence. London showed no signs of any such compliance. On July 28, 1954 Henry Hopkinson, the Minister for the Colonies, observed in the House of Commons that specific Commonwealth territories “which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent.” In a similarly pessimistic vein, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden remarked to recently elected Greek Prime Minister Field Marshal Papagos that *enosis* “would never happen.” Such blunt comments convinced supporters of *enosis* that the British would never abandon Cyprus without a violent confrontation, particularly after December 1954 when Britain’s Middle East headquarters moved from the Suez Canal Zone in Egypt to Cyprus. Britain’s defense responsibilities in the Middle East and to NATO made British control of Cyprus critical. From the British perspective, bringing the debate before the General Assembly, as the Greek-Cypriots and Athens intended, could only aggravate existing animosity, thereby delaying Britain’s efforts to resolve the problem and encourage dissent within the Western Alliance. Menderes shared London’s wariness over Greece’s determination to bring the Cyprus issue before the UN for possible resolution as “a regrettable political mistake full of dangerous implications.”

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702 Coyle 161.
703 O’Malley and Craig 12.
704 Howard 13.
705 Letter to Secretary of State Dulles from Prime Minister Menderes (August 31, 1954) Records Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Presidential and Secretary of State Correspondence with Foreign Heads of State, 1953-1964.
similarly feared that internationalizing a dispute between two NATO members would only reveal chinks in the West’s armor.\footnote{Letter to Feridun C. Erkin from John D. Jesnigan (September 21, 1954) Records Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Presidential and Secretary of State Correspondence with Foreign Heads of State, 1953-1964.}

\textit{Cyprus Goes Before the UN}

Secretary of State Dulles cautioned Greek Prime Minister Alexander Papagos against pursuing the matter in the General Assembly, to no avail. In October, 1954 Alexis Kyrou, the Director General of the Greek Foreign Ministry, presented Athens’s case for including the issue of the self-determination of Cyprus on the General Assembly’s agenda. Kyrou argued that Cyprus was a nation upon which the British had imposed foreign rule. By refusing to discuss \textit{enosis} with Greece and explicitly stating that Cyprus could never expect independence, Britain apparently left Athens with no choice but to bring this “major moral issue” before the UN for deliberation.\footnote{Howard 14.} The British representative to the UN, Selwyn Lloyd, countered that because Greece had signed the Treaty of Lausanne, which provided for Britain’s sovereignty over Cyprus, the UN could not hand over territorial possession to Greece. Doing so would set a “most disturbing precedent” that would potentially call into question the sovereignty of any region and justify violent activities by ethnic groups everywhere. It would send a clear message that the UN retained the power to adjust sovereignty at will.\footnote{Ibid 15.}

While France and Turkey backed Britain in keeping Cyprus off of the General Assembly’s agenda the U.S. took a more tentative position. Menderes requested that the American Delegation to the UN vote against the issue’s inclusion and made it clear to Dulles that the welfare of Turkish Cypriot population and the island’s strategic importance more than
justified Turkey’s right to have some say in Cyprus’s destiny. Washington leaned towards abstention; it would indicate America’s displeasure with Greece without forcing the U.S. to assume a position on the issue and, by default, an allegiance to the Greeks or the Turks. The Eisenhower Administration wished to maintain as flexible a position as possible to serve as an effective moderator. The American delegation refrained from taking part in the discussing the issue and ultimately abstained from voting on including Cyprus on the agenda. After a vote of 30-19-11, the Cyprus issue moved to be formally discussed in a Committee in mid-December. The United States preferred a more intimate setting to discuss the issue, one that did not extend beyond Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain. On August 20, 1954, as the Greek-Cypriots continued to bristle at Hopkinson’s insinuation that it could never expect to be free, President Eisenhower dispatched a note to then Prime Minister Winston Churchill inquiring how the redoubtable statesman intended to “handle the Cypress situation.” As it was one of Great Britain’s “family problems,” Eisenhower did not intend to offer his own perspective on the developing crisis, but was concerned how the American public’s perception of Cyprus could damage Anglo-U.S. relations.
At the start of discussions New Zealand’s UN Ambassador, Leslie Knox Munro, proposed a resolution whereby the General Assembly would agree not to discuss the Cyprus issue any further for fear that ongoing debate would cause animosity between the nations directly involved in the matter. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the US’s Ambassador to the UN, conveyed America’s support for this proposal. Washington had become “convinced that the paramount task before this body is to dispose of this item so as not to impair that friendship and trust, because that continuing relationship and solidarity are vitally important to the peace and stability of the area of which Cyprus is a part.” Heated debate could “only increase tensions and embitter national feelings at a time when the larger interests of all concerned are best served by strengthening existing solidarity among the freedom-loving nations.” On December 17 the General Assembly overwhelming supported the New Zealand proposal to not discuss the matter further.

The EOKA Strikes

By the time the Cyprus issue began to stall in the UN Grivas and the EOKA was prepared to initiate its campaign; it only required the blessing of Makarios. Convinced that no peaceful avenue remained through which enosis could be reached, in January, 1955 Makarios consented to Grivas’ beginning his campaign. During a meeting on March 29, 1955, Grivas outlined his plan for the first round of attacks to be carried out on the night of the 31st. April 1, 1955 was a grimly appropriate day for the EOKA to initiate its campaign of terror against the British who were fooled into thinking that it was communists who were responsible. When the identity of the true culprits had been discovered, the British were shocked to learn that the Greek-Cypriots

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FO 371/124012, Letter from Ambassador Bowker to W.H. Young Esq., Southern Department, Foreign Office, LONDON S.W.1 (July 11, 1956).

713 Howard 20.

714 Ibid 21.
had been able to mount such an effective assault. In eighteen coordinated attacks targeting government buildings, the EOKA detonated bombs in the cities of Nicosia, Limassol, and Larnaca. Transmitters of the Cyprus Broadcasting Service were also destroyed and the first in a series of revolutionary leaflets from the EOKA were distributed throughout Cyprus proclaiming:

> With the help of God, with faith in our honorable struggle, with the backing of all Hellenism and the help of the Cypriots, we have taken up the struggle to throw off the English yoke, our banners high, bearing the slogan which our ancestors have handed down to us as a holy trust-Death or Victory.

Mounting EOKA violence resulted in greater division between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities as they continued to move into separate enclaves segregated by barriers erected by British soldiers. EOKA operatives murdered several police officers throughout the first half of August and sent death threats to several others in an effort to compromise the effectiveness of the Police by targeting Special Branch, CID, and possible informers. British

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717 “EOKA’s First Revolutionary Leaflet, Distributed on April 1, 1955” in Dominick J. Coyle Minorities in Revolt: Political Violence in Ireland, Italy, and Cyprus (Farleigh Dickinson, 1983): 231. As if God was not enough of an endorser of the EOKA’s cause, it drew comparisons to heroes from Greek history including the “warriors” from Marathon to the Greek war of independence who had demonstrated “that liberation from the yoke of the ruler is always won by bloodshed.” The proclamation concluded bitterly by appealing to the “Diplomats of the World” to: “Look to your duty. It is shameful that, in the twentieth century, people should have to shed blood for freedom, that divine gift for which we too fought at your side and for which you, at least, claim that you fought Nazism.” EOKA planned to assassinate Greek-Cypriots working with the British but drew the line at attacking British military installations due to fears that Cypriot Communists might carry out attacks of their own against the bases as a way of discrediting the cause for enosis. The Cypriot Communist Party and numerous trade unions condemned the EOKA’s campaign, but this did not prevent the Britain and Turkey, in a bid to prevent any change in Cyprus’ status, from claiming the Nationalist campaign was inspired by the Communists. Makarios, once so vocally opposed to such violence, reportedly now supported the campaign and its usefulness in bringing international attention to his cause and pressure on Greece, although it might undermine Athens’ support of the Cypriot Nationalist cause. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLEY REVIEW, Office of Current Intelligence, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 14th April 1955, SC No. 02037/55, [http://www.foia.cis.gov/browse_docs_full.asp](http://www.foia.cis.gov/browse_docs_full.asp), accessed on May 17, 2010.
719 FO 371/117653, TOP SECRET, SPECIAL BRANCH, POLICE HEADQUARTERS, NICOSIA. 19th August, 1955. Special Branch Fortnightly Intelligence Report No. 15/55 for the first half of August, 1955. EOKA operatives killed a former Special Constable accused of being an informer in Nicosia on August 10 and shot a police sergeant and constable in Famagusta the following night. The sergeant died the following day. Other shootings and
officials in Cyprus found the campaign most effective in crippling police morale and public
confidence.\footnote{720 FO 371/117653, CIC (55) – SIXTEEN (Final), 23rd August, 1955, TOP SECRET, CYPRUS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, INTELLIGENCE REVIEW FOR THE FIRST HALF OF AUGUST, 1955.} Archbishop Makarios did little to help matters by using fiery rhetoric referring to
the enslaved Cypriots struggling beneath the British imperialist yoke in sermons such as the one
he delivered at Trooditissa on August 15 to a crowd of 10,000.\footnote{721 FO 371/117653, TOP SECRET, SPECIAL BRANCH, POLICE HEADQUARTERS, NICOSIA. The Archbishop’s speech included statements such as, “The prisons are full of patriots” and “It is a matter of historical record that the British only give liberty to those who are determined to win it for themselves.”} Other leaders of the clergy
made similarly inflammatory addresses to their parishioners to indicate a growing consolidation
of the church’s approval of violence and the belief that only acts of EOKA terror could secure
Cyprus’ freedom from the British.\footnote{722 FO 371/117653, CIC (55) – SIXTEEN (Final), 23rd August, 1955.}

The Start of the London Conference

The deteriorating situation compelled British Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan to
consider giving up most of Cyprus. He decided to explore such an option by hosting a tripartite
conference in London attended by Britain, Greece and Turkey. Macmillan’s decision to include
Turkey in the impending conference on the Cyprus issue aroused deep hostility among the
Greeks and their sympathizers. The Committee on the Cyprus Question, an organization
established by the Cyprus Federation of America, dispatched a letter to the Foreign Minister on
August 17 calling attention to Turkey’s lack of a legal standing to take part in the conference.
Firstly, Turkey renounced all claims to Cyprus in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, and secondly, the
Turkish-Cypriot population only represented 18% of the island’s population compared to the
80% Greek-Cypriot majority.\footnote{723 FO 371/117653, Letter from the Committee on the Cyprus Question to the Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, House of Commons, London, England (August 17, 1955).} Furthermore, the British had failed to carry out its affirmative
legal responsibilities under both the UN and the Atlantic Charters to allow self-governing people
attacks involving the police occurred in Kellaki, Therapos, Argos, Limassol, Aminandos, Platres, Omodhos and Dhora over the next two weeks.
the right of self-determination. In refusing to consider the rights and opinions of the people of Cyprus or allow a representative to attend the conference, the British were deciding the fate of half a million people without their consideration. The British may have also intended to use the conference as a venue for damage control, hoping to change the global perception of the struggle as one against colonialism to one between Greeks and Turks. The Greek press viewed the London Conference with the utmost suspicion and kept up a steady stream of pessimistic articles and editorials throughout its duration. From the beginning of the conference the Greek delegates believed that the British’s sympathies lay with the Turks, citing that even the placing of each of the delegations at conference table as proof of this blatant inequity. Many Greeks viewed the conference as little more than a ruse to draw Turkey into the dispute and force the Greek Delegation to agree to a compromise solution, thus relieving the British of the pressure of settling it single-handedly. It was also an opportunity to undercut Greek efforts at the UN to secure Cyprus’ independence.

Regardless of Britain’s intent, the admission of Greece and Turkey as brokers of a solution in Cyprus had severe repercussions in the years to come when each came to champion
the island as a national cause and potential grounds for war.\textsuperscript{729} Menderes informed the British that Turkey did not desire to see any substantial alteration to Cyprus’ current regime, but that any change should result in the island’s restoration to the Turks.\textsuperscript{730} On August 24, just prior to the Turkish delegation departing for the tripartite conference, Menderes made a public address in which he reaffirmed his commitment to maintaining and strengthening the Turkish-Greek friendship through arrangements such as NATO and the Balkan Pact. In the same breath the Prime Minister played on nationalistic impulses by making references to the anniversary to the 1922 expulsion of the Greek Army from Izmir and refusing to concede to the Turkish coastline being encircled by foreign-occupied islands.\textsuperscript{731} Such tangential threats unified the Turkish people and earned the support of the opposition parties whose leaders announced that until the conclusion of the London Conference they would call a truce in the political power struggle. Cyprus came to dominate as the single item of interest in the Turkish press with editorialists expressing their concerns that the British might be persuaded to broker a deal with the Greeks for Cyprus in exchange for military facilities. The Turkish press also its misgivings towards the possibility of self-government in Cyprus.\textsuperscript{732}

In his opening statement on August 30 at the conference, Foreign Minister Macmillan drew upon the customary Cold War rhetoric, stressing that all three nations were “members of the most important alliance perhaps of all history - on which the peace and progress of the whole

\textsuperscript{729} Ioannides 77.
\textsuperscript{730} O’Malley and Craig, 22.
\textsuperscript{732} FO 371/117653, RG1087/920, From: Mr. Stewart, Ankara, Telegram No. 38 Saving, Dated September 1, 1955, en clair, \textbf{RESTRICTED, FROM ANKARA TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE}, Addressed to Foreign Office telegram no. 38 Saving repeated for information saving to: ATHENS … 29 Saving, BMEO … 62 Saving, UK DELEGATION NEW YORK … 29 Saving, WASHINGTON … 83 Saving, GOVERNOR, Cyprus … 22 Saving.
world may depend -the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." Macmillan made clear Britain’s imperative interests in Cyprus and its desire to safeguard them, but would not commit to a position on the island’s sovereignty. This left Foreign Minister Zorlu with a number of questions to ask Ambassador Bowker at a reception held that evening over whether or not the British were considering transferring sovereignty to the Greeks. Zorlu stated that the Turks did not object to a constitution, a British goal, provided it applied equally to the rights of both communities and excluded Greek sovereignty at any point. Zorlu emphasized that equality of rights would include the right to veto any measure which might be potential harmful to the welfare of the Turkish-Cypriot minority. The Greeks, unsurprisingly, insisted upon an immediate plebiscite to decide Cyprus’ independence, and possible unification with Greece, an act that the Turks claimed violated the Treaty of Lausanne. With neither side willing to accommodate the other the conference seemed to be on the verge of collapse. British officials fretted that the Turkey might adopt an increasingly bellicose attitude ending in a severing of Greek-Turkish relations and possibly a war to reclaim the Aegean islands, Crete and Western Thrace.

The Talks Stall Out

Once the negotiations in London reached a standstill the Cyprus debate shifted once more to the floor of the United Nations when the Greeks requested for the inscription of Cyprus on the upcoming Agenda of the General Assembly. On September 21 the Colonial Office braced itself for the possible inscription, fearful that it might set a precedent for other colonial matters and that the prolonged interference of the UN would show that the British could be compelled to

734 FO 371/117653, RG1087/923, Confidential, Cyprus, Letter from James Bowker (August 31, 1955).
back down from their position so long as international pressure continued.⁷³⁶ Britain’s fears proved unfounded; following discussions on September 21 the General Committee recommended the Greek request be rejected by a vote of seven against (Chile, France, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, the U.K. and the U.S.) to four in favor (Egypt, Mexico, Poland and the Soviet Union) with four nations abstaining (China, Ethiopia, Haiti and Siam). With the crisis averted Macmillan reiterated his country’s desire to look to the welfare of the people of Cyprus and to shepherd them towards constitutional development and eventual full self-government while maintaining friendships with Greece and Turkey.⁷³⁷ He emphasized the avoidance of a precedent UN action in the matter might have set, beginning with encouraging the Greek campaign for the acquisition of Cyprus rather than the island’s self-determination. Had this occurred it would set a standard permitting UN members to ask the organization to support their claim to assume control over neighboring territories, challenging existing treaties and allowing the UN to encourage one nation to conduct subversive and violent acts in another.⁷³⁸ Ambassador Melas of Greece denied his country’s intentions of stirring up trouble, and claimed Greece came to the Cypriots’ aid as a concerned UN member only after a House of Commons’ member stated that they could never expect to be granted independence. Turkish Ambassador Sarper dismissed Melas’ remarks by stating that Greece, with its numerous minorities, was itself “a mosaic of nations” and could not possibly determine how Cyprus’ particular ethnographic composition determined its ultimate identity. Saper claimed that the Greek Delegation at the UN was “under pressure from a one-track minded person in Cyprus who would not shrink from

⁷³⁸ Ibid.
setting the world on fire in the hope of attaining his one and nebulous objective.”\textsuperscript{739} The puppet-master described could only be Makarios.

In contrast to its neutral stance on the UN becoming involved the previous year, the U.S. took a more resolute position to help the British gain a victory by a relatively comfortable margin.\textsuperscript{740} Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. called attention to the General Assembly’s decision not to adopt a resolution on the Cyprus issue the previous December or to give the matter further consideration. Those discussions had taken place in a state of relative calm; the current discordant situation precluded discussing the matter in anything but “suspicious conditions,” compelling Lodge to observe before the General Assembly, “There are occasions when quiet diplomacy is far more effective than public debate, and this seems to be one of those occasions.”\textsuperscript{741} The U.S. voted against inscription of the Cyprus matter, arguing that finding a peaceful settlement should be left to the three nations most directly involved in the matter rather than allowing it to become the basis of an international dispute.

Dissatisfied with Cyprus Governor George Armitage’s handling of the ongoing crisis, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden had him replaced by Field Marshall Sir John Harding shortly after the victory in the UN. Due to existing circumstances London decided it would be best that the Governor of Cyprus be a senior service officer, although not a “Military Governor.”\textsuperscript{742} The new governor arrived on the island on October 3, 1955 and immediately combined the administration, military, and police into an integrated security force. He also demonstrated finesse and ability as a negotiator despite a tempestuous working relationship with

\textsuperscript{739} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{742} FO 371/117661, RG1081/1148, SECRET, GOVERNOR OF CYPRUS. (J.A. Thomson) September 23, 1955.
Makarios. From the start, the two were hopelessly at odds with one another. Harding pledged the Greek-Cypriots a measure of control over domestic matters in exchange for peace, but was rejected by the Archbishop.743 As a result, punishments against Greek-Cypriots became less lenient, and laws regarding deportation, curfew, and censorship were likewise strengthened. Harding, continuing to showcase the ongoing British fear of communism, also made the misstep of outlawing the AKEL on December 12, abolishing the only political party with a distinctly anti-EOKA bent. The AKEL had vocally condemned the EOKA once they initiated their violent crusade in 1955.744 Such repressive tactics only played into the hands of the EOKA by compelling previously moderate Greek-Cypriots to identify with their cause and pledge support. They also aroused sympathy and support for the EOKA in Greece and other nations and compromised Prime Minister Eden’s ability to justify the conflict to both American and UN officials.745

As the conflict slogged on, the British continued to be at a disadvantage, lacking the sort of localized intelligence needed to challenge effectively a nebulous enemy such as the EOKA. The Cyprus police became honeycombed with EOKA insiders feeding their comrades inside information that enabled them to stay several steps ahead of their adversaries. To combat this situation, Harding decided to step up the recruitment of Turkish-Cypriots into the police force. By the end of 1956, there were 4,000 Turkish-Cypriot policemen to 1,000 Greek-Cypriots, in a complete turnaround of the ratio that had existed before the fighting had begun.746 Such a reversal could only lead to widespread violence once these new Turkish officers began to openly confront Greek-Cypriots. Initially, the EOKA limited its campaign to British military and

743 Newsinger 95.
744 Attalides 110.
745 O’Malley and Craig 27.
746 Newsinger 97.
colonial officials and certain Greek-Cypriot “collaborators.” On the day of the first wave of attacks, the terrorists left behind leaflets in the Turkish-Cypriot quarters of Nicosia assuring the minority that they intended them no harm, but also warning them not to side with the British. Unfortunately, the Turkish-Cypriots became targeted by the EOKA for doing that very thing. The reason was rooted in the British decision to readopt their “divide and rule” policy, drawing a number of Turkish-Cypriots into the conflict as members of the Cyprus police force. As a result, the Turkish minority suffered their first casualty on January 11, 1956 when Ali Riza, a Turkish-Cypriot police sergeant was slain by the EOKA.

The Political Impact on Cyprus in Turkey

Cyprus provided an unwelcome and unneeded crisis for Menderes as he faced growing criticism from both the RPP and his own party, with living costs and prices of consumer goods continued to spiral higher, and the activity of American military personnel on the black market further disrupted the Turkish economy. Escalating violence between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities sparked anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir in September 1955 when rumors circulated that an explosion had caused damage to the house in Salonika where Atatürk was born. Enraged Turkish rioters ran amuck in the cities of Izmir and Istanbul causing 300 injuries, looting 4,000 Greek-owned businesses, and causing substantial destruction to 78 Greek Orthodox churches. Menderes called out troops and tanks to arrest some 4,300 of the rioters. Accusations soon surfaced that the Turkish Government incited the protests and encouraged the ferment that led to the destruction of Greek properties. Witnesses testified to the systematic

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748 Holland 52.
749 Ioannides 108.
origins of the riots, citing the units of rioters that appeared with crowbars and steel claws to tear open the steel shutters of Greek shops.\textsuperscript{753} The slow response time of Turkish police lent more credence to theories that the riot served as a way to divert attention from the country’s economic troubles, and the failure to convict anyone arrested for the riots due to a lack of evidence confirmed such a possibility to many. A study mission from the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs stopped in Istanbul a month after the riots to inspect the damage; it concluded that the riots “had gotten completely out of hand and completely away from the control of the Turkish police themselves, who weren’t enthusiastic about putting them down.”\textsuperscript{754}

The Menderes Government used the riots as a pretext to clamp down on Turkish organized labor activity, shutting down the offices of the Istanbul Trade Unions and the three primary member unions, the dockworkers, textile workers and building operatives. Turkish officials contended that communists had taken control of these unions and manipulated them in order to organize the riots. The Turkish Ministry of Labor then suspended the activity of all Istanbul trade unions while their supposed role in the riots was investigated.\textsuperscript{755} British officials believed that while many workers took part in the rioting, the true reason for the targeting of the unions was their growing support among union officials for the RPP. The riots offered the Menderes Government an opportune pretext for removing union leaders from their posts, leaving the unions to carry on their quest for the right to strike and higher wages.\textsuperscript{756}

\textsuperscript{753} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{756} Ibid.
As a result of the riots and other factors dissatisfaction within the DP grew, leading to many Party members being dismissed in October for failing to follow party discipline and others opting to resign. Many of these outcasts banded together to form the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*) in December on a platform of rational economic planning and greater democratization.\(^757\) Menderes could no longer count on the loyalty and support of his cabinet. Following a contentious DP caucus on the night of November 30 during which one party member received a punch to the nose, all sixteen members of Menderes’ cabinet resigned in protest over Turkey’s faltering economic conditions.\(^758\) Some Deputies present demanded that Menderes likewise hand in his resignation, and he did, only to have it rejected by Bayar who instructed the beleaguered Prime Minister to assemble a new cabinet. The DP could still rely upon the unwavering support of the masses that benefitted the most from the party’s economic policies.\(^759\)

*Washington Struggles to Take Sides*

When the turmoil in Cyprus began anew in the mid-1950s the Eisenhower Administration attempted as silent and unobtrusive a position as possible.\(^760\) Such dispassion came at a price. When the U.S. failed to denounce Turkey for the riots of September 1955 it added to an already significant feeling of anti-Americanism and push for neutrality among the Greeks. The Turks insisted that Washington recognize that Greek ownership of Cyprus would place the Greek military only 40 miles from Turkey and “more or less” give them control over the Turkish port city of Adana. If Greek possession of Cyprus appeared forthcoming, “the Turks might be expected, frankly, to react rather violently.” Washington’s evasion pleased neither Turkey nor

\(^{757}\) Shaw & Shaw 412.  
\(^{759}\) Shaw & Shaw 412.  
Greece, which both “seem to take the attitude that we are giving the other country too much,” and both “are not at all unwilling to hold up the price of continued cooperation with us as more or less a demand for further and substantial assistance, both military and economic.” Part of the reason for Washington’s refusal to take a firmer stance on Cyprus was the fact that the conflict failed to conform neatly to either of the main tenets of American foreign policy in the early Cold War: opposition to the retention of colonies by former imperialistic nations and firm deterrence against Soviet expansion. The British retention of Cyprus as a base of military operations allowed it to fit in the latter U.S. policy concern, but the fact that it remained a subservient colony violated the former. But America’s overall indifference towards the turmoil in Cyprus, despite connections to Greece and Turkey, was primarily due to the fact that it continued to be perceived as a British problem.

The Cyprus Conflict Intensifies

1956 proved to be an especially bloody year in Cyprus as the EOKA stepped up its attacks and the British intensified their responses to them. Infuriated by Makarios’s refusal to denounce the EOKA’s ongoing campaign of terror, Harding ordered the Archbishop’s arrest on March 3 and his deportation shortly thereafter to the relative comfort of the Seychelles, but his absence failed to produce anything approaching a calming effect. During the last three weeks of March, the EOKA carried out 246 separate attacks throughout Cyprus. The British stepped up their efforts to bring Grivas to justice with a pair of well-planned operations that led to the capture and arrest of twenty EOKA fighters and the recovery of several thousand critical documents. Although Grivas himself managed to elude his pursuers, the recovered documents

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763 Newsinger 98.
provided the British with invaluable insight into the structure of the EOKA. Hangings of convicted EOKA prisoners and retaliatory executions of both British officials and their Turkish-Cypriot associates continued into the summer of 1956 with only a short-lived ceasefire in August as a respite from the violence until the Suez crisis that fall complicated matters considerably.

The intervention in Suez during October 1956 became a pivotal event for the British both in Cyprus and in the Middle East. In the last grand gesture of a once regal power, Great Britain conspired with France and Israel to reclaim the Suez Canal from the Egyptian government led by Gamal Abdel Nasser.764 Nasser’s dealings with the communist bloc to assist him in his national industrialization project had compelled the United States on July 19 and other Western powers soon after to withdraw funds for the Aswan Dam across the Nile River. As retribution, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal the following week to in defiance of its ownership by a British-controlled corporation. When attempts at international negotiations failed and the most critical oil route appeared lost, Britain and her allies decided to take the canal back using military force out of fear that Nasser would form an alliance of Arab republics to control the oil fields needed so desperately by the West. In private, Turkish Military leaders confided to the British their support for the operation and the Turkish Intelligence staff provided the British with information, but the Menderes Government forbade cooperation beyond this.765

With Cyprus as a critical launching point for many of the operations in Suez, Grivas found himself with a golden opportunity to strike British military and police targets on a daily basis, hampering efforts to prepare for the strike against Egypt.766 By the time the expedition against Nasser had been completed, thirteen British military personnel had been killed in Cyprus,

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764 Fouskas 108.
765 FO 371/130206, SECRET AND GUARD, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE TURKISH ARMY, 1956.
766 O’Malley and Craig 38.
more than had lost their lives fighting in Suez.\footnote{Ibid 40.} Without the support of the Eisenhower administration, the Suez operation was doomed to failure, painfully confirming to the British that they were no longer capable of any sizeable unilateral military action without clearance from Washington. Facing such a future, Britain once again reconsidered the necessity of maintaining all of Cyprus. The eventual loss of Suez as a military base made the Britain’s bases on Cyprus more essential than ever; London’s determination to retain these bases became unbending regardless of how the people of Cyprus felt about the issue.\footnote{“Report of Study Mission to Europe and the Middle East” 575.}

America’s perception that its ally’s mishandling of Cyprus led to a gradual dissociation from Britain’s policy. U.S. officials urged a resumption of negotiations between the British and the Greek-Cypriots. Regardless of the ongoing strife in Cyprus, the United States’ overall policy regarding the Near and Middle East from the mid-1950s onward stressed strengthening allies on the fringes of the Soviet Union such as Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece, and providing Israel with the resources to counter potential Russian gains in the Arab states.\footnote{John C. Campbell “The Mediterranean Crisis” \textit{Foreign Affairs} Vol. 53, Issue 4 (July, 1975): 606.} Maintaining naval superiority was crucial to these goals, and the U.S. Sixth Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean served as an imposing reminder to America’s allies of their benefactor’s regional interests, especially as the British presence in the Mediterranean region diminished in the aftermath of Suez.\footnote{Ibid 607.} In May 1956 London disbanded the Edirne Intelligence Centre, eliminating yet another valuable source of information on Turkish military matters. The American military became the most reliable providers of information on the Turkish military to the British, although relations between U.S. and British military officers were often less than harmonious.\footnote{FO 371/130206, \textsc{Secret and Guard, Annual Report on the Turkish Army, 1956}.} Representatives of the Royal Navy in Turkey regarded the U.S. Mission as being of low competence, but despite the

\footnote{\textsc{Secret and Guard, Annual Report on the Turkish Army, 1956}.}
British’s generally favorable relations with the Turks, they wielded little influence thanks to American resistance and obstructions. U.S. influence remained strong in Turkey’s military schools with the universal presence of instructors trained by Americans and supplemented with American advisers. From its experiences in Turkey and other areas where American and British military missions came into contact, the British decided, “American Missions are inclined to regard the foreign Armed Forces to whom they render aid as their own exclusive province.”

The DP Steps up its Campaign of Suppression

The DP stepped up its campaign against the press in the spring of 1956, justifying increasingly violent measures as means of preventing revolutionary activity. At the opening of a dam in Adana on April 20 Menderes contended that journalists in league with his political enemies were plotting to bring about a revolution and his removal from office. Future arrests and prosecutions of Turkish journalists bore out the prime minister’s increasing paranoia.

Newspapers running pictorial depictions of Menderes and other high officials deemed insulting or unflattering could also end in a prosecution and secret trial as was the case in the Siyasi Halk.

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772 Ibid.
774 On the night of April 29, four Turkish newspapermen and a staff photographer were arrested in Ankara by the city’s Political Police. The arrests occurred in the Cankaya section of Istanbul, near the residence of President Bayar who was allegedly hosting an affair attended by Menderes and six members of the Cabinet. Two of the reporters, Altan Oymen and Aydin Koker of the Istanbul newspaper Tercuman, endured thirteen hours of detention before being released. Police held the other three, Seyfettin Turhan of Hurriyet, Oktay Eksi of Dunya, and Dunya photographer Hikmet Tanilkan for less than three hours. Sadan Ferit Kansoy, head of the Ankara Political Police and the arresting officer, allegedly beat Tanilkan, confiscated his film, and threatened to charge him with spying for the Soviets, a crime punishable by death in Turkey. Following the release of the five men the police claimed that they were merely “guests” of Konsoy and did not charge them with any crime. In reaction to the incident, the Ankara Journalists Society called for the dismissal of Konsoy while the State Minister for the Press, Emin Kalafa, promised a thorough investigation. “Police in Ankara Detain Newsmen” The New York Times (Apr. 30, 1956): 2. Even mild lampoon was grounds for imprisonment, as the editor of the satirical weekly publication Chivi found to his dismay in the summer of 1956. A July issue of the publication included this joke: “A customer stopped at a Turkish newsstand and asked for a copy of a newspaper called Freedom. ‘We have no Freedom’ said the news vendor. ‘Then,’ said the customer, ‘I’ll take a copy of LIFE.’ ‘We have no life either.’ ‘Ah well,’ sighed the customer, ‘I might have known, for where there is no freedom, there can be no life.’” The editor of Chivi lost his freedom for one year in addition to a TL 10,000 fine for “writing with malicious and tendentious intent.” “Turkey: Costly Joke” Time Vol. LXVIII, No. 5 (Monday, Jul. 30, 1956): 20.
Gazetesi, an Istanbul paper accused of publishing a caricature of the Prime Minister in September.\textsuperscript{775}

With the Turkish press under closer state scrutiny, the government set its sights on curbing criticism originating at universities. In November, 1956 Turhan Feyzioglu, the 34 year-old dean of faculty of political science at the University of Ankara, publicly censured the government for preventing the promotion of a colleague who had created a magazine critical of the state’s economic policies. Feyzioglu asserted that such actions violated the autonomy of state schools, a remark that spurred Menderes to action.\textsuperscript{776} The Prime Minister ordered Education Minister Ahmet Ozel to dispatch a letter to the academic senate in Ankara to dismiss the young dean for his politically charged comments. The senate dutifully conducted an investigation, found Feyzioglu innocent and refused to fire him. Ozel disregarded the senate’s decision and dismissed Feyzioglu anyway. Four professors at the university resigned in protest and students walked out on strike. Police brought in 300 students in Ankara for interrogation and conducted similar questioning in Istanbul. In December the government began to formulate laws to negate the authority of the university senates and place universities under the control of the state.\textsuperscript{777}

RPP officials complained increasingly in late 1956 of being shadowed by police officers, both in Ankara and while conducting trips throughout Turkey to drum up support for their cause. Some in the opposition worried Menderes would suspend the elections scheduled for next year. The RPP’s Secretary General, Kâsim Gülek, made a speech in Bursa in late September to allay these concerns and assure Turks that should the RPP return to power it would maintain interest-

\textsuperscript{777} Ibid.
free long-term credits to the villages and take steps to solve the economic issues and restore lost freedoms in the press and judicial system.\textsuperscript{778} Gülek himself claimed to have been targeted by Menderes, who supposedly claimed that should the RPP leader ever land behind bars the prison barber who saved Gülek’s hair clippings would receive a gold watch. “That Menderes,” Gülek noted, “is a full-blooded Iroquois. He wants to scalp me.”\textsuperscript{779}

\textit{Harsh Economic Realities}

More shake-ups occurred within the Menderes cabinet. On June 19 Fuad Köprülü, a founding member of the RPP, informed Menderes in a note that, “I wish to be relieved of the post of Foreign Minister for reasons I do not think necessary to explain.”\textsuperscript{780} Köprülü himself did not elaborate on the reasons, but his wife cited the conclusion of an investigation of the former Minister of State for the Press, Makerrem Sarol, that absolved him of all charges. Long-standing enmity existed between Sarol and Köprülü, and Köprülü also butted heads with Menderes over the DP’s policies. Much of the Köprülü family occupied itself with defying the DP; the former Minister’s nephew, a member of Parliament, was charged with challenging the policies of the DP and facing removal from office, and Köprülü’s son, Orhan, a professor at Istanbul University resigned his post as the chairman of the DP for Istanbul Province.\textsuperscript{781} Menderes chose the Interior Minister and a close relative of his, Etem Menderes, to replace Köprülü. Etem Menderes went to live with Adnan Menderes’ family as a young boy and the two lived as brothers.\textsuperscript{782}

New faces sat in the Cabinet; Menderes’ vision for Turkey remained the same. On September 23 he held a press conference in Istanbul, a city about to experience significant

\textsuperscript{778} Robinson, \textit{Developments Respecting Turkey (Volume Four) September 1956 – September 1957} 3.
\textsuperscript{781} Ibid.
changes, and rattled off the various dams, irrigation projects, manufacturing plants and power plants nearing completion and projects about to be started, including a modernized Istanbul. He pooh-poohed naysayers and the overly cautious who contended that the state lacked the necessary funds or energy to undertake such ventures, and boasted that in two years, “the results will become apparent. But meanwhile, to speak in a manner to destroy the credit and esteem of the government, both within and without the country, is to be insincere.”

Menderes’ words of defiance did not reflect statistical reality. Turkey remained stubbornly agricultural with 70% of the population engaged in farming, and 40-45% of the national income coming from agriculture. In 1938 the figure had been 50.3%. 50,000 new tractors, courtesy of the state, were distributed annually yet most farming continued to be done with little to no mechanized assistance. Tractors remained a luxury the majority of Turkish farmers could only dream of. But at the same time those who had purchased tractors were stymied by problems stemming from the way in which the machines had been sold. Instead of exporting one or two tractor models, American corporate interests unloaded a bewildering array of machines on the Turkish market. Different tractor models required different technicians and different replacement spare parts after breaking down. Without standardization and simplification, thousands of broken tractors remained unused, hampering Turkey’s ability to compete with mechanized countries in the global market and from producing enough to bring in the foreign exchange needed to buy new machines and maintain its slipping standard of living.

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785 Shaw & Shaw 412.
786 A paucity of spare parts for vehicles in Turkey continued for years. In a letter dated November 14, 1957 to H. Daniel Brewster, Officer in Charge of Turkish Affairs in Washington, from the Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Turkey, Malcolm Thompson, Thompson shared the details of a recent honeymoon he had spent in Turkey including a drive along a highway south of Ankara in which he and his new bride encounters “a distressing number of trucks and buses broken down along the highway. We kept a record and over the entire trip we counted 27 trucks and 10 buses immobilized for one reason or another. This is a further indication of the desperate shortage...
Turkey lost ground rapidly; in 1953 it stood as the fourth largest exporter of grain in the world, the following year it became a net importer.\footnote{\textit{Turkey: A Challenge to American Business: A Letter from Richard D. Robinson} 3.}

Economic conditions worsened markedly for some Turks compared to others. Government workers and academics with fixed incomes strained mightily under inflation and shortages, while most Turks enjoyed rising earnings. Most farmers benefited from more credit cooperatives and electrification. Urban workers, shopkeepers, owners of small factories, and services also experienced improved standards of living.\footnote{Shaw & Shaw 412.} By and large, income distribution remained unequal. In the late 1950s wage earners saw their share of the GNP fall, 7\% in agriculture and 22\% for employees of the SEEs; while large landowners and capitalists’ share of the GNP rose; by the late 1950s 10\% of landowners took 36\% of the GNP, tax free to supplement the huge personal fortunes amassed during the boom years of the Korean War.\footnote{J.K. Eastham “The Turkish Development Plan: The First Five Years” \textit{The Economic Journal}, Vol. 74, No. 293 (Mar., 1964): 132-133. Altan Yalpat “Turkey’s Economy under the Generals” \textit{MERIP Reports}, No. 122, Turkey under Military Rule. (Mar.-Apr., 1984): 17.}

\textit{Conclusion}

Growing socioeconomic inequalities between the wealthiest Turks and the teeming masses alienated much of the DP’s bedrock of support that had turned out in the elections of 1950 and 1954. The Menderes government could not afford to lose more supporters with its repressive policies having already cost it many followers in labor unions, universities, and the bureaucracy. The military still appeared loyal, but the deteriorating economic situation in Turkey and ensuing attempts by the DP to silence political opposition pushed the country ever farther from the original template of the Kemalist Republic the Turkish armed forces was obligated to defend.
As Turkey continued to spiral downward it needed firm guidance from American officials, guidance American officials continued to withhold, partly due to a lack of personnel and partly from concerns that the appearance of high-handedness would alienate the Turks and worsen already strained relations. This sort of reticence is evident in Washington’s approach to the crisis on Cyprus that developed in 1955 and grew steadily worse the next year. The U.S. did not wish to alienate either of its valued allies, Turkey or Greece, therefore it stepped away from the role of arbiter while at the same time attempting to keep the situation out of the UN. America’s wavering indecisively between paternalism and aloofness left the Turks with mixed signals and Cyprus without a solution. The violence would continue into the coming years and serve as the basis for a reckoning in 1964 that drove a permanent wedge between the U.S. and the Turks.
CHAPTER V. “SURROUNDED BY DANGERS”: 1957-1959

Introduction

Turkey’s economic survival in the late 1950s broke down to a month-to-month struggle to keep the country afloat while being weighed down by rising prices and inflationary pressures, growing budgets, and trade imbalances. Loans from the U.S., Germany, the IMF, and other nations and international organizations gave the Menderes government the means of moving towards its uncertain future. By 1958 American patience and Turkish exhaustion convinced both sides to accept the necessity of an economic stabilization program to get Turkey back on its feet. Washington’s growing insistence that the Turks put its economic affairs in order gave credence to the opposition’s suspicion that the Americans now called the shots in Ankara. The Menderes government already appeared to be subservient to its masters in Washington by deferentially providing locations for the U.S. to construct military facilities from which they conducted surveillance and information collection operations against the Soviets. This policy coupled with the decision to accept a stabilization plan made the opposition’s claims that Menderes had willfully signed over Turkey’s political and economic future to the U.S. seemed less farfetched than in earlier years.

Fearful of the possibility that his enemies in the RPP could accrue enough support and potential votes to oust the DP from office, Menderes moved up the national elections scheduled for 1958 by almost a year and won his third victory on October 27, 1957 by a slimmer margin than the previous two. Unmoved by the obvious loss of support Menderes continued to utilize the same repressive tactics and reckless economic policies that had already cost him many supporters. Luckily for Menderes, the elections concluded just as Cyprus experienced yet more hostility between the Greek and Turkish communities. Political opponents in Turkey put aside
their differences to rally around the cause of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The British decided to abandon the island except for a pair of military base areas to maintain a presence in the Mediterranean. Representatives of Turkey, Greece, Britain, and Cyrus attempted to work out a set of agreements to provide for the island’s shared governance between the two communities, efforts that would ultimately prove to be in vain.

“From crisis to minor crisis”

On January 5, 1957 President Eisenhower appeared before a joint session of Congress to request a Congressional mandate to utilize American military and economic resources in suppressing communist activity in the Middle East. The Suez debacle of the previous year weakened the grip of British power in the region, potentially encouraging the growth of Arab nationalism, antagonism towards Israel, and political instability in the region. Without Britain’s regional guardianship Eisenhower warned of the prospect of “power-hungry Communists…tempted to use open measures of armed attack” starting “a chain of circumstances which would almost surely involve the United States in military action.” The Eisenhower administration intended to provide Turkey with a greater opportunity to assert itself as a regional power, particularly as the co-owner of U.S.-provided nuclear missiles.

A Turkey more active in preserving regional stability provided Menderes with greater means of demanding more U.S. economic and political support, although his reckless compulsion to fund costly new projects while ignoring flaws in the Turkish economy led to greater dissent within his own party and the opposition. Against the advice of his economic advisers and American officials, in February 1957 Menderes introduced a national budget 25% larger than the one from the previous year. Items included a 40% levy on all imports and a 70%

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sales tax on more than 250 “luxury products.” Shortly thereafter, prices rose by 30% to 40%. Menderes continued to obsessively overhaul and modernize his country and rebuild much of Istanbul, an effort some estimated cost $1 million daily. In the summer of 1957 so much of the ancient city lay in ruins that bewildered American tourists wondered mistook the rubble for bombed out buildings, little realizing that the city never sustained any wartime damage.

Washington continual rejection of additional loans led to discussions in the GNA of emulating other NATO members by reducing the size of the Turkish military in order to slacken the strains on Turkey’s economic capacity. With its economy in “a chaotic state” and its survival “a monthly miracle of deficit financing backed by substantial, but not overwhelming, foreign aid,” Turkey needed to do something. British Ambassador Sir James Bowker predicted the Turks could continue along their present choppy economic course, “moving from crisis to

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792 The elements seemed to be in a more cooperative mood in the spring of 1957. Six weeks of rain across the fields of Anatolia defied the initially grim forecasts of poor crop harvests. Turkey also welcomed the return of German investors, specifically Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, a Ruhr industrialist visiting the country on behalf of Germany’s corporate interests. Krupp pledged to spend 71 million marks on a modern blast furnace to increase the country’s manufacture of pig-iron two-fold. The Turkish press seized upon any rumor of further German-financed projects, from the construction of a railroad to Iran to a bridge across the Bosphorus. Germany had money to invest, specifically $2 billion gold and silver balance in the EPU, and Menderes’ confidence that it would be invested in Turkey compelled him to announce a 33.5% increase in the price of state-purchased wheat. Conservative economists and American advisers reacted to the announcement with disbelief; others assumed it was a political move to shore up rural votes in the coming general elections. “Turkey: Making Hay” Time Vol. LXIX, No. 23 (Monday, Jun. 10, 1957): 35.
793 Refurbishing the city angered the residents of condemned buildings, many of whom had only 48 hours to vacate their homes before construction crews gathered outside. Reportedly, if the Prime Minister disliked a building’s appearance or insisted that a street be widened, demolition commenced almost immediately with little consideration of the expense or the fate of those who lost their residences or businesses. By August renovation efforts destroyed, or “Menderazed,” more than 10,000 buildings. Menderes blithely destroyed religious sites significant to both Islam and Greek Orthodoxy. The Patriarch of Istanbul complained to a US official in 1958 that the municipal improvement program would claim two Greek churches as a means of fomenting dissent. The American, Robert G. Miner, pointed out that a number of significant Muslim mosques and graveyards had already been destroyed, proving religious affiliation counted for little when the bulldozers began to roll. OFFICIAL-INFORMAL, CONFIDENTIAL, American Consulate General, Istanbul, Turkey, Letter to Owen T. Jones, Esquire, from Robert G. Miner (May 7, 1958) Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs. Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. Office of the Officer-in-Charge, Turkish Affairs, Supplemental Subject Files Relating to Turkey, 1954-1958. FO 371/136464, RK 1051/2, CONFIDENTIAL, SOME IMPRESSIONS OF TURKEY, Letter from D.A.H. Wright to Mr. Ross (January 29, 1958). “Turkey: Benevolent Builder” Time Vol. LXX, No. 7 (Monday, Aug. 12, 1957): 22-23.
794 Ibid.
795 Ibid.
minor crisis as she became short of some particular vital necessity” while America came to their rescue after each stall-out. The British Embassy predicted 1957 would be a difficult year for Turkey, one with continuing inflationary pressures, trade deficits and rising prices. Only sizeable supplementary economic aid from the U.S. would allow the Turks to correct their imbalances.796

The Election of 1957

Maintaining Washington’s good graces depended largely on the Turks’ continued willingness to grant the U.S. access to Turkish military installations and resources. More assertive members of the Turkish press began to question America’s control over Turkey’s armed forces and the frequently unclear status of Turkish bases housing American equipment.797 The British Foreign Office recognized that while Turkey did not have U.S. bases “in the proper sense of the word,” it did host an unknown number of American Army, Air Force and potentially Navy personnel conducting secret work throughout the country. British officials knew of American servicemen stationed at the Adana air base to service U.S. planes used in training flights, but could not confirm whether or not any remained at Eskişehir. U.S. Embassy officials assured the British that there were no American combat aircraft permanently based in Turkey.798

America’s military presence in Turkey assisted Menderes in moving up the presidential election. In the summer of 1957, just before the GNA was scheduled to dissolve, Menderes pushed through appropriations for school, highway, and mosque construction, and a one-year

797 In early February, 1957 an Istanbul reporter asked acting Minister of Defense, Şemi Ergin, about a recent article run in Pravda claiming that Turkey and countries (including Japan, France, Great Britain and Iran) hosted American bases stockpiling nuclear missiles and atomic weapons. Ergin assured the journalist that Turkey had not yet granted the US bases on Turkish territory. FO 371/130205, 10327/3, Secret, RK1193/1, British Embassy, Ankara, Letter from Chancery to Southern Department, Foreign Office, S.W.1. (February 6, 1957).
798 Ibid.
moratorium on the $345 million in debts that farmers owed the state. When these measures failed to ensure a victory for Menderes and the DP in the upcoming election, the prime minister sought an excuse to move up the date. He found it in the number of messages dispatched by Moscow to Turkey expressing displeasure with the American bases. Menderes used these outside threats as a pretext for moving elections scheduled for the spring of 1958 up to the autumn of 1957. As in 1954, Menderes hoped to secure another mandate from the people so that his economic development program could move forward. The DP’s margin of victory ended up being narrower than in 1950 and 1954, in part because fewer liberal members of the DP, urbanites, and intellectuals turned out to vote while four times as many votes went to the RPP compared to 1954, giving the party a strong showing and 178 seats in the GNA to the DP’s 424. Rather than mellowing his policies in response to the obvious erosion of support for his

799 “Yok” 23.
800 “Turkey: The Impatient Builder” Time 18.
801 Bahrampour 24. When word of the adjusted election timetable leaked, Turkey’s three main opposition parties, the RPP, the Freedom Party and the Republican Nation Party scrambled to form a coalition to challenge the DP. Already prepared for this eventuality, the DP-dominated GNA revised the electoral law to prevent such coalition from coming into existence and potentially forming a new party. The GNA then announced October 27 as the date of the elections before dissolution, effectively ending any possible debate. Ibid 24-25. Such an affront to Turkish democracy and multiparty politics did not go unheeded. İnönü, the man largely responsible for allowing the election of 1950 to take place, took the floor of the GNA and waved a copy of Turkey’s bill of rights before the assemblymen while condemning the Menderes regime for its offenses against the press, the judicial system and Turkish liberty. “Yok” 23.
803 “Turkey: Surrounded by Dangers” Time Vol. LXX, No. 20 (Monday, Nov. 11, 1957): 40. A rumor that gained credence in many Turkish circles illustrated both the DP’s weakening power and the difficulty in determining who wielded more power in Turkish government, Menderes or Bayar. According to the rumor, on election night as midnight neared Menderes watched as he was seemingly being voted out of office and reached such a point of despair that he decided it best to recognize the DP’s loss and telephone İnönü in order to offer his congratulations. Bayar then angrily took control of the situation, ordering for the election results to be rigged to provide the DP with a victory. The government did not publish the official results of the October 27, making the opposition’s claims that the DP manipulated the final results more viable. Voting by a large took place in an orderly, if tense, manner, save a clash in Gaziantep near the Syrian border where an attack by RPP supporters against the DP headquarters resulted in the death of a police officer and an 11-year-old boy. The opposition claimed that to have won the popular vote with 52% compared to the DP’s 48%, tallies the Menders government rejected out of hand. The suspicious nature of much of the voting led the RPP to deem the Government to be illegal, and Menderes did little to disprove such claims.
party, Menderes continued to threaten the political opposition with repressive measures. Its
growing strength “won’t slow us down at all,” he insisted, and his message remained the same:
“Turkey cannot remain underdeveloped. She must have a strong army, and we must be able to
maintain it within our own resources. We Turks are surrounded by dangers. It means nothing
less than our national existence.”

In strengthening the Turkish military Menderes may have been strengthening a source of
political opposition. The election of 1957 revealed that the Turkish armed forces exhibited
greater political activism than in the previous two elections, and generally not in support of the
DP. Shortly after the election the Istanbul police arrested nine current and former army officers
on charges of plotting against the Menderes government, and reports surfaced of the local
military commander in the city of Gaziantep refusing to send out his garrison against a crowd a
protestors shortly after polling day. Such examples of the military’s disapproval of the existing
regime would continue over the next three years until 1960’s coup demonstrated the full extent
of the Turkish military’s dissatisfaction of the DP and its policies.

The election proved to be both a costly endeavor with campaign expenses increasing
inflation and augmenting economic problems. On December 4 Menderes outlined future
measures to the GNA including price controls, restraints on bank credit and increasingly self-
sufficient SEEs. American officials noted that the success of such stringent measures depended
upon Ankara’s willingness to carry out decisions “which are often politically unpalatable,” such
as curtailing the import of certain consumer goods. The Turkish lira swung from 8½ to 13 to

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804 Ibid. FO 371/117661, RK 1015/5, SECRET, BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA, 1016/16 Green,
805 Ibid.
Finland; Greece; Turkey, 742.
807 Ibid 742-743. Following the election the RPP resumed its increasingly spiteful attacks against Menderes
and his supporters in the press and on the floor of the GNA. To discourage this practice, soon after his re-election
the dollar within a year, making it nearly impossible for Turkey to make foreign purchases with its own currency. Turkey continued to import more than it exported and pay for its imports with hard currency obtained through the sale of minerals and agricultural goods. Ankara partially blamed the economic woes of Turkish peasants’ having greater cash purchasing power and driving up prices while Turkey struggled to find export markets. The cotton crop for 1957 dropped by one-third compared to previous harvests, raising local prices three times higher than the international market price.

Cyprus, Act II

To the people of Turkey the conduct of American servicemen remained of secondary importance compared to the unresolved question of Cyprus. On December 9, 1957 the UN General Assembly recommenced the debate on the Cyprus issue, sparking rioting by the island’s Greek-Cypriots. The EOKA threatened to initiate “total war” should the UN fail to resolve the
matter to its satisfaction. \textsuperscript{811} The combined expense of engaging the EOKA and administering Cyprus made it increasingly difficult for London to justify a continuance of the struggle. Greek-Cypriots began to boycott British goods while the EOKA continue to damage British installations but sparing British personnel. \textsuperscript{812} The EOKA threatened to widen its offensive unless the British began negotiations for a settlement and stopped the supposed “torture” of political detainees. The CIA read the EOKA’s sudden confrontational tactics as a sign that Grivas and Makarios had reached an impasse regarding their cause, with Makarios taking a more moderate stance while Grivas seemed poised to lead Cyprus into a “heroic holocaust.”\textsuperscript{813} During the summer, the TMT demonstrated its own cruelty by massacring a number of Greek-Cypriots, thereby inciting EOKA retaliations. \textsuperscript{814} The United States continued to remain neutral as the violence escalated in order prevent the estrangement of Greece or Turkey from the Western alliance. \textsuperscript{815} With NATO’s strength in the Eastern Mediterranean on the line, the U.S. could not officially favor one side over the other, but only hope some successful resolution could be reached in a timely fashion. When meeting with Turkish leaders assumed to be intensely emotional about Cyprus, U.S. officials were advised to avoid discussing the issue altogether. \textsuperscript{816} Britain’s determination to keep fighting for Cyprus eroded steadily, and the island’s military usefulness came increasingly called into question. Cyprus lacked sufficient ports to accommodate the primary units of the British Mediterranean fleet, although it did provide


\textsuperscript{813} Current Intelligence Weekly Review, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1 May 1958, SC No. 02003/58, Copy No. 192.

\textsuperscript{814} Atalides 48.

\textsuperscript{815} Laipson 57.

\textsuperscript{816} SECRET – BRIEFING PAPER FOR MR. ROUNTREE – TURKEY (date unknown) Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs. Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. Office of the Officer-in-Charge, Turkish Affairs, Supplemental Subject Files Relating to Turkey, 1954-1958.
necessary landing fields for the RAF and French Air Force as well as surveillance facilities.\textsuperscript{817} British leaders began to shun the idea of “Cyprus as a base” in favor of establishing military bases in order to maintain some presence in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{818} The ongoing debate in the UN hardened Turkey’s attitude towards Cyprus from the top down. In public addresses and radio broadcasts from Ankara Turkish officials vowed to look after the safety of the Turkish-Cypriot population.\textsuperscript{819} Turkish politicians found in Cyprus a convenient rallying point around which most Turks could place their political differences aside.

An independent Cyprus became a solution that both Turkey and Greece could compromise on. From February 5-11 1959, Prime Ministers Menderes and Karamanlis met in Zurich to find a final resolution to the Cyprus issue that would include Great Britain forfeiting its sovereignty over Cyprus, Greece renouncing its plans for *enosis*, and Turkey abandoning plans to partition the island.\textsuperscript{820} Karamanlis and Menderes agreed to a series of “gentlemen’s agreements” to support Cyprus becoming a member of NATO, discourage communist activity on the island, and bring all emergency measures to a conclusion.\textsuperscript{821} Eisenhower hailed the concluding agreement between Britain, Greece, and Turkey as “a splendid achievement” and the efforts of Menderes and Zorlu as exhibiting a “high order of statesmanship and resolution.” The president stated his confidence that the outcome would “strengthen the NATO alliance and indeed the entire Free World.”\textsuperscript{822} Menderes, too, thought that the solution would benefit the Atlantic Alliance and that it represented the apogee of mutual respect and understanding between

\textsuperscript{818} David Childs *Britain since 1945: A Political History* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997): 74.
\textsuperscript{819} NR – Mr. Lathram, GTI – Owen T. Jones, Comments Regarding Field Submission on Mutual Security Program for Turkey for FY 1959 (November 26, 1957).
\textsuperscript{820} Callaghan 334.
\textsuperscript{821} C. (59) 32 Cabinet: Cyprus, Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 16th February, 1959 The British National Archives 2.
\textsuperscript{822} Letter from President to Menderes (February 19,1959) Records Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Presidential and Secretary of State Correspondence with Foreign Heads of State, 1953-1964.
the three participating nations and the two Cypriot communities. Furthermore, it was his
“sincere belief that the new agreement will open a new era of closer cooperation between Greece
and Turkey and help at the same time to promote the welfare of the two communities.”

Negotiations moved to London, where the nature of British Sovereign Base Areas
(SBAs) and whether or not Cyprus would remain part of the Commonwealth dominated the
discussions. Eventually the participants agreed that the Cypriot House of Representatives would
decide the Commonwealth issue after independence. By early April most of the peripheral
matters had been settled, including the structure of the constitution. On July 29 1960, the British
Parliament ratified a bill enabling the British Government to grant Cyprus its long sought-after
independence. Representatives from Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom gathered
in Nicosia to sign the Cypriot constitution on August 16. Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus also
signed a treaty of alliance and added their signatures, along with the United Kingdom, to a
Treaty of Guarantees and a Treaty of Establishment.

Weaknesses in the Cyprus Solution

In spite of all the platitudes the leaders offered to one another, the potential for more
conflict arising in Cyprus remained, in part because of the nature of the solution. The blueprint
for the Republic of Cyprus proved one of the most complicated documents of the modern era,
drafted with the input of all parties involved except those who would be living under its laws, the
people of Cyprus. As a charter intended to bind together a new nation, the constitution reflected
a distressingly divisive sensibility that boiled Cyprus’ governance down to a matter of ratios and

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823 Letter to Eisenhower from Menderes (February 24, 1959) Records Group 59, General Records of the
Department of State, Presidential and Secretary of State Correspondence with Foreign Heads of State, 1953-1964.
The Cyprus settlement brought about a substantial change in Turkey’s attitude towards Britain. Many Turks
confided to officials at the Embassy of their renewed confidence in the British following their acceptance of the
London and Zurich Agreements. Macmillan emerged in particularly high regard by the Turks for his part in
promoting a solution to the Cyprus issue. FO 371/144748, RK 1051/6A, 1024/11, No.133. BRITISH EMBASSY,
ANKARA, October 17, 1959.

824 Attalides 3-4.
proper balances. It also has the unhappy distinction of being the first constitution to deny majority rule and give the minority disproportionate rights to ensure that enosis would be unachievable.\textsuperscript{825} The island’s president was to be a Greek-Cypriot elected exclusively by the Greek-Cypriot majority while the vice-president was to be a Turkish-Cypriot chosen by his constituency.

In order to guarantee an appropriate number of Turkish-Cypriots took part in governance, official proportions were established for many governmental positions. Although only representing one-fifth of the island’s total population, Turkish-Cypriots were guaranteed 30\% of all positions in the civil service and 40\% in the police, gendarme, and the military. A newly created House of Representatives with legislative power would consist of 70\% representatives elected by the Greek community and the remaining 30\% by the Turks.\textsuperscript{826} Such divisions carried over to the largest settlements in Cyprus, which were to be supervised by separate Greek and Turkish-Cypriot municipal authorities. The constitution also created communal chambers for the cultural affairs of both communities, intended to determine the proper educational and religious regulations; in these bodies the Turkish-Cypriots received an imbalanced 28.5\% of control.\textsuperscript{827}

Additionally, the constitution provided for the creation of two analogous political institutions to serve the two communities, each of which was capable of blocking the decisions of the other through national representatives. Voluntary associations such as trade unions and political parties were also placed under similar constraints with membership in the AKEL limited

\textsuperscript{825} London’s prevailing interests on Cyprus remained the integrity of its sovereign bases, access to the airfield at Nicosia, and the option to acquire alternative locations should British strategic concerns change. London could not commit to making Cyprus a member of the Commonwealth and of the sterling area. Turkey and Athens had yet to make their feelings known on Cyprus remaining in the Commonwealth, and the Cypriot economy lacked the development required for it to be an asset to the sterling area. Ibid. 14.

\textsuperscript{826} C. (59) 25 (Revise) 16\textsuperscript{th} February, 1959 Cabinet: Cyprus, Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, The British National Archives 3-4.

\textsuperscript{827} Attalides 53.
solely to Greek-Cypriots, for example. The cumulative effect of such government-sanctioned percentages and divisions was the continuation and augmentation of the existing sense of competition between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots. Perhaps the most disquieting feature of the 1959 negotiations was the allotments of troops from the Greek and Turkish militaries to be stationed on Cyprus. The presence of these soldiers ensured an element of antagonism from the two motherlands would be carried over to the island.

Makarios claimed that he was never fully consulted during the process of the constitution’s drafting and was coerced into signing, but had no qualms about serving as Cyprus’ first president. General Grivas refused to take part in the political establishment. He founded the Cyprus Enosist Front in 1960, a political organization dedicated to keeping the dream of union with Greece alive. Officials from all three of the guarantor powers raced to make the final arrangements on the final settlements before extremist elements from both the Turkish and Greek-Cypriot communities could expand their influence. In the end, the constitution of 1960 only served to further fragment the two ethnic groups along institutional and legal lines. Such polarization insured that the newly born Republic of Cyprus’ childhood would be a short and traumatic one. On August 16, 1960 Cyprus gained its independence from Britain as a republic and set about becoming a member of the UN and the Commonwealth. London fretted over the latter prospect, given Cyprus’s smaller size and its close, and often tense, relations with two countries outside of the Commonwealth, Greece and Turkey. At first, London at first considered a possible special association with Cyprus more feasible than full membership, but

829 Attalides 120.
831 Pollis 593-594.
soon relented. On September 12, 1960, Cyprus became a member of both the UN and the Commonwealth.

Turkey Pushes for Nuclear Missiles

While the Menderes government took steps to solve various economic ills Washington’s attention focused on the growing threat of Soviet nuclear weapons. The launching of Sputnik in October 1957 confirmed Russia’s nascent ability to launch an ICBM attack against the United States. NATO leaders met to determine if nuclear weapons should be deployed in NATO ally nations including Greece, Denmark and Norway. Most European NATO members were leery of the additional burden and threats that accompanied hosting nuclear weapons, but the Menderes government welcomed the prospect of receiving advanced weaponry. On December 9, Menderes announced to the Anatolian news agency that Washington had agreed to Ankara’s request to provide the Turkish Army with “Nike” and “Honest John” missiles under the Mutual Military Aid program. Turkish officers and NCOs were to receive the training required to operate these weapons at military schools in the US.833 Turkey became the first nation to sign the general NATO Atomic Stockpile Agreement at a NATO Council meeting in November 1958.834 Dulles praised Turkey’s initiative as part and parcel of the “excellent cooperation and understanding which has so long characterized the close and friendly relations between our two

833 FO 371/130205, UNCLASSIFIED, RK1193/2, Letter from Chancery to Western Department, Foreign Office, London, S.W.1. (December 10, 1957). The use of tactical nuclear weapons by the Turkish Military had yet to be the topic of concerted study and analysis. In military exercises started in the mid-1950s the use of nuclear weapons was limited to requesting one weapon which was provided and delivered by vessels and aircraft of the Sixth Fleet. FO 371/130206, SECRERT AND GUARD, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE TURKISH ARMY, 1956.
countries,” while the State Department forecast that the Turks would look to the IRBMs in Turkey as a way to leverage the U.S. for additional aid.  

The reality was somewhat mixed. As the U.S. began to scale back the size of aid appropriations to other countries, aid levels to Turkey remained comparably high due to its strategic significance and increasing military requirements. Turkey’s agreeing to the construction of IRBMs within its borders, the forthcoming delivery of NIKE and Honest John missiles, and additional aircraft, as well as the continuing supply of conventional arms and material justified the rise in defense spending. The U.S. continued held out hope that Turkey would take on a greater percentage of its military expenditures, but this could only happen when Ankara recognized the need to integrate a long-range plan for economic development to replace the “present spasmodic planning” that reflected “the character of Prime Minister Menderes.” Washington insisted that such an epiphany and subsequent request for American assistance in drafting an economic development plan must originate with the Turks, although Ankara seemed unlikely to adopt such a perspective so long as Washington made aid so readily available. On December 19 Secretary of State Acheson met with Menderes and Zorlu in Paris and agreed to immediately provide Turkey with $25 million in economic aid and to raise the initial sum of $55 million for defense support to $70 million “in order to provide encouragement and support to the Turkish efforts to stabilize their economy.”

Menderes Appeals to Dulles

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837 Ibid.
Menderes needed encouragement wherever he could find it going into 1958. D.A.H. Wright, an official with the British Foreign Office spent nearly two weeks in January visiting Ankara, Istanbul and several small towns to meet with Turkish officials and engineers and gauge the mood of the country. He found no shortage of criticism of Menderes’ authoritarian policies and his careless and unplanned spending. The Turkish economy teetered beneath military expenditures, a burden made worse by low standards of living and an annual population increase of 3%. In response to the collapse of the international market for agricultural products and raw materials, the state redirected resources from agriculture to industry, incurring the wrath of powerful landowners in the process. After four years of poor harvests, droughts, and drops in the prices of both primary commodities and raw materials the Turks exported, Turkey found it

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839 FO 371/136464, RK 1051/2, CONFIDENTIAL, SOME IMPRESSIONS OF TURKEY, Letter from D.A.H. Wright to Mr. Ross (January 29, 1958). Curious Turks frequently asked Wright if he was German, less frequently if was American, but “no-one ever seemed to expect me to be an Englishman and showed no sign of pleasure on being told so. We are clearly not very popular these days in Turkey.” Ibid. Nor did Americans have a monopoly on ill-will in Turkey, as by a pair of mysterious bombings aimed at US facilities in Ankara in late January proved. Ankara shrugged off the event as the work of communists. Just before midnight on January 26, 1958 a pair of bombs exploded in Ankara; the first outside the American Embassy Chancery building where it caused moderate damage to the windows and storehouse of a nearby house where the British Air Attaché resided and the second near the Library of the US Information Office located in the center of the city. No one was reported being injured. Menderes, Bayar and other members of the Cabinet roused from bed hurried to the sites of the explosions and contacted Secretary of State Dulles, then in the city on a diplomatic trip. FO 371/136461, DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR THE PRESS, JANUARY 28, 1958, NO. 37, ANKARA BOMBINGS. In early reports British Embassy officials concluded the bombs had been directed at the Americans and not a result of the Cyprus issue. On the 27th Menderes assembled his Cabinet to discuss the bombings. The following day, the Turkish police hauled in 34 suspects. The Ministry of the Interior released a communiqué stating that the investigations confirmed initial suspicions that the bombings were an act of “Communist sabotage.” Deputies from both the DP and RPP in the GNA supported the state’s assertion that the incident was “a Communist provocation aimed at America which could not harm Turkish American friendship.” FO 371/136461, RK 10346/1’A’FROM ANKARA TO FOREIGN OFFICE, En Clair, Sir J. Bowker, No. 197, January 28, 1958, FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION, D. 11.20 p.m. January 28, 1958, R. 12.06 a.m. January 29, 1958. Secretary Dulles sent a letter to Menderes on January 28 expressing his thanks for the Turks’ prompt investigation into the incidents of January 26. He concurred with the Ministry of the Interior’s communiqué confirming that the explosions to be of “Communist origin” and constituted an “act of terrorism…typical of those who believe and practice violence as a means to achieve their ends.” FO 371/136461, DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR THE PRESS, JANUARY 28, 1958, NO. 37, ANKARA BOMBINGS. The issue seemed to be closed, particularly where the press was involved, when the Ankara’s Prosecutor’s Office published a court order forbidding the publication of any item concerning the bombings in order to guarantee the unimpeded advancement of the investigation. FO 371/136461, RK 10345/1B, B40. ANKARA EXPLOSIONS: DULLES’ LETTER TO MENDERES.

840 Yalpat 17.
increasingly difficult to secure long-term credits. It became necessary to use deficit financing, leading to inflation, commodities shortages, and eventually a balance of payments crisis. The Turkish Government distributed most products, fixed prices through the National Protection Law, and prosecuted those who charged more than the set prices. Even with such measures many government-distributed commodities appeared on the black market. Some essential items, such as medicine, automobile tires and parts could only be purchased on the black market.

In late January 1958 Secretary of State Dulles stopped in Ankara in the midst of a tour of the Middle East, his first visit to the region since 1953. He met with President Bayar and Foreign Minister Zorlu to muse over the changes in the Middle East to take place during the previous five years. Just before leaving, Bayar asked Dulles to remain a few more minutes to discuss the issue of American economic and financial assistance to Turkey. Dulles assured his host that Turkey remained a consummate example of a nation standing up to Soviet demands before reiterating the Eisenhower administration’s hesitation to increase its funding of Turkey’s development. Developing a sound economy had to be 90% “the responsibility of ‘the home

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842 Yalpat 17.
843 As punishment, the names of those convicted of profiteering were announced over state radio.
845 Bayar became increasingly marginalized over the years either by Menderes or by choice. By 1958 a British Embassy described the impression of most Turks of the President as a man “having become little more than a venerated elder statesman and figurehead conscientiously doing his duty in the dreary routine of state visits and national ceremonial, simple and informal in his way of life, and increasingly withdrawn from the turmoil of domestic politics.” Bayar seemed to age markedly in the past few years and disinterested in anything except his grandchildren and going to the movies. Other conflicting rumors contended that Bayar remained the foremost power behind the DP and Menderes, fired with a hatred for İnönü and dismissing any concessions to the RPP. FO 371/136453, RK 1015/59, CONFIDENTIAL, 1018/119, No. 127, BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA, (October 23, 1958). The same Embassy official painted a rather unfavorable portrait of Bayar’s wife, describing her as having “the appearance of a crusty and superannuated nursery governess, who plays virtually no part in public life but spends long periods in the family home near Izmir.”
government” with foreign actors playing a secondary role. While Turkey continued to meet its military and political objectives, it had yet to adequately address its economic failings and its over-ambition: Turkey could finance its economic development program or it could fund its military program, but it could not do both. Washington recommended Turkey’s scaling back the size of development projects and making military cutbacks, and learning to live within its limits by implementing a more sensible exchange rate and monitoring its use of resources. Turkey seemed to be focused more on using foreign aid as a stopgap measure to prop up its sagging economy and less concerned with developing a successful stabilization program to put an end to the cycle of dependence.

The Stabilization Plan comes together

Turkish officials called Washington’s attention to the political ramifications of slowed economic development, such as the need to maintain economic development in order to ensure a standard of living that compared favorably with neighboring countries belonging to the Soviet bloc. Turkey needed to keep abreast of an annual population growth of 3% with 40% of the budget going towards military expenditures. Ankara claimed to be close to completing a stabilization plan to balance the budget, reduce inflation, and eliminate deficits incurred by the SEEs. The plan would require a multilateral approach and a great deal of foreign aid in order to be successful. But, as late as June 1958, the Turks had yet to present the OEEC with a well-developed stabilization program, and instead sent a collection of “chapter headings” containing

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846 Memorandum of Conversation” FRUS, 1958-1960 Volume X, Part I: Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey 740.
847 Operations Coordinating Board Report FRUS, 1958-1960 Volume X, Part I: Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey 754.
848 Ibid 742.
849 Memorandum of Conversation, SUBJECT: Turkish Stabilization Program (April 1, 1958) Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs. Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. Office of the Officer-in-Charge, Turkish Affairs, Supplemental Subject Files Relating to Turkey, 1954-1958.
little in the way of substantive content. To the OEEC this once again proved that Turkey remained uncertain as to how it would put the stabilization problem into operation. In late May Bayar sent Eisenhower an urgent plea for help. Turkey was now “living from day to day,” denied long-term credits from America, and without adequate supplies of oil, spare parts for machinery, or goods to sell. Ankara allotted its remaining foreign exchange reserves to repay installments on debts at the expense of development projects needing further investment. Once completed, these investments would cover Turkish needs by 90-95%, but completion was impossible until more foreign exchange materialized. Bayar assured Eisenhower that the investments would cure Turkey of its existing financial ills and ensure a healthy future.

Ankara’s apparent willingness to pursue economic stabilization and approach international organizations such as the IMF and the EPU-OEEC to obtain aid from West European creditors and facilitating economic stabilization encouraged the U.S. In answering Bayar, Eisenhower expressed both his and the American people’s desire to see the Turks improve their quality of life and lessen the burdens of collective defense. Eisenhower also used the message as a wake-up call when he wrote, “your economic problems have acquired such a scope that outside help alone will not be able to cure these problems.” Eisenhower advised that Turkey await the diagnoses of missions from the IMF and OEEC currently in the country making

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850 U.S. and OEEC officials also pondered who they should negotiate with. Up to this point, the primary source of economic information and proposals had been Foreign Minister Zorlu. Washington remained uncertain if Zorlu represented the genuine sentiments of the Menderes Government or followed his own impulses when making requests for foreign aid. CONFIDENTIAL RA – Mr. Black, RA – R. L. Yost, Meeting with Dr. von Mangoldt at Treasury, June 2 (June 4, 1958) Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs. Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. Office of the Officer-in-Charge, Turkish Affairs, Supplemental Subject Files Relating to Turkey, 1954-1958.
851 Letter From President Bayar to President Eisenhower 748.
852 Ibid, 749.
853 “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey” FRUS, 1958-1960 Volume X, Part I: Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey 744-745.
assessments. At the start of July, the IMF and OEEC, having completed their studies, informed Washington that the Turks seemed prepared to fix their economy. The U.S. now needed to determine the nature and amount required for prospective assistance in the stabilization program. Washington desired to see some adjustment made to the exchange rate, some progress made on the short-term debt owed to European creditors, a guarantee that such debt would be avoided in the future, and a large contribution on the order of $100 million provided by Western European nations via the EPU or similar organization. U.S. assistance would be separate from defense support and earmarked for the growing demand for imported goods.

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854 “Letter From President Eisenhower to President Bayar” FRUS, 1958-1960 Volume X, Part 2: Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey 752. Turkey’s unending economic trials and the differing opinions of Menderes and his Ministers regarding economic policies resulted in yet another rearrangement of the Cabinet in early June. Sitki Yiracali, the Minister of Industry, and Emin Nalafat, the Minister of State, both resigned their positions, apparently due to disagreements with their colleagues over Turkey’s economic program. Abdullah Aker moved from Minister of Economy and Commerce to Minister of State, Haluk Saman became Minister of State and Acting Minister of Labor, Hasan Polatkan became Acting Minister of Industry and Minister of Finance, and Hayrettin Erkmen took on the post of Minister of Economy and Commerce, leaving behind his positions of Minister of Labor and Acting Minister of Industry. British officials could not foresee what consequences the resignations might lead to, besides a continuing loss of confidence in the Menderes Government. Both Yircali and Nalafat advocated traditional economic policies and resisted the recent efforts to carry out the stabilization program; in years past the two “were generally believed to be nothing more than stooges and yes-men to the Prime Minister.” The British Embassy initially worried that the Cabinet reshuffle would be disadvantageous to Turkey, but then decided perhaps it would be for the best. The outgoing Ministers had vested interest in keeping the economic system free of alterations or restructuring due to their loyalties to Turkish business interests. With their resignations “the brakes on re-organization of Turkish economic policy have been let off to some extent,” although it still depended on which direction Menderes and Zorlu, “who are still at the wheel, want to go.” The departure of two Ministers devoted to the previous economic system did give some indication of Menderes’ commitment to the stabilization program. The flip side of the recent Cabinet changes was that Menderes had once more “snuffed out any spirit of independence or individuality of viewpoint among his immediate entourage, even in his own creatures” and made it less likely for the new Cabinet “to rise above its present level of mediocrity and general subservience to the Turkish Prime Minister’s wishes.” FO 371/136453, CONFIDENTIAL, RK 1015/28, BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA, (September 5, 1958). FO 371/136453, En Clair, Mr. Stewart, No. 1368, September 5, 1958, FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION. FO 371/136453, RK 1015/28, FROM Chancery Ankara, No. 1018/90, Dated 5/9, Received 10/9, SUBJECT: Resignations of Ministers of Industry and Minister of State in Turkish Government, Explanation of these resignations. FO 371/136453, CONFIDENTIAL, RK 1015/28, (September 18, 1958).


856 Ibid. SECRET, SECRETARY’S TRIP TO PARIS, JULY 3-6, 1958, US SUPPLEMENTAL AID TO TURKEY (to be raised only at French initiative) Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State,
Rising Tension over U.S. Servicemen in Turkey

Turkey faced other economic obstacles, including the sale of U.S. dollars on the black market, which risked damaging not just Turkey’s economy but US-Turkish relations as well. A number of the 7,000 Americans stationed in Turkey receiving their payments in dollars sold them illegally on the black market. Embassy officials circulated a dispatch demanding an end to the activity and a similar order went out to military personnel. Ambassador Warren recommended that script or Military Payment Certificates (MPC’s) be used to discourage the practice, a measure the Defense Department opposed. Similar activities occurred in other countries where Americans were stationed, but the proportionately larger number of military personnel located in Turkey translated into a problem of greater magnitude. Some Turks questioned plans to enlarge existing military facilities or construct new ones in Turkey, including


American military leaders faced myriad legal challenges in the countries that hosted bases that differed greatly from one location to the next. In the Philippines, for example, the local police had no jurisdiction over American soldiers accused of a crime while in Greenland the legal authorities wielded considerable control over the legal fate of US servicemen found guilty of their offenses. Growing numbers of US military and government officials and their families in Turkey continued to lead to a corresponding increase in criminal cases involving American personnel and concerns regarding the handling of prosecutions. The US European Command took steps to ensure that Turkish officials recognized the appropriate exercise of Turkish criminal jurisdiction and custody of American nationals in Turkey. Such arrangements included the treatment of American personnel being held before and after trials that was consistent with the privileges and protections afforded by US penal facilities. Expected rights for American prisoners included permission to communicate and visit with loved ones, lawyers and chaplains; and access to legal assistance. US military officials also wished to gain Turkish assurances that American prisoners would receive medical and dental care, bedding, clothing, food and transportation to US military authorities upon the prisoners’ release. Baker 62.


an expansion of the Izmir airfield planned for the summer of 1958 and the additional 360 servicemen and their dependents to be stationed there.  

Izmir already vibrated with anger in the aftermath of a number of scandalous events involving U.S. sailors visiting the city while on shore leave, including a particularly ugly incident on the night of August 26 when an American sailor molested a young woman at an open air movie theatre in the presence of her husband. The Izmir Fair and other venues of amusement became the scenes of similar incidents and led to an increased police presence. Although Turkish authorities managed to suppress most of these unsavory occurrences, the opposition press took the opportunity to criticize the DP Government for giving the American military free access to Turkish military resources including the Adana Air base. More unseemly episodes occurred throughout the summer. Some were comparatively minor and escaped the scrutiny of the Turkish press, such as when four inebriated airmen attached to the NATO airbase in Adana poured beer on the statue of Atatürk near the base’s main gate on the night of August 26. Other events, such as when a car carrying four US servicemen struck and killed a Turkish citizen near the city of Bolu on August 27, had profound consequences. A Turkish policeman saved the

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859 TO: The Secretary, THROUGH: S/S, FROM: EUR – Mr. Klbrick; NEA – Mr. Rountree, SUBJECT: Circular 175: Request for Authorization to Negotiate and to Conclude an Agreement with the Government of Turkey Concerning the Expansion and Development of Facilities at Izmir (Ciyli) (6/2/58).


861 FO 371/136453, RK 1015/29, CONFIDENTIAL, 1018/89, BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA. (September 5, 1958). Following special session of the GNA in September during which the Opposition condemned the Menderes Government for its policies regarding American servicemen and their use of the Adana air base, the RPP’s Secretary General Gülek called the American Embassy to speak with the Ambassador. He wished to convey that such criticism was not intended to cast aspersions on US policy in the Middle East or a sign of the RPP’s weakening support for the Turkish-American alliance in NATO. 20 minutes after the phone call concluded, the Ambassador received a phone call from the Deputy Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who asked agitatedly what had been discussed by the Ambassador and Gülek. When the Ambassador refused to reveal this information, the Minister of the Interior appeared in person to once more press the issue. The timing of the phone call convinced the Americans that the Embassy telephones had been tapped and that the Menderes Government was fearful of Gülek allowing some vital piece of information to be known by the U.S. The British Embassy advised its officials to bear this incident in mind when speaking on the telephone.
American quartet from an angry crowd and allowed them to depart, leaving the furious mob to stab him to death. Few Turkish newspapers carried the story. On September 16 another fatal traffic accident occurred when an airman stationed at Adana killed a Turkish child while driving. On September 7 Turkish police in Izmir arrested a pair of Navy enlisted men for destroying two Turkish flags. A Turkish court convicted and sentenced the sailors to ten months in prison on September 12 in a swift trial that roused the U.S. Navy’s concern. U.S. officials could not bury the story, and the people of Izmir responded with such hostility that the Embassy recommended an indefinite cancellation of shore leaves in the city. 862 Even with every effort made to keep the incidents hidden from newspapers and other media outlets, enough details leaked to color the Turkish people’s perception of their American guests. 863


863 Ibid. A poll conducted in Ankara University by US officials revealed that only one-half of 1% of the representative students polled rated the conduct of American servicemen in Turkey as “very good” while more than 50% chose a conduct rating of “very bad.” On a more hopeful note, those polled overwhelmingly supported the US as a nation and saw it as being a firm ally of Turkey. The enlarged presence of the American military in Turkey was due largely to the modernization of the Turkish armed forces and the requisite training and construction of new facilities. Washington still expected Turkey’s armed forces to be able to effectively repulse a direct Soviet attack and to do so with a smaller, more mobile force using modern weapons. Despite American recommendations, Turkish conventional forces remained large and expensive to arm with modern weaponry. US officials would only support Turkish forces intended to reflect the strategic concepts approved by US military planners and grew weary with the sluggishness with which the Turks took to finish $156 million worth of NATO infrastructure projects inside Turkey. Two years had passed since the projects began, and American representatives blamed the overly complicated nature of the Turkish Government’s administrative machinery for the lack of progress. The US Embassy directed a steady stream of informal and formal demarches at Ankara on behalf of the American companies enlisted to complete the projects. CONFIDENTIAL, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON (September 13, 1958) Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs. Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. Office of the Officer-in-Charge, Turkish Affairs, Supplemental Subject Files Relating to Turkey, 1954-1958. Under Secretary Dillon’s Trip to Turkey, September 1958, NATO Infrastructure Problem in Turkey (To Be Raised at US Initiative) Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs. Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. Office of the Officer-in-Charge, Turkish Affairs, Supplemental Subject Files Relating to Turkey, 1954-1958. On the largest projects, the POL pipeline running from Iskenderun to Batman had been completed nearly one-and-a-half years ago, but nonfunctional due to a lack of pumping stations. Taxes and administrative restrictions on the operations of the American company, Williams Brothers of Tulsa, and its importation of crucial materials prevented the project from reaching completion. Such practices were to have ceased following the implementation of tax-exemption measures by the Turkish Government, but the measures had yet to be applied in spite of repeated reminders from Ambassador Warren to Menderes.
State Department officials struggled to ascertain the reasons behind the escalating number of unfortunate occurrences involving U.S. servicemen. The language barrier between Turks and the 12,000 US military personnel and their dependents living in Turkey presented problems, and rumors that American servicemen received special privileges and treatment augmented them.\textsuperscript{864} Editorials critical of the U.S. military in opposition newspapers and disdainful looks at American soldiers on Turkish streets were to some extent a byproduct of growing discontent with the policies of the Menderes Government and its close identification with Washington. Turkey’s growing involvement in Middle Eastern affairs violated the Kemalist tradition of staying out of regional affairs and gave the opposition greater opportunity to openly contest Turkish foreign policy, the one venue where both sides had traditionally found common ground and purpose.\textsuperscript{865}

American military and government officials had their own problems to sort out regarding faltering community relations between the growing numbers of Americans stationed in Turkey and the Turkish public. The motivations and policies of the U.S. came under increasing Turkish scrutiny and resentment the British believed was all but unavoidable:

As regards Turkish feeling towards the Americans, we have always known that the Turks nourished certain grievances against the latter, not unconnected with Turkey’s complete dependence upon the United States for both military and financial support. Moreover the Turks have for long been suspicious of the American attitude towards the Cyprus dispute. The Turkish resentment towards the Americans is therefore to a certain extent inevitable, and there is little that we could achieve by intervention, except to help in smoothing out any differences of opinion between the Turks and Americans as and when they occur.\textsuperscript{866}

\textsuperscript{864} Operations Coordinating Report \textit{FRUS, 1958-1960 Volume X, Part 2: Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey} 769, 768.
\textsuperscript{865} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{866} FO 371/136453, RK1015/47, 1958, Southern Department, Turkey, SUBJECT: \textit{Eckhardt’s Visit to Turkey}: (i) internal situation, (ii) economic position, (iii) American’s unpopularity, Letter from C.T. Brand, December 3, 1958.
West German officials in Turkey also took note of the striking drop in the Americans’ popularity and the growing criticisms heard all over the country. The Germans recommended stationing French or British troops in Turkey, thus giving the NATO presence a more international character and drawing some of the fire from the Americans. London balked at the suggestion due to the relatively small number of U.S. troops and the highly technical roles they filled in Air Force units at Adana and two guided missiles units.867

Numerous unfortunate altercations marked 1958 and as it ended, officials of the Embassy in Ankara, State Department, Defense Department and the armed forces sought corrective measures to reverse the deterioration of Turkish public opinion focusing specifically on the rise of traffic accidents and black market activities involving servicemen.868 Ambassador Warren blamed the dangerous traffic conditions in Turkey for the road accidents rather than the carelessness of American servicemen.869 In 1958 nine Turks lost their lives in nine traffic accidents involving Americans, eight of them involving U.S. armed forces personnel. U.S. military members, particularly those of the Air Force, smuggling and selling goods purchased at military bases on the black market remained another tender subject with the people of Turkey. U.S. military officials requested jurisdiction over these cases, although few believed that the Turks would relent. Convictions carried with them a mandatory sentence of one year in prison. Warren believed the criminal activity involving U.S. servicemen to be due to the lack of a command authority among the Air Force support units in Turkey able to supply the requisite

discipline. Many of the units consisted of young recruits of low ranks perhaps lacking in necessary maturity. The Defense Department suggested assigning public information officers to areas in Turkey with large concentrations of servicemen, such as Izmir and Adana, as one means of improving the situation. These officers would then be charged with “selling” the servicemen to the Turkish public and hopefully repairing some of the public relations damage.870

*Turkey looks to NATO for Economic Support*

In the era of Khrushchev Washington remained open to détente, and Ankara continued to urge hesitation and skepticism. Détente would weaken Ankara’s position when requesting American military assistance and dilute the Turkish public’s perception of the Soviets as threat, thereby compromising a source of national unity. The Turks planned to enlarge the political and economic responsibilities of NATO, should détente preface a drop in American funds. In May 1958 Foreign Minister Zorlu attended a NATO Council Ministerial Meeting in Copenhagen to lobby for greater political coordination among the members so as to more readily contain the Soviets should the U.S. sidestep its role. If the West wished to counterbalance the Soviets’ recent economic expansion, it needed to seek out similar ventures.871 To this end Zorlu stressed that Article II of the NATO agreement be applied more efficiently in order to bypass possible conflict stemming from conflicting international economic policies, and to encourage greater economic collaboration between NATO members.872 Turkey found an unlikely ally in its crusade to fortify NATO’s economic resources in Greece. Both nations had a comparatively low national income from which a disproportionately high percentage of funds and resources went to defense matters. Each country requested more assistance from other NATO members in order to

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870 Ibid.
872 Ibid 330.
maintain or increase defense budgets. Athens and Ankara also faced pressing security concerns in late 1958, the Greeks in regards to Communist guerillas along its frontier, and the Turks in the form of ever-tempting offers of greater credit and trade from the Soviet Union. At a NATO Ministerial Meeting in December in Paris, the Greeks backed Turkey’s assertion that the success of both countries’ talks with the OEEC meant a stronger alliance. Officials from Greece and Turkey cooperated in drafting a report that would illustrate this correlation. Ankara worried that NATO determined its strength and fighting capability according to its nuclear capabilities at the expense of its conventional forces and their long-term support. As one of the largest provider of conventional forces, Turkey stood to lose prestige and financial support unless it could beef up its more modern segments, including fighter aircraft. Turkish military officials had a growing wish list of purchases to be made on its behalf, but could not make formal requests due to dwindling state funds. Turkey hoped NATO allies in the “Spirit of Alliance” might provide the needed economic support. Turkey proposed developing a new common financing infrastructure so that new weapons systems could be obtained fairly. Moving beyond military spending at the national level would be in keeping with the spirit of NATO and lighten the financial loads of specific members of the Alliance, such as Turkey, which housed many installations.

Washington’s agenda contrasted with Ankara’s to a considerable extent. The U.S. intended to reduce both NATO-approved force levels for Turkey and Turkish armed forces levels and replace them both with advanced weaponry such as missile systems. Ankara dutifully

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874 “Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State” FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume VII Part 1 383-384. This potentially tantalizing report has since gone missing.


876 Ibid 392.
followed much of the American advice by deactivating two infantry divisions and slating two more divisions for deactivation in the near future. In response to the Iraqi coup of July 1958 the U.S. moved up the delivery date of the first of four planned MGR-1 Honest John missile battalions and continued to drill two Turkish Nike missile battalions. These advanced weapons systems required advanced education and training most Turkish soldiers continued to lack. U.S. officials cautioned that before more modern American weapons could be entrusted to Turkey, new educational programs would be needed to raise the technical knowledge of the members of the Turkish armed forces.

The Growing Threat of a Coup

Even as the Turkish military geared up to assume new responsibilities that would increase both its prestige and importance it revealed itself to be a potential source of dissent and threat to the Menderes government that would accelerate quickly. On January 16, 1958, after weeks of rumors of a possible coup, the Security Police of Istanbul arrested eight active army officers and a retired colonel for scheming to overthrow the government. According to the National Defense Ministry, the cabal intended to seize the Radio House in Istanbul and broadcast that the government had fallen, hoping the announcement would spark a nation-wide revolt. When the accused officers went on trial on May 26 the state had widened its case to include the RPP as part of the conspiracy, painting the coup as a reprisal for the elections of October 1957. The court case came to an abrupt end just after the Qasim coup in Iraq on July 14, 1958

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877 Letter from Adnan Menderes to John Foster Dulles, November 20, 1958, RG 59: General Records Of The Department of State, Presidential and Secretary Of State Correspondence With Foreign Heads of State, 1953-1964.
879 Ibid 775.
881 Ibid.
overthrew the al-Said Government and King Faisal, perhaps out of the DP’s fears that the military’s supposed collusion with the RPP would become reality and lead to a similar outcome.\textsuperscript{883} Rather than adopt a more defensive posture in response to the Menderes government’s attempt to prosecute the DP, the party and İnönü seemed emboldened by the event and went on the offensive, specifically attacking the RPP’s foreign policies. Reports of Menderes’s intent to send troops into Iraq allowed İnönü to point out that such a move would violate a core Kemalist principle and was not in the nation’s interests. He further denounced Menderes for supporting the British and American landings in Jordan and Lebanon and allowing the US to use the base at Incirik to support the invading marines in an operation that could not be labeled as a NATO mission.\textsuperscript{884} Opposition leaders went so far as to draw a comparison to the previous regime in Iraq to the DP, sparking a firestorm of angry speeches from both sides during the GNA’s summer recess.\textsuperscript{885}

The RPP and elements of the military were not alone in compiling grievances against Menderes; the growing cost of living and loss of personal freedoms compelled many to turn against the DP. Much of the urban elite and members of the business community could be counted as members of the political opposition alongside liberal bureaucrats, the press, and intellectuals, but they had fewer media outlets to air their grievances.\textsuperscript{886} Having control of the country’s paper mills, the government handily crippled newspapers by cutting the supply of newsprint and forbidding the import of newsprint. Domestic shortages led to significant drops in newspaper production and circulation. Istanbul’s Cumhuriyet, an independent publication, had

\textsuperscript{883} Bahrampour 26.
\textsuperscript{885} FO 371/136453, RK 1015/30, 1018/92, CONFIDENTIAL, BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA. (September 9, 1958).
access to two or three days’ worth of newsprint, and the opposition’s Ulus, the newspaper Atatürk himself founded, circulated only one-fifth of its original 100,000 papers. 887

Internationalizing the Stabilization Program

Fewer newspapers offering less criticism could not halt the gargantuan foreign debt of over $1 billion or provide the goods apprehensive foreign concerns would not ship to Turkey without cash up front. To stave off the growing effects of inflation and its dysfunctional economic policies, in the spring of 1958 the Turkish government turned to the IMF and the Office for European Economic Cooperation to help implement a stabilization program and provide desperately needed loans. The ongoing negotiations between the IMF, the OEEC and Turkey fueled gossip in the Turkish press and public of the looming stabilization measures to be adopted by Ankara, culminating in speculative transactions, withdrawals and deposits from Turkey’s banks and a rush to obtain gold and goods. 888 The urgency of Turkey’s predicament meant that the standard OEEC procedures of the mission’s report being reviewed by the Managing Board of the EPU and the IMF before the Council of the OEEC rendered its final decision would take far too long, particularly with the OEEC about to go on summer recess. 889 Ankara wanted a final decision by the end of July and hoped the British would encourage the OEEC to consider the adoption of an “accelerated procedure” with the Turks. 890 Fortunately for the Turks the IMF and the OEEC agreed in principle to provide them with financial aid provided they immediately put stabilization measures into effect. 891 Throughout the summer

887 Ibid.
890 Ibid.
891 CONFIDENTIAL – Financial Discussions between the United States and Turkey (date unknown) Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs.
representatives of Turkey, the US, West Germany, the OEEC and IMF met in Paris, Ankara and Washington to discuss Turkey’s economic future and finalize the stabilization program. In August, the OEEC agreed to offer $100 million in credit, with half of the sum coming from West Germany. The IMF assured the Turks an additional $25 million in equivalent credit and the US another $234 million. In a public address, Finance Minister Polatkan singled out the generosity of the United States, which “again comes first in this aid program by means of making the largest contribution.”

The aid package of $359 million in foreign credits and aids provided by the consortium came with significantly thick strings attached, including Menderes’ acceptance of a stabilization program and a consolidation of Turkey’s short-term debt. This program included the creation of an exchange rate system able to balance out Turkey’s import and export prices, setting firm limits on credits offered by the central and commercial bank, reassessing the procedures of the SEEs, and the formation of a global import system on the basis of existing resources and pressing needs. These measures could only remain effective so long as foreign grants and credit were available.

According to Polatkan, America’s “efforts to raise the standard of living of countries such as Turkey and proved wrong the Russian propaganda that the United States was not prepared to help its friends.” The success of American aid depended upon the timely availability of essential consumer goods to maintain economic activity and to reassure the

References:

894 Economic Surveys by the OECD: Turkey 7.
increasingly anxious business community. The Turks needed to do much to repair the damage wrought by Menderes’ overly ambitious development program. The members of the OEEC were to make the resources promised available, making American funds all the more crucial.

Menderes could feel the rising heat at home and from abroad. In early September U.S. Ambassador Avra Warren reminded Menderes that he had only three to four weeks to implement the stability measures or the $359 million would be withdrawn. Menderes hotly replied that no one was better aware of the ticking clock than he and vowed the stabilization program would be in place regardless of political obstacles. Some days later Polatkan met with Secretary Dulles in Washington to discuss the long-term impact of the stabilization program might bring.

Polatkan shared Turkish fears that consumer goods might begin to disappear as austerity took hold. Should the flow of goods remain unchanged, Polatkan assured it would “assure a favorable psychological impact for the program on the business community.” Soon after their meeting the U.S. agreed to make available $50 million of Turkey’s annual $75 million defense support program for immediate use, with promises to provide the remaining $25 million as soon as possible. With U.S. funds to cover its military costs, Ankara had more latitude to provide subsidies for specific consumer goods.

With a stabilization plan about to be put into operation, and the U.S. putting up two-thirds of the $359 million bailout, Washington intended to make sure the measures stuck. American representatives in Turkey held frequent consultations with Turkish officials connected to the stabilization program to provide Washington with constant updates regarding where funds

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896 Ibid.
897 “Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State” FRUS, 1958-1960 Volume X, Part 2: Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey 756-757.
898 Memorandum of a Conversation FRUS, 1958-1960 Volume X, Part 2: Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey 758.
899 Memorandum of a Conversation FRUS, 1958-1960 Volume X, Part 2: Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey 759.
ended up.\textsuperscript{900} In accepting such loans, Menderes was assuming a risk with both economic and political implications. It gave the opposition damning proof that he had run the Turkish economy aground and could be influenced by foreign interests willing to push it off of the shoals. Turkey’s increasing dependence on foreign aid made it appear incapable of managing it finances in a prudent manner.\textsuperscript{901} The British Foreign Office wondered if having secured more U.S. economic aid would give Menderes the determination to deal with Turkey’s domestic political strife without moderation. The final sessions of Conference on Turkish Debt sponsored by the OEEC came to an end on May 11, 1959 after months of negotiations. Turkey and thirteen European countries signed a multilateral agreement providing the framework for the consolidation and repayment of Turkey’s commercial debts exceeding $400 million. The conference’s participants agreed to conclude bilateral agreements at some point in the future and the Ankara and Washington exchanged messages about the prospect of Turkey repaying private creditors in America.\textsuperscript{902} With the status of the repayment of Turkish debts in order and the stabilization program in place, Turkey improved fortunes attracted the interest of previously wary investors from the US and Europe, although the Turks had to yet prove themselves by keeping inflation at bay and preserving political stability long enough to prove that the interests of foreign investors were not misplaced.

\textit{The DP and the RPP go to War}

With crises including Cyprus, the conflict in Lebanon, and the new economic program reaching some resolution in the late summer of 1958, the DP and the RPP turned their attentions

\textsuperscript{900}“Operations Coordinating Report” \textit{FRUS, 1958-1960 Volume X, Part 2: Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey} 773.

\textsuperscript{901}Aydin 111.

\textsuperscript{902}CONFIDENTIAL – Response to a question inserted in the Record by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at Hearings on the Mutual Security Program for FY 1960 on May 14 (date unknown) Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs. Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. Office of the Officer-in-Charge, Turkish Affairs, Supplemental Subject Files Relating to Turkey, 1954-1958.
to undermining one another with a renewed sense of vigor. Menderes appeared at the opening of new factories and installations to deliver wrathful speeches.\textsuperscript{903} In a violent speech made in Balikesir Menderes accused his opponents of trying to foster a mood of revolution in order to encourage the assassination of the DP’s leaders and made a grim allusion to the executions of those who attempted to assassinate Atatürk.\textsuperscript{904} Such accusations smacked of desperation and made Menderes appear far less dignified than İnönü in the Turkish public eye. İnönü dismissed the RPP’s part in backing any revolutionary movement and argued that Menderes’s threats only distracted from the larger issue of compromised civil rights and liberties.\textsuperscript{905} The British Embassy assumed Menderes’ conduct to be nothing more than empty threats and attempts to discredit the RPP in response to the DP’s erosion of support.\textsuperscript{906} Washington worried that a compromise in Turkey’s internal stability would compromise it ability to keep up its duties in NATO and the world at large. Menderes had already restricted discussions in Parliament and looked prepared to further limit the freedom of assembly and the press, measures that might encourage “covert opposition activity.”\textsuperscript{907} On September 18 the RPP issued a statement outlining its opinions of the domestic political situation, squarely accusing the DP of making mistakes that brought about economic problems and using its suppressive tactics as a means of deflecting public awareness from the struggling economy. The aid recently secured by Turkey was an implicit admittance of

\textsuperscript{903} FO 371/136453, RK 1015/30, 1018/92, CONFIDENTIAL, BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA. (September 9, 1958).
\textsuperscript{904} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{905} FO 371/136453, CONFIDENTIAL, RK 1015/32, (1018/96) BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA. (September 12, 1958).
\textsuperscript{906} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{907} “Operations Coordinating Report” FRUS, 1958-1960 Volume X, Part 2: Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey 774.
its malfunctioning economic policies. Menderes charged the opposition with being responsible for delaying economic aid and continued his personal attacks against İnönü.

U.S. officials forecast in late 1958 that the embattled Menderes had “at least an even chance” of maintaining control of the increasingly recalcitrant RPP, but did not believe that the existing troubles in Turkey would give way to a revolution before the elections scheduled for late 1961. A military coup likewise seemed remote unless economic troubles continued unabated or “extreme political provocations” erupted. This optimism challenged hints dropped by Turkish officials that the twin engines of authoritarianism and ineffective economic policies had pushed the Menderes Regime onto hazardous ground. During a conversation in early June with U.S. Embassy officials Altemir Kilic, the Turkish Embassy’s Press Attache, expressed his concerns with the increased tensions in Turkey. At one point Kilic suddenly posed the question of what the U.S. would do “if it were suddenly confronted with the prospect of dealing with a new government in Turkey which might not be as willing as the Menderes administration to wed itself so completely to US foreign policy.”

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909 FO 371/136453, CONFIDENTIAL, (1018/103) BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA. RK 1015/35, (September 26, 1958).

910 National Intelligence Estimate FRUS, 1958-1960 Volume X, Part 2: Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey 785.

was possible and “despite tradition to the contrary, it might very well come from the Turkish military in concert with the disgruntled urban educated class.”

When the GNA reconvened on November 1 it helped to diminish some of the antagonism between the DP and RPP brought about by each party’s speechmaking campaign during the summer recess. The DP parliamentary group reluctantly agreed to accept austerity measures including a marked price hike on State monopoly products such as alcohol, tea and tobacco. Price spikes and looming product shortages led to three DP deputies representing Zonguldak resigning in protest and joining the RPP; scores more were rumored to be considering a similar response. The British doubted that the traditionally apolitical Turkish military would intervene unless the Menderes Government committed some “intolerable provocation.” However the GNA, the ultimate source of political power in Turkey, with its growing unease with Menderes’ policies might see fit to exercise its prerogative of dismissing the current regime via a majority vote, forcing Menderes and his cabinet to resign. The British officials in Turkey estimated the number of dissenting DP deputies in the GNA to be 160, more than enough to bring about a dismissal of the Menderes Government, but did not think enough would be willing to stand against their party and possibly forfeit their own political positions.

As 1959 opened the British Embassy noted the relative and perhaps momentary calm in Turkey, with much of the public’s attention focused on budget discussions in the GNA and the

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912 Ibid.
916 Ibid.
917 Ibid.
ongoing troubles in Cyprus. The DP had yet to reach an agreement regarding how to restrict the 
Opposition. This dissent hinted at the growing division within the DP, as the recent and ultimately unsuccessful attempt by a group of DP deputies to submit a bill to the GNA calling for an amnesty of all journalists prosecuted under the Press Law. Rumors abounded of anywhere from four to more than thirty DP Deputies resigning from their posts in the near future. On January 14 the General Congress of the RPP declared the party’s aims of the RPP, including the restoration of the freedom of speech, of religion, of the press and of public assemblies, and the right to strike. The Congress further called for an end to all anti-democratic laws, the guarantee of free and fair elections, and the assurance of an impartial Head of State. The Congress concluded with the reelection of İnönü as Party Chairman and Gulek as Secretary General. A commentator for an Independent newspaper observed that it was not enough for the RPP to assert that it would correct the mistakes of the DP upon coming to power, but they needed to offer the people a comprehensive plan of action to show what the Party doctrine would amount to. The people of Turkey seemed bored and frustrated by too much rhetoric and too little action.

_Calm Temporarily Restored_

January passed without incident in Turkish politics. The calm extended into February, leading a British Embassy official to speculate that both sides “are clearly holding their fire until

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918 FO 371/144742, INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM, FROM ANKARA TO FOREIGN OFFICE, By Bag, FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION, Sir B. Burrows, No. 1 Saving, (January 9, 1959).
919 Ibid.
920 FO 371/144742, RK 1015/2, Letter from Chancery to the Southern Department, Foreign Office, S.W.1. (January 16, 1959).
921 Ibid.
the main Budget begins in the Grand National Assembly.” References to the RPP in the DP’s Zafar newspaper lacked some of their usual pungency, and the paper even began to print speeches made by RPP deputies in the Budget Commission, eschewing its usual practice of only printing remarks made by the DP members. In the midst of the ephemeral lull the British Foreign Office wondered if conditions could give way to a military coup, despite assurances from the Embassy “that the possibility of a coup is so remote here that it might be misleading even to discuss it in a letter.” Bitterness towards Menderes’s unsuccessful economic and political policies had seeped into the Turkish military in large part due to pay cuts. The Menderes Government hesitated to clamp down on the military, perhaps keeping the recent coups in Pakistan, Iraq and the Sudan in mind, although there was no firm evidence to suggest that such plans being in the works among the Turkish ranks. Menderes went to lengths to regain the esteem of the military including unexpected appearances at military functions to deliver fulsome addresses praising the relations between the Government and the military. Even if these overtures proved short-lived, the British diplomatic corps believed the chances of a military coup in Turkey to be extremely remote, taking into account the Turkish people’s deeply ingrained deference for constitutional authority embodied in Atatürk’s reforms and constitution, the ensuing political and security challenges a coup might unleash, and the growing electoral power of the Turkish people to rid themselves of unpopular governments. Any attempt by middle ranking or senior military officers to organize a coup would meet numerous difficulties,

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923 FO 371/144742, RK 1018/24, CONFIDENTIAL, BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA, Letter from Chancery to the Southern Department, Foreign Office, S.W.1. (February 13, 1959).
924 Ibid.
926 Ibid.
927 Ibid.
given the size and diffusion of the Turkish military. In Arab nations “it is possible to control
events with a handful of tanks, but any such attempt in Turkey might well lead to a civil war.”

The prospect of such an event seemed even less likely as the DP and RPP continued to resolve
their differences. Just before midnight on February 28 the GNA approved the Budget for 1959-
1960 with a vote of 363 to 151. This set a positive tone just before a short recess for the
Assembly and a suitable climax to two months of relative calm.

Internal divisions remained sidelined while other more compelling events distracted the
people of Turkey and outshone the usual party conflicts. On February 17, while attempting to
land at Gatwick Airport in the midst of thick fog, the plane carrying Menderes and twenty-four
crew members and officials crashed into Jordan’s Woods in Sussex near London. Menderes
emerged with comparatively light injuries from a crash that killed fifteen. Menderes’ ability to
survive a horrendous accident that killed so many others lent him a transient aura of being
blessed by a higher authority and gave the Prime Minister a measure of temporary unified
support shown by mass demonstrations in Istanbul and Ankara to welcome him home. A
month later Menderes consolidated his popularity gains made after the airplane crash while the
RPP began to lose ground. Turkey’s economy exhibited signs of stabilization and Menderes’s
popularity grew with reports that the government was close to pardoning journalists found guilty
of press offenses. The RPP looked to late April when it would begin provincial tours by party

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928 Ibid.
929 FO 371/117661, 1018/35, No. 35, BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA, March 5, 1959, Letter to The
Right Honorable Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., M.P., etc., etc., etc. from B.A.B. Burrows.
932 Ibid.
933 FO 371/117661, 1018/42, RK1015/10, BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA, March 20, 1959, Letter to C.
T. Brant, Esq., Southern Department, Foreign Office, S.W.1. from A. H. Wyatt.
officials, including İnönü, in a bid to recapture some of its lost impetus.\textsuperscript{934} The RPP made no secret of İnönü’s plans to provoke Menderes to make a misstep that might reduce his national standing and to a considerable extent he succeeded, as the tour encountered no shortage of hostility from RPP supporters. The Government painted İnönü as the source of the trouble who intentionally provoked the events of recent days; on May 3 Namik Gedik, the Interior Minister ominously warned of the possibility of “further trouble” in the event of another tour.\textsuperscript{935} With the media blackout still in effect the RPP took its malice into the GNA and demanded a formal Parliamentary investigation into the roles played by Menderes and Interior Minister Gedik in the disruptions of İnönü’s Aegean tour. The DP rebuffed this demand with threats of harsher legislation to control the activities of the opposition and the press. Undeterred, RPP deputies continued to violently air their grievances in the GNA.\textsuperscript{936} Voices of moderation strained to be heard over the threats exchanged between the RPP and DP, and both Menderes and İnönü instructed their supporters to steer clear of any action that might spark violence, but there was no attempt to reach an authentic reconciliation between the RPP and DP.\textsuperscript{937} RPP deputies walked out of the June 1 GNA meeting when their calls for an inclusion of a Parliamentary investigation


\textsuperscript{935} “Turkey: Scene of Victory” 40. Obviously the Menderes Government took İnönü’s “Aegean Offensive” deathly seriously and subsequently squelched it. The British Embassy speculated that other factors might have brought the harsh governmental reaction. While İnönü braved hostile crowds and apathetic police, Menderes entertained the visiting King Hussein and the Shah of Iran in Istanbul with the Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary expected to arrive in Ankara shortly. With emissaries from their contentious neighbor, Menderes may have been in no mood for any displays of dissent that would indicate anything less than national unity. But if the public’s perception of the state’s response made the DP appear to be possessing a totalitarian streak, an RPP official confided to a British diplomat that the stone which struck İnönü in Uzak might begin to redress the esteem Menderes garnered by escaping death at Gatwick. FO 371/117661, RK 1015/12, CONFIDENTIAL (1018/65) BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA (May 6, 1959), Letter to E. J. W. Barnes, Esq., Southern Department, Foreign Office, London, S.W.1., from Leslie Minford.


\textsuperscript{937} Ibid.
on the agenda once more went ignored and threatened to request an extraordinary session on the GNA after the summer recess began on June 12 if its demands continued to be ignored.938

The worsening of domestic political matters took place concurrently with growing complications between Washington and Ankara. On March 5, 1959 Turkish and American officials signed the U.S.-Turkish agreement, a bilateral accord that committed the U.S. to take action, including armed force, to assist Turkey in the event of “direct or indirect aggression.” This supplemented earlier agreements, including the bilateral Military Facilities Agreement of June, 1954, and the Air Technical Arrangement of December, 1954, both of which permitted the U.S. military operational use of agreed upon bases and facilities inside Turkey following prior discussion. The bilateral agreement provided a measure of reassurance to the RPP, which never highly regarded the CENTO as anything more than “a sort of false prop for leaders who did not enjoy support of their own peoples.”939 CENTO membership was not insurance against being overthrown, as the Nuri Said regime in Iraq discovered, or extreme unpopularity, as the Shah of Iran found out. Turkey continued to insist that its defense be grounded in NATO rather than a Middle Eastern collective effort as was the case with CENTO. Ankara expressed concern that the vague interpretations of “aggression” and the appropriate responses to it in the bilateral agreement might allow the US to dispatch troops to Turkey in the event of internal unrest, or “unarmed indirect aggression.” American officials assured the Turks that such a thing would never occur, but they would not they agree to clarify the meaning of the agreement’s text.940

940 Ibid.
When this precipitated concerns that RPP deputies in the GNA might refuse to ratify the agreement, the Menderes Government implemented it without the GNA’s approval.⁹⁴¹

Relations between American military personnel stationed in Turkey, as was the case in so many locations, retained a degree of tension between the native residents and those they looked upon as guests. All NATO members had already signed the Status Forces Agreement obligating NATO troops to obey the laws of the land they happened to be stationed in. U.S. servicemen could not expect to receive special treatment should they be accused of a crime, nor obtain a provision for waiver of jurisdiction.⁹⁴² In the late 1950s as more NATO installations opened in Turkey and more U.S. military personnel arrived to begin their overseas duties; by 1959 approximately 12,000 Americans and their dependents resided in Turkey. While the State Department collected news items in Turkish newspapers dealing with the crimes of U.S. servicemen, the U.S. Embassy’s overall impression of the Turkish attitude towards Americans remained upbeat.⁹⁴³ So long as the Turks continued to suspect the Soviet Union of evil designs; American military, technical and economic aid continued to keep Turkish security strong; and


⁹⁴³ On March 18 and 19 alone newspapers in Turkey covered a variety of scandalous affairs prominently featuring American soldiers. A story in the March 18 edition of Son Posta related the story of a pair of young daughters of an American official in Ankara who shared a house with two US soldiers so that they could conduct their love affairs in private. When the soldiers were reassigned to a new post, the young women replaced their former paramours with two Turkish youths. Once the parents grasped what was going on, both of their daughters were pregnant by unknown fathers. “The Adventures of Two American Girls in Ankara” Son Posta (March 18, 1959). On March 19 The following day the Hurriyet included the account of American sailors from two US fleets in Istanbul who became intoxicated and made passes at single girls and married women alike in “the best example of the ‘American Style.’” The article’s author wondered if Istanbul’s authorities had been coerced into turning a blind eye to such behavior, or if being an American served as a free pass to engage in such lewd acts. “American Style” Hurriyet (March 19, 1959). Another Istanbul newspaper, the Tercuman, included an item that same day about some Turkish girls who spoke English being invited to a private party by American officers “where everybody drank, danced, rocked, rolled and could not get on their feet again.” After the police raided the place it was determined that three of the girls had lost their virginity. “Some nations in the historic ages used to offer their maiden girls to all men, regardless of their nationality, during orgies,” observed the writer. “But is the guilt of this incident which is neither new nor unique solely imputable to the depraved tastes of these corrupted people?” “Moderation in Living” Tercuman (March 19, 1959).
Turkey sought to be a part of the West, the State Department assumed that “the Turkish public and the government is generally prepared to accept the presence of large numbers of Americans, free from an attitude of distrust and suspicion.”\textsuperscript{944} The Embassy believed the reason for this was the lingering doubt that the Turkish military still lacked the modern weapons and training needed to deter Soviet aggression without the assistance of the United States. Until such time when the Turks could defend their land without such help, “it seems clear that Turkey will welcome the stationing of friendly troops, particularly United States troops, despite the historical factors which would otherwise lead Turkey to oppose such a move.”\textsuperscript{945} The Embassy concerned itself less the Turks viewing with Americans in their country as members of an occupying force, but as symbols of a higher standard of living. U.S. officials based their concerns on the fact that the Menderes Government had based its political survival on raising the standard of living and American servicemen and their families enjoying consumer goods they could easily buy at PX facilities on NATO bases, a positive exchange rate, and free import benefits acted as bitter reminders to the Turkish people of their weakening economic position. The increasing number of incidents in which juvenile U.S. soldiers and airmen indulged their impulses was not the cause of growing Turkish resentment towards Americans in Turkey, but rather acted as “anti-American fuel lying around ready for firing in Turkey.”\textsuperscript{946}

\textit{Assessing the Performance of the Stabilization Program}

Concrete improvements in Turkey’s economic conditions would do much to reverse the trend of anti-Americanism. By May of 1959, ten months had passed since the initiation of the stabilization program and the State Department gave the Turks passing marks on their adherence

\textsuperscript{944} Turkey, US Embassy Ankara Memo (date unknown) Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs. Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. Office of the Officer-in-Charge, Turkish Affairs, Supplemental Subject Files Relating to Turkey, 1954-1958.  
\textsuperscript{945} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{946} Ibid.
to the program. Price increases had halted at around 25% and reports claimed that this limited price increase showed a reduction in the real price level.\textsuperscript{947} De facto devaluation of the Turkish lira and imposed credit ceilings raised confidence in Turkey’s currency at home and, to a lesser extent, abroad. Prices on gold and dollars on the Istanbul black market were holding steady and deviating very slightly from the official prices. Black market activity in general was on the wane throughout Turkey. Perhaps most importantly, the credits offered by the IMF, OEEC countries and the U.S. to support the stabilization program and a new system for import selection and distribution made a number of previously scarce imported goods available to Turkish consumers.\textsuperscript{948} The devaluation had raised prices, but wages increased as well. Many Turkish businessmen, once vocally opposed to economic reform, came to accept the changes; manufacturers improved the quality of items they produced; consumers exhibited greater selectivity in making purchases; and disreputable traders found in increasingly difficult to compete and avoid the scrutiny of Turkish officials looking for importers’ qualifications. The government also examined the potential value and efficiency of private investment projects more closely, and real estate speculation was down.\textsuperscript{949} All in all, Washington officials generally agreed “the Turkish Government merits full credit for the substantial success of the stabilization effort and especially for its determination to avoid credit expansion.”\textsuperscript{950}


\textsuperscript{948} CONFIDENTIAL – Response to a question inserted in the Record by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at Hearings on the Mutual Security Program for FY 1960 on May 14 (date unknown).

\textsuperscript{949} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{950} SECRET – TO: The Under Secretary, THROUGH: S/S, FROM: NEA – G. Lewis Jones, SUBJECT: Turkish Economic Problems: Mr. Zorlu’s Visit (date unknown). Reportedly both Menderes and Zorlu had worked past their previous reluctance regarding the stabilization program, although Zorlu continued to press for continuing foreign credits for a new three year investment plan that required $600 million in foreign credits. Both the OEEC and the West Germans turned him away in quick succession.
Lingering problems remained to potentially hamper and hinder the development of the Turkish economy. OEEC and IMF observers reported the continuing absence of a cogent and comprehensive program for public investments. In June Ankara submitted a partial investment plan to Washington that only included eleven of the 27 State Economic Enterprises. SEEs, long-used to operating on subsidies remained an economic and political millstone that Ankara hesitated to modify. SEE budgets remained largely untouched for fear that those in control of them would withdraw their support of the Menderes Regime. Another economic problem with political dimensions that endangered the success of the stabilization program was Ankara’s hesitance to cut spending by municipalities and public works agencies. An agency created to assess the priority of projects and set realistic budgets did exist, the Economic Coordination Committee, but it still lacked legitimate authority to carry its intended responsibilities.

Ambassador Warren opted to ignore these myriad economic obstacles when he publicly stated in June that upon completion of the stabilization program Turkey would require less foreign assistance. The alarm of Turkish officials at Warren’s pronouncement came through in a piece written in the Vatan newspaper by Coşun Kirca of the RPP’s Research Board. Kirca pointed out the changes between 1948, when US assistance to Turkey began the country did not have the inflation level. Washington justified the aid on the grounds of Turkey’s weighty defense burden and its underdeveloped economy. Because the stabilization program would not be unlikely to have significant impact on either Turkey’s military expenditures or its lack of development, it would therefore need ongoing foreign assistance for years to come. Warren’s unconcerned statement betrayed ignorance shared by the American public and Congress of

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951 Ibid.
952 CONFIDENTIAL – Response to a question inserted in the Record by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at Hearings on the Mutual Security Program for FY 1960 on May 14 (date unknown).
underdeveloped countries like Turkey of the fact that preventing non-Communist
underdeveloped nations of Asia and Africa from slipping into the Soviet orbit necessitated the
West rendering assistance that would reduce inflation and provide for foreign assistance
programs.\textsuperscript{954} British Embassy official E.J.W. Barnes spoke to Kirca about his article shortly after
its publication and mused that it showed Kirca’s shift towards neutralism. Kirca responded that
neither he nor the RPP entertained the thought of being neutralist, and should the RPP come to
power Turkey would remain a part of NATO and preserve its connections with the West. But if
Turkey did not seem likely to slide towards neutralism, “anti-Americanism was a definite
possibility.” The Americans seemed to forget that underdeveloped countries “were extremely
sensitive about their poverty and lack of technical advancement and that the relationship between
the donor and receiver was far more delicate than the Americans seem to consider.”\textsuperscript{955}

“\textit{Tortured American Sergeants}”

The possibility of anti-Americanism grew became quite distinct by the late summer of
1959. A dramatic incident involving American servicemen serving at the NATO land forces
headquarters in Izmir threatened to damage U.S.-Turkish relations; earlier minor incidents
incited frustration, but what occurred in Izmir roused national resentment. Early in the morning
of August 4, 27 year-old U.S. Army Sergeant Dale McCuistion was seized by Turkish
plainclothesmen while driving his station wagon in Izmir. Given that his captors drove an
unmarked car and wore civilian clothing, McCuistion assumed he was being robbed and put up
resistance. Following his arrest Turkish police informed him he was being charged with making
black market purchase of Turkish lire. The sergeant denied the charge and then endured 18
hours without food, water or sleep as his captors questioned him and “beat me unmercifully.

\textsuperscript{954} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{955} Ibid.
They rabbit-punched me from behind and kicked me. I was afraid they’d kill me.”956 Hours after McCuiston’s arrest, Turkish police under the command of Chief Nevzat Emrealp arrested U.S. Air Force Sergeant Giacomo Racevuto on charges of currency black-marketing. Emrealp then informed NATO officials that he wished to speak with two more Air Force Sergeants, James D. King and Joseph Proietti, about currency black-marketing, but would not arrest them. The Izmir chief neglected to say that the Turkish manager of the noncoms’ club in Izmir implicated King following a beating by the police.957 King and Proietti were both arrested and charged with black-marketeering.

The charges were not unique, but the aftermath and its political implications certainly were. According to Sergeant King, Turkish officers without a warrant turned his house upside down searching for evidence in front of his horrified wife and children, while he found himself in a dungeon to be acquainted him with a customary beating known as the bastinado. King claimed that two Turkish gendarmes suspended him by his ankles from a rafter and then beat the soles of his feet with a leather or rubber stick.958 Two days after McCuiston’s disappearance, NATO officials turned to Turkish authorities for answers. The Turks initially denied any knowledge of his arrest, and then allowed a US colonel to see the visibly mistreated McCuiston and King. The Turkish Government ordered its own investigation into the allegations of the beatings. Nevzat Emrealp, the Izmir police chief, denied the beatings and claimed that McCuiston had received bruises only after resisting arrest.959 Ten more days elapsed before NATO learned why the four sergeants had been charged and the possible sentences they faced.

956 FO 371/144752, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, Congressional Record – House (September 11, 1959): 17605.
957 Ibid.
959 FO 371/144752, “Turks Harden in their Attitude to Americans” Birmingham Post (September 18, 1959): 19.
Izmir’s public prosecutor insisted on a 25-year prison sentence for McCuiston and milder sentences for the others. According to the Turks, the four accused had purchased a total of $15,000 worth of Turkish lira at the black market rate of 11-12 per dollar rather than the official rate of TL 9 to the dollar.  

Per the status-of-forces treaty with the U.S., Turkish courts had jurisdiction over offenses American military personnel committed when not on duty. This did not prevent US officers serving at NATO from compiling a report to be sent to the Pentagon chronicling the abuses the four arrested men supposedly suffered at the hands of their captors in affidavits. Lt. General Paul D. Harkins wrote in a report to the Pentagon: “There seems to be little doubt that Sergeants McCuiston and King were mistreated.” Once American diplomats became involved, the complexion of the situation changed markedly; it had a $2 billion investment in economic and military aid requiring protection. The U.S. Consul in Izmir, Donald B. Eddy, attempted to dissuade NATO chief of staff in Izmir, Brigadier General Paul Hollister, from sending the possibly damaging report to no avail. Eddy then attempted to circumvent the report by making a statement to the Turkish press downplaying the treatment of the imprisoned U.S. soldiers and calling into question the truthfulness of information NATO had already provided to journalists by stating, “In my opinion it is impossible for a responsible American officer to make such a statement.” Eddy denied that the Izmir police tortured the four servicemen and claimed that examinations of McCuiston and King conducted on August 5 by US Air Force physicians

960 FO 371/144752, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, *Congressional Record – House* (September 11, 1959): 17605.  
961 Ibid.  
962 “Tortured American Sergeants” 19.  
disproved any claims of torture. McCusiton did have bruises on his chest and shoulder that could have resulted from resisting arrest.

Eddy’s less severe interpretation of the recent events did not match a statement made by a Colonel Wilkinson and then printed in the Izmir newspaper Sabah Postası on August 14 before finding its way into a number of foreign newspapers: “The Americans were detained in a place like a stable, without food, water, without bread. Sergeants McCuiston and King are in a terrible state. There is cause for anxiety for the life of McCuiston, whose body is covered in bruises. The feet of Sergeant King were crushed through beating by the Turkish police until they bled.” Eddy refuted Wilkinson’s claims in another Izmir newspaper, Yeni Asîr:

I cannot believe that Colonel Wilkinson made the statement attributed to him in the New York and Athens newspapers. I find it incredible that a responsible American officer could have said such things. Surely he has been misquoted. I know Wilkinson well. I am certain that, in his heart, he is a friend of Turkey. If not, then would not have extended his tour of duty for an extra term. I believe that, if you will ask Colonel Wilkinson himself, he will set the record straight.

On August 21 Wilkinson issued a denial to the statement attributed to him in the Sabah Postası, claiming he had only made one statement to the Turkish press on August 5 and it was not the alleged statement that appeared on August 14.

As conflicting details of the arrests continued to sort themselves out, Washington summoned Ambassador Warren to meet with State Department officials about the incident. Matters became complicated by August 18th appearance of a lurid account in Time magazine of the torture the four Americans claimed to have endured, apparently based solely on the accounts of the Sergeants. The article, particularly the divergent responses of Consul Eddy and General

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964 FO 371/144752, “Turks Harden in their Attitude to Americans” Birmingham Post 19.
965 FO 371/144752, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, Congressional Record – House (September 11, 1959): 17605.
966 Ibid.
Hollister, roused demands for action from both U.S. public and Congress. Congressman Alvin M. Bentley raised the possibility of a Senate subcommittee hearing on the events in Izmir should developments demand one.\textsuperscript{967} Under Secretary of State Loy W. Henderson wished to avoid such a development and called Bentley’s attention to the various “distortions and inaccuracies” contained in the account run in \textit{Time}, especially those regarding the conduct of Consul Eddy. Henderson contended that both Eddy was informed of the arrests the day they occurred and then passed the news on to the Embassy and the State Department.

Shortly thereafter, Washington announced it was sending a five-man investigative team to Izmir under the command of General Edward F. Penne, Chief Justice of the U.S. Army to seek out the truth. This unleashed an angry torrent of protest from both the Turkish press and public, which viewed the mission as interference and showed a lack of American faith in the Turkish courts. Despite the outcry, the Menderes Government reluctantly offered its cooperation to the mission and ordered a ban on any mention of the investigation or trial in the Turkish press.\textsuperscript{968} In September Izmir’s public prosecutor’s office charged two Turkish policemen with mistreating Sergeants King and McCuiston. The two officers were eventually discharged while the four Americans remained in custody as the trial continued.\textsuperscript{969} U.S. officials used the incident to showcase the dangers of American servicemen ignoring Turkey’s economic conditions and engaging in black market activities. Once again, U.S. authorities considered measures that would prevent American personnel from changing money on the black market or reselling items purchased at the PX at grossly higher prices. These steps would do little to overcome the fundamental sense of inequity felt in a country where an American sergeant received more pay

\textsuperscript{967} FO 371/144752, Letter from Alvin M. Bentley, Member of Congress, to Hon. Loy W. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, Department of State, Washington, D.C., \textit{Congressional Record – House} (September 11, 1959): 17604.

\textsuperscript{968} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{969} “Sergeants on Trial (Contd.)” 39.
than either a Turkish general or a senior state official. A final grisly example of the perceived legal advantages of American servicemen occurred on November 5 when Lieutenant Colonel Allen I. Morrison plowed his car into a column of the Palace Guard, resulting in one death and ten injuries. American authorities took Morrison into custody and tried and sentenced by a US court martial the following March. He was found guilty of negligence, suspended from rank for six months and slapped with a $1,200 fine. The Turkish press once more unleashed a torrent of angry articles and editorials citing that Morrison would have received a sentence of up to three years in jail had he stood before a Turkish court.

Also in October, Foreign Minister Zorlu asked U.S. officials to put in a good word on their behalf to the German Government regarding a short-term credit from Bonn. Turkey needed nearly $100 million in cash immediately in order to keep goods flowing into the country and maintain the public’s confidence in the effectiveness of the stabilization program. The State Department contacted the U.S. Embassy in Bonn to initiate an informal exchange of views with the Germans on Turkey’s stabilization plan and the short-term financing issue, to the disappointment of the Turks who had hoped the US would more actively press the Germans for immediate credits. Instead, Bonn agreed to participate in possible multilateral assistance, but would not likely extend any bilateral credits. The German decision left Zorlu disturbed due to his assumed “commitment” from Washington to insist on the Federal Republic’s providing the needed credit. The State Department pondered whether or not Zorlu had acted as a representative of Menderes or had acted on his own volition. Regardless, the size of Turkey’s

970 FO 371/144752, “Turks Harden in their Attitude to Americans” Birmingham Post 19.
972 Harris 59.
974 Ibid.
short-term debt precluded Washington from encouraging it to grow further and Zorlu’s demands were dismissed as “unwarranted” and to respond to them would “simply undermine the efforts of those people in the Turkish Government who are attempting to make the stabilization program a success.”

Eisenhower’s Visit to Ankara

In early December State Department officials finalized the itinerary of Eisenhower’s trip to the Soviet Union for scheduled negotiations with the Russians, a trip that included stopovers in eleven countries including Turkey. State Department officials did not intend for the seventeen-hour visit in Ankara to be of a substantive nature, but rather one involving “a lot of ceremony and few problems.” Eisenhower would offer thanks for Turkey’s help in Korea, Lebanon, its cooperation in NATO and CENTO, and Menderes would have a chance to demonstrate his country’s devotion to the defense of the West. U.S. Embassy officials in Ankara anticipated the content of the president’s discussions with the Turkish government covering a potential decline in American aid or the eroding support of strong allies such as Turkey. They recommended Eisenhower acknowledge the continuing threat posed by the Soviets and the need to keep the defenses of NATO and CENTO countries strong. Additional recommendations included stressing the Turkey’s need to strengthen its economy through greater stability and more sound investment programs, and maintaining practical levels of defense spending. Ike could assure the Turks of the continuance of significant U.S. aid for development,

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975 Memo, Department of State, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary, C.D.D., Turkey, (November 18, 1959) Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs. Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. Office of the Officer-in-Charge, Turkish Affairs, Supplemental Subject Files Relating to Turkey, 1954-1958.


as well as the growing importance of aid from other nations. Should the Turks raise the question of U.S. support in obtaining more European credit, Ike could refer to the close association between the U.S., Turkey, the IMF and the OEEC that yielded the 1958 stabilization program and provided the funds required to sustain it. Such cooperation demonstrated America’s commitment to the development of a prosperous Europe made up of nations able to fortify underdeveloped areas.

The Turks took great pains to prepare for what amounted to a layover by Eisenhower, marshaling troops to line the fifteen miles of road from the airport to the presidential palace and £30,000 worth of decorative arches and banners to beautify much of the route. Hundreds of thousands of Turks streamed into the city to welcome Eisenhower on the afternoon of December 6, forming dense crowds as the 1934 Lincoln convertible bearing the American entourage, a vehicle once belonging to Atatürk, wended its way through the city. Eisenhower received an honorary degree in political science from the University of Ankara, and a membership in the Turkish War Veterans Association of which he stated, “I know what kind of fighters the Turks are, so I appreciate this very much.”

Security matters dominated the discussion between Eisenhower and Zorlu at the presidential palace. Zorlu made plain his concerns that the Soviets apparent willingness to scale back the arms race did not preclude the possibility that they would only step up economic warfare. Russian dominance of the markets of non-aligned countries would then demonstrate the supposed supremacy of communism. The Turkish Foreign Minister advised his guest remain

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978 Ibid.
979 Ibid.
“cautious and realistic” when dealing with the Soviets, sharing Turkish concerns that the US might reduce military aid without securing adequate security guarantees from Moscow. Eisenhower assured Zorlu that America’s willingness to negotiate with Moscow should not be interpreted as a concession or willingness to compromise. Before departing, Ike paid tribute to his Turkish hosts, stating, “No power on earth, no evil, no threat can frustrate a people of your spirit.”

American officials noted tangible progress in reaching their desired policy goals for Turkey as 1959 drew to a close. Greece and Turkey, so long bitter rivals, reached an agreement on Cyprus and could now move guardedly towards more cordial relations. Signs of the stabilization program’s success could be detected following the state’s taking control of credit and limiting extreme liquidity while desired consumer goods continued to reach the Turkish market. The U.S. set aside $100 million so that the Turks could import needed raw materials, spare parts and essential commodities to keep the market working. Turkey’s conventional armed forces had been satisfactorily armed and equipped, and a mandatory literacy-training course was now in place to get new Turkish recruits up to speed. A strong foundation had been laid for further modernization of Turkey’s military. One Honest John battalion was up and running and training for three additional battalions was close to finishing. A pair of Nike battalions would soon be operational with more weapons systems slated to be constructed in the new future, including nuclear-tipped Jupiter-class missiles.

Conclusion

985 Ibid 827.
Well before the three crises of the 1960s, the U-2 incident of 1960, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and the 1964 Cyprus Crisis, which resulted in irreparable damage to U.S.-Turkish relations, growing tension in the association was more than evident. American servicemen, so recently seen as guardians of Turkish security, in their increasing numbers and routine appearances in Turkish newspaper stories as perpetrators against Turkey’s women and defilers of national symbols, seemed arrogant or detached at best and brutish occupiers at worst. The modern cars the Americans involved in deadly accidents were driving conveyed a message of arrogance and infallibility to average Turks who, contending with a weakening national economy, bitterly resented. Well-paid U.S. servicemen taking part in black market schemes added further insult.

The people of Turkey might have overlooked these crimes had the national economy been less dire. Instead, they illustrated all too well just how far Turkey had fallen in recent years, from a nation with a booming economy and vast developmental potential to a nation with compromised sovereignty, survived on the philanthropy of the U.S. and other countries. Menderes, no longer the deliverer of prosperity and the overseer of a “little America,” faced a thorny and increasingly dangerous situation. His unflinching resolve to bring Turkey closer to the U.S. no longer offered its previous advantages. The opposition’s previous claims of his government handing over Turkey’s independence rang truer with tens of thousands of American personnel residing on bases occupying thousands of acres land the DP had willingly signed over to Washington. Without the prosperity of the early 1950s to justify for his actions Menderes’ supporters abandoned him in droves. Taking measures to resurrect the economy, such as agreeing to 1958’s stabilization plan made him seem to be leading Turkey towards greater
dependence upon the U.S. Gossip of an impending military coup would soon give way to reality.

Introduction

As it entered the 1960s the Menderes government had a decade’s worth of missteps and errors carefully cataloged by its opposition and cited by a frustrated Turkish public as evidence of the DP’s escalating incompetence. The Menderes administration responded with ongoing paranoia-fueled investigations into the RPP’s supposedly illegal activities and infringing upon civil liberties, all part of an increasingly desperate attempt to stay in power. Washington struggled with the dilemma of dealing with an ally upon which it could generally rely, but one with an uncertain political future. America’s financial and political support of the Menderes regime might darken future dealings with future administrations that refused to delineate between U.S. support of Turkey and U.S. support of Menderes.

U.S.-Turkish relations grew more tenuous after a military coup in May 1960 that toppled the Menderes government in reaction to student protests threatening to give way to a larger revolution. The Turkish military, headed by General Cemal Gürsel, assumed control of the government following the arrests of Menderes, Bayar and other high-ranking DP officials on charges of treason. Gürsel and members of the high command created the Committee for National Unity (CNU), and through this governmental body began to reinstate freedoms, amend the Constitution, implement vigorous economic reforms, and eventually restore a democratically elected civilian government. The CNU took steps to eliminate the influence of the DP and discourage future opposition by purging government offices, the military, and universities of potential threats.

The CNU’s agenda included some adjustments to Turkey’s dealing with the U.S. The general tone of Turkey’s foreign relations remained fundamentally unchanged after the coup, but
the CNU charted a more assertive course by taking the initiative to solve the litigious issue of the legal status of U.S. personnel, an unsurprising concern given the CNU’s military background. Due to American officials’ failure to anticipate the coup, many Turks wondered just how well the U.S. understood its ally. Some wondered if the close connections between the two countries should continue. But with the exception of some pointed editorials in the Turkish press and a greater openness to the Soviet Union the changeover from the DP to the CNU meant little substantial change to Washington’s affiliation with Ankara, particularly regards to Turkey’s expectations for continuing financial support from the U.S.

Another key aspect of the Menderes government’s foreign policy to be left largely unchanged by the CNU was Turkey’s campaign to become a member of the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1959 Ankara submitted its application to join the Common Market and waited over the course of the next four years for the EEC to reply in the provisional affirmative, enduring all manner of bureaucratic challenges and interruptions caused by the coup and EEC misgivings regarding Turkey’s economy. Turkey’s rationale for wanting to become an EEC member was rooted in its ambition to become a modern Westernized nation, an ongoing struggle for legitimacy in the eyes of the West that began with the later Ottoman rulers and continued under Atatürk. Turkey’s modernization developed as resistance to the growing power of Western European nation-states and their creeping influence in the Ottoman Empire. To modernize was to survive, to remain chained to the past and tradition was to invite foreign domination and dismantling. Belonging to the EEC, as it was with NATO, connoted Turkey’s status as a modern nation alongside the nations of Western Europe, and offered common market in which Turkey could sell its goods with greater ease to the members of the community. The EEC meant more than just lower tariffs and further recognition of Turkey’s status as a Western
nation, it also was an organization to which Greece aspired to belong, therefore making Turkey’s association of even greater import. The growing animosity between the rival nations, due in no small part to the deteriorating situation on Cyprus during the early 1960s, created a Turkish mindset that Greece could not gain the advantage in any respect, be it in the form of military aid from the U.S. or belonging to an international organization.

**Background to the Coup**

Menderes reportedly kept a translated copy of the U.S. Constitution on his desk to consult whenever necessary. Many guessed at the significance of this; some took it as a sign of Menderes’s contemplating future democratic reforms of Turkey’s political institutions, but most believed liberal reform to be the farthest thing from the Prime Minister’s mind. In March 1960 government officials conducted a tour of Turkey to assess the nation’s mood and found most Turks increasingly adopting a recalcitrant attitude towards the current administration and its policies. With its popular support eroding the Menderes administration opted to postpone plans for early elections and redouble its efforts to limit the power of the RPP to secure a third victory. On April 18 DP deputies in the GNA voted to create a special investigative committee

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987 Note on Turkish Domestic Political Situation, date unknown, Record Group 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division. On domestic political matters the Menderes Regime continued its unbendable tactics, although it did begin to demonstrate some flexibility in its Soviet policy. In April, after prior consultations with its partners in NATO and CENTO, it announced a prospective exchange of visits between Menderes and Khrushchev following an invitation from Moscow. In recent months the French Embassy picked up on rumors of imminent improvements in relations between Ankara and Moscow in an attempt to create a calmer climate. Some in the French press correlated Menderes’ decision to send emissaries to Moscow with opposition criticism of his failure to attempt to take advantage of the atmosphere of détente. American officials in Ankara doubted this; the RPP, as the only opposition party of any significance, viewed itself as the true guardian of Turkey against foreign belligerence, particularly the Russians, and could hardly be expected to advocate closer relations with their traditional enemies. Turkish officials later justified their decision to pay a call to Moscow in terms of prestige and “the spirit of the times” because Turkey was “about the last nation not to have made a pilgrimage to Moscow.” Before accepting their invitation Ankara informed the Russians that because of Turkey’s comparative weakness it could not deal bilaterally with the Russians, thus necessitating membership in NATO and CENTO. Ankara stipulated that issues relating to these mutual security organizations could not be discussed while Menderes visited Moscow and the Soviets agreed. The State Department did not appear overly concerned with the Menderes Administration’s planned visit. Other
with sweeping powers to investigate the RPP’s allegedly illegal activities and treasonous acts ranging from dissuading the military from following orders to communicating with Moscow using secret Soviet radios. The investigatory committee suspended all RPP political activity for three months and banned any advertising of RPP activities. Washington looked on, concerned that the “future course of domestic political events in Turkey will probably be determined by the manner in which the GNA special committee exercises in the weeks immediately ahead.” How much future leeway the investigatory committee would have depended upon the tolerance of the general public for its activities.

Menderes’s growing loss of support and authoritarian measures challenged to America’s political and economic goals for Turkey. Without a stable government Turkey could not guarantee its own security and the collective defense of the region. The American Embassy could not deny the fact that the repressive policies of Menderes and Bayar actively used since 1957 against the RPP would cause trouble if the DP maintained its present course. U.S. officials could not reach an consensus on the most appropriate response; the staff of the


Note on Turkish Domestic Political Situation.
Ibid.
TO: The Under Secretary, THROUGH: S/S, FROM: NEA – Parker T. Hart, SUBJECT: Allocation to Turkey Out of Remaining FY 1960 Funds (5-6-60).
Goals (5-5-60) Record Group 496: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-61, Office of African & European Operations, Regional Organizations Staff, Records Relating to Regional Development Programs, 1951-60. Some in the American press and government compared Turkey’s troubles to those that existed in Korea a decade before and more recently in Cuba, a parallel most US officials waved off as inexact, although Turkey’s problems could not be ignored.
Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) advised Washington to publicly condemn the Menderes government persecution of the RPP, but State Department officials warned that any action by the U.S. might be interpreted as an attempt to interfere in Turkey’s domestic affairs and “will excite Turkish sensitiveness and could jeopardize important security interests (access to facilities, for example).” Washington had yet to decide what to do about Turkish requests for more U.S. aid. There was American apprehension regarding how U.S. aid might be perceived in a time of growing political unrest. Any apparent support of Menderes from Washington carried with it a degree of political risk if it should the DP fall and a new government rose to power, bitter at the U.S. for helping to sustain the Menderes government and less receptive to Washington’s suggestions.

As the handwringing continued in Washington, events in Turkey lurched forward with an inexorable momentum. Modestly sized student demonstrations quickly grew into well-organized protests on Turkish university campuses, first in Istanbul on April 28th and then Ankara the following day. Officials of both cities dispatched police to arrest and detain hundreds of the protestors; on May 1 martial law was in effect. It remained to be seen how the Turkish military would react to the situation. American Embassy reports from as late as May 5, 1960 described the army as having “no sign or any intention other than to remain loyal to the Administration.” In reality, the military was close to intervening. When the military decided to take action it did so largely to prevent the Menderes government from using it as an instrument against İnönü, a

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993 TO: G – Mr. Hare, FROM: NEA – Parker T. Hart, SUBJECT: Discussion of Turkish Political Situation at OCB Luncheon Meeting (April 26, 1960) Record Group 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.
994 TO: The Under Secretary, THROUGH: S/S, FROM: NEA – Parker T. Hart, SUBJECT: Allocation to Turkey Out of Remaining FY 1960 Funds (5-6-60).
995 TO: O – Mr. Henderson, FROM: NEA – G. Lewis Jones, SUBJECT: Admiral Burke’s Conversation with Senior Turkish Army Officer (June 1, 1960) Record Group 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.
996 Ibid.
respected former army officer, and his supporters. In its tenacious struggle to stay in power at any cost, the Menderes government intended to employ the military in political affairs and forced its commanders to choose sides or have it chosen on their behalf. As a precautionary measure, Menderes gave General Cemal Gürsel, commander of the Turkish land forces, a mandatory leave of absence a week after declaring martial law. Before departing Gürsel advised his troops to take heed of the “greedy political atmosphere now blowing in the country.” Martial law in Ankara and Istanbul restored temporary calm and order, but not the government’s sense of safety; it called upon the garrison commander in Ankara to draft plans for the defense of the city should further turmoil occur. The plans instead became a blueprint for the military’s takeover of Ankara eleven days later after another round of civil unrest.

*The Turkish Army Takes Control*

On May 25, 5,000 student-demonstrators, in defiance of the ban on public gatherings, took to the streets of Ankara. The Turkish military decided to act. In the early morning hours of May 27 over Turkish State Radio, the only station in the country still broadcasting, Colonel Alparslan Türkeş announced to its listeners that, “Due to the crisis in our democracy and the most recent distressing incidents, the Turkish Armed Forces have taken over the administration of the country.” A group of military officers dissolved the GNA and placed Menderes and 630 other DP leaders from the cabinet and the parliament under arrest. General Gürsel addressed the Turkish people to assure them that he was not establishing a military dictatorship; the military had removed an undemocratic government to make way for a more just administration.

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997 TO: O – Mr. Henderson, FROM: NEA – G. Lewis Jones, SUBJECT: Admiral Burke’s Conversation with Senior Turkish Army Officer (June 1, 1960).
999 Ibid.
1001 Foto Mahabirleri Derneği 75.
Gürsel elaborated on these points in a press conference the following day, stressing that “purpose and the aim of the coup is to bring the country with all speed to a fair, clean and solid democracy,” and vowed to “transfer power and the administration of the nation to the free choice of the people.” He intended to oversee the writing of a new constitution by legal scholars, put the members of the previous government on trial, initiate a concerted program of economic development, and hold democratic elections.

General Gürsel became the Head of State and Government, leading through a provisional governmental body, the Committee of National Unity (CNU), made up of five other generals and twenty officers. The elder members of the CNU hoped to restore civilian rule to Turkey in as timely a manner as possible, in contrast to their younger counterparts who wanted to oversee sweeping economic and political reforms as long as it took to see such changes be made. CNU-approved laws passed to protect the revolution and create courts to punish crimes against the security of the state, and the removal of the word “temporary” from the constitution indicated that the Turkish military might retain control of Turkey. Gürsel denied this; he pledged the steady reestablishment of democracy with free elections on May 27, 1961 and a new civilian government to be in place the following October, following the passage of new election laws, the promulgation of a new constitution, and the development of a viable second political party able to run against the RPP, now Turkey’s principal political party. The RPP was expected to dominate in the upcoming free elections, with Gürsel or a Gürsel-approved candidate becoming

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1002 Lombardi 205.
1004 Robinson The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development 235.
the next president, despite the general’s initial assurances that he had no intention of seeking office and would relinquish power once a stable government coalesced.1007 Following the creation of a new cabinet composed of competent non-partisan members, the CNU set about arranging the trials for Menderes, Bayar, and other high-ranking officials held prisoner at the Ankara Military Academy.1008

American Reactions to the fall of the DP

As control of the Turkish government changed hands State Department officials in Washington received CNU emissaries in June to discuss, unsurprisingly, prospective U.S. aid provided by the Contingency Fund to the tune of $20 million.1009 The U.S. Embassy in Ankara recommended Washington providing the Turks at least $10 million FY 1960 Defense Support Aid as a show of support for the “interim” government that might provide some measure of economic and political stability. It would encourage the new government to keep the stabilization program in place and cover Turkey’s foreign exchange shortage made worse during the reduced foreign trade during the summer months when agricultural production slumped.1010 The State Department judged the Embassy’s recommendations as politically justifiable; a complete rejection of Turkey’s aid request might suggest the U.S. harbored no sympathy for the present government and promote resentment. Some measure of aid would “demonstrate a desire to help Turkey generally and avoid the implication, drawn in the past in Turkey, that we were

supporting just a single political party.” Subsequent aid requests confirmed that the new government retained much of the previous regime’s character. In late July the CNU sent Washington a frantic request for $34.4 million in defense support funds to cover the seasonal foreign exchange deficit. Washington preferred the deficit be covered by IMF and OEEC assistance, but neither organization wished to make funds available until October. Embassy officials recommended Washington’s approval of the sum as a political measure, but the IMF Board, mistrustful of Turkish intentions, advised waiting until more detailed IMF-OEEC discussions finished in October before making a decision. The advice went unheeded: Washington wanted to encourage Turkey to continue pursuing economic policies to promote national development, to create a development planning institution, and to avoid requesting bilateral loans from Italy, Germany, and other European powers. With these variables in mind, the State Department approved making $34.4 million of FY 1961 defense funds available to Turkey. The State Department viewed the change in Turkey’s government as an opportunity for Ankara to start clean with the IBRD, which remained wary of extending more loans to Turkey with its imposing foreign debts and lack of an effective investment plan. When the provisional government revealed its desire to create an investment program with the assistance of foreign advisors, the State Department saw no reason why Turkey and the IBRD couldn’t use the project to reestablish concordant relations.

1011 Ibid.
1013 Ibid.
Providing defense funds aside, Washington officials waited until the dust settled in Ankara before making any grand gestures to indicate its official approval of the “interim” government, as it continued to be identified in official U.S. communiqués. Anxious for recognition of its legitimacy, the CNU lobbied for the formal recognition of the United States. The new Turkish Foreign Ministry, Selim Sarper, contacted Ambassador Warren to request a statement from the White House indicating America’s solidarity with Turkey. Such an encouraging message might discourage any potential Soviet designs and prop up the morale of the Turkish people. Eisenhower, on advice from the State Department, sent Gürsel a personal letter lauding his commitment to hold public elections in the near future and reinstate a civilian government. Gürsel received it on June 11 and dispatched his own message to Eisenhower the following week promising that Turkey had been saved from “the dictatorship of a clique steering along a path likely to endanger the supreme interests of the country.” To guide Turkey back towards democracy, Gürsel shared the recent formation of a committee of legal scholars to prepare a new constitution that “will undoubtedly be welcomed by our Allies and, first of all, by the United States.”

As the CNU laid the foundation for a new civilian government State Department officials described the atmosphere in Ankara as one of “nervous expectancy.” The CNU seemed to have the full support of the people in its state-building efforts. With political activities curtailed, students ordered to return to their universities, and the press muzzled, it was a challenge to

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1015 Memorandum for the President, Subject: Message from You to the New Turkish Head of State, (6-7-60) Record Group 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.
1017 Ibid.
1018 Draft of report, date unknown.
forecast the national mood. The shroud of secrecy under which the CNU deliberated and conducted its policies alarmed Ambassador Warren. On June 12 the government announced a temporary law to entrust the CNU with the national sovereignty and the powers of the GNA until the creation of a new constitution and an election of a new GNA. The law also established a Court of Justice to try Menderes, Bayar, and other former DP officials. According to Warren, Turkey sat perched “on the crest of another wave of hatred; the cry for bloodshed is widespread,” with the Turks displaying unrestrained malice, “a facet of Turkish character that has surprised all but the oldest foreign residents of Turkey who remember Ataturk’s methods and the ways of the Sultanate.” A vengeful Turkish public clamored for speedy trailed followed by executions of the convicted, while the provisional government counsels split over how the trials should be conducted and when they should commence. At the start of September the CNU claimed to have concluded all investigatory work and amassed all pertinent evidence. It only needed to contact potential lawyers to represent the accused.

The CNU had other legal matters to attend to, including the longstanding problems between American military and civilian personnel living in Turkey, specifically the issue of American servicemen receiving favorable treatment in Turkish courts compared to Turks brought up on identical charges. The currency violations in Izmir from the previous year remained unresolved to anyone’s satisfaction, and U.S. soldiers involved in automobile accidents

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1020 Draft of report, date unknown.
1021 Letter from Fletcher Warren to G. Lewis Jones, Jr. (September 1, 1960).
1023 By the late 1950s approximately one million American soldiers and their dependents lived on or near foreign bases. Baker 53.
continued to be granted immunity from Turkish legal jurisdiction. Provisional government officials hoped to revise the treaty between the U.S. and Turkey, so as to ensure that the legal treatment of U.S. servicemen and Turks would be more balanced. The Department of Defense had yet to take steps to acknowledge the problems and cooperate with the State Department in developing a comprehensive community relations program in Turkey to improve relations between Turkish civilians and guest Americans. Frustrated Turkish military leaders insisted that much of the underlying tension between U.S. personnel and Turks arose from “an inherent inability of Americans to understand Turkish psychology.” Many Turkish journalists shared this opinion. On June 9 the magazine Akis printed an article entitled “America’s Tragedy” that criticized Ambassador Warren for failing to keep Washington apprised of events in Turkey prior to the coup. Fundamentally, the Ambassador “did not at all understand Turkey and the Turks” and thus could not grasp the gravity of events as they occurred in April and May. The “erroneous” reports he submitted to the State Department tapped into a deep Turkish dread. As the article’s author confided:

Many Turks have lived for years in the anxiety that such conduct might harm Turkish-American friendship, because it is this type of Ambassador who aggravates anti-American sentiment in various corners of the world even more effectively than the communists. Isn’t it as the result of these reports that America felt compelled to appear to be supporting the Menderes Administration?  

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1024 Memorandum of a Conversation (September 20, 1960).
1025 TO: O – Mr. Henderson, FROM: NEA – G. Lewis Jones, SUBJECT: Admiral Burke’s Conversation with Senior Turkish Army Officer (June 1, 1960).
1026 “America’s Tragedy” The Files of Robert G. Barnes (June 15, 1960). Breakdowns in understanding and communication continued with the new government. In December rumors circulated of a possible evacuation of American forces from Turkey stemming from a statement given by President Eisenhower regarding sending of American dependents back home. At some point a story surfaced that the US military command sent orders that following the dependents’ departure all officers were to amass enough rations, clothing and equipment to survive out in the field for two weeks, ostensibly in the event of another expected political crisis. American officials in Turkey dismissed the rumor and cited a letter writing campaign from two months earlier in which several US servicemen received letters threatening their lives unless they left the country.
While its personnel came under fire in the press, the U.S. Embassy offered General Gürsel high praise for conducting himself in a manner befitting his nation’s chief executive officer and the CNU’s main representative in a time of transition: “He is still slow of speech, slow of thought, unhurried, calm and, evidently, extremely confident of his ability to do what needs to be done.”\footnote{Letter from Fletcher Warren to G. Lewis Jones, Jr. (September 1, 1960).} A clear peaking order had developed in Turkish politics with the CNU overlooking the GNA as the “final repository of all the powers of the Turkish people.”\footnote{Ibid.} Much of Turkey still regarded the CNU with cool detachment or outright mistrust, particularly in the former DP rural strongholds, but many others would not be at ease until Turkey’s economic fortunes improved. Business activities in Turkey continued to stagnate and uncertain farmers took to hoarding their wheat crops and waiting for economic stability to return.\footnote{Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Current Political Situation (September 21, 1960) Record Group 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.} Leftists and communists courageous or foolhardy enough to speak out insisted that Turkey’s economic and political ills could be cured by rapprochement with the Soviet bloc. Dwindling supplies of foreign exchange and the reduced availability of consumer items and less financial assistance from the U.S. made even those who scoffed at Russian assistance in previous years consider such offers seriously.\footnote{Ibid.}

As Washington adjusted to the CNU in the aftermath of the Menderes government and recalibrated policy, few offered any final analysis of the failure of the DP and the United States’ role in its demise. Dwight J. Simpson, a professor of political science at Williams College, traveled to Turkey in 1964 to teach development economics at the University of Istanbul. His interpretation of the events leading to the coup placed blame on the shoulders of both sides. He
cited Menderes and Bayar’s inability to understand “the vast complexities of the development process which they helped set in motion.” Simpson vituperated American officials for failing to voice any objections to Turkish development plans until Turkey could no longer avoid economic and political turmoil. Washington acted as both enabler and meddler, and in the course of its “irresponsible meddling, contributed to, encouraged and, indeed, made possible many of the excesses, errors and injurious results of the Menderes government’s attempts at development.” Had U.S. officials exhibited more assertiveness and prudence in dictating how Ankara utilized American aid, Simpson speculated it would have preempted the Turks’ wrongheaded and ultimately destructive approach to the development of their country. Their decision to remain silent defied common sense given the amount of capital and the potential risks; Simpson could not make sense of the failure of the ECA and MSA to “insist on sound, rational planning and a wise allocation of capital resources so as to maximize the possibilities of good results.”

Some defenders of the DP likewise found fault with the United States, particularly in its criticism of the DP’s economic policies. Washington, contended these DP’s supporters, only detected the economic failings of the DP’s policies without realizing their social value. Visible infrastructural improvements such as roads, power sources, and electricity in many areas could not be defended from the viewpoint of economics, but those dwelling in misery that enjoyed them might have been deterred from welcoming a Communist resolution out of desperation.

Changes to the Turkish Government and Military

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1032 Ibid 143.
1033 Ibid 144.
The coup precipitated purges in many Turkish institutions such as the civil service, academia, and the cabinet. Most dramatically the CNU forced 4,000 Turkish high-ranking officers into early retirement, ostensibly to streamline the military’s organizational structure. Ambassador Warren believed the CNU’s true intent was to push aside officers with little faith in the new government. The mandatory retirements shook up the Turkish armed forces and upset the functionality of U.S. and NATO military operations. Meanwhile, the rift between senior military leaders and younger officers, disheartened by their commanders’ decision to take part in the coup, threatened to tear the Turkish armed forces apart. Having reluctantly intervened to bring down an ostensibly democratically elected government, Warren worried of future military involvement in political matter, and “the long run precedent establishes for the continuing admixture of military and political affairs.” Warren concluded it might be best for U.S.-Turkish relations if the CNU handed over the government to an elected regime as soon as possible.

Warren also fretted over the course of Turkey’s economy under Gürsel and the CNU. While it repeated the mantra of a balanced budget, private initiative, and closing of the economic gap being chanted since the Marshall Plan days, Warren worried that the CNU, particularly its younger members, looked the past for inspiration and motivation. In carrying and justifying the coup Warren believed that the young officers:

went back to the Ataturk Regime and turned up and brushed off old ideas, goals and methods of the great Pasha. This means they came up with his ideas of etatism or statism and the traditional Turkish respect for Government undertakings as contrasted with that of mistrust for private individual or corporate undertaking. Consequently, the CNU, I believe, is much closer today to Ataturk’s statism than it is to the American conception of the proper relationship between the state, industry, and capitalism.

\[1035\] Letter from Fletcher Warren to G. Lewis Jones, Jr. (September 1, 1960).
\[1036\] TO: O – Mr. Henderson, FROM: NEA – G. Lewis Jones, SUBJECT: Admiral Burke’s Conversation with Senior Turkish Army Officer (June 1, 1960).
\[1037\] Ibid.
As a sign of this statist shift Warren cited the CNU’s recent dismissal of several members of the Cabinet with supposed capitalist proclivities.\textsuperscript{1038}

\textit{The CNU’s Foreign Policy}

Foreign Secretary Sarper and Gürsel assured the U.S. Embassy that even with the recent shake-ups in its bureaucracies Turkey would continue its close cooperation with Washington in international matters. From the beginning the CNU made plain its commitments to NATO, CENTO, and the United States, although the State Department noted of the new government “there is a greater tendency to question the requirements of the United States in Turkey than was evident under the Menderes Administration.”\textsuperscript{\textcolor{red}{1039}} Turkey remained skeptical of Soviet overtures, and in short order the CNU refused a Soviet offer of large-scale aid totaling $500 million at 2.5-3\% annual interest, dismissed advice from Khrushchev that Turkey adopt a neutral policy, and rejected the possibility of granting flyover rights to the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{\textcolor{red}{1040}} At the same time, Turkey, though not prepared to capitulate to Moscow’s demands, “proposed to be no more and no less friendly towards the USSR than the West and therefore supports a wary relaxation of East-West tensions.”\textsuperscript{\textcolor{red}{1041}} Washington noted that both Ankara and Moscow planned to increase the frequency of cultural and economic delegations between the two countries, and although Turkey rejected undesirable Soviet proposals just as the previous regime, it did so with more politeness than the DP. Of the conciliatory tone in Turkish-Soviet relations, the State Department decided, “Turkey wishes to end its own cold war with the USSR and to have it assimilated into the overall problem of East-West relations. The Turks

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textcolor{red}{1038}] Letter from Fletcher Warren to G. Lewis Jones, Jr. (September 1, 1960).
  \item[\textcolor{red}{1039}] Ankara, April 27-29, 1961, Background Paper Draft.
  \item[\textcolor{red}{1040}] Draft report, date unknown.
  \item[\textcolor{red}{1041}] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
appear to be making a concerted effort, vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc, with their NATO allies."\textsuperscript{1042} Ambassador Warren believed that “the only thing that would cause the Turks to change their attitude toward the USSR and the USA would be the conviction that the United States had ceased to be as good an ally to Turkey as Turkey is to the USA.”\textsuperscript{1043} With Turkey at a political juncture, it seemed an opportune moment for many Turks to reassess the country’s existing foreign policy and relations with other countries, particularly with non-aligned nations such as Cuba, Laos and India obtaining assistance without formally pledging their loyalty to any one side. Recent indications of growing secrecy, a possible reorientation away from the West, a potentially totalitarian government, and a reacceptance of statism all added up in Warren’s mind to the conceivable prospect of Turkey becoming tolerant of communism.\textsuperscript{1044}

Khrushchev urged the CNU to consider rethinking Turkey’s policies towards his country. In June he sent Gürsel a message stating that “the most sincere relationships between our neighboring countries could take place if Turkey placed itself on the road to neutrality.” Moscow proposed an exchange of high-level visits and offered numerous large long-term, low-interest loans. Washington worried that the continuing weakness of the Turkish economy and the relative inexperience of the CNU in handling such affairs might it difficult to resist the Soviets’ offers of loans totaling $500-600 million.\textsuperscript{1045} The Soviets had previously tendered similar Faustian pacts to Menderes government during times of economic upheaval, but, according to observers in Ankara, the CNU seemed to be making its policy decisions more on

\textsuperscript{1042} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1043} Letter from Fletcher Warren to G. Lewis Jones, Jr. (September 1, 1960).
\textsuperscript{1044} Ibid.
the basis of the interests of the nation than its predecessor, which frequently only thought in terms of the party’s benefit.\textsuperscript{1046}

\textbf{The DP on Trial}

Foreign Minister Selim Sarper refuted any claims of Turkish softening towards the Soviets, stating that Gürsel desired to follow “a proper and moderate course for his country” that included continuing support of NATO, CENTO and bilateral alliances.\textsuperscript{1047} Sarper did acknowledge that the longer the CNU put off holding elections, the more it seemed the CNU desired to remain in power. Gürsel hoped to commemorate the May 27 coup by holding elections on the same date in 1961, but the slow pace of the legal scholars working on the constitution precluded this from happening. Gürsel pushed Election Day to October 29, 1961.\textsuperscript{1048} Turkey could wait, particularly with its attention largely focused on the impending trials of Menderes and his closest supporters.

Foreign Minister Sarper assured concerned U.S. Embassy and military officials that the trials would be “as fair and humane as possible.” General Norstad urged Gürsel and Sarper to remember that world opinion “would not accept vindictive action against opponents who…were now politically finished.”\textsuperscript{1049} Many Turks still demanded capital punishment for the accused, a fact that risked alienating the Western press. The CNU strove to appear detached from the trials,

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{1046} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{1047} Memorandum of a Conversation (September 20, 1960).
\item\textsuperscript{1048} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{1049} T 236/6416, FROM UNITED KINGDON PERMANENT DELEGATION TO NATO/PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE, Sir P. Mason, FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION, No. SE8 Saving, October 31, 1960, CONFIDENTIAL, R. November 1, 1960. Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 328 Saving of October 31, 1960. A special court, known as the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, consisting of eight regular judges, five civilian and three military would oversee the trial. A civilian attorney would serve as the chief prosecutor with 11 assistants, four of whom would be from the military. Ankara justified the military judges by citing the large number of military officers under trial. Each defendant could be represented by three attorneys. NEA – Mr. Jones, GTI – Robert G. Miner, Composition of the Special Court Constituted to Try Bayar, Menderes and Company (October 10, 1960) Record Group 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.
\end{footnotes}
and some officials believed that the CNU would utilize its legislative powers to change death sentences to life imprisonment if necessary, in order to retain the West’s good will.\footnote{Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Current Political Situation (September 21, 1960).}

The trials of Menderes and his top officials began on October 14, 1960 in a converted gymnasium on the prison island of Yassi Ada.\footnote{NE – Mr. E. A. O’Neill, GTI – John H. Morris, Turkish Trials (12 October, 1960) Record Group 469: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.} The special high court consisted of six civilian judges and three military judges. Their final decision would be final and without appeals unless the sentence was death. Menderes, Bayar, and over 200 state officials went before the court to answer for their authoritarian policies, crimes punishable by five to fifteen years’ hard labor.

Menderes and Bayar stood accused of violating Articles 146 of the Turkish Constitution Penal Code, specifically of “attempting to abrogate the constitution or preventing the National Assembly from fulfilling its duties.”\footnote{“Menderes on Trial, Could Get Gallows” Stars & Stripes (Saturday, October 15, 1960): 5.} A conviction for such unconstitutional acts might mean in a trip to the gallows, but Minister Sarper seemed confident that Menderes would eventually receive “grace” and be granted a stay of execution by the CNU.\footnote{Memorandum of Conversation FRUS, 1958-1960 Volume X, Part I: Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1993): 731.} General Norstad recommended Eisenhower send a personal letter to Gürsel making plain America’s concerns that harsh sentences would inflame Western public opinion and cause political disruption in Turkey, but both Ambassador Warren and the State Department feared that reemphasizing the point “might smack of intervention and, by provoking Turkish nationalism, produce a contrary result.”\footnote{Ibid.} Without an official position regarding the trials from the White House American officials made it clear to Turkish officials in private and unofficial encounters that “the CNU and even Turkey itself is on trial in the eyes of the West and that the result of the trials and sentences...
should be just and acceptable to Turkish and world opinion. Sentences seeming revengeful and contrary to the evidence might cause friction in the US and Europe towards Turkey and endanger Turkish domestic stability and affect Turkey’s membership in CENTO and NATO. Political Democratization and Economic Reform

The outcome of the trials made Western governments anxious, as did waited for the promised return of an elected parliamentary government. Western observers saw the dismissal of 14 of the 37 members of the CNU in early November as a sign of the provisional government’s intent to restore democracy, as those who had been removed advocated prolonging military rule. Those left behind in the reorganization of the CNU were assumed to be moderates supporting a timely restoration of a civilian government. U.S. Embassy officials also took the dismissals to mean that the pace of the trials would quicken. In mid-December the CNU announced a law calling for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly on January 6, 1961, a bicameral assembly consisting of a CNU Senate and a House of Representatives made up of 272 members elected to their positions by political and occupational groups and local leaders, rather than the people. Gürsel persistently maintained free elections for a new GNA by October.

Plans to restore democracy represented substantial progress in bringing equilibrium back to Turkish politics. The provisional government hoped to bring similar balance to the Turkish economy. The Menderes government laid some of the groundwork in August 1958 with the adoption of stabilization measures designed to ensure stabilization and encourage gradual growth. Economic officials in the provisional government saw no reason to dispense with the

\[1055\] Ankara, April 27-29, 1961, Background Paper.  
\[1058\] Ibid.
measures but rather to increase their stringency.\footnote{1059} SSEs continued to account for more than one-half of the nation’s industrial output, but the ongoing lack of coordination and unproductive methods of production ended in inflation and a wasteful drain on national resources. To reverse this trend the Council of Ministers passed a decree on June 21, 1960 creating a Special Commission charged with reviewing current and proposed investments in the general, annexed, municipal, and SEE budgets.\footnote{1060} The Commission finished reviewing the investment projects of 34 SEEs worth TL 10.5 billion by the end of 1960, and decided to eliminate 88 projects totaling TL 2 billion, to delay 259 projects totaling TL 3.4 billion, and to continue 332 projects costing of TL 5.2 billion.\footnote{1061} The provisional government sought to redress the trade imbalance without crippling the country’s economic life by importing free of restrictions only a marginal number of goods absolutely critical to Turkey’s economy, such as spare parts, specific industrial raw materials, and some necessary equipment and machinery. The existing quota system would remain in place with priority given to commodities that increased production.\footnote{1062} It remained to be seen of these short-term measures would result in economic stabilization and how effective planned long-term policies would be. To assist Turkey in making these changes the provisional government created the State Planning Organization (SPO) to coordinate economic policy and draft a long-term investment program for the promotion of development while ensuring stability. After the DP’s disorganized approach to economic development without clear goals and effective methods, Turkish business interests were prepared to reintegrate state planning into economic policy formation and implementation.\footnote{1063} The first order of business for the SPO: drafting a

\footnote{1059} T 236/6416, REPORT OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT ON ITS ECONOMIC POLICY MEASURES, Pursuant to Document CM(59) 90.
\footnote{1060} Ibid.
\footnote{1061} Ibid.
\footnote{1062} Ibid.
\footnote{1063} Barkey 60-61.
fifteen-year development plan to methodically correct the country’s economic problems.\textsuperscript{1064} Such an effort had not been attempted since the late 1930s, for fear of it being labeled as a socialistic measure, but with the CNU showing a greater openness to statism as a means of repairing the Turkish economy a carefully planned economic policy was a practical aspect to the larger resolution.

The SPO and the Special Commission to review budgets represented just two of the attempts made by the provisional government to address the economic tribulations that contributed to the demise of the DP. Other projects in the works prior to the coup intended to cultivate economic development remained important components of the CNU’s economic policies, perhaps the most important being membership in the European Economic Community. Joining the EEC offered not just the advantages of improved movement of Turkish-made goods and Turkish workers throughout Western Europe, but also some concrete evidence of Turkey being a European nation, an all-too elusive prize sought ever since the last days of the Ottomans.

\textit{Turkey’s Europeanization in Context}

American bureaucrats in the early 1950s encouraged one another to consider Turkey as a European rather than an Asian nation, particularly after its membership in organizations dominated by European nations such as the OEEC and NATO.\textsuperscript{1065} This sort of encouragement galled some British officials who believed that the Americans’ “over-enthusiastic” praise of the Turks progress belied their true cultural identification. A 1957 comment courtesy of British Ambassador James Bowker summarizes this Anglo perspective:

\begin{quote}
Though the Turks are apt to regard themselves as a fully fledged Western power, the fact of course is that Turkey lies astride two continents and though politically she looks
\end{quote}


mainly towards Europe and the West, she still retains and no doubt long continue to retain, many characteristics of Asia. The proper criterion therefore for measuring Turkey’s achievements is not the standard of Western Europe, but that of the Middle East and East European countries which surround her.\textsuperscript{1066}

Measured against the Western European character, the Turks’ “typical defects” of “unimaginativeness and cocksureness (the proverbial product of ‘a little learning’) – stand out blackly enough,” but in comparison to Middle Easterners and Eastern Europeans “the same defects readily assume the guise of virtues” becoming “‘stolidity’, discipline and the absence of ‘inferiority complex’, which are rare enough in this area.”\textsuperscript{1067} According to Captain E.W. Sinclair, a British Naval Attaché, the modern Turks might play at being European, but could not fully suppress the impulses of their Central Asian ancestors; “and even if over the centuries environment may do much to change the spots of the leopard, it will not obliterate them.” Thus one must bear in mind that “the Turk for all his efforts to be of the West is in the main an Oriental, with most of the characteristics and weaknesses of the East. Included in these is corruption; it is part of the way of life, and therefore widespread, but only here and there does it reach serious proportions. Nevertheless, it is anything but an endearing characteristic.” Sinclair placed the Turk on middle ground: “Let us compromise and call him a Middle Easterner with a touch of the West in him.”\textsuperscript{1068}

The Turks had no patience for such compromise. The first dreamings of a Pan Europe or a European Union in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century writings of Kant, Hugo, Novicov and dozens of other


\textsuperscript{1067} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1068} FO 371/130210, British Embassy, \textit{SECRET}, The Turkish Nation – An Assessment of its martial worth and potential: A Report by Captain E.W. SINCLAIR, Naval Attaché ANKARA, July, 1957. Sinclair included a laundry list of personality defects that in his mind typified the Turk: “His Eastern background makes him idle and a fatalist” prone to giving up in the face of adversity and looking to Allah for deliverance; “He has little imagination and no original thought;” and “If only the Eastern element of face saving did not make him so conceited – a mixture of arrogance and stupidity is a description I hear from those who work daily alongside him – and suspicious, he could be so much easier to help and his advancement in all spheres correspondingly more rapid.”
utopian treatises never considered the Ottomans as part of the proposals. The destruction wrought by regionalism during World War I gave greater urgency to universalism and organized Pan Europe movements developed throughout the interwar period with little success. Only after the Second World War did the idea of a Pan Europe come to be too compelling to ignore with not only the defeat of Germany, “but the defeat of Europe” leaving the continent “prostrated, weary, hungry, powerless.”1069 Dissatisfaction with the limited opportunities for closer economic and political relations Atlantic institutions offered, and the desire to heal the damage wrought by World War II stirred the nations of France, Italy, West Germany and the Benelux countries to come together to establish “a more meaningful international community” that would become the European Economic Community (EEC). According to Jeffrey Vanke, the EEC became a panacea to specific traumas experienced by each of these countries, from German shame for its wartime crimes to French humiliation for its wartime collaboration and occupation. Britain, on the other hand, having avoided invasion and contributing to the defeat of the Nazis, saw little need to consider possible integration with its neighbors, opting instead to orient itself along Atlantic rather than European lines.1070 Vanke’s interpretation of the formation of the EEC is grounded in the idea of integration as a process guided more by emotional factors than previous accounts that cite economic incentives that drew the founding members of the Community together more than political ones. The political divisions and distrust that existed in many Western European countries after the war curbed the potential for national cohesion and made leaders more receptive to transnational solutions as a means of restoring political stability.1071

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1070 Vanke 52, 64.
1071 As members of “other states” or the “peripherals” that lacked strong political and economic ties with one another, Turkey and Greece might have opted to join one of the groups or decided to remain on the outside as Europe began to integrate. At the Working Party No. 23 of the OEEC Council held on March 18, 1957, the delegations of member nations undergoing economic development were invited to submit a statement on their desire
To some extent Turkey fits into Vanke’s elucidation of the initial motivations behind the development of the EEC. Although Turkey escaped wartime destruction comparable to nations such as France and Germany, the costs of maintaining and equipping an army on full alert during the conflict held back the Turkish economy and continued after the war and fears of Soviet expansionism took hold. And, as has already been seen, Turkey’s political environment, particularly by the mid-1950s, could hardly be described as amicable. Unlike the countries of Western Europe, Turkey did not regard the community as a source of absolution for recent transgressions. Instead, membership in the EEC offered proof of Turkey as a member of Europe. The secure political environment provided by NATO and the United States made possible and facilitated the initial stirrings of European integration beginning in the late 1940s. Military protection provided by the NATO allowed West Germany to channel its resources into productive cooperation with its former enemies, resulting in a more democratic and economically dynamically Europe. America advocated for a Pan Europe during the war


1072 The centuries-old question of just how “European” the Turks can be considered according to Western specifications has bedeviled scholars, politicians and laymen in both Europe and Turkey. From the 16th to the 18th centuries the Ottoman Empire provided a clear demarcation line for the end of Europe and the beginning of the Muslim World wherein lurked the “Terrible Turk.” This bestial near-mythic creature experienced a gradual rehabilitation in the Western European consciousness from a figure of dread to one of pity when the threat of Russian expansionism recast Turkey as the “sick man” or “old man of Europe.” Gallantly coming to the decrepit Ottoman Empire more out concern for its colonial interests than a desire to preserve the Ottomans, the French and British defeated Russia in 1856, bringing the Crimean War to a close. As a signatory of the Treaty of Paris brining the war to a close in March, the Ottoman Empire was formally recognized for the first time by other European powers.

years as a means of avoiding future bloodshed on the continent and continued to support
unification when peace returned. In 1950 the Truman Administration formally declared its
commitment to continued European unification and made good on this pledge with the passage
of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The MSA, according to Congress, “should be so
administered, as to support concrete measures for political federation, military and economic
unification.” Turkey’s prospects for economic recovery demanded looking beyond traditional
nation-to-nation trade to trade within in the EEC or a comparable organization. Turkey’s
further hoped to join the EEC in order to more closely monitor its old Mediterranean rival,
Greece. The British postulated Turkey’s keenness to join the EEC resulted both from the Greeks’
application and the Turkish desire to participate in any organization with “European” in its title,
even if they had little sense of the organization’s role or how it functioned. Ankara’s interest in
joining the EEC seemed in keeping with its desire to be part of the OEEC and NATO, namely “a
desire to derive the maximum advantages from membership of the Common Market whilst
delaying acceptance of any obligation for as long as possible.”

Initial Dealings between Turkey and the EEC

Turkey’s bid for associate membership in the EEC was the next logical step in Turkey’s
progression towards westernization, as it would permit the nation’s exports admission to the
European market and encourage economic development. A nagging deficit of payments due to
an ongoing imbalance of trade hampered Turkey’s development efforts; EEC membership
offered some promise of overcoming the imbalance by easing the movement of Turkish goods in

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1074 Kunz 870.
1075 “Verbal Report of European Study Mission, Wednesday, April 22, 1953, House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C.” Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1951-56,
Volume XV, European Problems: Committee and Subcommittee Hearings Briefings and Study Mission Reports,
1076 Hale “Anglo-Turkish trade since 1923: experiences and problems” 115.
1077 FO 371/150306, 11317/1, Despatch No. 1E, British Embassy, Ankara, Letter from B.A.B. Burrows to
member countries. On the EEC’s end, the decision to consider the membership of Greece and Turkey showed a renewed interest in renewing economic and political ties in the Mediterranean region after decades of marginal involvement. Taking on Greece and Turkey as associate members also gave the ECC an opportunity to prove its ability to assist countries in the midst of modernization efforts.

Ankara’s decision to place its bets on the EEC resulted more from its longstanding relationship with the Community’s six members than any philosophical considerations, particularly in regards to West Germany, which overtook the U.S. as the largest buyer of Turkish goods and supplier of Turkish imports in the early 1950s just as Washington had intended. Along with the flow of German goods into Turkey came German engineers and businessmen to establish private enterprises or to assist existing ones. Many Turkish mines and factories began to shun American equipment and machinery in favor of German models. The number of Germans operating inside Turkey reached a high enough level that Turks frequently mistook MSA officials for Germans. With so much mining, electrical and agricultural equipment coming from West Germany in Turkey, it made sound financial sense to seek membership in the EEC in order to take full advantage of the customs union. The West German government under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer viewed Turkey not only as an integral trading partner, but also as a nation living a similarly uncertain existence on the edge of the Warsaw Pact.

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1079 Emile Noel “Relations Between the Community and Turkey” in Osman Okan and H. Aktan, eds. Economic Relations Between Turkey and the EEC: Proceedings of a Seminar held in Antalya on October 11-14, 1976 (Hacettepe Institute for Economic and Social Research on Turkey and the Middle East): 1.
1082 Krieger 168.
looked to Germany with a similar sense of empathy and had supported German efforts to achieve ratification of the ill-fated European Defense Community Treaty by Italy and France in 1954.\textsuperscript{1083} Although Turkey did not take part in the EEC’s forerunner, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Prime Minister Menderes found the organization important enough to maintain close contact with his diplomats to keep him informed of the ECSC’s progress.\textsuperscript{1084} The information provided by these diplomats led Ankara to view belonging to an economic community as a means of achieving economic potential. To this end Menderes replaced Foreign Minister Faut Köprülü with Fatin Rüştü Zorlu in late July 1955. Zorlu’s fluency in English and French, background as Turkey’s representative at the NATO Council in 1952, and knowledge of collective security and trade agreements made him eminently suitable to represent Turkey in future negotiations with the EEC. On August 4, 1959, two weeks after the Greeks officially applied for EEC membership, Turkey submitted its application. In order to remain apace with Greece, the Turks drafted the application hurriedly and with little preparation.\textsuperscript{1085} On September 11 the EEC Council acknowledged the Turks’ request and authority the EEC Commission to initiate exploratory discussions with the Turkish government.\textsuperscript{1086} Representatives of the EEC convened on October 5 to begin exploratory discussions of the Turks’ application. Three days later the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States reviewed the application before the EEC Council of Ministers took its turn on October 14 and expressed its

\textsuperscript{1083} Robinson \textit{Developments Respecting Turkey, July 1953-October 1954} 45.
\textsuperscript{1084} Sefer Sener and Ali Akdemir “Contributions of Full Membership of Turkey in the Context of Transformations in EU Development Process” \textit{The Journal of Turkish Weekly} (June 21, 2006)
\textsuperscript{1086} FO 371/171408, European Economic Community, Official Spokesman of the Commission, September 1963, P.34/63, \textbf{INFORMATION MEMO: ASSOCIATION OF TURKEY WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.}
overall satisfaction. This initiated the second phase of explanatory conversations.\textsuperscript{1087} It took the EEC a relatively short time to respond, suggesting it had few initial objections to Turkey’s application.

The EEC did reject Turkey’s request (as it had Greece’s) for 24 years to remove trade barriers while the Six would dismantle similar barriers in only twelve years. The EEC also rebuked Turkey’s appeal for some of its agricultural products, such as tobacco, be given “special treatment” separate from the existing common agricultural products the Six had agreed to in the Treaty of Rome in 1957.\textsuperscript{1088} On other matters the EEC remained close-mouthed, such as Turkey’s request for $120 million from the Community in financial aid annually over the next ten years. Turkish leaders knew their country could not immediately form a customs union as a full member, in large part because of the joint loan from the U.S., IMF, and OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) and debt consolidation, nor did they wish to sign an aid and co-operation agreement with the Community.\textsuperscript{1089}

The Council of the Community, consisting of Cabinet Ministers and officials from the six member nations of the EEC, unanimously approved Turkey’s request as it had for Greece. Although the Council issued a public statement that Turkey’s association with the Community would present some problems, it did not specify what such problems might be.\textsuperscript{1090} It was fairly evident what factors dissuaded Turkey’s underdeveloped economy from being fully integrated into the EEC: Turkish living standards stood were below those of the EEC countries, and more


\textsuperscript{1088} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1089} T. Penrose, “Is Turkish Membership Economically Feasible?” in D. Rustow and T. Penrose \textit{The Mediterranean Challenge: Turkey and the Community} (University of Sussex: Sussex European Research Centre, 1981): 61.

than 80% of Turkey’s exports continued to be agricultural products compared to less than 20% for the EEC.\textsuperscript{1091} Substantial economic progress would be necessary before the EEC considered Turkey ready for full membership.

\textit{The Application Process Moves Forward}

On September 29, 1959, official negotiations between the EEC and Turkey commenced in Brussels to lay the groundwork for the creation of a customs union completed in twenty-two years, concurrently with full membership status. At the first preparatory meeting EEC officials raised concerns with Turkey’s lack of European character, its overwhelmingly Muslim population, its comparative lack of democratic institutions, and its underdeveloped economy. Robert Marjolin, the Vice President of the European Community Commission, told Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs C. Douglas Dillon that the only justification for Turkey or Greece becoming an associate member would be as a conduit through which sizeable economic aid could be provided, thus lightening the U.S.’s financial burden.\textsuperscript{1092} In Marjolin’s estimation, Turkey’s application to join the EEC seemed to be motivated solely by its economic concerns, but Greece sought much more including preferential treatment without committing to anything in return. If the expansion failed, then the EEC did not expect the associate membership status of Greece or Turkey to have meaning outside of the financial realm; the only “association” with the Common Market would be guaranteed by agreements regarding financial assistance.\textsuperscript{1093} Greece and Turkey would be of greater value to the EEC after economic development.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1093} Ibid 155.
\end{footnotesize}
Officials of the EEC and the U.S. Mission to the European Community discussed the possibility of coordinating aid programs to Greece and Turkey. Greece applied for $60 million in EEC grants and credits over the next five years, much more than the $26 million in grants and credits the U.S. made available to Greece in 1958. Conversely, the Turks sought $100-125 million in EEC grants and credits, less than the $120 offered by the U.S. in the same year. American officials remained evasive on the subject, nervous that a reduction in American aid and an increase in EEC support might result in Washington losing political influence over Greece and Turkey. During Eisenhower’s brief visit to Ankara in December the Turks attempted to secure America’s support for their application for association with the EEC. The best the U.S. could do was a fleeting reference in a communiqué issued at the end of the visit expressing Washington’s hope that Turkey’s association with the EEC would result in closer solidarity among the participating countries.

1959 closed with both Turkey and Greece still negotiating with the EEC. The Greeks enjoyed greater progress, due in large part to a smaller agricultural sector compared to Turkey’s. This size differential could be seen in the Greek request for a full customs union after a transitional period of twelve years compared to the Turks’ 24. Turkey also requested twice as much economic aid in the coming year from the EEC than the Greeks, $120 million. The Turkish government took steps to systematically formulate Turkey’s policy towards the EEC and firm up its position. It assigned this task to the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Turkey under the leadership of Secretary General Çihat Iren. Iren made it his mission to educate

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the Turkish people about the benefits of EEC membership. Most Turks knew little of the
organization and those familiar with it, namely Turkish businessmen and industrialists, largely
opposed to Turkey’s joining. Iren addressed a crowd of 1,000 members of the business
community in Istanbul as the kick-off to a publicity campaign that included seminars and articles
produced by the Union of Chambers of Commerce to create awareness of the Common Market
and the need to remain close to Europe so as not to fall behind Greece. Cynical Turkish
industrialists remained unconvinced of the advantages of joining the EEC and unsure of what
would occur when the Turkish market made itself open to the highly industrialized EEC
countries. Turkey’s prospective association with the EEC discouraged new investment,
particularly in the private sector, and some less sturdy industries considered liquidation.

Turkey’s negotiations with the Common Market recommenced in February 1960 with
Ankara expecting a signed agreement by May. L.M. Minford of the British Embassy stated of
the discussions that, “It has been evident to us here that the E.E.C. was not proceeding at all
expeditiously with Turkey’s case for association.” When Foreign Minister Zorlu formally
criticized the glacial pace, the Six blamed the ongoing negotiations with Greece as the cause, an
aggravating development to the Turks who expected Turkey and Greece to be dealt with together
as had been the case with NATO. The Council of Ministers defended their actions by
explaining that the Greeks submitted their application before the Turks. The Greeks had also

1097 FO 371/150306, 11317/1, Despatch No. 1E, British Embassy, Ankara, Letter from B.A.B. Burrows to
1098 Ibid.
1099 FO 371/150306, 11317/1, Despatch No. 1E, British Embassy, Ankara, Letter from B.A.B. Burrows to
1100 Ibid.
1101 FO 371/150306, 11317/1, Despatch No. 1E, British Embassy, Ankara, Letter from B.A.B. Burrows to
1102 FO 371/150309, M6120/48, 11317/14, Letter to L.G. Holliday, Esq., C.M.G., European Economic
Organisations Dept., FOREIGN OFFICE from L.M. Minford. (March 18, 1960).
provided the Council with necessary basic information available that the Turks, in their usual inefficiency, had failed to make available.

The EEC intended to use the Greek case as a example and “to try to get it out of the way before moving on to any other proposed associations” including the Turks.\textsuperscript{1102} Zorlu met with representatives of the Common Market in March 1960 to discuss the possibility to moving the negotiations to the next stage the following May.\textsuperscript{1103} The start of official negotiations between Greece and the EEC in March 1960 without Turkey infuriated Ankara. British officials knew the Menderes Government despised having to follow the Greeks in negotiations with the EEC because the Turks “consider that they are tied by what happens with the Greeks in their negotiations and that their freedom of negotiation is hampered.”\textsuperscript{1104} Ankara contended its primary motivation for joining the EEC to be the anticipated financial aid, specifically a loan from the European Investment Bank (EIB) to make Turkish industries more competitive. Should Greece break off negotiations with the EEC, Turkey would be “only too happy to do the same” because it had only applied to join the Common Market because Greece’s membership, with its similar economy “would have left Turkey out on a limb.”\textsuperscript{1105}

The May 27th coup d’état brought Turkey’s negotiations with the EEC to a standstill and gave additional proof to many Europeans, particularly the French and Italians, that Turkey

\textsuperscript{1102} FO 371/150311, 176120/66, 1163/115/60, CONFIDENTIAL, UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, BRUSSELS, Letter to the European Economic Organisations Department, Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W.1. from K. C. Christofas (March 24, 1960).


\textsuperscript{1104} T 312/802, Letter to the Economic Organisations Department from the Commercial Department (May 20, 1960).

\textsuperscript{1105} T 312/802, Letter to the Economic Organisations Department from the Commercial Department (May 20, 1960).
lacked the requisite stability to become a viable member of the Community. 1106 France effused to support Turkey as an associate member of EEC, largely because of its close relationship with Washington at a time when the French sought to distance themselves from American interference. Italy’s concerns were more commercial in nature; it did not relish the prospect of competing with Turkish agriculture. 1107 The disruption caused by the coup gave the Greeks additional time to place themselves in a more favorable position relative to Turkey, specifically by demanding, without any Turkish input or consideration, that the Six double their imports of Greek and Turkish tobacco. Greece’s exports to the Common Market greatly exceeded those of Turkey, making such an arrangement disproportionately beneficial to the Greeks. A delay in the resumption of negotiations gave Greece time to maneuver into a more favorable position while Turkey attempted to regain its bearings in the application process.

At a June 1st press conference the new Minister of Commerce, Dr. Cihat Iren, long an advocate of closer ties with the Common Market, assured that the new economic policies of the incoming administration would allow for a smoother application process, but it needed time to reassess the situation from all sides before negotiations could resume. 1108 Ankara contacted the European Commission requesting negotiations recommence when the political situation stabilized somewhat. 1109 A Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman stated that the request to postpone negotiations should not to be viewed as Turkey’s withdrawal for membership

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1107 Krieger 169.

1108 T 312/802, M 6120/144, 11317/29, Letter to the Economic Organisations Department from the Commercial Department (July 15, 1960).

1109 FO 371/150319, Confidential, Letter from the Commercial Department to L.G. Holliday, Esq., C.M.G., European Economic Organisations Dept. (July 1, 1960).
consideration, but as a request for a delay to allow Ankara to reassess the situation.\textsuperscript{1110} Departmental changes indicated Ankara’s commitment to facilitating the application process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its head, Semin Günver, no longer had responsibilities for conducting negotiations with the Six; the Ministry of Commerce created a section to take its place.

Officials of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs cautioned against taking a leisurely approach to the negotiations, lest Greece gain a preferential position, specifically in tobacco exports. The Turks hoped to secure an arrangement allowing for preferential sales of Turkish tobacco in the EEC countries and other facilities for the enlargement of Turkey’s exports.\textsuperscript{1111} As far as the British could surmise, “the Six are evincing no great enthusiasm about either Greece or Turkey as members of the E.E.C.”\textsuperscript{1112} General Gürsel made Turkey’s bid for membership a central issue in his administration. He commanded work begin that summer on a new Turkish proposal by experts from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce to reassess Turkey’s position and determine necessary changes. At that point, Ankara’s position on EEC membership remained unchanged; Turkey wanted to participate on the terms identical to those of Greece.\textsuperscript{1113} The EEC requested that the Turks defer their application after a new civilian government had been elected and come to power. EEC officials struggled to concoct an

\textsuperscript{1111} T 312/802, CONFIDENTIAL, Letter from W.P.W. Barnes to T.H. Sinclair, Esq., Board of Trade (February 15, 1961).
\textsuperscript{1112} FO 371/150319, Confidential, Letter from the Commercial Department to L.G. Holliday, Esq., C.M.G., European Economic Organisations Dept. (July 1, 1960).
\textsuperscript{1113} Memorandum of Conversation (July 25, 1961) Record Group: 469, Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-61, Office of African and European Operations, Regional Organizations Staff, Records Relating to Regional Development Programs, 1951-60.
agreement that reflected the Turkish economic situation while maintaining consistence with the

tenets of GATT.\textsuperscript{1114}

The EEC Council announced on May 31, 1960 that the exploratory stage with Turkey
was over and approved the Commission beginning official negotiations. With a growing head of
steam Ankara applied for Turkey’s association with the EEC on July 31; the Council informed
the Commission to commence exploratory talks with the Turks in late September, talks that
would continue for three months.\textsuperscript{1115} On September 8, the newly appointed Minister of
Commerce, Mehmet Baydur, publicly recommitted Turkey to joining the EEC and contended
that his ministry was close to finishing the preparations for the upcoming negotiations. Suat
Yalin, the head of the Ministry of Commerce’s section overseeing EEC matters, aimed for a
resumption of negotiations in October and final membership being gained by the close of 1961.
Yalin expected a window of 25 years to pass before Turkey’s economy would adapt to the
Common Market.\textsuperscript{1116} The Commercial Department of the British Embassy assumed the
negotiations would proceed slowly because the Gürsel Government lacked any sense of its
expectations from joining the EEC besides the prospect of financial aid from the European
Investment Fund.\textsuperscript{1117}

At a press conference on September 21, 1960 Minister Baydur announced that the
Ministry of Commerce continued to analyze the ramifications of possible membership, “a matter
of the highest urgency to define the form and the conditions of our participation in the

\textsuperscript{1114} Letter from William M. Kerrigan to Stanley D. Schiff (November 7, 1961) Record Group: 469, Records
of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-61, Office of African and European Operations, Regional
Organizations Staff, Records Relating to Regional Development Programs, 1951-60.
\textsuperscript{1115} FO 371/171408, European Economic Community, Official Spokesman of the Commission, September
1963, P-34/63, \textbf{INFORMATION MEMO: ASSOCIATION OF TURKEY WITH THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY.}
\textsuperscript{1116} T 312/802, M 6120/227, 11317/20, Letter to the European Economic Organisations Department,
Foreign Office from the British Embassy, Ankara, (September 16, 1960).
\textsuperscript{1117} Ibid.
Meanwhile, negotiations between Greece and the Six advanced quickly as Greece conformed to the customs tariff reductions provided for by the Treaty of Rome on a number of its imported industrial goods. Greece’s full membership by 1961 seemed assured. Turkey had just drafted its own new customs tariff for the protection of developing Turkish industry to be reviewed and approved by GATT. The Ministry of Commerce speculated that once Turkey reached an association with the EEC, it would require three years to restructure its economy though the mass importation of the needed agricultural, industrial and tourist equipment. This would be done through the assistance of the EEC and enable Turkey to at least realize the potential of its natural and human resources. After three years Turkey would then implement the tariff reductions as stipulated by the Treaty of Rome.

**Negotiations Drag On**

Even as the Turks assembled a long-term game plan for membership in the EEC the negotiations in Brussels ground to a halt. In late October the crestfallen Turkish delegation under Dr. Iren returned to Ankara after the Executive Committee rejected the Turks’ requests for of credit of $120-200 million from the EIB, the same amount the Bank had made available to Greece. The Turks also could not be compelled to offer more than 40% liberalization upon entering the Common Market. Yalin announced that more studies would be required before negotiations resumed in December. These yielded no more progress than the negotiations of two months before. The EEC and Turkish delegations met once more in April 1961 to discuss

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1118 T 312/802, 11317/32, Letter to the European Economic Organisations Department, Foreign Office from the British Embassy, Ankara, Turkey and the Common Market, (September 27, 1960).
1119 Ibid.
1121 Ibid.
the problems of Turkey’s economy.\textsuperscript{1122} The EEC had myriad concerns regarding Turkey’s status as a developing country and its nagging imbalance between rising import demands for industrialization and insufficient export earnings. The Turks had yet to demonstrate and signs of long-term self-discipline.\textsuperscript{1123}

On July 9, 1961 Greece signed its association agreement with the EEC, the Athens Agreement, a crushing blow to Turkey. Ankara sent several protest letters in August reasserting Turkey’s wishes to apply for some form of association with the EEC and requested that that its application be considered on September 27.\textsuperscript{1124} During the months following its submission of a request for association in August 1961, Turkey received no official word on the status of the request. The EEC informed Ankara in January 1962 that the submission was in the hands of the Council of Ministers awaiting approval. Following the expected consent of the Council, Ankara hoped to procure U.S. support of Turkey joining the Common Market.\textsuperscript{1125} Kamuran Inan, who headed relations with the EEC on behalf of the Turkish Foreign Office, assured William M. Kerrigan of the U.S. Embassy that although an association with the Common Market would be of critical importance to Turkish trade, perhaps greater long-term importance would result from the political ties with the Common Market “and thus with the West which was implicit in [the]

\textsuperscript{1122} FO 371/171408, European Economic Community, Official Spokesman of the Commission, September 1963, P-34/63, INFORMATION MEMO: ASSOCIATION OF TURKEY WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

\textsuperscript{1123} T 312/802, CONFIDENTIAL, Letter from W.P.W. Barnes to T.H. Sinclair, Esq., Board of Trade (February 15, 1961).


association.” Without such ties “the inflow of Western ideas into Turkey would be extremely slow and ineffective.”

Turkey’s status in the midst of the possible enlargement of the EEC aroused little interest in Washington. In November 1961 the U.S. Embassy in Ankara wondered if the State Department still wanted to see Turkey as a member of the association. State Department telegrams regarding the American position on the EEC made no mention of Turkey, leading an Embassy official to question if the U.S. wished to see membership in the EEC limited to the Six, Great Britain and Denmark. Such a stance would be a “body blow failure” to “Turkey’s efforts to westernize and industrialize itself,” and also hamper ongoing American efforts to bring about the same result. The Embassy worried that a rejection of Turkey’s application might lead to potential political and psychological implications, namely a marked shift away from the West.

In February 1962 the Turks submitted yet another proposal to the Council, one nearly identical to the one submitted in August and “in all respects similar to the Greek terms of association with the EEC.” Turkey made clear to the EEC its intentions of taking on all of the political obligations that accompanied membership, although it would still require an interim period of two decades before its economy would be ready. The EEC continued to consider what sort of association to grant Turkey, and announced that a decision would be postponed until after the Finance Ministers met in Rome in mid-March. Uncertainty with the coalition government coupled with a poor wheat crop in 1961 contributed to a recession that began after the ousting of

1126 Ibid.
1127 Letter from William M. Kerrigan to Stanley D. Schiff (November 7, 1961)
the DP. The Turkish government continued to work out the specifics of its Five Year Development Plan, but lacked a short-term plan of action to deal with the sluggish economy and balance of payments problem.\textsuperscript{1130}

In growing frustration Turkish officials insisted that the ultimate form of the association with the EEC meant less than establishing any type of association. A Turkish official confided to the Dutch Ambassador that “Turkey could simply not afford to be kept waiting out in the hall; Turkey had to be inside the room with its associates. However, what role it played inside the room was of relatively little importance.”\textsuperscript{1131} With the exception of members of academia and the business community, most Turks now favored Turkey’s association with the EEC.

Community members remained divided. The United States continued to distance itself from the discussion, stating that Ankara and Brussels should resolve the issue of Turkish association without American involvement. Washington emphasized its willingness to support any association so long as the customs union conformed to GATT and Turkey gained full membership following a transition period, in much the same manner as the Greek precedent.\textsuperscript{1132}

\textit{The Negotiations Gain Traction}

In May Ankara stepped up its diplomatic efforts under the guiding hand of the new Foreign Minister Cemal Erkin, the Turkish Ambassador to England, who replaced Sarper in late...
March 1962.\textsuperscript{1133} Erkin vowed to carry his government’s message to other nations, that Turkey, a valued and reliable member of NATO, would not have a complete relationship with the West until it became a member of the EEC.\textsuperscript{1134} Before taking on the new post Erkin met with French President de Gaulle to present Turkey’s case and smooth over past missteps including voting in the UN in ways that conflicted with France’s wishes.\textsuperscript{1135} Placating the French, still one of the primary opponents to Turkey’s membership in EEC, might improve future negotiations. The Turkish government assembled a delegation led by Minister of State Feyzioğlu to tour capital cities including Paris, Brussels, and Bonn and meet with European leaders to discuss Turkey’s prospective membership. This sudden flurry of activity resulted from a combination of Erkin, an advocate for Turkey’s integration into Europe since the mid-1950s, and recent condemnation by the GNA that the government had dragged its heels in pursuing membership.\textsuperscript{1136}

As Ankara worked to make tangible progress in its application, international organizations stepped in to do their part. NATO and the OECD arranged with the EEC to relieve them of offering Turkey a bilateral economic assistance plan. The removal of this obstacle allowed the EEC Commission to move closer to finalizing an EEC-Turkish arrangement.\textsuperscript{1137} The EEC Council could now shift its focus away from the issue of financial assistance and concentrate on the issue of trade arrangements between the Six and Turkey, including potential tariff quotas and a waiver the EEC Council might offer on Turkey’s behalf, provided the U.S.

\textsuperscript{1135} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1136} Ibid.
approved it. The EEC assumed that, given the political implications, the U.S. would agree to the waiver. Proposed favorable tariffs for Turkey included exported foodstuffs under consideration for some time: dried figs, hazelnuts, raisins and tobacco.\textsuperscript{1138} To the Turks’ disappointment, Washington refused to guarantee its support of any waiver that granted the Turks a beneficial tariff device. The State Department remained adamant that a possible discriminatory arrangement should not be considered, in part because it would set a precedent for other countries seeking similar consideration from the Six.

In the spirit of conciliation following Britain's decision in the summer of 1962 to join the EEC, the organization’s official negotiations with Turkey restarted on July 24, but barriers remained to be overcome. The French now lamented the precedent of the EEC’s association agreement with the Greeks and assumed the Turks viewed the prospective association as little more than a means of gaining economic aid, for fear of American cuts in financial assistance.\textsuperscript{1139} The French refused to finalize the association with Turkey before settling the issue of Britain joining the EEC. Once Britain’s entry had been resolved, then “everyone would then have to take a deep breath and start examining the consequences in terms of relations with other countries,” including Turkey.\textsuperscript{1140}

Turkey held its own lively debates regarding the EEC, including internal disagreements between Turkish officials from different departments arguing for or against EEC membership. A feud between the State Planning Organization (SPO) and the Foreign Ministry threatened to disrupt Turkey’s negotiations with the EEC. As the organization in charge of central planning, the SPO resisted economic ties to the EEC that might compromise Turkish economic

\textsuperscript{1138} Ibid.\textsuperscript{1138} \textsuperscript{1139} T 312/802, CONFIDENTIAL, R. June 29, 1962, Addressed to F.O. Telegram No. 245 Saving of 28/6, Turkey and the E.E.C.\textsuperscript{1140} Ibid.
development. Instead, the SPO preferred to oversee a massive development program independent of European investments to jumpstart the Turkish economy.\textsuperscript{1141} The Turkish Foreign Ministry argued that such development would be impossible without the support of the EEC and contended that the SPO clung to an archaic neo-Ottoman perspective that violated the modernizing spirit of Kemalism. Unable to arbitrate the competing views among its own leaders, the Turkish government could not provide the EEC with a consistent collection of proposals and requests needed to determine Turkey’s membership. At the same time the provisional government needed to be viewed by the Turkish people as making tangible progress towards a closer association with the EEC.\textsuperscript{1142}

The Six and Turkey continued to hammer out an agreement that would provide for a “pre-association” or preparatory period of 6½ years, during which the EEC would provide preference to Turkish raisins and tobacco. At the conclusion of this period, if the Council of Association agreed, a transitional period would commence, after which Turkey would become an associate member and eventually a full associate in the EEC customs union. Due to Turkey’s weak economy the ECC intended to provide Ankara with an association that would protect Turkish exports from the possibly discriminatory impact of its earlier accord with Athens, as well as GATT.\textsuperscript{1143} Before the EEC moved forward it requested that the U.S. promise to recognize a GATT waiver for favored tariff arrangements for Turkish raisins and tobacco.\textsuperscript{1144} This placed the U.S. in an awkward position. In principle, the U.S. supported Turkey’s closer association with the EEC, but it did not approve of “preferential solutions” such as preferences.

\textsuperscript{1142} T 312/802, TURKEY, (J.E. Galsworthy) DISTRIBUTION:/CONFIDENTIAL, (date unknown).
for Turkish raisins and tobacco. Washington requested the Six provide it with background information on and the reasons for the desired agreement before rendering a decision. This left the Americans against their tariffs proposal, the British uncommitted, and the French voicing their support of the Turks seeking action under GATT. Washington officials still resisted becoming formal participants in the ongoing negotiations, and any meetings between U.S. and Turkish officials regarding the negotiations concentrated on the political rather than the economic developments. Washington impressed upon the Turks that it did not discriminate between Greece and Turkey in the EEC, and supported Turkey’s association with the EEC so long as it conformed to GATT.

On November 13, 1962 the EEC Council met with State Department officials to discuss future financial assistance to Turkey and the preferential quotas for raisins and tobacco during the pre-accession period, a topic the U.S. still refused to consider. At the start of the following month ambassadors of the EEC representing the Belgian, French, German and Italian embassies presented the proposed agreement to the State Department. The European representatives requested that the U.S. willingly grant GATT Article XXIV: 10, a waiver to allow for a proviso in the association agreement allowing Turkey its desired preferential tariff quotas for raisins and tobacco. The Europeans echoed American sentiments that stronger political ties needed to bind Turkey to the West, but could not guarantee that the EEC-Turkey

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1145 Ibid.
agreement would resemble the one it had with Greece. They seemed unconcerned with the
potential violation of GATT, particularly since the rules of GATT had yet to be rigorously
enforced.1149 State Department officials agreed with the Europeans on the desire for closer
relations between Turkey and the U.S. and Europe, but the proposals on Turkish raisins and
tobacco remained sources of economic and political concern, particularly in regards to peripheral
nations such as those in Central Europe, which might seek similar concessions violating the
GATT, as well as the possible impact it might have on future negotiations between the U.S. and
the EEC, since preferences for these two commodities might seem to be at the expense of
America. The Europeans parried these contentions by pointing out that American and Turkish
tobaccos were not in direct competition, and that the agreement with Turkey would be a singular
one, primarily because of Turkey’s strong ties to Europe.1150 The Americans offered any and all
assistance to the EEC in reaching a solution amenable to all. After meeting with the Europeans,
the State Department officials convened with officials of the Turkish Embassy to discuss the
American reply to the EEC. The Americans expressed their frustration with being asked to make
difficult and important decisions with little available information, and concern that by opposing
preferences to key Turkish exports the U.S. seemed to be the obstructing the negotiations and
preventing Turkey from joining the EEC.1151

*Settling the Remaining Issues*

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1149 NEA – Mr. Talbot, NEA – James N. Cortada, Meeting with Europeans on Turkish Association with the
EEC (December 1, 1962) Record Group 496: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-61, Office of
African & European Operations, Regional Organizations Staff, Records Relating to Regional Development
Programs, 1951-60.

1150 Ibid.

with the EEC (December 5, 1962) Record Group 496: Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-61, Office
of African & European Operations, Regional Organizations Staff, Records Relating to Regional Development
Programs, 1951-60. NEA – Mr. Talbot, NEA – James N. Cortada, Conversation with Turkish Representatives
Concerning Turkish EEC Association (December 1, 1962) Record Group 496: Records of the US Foreign
Assistance Agencies, 1948-61, Office of African & European Operations, Regional Organizations Staff, Records
Relating to Regional Development Programs, 1951-60.
From January 14-21, 1963 an additional round of negotiations between the EEC Commission and the Turkish Delegation took place. The Turks surprised the Commission by presenting a draft text for an agreement the Commission ultimately dismissed as unrealistic, although it provided evidence of Turkey coming closer to the Commission’s expectations. The meetings concluded with the Commission promising to submit a report on the status of negotiations for review and discussion by the EEC Council on February 11. Both Turkey and the EEC now agreed in principle with the basic outline of the Association Agreement. During a preparatory period the EEC would reduce its tariffs for designated Turkish products and provide financial aid. A general lowering of tariffs would occur at the start of the transitional period and conclude with the establishment of a customs union. The French sought to make any references to the customs union as unclear as possible but could not overcome the protests of the over Five for setting a date for the creation of the customs union.

Dissent in the EEC did not end there. Both the French and the Italians advocated providing Turkey with financial aid rather than tariff advantages, the French because of their colonial possessions and the Italians because of the potential competition between Turkish and Italian exports. Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands supported the creation of organic links rather than financial aid. Turkey and the EEC’s last major point of divergence was the list of Turkish goods the EEC would grant tariff reductions to during the preparatory phase. The Commission agreed to Turkey’s requests for tobacco and cigarettes but had yet to decide on figs, citrus fruits and other products. Even if the EEC agreed to all of the Turks’ demands, the list of

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1152 T 312/802, (1164/1/1/63) CONFIDENTIAL, TURKEY AND THE EEC (N.J. Barrington).

1153 Unlike the agreement with Greece, which did not include a preparatory stage and fixed the transitional period for specific products at 22 years, the Turks might encounter multiple preparatory stages until the EEC was satisfied and were not given a set number of years for the transitional period. These vagaries would plague Turkey over the coming decades and allow the EEC to demand continual stipulations and adjustments until full membership would be granted. As of the writing of this, that has not yet transpired.

1154 T 312/802, (1164/1/1/63) CONFIDENTIAL, TURKEY AND THE EEC (N.J. Barrington).
goods would still need to be approved in GATT and this would be impossible without consent from the U.S. The Americans continued to make their opposition on the possible tariffs quite clear, but the Six hoped that Washington might be persuaded by the Six to agree if the political benefits were made clear. The British predicted any damage to American trade the trade arrangements might cause would be paltry.\textsuperscript{1155}

Such concerns seemed moot while the EEC’s negotiations with Britain remained unresolved; the Belgians, for one, would not consider moving forward with the Council’s agreements with Turkey until the EEC and Britain reached a resolution.\textsuperscript{1156} The breakdown in negotiations between Britain and the EEC, masterminded by French President de Gaulle in early 1963, garnered a substantial amount of coverage in the Turkish press, most of it sympathetic to Britain. The Turks would be left with little incentive to join if the EEC evolved into a “private club” that forbade American involvement in the defense of Europe, a role Turkey considered to be of the utmost importance. Turkish commentators criticized de Gaulle for refusing to reveal his reasons for barring the U.K. from the Common Market. To Ankara the General seemed to suffer from delusions of grandeur for believing himself “strong enough to alter the course of history which demands Britain’s entry into Europe.”\textsuperscript{1157} The gentlemen of Turkish Government were not quite so resolute in their analysis as the gentlemen of the Turkish press. Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed unsure of the full implications of the situation and asked the U.S. Mission for their opinion, though not the British. It remained to be seen if Turkey conformed to de Gaulle’s scheme more readily than the U.K.\textsuperscript{1158}

\textsuperscript{1155} T 312/802, (1164/1/4/63) CONFIDENTIAL, Letter to R. Burges-Watson, Esq., E.E.C. Department, FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1. (March 8, 1963).
\textsuperscript{1156} T 312/802, (1164/1/1/63) CONFIDENTIAL, TURKEY AND THE EEC (N.J. Barrington).
\textsuperscript{1157} T 312/802, By Bag, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION, Mr. Man, No.8 Saving, February 7, 1963, R. February 8, 1963, CONFIDENTIAL, Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 8 Saving of February 7. Repeated for information Saving to: Washington, Paris, Bonn, UKDEL Brussels, Istanbul.
\textsuperscript{1158} Ibid.
At the start of March the Turks had their answer. The EEC Commission produced a renewed mandate to move ahead with its discussions with the Turks and announced that the commercial aspects of the Agreement were close to being finalized. Despite their current entanglements with the EEC, the British did not wish to see the signing of the Agreement delayed, nor did it appear that Turkey’s association with the Common Market would pose any direct challenge to Britain’s interests as an member of the EEC or not. In April the EEC Commission received a mandate to continue its talks with the Turkish delegation, although a final decision on financial aid would not be determined until May. The EEC decided to extend Turkey preferential quotas for tobacco and raisins during the preparatory stage, but had yet to determine the size of the quotas. The expected quota would be somewhere between 12,000 tons, the average Turkish exports to the Community between 1960 and 1962, and 17,000 tons, the amount requested by the Turks. Due to objections from the Italians the EEC failed to agree to reductions in the Common External Tariff on dried figs and nuts and decided against assisting Turkey with six other minor exports. In regards to financial aid, the Six started out using the $125 million offered to Greece as the basis for the sum intended for Turkey until German protests led to an additional $25 million. The Turks hoped for EEC funds for vocational training and assistance with expert advice.

The British delegation in Brussels observing the finalization of the Ankara Agreement wondered if the Turks would be granted any control over EEC policy on specific products such as the Greeks had received. If this proved the case, it might impact the exports of some members

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1159 T 312/802, CONFIDENTIAL, ASSOCIATION OF TURKEY WITH E.E.C. (date unknown). Any concerns the British harbored about Turkey associating with the EEC related to the possible harm done to the commercial interest of members of the British Commonwealth, specifically Australia and Rhodesia. Turkish tobacco might impact Rhodesian tobacco and Turkish sultanas might undermine Australia’s export of the fruits.  
1160 FO 371/171408, CONFIDENTIAL, INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM, FROM BRUSSELS TO FOREIGN OFFICE, (United Kingdom Delegation) By Bag, EUROPEAN (GENERAL) DISTRIBUTION, Sir A. Tandy, No. 30 Saving, April 25, 1963, R: April 26, 1963, CONFIDENTIAL, GILL.  
1161 Ibid.
of the Commonwealth, specifically Rhodesian tobacco and Australian sultanas. At a Council of Ministers on May 9 the EEC decided against offering a right of veto to the Turks; it seemed “the Turks have been bought with cash rather than with restrictive trading arrangements.” Most of the outstanding questions regarding the Turkish negotiations came to be answered at the May 9 meeting, including financial aid levels, which the Council agreed to set at $175 million, the amount suggested by the Germans (to the other EEC members’ chagrin) and more than the Greeks received (to the Turks’ delight). The sum included both long-term loans from the EIB and technical aid. Germany would put up one-third of the amount, France another third, Italy 18% and the remaining amount divided among the other three nations. The Council also finalized the tariff measures to offer the Turks during the preparatory period with 32,000 tons for raisins and 11,500 tons for tobacco. Italy relented and agreed on offering tariff quotas for hazelnuts and dried figs to the Turks, set at 13,000 and 17,000 tons respectively. The proposed arrangements seemed generous to the British delegation in Brussels, showing that the Germans had managed to wring some concessions from the French. The second round of negotiations with the Turks would begin shortly on May 16 and hopefully concluded before the summer break in July.

This proved to be unfeasible. When the Turks detected the EEC’s anxiousness to finalize the agreement before the summer break they took the opportunity to ask for concessions on more products and larger quotas above the initial offer. Instead of being grateful for the proposition, the Turks “treated the Community’s offer as an initial negotiating position and

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1163 FO 371/171408, CONFIDENTIAL, INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM, FROM BRUSSELS TO FOREIGN OFFICE, (United Kingdom Delegation) By Bag, EUROPEAN (GENERAL) DISTRIBUTION, Mr. Galsworthy, No. 39 Saving, May 14, 1963, R: May 14, 1963, CONFIDENTIAL, GILL.
1164 Ibid.
pressed hard for more,” specifically increases in the tariff quotas. These requests only succeeded in squandering much of the EEC’s goodwill, particularly the Germans who had repeatedly stood up to the other five on behalf of the Turks. The negotiations dragged into the end of May, forcing the Commission to seek another mandate from the Council. British observers speculated the Turks’ move may have been driven by political factors, specifically “justifying their own existence and in striking a hard bargain for presentational reasons at home.”

Greece did not make matters any easier for the EEC by fussing over what it considered to be overly generous terms for the 28,000 ton quota on Turkish raisins at an EEC-Greece Council of Association meeting held on May 30, an amount already reduced from the 32,000 tons initially sought by Turkey. The EEC agreed to raise the Turkish tobacco quota to 12,250 tons leaving only the question of technical assistance to be answered; if the Turks agreed to the proposed amount of $175 million, the EEC hoped to have the Agreement of Association signed in July.

With the association between Turkey and the EEC nearing a final settlement, the British debated whether or not to toss a wrench into the slowly turning gears by supporting the Australians in their efforts to challenge the proposed quotas in GATT. If the British agreed to support Australia’s opposition, technically justified or not, would be viewed in Brussels “as an anti-Community move, and would, in particular, upset the Germans who have been throughout the sponsors of the Turks. In fact it would unite the Community against us (which would delight the French) and would presumably not endear us to the Turks.” The Australians did not care for what they considered to be preferential arrangements for the preparatory stage outlined in the


1167 Ibid.

proposed agreements. This view mirrored earlier American complaints, but the British could not
read Washington’s current position. On May 30 the Americans made a demarche about the
proposed agreements in Ankara, insisting the Turks not request preferences on more than four
products already agreed with the EEC and not seek larger quotas for these products. Should the
Turks continue to push for more concessions the U.S. warned it would be likely to come down
on them in GATT. The British hypothesized that “when the time came they would be unlikely
for the sake of their relations with Turkey, to get up in public and oppose closer relations
between Turkey and the E.E.C.”1169 Rather than threatening the Turks, the Americans implicitly
 supported the Turkish requests for the four products already agreed upon in the proposed
agreements, thus forcing the Turks to stop pressing for more concessions from the EEC. With
the Americans adopting a softer line with the Turks in GATT, London decided against
supporting the Australians in protesting to the EEC.1170 The path for Turkey at last seemed clear.

*Signing the Ankara Agreement*

On September 12, 1963 the Foreign Ministers of the Six and Turkey signed the final
version of the long-gestating association agreement between the EEC and Turkey, the Ankara
Agreement. Officials from Western Europe congregated in the Grand National Assembly
building in Ankara to hear speeches by Foreign Minister Erkin and EEC Commission President
Walter Hallstein. Erkin hailed the agreement as a landmark that signaled the “European vocation
of Europe.” Four years of negotiation and “persistent knocking” culminated in Turkey’s partial
membership into a European club. The event garnered little attention in the European press, but
provided a potent justification for the Turks’ economic and political identity as a European

1169 Ibid.
1170 Ibid.
nation. The agreement provided the Turks with further pleasure by granting terms no less favorable than its Greek rival. The British delegation forecast that Turkey, with its a larger overall economy and population, would prove to be a more important economic partner for the Six than Greece. For both the EEC and the Turks, the reasons behind their signing the treaty remained largely political. The agreement represented yet another step in Turkey’s process towards being accepted as a distinctly European nation independent of the United States; and to Europe, further linking itself to Turkey afforded it an ever greater presence in the Mediterranean from which it could help keep the peace between Greece and Turkey.

The Turkish government hoped that the Association Agreement would give it greater international cachet to attract foreign investments to fund its massive $1.25 billion development plan for 1964, a plan that included over one hundred major developments. Furthermore, Turkey hoped that its position in the EEC would permit it certain latitude in determining the organization’s duties, tariffs, and other trading restrictions.

The end result, associate member status, proved most unsatisfactory to Turkey, which assumed the Ankara Agreement meant Turkey being treated as an equal. Ankara expected the

1171 FO 371/171408, M 10822/19. RESTRICTED, No. 69 (E), (11317/33) BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA. Letter to The Right Honorable, The Earl of Home, etc., etc., etc. from Denis Allen, (September 13, 1963). Shortly after the signing of the Ankara Agreement the Working Party on EEC/Turkey in GATT finished its report on the agreement. Its conclusions were nearly identical with those reached regarding Greece’s association with the EEC in 1962. Ironically, the Greeks came out with the strongest objections. They and India drew attention to the provision of a time-table for the preparatory stage only while the plan and agenda of the transitional stage was to be determined at a later date, allowing the Turks to prolong the move to the transitional stage indefinitely while still reaping the benefits of what the Indians described as “limited preferential treatment on a non-reciprocal basis for a sufficiently long number of years.” The EEC went to great lengths to downplay the “abnormal features” of the Ankara Agreement and contend that it conformed to the requirements of the GATT, but encountered no shortage of hostility as it did so. T312/802, CONFIDENTIAL: INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM FROM GENEVA TO FOREIGN OFFICE (U.K. Delegation to G.A.T.T.) By Bag, Mr. Baker, INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISTRIBUTION, No. 174 Saving. September 25, 1964, R: September 29, 1964, CONFIDENTIAL NEUTRAL.

1172 FO 371/171408, European Economic Community, Official Spokesman of the Commission, September 1963, P-34/63, INFORMATION MEMO: ASSOCIATION OF TURKEY WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

1173 Emile Noel “Relations Between the Community and Turkey” Osman Okyar and Okan H. Aktan, eds. Economic Relations Between Turkey and the EEC: Proceedings of a Seminar held in Antalya on October 11-14, 1976 (Hacettepe Institute for Economic and Social Research on Turkey and the Middle East): 1.
Agreement to promote Turkey’s economic integration with the EEC, permit the unimpeded movement of Turkish workers in member countries, and encourage closer bonds between Turkey and Western Europe.\footnote{LaGro and Jørgensen 4.} The 1963 Agreement specified the determination of the EEC and Turkey “to establish ever closer bonds between the Turkish people and the peoples brought together by in the European Economic Community.”\footnote{“Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey” Official Journal of the European Communities No. L/361 (12-31-1977): 1.} Article two specified the purpose of the Agreement “is to promote the continuous and balancing strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure the accelerated development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and the living conditions of the Turkish people.”\footnote{Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey 5.} The agreement envisaged three phases that would lead to the establishment of a customs union: the preparatory, the transitional, and the final. Expected to last at least five years, during the preparatory phase Turkey would bolster its weak economy so that it would be more capable of assuming the duties that came with a full membership. To this end, articles from the agreement’s financial protocol opened tariff quotas favoring the exportation of specific Turkish agricultural exports, specifically unprocessed tobacco, dried grapes, dried figs, and nuts.\footnote{Ibid. 19-20.} Though it protested this preferential component of the proposed agreement and its commercial impact of the preference, Washington acknowledged the political repercussions of continuing resistance and at last relented.\footnote{ELEVENTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION, Karachi, April 30-May 1, 1963, Background Paper; Political-Economic Situation in Turkey.} The financial protocol also provided the framework for the Turkish government to apply for financial aid through the EIB, and stipulated that Turkey be eligible for 175 million units of account during the first five years.
after the agreement.\textsuperscript{1179} Four years after the signing of the Agreement, the Council of
Association would assess Turkey’s economic situation and whether or not it could continue the
accession process.

The interpretation that Europeans and Turks developed regarding the meaning of the
Ankara Agreement remains largely incompatible. Whereas officials of the Turkish government
“cited it like a piece of scripture,” a document tantamount to an agreement for full membership,
Europeans remained unaware (or dismissive) of the Turks’ reverence for the Ankara
Agreement.\textsuperscript{1180} From the perspective of the EC an association agreement meant a fractional
membership, entailing certain economic privileges such as tariffs on Turkish exports. Turkey
lacked voting rights in the EC Council, and therefore could do little to shape EC policy.\textsuperscript{1181} This
has long been the case; the Turks perhaps recognized the significance of economic integration as
a source for political and social change long before Europe, just as they viewed NATO
membership as more than simply belonging to a security organization.\textsuperscript{1182}

\textit{Conclusion}

During the early 1960s the Turkish political environment grew increasingly contentious
and combative. Many Turks, no doubt, longed for the relative simplicity of the days of single-
party rule under Atatürk. The coup of May 1960 did not mark the return of the RPP as the
dominant party, as some initially feared, nor did it indicate a simplification of the political
struggles that preceded it. The Turkish military, to its credit, did the best it could as a typically
apolitical organization to restore Turkey to the sort of civilian government envisioned by Atatürk
had designed. It directed its efforts as various factions competed for power and ultimately

\textsuperscript{1179} Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey 24.
\textsuperscript{1180} Robins 105-106.
\textsuperscript{1181} Hine 141.
\textsuperscript{1182} Akçapar 8.
assembled a collation government held together primarily because of the collective fears of more violence and a possibly another coup. With Turkey in such a delicate condition the CNU’s ability to maintain close ties with the U.S. and to direct Turkey’s towards membership in the EEC proved it could maintain critical diplomatic relationships, and at the same time move forward in efforts that would bring Turkey closer to Western Europe and make it less reliant upon the U.S. Turkish membership in the EEC embodied precisely the sort of progress Washington had encouraged since the Truman administration. While it indicated the potential for increasing political and economic closeness between Turkey and Europe that might allow the U.S. to reduce the scale of its financial commitments to the Turks, Turkey continued to view the U.S. as its most stalwart advocate and protector. It would take the combined shock of a series of international crises in the coming years to bring about a Turkish crisis of faith and wonder if its esteem in the U.S. had become misplaced.
CHAPTER VII. HOSTAGES TO THE PAST: 1961-1964

Introduction

Early 1961 found Turkey and the U.S. with new executive branches at the helm, each taking stock of the domestic and international environments and plotting the most appropriate course. The next three years would be rife with political upheavals in both countries, fraught with tension and misunderstandings that culminated in rather strained relations between Ankara and Washington. In Turkey the CNU kangaroo court concluded its trial of Menderes and several of his supporters with the handing down of death sentences to the former president and his closest advisers. The military government made good on its promise to restore free elections while straining to hold together a series of fragile coalition governments. The younger and more disgruntled officers in the Turkish military remained a constant threat with the more extremist members forming secret cabals to remove the CNU from power and replace it with a new military regime willing to direct political and economic reforms more forcefully. America found itself having to deal with national turbulence of its own, brought about by a resumption of tension with the Soviets over downed U.S. spy planes, the fate of Berlin, and missiles in Cuba, and a domestic tragedy: the killing of President Kennedy in late 1963. The Turkish provisional government’s various struggles to remain in power affected its relations with the U.S., just as the changes in Washington brought about either by elections or assassination altered its dealings with the Turks. The only certainty of the 1960s was the presence of uncertainty.

Tense cold war standoffs in the international arena thrust Turkey into a potential crossfire between the U.S. and Russia on two occasions and encouraged a greater number of Turks to reassess American military facilities in Turkey as being more of a liability than an asset. The first crisis occurred in 1960 when the Soviets shot down a U-2 spy plane housed at a secret
NATO air base in Turkey. A second, tenser predicament took place two years later over the construction of Soviet missile facilities in Cuba shone a spotlight on similar weapons systems built by the U.S. in Turkey. The Kennedy administration’s decision to remove the missiles from Turkey without the Turks’ input in the decision or even knowledge of the resolution ended in a reconsideration of Turkey’s relations with the U.S. and the possible dangers the alliance promoted. Half-hearted efforts by American officials to replace the missiles with a comparable defense system ended in further Turkish dissatisfaction with the conduct of the U.S. and the realization that Washington regarded Turkey as a disposable ally it could dismiss without its consultation.

Festering conditions on Cyprus widened the lengthening cracks between Turkey and the U.S. An administrative and legal structure essentially designed to fail doomed Cyprus was to experience a revival of violence between the Turkish and Greek-Cypriot communities. In late 1963, following several years of relative calm, hostilities renewed, as did Turkey’s commitment to protect the Turkish-Cypriots by invading the island if necessary. An invasion would invariably lead to a war between Greece and Turkey and then a weakening and potential disintegration of NATO’s southeastern flank. To bypass such an eventuality the Johnson administration warned Turkey that should the Soviets take advantage of the situation to project power into the Mediterranean would not result in any action on NATO’s part. This warning had its intended effect of discouraging Turkey from considering an invasion of Cyprus but also drove home the point that the Turks, even as staunch members of NATO and supporters of American policy, could no longer count on the U.S. The honeymoon period of U.S.-Turkish relations was clearly at an end.
Conclusion of the Trials at Yassi Ada Trials

President John F. Kennedy entered the White House in early 1961 with post-coup still planning a restoration of multiparty politics with free elections scheduled for the autumn. Turkish Foreign Minister Selim Sarper assured the U.S. Embassy that Turkey’s position on the Soviets remained fundamentally unchanged, that Turkey would “be no more and no less friendly toward the USSR than the West.” Toward the U.S. the provisional government showed more backbone than the Menderes government by insisting upon a renegotiation of the Military Facilities Agreement (MFA) provision obligating Turkey to provide the U.S. with land for military projects, including missile installations. American officials intended the MFA to maximize Turkish and American assets in the cause of mutual security, and the Kennedy White House impressed upon Sarper the importance of the MFA in the ongoing IRBM project, which U.S. officials had spoken of canceling months earlier for fear of its obsolescence. Emboldened Ankara refused to grant the U.S. access to a site at Elmadag to construct a tropospheric scatter system until a new and more favorable agreement could be reached. The provisional government also formally requested an alteration to the issuance of duty arrangements that would shift final determination from CHJUSMMAT to the Turkish Ministry of Justice and provide the Turks with more legal control over Americans stationed in their country.


1185 Ibid. The proposal called for the U.S. Forces in Turkey to determine whether or not an offense conducted by an American serviceman “has arisen out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty” and then to submit an appropriate certificate to the Turkish court. The Turkish court would rule on the basis of the certificate, except in cases in which both governments would be required to examine the circumstances. On
In August 1961, after ten months of deliberations, the Yassi Ada trials of DP officials concluded with the final hearings before the High Court. Days before the High Court announced its sentences Menderes attempted to overdose on sleeping pills. He emerged from a coma just before the court handed down guilty verdicts to all of the former DP Deputies in the GNA on charges of violating the Constitution. Fifteen received death sentences, including Menderes, Bayar, Zorlu, former Finance Minister Polatkan, and former Chief of the Turkish General Staff General Rustu Erdelhun. The court sentenced 31 other defendants to life imprisonment, 418 to terms varying between two and 20 years, and released 128 others. While Washington opted not to formally denounce the death sentences, officials of the French and British Governments publicly condemned the verdicts as “crimes against humanity.” In response to domestic and international pressures the CNU commuted twelve of the fifteen death sentences and ultimately decided to execute only those judged guilty unanimously by the court: Menderes, Zorlu, Rustu, and Polatkan. İnönü secured a pardon for Bayar, his former nemesis, who at 78 could not be legally executed by the state. The appropriate terms of amnesty for those remaining behind bars triggered a long-running dispute between the RPP and the Turkish Justice Party (TJP). The TJP lobbied for more prisoners to be freed than the RPP would allow due to concerns that the military would reject such amnesty.

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1186 Dana Adams Schmidt “Menderes to Die; Bayar Gets Life: Turkish Court Also Dooms 2 Ex-Ministers – Junta Spared Lives of 12” New York Times (Sep. 16, 1961): 1. In addition to the expected charges for which he would be executed (inciting the revolts of 1955, threatening İnönü’s life, etc.) the provisional government charged Menderes with some lesser, more bizarre crimes, including fathering and then killing an illegitimate child and selling a dog he had received as a gift from the King of Afghanistan to a state farm for profit.

1187 It required four and a half hours to read the sentences supported by 1,600 pages of documents.


1189 Heper “İsmet İnönü: A Rationalistic Democrat” 32.

1190 CONFIDENTIAL: TURKEY.
Menderes, still recovering from his botched suicide attempt, was not yet healthy enough to die. The darkly comic phrase, “Soon he will be fit to hang” gained popularity in Istanbul before Menderes and his former cabinet members went to the gallows on September 16.\textsuperscript{1191} \textit{New York Times} columnist C. L. Sulzberger found little humor in the executions. In a September 18 column titled “The Stain of Blood in Turkey” Sulzberger postulated that the executions would introduce the “principle of blood vendetta” to Turkish politics and challenge the process of democratization.\textsuperscript{1192} Sulzberger wondered what implications the executions would have on Turkey’s Western allies “embarrassed” by the recent developments: “Whatever its faults, the defunct Government was a loyal member of NATO, which expounds democracy. Yet now some of these NATO advocates are executed for seeking to destroy democracy.”\textsuperscript{1193}

Sulzberger’s fears of a backsliding towards totalitarianism proved unfounded during the relatively calm lead-up to the parliamentary elections in October. The RPP led by İnönü looked poised to dominate the parliamentary elections by snagging most of the available 150 seats in the Senate and the 450 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.\textsuperscript{1194} A RPP blowout would mean little progress from the single party rule the coup supposedly struck down, making a viable third party

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\textsuperscript{1191} Dana Adams Schmidt “2 Menderes Aides Hanged in Turkey: Former Premier’s Execution Delayed by Suicide Try” \textit{New York Times} (Sep. 17, 1961): 42.
\textsuperscript{1193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1194} NEA – Mr. Jones, Mr. Hart, GTI – Robert G. Miner, Resignation of Turkish Cabinet (January 4, 1961) Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division. The CNU continued to function as one-half of a bicameral Constituent Assembly until January 1961 when the CNU, acting as the Senate with legislative authority, met with the House of Representatives for the first time. According to the bylaws of the Constituent Assembly, the CNU retained primacy in the government until a new civilian government could be elected. Until such time the CNU set about cleaning up the mess left in the wake of the DP, staring with the passage of a bill that allowed for a constitutional referendum. The Constituent Assembly also drafted and passed an electoral law establishing the legal requirements for the parliamentary elections set for October 29. In July the public referendum passed, allowing for a new Turkish Constitution founded on democratic principles to go into effect. “America’s Tragedy” The Files of Robert G. Barnes (June 15, 1960). Turkey (December 28, 1960).
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from the remnants of the DP a necessity. Newly created parties, including the Republican Nation Party (RNP), the New Turkey Party (NTP), and the Turkish Justice Party (TJP) lacked the groundswell of support enjoyed by the RPP, but could become part of a coalition government to foil the political dissent a RPP sweep might bring. With the military watching them closely candidates from the various parties quietly campaigned and scavenged for the support of former DP supporters. Turkish cities remained free of the usual banners and posters that traditionally accompanied campaigns and Istanbul did not host any major rallies until the days just before the elections. Candidates were forbidden from criticizing Gürsel’s junta or mentioning the recent trials and executions for fear that such talk might compromise the country’s security.

The Return of Free Elections and Coup Threats

On Sunday, October 15, 1961 the CNU at last presided over the long-promised free elections of a parliamentary democracy. When none of the four main parties secured a controlling majority in either the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies, the GNA had no choice but to create a coalition government. Leaders of the four parties initially refused to support a four-party coalition proposed by Gürsel until İnönü relented. Shortly thereafter the remaining three party leaders formally pledged to assist in the formation of a new civilian government.

The four parties supported Gürsel by agreeing not altering any of the laws passed by the CNU during the previous 17 months, particularly those regarding the release of the former members of the Menderes Government still behind bars. As expected, the new GNA overwhelmingly

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elected Gürsel President on October 25 with 434 votes to 173 and İnönü became Prime Minister. As a sign of the shift from military to civilian rule Gürsel eschewed his usual uniform for a black business suit when taking the oath of office.\textsuperscript{1200} It remained to be seen if Gürsel’s costume change indicated a sincere commitment to democratization and a dismantling of the military regime, particularly with many members of the now defunct CNU sitting in the Parliament and Senate.\textsuperscript{1201}

İnönü assembled the delicate coalition with cabinet members drawn from the RPP and the Justice Party, united by a shared sense of loyalty to Turkey and fear of another coup.\textsuperscript{1202} İnönü influence also helped greatly in holding the coalition government together during the democratization and unification process.\textsuperscript{1203} His presence would be crucial from the start, as disagreements threatened to tear the coalition apart just as it was coming together, specifically over amnesty for political prisoners. The RPP wearied of the JP’s more radical members supporting an offer of general pardons to members of the Menderes government. The RPP countered that such a reprieve would damage the prestige of the coalition government and on February 1962 the Turkish Government ousted six of the more extreme JP deputies.\textsuperscript{1204} This ousting occurred just as rumors surfaced of several military officers stationed in Ankara planning

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1202} UNCLASSIFIED. Greece, Iran, Turkey and Cyprus Briefing, date unknown, Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.
\item \textsuperscript{1203} Most Turks wanted guarantees that the military would remain permanently outside of government, but İnönü continued to bend to the army’s will, ever mindful of the fact that their support gave him strength.
\item \textsuperscript{1204} TO: NEA – Philips Talbot, FROM: OTI – Robert G. Miner (May 31, 1962) Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division. The fact that, by and large, the military stood alongside the coalition during the failed coup provided optimism concerning the loyalty of senior Turkish commanders. How sincere such loyalty was remained unknown; the senior commanders may have stood up to the upstarts in the lower ranks out of a sense of self-preservation rather than devotion to their Prime Minister. But for many senior officers, particularly those of a certain age, İnönü was the only prominent and active embodiment of the Kemalist legend, making him all the more worthy of respect. Also, the military’s higher echelons did not look back on its running the country through the CNU with great fondness; most senior officers wished to return to the business of soldiering and allow İnönü to run the country, provided he did not run it off the road. Commentary by Nuri Eren.
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a coup.  

1205 Thankfully, the supposed plot lost any chance of succeeding once the Armed Forces reasserted its loyalty to the coalition government, but American officials worried that the lack of cohesion within the military might allow for a repeat of May 1960.  

1206 The intricate divisions within the three branches and between senior and field grade officers threatened to destroy any sense of unity within the Turkish military and in turn “seriously weaken both the political and the military strength of a key ally.”  

1207 In smashing the Ankara group, according to a Turkish Senator, the government “has halted plots, strengthened itself” and eliminated the possibility of a “recurrent threat.” Most senior Turkish officers remained loyal to the new government and the principles of the coup of 1960 if anxious for the civilian government to address the country’s economic and social problems.

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1205 CONFIDENTIAL: TURKEY. Chief of the Turkish General Staff Cevdet Sunay attempted to deter the plotters before the coup by removing key officers from their posts the day before and warning suspected leaders in the plot to call of their plans and remember their loyalty to the state. His efforts failed when two of them, Commandant Harb Olulu and Colonel Aydemik, refused to relinquish their commands. They returned to their posts and began to berate cadets from the Military Academy and the Armor School into action. Soon after, cadets from the Signal and Gendarmerie Schools joined the ranks of the rebels. A third coup leader, Colonel Surek, organized tanks, soldiers and cadets to launch a two-pronged attack against key government buildings. In an ironic twist of fate, the coup of 1960 led to the coalition government’s decision to improve the defenses of the Parliament and other buildings in the event of a similar event.  

1206 TO: The Secretary, THROUGH: S/S, FROM: INR- Roger Hilsman, INTELLIGENCE NOTE: COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY (February 22, 1962) Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division. On Thursday February 22, 69 junior and middle grade officers and students of the Military Academy and other Ankara-based military schools attempted to overthrow the collation government in response to the state’s growing intolerance for dissent in the military and the JP and its failure to solve the country’s socio-economic problems. One Lieutenant attached to the Ankara Military Academy was shot dead by a captain on the 23rd and a one enlisted man was wounded by a ricocheting bullet.  

1207 Confidential Message, Department of the Army, 260800Z FEB 62.  

1208 Ibid.  

The coup attempt raised some concerns regarding how another military takeover might impact the security of American weapons systems in Turkey.\textsuperscript{1210} U.S. officials reasoned that if the military did seize control and install an authoritarian government, it would likely maintain Turkey’s connections NATO and the U.S. The new junta might be more difficult for the U.S. to negotiate with and more anti-Soviet than previous governments, but the State Department concluded that “even such circumstances the U.S. would be able to maintain measures to ensure against unilateral Turkish operation of the Jupiter weapons system,” although a second takeover “would completely undermine the present military hierarchy and perhaps even endanger the effectiveness of the Turkish armed forces as a military instrument.”\textsuperscript{1211} Because of the uncertainties of rule the coalition government made doubly sure that U.S.-Turkish relations remained as amiable as possible.\textsuperscript{1212} In both private and public settings İnönü emphasized the need to maintain close relations with the United States and actively involved in NATO. Gürsel

\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{1210} UNCLASSIFIED. Greece, Iran, Turkey and Cyprus Briefing, date unknown.
\textsuperscript{1211} Turkish Government Stability and JUPITER Control (2/27/60) Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.
\textsuperscript{1212} Turkey had some concerns when it came to America’s loyalty to the coalition government. Shortly before the failed coup at an informal meeting with Embassy official K.G. Barnes, Foreign Minister Selim Sarper asked if he might confirm rumors of the U.S. Embassy conspiring with the Turkish military to undermine the civilian government. Barnes vigorously denied the claims and maintained that U.S. policy clearly reflected Washington’s desire for a strong and stable civilian government. Sarper referred cryptically to “the junta,” a residual mindset of the CNU, rather than a well-defined organization of military officers, that did not believe in the ability of a civilian government to carry out basic reforms. Sarper’s list of suspects included various Commandants and Commanders in the Turkish Army and Gendarmerie. FOR THE FILES, K.G. Barnes, Foreign Minister Sarper’s Call on the Ambassador (January 23, 1962) Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division. Prevention of a small-scale or international war remained the principal American policy objective in the short-term, and Washington wished to impress that fact upon the İnönü government, as well as “any other government that is likely to succeed it.” This meant that it behooved the U.S. to maintain acrimonious relations with both the coalition government and the military in the event of another coup. Letter to Oliver M. Marcy, Esquire from Robert G. Barnes (February 5, 1962) Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.
used the ongoing instability as a pretext to request the U.S. ramp up its long-term financial support of the coalition government to help guarantee Turkey’s stability.\textsuperscript{1213}

Gürsel and İnönü had good reason to not wholly trust elements of the Turkish military. Some members of the Turkish top brass refrained from condemning the foiled plot while other officers spoke ominously and openly of undertaking another coup attempt in the near future.\textsuperscript{1214} İnönü remained in close contact with the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, the Service Chiefs and the Senior Commanders who, in turn, pledged their support. But the high command was not immune to the junior and middle rank officers’ growing impatience with the coalition government’s slowness to set aside its differences and bring about badly needed political and economic reforms.\textsuperscript{1215} İnönü worked his charisma overtime to convince the most conservative members of the RPP to sit down with the most radical representatives of the JP and resolve their differences so as to discredit the coup’s organizers.\textsuperscript{1216} His words of reassurance did not match the RPP/JP coalition cabinet’s ongoing fight over the terms and schedule of an amnesty for the 400 political prisoners. The JP remained committed to a more general amnesty than İnönü and

\textsuperscript{1213} Walz "Turkey Seeking Massive U.S. Aid: Gursel Says Civilian Regime Is Striving for Stability" \textit{New York Times} (Apr. 13, 1962): 3. The Turkish Government hosted a symposium in Ankara from May 18-22 attended by governmental representatives from Western European countries, the U.S., the IBRD and other organizations in order to promote its progress. Turkish officials presented and discussed the methodology utilized to put the five year plan together and analyzing the types of governmental policies required in order to implement the plan successfully. Many foreigners at the conference expressed incredulity with Turkish forecasts for a 7% annual growth rate, but most were impressed by the professionalism and competence of the Turkish planners. Satisfied with what they learned in Ankara, the U.S. delegation to the OECD returned with its report on the Turkish development plan to be reviewed in early June by the Economic and Development Review Committee (EDR) of the OECD. During a later session Turkish planning officials would be in attendance to field questions and assist in the completion of a draft report that would go before the OECD Council on July 1. This would occur two weeks before the final form of the Five Year Plan would be submitted to the Turkish Cabinet and then the Parliament a few weeks later. Memorandum of Conversation (May 24, 1962) Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.

\textsuperscript{1214} Department of External Affairs Summary, OF: Ankara letter No. 186 of March 28, 1962, Subject: The Government and the Army since the February Crisis, Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance, Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1215} VICE-PRESIDENT’S Agencies 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.

\textsuperscript{1216} Ibid.
his RPP supporters would allow. In reaction to the toxic political climate İnönü tendered his resignation as prime minister to Gürsel on May 31, 1962. Two days later Gürsel managed to convince İnönü to stay on and form a new government. Washington worried that the military might attempt another takeover if another coalition government could not be formed in a timely manner. When İnönü attempted to step down, it served as a wake-up call for the RPP to continue to stand as the responsible source of authority in the country. İnönü’s resignation had the opposite effect on the Justice Party, deepening the divide between moderates and the extremists who each blamed the other for the coalition’s collapse. Uncertainty and stubbornness trickled down to the GNA whose dissatisfaction made it nearly impossible to muster the necessary parliamentary support to make any progress.

News in June of yet another possible coup gave greater urgency to İnönü’s efforts to create a new coalition cabinet, this time comprised of the RPP, the Peasants-Nation Party, and the New Turkey Party. He came close to bringing together the three parties on June 19 until the participants failed to resolve how to fairly divide the ministries. The beleaguered İnönü attempted once more to hand in his resignation; once more Gürsel refused to accept it. In a radio address on the evening of June 21 Gürsel assured his countrymen that the formation of a new

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1221 CONFIDENTIAL: TURKEY.
coalition cabinet would be concluded shortly. On June 25 came the formal announcement of a new coalition formed by ministers from the RPP, the NTP, the JP and the Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP), one more cohesive than its predecessor once the coalition agreed to a solution to the amnesty issue. On October 18, 1962, with little fanfare, the state released 258 incarcerated officials of the deposed Menderes government. Angry student protestors took to the streets of Ankara to show their disgust with the measure, while the JP insisted on the release of the remaining prisoners. On February 23 the Turkish Senate granted general amnesty to 41 nonpolitical prisoners sentenced after the 1960 Revolution, although other prisoners, including Bayar, remained incarcerated, but the amnesty issue appeared resolved to everyone’s relative satisfaction.

With the new coalition government at last in place the High Planning Council put the final touches on a Five Year Development Plan and the GNA passed reforms on SEEs and tax hikes required to ensure the plan’s success. The final plan included measures to encourage the private sector and reform state enterprises by providing management with more leverage in decision-making and allowing management to determine the prices of state-produced products and services. To fund the Five Year Plan the Planning Council planned to create new sources of taxation from increased corporate income taxes, highways taxes, a gasoline tax, and a sugar tax. The Council also sketched out an Industrial Development Bank capable of providing TL 20

1225 Ibid.
million in equity capital and TL 40 million in long-term industrial loans.\textsuperscript{1229} Ankara moved forward to implement the Five Year Plan before the end of the year at last providing evidence of its commitment to economic reform intended to bring about growth.

\textit{Johnson’s Trip to Turkey}

The frequent infighting and anxiety within the coalition government and the omnipresent threat of a coup deterred Gürsel and İnönü from making trips to the U.S. with the frequency enjoyed by the Menderes government. In recognition of this fact American officials decided to come to the Turks in order to “give this trusted and courageous ally the recognition it deserves.”\textsuperscript{1230} Washington viewed the insecure Turks as “in constant need of bucking up if we are to be assured of their continued cooperation and friendship.”\textsuperscript{1231} Vice President Lyndon Johnson’s trip to Turkey in August of 1962 as part of a larger tour of the Middle East would be the first face-to-face interaction between the highest levels of the Kennedy administration and the Gürsel government. Washington intended to demonstrate its appreciation of Turkey because the Turkish people and their government “need to know that Turkey’s exposed position on the firing wall of the Cold War is appreciated by the United States.”\textsuperscript{1232} The Kennedy Administration instructed Johnson to allay any Turkish suspicions of America’s waning interest in Turkey’s security and to reassure Ankara that the U.S. viewed “attacks of any sort on any NATO country with equal seriousness and that we will act promptly in accordance with our

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\textsuperscript{1229} Ibid. The largest private banks in Turkey, the İş Bank, Ottoman Bank, and Yapı ve Kredi Bankası, signed a protocol obliging them to provide the necessary funds to bring the new bank into existence, able to provide long-term industrial loans and not just the short-term commercial credits currently available. \\
\textsuperscript{1230} VICE-PRESIDENT’S VISIT TO TURKEY, August 26 – August 30, 1962, Summary Briefing Paper, Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division. \\
\textsuperscript{1231} Talking Points (11/26/62) Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division. \\
\textsuperscript{1232} Ibid.
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commitments.” Johnson should assure the Turkish people of America’s “continued commitment to assist Turkey in its efforts to maintain its independence and speed economic and social development.”

Upon his arrival in Ankara Johnson greeted the Turkish people over state radio to assure them of the lasting spirit of the friendship between the U.S. and Turkey that meant, “an attack upon Turkey would be an attack on the United States.” In a replay of Eisenhower’s visit three years earlier, nearly a quarter-of-a-million Turks lined Johnson’s motorcade route. In private meetings Johnson offered Turkish officials steadfast promises of American support and friendship and emphasized the interchangeable nature of American and Turkish ideals: “Your freedom is our freedom. The fulfillment of the dream of your people is the hope and goal of my people.” He expressed America’s sympathy with Turkey’s ongoing efforts to develop economically and remain democratic, but emphasized that because the U.S. continued to make sacrifices to ensure the safety of its allies, its allies should expect to do the same.

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1233 Talking Points (11/26/62).
1234 Vice President’s Visit to Turkey, August 27 – September 1, 1962, Scope Paper.
1235 Department of State Airgram, TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FROM: AmEmbassy, Ankara, SUBJECT: Visit of Vice President Johnson to Turkey (November 6, 1962) Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division. Johnson’s one-on-one interaction with the common people of Turkey represented something entirely new. In Turkey, where political leaders tended to be isolated from those they ruled, the idea of a high-ranking political figure coming down to mingle with the masses caught many Turkish officials completely unaware. The Secretary General of the Foreign Office confided to Ambassador Hare that watching Johnson interact with the people of Turkey gave him “a far better idea of what American person-to-person democracy really means” and wondered how such an approach would improve Turkish politics. Deputy Prime Minister Erken Alican told Secretary of State Rusk the following month that after watching Johnson in action he had taken to shaking hands with everyone and “was on his way to being called the Johnson of Turkey.” VICE PRESIDENT’S DEPARTURE STATEMENT, ISTANBUL, August 30, 1962, Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division. Memorandum of Conversation, SUBJECT: Visit of the Deputy Prime Minister (September 18, 1962) Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.
1237 Department of State Airgram, TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FROM: AmEmbassy, Ankara, SUBJECT: Visit of Vice President Johnson to Turkey (November 6, 1962).
Before departing Turkey, Johnson reassured its people that the U.S. looked forward “to working with you and beside you in the creative labors upon which you are embarking in this decade of development.” Turkish leaders took great pains to assure U.S. officials that their optimistic outlook for the stability and survival of the second coalition government was not misplaced. Johnson’s steady string of remarks emphasized that the U.S. stood solidly with Turkey and Western in the face of any and all dangers.¹²³⁸

_The Odyssey of the Jupiters_

Much of America’s commitment to defending Turkey came in the form of the Jupiter-class missile installations still under construction at the time of Johnson’s visit. The presence of the missiles offered an extra measure of assurance that the Soviets would think twice before striking Turkey. In the years following Stalin’s death Moscow demonstrated its ambassadorial skills with the “peace offensive” but the growing number of NATO bases in Turkey roused some of the Russians’ previous enmity that confirmed to the Turks that their old enemy could still not be trusted. In June 1957 Premier Khrushchev summarized Ankara’s primal fear when he stated to Turkey, “You regard yourselves as a strong defensive means in NATO. In the event of war (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) General Norstand will not only not be able to rush to Turkey’s aid but will not be able to be present in time for Turkey’s funeral.”¹²³⁹ With Turkey within striking distance from Soviet base Turkish officials would not sleep soundly until the U.S. constructed its own bases on Turkish soil, including nuclear weapons facilities. The American military operated an increasing number of bases on Turkey, some taking advantage of the country’s closeness to the Soviet border and its mountainous terrain to collect information.

¹²³⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, SUBJECT: Visit of the Deputy Prime Minister (September 18, 1962).
Turkey remained largely in the dark about such activities. This did not lessen the peril of Soviet menace; as Foreign Minister Erkin once confided to American officials, the bases “constitute for us a danger and a guarantee. The danger emanates from their function as a lightning rod.” American missiles in Turkey made for taller lightning rods. In 1959 Turkey and the United States negotiated the complexities of installing a squadron of Jupiter IRBM around Izmir and concluded the agreement without a public statement. Because of the intricacy of the equipment and the specialized level of training required for those manning the stations, the missiles would not be operational until the summer of 1962. The Turks waited anxiously over the next three years for the installation of the missiles and the instruction of their crews to conclude. Ankara remained enthused to host the missiles, despite Soviet contentions that such a development “might bring Turkey to [a] ‘dangerous adventure’” that could complicate the potential reestablishment of friendly relations between the two countries.

The U-2 crisis of 1960 provided one such “dangerous adventure” and demonstrated to Turkey the hazards of hosting American bases and military equipment. Although the U.S. spy plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers took off on May 1 from the top-secret U.S. air base at Peshawar, Pakistan for its ill-fated mission over the Soviet Union, its base was located in Turkey at Incirlik. This indirectly incriminated Turkey in violating Soviet air space, even though Washington chose to keep Ankara uninformed of the flyovers. Shortly after the Soviets produced a shaken Major Powers five days after shooting down his U-2 Soviet Marshall Rodion

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1240 Sandars 272. These facilities included a base at Belbasi near Ankara collecting seismic data in order to track Soviet nuclear weapons testing and two other bases in eastern Turkey at Diyarbakir and Karamüsel which served similar purposes.
1241 Ibid.
1242 Harris 92.
1243 “Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State” Department of State, Central Files, 782.0670/2 – 561. Secret. Also sent to Moscow and repeated to Athens, Bonn, London, Tehran, Rome and Paris Topol. (Ankara, February 5, 1961, 11 a.m.).
1244 Sandars 273.
Malinovsky issued a blanket threat to launch missiles against the airbases in Norway, Pakistan, and Turkey involved in the overflights. Malinovsky’s threat proved more blustery than substantial, but still gave Ankara pause.\textsuperscript{1245} Turkey’s consent to nuclear weapons resulted in similarly unforeseen dangers when Moscow decided to construct missile installations of its own in Cuba.

As the Soviet Union and the U.S. refined their ability to launch long-range missiles by 1959, some NATO members began to doubt the authenticity of America’s commitment to defending Western Europe when the two powers could conveniently increate one another from home without relying upon missiles based abroad. At the same time Washington officials started to question the expense and political wrangling that went into maintaining such facilities, and spoke increasingly of dismantling overseas weapons bases. European leaders argued that if this came to pass NATO’s nuclear responsibilities ought to be more equally distributed among the Alliance members who stood to lose the most in a nuclear exchange. American officials empathized with the position but did not know how to share such a dangerous burden without the creation of costly and risky separate national nuclear forces with independent nuclear decision-making capabilities.\textsuperscript{1246} In late April 1960, just prior to the U-2 crisis, the Eisenhower administration alerted its NATO allies to the swift progress being made to upgrade the alliance’s nuclear defenses with mobile, solid-state Polaris-class missiles fired from nuclear submarines.\textsuperscript{1247} Such an advance would negate the usefulness of the Jupiter missiles based in Italy and Turkey and the Thor missiles located in Britain. Both classes of American missiles,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[1246] Ibid.
\item[1247] Ibid 50.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
with their limited range, lack of accuracy, and relatively weak payloads, fell under a shadow of obsolescence cast by the Polaris.

Such a technological eclipse was inevitable; American planners had never intended the Thor and Jupiter class missiles to be anything more than an expedient measure. During the mid-1950s, in a harried attempt to close the missile gap with the Soviets, American military planners envisaged a Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) able to reach Soviet targets until the successful development of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). From the beginning the U.S. developed the Jupiter-class IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missile) with an eye on its imminent replacement, causing problems for both the U.S. and the NATO countries that agreed to host the Jupiters, Italy and Turkey. Eisenhower fully understood the danger the Jupiters posed as little more than “an invitation to pre-emption,” but still pressed to construct facilities. The installation planned for eastern Turkey would house fifteen Jupiter missiles capable of carrying a megaton-yield warhead to targets beyond Moscow. It presented the U.S. with few tactical or political advantages; the Jupiters lacked accuracy and sturdiness, and required several hours preparation time before being launched. Given such limitations the Jupiters “could have served one purpose, and one purpose alone. They signified an offensive, first-strike capability on the part of the United States against the Soviet Union.” In the spring of 1962 the Jupiter installation at last became operational. The Turks took official control of the facility on October 22, at the height of the Cuban missile crisis.

1248 Before the advent of the ICBM, the United States and Soviet Union assessed one another’s firepower according to medium-range missiles, weapons required to be closer to their intended targets than their intercontinental descendants. It is for this reason that the Jupiters in Turkey were of such paramount importance to both Washington and Moscow. Turkey remained the only NATO ally that shared a boundary line with the Soviet Union and the placement of nuclear missiles there cast a provocative shadow over Russian territory that the United States remained free from until the Soviets began to construct their own missile facilities in Cuba.


Despite the Polaris system being a far superior deterrent compared to the Jupiters, Washington hesitated to deprive Turkey of its new status symbols.\textsuperscript{1251} The Turks “considered it necessary to go through with the project for psychological and political reasons,” namely the prestige and influence than accompanied co-ownership of the weapons, and viewed the Jupiters as a natural extension of their role in NATO and irrefutable proof of their close relationship with the U.S.\textsuperscript{1252} Turkish political and military leaders grew enamored with the idea of the perceived control they wielded over the Jupiters, even if it was largely a façade. “One of Turkey’s great worries,” a State Department telegram in April cautioned, “is that local aggression against her would not be regarded as important enough to warrant response by US or other NATO countries.”\textsuperscript{1253} The Jupiters in Turkey functioned as a deterrent against Soviet aggression as well as an invitation to it. Turkey expressed concerns that because of the two-key launching system that required the presence of American personnel, they might be compelled to take the U.S. key by force in the event of Soviet aggression should the U.S. refuse to allow a launch when the Turks deemed one to be necessary.\textsuperscript{1254} During the late summer of 1961 Kennedy decided to remove the missiles in light of their obsolescence and lack of strategic value.\textsuperscript{1255} Foreign Minister Sarper balked at the proposed removal, perhaps under pressure from the Turkish

\textsuperscript{1251} Three Mediterranean-based Polaris submarines could provide double the coverage of the Jupiters in Turkey. The Jupiters were liquid-fuelled and “soft,” or land-based, in their configuration, making them both slower and more vulnerable compared to the solid-fueled and mobile Polaris missiles. Kuniholm 52.


\textsuperscript{1253} Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Department of State, Central Files, 375/4 - 362. Secret. Repeated to Ankara. Paris, April 3, 8 p.m.


military.\textsuperscript{1256} Turkey would not receive Polaris missiles of its own, and despite the technological imbalance of the Jupiters, they helped to assuage fears of a Soviet attack. They had some custodial control over the Jupiters, specifically the rockets, something a Polaris sub patrolling the Mediterranean could not possibly offer them.

The debate over the missiles in Turkey represented some of the challenges facing the Atlantic Alliance in the early 1960s. NATO had in some respects become a victim of its own success. Militarily it was stronger than ever and its members generally secure from Soviet threats, the very conditions that historically portend the end of alliances. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the consequent alterations to military strategy and political negotiations yielded considerable changes in the relations between NATO members and their expected responsibilities. Nations could no longer surrender territory to temporarily placate an invading enemy and buy time. The quaint days of mass mobilization were no more, replaced by the need for speedy diplomacy and nuclear deterrence. Avoiding war in the modern age required close careful coordination among allied nations under the guiding hand of the United States, a difficult prospect with the U.S. and its NATO allies frequently squabbled over the best strategy to dissuade communist belligerence towards Western Europe. The importance of nuclear readiness advocated by Eisenhower remained of paramount importance, but the potential usefulness of non-nuclear forces able to deal with non-nuclear threats in a “flexible response” gained greater favor during the years of the Kennedy administration. An over-reliance on nuclear weapons risked preventing NATO from dealing with “less extensive hostilities” that could erupt in “unforeseen and unpremeditated ways.” “If we could not check such outbreaks with ready forces equipped with conventional weapons,” speculated a NATO report, “we might immediately be

\textsuperscript{1256} Harris 92.
compelled to choose between surrender and the incineration of the Northern Hemisphere in an apocalyptic nuclear exchange."1257

The Cuban Missile Crisis and Turkey

The escalating dangers of proliferating nuclear weapons rang true during the days of the Cuban crisis. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was the first to propose removing the Jupiters in Italy and Turkey as a means of appeasing the Soviets following the naval blockade of Cuba. At a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) on October 20 McNamara pointed out that Washington could not expect Moscow to order the removal of missiles in Cuba without being prepared to offer something in return.1258 Kennedy agreed to consider removing strategic missiles out of Italy and Turkey, but only if the Soviets happened to raise the issue. On October 21 Kennedy reportedly told the British Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore that while the Jupiters in Turkey were essentially valueless, he was unsure if a deal with Moscow could be reached. If the U.S. brokered a deal publicly it might precipitate harm to the harmony and solidarity of NATO and compromise American defense objectives.1259 Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze cautioned that Europe might view the removal of the Jupiters from Turkey as a sign of American willingness to remove any such weapons from Europe, should circumstance demand it.1260 Washington contacted Ambassador Raymond Hare in Ankara to assess the implications

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1259 Scott 59.
dismantling the Jupiters would have.\textsuperscript{1261} American officials acknowledged the fact that the Turks attached no small amount of pride to the Jupiter missiles, and regarded them as a “symbol of [the] Alliance’s determination to use atomic weapons against Russian attack on Turkey whether by large conventional or nuclear forces.”\textsuperscript{1262} Having the missiles also demonstrated Turkey’s commitment to being a member of the NATO Alliance: Ankara could scarcely be expected to accept being equated with Cuba.\textsuperscript{1263} Replacing the missiles with a NATO seaborne multilateral nuclear force consisting of a mixed crew of U.S., Italian, Turkish, and possibly Greek personnel remained another option, but concrete steps in that direction had yet to be taken. Embassy officials advised Washington to consult Ankara and gain its support before making any final decisions to alter the existing defense arrangement. Because Cuba lay outside the NATO area, the Embassy recommended closing a nuclear-capable base outside the NATO area rather than potentially harm ties to a NATO ally, an action that might alarm other NATO members.\textsuperscript{1264}

The NSC debated the proper geopolitical context of the Cuban Crisis in discussions over the coming days as the naval quarantine around Cuba went into effect. Under Secretary Paul Nitze wished to disperse with any more consideration of pulling the missiles out of Turkey, fearing that doing so would embolden the Soviets to insist upon the denuclearization of the entire NATO area. Nitze insisted that the U.S. maintain its focus on Cuba and not American facilities


\textsuperscript{1264} Ibid.
located elsewhere.\textsuperscript{1265} Secretary of State Dean Rusk agreed that missiles in Turkey constituted a NATO vs. Warsaw Pact issue, not a U.S. vs. USSR issue, as was the case with the missiles in Cuba. Speaking on behalf of the State Department, Undersecretary George Ball dismissed the possibility of asking the Turks about it, “for fear of a disastrous Turkish reaction.” With the Soviets publicly broadcasting their proposal for Turkish missile withdrawal, it eliminated the possibility of contacting the Turks privately about removing the obsolete missiles.\textsuperscript{1266} Kennedy bristled at the conundrum: the U.S. risked war over missiles of little value in Turkey, when it could exchange them for the removal of missiles in Cuba that potentially added 50% to Russia’s nuclear capability. He worried that it would prove difficult to rally public support at home and abroad for an air strike against Cuba when the U.S. would “appear to be attacking Cuba for the purpose of keeping useless missiles in Turkey.” Because the U.S. could not recommend taking the missiles out of Turkey the Turks would have to make the offer.\textsuperscript{1267}

On October 27 Khrushchev sent a public message to Kennedy pledging that the missiles in Cuba would disappear upon a similar removal of the missiles in Turkey. The Chairman’s reasoning was simple: “You have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then can recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations between our great states? This is irreconcilable.” Having agreed to remove its missiles from Cuba Khrushchev further vowed:

\begin{quote}
to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{1265} 90. Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Washington, October 27, 1962, 10 a.m.): 252.
\textsuperscript{1266} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1267} Ibid. 255.
\end{footnotes}
the territory of Turkey’s other neighboring states.\textsuperscript{1268}

The Turks grew uneasy being at the center of an international crisis, given that in the event of a war the Soviets would train their missiles on Turkish military targets. But İnönü and Sarper put aside these concerns and doggedly pledged their loyalty to the U.S., come what may.\textsuperscript{1269}

By the afternoon of October 27 many on the Executive Committee of the NSC accepted an invasion of Cuba as unavoidable: Secretary McNamara suggested preparing the Air Force to strike Cuban targets with 500 sorties on the first day. With U.S. missiles still in Turkey McNamara predicted the Soviets would likely invade after the strikes commenced. At this point the dominoes would start to topple and the minimum NATO response to the Soviet attack would be a sea and air assault by U.S. forces stationed in Turkey against the Soviet Black Sea fleet.\textsuperscript{1270}

Kennedy preferred an approach that would bypass such a messy scenario. He pondered drafting a message to the Turks that would compel Ankara to insist that the missiles be withdrawn.\textsuperscript{1271}

When the formal Executive Committee Meeting concluded Kennedy argued that the U.S. could agree to the Soviets’ offer and replace the Jupiters with Polaris submarines patrolling the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{1272} Kennedy decided that Ambassador Raymond Hare should not approach the Turks about removing the Jupiters.

On October 29 the Turkish Ambassador to the U.S., Turgut Menemencioğlu, met with William R. Tyler, the Assistant Secretary of State, Europe. The Ambassador conveyed his government’s thanks to Kennedy for refusing to make a “deal” with the Soviets concerning

\textsuperscript{1269} Harris 93.
\textsuperscript{1271} This letter has not been found.
\textsuperscript{1272} Ibid 268.
missile bases in Turkey. Tyler emphasized that Washington continued to regard the missiles as being for NATO’s defense, a defense that was “indivisible” because the U.S. “viewed our commitments in all areas of NATO as equal.” In reality, a deal had already been brokered between Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador to remove U.S. missiles in Turkey in exchange for the Russian missiles in Cuba. Members of the Policy Planning Council assembled to determine how to go about initiating the dismantling of the missiles while avoiding potential embarrassment “by a deployment of obsolete and vulnerable weapons that is not, in fact, in the US interest.” Washington also needed to find the means to “avoid clouding the appearance of US resolution conveyed by our recently demonstrated will and ability to get Soviet offensive weapons removed from Cuba without any trade-off of US and allied interests.” American officials in December conveyed Washington’s appreciation for Turkey’s “firm and forthright stand” regarding Cuba, and assured them that the U.S. Government “at no time equated Turkey with Cuba nor considered any ‘deal’ with the USSR involving the NATO Jupiter missiles in Turkey.”

Discussing the Multilateral Force

In the aftermath of the successful resolution of the Cuban crisis an exhilarated Washington pondered how to best take advantage of its enhanced prestige to reinforce ties to Europe. The October crisis showed the effectiveness of “a broad spectrum of military power—power which permitted the application of a carefully measured response sufficient to deal with

1274 Ibid 297.
imminent danger without triggering a nuclear exchange.” With Cuba as a reference point of America’s approach to a nuclear crisis, Europe was left wondering if the U.S. would seek its counsel in a similar showdown in the future or if a true “partnership” still existed. Washington planners formulated ways of fulfilling European desires for increased nuclear responsibility via a new collective nuclear force operating under NATO auspices that would draw on European resources and personnel. State Department officials bandied about preliminary ideas for defense platforms to replace the IRBMs in Turkey and Italy, such as a small pilot NATO Command seaborne multilateral force (MLF) made up of Canadian, Greek, Italian and Turkish elements. This solution would be relatively low cost and leave out “the politically sensitive issue of German and Franco-British nuclear relations during EEC negotiations.” More importantly, it would be solid proof of the U.S.’s commitment to strengthening NATO’s abilities to defend Europe from nuclear attack, and serve as a clear signal of America’s commitment to defend the Turks.

But would the proposed MLF adequately mollify the Turks about to lose their Jupiters? Polaris submarines would not suffice due to the lack of direct Turkish participation. Since 1957

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1277 NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, PARIS, DECEMBER 13-15, 1962, SCOPE PAPER (December 6, 1962) Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division. At a NATO Ministerial Meeting held in Paris in December the State Department speculated that the positive outcome of the Cuban Crisis would lend the proceedings “a sense of elation and relief” that might frustrate any significant decision-making.


1279 Popper 6.


Turkey had been waiting to be given tactical nuclear weapons that they would have partial control. Little more than a week after taking formal possession of the Jupiters, Washington planned to remove them. Turkey would expect nothing less than a comparable nuclear missile system, either in the form of another national MRBM force or participation in a MLF armed with nuclear missiles. Most U.S. officials preferred the latter option, a MLF under NATO auspices consisting of a squadron of six ships each carrying eight MRBMs and crewed by an international team. American officials had already begun to travel to the capitals of nations likely to participate to market the MLF concept, an option Washington assumed the Italians and Turks would look upon favorably “as a means of gracefully phasing out land-based IRBMs which they would expect to be the object of increasing pressures in the post-Cuban period.” The proposed MLF would be funded with American money until such time as the European members could pay their own way and enlarge it, particularly after EEC negotiations concluded. Once the participants fleshed out an agreement establishing the MLF and negotiated the endless legal difficulties, it would be easier to compel the Turks to see the uselessness of financially supporting both the IRBMs and the new MLF. In the interim as the U.S. dismantled the Jupiters and the MLF came into being Polaris submarines could supply the necessary coverage.

The British had significant reservations regarding the military value of the MLF or any mixed-man element project, but recognized the political importance the U.S. placed on the concept’s success. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan observed that Britain “could not refrain from endorsing it in principle. But it would be to our advantage to defer for as long as possible a decision on the question whether we should contribute to a force of this nature.”

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1282 Ibid 736.
1283 Ibid 736-727.
1284 Cabinet Conclusions: Minutes and Papers: CAB 128/37 (23rd May 1963). Part of London’s lack of enthusiasm for the MLF project had to do with the fact that the proposed mixed-manned fleet would consist of
time the British maintained that there was “no strategic requirement for a force of the kind proposed” and little difference from the existing system of U.S. missile silos located in NATO member countries with Washington likely retain the power over the launching of missiles from MLF vessels. Many senior NATO officials likewise saw little reason to support the MLF concept; it would simply drain NATO’s naval resources away from more pressing tasks. Washington could not deny the validity of these arguments and freely acknowledged to London that the main purpose of the MLF was political rather than military. It would provide an international framework to allay growing pressure from NATO allies such as Germany and Turkey who desired a greater share of the Alliance’s nuclear responsibilities.1285

The Turks also showed little enthusiasm for the MLF project and did not see it as an adequate substitute for the Jupiters.1286 Still sensitive to Turkey’s impending loss of the Jupiters, the U.S. Embassy stressed that any proposal to the Turkish government must not appear to be a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union in which the security of Turkey was compromised.1287 Secretary McNamara met with Foreign Minister Sarper in Paris in mid-December to discuss the Jupiter issue and proposed that the missiles be dismantled by April 1, 1963 and then replaced with Mediterranean-based Polaris submarines. Ankara would participate with SACEUR in the targeting of the Polaris missiles. McNamara pitched the proposal as a modernization effort and a security measure: the outdated IRBM’s in Turkey provided the Soviets with a tantalizing target

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1285 Ibid.
1287 Ibid.
that would likely have been attacked in the event of U.S. action against Cuba.\footnote{384} With the
Polaris system NATO had a more efficient deterrent lacking the Jupiters’ vulnerability to attack.
On January 8, 1963 the State Department contacted U.S. Ambassador Hare to start discussions
for the replacement of the Jupiters. What would take the missiles’ place remained unclear; the
major proposal continued to be the MLF. Washington assured Ankara that it would use its pull
to ensure that the “final configuration will include significant participation by Turkey” to lessen
the sting of losing the Jupiters.\footnote{389}

The Turkish military reserved the right to bar the GNA from ratifying the bilateral
agreement to dismantle the weapons as well as the technical-level agreements that determined
how the missiles would be removed.\footnote{390} The future of U.S.-Turkish relations hung in the balance,
as the loss of the Jupiters fed Ankara’s growing crisis of confidence in America’s support of
Turkey’s military and political stability. To fill the void left by the Jupiters Ankara desired a
significant increase in the $120 million slated to fund Turkish modernization efforts for FY
1964. Washington seemed to have little choice in the matter. Failing to provide the funds might
confirm to Ankara a “sudden and catastrophic decline in U.S. military interest in Turkey.” The
State Department feared the risks of losing the confidence of Turkey and of the Turks “out of
stubbornness and near-despair, would indefinitely delay the Jupiter removal, either on the legal
or technical levels,” particularly if İnönü failed to keep the military on a short enough leash.\footnote{391}

\footnote{384} Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey (Washington, December 18,
1962, 8:17 p.m.) \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XVI: Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece;
\footnote{389} Letter from Gerard C. Smith to Livingston T. Merchant, American Embassy, Ankara (April 17, 1963)
Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations
Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.
\footnote{390} \textsc{TO:} G \textsc{FROM:} NEA – Philips Talbot, \textsc{SUBJECT:} FY 1964 MAP Level as Basis
General Wood’s Discussions in Turkey, Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 1948-1961,
Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.
\footnote{391} Ibid.
With much to lose Washington decided to provide an additional $150-180 million for development in addition to $168 million for the military assistance program.\textsuperscript{1292}

At a certain point Washington abandoned the MLF concept, perhaps due to a lack of interest on the part of the prospective participating members or the inability to work out the myriad political and military intricacies. Any such project would result in significant costs that would be difficult to divide equitably among those taking part.\textsuperscript{1293} The Polaris submarines could already carry out the intended mission of the MLF without the added expense and complexities of creating, equipping and training an international military group armed with nuclear missiles.

Turkey did not emerge from the fracas over Cuba completely empty-handed; the U.S. agreed to assist the Turks in an aircraft modernization program.\textsuperscript{1294}

\textit{The Impact of the Cuba Crisis on U.S.-Turkish Relations}

The outcome on Cuba confirmed that American decision-makers would make far-reaching policy decisions that impacted Turkey without its input, regardless of its NATO membership and partial ownership of nuclear weapons. Such supposed guarantees of inclusion in the Alliance’s decision-making process proved ephemeral or non-existent. Given the time restraints of the crisis and the need for swift unilateral decision-making, officials in Washington can be partially absolved for leaving Ankara on the sidelines when making key decisions. What cannot be so readily pardoned is the is the constant denial by American officials that Washington never brokered any “deals” with the Soviet Union over missiles in Turkey. This allowed the U.S. to maintain the illusion of having the upper hand throughout the crisis, but it made

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1292} ELEVENTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION, Karachi, April 30-May 1, 1963, Background Paper; Political-Economic Situation in Turkey.\textsuperscript{1293} Popper 6.\textsuperscript{1294} Scott 100. Interestingly, even as Washington officials worried over their IRBMs in Turkey there remained stationed nuclear-armed F-100 aircraft stationed in Turkey and piloted by Turkish air force officers that the Soviets did not contest.}
involuntary liars of the Turks leaders who received no notification of Washington’s intention to remove the missiles. As late as the summer of 1963 İnönü publicly denied that the U.S. and Russians had negotiated a deal without Turkish input. This lack of consideration demonstrated to even the most Westward-leaning Turk that there were limits to America's concerns for Turkey and limits to what being in NATO afforded its members. Had the Russians reacted with hostility during the crisis they most certainly would have attacked that the missiles in Turkey, meaning that having access to certain weapons did deter aggression but perhaps assure its inevitability. The lack of Turkish participation in making critical decisions when the annihilation of Turkish targets was a distinct possibility showed that the United States was not only willing to put Turkey's security concerns aside for its own ends, but its very existence as well.

The Kennedy Meeting

The ongoing threat of a coup coupled with the Cuban Crisis only compounded the coalition government’s worries. Removing the Jupiters from Turkish soil tarnished the reputation of Turkey’s military and perhaps drove estranged officers to make yet another grasp for power. On the night of May 21, 1963 Turkish dissidents under the command of Talat Aydemir, a disgruntled former army colonel, made a bid to bring down the Gürsel Government. Aydemir, a veteran of the failed coup attempt of February 1962, led a handful of rebels in the seizure of the Ankara radio station. The rebels, mainly cadets from the War College formerly run by Aydemir, announced over the radio that the capital was now under the control of army units serving “on behalf of the Revolutionary Committee of Talat Aydemir” before the signal went dead. Hours later General Cevdet Sunay, the Chief of Staff, broadcast on the restored

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1295 Harris 93 note 19.
Turkish radio network that the situation had been contained.\footnote{1296} Martial law went into effect in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir and remained enforced throughout the summer. Further investigation found that many of the officers involved in Aydemir’s plot had been forcibly retired by the CNU. Aydenir and six other former army officers received a death penalty from a military tribunal, 29 others received life imprisonment sentences, and the remaining 43 defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from five to fifteen years.\footnote{1297} London summed up the abortive coup as “unfortunate that internal political tension should have exacerbated in a [NATO] member country.”\footnote{1298}

Even with such disquieting examples of the continuing presence of malcontented elements in the Turkish military, three years after the coup of 1960 the ground beneath Turkey seemed to be stabilizing. Shortly after the signing of the Ankara Agreement in September 1963 Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister Ekrem Alican and Ferit Melen, the Minister of Finance, met with President Kennedy in Washington seeking reassurances that the U.S. was not losing interest in Turkey, as the removal of the Jupiters and abandonment of the MLF plan seemed to suggest.\footnote{1299} The two men had much good news to share with the President. Besides the conclusion of negotiations with the EEC the coalition government continued to stabilize the country with the Five Year Plan concluding its first year of operation. Good crop harvests suggested a clear economic upswing.\footnote{1300} Some problems remained. The newly implemented planned economy presented challenges, particularly in external financing, although the OECD

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{1296}“Rebels and Army Clash in Turkey: President Reports Uprising Crushed-Insurgent Chief Said to be Arrested” \textit{New York Times} (May 21, 1963): 1.
\item \footnote{1297}“Turkey Sentences 7 to Death in Coup of May 21” \textit{New York Times} (Sep 6, 1963): 4.
\item \footnote{1298}Cabinet Conclusions: Minutes and Papers: CAB 128/37 (23\textsuperscript{rd} May 1963).
\item \footnote{1299}BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATION (September 30, 1963) Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division. Alican, an economist and private businessman, headed the New Turkey Party created in 1961. He supported conservative fiscal and monetary policies and the support of private enterprise.
\item \footnote{1300}Ibid.
\end{itemize}}
Consortium continued to lend the Turks support. In July the Consortium contributed $250 million, meeting the Turkish target, but the Turks faced dwindling foreign exchange reserves. Minister Alican implored Kennedy to exert his influence over the Consortium: “If the United States supports us, the rest of the Consortium will too. The economic problems of Turkey are vital in this phase of Turkish life; if the Five-Year Plan is a success, Turkey will turn the corner.” A growing Turkish economy would have more products to export and attract private investors both at home and abroad.

Kennedy assured his visitors that Turkey remained an essential American ally. He acknowledged that devoting the lion’s share of U.S. aid to Turkey’s military denied the domestic economy the chance to fully expand. The time seemed ripe to devote energy and funds to Turkey’s economy, particularly with the Cold War in a state of relative equilibrium. Kennedy noted that Khrushchev faced growing opposition from China and at home, and while he did not put much faith in the chances of “a real détente,” given recent flare-ups in Cuba and Berlin, Kennedy did not believe a Soviet attack against Turkey to be forthcoming. Other subtler dangers did exist, such as the strong communist presence in Italy and Greece, and the possibility of a popular front developing in France after de Gaulle. These were possible weak points Khrushchev might exploit, and Turkey might join their ranks if the Turkish people did not begin to see an improvement in their fortunes. Kennedy could not be as free with American financial aid with Capitol Hill demanding cuts in foreign aid and a growing balance of payments problem. The President vowed to place Turkey’s economic development above its military over

1302 BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATION (September 30, 1963).
1303 Memorandum of Conversation (September 31, 1963).
1304 BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATION.
1305 Memorandum of Conversation (September 31, 1963).
the coming years and support the goals of the Five Year Plan, namely an annual GNP growth rate of 7%. Kennedy further assured Alican that he would do everything possible to convince the Europeans in the Consortium to offer more favorable terms on their contributions to Turkey, but the Turks would have to be willing to help themselves to secure European financing by presenting projects to the members of the Consortium in a timely manner.  

The September meeting between Alican, Melen, and Kennedy represented something of a highpoint in the U.S.-Turkish relations since 1945, or at the very least a last moment of cordiality before the Cyprus crisis of the following year brought everything to a halt. Alican bore sentiments of friendship to the U.S. “from the people, from the nation itself, and not just the government. Through all the events since May 1960 there had been no change in the friendship of the Turkish people toward the American people – no sign of animosity towards Americans.”  

Turkey very much resembled a Western state, as a NATO ally and associate membership to the Common Market, associations made possible largely by the United States, in both obvious manipulation and behind the scenes persuasion. The end result bore the hallmarks of a sound friendship between a Western superpower and an up-and-coming regional power, soon to be challenged by a pair of assassin’s bullets and political instability on a small island nation in the Mediterranean.  

Shifting American Concerns  

Some in Washington raised questions regarding the state of America’s relations with Turkey before Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963. In early October Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska, a member of Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations, submitted his findings from a pair of visits in late 1962 and early 1963 to ten

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1306 BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATION.  
Middle Eastern and North African countries, including Turkey. Washington dispatched Gruening to investigate possible alterations to or eliminations of the existing aid programs to these countries. According to Gruening, nearly two decades of economic assistance programs “shielded from public scrutiny and criticism by those of its advocates who voiced the fear that any such scrutiny and criticism would give aid and comfort to those who are unalterably opposed to any such foreign aid program at all” caused a sense of reflexive entitlement in recipient countries recklessly using U.S. funds, thereby damaging American credibility.  

Gruening argued that politically unstable nations such as Syria or economically developed countries such as Libya should no longer receive U.S. economic assistance. Greuning did not advise that American aid to Turkey be cut, but that future money should be more closely monitored to ensure greater effectiveness. 

Turkey’s need of solid guarantees of American financial support increased in the autumn of 1963. In October the SPO revealed a planned investment program totaling $1.25 billion for 1964 to fund more than 100 projects in the private and public sectors. Turkish economists heralded the return of price stability after a decade of inflation and a growing number of private investors prepared to put up more than $425 million on behalf of the SPO. While the economic signs appeared favorable Turkey’s political future remained uncertain with increasingly feeble leadership. President Gürsel, already the survivor of one stroke, became too frail to assert a prominent role in the day-to-day affairs of governance and retired to the solitude of his residence. Nearly 80 years old, İnönü exhibited a dynamism that belied his age, but his advanced years and Gürsel’s growing infirmity allowed the Justice Party greater opportunity to

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1309 Ibid 20.
exert more power following the elections of November 17. Their platform hinged largely on the unpopularity of the recently passed tax hike needed to cover the $1 billion price tag of the Five-Year Plan’s first year.\footnote{Ibid.}

Following Kennedy’s assassination İnönü and his entourage dutifully made the trip, as so many other heads of state did, to Washington to convey final respects to the slain president. In a meeting İnönü assured Under Secretary for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman that democracy would continue in Turkey as would of Turkey’s commitments to the U.S.\footnote{Memorandum of Conversation (November 27, 1963) Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 1948-1961, Deputy Director for Operations Office of European Operations, Turkey Division.} To İnönü’s relief, Secretary McNamara guaranteed that Washington would make no significant changes to America’s security agenda in the aftermath of Kennedy’s death. İnönü next turned to the topic of the Consortium, whose European members had yet to deliver the aid promised Turkey. Because Ankara had included expenditures in the budget on the assumption that the aid would be forthcoming, it now faced a critical dilemma. Both the private and the public sector faced difficulties in the coming year unless the U.S. could exert the required pressure to free up the promised funds. İnönü wished to return to his nation with a promise identical to the one given to Alican by Kennedy less than two months prior: “that the United States considered the economic recovery of Turkey as necessary and vital as the United States had considered the recovery of Europe to be.”\footnote{Ibid.} Harriman could not be so forthcoming due to “a growing discontent on the part of Congress and the American people, who were aware of European prosperity and asked why the United States should shoulder the entire responsibility and why should not Europe assume its share.” This issue was part of Johnson’s political inheritance, and the new administration viewed to Turkey’s difficulties with the Consortium as “almost a test case
for the Europeans” to see if they could look after their own as the U.S. gradually disengaged itself.

The dismal performance of the RPP in the local elections of November left many in the party wondering how it would perform in the national elections of next spring if İnönü continued as its head. After four decades of loyal service to his country many believed İnönü should take his final bow. Even the military, long a stalwart bastion of support for İnönü, seemed disillusioned with his leadership. The main conflict remained between the RPP and the JP over the economic development laid out by the Five Year Plan. During 1963 most of the development plans funds, $650 million, went into the public sector in the form of roads, harbors, schools, hospitals, and communication networks to build up Turkey’s infrastructure and promote its long-term earning potential. But these efforts did little to foster job creation. The JP disagreed with the added tax hikes intended to finance the Plan and ensure a 7% annual growth rate. The higher taxes burdened Turkey’s lower classes and diverted away supplies of private investment. The JP lobbied for a more realistic growth rate. Members of the RPP steadfastly asserted that the state must govern the economy until it had developed to a point where the private sector might be allowed greater independence.

Conflict and uncertainty about the future of the Turkish economy deterred consumers from making purchases. General business conditions gradually declined and talk of another potential junta circulated once again, this time originating among the military commanders stationed in Izmir. It seemed as if members of the military could no longer curb the impulse to involve themselves in political matters; before the coup of 1960 the Turkish military’s approval

had been advisable, now it was imperative. As Izmir’s mayor, Osman Kibar, told Embassy Official Charles F. Clock, “the road of power crosses over the bridge of the army.”1317 In line with this reality, the JP dialed down the volume of its rhetoric to appease the military, which realized that İnönü “had outlived his usefulness.” İnönü took his cue and resigned as prime minister in early December, after more than four decades of service to the Republic as a soldier and statesman. İnönü sought to lead a life in private, little knowing that he would once more be called upon to serve Turkey and contend with yet another crisis.

Crisis on Cyprus Renews

The predicament emerged like so many others during the previous years, on Cyprus, when the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities renewed their conflict and threatened to pull Greece and Turkey into the fray once again. The Johnson administration waded into the quagmire to avert a war between Greece and Turkey and a fissure in NATO’s southeastern flank the Soviets could potentially exploit. But Johnson’s often tactless handling of the situation angered the Turks and further validated their suspicions from the Cuban Crisis, that the U.S. could no longer be assumed to be a stalwart ally to rely upon unconditionally. Johnson managed to achieve his goal of preventing Greece and Turkey from going to war with each other, but in doing so he managed to permanently distort Turkey’s favorable perspective of the United States.

“I think that the British are getting to where they might as well not be British anymore if they can’t handle Cyprus” confided President Johnson to Under Secretary of State George Ball in a January 25, 1964 phone conversation.1318 From London’s perspective, they had ceased to be “British” after Suez eight years before. In some respects Johnson was correct: the British avoided their traditional role as arbiters and enforcers of peace in Cyprus. This gave Washington

1317 Memorandum of Conversation (December 20, 1963).
1318 Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Ball, January 24, 1964, 2:05 p.m., Tape F64.07, Side B, PNO 4.
little choice in becoming increasingly involved in the region. Although throughout the early
1950s the British did their utmost to avoid internationalizing the Cyprus problem, by December
1963 they welcomed the involvement of NATO and, to a lesser degree, the UN when inter-
communal violence on Cyprus broke out once again. The U.S. also dispatched a series of
diplomatic missions to arbitrate both sides and search for a peaceful resolution, but the Johnson
administration’s diplomatic efforts lacked subtlety. The Johnson cabinet retained the Kennedy-
era approach to the Cold War as an open conflict between the Soviet Union and America and the
frequent tendency to typify leaders and situations in pejorative and evocative terms that colored
the decision-making process. President Makarios’ ambiguous relationship with the AKEL
and the Soviet Bloc led to his being dubbed “the Castro of the Mediterranean” and “the Red
Priest” by the Johnson administration, and viewed as a leader to be dealt with in the requisite
manner. The foremost objective of America’s intervention in Cyprus remained maintaining the
integrity of NATO’s southeastern flank. Any demands made by the governments of Cyprus,
Turkey, and Greece placed second behind this overriding security concern.

Cyprus seemed designed to ferment conflict. From the beginning the Republic of
Cyprus foundered as President Makarios and the Greek-Cypriot leadership haggled endlessly
with high-ranking Turkish-Cypriots led by Vice-President Dr. Fazil Küçük over the letter of the
law. The 1960 Constitution proved unsatisfactory to both sides in establishing a workable
political framework. It largely failed to resolve the long-standing social, economic, and political

\[1319\] An article published in fall 1965 by the Chinese Defense Minister, Lin Piao, entitled “Long Live the
Victory of People’s War” was described by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara as the Chinese Mein Kampf.
By making such comparisons, “it was possible for the Johnson Administration to identify Mao as the Asian Hitler,
Vietnam as the new Czechoslovakia, and, importantly, domestic critics as would-be appeasers.” Vaughn Davis
Détente and the Nixon doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press): 38. When Brazil appeared threatened by a communist revolution in 1963, Johnson
expressed concern that the South American country would not simply become “another Cuba” in the Western
issues that divided the two communities and, in some instances, only served to exacerbate them. Concerns over the establishment of a Cypriot army, the matter of separate Turkish-Cypriot boroughs, and the allocation of civil service posts along the 70:30 ratio are just a sampling of the myriad disputed issues that eventually caused the central government to cease functioning.\textsuperscript{1320} It is more than possible that President Makarios, still fixated on \textit{enosis}, only half-heartedly attempted to bridge the schism between the Greek and Turkish communities, with little genuine interest in overseeing the creation of a new Republic. Whatever the case, neither Makarios nor Vice President Küçük exhibited genuine willingness to cooperate in the creation of a unified Cypriot national identity.\textsuperscript{1321}

A Greek-Cypriot majority unwilling to share leadership duties with their Turkish neighbors shared Makarios’ indifferent outlook. The frequently vague constitution did little to alleviate matters as evidenced by the controversy over the composition of the army of the Republic, which was to consist of two thousand recruits, 1200 Greeks and 800 Turks. But the Constitution failed to specify if the troops were to be integrated, as Makarios wished, or segregated, as Vice President Küçük desired. Eventually, Küçük used his power of veto to bring the army’s development to a standstill. It was only the first round in a series of disagreements; a more ominous debate centered on the creation of separate Turkish-Cypriot municipalities. In 1958, the British Government allowed distinct Turkish-Cypriot municipal councils to administer separate Turkish quarters and take on such duties as tax collection. For the Greek-Cypriots, such boroughs suggested partition, and in the autumn of 1962 Makarios proposed integrating these

\begin{enumerate}
\item[] Mehmet Ugur \textit{The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma} (Brookfield, USA; Singapore; Sydney: Aldershot, 1999): 164.
\end{enumerate}
communities. This attempt to tamper with the rights of the Turkish Cypriots raised the ire of Turkey.

Deteriorating relations between the Turkish and Greek-Cypriot communities in 1963 over the possibility of the integration of the Greek-Cypriot boroughs exacerbated preexisting friction between the governments of Greece and Turkey over Turkey’s proposals to extend its fishing rights in the Mediterranean. In the spring Ankara drafted a bill to legally extend Turkey’s territorial and fishing rights perilously close to the Eastern Greek islands where many Greek fishermen pursued their livelihood.\(^\text{1322}\) In April the Yugoslavs informed Greece’s Ambassador to Turkey, Evangellos Averoff, of a supposed meeting between Erkin and the Yugoslavian Ambassador in which the Foreign Minister claimed that if Athens and the Greek-Cypriots failed to be more amenable to Turkish demands, repercussions against the Greeks living in Turkey and the partition of Cyprus might result.\(^\text{1323}\) Ankara replied to the Greek request for negotiations on the territorial waters issue in an unaccommodating fashion by only agreeing to consider talks “in due course,” meaning only after the Turkish Parliament passed legislation deciding the issue.\(^\text{1324}\) Athens expressed its disappointment at the Turks’ refusal to begin negotiations forthwith and

\(^{1322}\) FO 371/169065, CE103144/9, (1036/15/63) CONFIDENTIAL, BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA, April 23, 1963. Letter to K. D. Jamieson, Esq., Foreign Office, LONDON. S.W.1. from R. C. Barnes. To the Greeks, the Turks already conducted themselves as if the law already existed, having recently sunk the Maritsa, a Greek fishing vessel it claimed had wandered into Turkish waters. The Greeks located the sunken vessel 1,600 meters beyond Turkish territorial waters, proving that the commanders of the Turkish warship must have known that they were outside of their jurisdiction when the incident occurred. The Greek Ambassador to Turkey, Evangellos Averoff, sent a strongly worded message to Foreign Minister Erkin highlighting the discovery of the Maritsa. He confided his fears to a British official that the attack might be the prelude to other such incidents committed by the Turks without regard for the larger international implications. The traditional American policy was to make concessions to the Turks, but Averoff now wondered if it might be more effective “to establish a strong position by assertion in the first place and then be prepared to make concessions.” Such an approach would be more in keeping with the Turkish people, who “at any level below the highest, were very primitive and inclined to be brutal.” FO 371/169065, CE103144/1, (6/1/63) CONFIDENTIAL, BRITISH EMBASSY, ATHENS. February 13, 1963. Letter to D.B. Alexander, Esq. from J. C. Moberly.


\(^{1324}\) Ibid.
warned it would not accept any unilateral decision made by the Turkish Government regarding territorial and fishing rights.\textsuperscript{1325} Given the increasingly recalcitrant attitude taken by the Turks, Greece was surprised when the GNA decided to table the bill.\textsuperscript{1326} Peacemakers from Athens, Ankara and Washington worked to patch up lingering feelings of ill will between Greece and Turkey. On May 9 Ambassador Averoff spoke before the Greek Parliament and urged both sides to consider the progress made in the preceding three decades before squandering it over Cyprus and the territorial waters issue. Despite the recent spate of “hitches and regrettable incidents” Averoff pleaded for the Parliament not to lose sight of the greater importance of Greek-Turkish friendship and to seek a satisfactory solution to the territorial waters debate through negotiation.\textsuperscript{1327} Four days later Foreign Minister Erkin assured Athens that had not abandoned its belief that cooperation and friendship between Greece and Turkey was indispensable to their shared interests.\textsuperscript{1328} The U.S. maintained that it did not intend to take up any position on the issues, but simply wanted to ensure good relations between Turkey and Greece, which it regarded “as of the utmost importance.”\textsuperscript{1329} Calm appeared to be settling with Turkish officials feeling increasingly optimistic about the development of friendlier relations with Greece and peaceful resolutions to the fishing rights issue and the Cyprus affair.\textsuperscript{1330}

The calm between Turkey and Greece did not last. On November 22, 1963 during a visit by Makarios to Ankara, Prime Minister İnönü warned him that Turkey would not idly stand by...
and allow him to modify the constitution. Makarios blithely disregarded İnönü’s warning and remained undeterred in his course of action. With the encouragement of the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Sir Arthur William Clarke, Makarios set about formally altering the constitution. On November 30, 1963 Makarios proposed thirteen constitutional amendments that would consolidate his power at the expense of the Turkish minority and allow a more efficient government to develop. Although some of the points included concessions intended to improve conditions for the Turkish-Cypriots most of the proposals specifically benefited the Greek-Cypriots such as removing the vice-president’s veto, decreasing the mandatory numbers of Turkish-Cypriots in the military and civil service, and unifying the municipalities. Makarios dispatched a message to the governments of Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain on December 5 declaring his intention to eliminate the 70:30 ethnic proportion guidelines in the civil service as well as unifying the divided city councils. Unsurprisingly, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots immediately rejected the proposals as simply a prelude to enosis.

One week later, on December 12, tensions spilled over from the corridors of government to the streets of Nicosia, when two Greek-Cypriot plainclothes police officers demanded identification cards from a group of Turkish-Cypriots near a brothel in Nicosia’s Turkish quarter. The altercation escalated into an armed confrontation. In reprisal the ever implacable General Grivas and his paramilitary forces attacked a number of Turkish-Cypriot villages, killing 300, taking nearly 700 hostages, and driving hundreds more from their homes in what became known

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as “the Bloody Christmas Massacre.”

Cyprus’ three guarantor powers called for an immediate cease-fire, but only Turkey asserted itself militarily by deploying the 650-man Turkish contingent in Cyprus across the road between Nicosia and Kyrenia and conducting low-altitude flights over the island on December 25. More ominously, the Turkish fleet began to steam directly for the island. Turkey’s suggestion of a potential joint military intervention with the two other guarantor powers went unheeded in both Great Britain and Greece. But Makarios, fearful of a Turkish invasion, agreed to a cease-fire to be brokered by the 7,000 British troops from the two sovereign bases. The British Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, scrambled to contain the developing crisis, fleshing out agreements regarding the exchange of prisoners and hostages, and overseeing the drawing of a “Green Line” between the Turkish and Greek sections of Nicosia.

Fumbled Attempts to Broker Peace

On January 16, 1964 representatives of the three guarantor powers and the two communities in Cyprus convened in London. The Greek-Cypriots argued for the dissolution of the constitution, specifically the paragraphs sanctioning Turkish intervention in order to maintain the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority. They further lobbied for a unitary state and the elimination of any special rights guaranteed the Turkish-Cypriots by the 1959 Agreements. Furthermore, Makarios demanded that the 1960 Constitution be replaced with an unfettered government capable of making revisions to the constitution as needed. At the opposite end, the Turkish minority argued for partition citing the recent violence as irrefutable evidence of the two communities’ inability to coexist in peace. The Turkish-Cypriots proposed a Federal State of

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Cyprus with Greek and Turkish provinces separated by a border to be called the Attila line. The Greek-Cypriots decisively rejected the plan and the conference soon ground to a halt. British leaders grimly realized the crisis could not be resolved with additional British troops who would only inflame matters. Sending more troops into possible danger might prove a political liability to the Conservative Party in the upcoming election, and being the former colonial custodian of Cyprus and “a hostage to the past” limited the number of options available to the British.1337

With London hesitant to send more of its own troops British Ambassador Sir David Ormsby Gore met with Secretary Rusk to discuss the possibility of bringing in NATO soldiers to serve as peacekeepers, provided the three guarantor powers agreed.1338 Rusk worried that such a force in Cyprus would put American soldiers in situations in which they might be called upon to exchange gunfire with Turkish forces. He preferred a NATO-brokered solution to an UN-brokered one that might end in the creation of a peacekeeping force outside of U.S. control that could potentially include Russian and Yugoslavian elements.1339 U.S. officials keenly felt the need of arriving at a solution quickly with Turkish troops prepared to hit the Cypriot shoreline at a moment’s notice should the Turkish-Cypriots be placed in harm’s way. At first the British government welcomed any outside assistance be it from NATO or the UN. It then shifted to preferring NATO due to fears that any formal participation by the UN might lead to an inquiry into the legality of its Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs).1340 The British resigned themselves to withdrawing their troops if they failed to quell the violence. Washington felt equally impotent; Johnson pondered if Cyprus would first have to endure “a blood bath” before U.S. military

1337 3. Memorandum of Conference With President Johnson, Washington, January 25, 1964, 6:30 p.m.
1340 Briscoe 158.
involvement, but remained unwilling to give the British any indication that the U.S. would take part in an allied force, NATO or otherwise. He advised the British attempt to soldier on alone.\textsuperscript{1341}

Unaware of Johnson’s hesitance, London moved to establish a permanent force in Cyprus consisting of NATO troops to be under the Alliance’s sponsorship. The British approached West Germany, France, Italy, and the United States to take part; only America agreed, even though Johnson did not believe that anything intervention would lead to a positive outcome for the U.S. Johnson’s initial intransigence mellowed over the coming days to the point where on January 28 he accepted a plan drafted by George Ball that placed 1,200 U.S. troops as part of a 10,000-man NATO peacekeeping unit to keep the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots separated until the crisis could be mediated.\textsuperscript{1342} Washington stipulated two caveats possibly intended to undermine the British proposal, the first being that, because it did not belong to NATO, the Cypriot Government should approve of the force and the second that the three guarantor powers defer their intervention privileges on the island for three months.\textsuperscript{1343} Precedent established that Makarios would never allow NATO intercession and Ankara was equally unlikely to temporarily relinquish its right to intervene. Nevertheless, on January 31, the United States and Great Britain formally offered Nicosia 10,000 NATO troops. Angry Greek-Cypriots did not approve the offer; on February 4, they bombed the U.S. Embassy, prompting an evacuation of American citizens off the island.\textsuperscript{1344}

\textsuperscript{1341} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1344} Ibid.
Athens eventually accepted the proposed NATO unit as a solution, but Ankara continued to object to the international force. The GNA directed much criticism towards the İnönü Government for failing to act more assertively in Cyprus, and permitting NATO to take the lead hardly improved its position. The diplomatic gears ground to a halt once more. U.S. officials began to regard the Cyprus dispute as the gravest international situation since the Cuban missile crisis. As the violence in Cyprus escalated and negotiations in London collapsed, the Johnson administration continued to insist the issue be limited to NATO, rather than UN, involvement. Secretary of State Dean Rusk feared a strong military response by the U.S. against the Turkish-Cypriots could result in severe repercussions for the 17,000 American troops stationed in Turkey. Should a military contingent be dispatched to settle the dispute, the United States preferred a British-led operation. Great Britain preferred to toss the hot potato to NATO, or if need be, the UN. Johnson and Undersecretary of State George Ball saw a British appeal to the UN as “the worst possible alternative;” the Afro-Asian majority within the United Nations would undoubtedly favor Makarios’s and the Greek-Cypriots’ position, inviting increased Soviet interference. Johnson and his advisers worried over the prospective UN peacekeeping force “which would be beyond our control and in which the Russians and the Yugoslavs would undoubtedly want to participate.”

The Ball Mission

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1348 Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State. London, February 9, 1964, midnight. Department of State, Central Files, POL 28-8 CYP. Confidential; Flash. Repeated to Athens for Ball. Relayed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, USUN, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.
Despite the risk of a Soviet infiltration and Britain’s insistence that it could no longer carry the island’s burden alone, Johnson hesitated to commit American troops to Cyprus until every possible diplomatic solution had been explored.\textsuperscript{1350} Undersecretary George Ball also emphasized that the U.S. should avoid playing an active mediating role in Cyprus because: “Anyone who settles this is going to come down hard on the Greeks.”\textsuperscript{1351} In terms of containment, Turkey, with its larger and better-equipped army and its shared border with the Soviet Union, was bound to carry more weight in the peace-brokering process. Johnson and Ball continued to stand firm on keeping American troops out of Cyprus, and believed Makarios agreed, fearing that “US forces would be [a] special target of hit and run tactics of Greek Cypriots.”\textsuperscript{1352} The Johnson Administration preferred the tactic of remaining on the periphery of the negotiations so that the three guarantor powers would not shirk their responsibilities by expecting the U.S. to resolve the crisis.\textsuperscript{1353}

The mounting casualty rates on Cyprus and the increasing possibility of a Turkish invasion left the U.S. with little choice but to intervene. Throughout the first half of 1964, while the international community looked on helplessly, the inter-communal fighting in Cyprus claimed 191 Turkish-Cypriots and 131 Greek-Cypriots lives. An additional 209 Turks and 41 Greeks were reported missing and presumed dead, and 20,000 Turkish-Cypriot refugees had been forced from their homes to the relative safety of the Turkish quarters of Nicosia and Kyrenia. Such a mass influx of Turkish-Cypriots fleeing the violence gave greater credence to those in the Turkish minority who touted partition as the only possible solution. British troops

\textsuperscript{1350} Geyelin 114.
\textsuperscript{1351} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1352} Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State. Athens, February 10, 1964, 10 p.m. Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, and CINESTRIKE.
\textsuperscript{1353} Ibid.
managed to preserve the cease-fire in Nicosia, but a particularly violent raid on the Turkish-Cypriot section of the city of Limassol provoked the İnönü Government to threaten an invasion and challenged Turkey’s faith in the British ability to serve as a guarantor power with its troops under strict orders not to shoot.\textsuperscript{1354} Turkey was equally apprehensive of a UN force that “they would regard as an instrument of Soviet or Third-World politics and subject to manipulation by Makarios.”\textsuperscript{1355} It would be left to the United States to quell the violence through overt diplomatic pressure and keep Cyprus within the NATO fold by dissuading Makarios from inviting a UN intervention.

America’s most effective weapon in the Cyprus dispute proved to be the tenacious Undersecretary of State George Ball.\textsuperscript{1356} Putting aside their initial misgivings over U.S. involvement, in February Johnson gave Ball carte blanche as a special presidential envoy to organize a peacekeeping force and negotiate a peaceful resolution.\textsuperscript{1357} His mission would take him to London, Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia. Before departing on his mission Ball met with America’s UN Ambassador, Adlai Stevenson, whose previous dealings with Makarios led him to regard the Archbishop as “a wicked, unreliable conniver who concealed his venality under the sanctimonious vestments of a religious leader.”\textsuperscript{1358} The only method of dealing with Makarios, Stevenson assured Ball, was by “giving the old bastard absolute hell.” Later actions indicated that Ball took Stevenson’s advice to heart. Ball reached London on February 8 and then stopped over briefly in Ankara to meet with İnönü who warned of Turkish public opinion favoring

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1354] Ibid.
\item[1356] Perhaps best remembered as the dissenting voice in Johnson’s cabinet concerning the Vietnam War, Ball had been sent to Paris earlier in the spring to confer with French President Charles De Gaulle on the Asian conflict. H. W. Brands \textit{Into the Labyrinth: The United States and the Middle East, 1945-1993} (McGraw Hill, 1994): 5.
\item[1357] Geyelin 115.
\item[1358] Ball 340-341.
\end{footnotes}
military intervention.\textsuperscript{1359} He further added that Turkey was not secure with a guarantee enforced by British troops under orders not to intervene with force.\textsuperscript{1360}

Ball arrived in Nicosia on February 12 to find the city “an armed camp” divided along the “green line” by barbed wire.\textsuperscript{1361} Ostensibly sent to mediate the situation and attempt to dissuade the Archbishop from continuing to seek out the support of the UN Security Council, Ball’s message to Makarios might be aptly described as a threat draped in the thinnest of veils.\textsuperscript{1362} As Ball recounts in his memoirs, if Makarios maintained his obstinacy, then “I planned to say to the guarantor powers: take the problem to the Security Council but understand that America will supply no component for any UN force.”\textsuperscript{1363} By threatening the possibility of such a scenario, Ball had the leverage to warn Makarios that the U.S. might not protect him from Turkey if he continued to impede a NATO solution.\textsuperscript{1364} Ball and the British High Commissioner, Sir Cyril Packard, confronted Makarios on the afternoon of February 13 at the presidential palace. The defiant Archbishop reiterated his intention of request a resolution from the UN Security Council to guarantee the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus. In doing so, the Treaty of Guarantee would become void and outside intervention by a guarantor power made illegal. Packard was on the same page as his American counterpart and before long the two “told off Makarios and his extremist ministers in a manner unfamiliar to diplomatic discourse” in which they painted “a lurid picture of the consequences that would entail from the

\textsuperscript{1359} Bill 183.
\textsuperscript{1360} Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State Athens, February 10, 1964, 10 p.m., Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCUEU, and CINESTRIKE.
\textsuperscript{1361} Ball 343.
\textsuperscript{1362} Bill 184.
\textsuperscript{1363} Ball 342.
\textsuperscript{1364} Ibid.
The specter of a Turkish invasion in the absence of a Western response appeared to shake Makarios. “Even his beard seemed pale,” a jubilant Ball reported to Johnson after the meeting concluded.  

Pale beard or no, the wily Archbishop rejected Ball’s proposal for a NATO-led arbitration, allowing the violence to continue largely unchecked. President Makarios was not alone in his defiance of a NATO occupation. On February 5, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev contacted a number of Western leaders to alert them that the USSR would not stand idly by while the NATO Alliance took control of Cyprus. Although Khrushchev was cryptic as to what course of action the Soviets would take should the West occupy the island, his message let in a sinister draft from the cold war that Johnson and his staff had sought to keep out. The Russians’ pledge of support also enabled Makarios to stand in defiance of British and American demands to keep the UN out of the negotiations. Additionally, it led to speculation in the West that the Soviets had promised Makarios that they would prevent a Turkish invasion.  

In spite of the United States’ wish to keep the Cyprus dispute confined to NATO members, the critical state of affairs demanded outside intervention, even from the United Nations if need be. During Ball’s time in Nicosia, a group of Greek-Cypriot guerillas assaulted Turkish-Cypriot positions in the city of Limassol. Despite a standing cease-fire agreement, the Greek-Cypriot forces used mortar and bazooka shells and then bulldozers to destroy several buildings, killing nearly fifty Turkish-Cypriots in the process. When Ankara threatened a possible intervention after the assault Ball flew to Ankara to smooth things over. Arguing that  

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1365 Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State. Nicosia, February 13, 1964, 1:45 a.m. Department of State, Central Files POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House. JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.  
1366 Ibid.  
1367 Briscoe 160.  
1369 Ball 345, Bill 184.
any Turkish aggression would give the Greeks the necessary proof to demonstrate to the UN that it should remove Ankara’s right to intervene, Ball secured İnönü’s promise that for the moment Turkey would stay out of Cyprus.\footnote{1370} The Turks, despite their pledge, convinced Ball that another violent incident such as the one at Limassol would provoke Turkey to action and then likely pull Greece into the conflict.\footnote{1371} Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou said as much when he told Ball that, though he considered war with Turkey to be “insane,” if the Turks “open [the] door to the insane asylum, then he would have to accompany İnönü inside.”\footnote{1372} In a report submitted on February 17, Ball glumly predicted a 50% chance of a civil war between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots with the potential to engulf Greece and Turkey.\footnote{1373} Ball recommended U.S. assistance in the creation of a UN peacekeeping force, and with Greece steadfastly refusing to allow any sort of NATO involvement, the Johnson administration reluctantly consented to UN involvement.

\textit{NATO’s Southeastern Flank in Peril}

On March 4, 1964, the UN Security Council passed resolution 186 to establish a 6000-man United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and a UN mediator. The UNFICYP’s infantry units were drawn from a combination of NATO members and neutral European nations: 3500 troops from Great Britain, 500 from Ireland, 1150 from Canada, 700 from Finland, 700 men from Sweden, and a handful from Denmark.\footnote{1374} Such a pedigree, free from any eastern bloc element, made the UNFICYP a practical alternate for a NATO-led force. Notably absent was an American contingent, but the U.S. did pledge financial assistance and

\footnote{1370}{\textit{Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, Washington, February 14, 1964, 8:48 p.m.}} Department of State, Central Files, POL 28-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis.
\footnote{1371}{\textit{Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, February 18, 1964, 5:55 p.m.}} Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.
\footnote{1372}{\textit{Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Athens, February 21, 1964, 3 p.m.}} Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate.
\footnote{1373}{Bill 185.}
\footnote{1374}{Briscoe 171.}
offered to take part in the airlift of the new force.\textsuperscript{1375} Although the 1959 treaties remained intact, as did the duties of the guarantor powers, the creation of yet another force under orders not to use deadly force did not please the Turks. Makarios, on the other hand, seemed satisfied with the arrangement and announced that, barring potential future troubles, conditions on the island were bound to improve.\textsuperscript{1376} In reality, Makarios, guided by his pronounced sense of self-preservation, began in April 1964 to secretly assemble a personal army of 10,000 men from the Greek mainland.\textsuperscript{1377} He brokered armament deals with Swedish and Finnish contacts, but primarily through Nasser’s government and partially funded by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{1378} With the creation of the Greek-Cypriot National Guard to be headed by General Grivas, Makarios could now dictate the agenda he had largely been denied during the first three years of his presidency. Most of the Turkish minority, estimated at 45-50,000, had been driven from their homes to dwell in armed enclaves effectively under an economic blockade. Under such dangerous conditions, it was virtually impossible for the Turkish-Cypriots to assert themselves politically.

Such a state of affairs drove Ankara to action and already fragile Turkish-Greek relations deteriorated precipitously as Cyprus unraveled. In an attempt to gain leverage in the crisis the Turks steadily applied more pressure on the Greek minority living inside Turkey. On March 28 the Turkish Government expelled seven Greek nationals living in Istanbul for supposed involvement in subversive activity in Istanbul. Ankara announced it would eject thirty more Greeks for being in violation of public safety without any specific charge or evidence.\textsuperscript{1379}

\textsuperscript{1375} Laipson 60.
\textsuperscript{1376} Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State, Nicosia, March 23, 1964, 9 p.m. Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential.
\textsuperscript{1377} Joseph S. Joseph \textit{Cyprus-Ethnic Conflict and International Concern} (New York · Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1985): 89.
\textsuperscript{1378} Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State, Nicosia, May 22, 1964, 6 p.m. Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret.
\textsuperscript{1379} FO 371/174813, CE113144/2, Letter to D.S.L. Dodson, Esq., C.M.G., M.C., Central Department, Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W.1. (date unknown).
Athens grew concerned at what it considered to be the Turks “behaving in a classical manner”: using pressure on the Greek minority to gain the upper hand with the Athens over Cyprus, mobilizing Turkish public opinion, and weakening the economic strength of the Greek minority with an eye on eliminating it altogether. Ankara started the process by deciding to abrogate the 1930 Treaty of Residence, Commerce and Navigation, and suspending the 1952 Greek Turkish Visa Agreement. This would impact 12,000 Greeks residing in Istanbul, and thousands of others living in Thrace and other locations. On April 10 the GNA unanimously approved such a law; the Senate was expected to do the same. For the British Foreign Office it became difficult to differentiate between Ankara’s “deliberate governmental action aimed at influencing M. Papandreou’s Cyprus policy and the continuous war of petty bureaucratic vindictiveness and reprisal which exists between traditionally distrustful and uncongenial neighbors.”

Whatever the Turkish motivations, Prime Minister Papandreou alerted his Ambassador in Turkey, Poumpouras, to inform İnönü that they could not “afford to sacrifice their relations on the altar of Cyprus” and risk their partnership in NATO and cooperation in the developing European community. They could not allow a local matter to overshadow the larger international considerations. When İnönü postponed the meeting with Poumpouras on April 8 the Greek met with Foreign Minister Erkin instead. Erkin agreed with the need to keep the Cyprus issue within an appropriate perspective, but did not feel confident that Papandreou’s message would make much of an impression on İnönü, particularly once Makarios began to threaten to cut off supplies of electricity and water to the Turkish-Cypriots. When Poumpouras did meet with İnönü he came away from the encounter convinced that the Prime

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1380 FO 371/174813, CONFIDENTIAL, CE103144/5, Letter to L. Dodson, Esq., C.M.G., M.C., General Department, Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W.1. from M.C.G. Man (date unknown).
1381 Ibid.
1382 FO 371/174813, CE113144/7, Letter to L. Dodson, Esq., C.M.G., M.C., General Department, Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W.1. from M.C.G. Man (April 13, 1964).
Minister could do little, and that Ankara’s strategy was to compensate for every setback on
Cyprus by twisting the screws to the Greeks living in Turkey. Only in this way could the
Turkish Government convince public opinion and the political opposition of its commitment to
Turkish rights.1383

General Lyman Lemnitzer of NATO believed the Turks to be actively considering a
military action against Greece, such as seizing a Greek island to use as bargaining chip in
negotiating a settlement to the Cyprus question. The obvious lack of support from their allies
dissatisfied the Turks, leading to a consideration of a tougher course of action towards Greece
and Cyprus with little to no consultation of the West. It remained to be seen how far they would
go.1384 On April 15 Athens sent a note of protest to the Turkish government regarding the harsh
measures taken against Greek residents of Istanbul, including expulsions and limiting the
performance of their occupations, violations against the Greek-Turkish Convention of Residence,
Commerce and Navigation the Turks recently denounced.1385 The Greeks accused the Turks of
persecuting Greek citizens residing in Turkey for political reasons and jeopardizing Greek-
Turkish relations.1386

UN Secretary General U Thant as well as British and American officials recognized the
need for a face-to-face meeting between İnönü and Papandreou before they reached a point of no
return. Athens revealed it might consider a meeting given ample preparation time, but only to
address the Greeks community in Istanbul; Cyprus was an entirely different matter. Greek
Foreign Minister Kostopoulos “volunteered categorically though extremely confidentially that

1383 Ibid.
1384 FO 371/174813, CE103144/9, No. 671, April 18, 1964, D. 12.54 p.m. April 18, 1964, R. 1.58 p.m.
April 18, 1964, IMMEDIATE, CONFIDENTIAL, Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 671 of April 18.
1385 FO 371/174813, CE103144/19, No. 68, April 19, 1964, D. 1.30 p.m. April 19, 1964, R. 1.59 p.m.
April 19, 1964, Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 680 of April 19.
1386 FO 371/174813, Cypher/OTP And By Bag, FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION,
No. 1512, D. 4.35 a.m. April 18, 1964, CONFIDENTIAL, Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1512 of April
17.
the Greeks were prepared for the sacrifice of their minority in Istanbul” but warned of severe repercussions if the Greek Orthodox Patriarch was violated in any way.  

The British worried that the Americans assuming the responsibility for bringing Papandreou and İnönü to the table would anger the Greeks; Athens considered the U.S. to be overly pro-Turkish and willing to give the Turks Cyprus and even Thrace or Rhodes if need be. News of the Americans proposing a meeting “might result in disastrous pressures on Papandreou part of whose internal political pretention is to free himself from a servility to the Americans which he attributes to his political opponents.” Any settlement on Cyprus would likely involve the Greeks in Turkey in exchange for the Turks’ willingness to walk away from Cyprus, “an extremely ungrateful task for the Americans to have to promote a meeting which might have this consequence and risk of failure would be high.” Despite the many political hazards the U.S. took the lead in attempting to foster discussion between the two sides and prevent a disruption of the NATO Alliance. The Turks categorically refused to consider direct talks and persisted in placing all of the blame for the current state of Greek-Turkish relations on the Greeks. Foreign Minister Erkin insisted that the Greeks would first have to accept Turkey’s “accepted solution” for Cyprus before talks between the prime ministers could commence. Erkin later demonstrated some flexibility in trying to arrange for an exploratory meeting between Turkey and Greece’s

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1389 Ibid.

1390 FO 371/174813, CE103144/20, WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION, No. 1786, May 9, 1964, D. 11.00 p.m. May 9, 1964, R. 1.40 p.m. April 26, 1964, PRIORITY, CONFIDENTIAL, Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1786 of May 9.
Ambassadors, but Athens rejected his proposals following the expulsion of two Orthodox Metropolitans from Istanbul.  

While Athens and Ankara squabbled over holding discussions Greek and Turkish soldiers secretly slipped into Cyprus throughout the summer, reaching numbers far exceeding the limits set by the agreements of 1959. Some reports placed the number of troops as high as 10-15,000. Adding to the undercurrent of tension was the fact that the UNFICYP proved to be incapable of protecting the Turkish-Cypriot minority from attacks and coercion. With the more radical elements of the Greek-Cypriot community continuing their campaign of violence, Ankara decided a demonstration of its disapproval was in order by moving its fleet closer to Cyprus and stepping up the number of sorties over the island. American officials did not take Turkey’s belligerent moves seriously, but did debate the Turks’ ability to coordinate a landing on Cyprus. Johnson did not wait to find out. To head off a Turkish invasion of Cyprus, he composed what George Ball described as “the most brutal diplomatic note I have ever seen.”

The Johnson Letter and its Impact

President Johnson could not anticipate the full extent of the damage his infamous June 5, 1964 letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü would have on future U.S.-Turkish relations. According to Henry Kissinger it “transformed the NATO guarantee from a strategic necessity into a whim of American policy,” thereby causing Turkey to lose its already troubled faith in the Alliance. Although the letter succeeded in preventing a Turkish intervention, it finally proved to many in the Turkish elite that the association between the two countries was little more than a

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1392 Laipson 61.
1393 Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at Admiralty House, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 23rd May, 1963, at 10.30 a.m. The British National Archives 3.
1394 Ball 350.
“marriage of convenience” dictated by Soviet containment and Turkey’s strained relationship with Europe. The readiness with which Johnson appeared to dismiss Turkey’s concerns accelerated Turkish fears of abandonment sparked in 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis when Kennedy risked making Turkey, as well as Germany, a theatre of conflict between the two superpowers. Having been notified of Turkey’s intent to invade and “occupy a portion of Cyprus” under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee, Johnson identified the inherent hypocrisy of an operation that would lead to partition, which was excluded by the same treaty. Johnson also bristled at Ankara’s apparent willingness to undertake an invasion and partition of Cyprus without the consultation and approval of Washington. The president called upon the Turks’ obligations to NATO and the fundamental betrayal to the precepts of the Alliance a war between Greece and Turkey would mean. Johnson’s reminder that Turkey’s responsibilities to NATO should outweigh potential war with Greece contained the crucial threat. If a Turkish intervention should “lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union,” Johnson wrote, “I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.” The telegram included a litany of other reasons to deter Ankara from its course of action, including the ongoing efforts and recent successes of the UN peacekeeping force that would be undermined by a Turkish invasion, and the violation of Article IV of the 1947 bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Turkey forbidding the Turks from using U.S.-provided military

1398 Letter from President Lyndon B. Johnson to Ismet Inonu in Coyle 235.
1399 Ibid 236.
assistance for purposes other than those previously sanctioned by Washington. Johnson assured İnönü that he intended his severe warning to ensure the safety of the Turkish-Cypriots and had pursued a policy consistent with this to the detriment of relations with Athens and Makarios. Johnson had already utilized a similar threat when he authorized George Ball to intimidate Makarios by warning that the U.S. would do nothing to hold back Turkey if it invaded.

After U.S. Ambassador Hare presented the letter to İnönü the Prime Minister expressed his immediate disagreement with some of Johnson’s points, but agreed to refrain from taking any action in the immediate future so long as the U.S. agreed to assume a more active role in resolving the conflict. İnönü expressed his desire to let the Turkish people know that he postponed Turkish intervention at the request of the U.S. and not because of his own hesitation. Johnson’s letter found its way into the hands of the Turkish press who published it for the public to read and judge for themselves. Large demonstrations made up an immediate part of the ensuing anti-America reaction; in the long-term an increasingly powerful Left in Turkey used the letter as a means of gaining leverage over the more conservative elements in Turkish government. Taylor Belcher, the American Ambassador to Cyprus, wondered if İnönü had consciously attempted to provoke Washington’s disapproval of an invasion, because it would take the Prime Minister “off [the] hook politically and shift blame for Turkish inaction to us.” The Greek Foreign Minister Stavros Costopoulos also saw a political motivation behind Turkey’s threatened invasion: the upcoming Senatorial elections. More important than this was what Costopoulos identified as “the Turks’ ‘spoiled child’ complex in which they seek to obtain

1400 Ibid.
concessions from USG to support GOT in return for latter’s better behavior,” thereby reducing
the threatened invasion to a hollow threat.\footnote{57} \footnote{57. Telegram From the
Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Athens, June 8, 1964, 10 p.m.,
\textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XVI: Cyprus; Greece; Turkey}

Ball believed the Turks to be “clearly frightened” by the unresolved situation on Cyprus,
regardless of Ankara’s intentions, as well as “perplexed and sad” as they waited for Washington
to “force a settlement on them – provided adequate face-saving aspects can be devised.”\footnote{64}
\footnote{64. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson,
Cyprus; Greece; Turkey} (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2000): 132.}
\footnote{95. H.W. Brands \textit{Into the Labyrinth} 95.}

Johnson’s harsh warning was an unexpected tactic given the fact that Washington regarded
Turkey as the centerpiece of its Middle East policy. In the event of a war with the Soviet Union,
the Turkish Straits could be closed down by NATO, effectively bottling up the Black Sea, while
U.S. bombers stationed in Turkey struck targets far behind Soviet lines.\footnote{108}
The note was also a shock to the Turks given their previous dealings with Johnson. As vice-president
in the summer of 1962 Johnson demonstrated to them how face-to-face democracy worked; as president
two years later he showed how executive authority could be wielded with distant ruthlessness.
Furthermore, The Johnson Administration, notably sensitive to Turkish demands throughout
1964, complemented the resolve shown by the İnönü Government. “İnönü is a hero,” Johnson
told Turkish Foreign Minister F. C. Erkin during an April 29 meeting, adding that the United
States was “tremendously grateful that he had acted with such statesmanship at a time when
others did not display the same qualities.”\footnote{1406} The president further assured Erkin that his
administration did not have a better friend than İnönü, professed his admiration for the Turkish
people and enthused: “We are always going to be stout allies.” Such glowing approval would take on a note of irony less than a month later.

**Negotiating a Settlement to the Crisis**

With an invasion of Cyprus effectively denied them by Washington, the Turks continued to use the Territorial Waters Act and the denunciation of the Convention on Residence, Commerce and Navigation, to go into effect on August 25 and September 30 respectively, as sources of long-term pressure on the Greeks. Ankara freely admitted that it intended for its campaign against the Greeks residents of Istanbul to coerce Athens to condemn Makarios’s policy in Cyprus and withdraw its support of the Archbishop. To achieve this end Ankara forbade Greek nationals from removing their assets out of Turkey and froze the accounts held by Greek residents in Turkish banks. In addition to these new measures the Turkish government deported 76 Greek nationals in late May and early June for failing to comply with the measure, bringing the total to 139. Many were prominent business and civic leaders with wealth the Turkish press assumed had been used to bribe Turkish officials and ensure their protection.

British officials assumed the measures to be a last-ditch attempt by the Turks to shore up public opinion and quell resentment over the plight of the Turkish-Cypriots. Ankara did not appear to have carefully considered the possible outcomes of seizing “what is virtually the only weapon available to them, other than intervention. And now, because they must pin their hopes to something, they tend to over-emphasize the effect which the deportations might be expected to have on M. Papandreou’s polices and to under-estimate the degree of resentment that the

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1407 Ibid.
1409 FO 371/174813, CE103144/27, BRITISH EMBASSY, ANKARA. June 3, 1964. Letter to D.S.L. Dodson, Esq., C.M.G., E.C., Central Department, Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W.1. from M.C.G. Man. Most Greek nationals residing in Turkey anticipated this action months before it occurred and accordingly moved their assets out of the country.
1410 Ibid.
deportations will have inspired.” The Turks seemed to be actively promoting violence against the Greek community to risk an international event such as what had occurred in 1955, and London did not believe they would deter aggression against the Greeks should it occur. Any moderation of the Turkish position towards the Greek community seemed unlikely until the Cyprus issue was settled to Turkey’s satisfaction.

Because Greece refused to directly negotiate with Turkey without representatives from the Cypriot Government present Johnson had little choice but to negotiate a solution separately with İnönü and Papandreou. From June 22-23 İnönü met with Johnson to discuss the Cyprus problem and concluded the meeting by vowing to reach a greater sense of understanding of one another’s position and to remain committed to “common democracy, to individual freedom, to human dignity and to peace in justice.” Johnson and İnönü released a communiqué emphasizing the legitimacy of the 1959 treaties guaranteeing the independence of Cyprus, a stance Greece found to be greatly disappointing. Beyond this tepid assertion there was no sign of a solution that might prevent future conflict between Greece and Turkey. İnönü departed the U.S. as Prime Minister Papandreou arrived to meet with Johnson for more direct negotiations between the leaders of Greece and Turkey to find some lasting solution to the Cyprus issue. Johnson met with as much success with Papandreou as he did with İnönü. The Cyprus riddle remained without a long-term solution.

The Johnson-İnönü communiqué reaffirming the commitment of Turkey and the U.S. to the validity of the 1959 treaties inflamed Greek-Cypriots because it legalized the potential

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1411 FO 371/174813, CONFIDENTIAL, Letter to D.S.L. Dodson, Esq., C.M.G., E.C., Central Department, Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W.1 from D. Allen (date unknown).
1412 Ibid.
involvement of the Turkish military. In a letter to the *New York Times* dated June 25 Zenon Rossides, the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the UN, excoriated the decision to recognize the Zurich and London agreements. Rossides rejected the treaties’ ability to ensure Turkey’s sovereignty and independence, because it left Cyprus “a country that is deprived of the fundamental right to decide upon its own Constitution, or amend it even on matters of purely internal administration without the consent of three foreign powers, is obviously not an independent or sovereign nation.”

Johnson had little choice but to maintain the status quo as best he could. With the political futures of both İnönü and Papandreou at stake should either one make a substantial concession, Johnson could not lean on either leader, the way he might a timid Congressman, and expect them to bend to his will.

The British made greater gains at a conference in Geneva held in August. The U.K. Mission brokered the creation of the Greece-Turkey Joint Board of Defense, an association to be co-chaired by one Turk and one Greek appointed by their respective governments. Rounding out the Board would be the two nation’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense and the Chiefs of Staff. An emissary of the SACEUR would be in attendance at meetings held every four months alternating between Ankara and Athens with extraordinary meetings as needed. The Board’s broadly defined role was to “consider and recommend to Governments and where appropriate to the North Atlantic Council, such actions as it may deem necessary and desirable to maintain the peace and security of the Eastern Mediterranean area” and to seek new ways of increasing cooperation between the two countries. The Turks agreed to contemplate the union of Cyprus

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1416 FO 371/174813, SECRET, Cypher/OTP, FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION, Mr. Scott, No. 382, August 12, 1964, D. 4.38 p.m. August 12, 1964, R. 5.08 p.m. August 12, 1964. IMMEDIATE, SECRET.
with Greece in exchange for base facilities on the island. Following this development a rickety truce was in effect on Cyprus by mid-August with UN peacekeepers maintaining calm between Greek and Turkish forces. Supplies of food slowly trickled into the embattled Turkish minority communities. At Geneva representatives discussed the prospect of allowing enosis in exchange for a Turkish base on Cyprus, but such a solution seemed remote.

Moscow expressed its dismay with the recent violence on the island, and indicated its willingness to contribute to the peacekeeping effort. In the short-term, London advised circling the wagons at NATO in order to stave off a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey, and at the same time dissuade Soviet involvement. The British did not wish to risk an independent Cyprus with the potential to become a menace to their interests in the eastern Mediterranean and to the long-term welfare of the Turkish-Cypriots who stayed. In the meantime, the British Foreign Office concerned itself with deterring Makarios from calling for Cyprus’ independence at an upcoming of the UN General Assembly. Conditions on Cyprus returned to a state of relative normalcy but with the fundamental issues regarding the Greek and Turkish populations left unresolved and capable of giving way to a cycle of violence in the near future that would once again involve Greece and Turkey in a possible war. Dealings between Athens and Ankara had steadily declined since the late 1950s and early 1960s when the two developed a cooperative relationship that helped to slacken past strains over issues such as the Turkish minority in Eastern Greece, fishing rights in the Mediterranean, the Greek minority in Istanbul, and the problems of Cyprus. Turkey faithfully upheld is support of the London-Zurich agreements and

\[1417\] Ibid.
\[1418\] C.M. 64 Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 18th August, 1964, at 11:30 a.m.
\[1419\] Ibid.
\[1420\] Ibid 4.
steered the Turkish-Cypriots towards a policy of moderation. The events of 1964 dissuaded Ankara from continuing this approach and placed it on a collision course with Athens that ended in 1974 with Turkey making good on its threat to invade Cyprus and another war scare.

American soldiers and their families stationed in Turkey detected a marked rise in hostility in reaction to Washington’s handling of the events on Cyprus. The Turkish press published anti-American treatises and enough incidents, real and imagined, occurred by the end of 1964 that servicemen newly arrived in Turkey heard no shortage of cautionary tales involving spitting, stoning, shattered windshields, and slashed tires. Americans increasingly reported that the Turkish people had no misgivings about charging them higher rents and prices on consumer goods in politically tinged acts of price gouging. Such signs of aversion were the cost of preventing an immediate crisis on Cyprus, and it would grow in size and aggressiveness. In August Turkish demonstrators attempted to gather in front of the American Embassy. When Turkish police prevented the mob from reaching the embassy building they turned their wrath against the nearby U.S. Air Force airmen billets from which American servicemen foolishly taunted the protestors. Several broken windows later the police arrived and dispersed the crowd. Although Ankara suppressed the story from the Turkish press the event such violent altercations became distressingly common in the coming years with members of the American military targets of physical attacks. Turkey’s concerns in Cyprus became lost in a mounting pile of potential international calamities. The Johnson administration was already overtaxed with the widening conflict in Vietnam, ongoing tension with the Soviets, and other crises taking shape in the Congo, Panama, and Indonesia. In addition to this list of global concerns, like İnönü and Papandreou, Johnson

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1422 Baker 75.  
1423 Wolf 53-54.
had his own political future to consider. With his reelection on the line in November 1964, Johnson informed his staff that he did not need a second war to break out and damper his chances of winning.\footnote{Warren I. Cohen “Balancing American Interests in the Middle East: Lyndon Baines Johnson vs. General Gamal Abdul Nasser” in Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, eds. \textit{Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World} (Cambridge University Press, 1994): 285.} Within the circus of Soviet containment, Cyprus seemed a mere sideshow, one in which American foreign policy could be capriciously adjusted as needed. It has been suggested that Johnson did not consider Cyprus in 1964 to be a matter of great importance to warrant his close personal involvement, hence his willingness to delegate management responsibilities to George Ball.\footnote{Geyelin 116.} But if, as John Lewis Gaddis asserts, the Johnson administration’s greatest fear was not the spread of communism but “the threat of embarrassment” or appearing impotent then the U.S.’s heavy handed-approach to Turkey becomes clearer.\footnote{John Lewis Gaddis \textit{Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982): 212.} Moscow could easily view the ongoing tug-of-war between two NATO allies over Cyprus as an indicator of Western weakness and Washington’s inability to bring the crisis to an end, necessitating a bold move by Johnson to allay such a perception. But in sending his letter Johnson effectively “struck at the sanctity of Turkey’s whole system of alliances” and negated the wisdom of keeping Turkey’s NATO membership as the cornerstone of its foreign policy.\footnote{Harris 59.}

\textit{Conclusion}

Even with his less than satisfactory handling of the crisis costing him a number of votes from the Greek-American community, a concern he regularly mentioned when discussing the Cyprus issue, Johnson managed to secure his reelection.\footnote{Cohen 285.} But he lost substantially more than the support of Greek-Americans; Johnson also managed to alienate both his Greek and Turkish
allies and guaranteed that Turkey would no longer again be the unwavering ally of years past. His diplomatic note made tangible a rapidly sense of cynicism and incredulity in Turkey regarding the U.S. as an ally, building on the consequences of the U-2 incident and Cuban Crisis. It is far too simplistic to cite the Johnson letter of 1964 as the primary reason for damaging the previously affable relations between the United States and Turkey; larger domestic and international developments had been pushing Turkey to consider adopting new policies that demonstrated greater autonomy from Washington. The steady growth of anti-Americanism in Turkey during the 1960s became much more visible after Johnson’s letter; the letter did not create such sentiment so much as give free reign to display preexisting feelings in a much more obvious and vocal fashion. In denying Ankara the right to protect the lives of Turkish-Cypriots and to carry out its duties as a guarantor power per the London Treaty, the Johnson Administration showed the people of Turkey just how difficult unilateral action would be without the approval of the United States, a bitter lesson the British had learned in 1956 while attempting to retake the Suez. For over a decade Turkey regarded its NATO membership as an incontrovertible proof that its security was guaranteed by fellow members, the U.S. in particular. It viewed its NATO membership as a nearly sacred bond. In less than two years, by the example of its conduct during the Cuban crisis and now Cyprus, the U.S. demonstrated the malleability of the Alliance to fit the needs of American policy at the expense of other members.

From Johnson’s end the immediate concern was of course to avoid conflict between Greece and Turkey that would cause irrevocable damage to NATO. In that regard he did succeed. From a tangential standpoint the outcome of the Cyprus crisis also succeeded in convincing Turkey to expand their efforts to draw closer politically and economically to Western
Europe, particularly by seeking full membership in the European Union. This ongoing effort has offered no shortage of frustrations during the past decades.
CONCLUSION

The frighteningly blunt character of the Johnson letter ran contrary to previous years of American officials frequently communicating their expectations in the most obfuscating or ambiguous of ways. But more than anything, Johnson’s threats of inaction clearly conveyed to Ankara that the U.S. controlled NATO and would not permit the Alliance’s members to carry out unilateral operations that might upset the balance of peace. In a sense, the Turks learned in 1964 the same jarring lesson that the British had discovered in 1956 after capturing Suez; it simply took longer for Ankara to have the realization. The 1964 letter removed any doubt in Ankara as to whom it answered and startled Turkish officials conditioned to hearing suggestions and recommendations from Washington rather than outright commands and intimidation.

The reasons for Washington’s tangential rather than a direct approach had to do as much with the United States’ hesitance to embrace its hegemonic duties after World War II as the turbulent state of Turkish politics during the same period. Washington had a definite vision for the state of the world, one that replaced the imperial dynamic that developed during the Pax Britannica with bilateral relations to encourage expanded democracy and economic development in underdeveloped nations, while at the same time promoting enough military strength to both hold back the Soviets and discourage the activities of domestic leftist groups. This approach frequently worked at cross-purposes when U.S. officials discovered that those in power in developing regions favoring military build-up would have little interest in promoting political participation that might replace them with a new administration.

Turkey is an interesting test case in that it entered its first sustained period of multi-party politics at roughly the same time that Washington decided to commit financial and military assistance to the Turks. The RPP, in power for more than twenty years and heavily identified
with the Turkish military, voluntarily stepped aside in recognition of the desire among the majority population for political change. For the DP, the timing must have appeared most fortuitous: finding a benefactor willing to sponsor military improvements and economic development just as the Menderes government came to power. Even though the DP never gained the full support of Turkish military elites, a circumstance that would ultimately seal the party’s fate, it proved itself as a willing and competent participant in holding back the Soviets and was rewarded with NATO membership and advanced military hardware, including partial ownership of nuclear weapons. In taking on more of these defense duties, the Menderes government actually increased the importance of the Turkish military and guaranteed that it would assume a more active role in national politics, particularly when the DP began to utilize increasingly oppressive tactics against the opposition.

This increasingly repressive political environment became a turning point on several levels. It justified the eventual removal of an increasingly corrupt government that seemed to remain power thanks in large part to the grace of the United States, consequently creating a negative correlation between the progressively unpopular DP government and the United States at a time when America’s military presence was on the rise. Whereas the Turks initially viewed the presence of U.S. armed forces in their homeland as testimony to America’s support of its sovereignty and stability, as the years wore on American military personnel came to be seen increasingly as members of an occupying force living in an increasingly insular manner and in defiance of Turkey’s law. The first U.S. facilities in Turkey appeared at a time when the Turks lived in fear of a Soviet invasion. When this fear largely subsided by the mid-1960s the Turks were left wondering if handing over millions of acres to the U.S. to do with as it saw fit was
ultimately worth it, particularly when the outcome of the 1964 Cyprus crisis demonstrated that Turkey’s membership in NATO limited rather than augmented its military options.

How Washington viewed Turkey’s responsibilities in the cold war changed over time, and the goals and intentions of U.S. foreign policy shifted from one administration to the next. Slogging through Korea robbed the U.S. of both blood and treasure and depleted the good will of the American people towards the Truman White House. Eisenhower learned from these lessons and approached the security of American interests with an eye towards the deployment of nuclear weapons overseas in order to cut down on costs and to raise the stakes with the Soviets. The Korean War also prevented policymakers from being willing to consider the cold war as a conflict with nuance and shadings, but instead view it as a monolithic clash pitting East against West where fronts could develop anywhere in the world. Concerns in Washington moved from rebuilding the economies of Europe to ensuring their military preparedness in the event of war with the Soviets or their allies.

Washington’s decision to focus more of its efforts on improving America’s ability to defend the Mediterranean opened the door to greater participation by international organizations in Turkish economic matters. In a number of respects, the history of Turkey during the period of 1945-1964 is a narrative of its associations with the international organizations it joined or attempted to become party to. On numerous occasions American officials made every effort to secure Turkey a place at the table in a number of global organizations beginning with the OEEC and NATO. Turkish membership took on added importance after the Marshall Plan concluded in 1952 and aid from the United States ceased to be as forthcoming as it had been in the previous years. Membership in these organizations offered Turkey a measure of prestige and financial reward, but also provided a frequently rough indoctrination in the fine art of macroeconomics.
These organizations, beginning with the ECA in the late 1940s, expected Turkish officials to compile, assess, and provide statistical information to international organizations. The Turks’ slowness to do so in a timely and efficient manner resulted in a number of discouraging moments in dealings between the ECA, MSA, OEEC, NATO, and the EEC. The Turks were slow to learn that having such data at the ready would ease their dealings with these organizations and reduce the time spent waiting for loans to be approved or rejected. But the lesson eventually did stick, as evidenced by the decision to create state institutions such as the State Planning Organization, designed specifically to gather and interpret economic data in order to ascertain the most effective approaches to development.

Turkey frequently placed more symbolic value in its membership to NATO, ownership of outdated Jupiter missiles, and status relative to the European Union than in the practical worth of such memberships. But arguably, Turkey’s tenacious pursuit of EEC membership became a rejection of its relationship with the United States, as well as an affirmation of American efforts to integrate Turkey with Western Europe with both economic and political ties. Increasing American vacillation eventually led the Turks to look to Western Europe for help. West Germany became a key lender of capital to Turkey, as well as the primary destination of Turkish laborers who took part in rebuilding the German infrastructure during the 1960s. Other European countries also became important contributors to the Turkish government, frequently with the encouragement of the U.S. government, until it was in their best interests to see to it that Turkey’s economy was both strong enough to take part in and compatible with the Common Market. The mindset in Turkish policymakers appears to have shifted from the concept of economic development based on foreign assistance, to expansion grounded in industrialization.
and trade with its Western European partners. In a roundabout way the United States’ desire to see Turkey as a self-reliant state became realized.

The years 1960-1964 represent a period of profound reevaluation and re-conceptualization of Turkey’s foreign policy, particularly in regards to the United States. When the 1960 coup took place American officials followed the same general strategy they had adopted in response to Menderes’s authoritarianism, to lay low, wait for the dust to settle, and assume that whoever emerged as the victor would remain committed to the general tenets of U.S.-Turkish relations. Such a strategy proved to be a sensible one that made it possible for Washington to retain its relatively good relations with Turkey during the regime change, though with some caveats. The provisional government dominated by military leaders systematically analyzed the domestic and foreign policies of the Menderes regime. The CNU decision to reframe Turkey’s Western-oriented foreign policy as one based on its membership in NATO rather than the special relationship between Turkey and the United States may have been due in some measure to military leaders finding more utility in a military alliance than a less tangible political affiliation. It also indicated a desire on the CNU’s part to separate itself from Menderes era policies and make a clean break with the past including the DP’s overeager willingness to follow wherever Washington led.

Washington had also made significant alterations in its dealings with Turkey. American funding continued to drop from the salad days of the Marshall Plan, and the removal of the Jupiter missiles by the Kennedy Administration in 1963 coupled with President Johnson’s harshly worded letter stemming from the possible Turkish invasion of Cyprus the following year, demonstrated to Turkey that they were no longer the staunch ally of the U.S. they once believed themselves to be. These combined acts further showed that Turkey’s belonging to NATO did
not guarantee that their particular security concerns would necessarily be ensured under membership to the Alliance. Turkey appeared to have become a disposable ally. This series of rejections assisted in the development of a vocal leftist movement; after 1964 the Turkish elite and the growing leftist movement were quick to question American motives behind its Mediterranean policies and more amenable to EEC membership as a long-term solution to certain political and economic woes. When the Justice Party broke the RPP’s coalition government in 1966 the new Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, demanded the drafting of a new basing agreement with the U.S. The following year Turkey rejected American requests to allow them access to Turkish facilities in order to offer support to Israel during the Six Day War.1429

In the end Turkey came to view the United States as an increasingly remote and unreliable ally, one willing to turn its back on the Turks if it would serve larger American interests and make promises it had little intention of keeping. When security concerns and perceived risks between the two countries were most in sync during the late 1940s and early 1950s, relations between Turkey and the U.S. were at their closest. But a steady deviation from Turkey’s expectations for America brought about a gradual separation beginning with Washington’s decision to not become a full member of the Baghdad Pact in 1953 and culminating in the one-two punch of the removal of IRBMs from Turkish soil without consulting in 1962 and the unexpectedly brusque nature of Johnson’s letter two years later. After 1964 Ankara chose to approach foreign policy in a more multilateral fashion, including more interaction with the non-aligned countries and warmer relations with the Soviet Union; in November the two countries signed a cultural agreement. Growing anti-American sentiment accompanied Turkey’s more autonomous foreign policy, and a perception of NATO as an

1429 Cooley 115.
unwanted burden on the Turks gained wider acceptance that reached its height in the mid-1970s after Turkey invaded Cyprus and the Carter administration subsequently placed an arms embargo on the Turks. This came after a decade of Washington’s clear lack of understanding of the Turks’ security concerns and prompted a growing interpretation of belonging to the European Union as an opportunity to uncouple Turkey from American influence permanently.\textsuperscript{1430}

Turkey’s military experienced the most profound evolution of Turkish institutions during the two decades after World War II. Within that short time Turkish soldiers graduated from the horse-drawn cart to the medium-range missile. With its growing technical repertoire and expanding arsenal, its political prestige and prominence also grew. If the coup of 1960 showed that the Turkish military had the power to remove civilian governments, the elections of 1961 showed it also had the aptitude of overseeing the development of a new one without retaining control. This demonstrated a deeper sensitivity to national politics perhaps unexpected in the average junta, and the relative success of the coup helped to allow the military to take part in similar interventions in 1971, 1980 and 1997.

What remains is taking stock of the overall success or failure of America’s policies in Turkey during the period under review. Although U.S.-Turkish relations were certainly not as amicable in 1964 as they had been in the late 1940s, Turkey could still be counted as a stanch member of the anti-Soviet cohort. A democratic government was in charge, in contrast to the military junta that came to power in Greece in 1967 and remained in place for seven years. Turkey’s economy was better integrated into Western Europe’s than before World War II, and the European Community had penciled in Turkey for full membership at a future date. Taking stock of the variable nature of the cold war, Washington’s frequently ambiguous approach to

\textsuperscript{1430} Sadik 14.
Turkey proved itself to be largely successful. U.S.-Turkish relations weathered attempts by the Soviets to drive a wedge between the two countries after Stalin’s death and the regime changes that occurred in Turkey in 1950 and 1960. But ambiguity can hardly be the bedrock of a strong, lasting relationship; when the only certainty the Turks could expect from the U.S. became indecision, it became that much easier to navigate a course that did not always correspond with Washington’s objectives.
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