RHETORIC AND THE SCHOLARSHIP OF ENGAGEMENT: PRAGMATIC, PROFESSIONAL, AND ETHICAL CONVERGENCES

Heather Fester

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 2009

Committee:

Dr. Richard C. Gebhardt, Advisor

Dr. Michael B. Ellison
Graduate Faculty Representative

Dr. Kristine L. Blair

Dr. Lance Massey
ABSTRACT

Richard C. Gebhardt, Advisor

The scholarship of engagement, an effort to redefine faculty scholarship in ways that emphasize communal outreach, and rhetoric, which is epistemologically relevant to our modern academic lives, are both models for the future of higher education that are pragmatic, post-professional, and based on ethics. External pressures on the university make discussion of rhetoric and engagement, both of which deal directly with knowledge that grows out of scholarship as it guides practice and service, timely and necessary.

*Rhetoric and the Scholarship of Engagement* examines the competing forces behind this scholarship reform, historicizing the trends and arguing that contradictions inherent in the reforms represent a rich dialogue about the future of academic life. Throughout, *Rhetoric and the Scholarship of Engagement* treats the space between the community and academy as a *dialectical space*—a space structured by tensions between opposing forces such as tensions between discipline/institution, theory/praxis, service/pure scholarship, traditional professionalized practices/changing models of professionalism, responsive faculty roles/isolated functions, foundational/antifoundational knowledge, and visible/invisible work carried out by faculty members.

To suggest best practices for the transition to engaged scholarship, *Rhetoric and the Scholarship of Engagement* highlights scholarship and faculty roles in the field of
rhetoric and composition, arguing that as an already engaged field, it offers a rich theoretical background and successful models for engagement rooted in its pragmatic orientation, struggles for disciplinary legitimation, and overt focus on postmodern ethics in research and institutional life. Through the presentation of rhetoric and composition research, these chapters offer a theoretical background for engagement by examining historical influences, various models of engagement, complications, and examples of application.

In conclusion, the dissertation argues that dialectic spaces, such as exists between the academy and community, can be remediated, not by erasing the contradictions but by reconceiving faculty roles around them. By inhabiting a more robust role as an engaged, pragmatically savvy, post-professional, postmodern and ethical “Citizen Scholar,” the faculty member will be better able to adapt to changing demands throughout his/her academic career.
To my friends and family.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge the support, feedback, and encouragement of the members of my dissertation committee for their careful reading and thoughtful commenting on this dissertation. I would especially like to thank the committee chair, Dr. Richard Gebhardt, who suggested I investigate the scholarship of engagement as a topic dovetailing with my own interests in civic rhetoric and public discourse. He was able to point me toward several faculty-level scholarship of engagement developments on BGSU’s campus as I began the project, which helped develop my understanding of the material. He also helped me make many connections between engagement reforms and work on scholarship in the field of rhetoric and composition, both through discussion with him and as I read his publications. One of Rick’s strengths as a teacher, I have long felt, is the way he teaches through modeling, and my experience with him on this dissertation has been invaluable not only for his editorial acumen and willingness to wrestle with ideas, organization, or syntax to help me with clarity, but also for the ways he modeled professionalism and encouraged me when I struggled. Because of Rick’s careful attention to my dissertation and the time he took with it, I learned a great deal about academic writing and my own process, forms of knowledge that will serve me well in all future projects.

I would also like to thank Dr. Kristine Blair, who is quite an inspiring engaged scholar and whose feedback on the chapters always challenged me to push intellectual and practical boundaries in my work. Kris provided multiple models, from her own work also, and asked some difficult questions, many of which I know I will be returning to for future projects that grow out of this dissertation. I always felt as if she valued the work;
her willingness to take it seriously and provide supportive comments was another source of inspiration to me when I was laboring to complete a chapter or revision.

It was a pleasure to work with Dr. Lance Massey as well, who was able to help me with some research “brush-clearing,” as he put it, while clarifying several directions for future projects that I had not been focused on. Dr. Michael Ellison was a very supportive outside committee member, and apart from posing helpful questions, his interactions with the text and his careful reading helped validate the dissertation and generate some potential new audiences for the future.

Thanks also to Dr. Barbara Genelle Smith Gebhardt who took a personal interest in the success of the project, provided supportive commentary, and read the dissertation closely, which proved a great help as I was preparing the final copy for submission.

I would like to thank all the faculty I’ve worked with in Bowling Green State University’s Rhetoric and Writing Ph.D. program. They’ve all contributed, whether directly or indirectly, to my success as a student and Ph.D. candidate. I’d especially like to thank Dr. Sue Carter Wood, whose courses on the history of rhetoric, advanced composition pedagogy, and women in the rhetorical tradition laid the foundation for my dissertation research.

Last but definitely not least, I’d like to thank my parents, Dan and Rita Fester; grandmother, Joyce Corman; other family members; colleagues; and friends who supported me in multiple ways throughout this project, especially when I took my first tenure-line position while ABD and found my endurance and commitment to the dissertation flagging. I honestly could not have done it without them, and they have all
provided me with many “graces” and much space, helping me see the importance of the work I was doing so I could accomplish this goal. Thank you all!
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. RHETORICAL ENGAGEMENT .................................................................. 1
Rhetoric and Composition as an Engaged Discipline ................................................ 4
Relevance vs. Isolation .................................................................................. 7
Theory vs. Practice......................................................................................... 9
Marginalized vs. Central ............................................................................... 13
Key Definitions .......................................................................................................... 18
The Research Gap: Rhetorical and Dialectical Engagement ..................................... 23
Limitations: Dissent in the Ranks .............................................................................. 29
Dissertation Overview ............................................................................................... 36

CHAPTER II. ACTION IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD .................................................... 43
The “Tacit Tradition” ................................................................................................. 45
The “Taint of Practice” .............................................................................................. 47
Rhetoric and the Pragmatic Tradition ........................................................................ 51
Domains of Pragmatism within Rhetoric and Composition ........................................ 55
Neopragmatism in Rhetoric and Composition .......................................................... 55
Rhetorical Hermeneutics ......................................................................................... 60
The Pluralist Strand in Rhetoric and Composition .................................................... 61
The Third Sophistic and Pragmatic Rhetoric .............................................................. 62
Contextualism ......................................................................................................... 63
Constructive Postmodernism in Rhetorical Thought .................................................. 64
Classical Pragmatism in Rhetoric and Composition ................................................... 65
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethics and Technology</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Ethics</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmodern Rhetorical-Ethical Models</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocal Models of Ethics</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heuristic Models of Ethics</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Models of Ethics</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflexive Models of Ethics</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics across the Curriculum</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V. TOWARD A NEW SCHOLARLY CITIZENSHIP</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergences and Dialectical Engagement</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domains of Engaged Rhetoric</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetorical Engagement</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of Rhetorical Citizenship</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civically Engaged Pedagogies</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Analogies Found in Institutional Service</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Intellectualism</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges across the Domains of Engaged Rhetoric</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Scholarly Citizenship Models</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works Cited</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES/TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure/Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Figure: Kinneavy’s Triangle</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Figure: The Ethical Situation Triangle</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Figure: Ethical Systems Triangle</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Figure: Research Practices Triangle</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Figure (repeated): The Ethical Situation Triangle</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Figure: Rhetorical-Ethical Models Triangle</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Figure: Gebhardt/Rice Model of Engaged Research</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I. RHETORICAL ENGAGEMENT

“[Higher Education has] become a private benefit, not a public good. Increasingly, the campus is being viewed as a place where students get credentialed and faculty get tenured, while the overall work of the academy does not seem particularly relevant to the nation’s most pressing civic, social, economic, and moral problems” (Boyer, “The Scholarship of Engagement” 85).

“Pressure for change in higher education is unrelenting. The common message to universities from legislatures, boards, and other constituencies is this: Focus missions. Set priorities. Teach more, and become more engaged with your communities. Many institutions have responded to these pressures in good faith with various exercises in strategic planning and creative mission building, and some have seen real change. But in many others, reform efforts have run head-on into a culture that continues to reward contributions to the discipline ahead of those to the institution. Thus, many large-scale efforts to restructure faculty work have fizzled at the department level” (Slevin, “Preserving Critical Faculties” 25).

As the two epigraphs that open this chapter suggest, American higher education and English studies as a part of that system are currently operating in an engagement-sensitive world. The first quote by Ernest Boyer suggests that the needs of the public are often neglected by higher education, and he labored as Carnegie Foundation president to close this gap between community and academy. The second quote from rhetoric and composition specialist James Slevin points to some of the problems that have come out of this tense space between community and academy. He describes how the “pressures” from the community have resulted in “various
exercises in strategic planning and creative mission building” in the academy that have sometimes resulted in real change but have often “fizzled” out (25). The tone of the passage suggests resistance to such external and administrative mandates for engagement if they are issued without genuine changes in the university structure to support them.

The space between community needs or expectations and the mission of universities and colleges is a dialectical space—i.e., a space structured by tensions between opposing forces. Such a space is volatile and creative, as this dissertation will explore, and it is an area where genuine change is made possible. The present dissertation explains the way faculty scholarship and roles are changing in this space created by demands for engagement, and it argues for a trajectory of best practices throughout the transition period. It also addresses the material realities of changing professional roles for faculty where engagement is perceived as a time-consuming obligation added to existing roles.

The controversies surrounding the scholarship of engagement movement emerge from the contrast between not only academic versus community values, but, as the chapters of this dissertation will explore, also between the values of discipline v. institution, theory v. praxis, service v. pure scholarship, traditional professionalized practices v. changing models of professionalism, responsive faculty roles v. isolated functions, foundational v. antifoundational knowledge, and visible v. invisible work carried out by faculty members. In other words, engagement initiatives create spaces where a confluence of forces driving academic change interact, and taken together, these signal a larger shift in the university’s role in society and the faculty member’s role within the system as well.

Also, in these dialectical spaces created by the scholarship of engagement movement, the present dissertation shows, rhetoric and composition has an important place because, like
engagement, it is rooted in pragmatism and public discourse and service. Further, both rhetoric
and engagement are especially relevant now because of the return of ethics in discussions of
higher education reform and the decline of previous models of disciplinarity, professionalization,
and scholarship. This is a dissertation about the common origins of these—at first—seemingly
unrelated changes on-going across institutions of higher education. This is also a dissertation
about the changing role of rhetoric and composition in the newly engaged university setting. As
the dissertation will show, however, such changes are not foregone conclusions, nor should they
be, based on the still omnipresent resistance to them from members of the university community.
The success of these interlinked movements will rely in part on the efforts of rhetoric and
composition faculty, without whom field consensus and communication about material concerns
and important engagement principles beyond the discipline will not be possible.

This scholarship of engagement chapter will provide definitions for the dissertation and
an overview of concerns shared by the movement and engaged rhetoric. The next section,
“Rhetoric and Composition as an Engaged Discipline,” explores three conflicts that partially
structure the field, namely the contrast between relevance/isolation, theory/practice,
marginalized/central concerns in field identities. Then, the chapter will examine the crisis in the
humanities that has pushed engagement and rhetoric to the forefront of academic reform in a
Definitions” section will explain and contextualize the terminology and concepts from the reform
initiatives, including the notions of engaged scholarship, engaged professionalism, and rhetorical
engagement. The section after, “The Research Gap: Rhetorical Engagement,” reviews efforts
within the field to redefine scholarship along engaged lines. The “Limitations: Dissent in the
‘Ranks’” section considers prevalent faculty concerns that may limit the success of engagement,
and the final section “Dissertation Overview” outlines the chapters that follow, connecting them to the overall project of moving beyond the field in discussions of scholarly citizenship.

**Rhetoric and Composition as an Engaged Discipline**

Rhetoric and composition, a field rooted in ancient philosophies of public discourse and ethics, which has gained disciplinary status and respectability in the last forty years or so, has arisen from the same kairotic ashes as engagement has, and is similarly viewed by many with suspicion. For this reason, the field, too, often finds itself at the heart of conflicts between private benefit and public good (Halloran), between basic research and broadened definitions, between teaching or community-oriented service growing out of intellectual work and a reward system for faculty that relegates considerably less esteem to such work. Rhetoric and composition has operated on the margins of the academy for some time, as Thomas Miller describes; only in the last half of the twentieth century have conditions ripened sufficiently for the field to move to the center.

There are multiple factors at work in explaining why this is so. Thomas Miller describes how disciplines go through a process of naturalization in conjunction with significant cultural changes. He says, “When a discipline becomes institutionalized, it can deny that it is a rhetorical response to a particular social problem or cultural need because it has become authoritative enough to establish its purposes and positions as autonomous categories such as ‘science’ or ‘literature.’” (19). For rhetoric and English, those disciplinary roots are linked to open enrollments. Miller continues:

As the boundaries around the educated culture became blurred by the decline of learned languages and the admission of broader classes of students, higher education was called
upon to explain historical changes and cultural differences…. Rhetoric and moral philosophy have traditionally been situated in the domain where the learned culture made contact with the popular experience…. [T]he teaching of English, particularly in broad-based institutions and in lower division courses, has been an area where the conventions of academic discourse and the learned culture still come into contact with those who have not been taught to respect them…. The dominant culture is itself transformed by such contacts through the dialectic process of “transculturation.” (26-29).

Miller borrows Mary Louise Pratt’s notion of “contact zones” to describe the spaces of enculturation where “the learned” meets the “less refined,” and he argues these zones are the fertile soil out of which rhetoric grows. Rhetoric is, in his argument, concerned with translating ideas for “public audiences” and has occupied itself with “public opinions” instead of “Truth,” and “in this domain between the popular experience and the educated culture, rhetoric has been defined as the art of celebrating public values, resolving legal conflicts, and deliberating over political policies and actions” (6-7). In short, then, rhetoric could be defined as historically “engaged” with public and civic discourse and virtue. Furthermore, rhetoric, like engagement, has emerged from the tense, transitional space structured by opposing forces.

While Thomas Miller’s connection is fresh and insightful as he links rhetoric’s rise in the curriculum with changing demographics and levels of access to higher learning, it is useful to remember that those changing enrollments are a symptom of other, broader social changes. The same is true regarding engagement initiatives. Richard E. Miller makes the argument in Writing at the End of the World that technology has dramatically refigured the role of rhetoric and the shape of the academy. With rapidly evolving technologies come changes in basic literacy, and these affect change in curricula, textual practices, and institutional structures. This is an
increasingly popular view that has been treated in the literature as study of the changing “geographies” of higher education and of writing (Reynolds; Mauk; Ede; Powell). Rhetoric and composition, as the chief guardian and purveyor of academic literacy, in this view, necessarily follows technology.

Another theory linked to changing demographics in higher education that also results in changes for the role of rhetoric and composition finds the field complicitous in the corporatization of higher education (Bousquet; Ohmann). Jeffrey Williams has argued persuasively, however, in a 2005 *JAC* article that many of the grand narratives we invoke to describe the social history of education and its influence on disciplines, such as the influence of the corporate model or German research model on American higher education, actually operate to a large extent as myths. Williams claims, even more surprisingly, that higher education is the historical legal precedent for private corporations resulting from an 1819 ruling involving Dartmouth College. “In Marshall’s ruling and subsequent case law, though distinguished as charitable rather than profitable, universities are indelibly a function of private property, existing to serve not the public but the will of the trustees” (67). In other words, the conceptual resistance to both rhetoric and engagement is often manufactured through narratives that emphasize one version of higher education history rather than the competing values that have led to the present university structure.

So, while Thomas Miller describes the disciplining influences of open admissions and others describe the influences of technology and economics in forming the discipline of rhetoric and composition as an engaged discipline, no single cause can encompass the many competing values that surround engaged practice in the academy. Perhaps instead of isolating causes, it is more useful to examine areas of consensus *existing* in the field to gain an understanding of why
so many of our practices are engaged. Chris Gallagher describes these types of practices in the field as a host of “efforts to make composition and rhetoric more ‘relevant,’ including various calls for ‘public intellectuals’ (Brandt; Daniell; Hawisher and Selfe); and service-learning (Adler-Kassner, Crooks, and Watters; Deans; Herzberg; Wells; Welch)” (76, emphasis mine). He emphasizes that appeals for relevance are symptoms of our “disciplinary guilt” and a generalizable “fear of not mattering” (76, emphasis in original). On the other hand, these engaged components of the field are perhaps less driven by guilt than by the need for a meaningful consensus that emanates from our disciplinary roots. It is this consensus which allows the field to cohere around center spaces at conferences and in journals devoted to composition, even when we have multimodal research methodologies and practitioners with a multitude of epistemic and institutional homes.

The chapter subsections that follow introduce three of the dialectical tensions that have structured the identity of rhetoric and composition as an engaged discipline: relevance versus isolation, theory versus practice, and marginalized versus central.

**Relevance versus Isolation**

One dialectical space that has marked early disciplinary histories of the field expresses the field’s consistent focus on work that is relevant in public life. Gallagher himself provides a stunning example of this “ugly duckling” trope, the idea that compositionists self-select because they just “do not fit” in the other areas of the academy, and, when they finally “fit” with composition, they gain some sense of inner peace. Gallagher says:

What compositionist, striving for tenure, has not wondered if her talents might do more good in the world outside the academy? What compositionist, upon earning tenure, has
not felt some guilt—and perhaps more than a touch of depression—as a result of being rewarded by a system that is demonstrably corrupt? What compositionist has not looked upon his publications and wondered, *Do these make a difference? How else could I have spent my time?*… What compositionist has not worried that she is *a little too comfortable?* (80)

Lest it appear that Gallagher’s generalizations above are isolated in the field, allow me to offer further evidence of the “confessional” nature of this trope. In a recent issue of *College Composition and Communication*, Joseph Harris shares this story:

The first CCCC I attended was in Minneapolis in 1985. I was a graduate student and unsure about what I wanted to do. I liked books and movies and ideas and teaching; I didn’t much like what I knew of how intellectual life seemed constricted by the academy. Expecting no more than the usual encomia, I went that first morning to hear Maxine Hairston address the Opening General Session…. Eavesdropping on the conversations that buzzed through the hallways and lobbies and session rooms of that conference, I began to think this might be an academic group I wanted to be part of. (535)

Further, Richard Young describes this impulse as a common one in the early structuring of the field:

One of the things that led me into rhetoric in the first place was a kind of Deweyan preference for reasoned action in the world. There is a deep current of Platonism that runs through literary education that places value on dissociating oneself from the world. Being a good Midwestern boy from a rural community in the 1930s, I had trouble with that. Rhetoric, though, offered a way of hanging on to the values that led me into literary
studies and at the same time let me see connections between what I was doing intellectually and what was going on in the world. (Cauthen 212)

Again and again, the distinction is made about something in rhetoric’s disciplinary identification, something that differentiates its core concerns, sounding suspiciously like “engagement,” well before its heyday.

Theory versus Practice

However, not all center spaces in rhetoric are, nor should they be, chiefly concerned with relevance to a constituency. Another dialectical space that is at the heart of debates about our nature as an engaged discipline is the idea that the field is part of a heroic quest to cast doubt on Theory, to slay the monolithic critical theory dragon. This is not a quest embraced by the discipline as a whole, but it does surface often in narratives of the field’s formation. Robert Connors, in his poignant musings about the cost of disciplinary maturity for the field, cautions us to avoid “theory hope.” He explains:

As the teaching and service elements of composition studies attenuate, the theoretical side of our field is, then, coming to the fore. And for many of us, the question is beginning to arise: Whom does the theory serve? This is not simply querulous idealism, but a very practical question, because we have historically gained intellectual vitality from teaching and service…. After I entered [the field], I pushed as hard as I knew how for the respect that disciplinary status would bring to composition studies--and now I find myself thinking about the problems of answered prayers (“Composition History” 15).
Connors claims the dependence on theory as isolated from those it serves is a side-effect of disciplinary maturity—the stage we have been in for the last ten years or so—and this theory-dependence has entailed “a movement away from the human meaning of what we do” (16).

Hepzibah Roskelly and Kate Ronald in their romantic/pragmatic exploration of rhetoric again visit the notion that “grand theory” is antithetical to practice for the discipline and even the profession. They say:

If reflective theory-making is missing from teaching stories like Atwell’s and Calkins’s, then reflections about practice are absent from much of current critical theory. The opposite perspective from elevating practice as the only method for making knowledge yields another prevalent and disturbing trend: the study of “pure” critical theory—postmodern, feminist, postprocess—out of context, as an “out-of-body” experience, existing for its own sake, disembodied from living texts and lived experience.... [Stanley Fish] displaces practice to a realm that speculation, judgment, and philosophy can’t reach and supposedly wouldn’t want to. The tone of Fish’s statement strikes the reader’s ear as vaguely—if gaily—hopeless. Its message is undeniably cynical, and cynicism is increasingly popular, at least in theory. (17-18)

In this view, then, it is potentially the pragmatic nature of the work in rhetoric and composition that places the field outside of postmodern grand Theory, but this does not mean that Theory has no place in the field.

In fact, many in the field claim theory must be part of the intellectual work of the discipline over and above practice or else the discipline will no longer be able to create new knowledge. Jasper Neel’s opening article in an edited collection on intellectual work in rhetoric and composition epitomizes a battle between theory and praxis in the field. He says, “It is an
intractable conundrum, the theory versus praxis split—more intractable and more confusing in rhetoric and composition than in most other disciplines because contemporary rhet/comp grew from the classroom” (Neel, “Reclaiming” 3). Lynn Worsham says this debate has led to an “ongoing battle over the nature of ‘our’ work” and “a kind of dramaturgy” (102). Gary Olson describes the same debate as “the theory wars” (23) and warns the demise of theory threatens the intellectual future of the discipline. These shared concerns about such a rift are also represented by our field’s appellation as “rhetoric and composition,” with rhetoric representing the “legitimating” theoretical impulse and composition mostly indicating the part of the field that “grew from the classroom” (Neel 3). This is a conundrum, Neel says, that has long plagued not only the field of rhetoric and composition but also other areas where praxis, or the application of a skill or theory in practice as is found in engagement, is the purpose.

Further, according to a recent article by Karen Kopelson entitled “Sp(l)itting Images; or, Back to the Future of (Rhetoric and?) Composition,” this theory-praxis divide is at the heart of the “paralysis or dividedness” (773) the field experiences. Kopelson’s argument is that the field is somehow languishing in conflicts such as this one, definitions of the work it does, and its own identity. She says:

I am not arguing against putting our hands on the world to change it. Rather, I am making a theoretical argument that, though heralded as the resolution to the theory/practice debates, praxis is actually symptomatic, not necessarily of a demand for application, but of a continual, overarching separation of use, service, intervention and action, from… what Friere… calls, “mere intellectual exercise.” (765)

Kopelson isolates “use, service, intervention and action” and claims we need a theoretical “redefinition or reunderstanding” (765) of these terms to move beyond the impasse.
Kopelson, while she is not denying the importance of practice or “putting our hands on the world to change it,” believes the field’s “proclivity for self-examination” has been at the expense of other “critical concerns and of making other, more innovative and far-reaching forms of knowledge” (775). She admits the primary task of rhetoric since the time of Plato has been “defining and redefining itself, of asking questions about its scope and promise, for example, and about its relationships to other modes of inquiry and knowledge production—of asking questions about what rhetoric can do and ‘still be itself’” (772). However, Kopelson claims that the field could better honor this theoretical tradition by “moving out into all the spaces left and doing definitive work” (772) rather than participating in “endlessly belaboring definitions and demarcating spaces” (773). She invites us to “curtail our question asking” (773) and leave “our identity crisis behind” (775).

I quote Kopelson at length here because the theory-praxis split that she unpacks is at the heart of this dissertation. The scholarship of engagement and rhetoric and composition both deal directly with knowledge that grows out of scholarship as it guides practice and service. Furthermore, I believe Kopelson misses a crucial theoretical significance behind our self-reflexivity as a field that will also be central in the current dissertation. To put it succinctly, rhetoric and composition is a field born in an identity crisis and growing out of exigencies related to that identity crisis within the university structure itself, exigencies that have created a space for the emerging engaged scholarship initiative. Moreover, the field occupies a center space between dialectically opposed pairs such as the spaces between new and old forms of literacy, university demographics, and campus geographies that drive our questioning and defining impulse. One major productive and exportable form of disciplinary knowledge comes from our navigation of these tenuous, volatile, confrontational spaces. In other words, the field’s
questioning impulse and difficulties with theory, which Kopelson problematizes, is wedded to
the nature of our field as it navigates dialectical spaces and forms metatheories (that often take a
self-reflexive turn) to accomplish important tasks, both practical and theoretical. Rhetoric
happens where the rubber meets the road, where the public and the academy meet, where the
masses and speaker interact. The field is perpetually situated on the cusp of institutional change
and is most vital when “dynamically engaged with the domain that lies between what is up for
debate and what is beyond question” (T. Miller, “Rhetoric Within” 39, emphasis mine).
Engagement operates in similar and overlapping spaces.

Marginalized versus Central

In describing her discoveries about the field of rhetoric and composition upon entering it,
Andrea Lunsford nicely summarizes how these aforementioned tropes meet in a way that makes
the discipline’s scholarship vital to the community:

I knew only vaguely and intuitively that this field offered the conceptual, theoretical, and
political ground for teaching that I was looking for—one that was radically democratic;
that valued what was “other”; that blurred the boundaries between disciplines, between
the genres of reading, writing, and speaking, between theory and practice, between
research and teaching; and that tended carefully to its effects in the world beyond as well
as in the academy. These characteristics, I argue, are largely responsible for the
remarkable growth of composition and rhetoric during the last quarter century as well as
for the vitality, the sense of excitement and playful purpose that animates the field today.
(“Rhetoric,” 76)
In the second sentence above, Lunsford makes the argument that the unique nature of field scholarship has sponsored growth and success, and she uses some key precepts of engagement in defining that scholarship. She says the field was appealing because it was interdisciplinary, valued teaching and practice alongside research and theory, and “tended carefully to its effects in the world beyond as well as in the academy” (76).

Examples abound of these three structuring tensions in disciplinary self-analyses, and Karen Kopelson’s article is critical of reliance on these same tropes. However, these tropes represent dialectical spaces in the field, not all-encompassing representations of fieldwork. While this dissertation on the scholarship of engagement, an outgrowth of the scholarship of application, will often examine practice, that focus is not meant to devalue more theoretically-driven branches of composition, such as the cultural studies and rhetorical studies branches, which have also added important nuances to the narrative of composition’s emergence and vitality this century.

The predominant scholarly tradition that has evolved out of rhetoric and composition’s legitimation struggles in the last thirty years has very much emphasized threads of engagement as a precise “center space.” As Susan McLeod points to, rhetoric in its most recent manifestation in the last forty years or so has developed a research tradition that incorporates pedagogical, historical, theoretical, exegetical, and social science methodologies. Some see this diversity as a strength (McLeod, “Breaking”; Lauer, “Rhetoric”; Gebhardt, “Evolving”, “Reviewing”; Lunsford, “The Nature”; Roskelly & Ronald), while others view it as a weakness that creates intra-field conflict between quasi-positivists and relativists. From the luxury of distance, however, we can see how the scholarly tradition of rhetoric and composition emerged, out of necessity, from a logic of “us” versus “them,” pitting the compositionists on the margins of the
academy without sufficient resources to do the work they were asked to against the academic mainstream disciplines who set and naturalized the rules for “rigorous” scholarship.


Safeguarding the values that guide higher learning by protecting intellectual freedom is crucial if we want to maintain the quality of advanced learning in America. However, because of pressures described in the third chapter of this dissertation, “Up Through Professionalism,” we need to look critically at those values to ensure they are the ones that will meet the needs of today’s college student. The role of the college may in fact be changing in society, as it has over time, and we need to adapt where we can or risk obscurity (Spellmeyer, *Arts of Living*).

Professionals in English Studies are continuously faced with public condemnations because “Johnny can’t read or write”—or more often these days, “Johnny can’t edit or punctuate”—when he reaches corporate America. Even though we tire of repudiating such statements with descriptions of what we “really do” in English Studies, and how research does not support teaching X, Y, or Z the way the public thinks it should be taught, academic professionals have to admit that there is an experiential gap in the transfer between the coursework we assign and the real world students encounter on their own.

Many factors may hinder transfer of learning, such as changing student populations, shifting expectations for learning, changing campus materialities and spaces, and/or changing notions of literacy in modern society. To approach this problem of disconnect, former Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching president Ernest L. Boyer conducted a host of studies during his tenure that explored, first, student engagement in learning, and second, ways to improve teaching. It was not until the end of his career that Boyer coined the term “the
scholarship of engagement,” which is most directly an outgrowth of his “scholarship of application of knowledge” from the 1990 Foundation report *Scholarship Reconsidered*. Engaged scholarship, Boyer claims, helps faculty and institutions of higher learning maintain relevance in the “intellectual and civic progress” of the nation (81), and it is characterized by service “directly [tied] to one’s special field of knowledge” that derives “directly out of, this professional activity” (*Scholarship Reconsidered* 22). In short, “the scholarship of engagement” (SoE) takes the engaged work that professionals already do and seeks ways to relate it to society and students.

What is often underemphasized about this reconsideration is that it requires rhetorical strategy more than a substantial change, and this leads to distrust on the part of the faculty. The vast conflicts throughout the rhetorical tradition between the sophists, who believed rhetorical strategizing was ethical for the public’s good, and the philosophers, who mistrusted language that could manipulate “Truth,” are again relevant as we face the issue of engagement. In this context, “engagement” may be labeled as “rhetrickery,” to borrow Wayne Booth’s term, or else as a fad with little to no staying power.

To counter this misconception, the second and fourth chapters, dealing with pragmatic educational reform and ethical education, respectively, trace the trajectory of the attitudes about rhetoric and ethical persuasion throughout the history of higher education reform. These chapters offer possible lenses through which faculty—particularly rhetoric and composition faculty—can view the current skepticism. Faculty in rhetoric and composition need to lead the way in diffusing hostility towards this movement because of our unique understanding of the rhetorical forces shaping it, because of the increasing relevance of rhetoric in today’s society, and because of our own recent struggles as an emerging field to redefine the intellectual work of scholarship along what this dissertation argues are engaged lines.
By treating engaged scholarship rhetorically, I do not mean to suggest that a few articles in *The New York Times* by well-positioned public intellectuals will accomplish the necessary goals and change our common vocabulary of scholarship, though such efforts would be an important start. Throughout this dissertation, I historicize a complex tension between the *intellectual* and the *practical* as rival trends in academia, and as Bruce Kimball describes, such tension is propelled by the fact that advocates on the practical and intellectual sides of the debate fail to fully appreciate the goals and motives of the other. The scholarship of engagement is a powder keg precisely because it offers a meeting ground for dialectical tensions such as the practical and intellectual, increasing the need for articulation of both forces in the changing mission of higher education. Chapter Five offers suggestions and examples of the ways that the practical and intellectual can be integrated through a model of “New Scholarly Citizenship.” It is through rhetoric that this balance can be initially struck, but it must be maintained through structural change in faculty reward systems and roles. The era of the “New American Scholar,” as Boyer’s colleague Eugene Rice has described the engaged academic, is an exciting time of redefinition, offering us in the academy the option to remediate social need or explain how our most basic research is already engaged in society. We finally have an audience, even if it is one created by the public’s questioning of our effectiveness and relevance.

So rather than viewing the predominant problem of higher education today, and the humanities especially, as one of funding, perhaps it is more accurate to describe the crisis as one of “relevance.” This effort to make scholarship matter is especially important for professionals in the humanities, given declining enrollments (Spellmeyer, *Arts of Living*). Even though it will take greater self-awareness of the goals and existing scholarship practices of humanistic education and English studies before we can expect consistently and self-evidently engaged work
in these areas, examples have already been set by some leading rhetoric and composition professionals, such as Kurt Spellmeyer and Richard E. Miller.

**Key Definitions**

While the movement and tensions described in the opening sections of this chapter have generated commentary and discussion across higher education in the United States, it is not always immediately clear what is meant by the term “engaged scholarship” or what drives ensuing debates. Ernest Boyer’s primary objective was to integrate community need, student satisfaction, and faculty research and teaching. Whereas the debate was waging during his tenure as Carnegie Foundation president over whether scholarship or teaching should receive more emphasis, Boyer argued for movement beyond the teaching/research binary. He wrote that in order to restore student engagement, institutions would have to first and foremost reevaluate the demands on faculty time and the forms of faculty scholarship that were rewarded.

Boyer argued in 1990 that the scholarship of discovery, integration, application, and teaching should replace the dualism of teaching versus research. His argument came at the height of a period of attenuating standards for specialized, original scholarship in the competition for dwindling tenure-line appointments. Boyer’s new schema sought to remove some of the stress and discontinuity from faculty lives, while restoring quality of life for all involved in academic endeavor. He explained how the dual reward system that forced competition between teaching and research had evolved out of changing models of higher education in America, beginning with the Colonial College (moral) model to the Agricultural school (practical) model to the German positivist model of the research institution (increasing emphasis on disciplinarity and isolation). The new model he proposed would return schools to what he believed were the
founding principles of American higher education, which emphasized research to the inclusion, not exclusion, of teaching. Boyer explains:

   The emphasis on undergraduate education, which throughout the years had drawn its inspiration from the colonial college tradition, was being overshadowed by the European university tradition, with its emphasis on graduate education and research…. [T]he focus had moved from the student to the professoriate, from general to specialized education, and from loyalty to the campus to loyalty to the profession.

   We conclude that for America’s colleges and universities to remain vital a new vision of scholarship is required. What we are faced with, today, is the need to clarify campus missions and relate the work of the academy more directly to the realities of contemporary life. (Scholarship Reconsidered 12)

   Central to debates about the role of engaged scholarship in higher education are problems emanating from restructured academic evaluation systems affecting tenure and promotion. Given the deeply rooted assumptions about “traditional” research in tenure and promotion, which is the purview of Chapter Three, “Up Through Professionalism,” it is difficult to conceptualize faculty reward systems predating the rise and institutionalization of professional research. Eugene Rice calls these limiting conceptions “assumptive worlds,” which social psychologists have described as “complex[es] of basic assumptions” about scholarship, in this case, that “in times of transition… [are] fundamentally restructured” (8). These “assumptive worlds” represent comfortable periods of consensus in the professions; however, a time of transition is upon us, and the “assumptive worlds” of faculty are in upheaval.

   Over time, faculty have operated from a multitude of such frames of reference, and as Jeffrey Williams points out, there are many competing versions of the evolution of higher
learning. Gregory Clark and Michael Halloran argue in one iteration that the rise of first
individualism, then secularism and professionalism led to the disintegration of shared values in
institutions and eventually to the dissociation of both civic virtue and oratorical training from
higher education (17-24). Disinterestedness and scientific detachment increasingly characterized
the universities and colleges during the same period, which saw the shift in science fields,
beginning with medicine, from the private sector to departmental homes in institutions of higher
education. This shift also helped professionalize scholarship in higher education (Kimball, *True
Professional*), and it established what Gallagher calls a “commonsense” model of
professionalism. This model defines a professional field as:

- A body of knowledge, skills or techniques, and standards for ethical practice
- A formal system for admitting, training, and credentialing new members of the profession
  (usually involving higher education)
- A service ethos: that is, a commitment to serving others and society in general
- A system of self-regulation
  (accordingly:) autonomy from external regulation
  a certain amount of prestige in the eyes of the general public (83)

Along with changes in professionalism, mostly precipitated on the German model of the
university, came other reforms: a growing emphasis on research, the emphasis on generating new
knowledge for its own sake, the rise of disciplines and the elective curriculum, and finally, for
faculty, the emergence of professional organizations and the dominance of a culture of peer
review that redefined academic quality and reward systems (Bringle et al 6). Not coincidentally,
this period of increasing specialization and professionalization can be seen as the “dark ages” of
rhetoric. It was not until the decline of scientific disinterestedness, a trend Kuhn has described
rhetorically as a “paradigm shift,” that rhetoric returned to the curriculum and discussion of “civic virtue” resumed.

It is perhaps because of the relative disappearance of rhetoric during the rise of the scientific model in the disciplines that teaching and research are still so interwoven in the field of rhetoric and composition. The two strands that exist elsewhere as the scholarship of engagement and the pedagogy of engagement are often so interrelated in rhetoric and composition as to blur any boundaries between them. For instance, compositionist Bruce Herzberg runs a service learning program that engages students in service learning classes, and he writes academic articles and makes conference presentations about this work; this evinces a scholarly-oriented pedagogy of engagement that feeds into engaged scholarship. While this service-learning program is meant to engage students in the community, to promote civic engagement pedagogies primarily, it also meets the requirements of what the MLA Commission on Professional Service position statement “Making Faculty Work Visible” calls intellectual work and professional citizenship. The MLA document describes how an invisible consensus has served to maintain traditional divisions between teaching, research, and service; however, “Now that this consensus is eroding under new economic, social, demographic, and technological conditions in the production and dissemination of knowledge, the traditional triad of faculty rewards is attracting criticism from both inside and outside academia” (168). Disciplinary conversations have variously treated genres as diverse as grant-writing efforts that support engaged teaching practices (Roen) to the scholarship of administration and accompanying reports that establish a program’s theory-based practices, reforms, and methods for teacher training and evaluation (Hult) as valid intellectual work.
Even though there are flagship documents for engaged scholarship, there is still a significant disconnect between actual assessment of faculty work and such documents. Two years after the MLA document, the Council of Writing Program Administrators published “Evaluating Intellectual Work of Writing Administration,” which applied the earlier document’s principles to tenure and promotion guidelines affecting writing administrators. These documents may, however, have limitations in producing change:

Some association recommendations, developed by ad hoc committees, may have a one-shot quality about them, rather than being part of ongoing advocacy by the sponsoring organization…. [W]hen the MLA Ad Hoc Committee on Teaching appears unaware of recent and relevant work by the MLA Commission on Professional Service, it undermines the credibility of both documents and the significance of years of work by two faculty committees. (Gebhardt, “Scholarship of Teaching and Administration” 30)

It is relatively clear here that a form of “dialectical engagement” even within English studies is lacking, as is a consensus about scholarly work and rewards.

Furthermore, even though rhetoric and composition practitioners have written often and persuasively about definitions of scholarship, these discussions have been limited in scope to field forums. That is not to say that individuals writing about scholarship in rhetoric and composition and its evaluation, either directly (Hult; Roen; Gebhardt & Gebhardt; Slevin) or indirectly (North; Harris; Lauer; McLeod; Fulkerson; Lunsford) have not intended for their work to reach beyond disciplinary boundaries. However, the sad fact remains, perhaps for reasons alluded to in the above quote, that much of it hasn’t.

Part of this inertia of transfer beyond the discipline may be related directly to departmental and institutional politics, where rhetoric is still seen as solely a service discipline or
as an undertheorized academic enterprise that lacks methodological rigor. Assumptions like these are slowly changing, aided by Boyer’s work and pressures that have forced academics to “think very hard” about the way they have been doing business all these years.

The Research Gap: Rhetorical Engagement

Moreover, the broader topic of redefining scholarship is expressly relevant to rhetoric and composition as anyone familiar with the field’s struggles to define an emergent, innovative, and multimodal research methodology can attest. While research has applied Ernest Boyer’s new model of scholarship to the intellectual work of composition (Slevin, “Engaging”; M. Harris; McLeod, “Scholarship”; Roen; Roen et al.; Gebhardt, “Evolving”; Hult), as already mentioned, there has not been a sufficient level of discourse between the field and the university on the topic of engagement. Furthermore, even early efforts to extend new definitions of scholarship across English studies included the work of rhetoric and composition faculty—two of the six members of the MLA Commission on Professional Service Committee were compositionists—but as noted, those documents have enjoyed limited success. Such discourse across the curriculum is crucial because while the civic and rhetorical parts of our disciplinary identity have lain dormant, as S. Michael Halloran, Thomas Miller, and others have described, the time is ripe cross-institutionally for a fuller realization of rhetoric within the curriculum. Rhetoric does not just fulfill a course requirement under this emerging model. Rather, students need rhetorical training in new ways as Wayne Booth has recently argued (2004), and faculty and administrators need to become rhetors because of external pressures on the university related to funding and definitions of scholarship at large.
Even within books and articles devoted primarily to scholarship and civic discourse and/or engagement within rhetoric and composition (Halloran, “Rhetoric”; Weisser; Spellmeyer, Arts) or across disciplines (Boyer, Scholarship; Gibaldi; Moxley & Lenker; Bringle et al.; Zahorski; Colby et al.; Hardin & Wallace), there is not a comprehensive review of how the various strands of engaged scholarship are conversant with the rhetorical tradition, our disciplinary past, the larger university, and the identities of scholars in institutions of higher education today.

However, scholarship theorists in the field have elaborated many of the issues that need to be brought to the national discussion of reform measures. James Slevin and Louise Wetherbee Phelps were two representatives for rhetoric and composition on the MLA Commission on Professional Service, who worked, beginning in 1992, to “redefine professional service in higher education and to formulate new guidelines for rewarding it” (161). According to Slevin in his 2001 “Engaging Intellectual Work: The Faculty’s Role in Assessment,” in which he sought to bring wider currency to the MLA document, Louise Phelps was particularly influential on the committee, and her “thoughtfulness energized and guided us all” (305). Slevin continues, “[F]or reasons I will develop in the section on intellectual work, writing programs can offer privileged views of the intellectual work of faculty and students and so can become a vehicle for refining and improving processes of assessment” (305).

In the mid-1990s, nationally-known field leaders made use of Scholarship Reconsidered as they drafted articles for Richard and Barbara Genelle Smith Gebhardt’s Academic Advancement in Composition Studies. In this volume, Muriel Harris articulates the way that Writing Center scholarship differs from even the rest of the field’s scholarship. She says:
[W]riting Center scholarship includes a great quantity of localized, site-specific research…. [S]cholarship in this area looks different—in the topics discussed and the methods used to make knowledge—from much composition studies scholarship. So the materials in the tenure or promotion file of a writing center specialist may not look familiar to administrators and faculty members versed in reviewing traditional evidence of scholarship. (88)

Instead of devaluing the administrative work of writing center directors, M. Harris argues for more concrete methods of assessment, such as breaking down evaluation of their work into categories like “theories and practices,” “models and local practices,” “tutorial methods and training,” “materials,” “administration,” “professional development concerns,” and also quality of academic leadership. Susan McLeod, also writing for Gebhardt and Gebhardt, advises more communication about scholarly work in composition. She says, “The key to an effective review process for composition faculty, then, is for members of the English department to be educated about how the work of composition scholars fits into the larger picture of academic scholarship” (178).

Duane Roen joined the conversation in the same volume, suggesting that composition scholarship, particularly administrative work, be looked at as “the scholarship of application” from Boyer’s schema, out of which, in Boyer’s words, “[n]ew intellectual understandings can arise out of the very act of application…. In such activities as these, theory and practice vitally interact, and one renews the other” (23). In a 2001 article, Roen and four other compositionists, suggest strategies for applying the newly conceived evaluation criteria designed by Glassick, Huber, and Maeroff in 1997 to the work of writing program administrators.
Prior to much of this work, however, a 1992 *College Composition and Communication* editor’s column, “Diversity in a Mainline Journal,” invited further scholarly discussion defining and pushing the boundaries of “acceptable forms of academic publishing,” even though “innovative scholarship” often clashes with “‘traditional’ academic evaluation” (Gebhardt 439). Furthermore, this prominent field journal issued a call for “widening consideration of the way scholarship in composition studies is viewed, of how it should be evaluated, and of ways scholars in our field can more effectively present themselves for tenure and promotion” (Gebhardt 442). Then, in 1994, another editor’s column in *College Composition and Communication* described two trends that were converging in important ways: 1.) “widening considerations” of scholarship and 2.) tenure/promotion difficulties for compositionists (Gebhardt, “Editor’s Column: Scholarship” 442).

These issues are particularly relevant for the field’s definitions of scholarship when we consider how battles over nontraditional scholarship in discussions of promotion and tenure have been specifically meaningful for scholars in rhetoric and composition. Richard Gebhardt called further attention to these issues in a Rhetoric Society of America presentation in 1994 as he called for us to reach beyond disciplinary boundaries. He said: “We have considerable experience to share about scholarship focused on teaching and students. And it is in our vested interest to help other specialties—outside English studies and within—to understand such scholarship and to practice it” (“Scholarship, Promotion, and Tenure” 183). For the field, such efforts at redefining traditional scholarship included efforts to value textbooks as scholarship equivalent to scholarly books, to recognize the intellectual work in collaborative projects, and to reward scholarship that is disseminated but not published (Gebhardt, “Editor’s Column:
Scholarship” 442). However, such redefinition can only be accomplished through cross-disciplinary efforts, which have heretofore been limited in success.

By 1997, when *Academic Advancement in Composition Studies* came out, Gebhardt had solidified some of his recommendations for “evolving views of faculty work and rewards.” He argues that such changes are important for the field’s vitality:

The public perception that we are not meeting those needs is at least part of the reason American higher education faces criticism and economic constraints as it approaches the next century. So there are advantages to being seen as a discipline that is responsive to society’s expectations rather than aloof from them…. [I]t is one of the reasons our field should broaden the definition of *scholarly activities* and enhance the relationship of scholarship to other dimensions of faculty work. (“Evolving” 16)

However, public perception is only one strand of a conglomeration of pressures changing expectations for scholarship. These changes are being impelled on four fronts:

1. inside academe, faculty evaluation stresses research and publication and particularly privileges research of discovery and prestige publication; 2. increasingly, various groups outside higher education are finding the proportion of faculty time going for ‘research’ to be problematic and so are pressing for increased emphasis on ‘teaching’ in workloads and faculty rewards; 3. in turn, governing boards, administrators, and other academic leaders are looking for ways to increase teaching ‘productivity’; and 4. at the same time, many faculty are dissatisfied with the research and publishing demands they are expected to meet. (Gebhardt, “Avoiding the” 12)

Furthermore, the university is itself being redefined in today’s political and economic infrastructure, which is also affecting widespread perceptions of scholarship.
As the above statements make clear, it is not just rhetoricians, but others in the humanities and English studies, more generally, who have a significant stake in the conversation. In these areas, enrollments have declined steadily. Without active scholarly campaigning for the importance of the work English professionals do, esoteric and “traditional” forms included, the mission of English studies may appear more and more isolated from the goals of the modern university. Kurt Spellmeyer in his 2003 book *Arts of Living* sounds the alarm that the humanities in general would benefit from increased attention to engagement, though he does not specifically use this term. He calls instead for the humanities to assume “direct involvement in the making of culture” (7) if we are to have any future at all. Part of the problem lies in the dichotomy between art and democracy, he says, art being the “aristocracy” of talent that our scholarship has tried to protect from “the leveling tendencies of the modern world” (7). Engagement, or the democratization of the humanities, seeks to make such study vital to the curriculum of higher education at the same time as it reinvigorates students’ lives in creative ways, offering a way for the profession to attract larger enrollments while emphasizing interdisciplinarity. And, faculty scholarship with a broader teaching and service orientation in addition to traditional categories can help accomplish these goals.

Such focus needs to be found, and as Steven Mailloux has recommended (“The Politics of Doing”), “rhetoric,” may be a unifying front for reform of the profession (201), a claim he continues to maintain in spite of past failures to popularize it. He says:

‘Rhetoric’…identifies a tradition and a project that, if adopted by a reconceptualized English studies, would probably encourage the practitioners of various privileged disciplinary activities (literary criticism, cultural studies, critical theory, etc.) to come
more directly to terms with what has most often been the least respected (but always economically important) activity, rhetoric and composition. (201)

By retaining rhetoric-English department alliances, he maintains, shrinking budgets will be less likely to harm either, and the two will be able to share strengths, keeping rhetoric from being co-opted entirely by professional schools and preventing the scope of English studies from being constricted in the institution. He goes on to say, “[T]he revised form I wish to advocate is a rhetoricized English studies incorporating critical theory and cultural rhetoric studies, which will in turn make more central not only rhetorical pragmatism but socio-political, transdisciplinary perspectives in the reading of cultural texts, literary and non-literary” (201). His proposal is politicized and politicizing, however, relying on the same faults of “content” and accompanying assumptions, such as the privileging of interpretive enterprise over productive enterprise (Fulkerson). Spellmeyer and Mailloux, however, provide two center spaces around which we can meet to discuss convergence.

**Limitations: Dissent in the Ranks**

Currently, and from the legacy of Boyer, faculty are faced with dual concerns that fall under the rubric of “engagement”: *engaged pedagogy* and the *scholarship of engagement*. These new emphases have been met by considerable resistance on the faculty level while being carried on with great gusto on the administrative level. Perhaps because it has been meted out as a sort of “new expectation” by the university, often faculty feel that engaged scholarship will place too many demands on their time and pull them in too many directions when it seems to offer no promise of permanence in the scheme of things. This concern is a vital one, especially in light of the material realities of many faculty teaching 3/3/3, 5/5, or 4/4 course loads. It may seem, at
such institutions, that such work would be destined to remain an unreachable “ideal” rather than a reality that can be integrated and rewarded in the faculty workload without seeming to be an additional obligation.

This dissertation will address some of these constraints, mainly through encouraging an awareness of the engaged work that many faculty members are already doing. In some cases, engaged initiatives, such as teaching in service-learning programs, offer ways to integrate teaching and scholarship or scholarship and institutional service, thereby improving the quality of life for faculty. Instead of viewing the “scholarship of engagement” as an additional burden on faculty, there are some who view it as a liberating and motivating factor. In a January/February 1997 edition of *Change: The Magazine of Higher Education*, Zelda Gamson writes:

> We need to get over the traditional research culture that has sapped the vitality of most our colleges and universities by drawing faculty away from commitment to their institutions and communities. The denigration of applied research and problem-solving has further eroded higher education’s connection to the world. The fetishism of much academic writing has contributed to the unintelligibility of academic discourse and depleted the ranks of public intellectuals. Finally, the domination of research and publications in tenure and promotion decisions has had a chilling effect even on those faculty members who wish to engage as citizens outside of their institutions. (175)

In her estimation, then, the institution, the public, and the faculty all stand to benefit, but perhaps the faculty benefit most of all by reshaping the research culture. Often junior faculty offer the valid complaint that the reconceptualized model of scholarship is too risky and that pursuing engaged research will lead them to jeopardize their chances for advancement. They fear
additional burdens that engaged scholarship might add. Scholarship, however, more broadly considered, can help them build instead of strain the resources they offer tenure committees.

Another concern stems from faculty resistance to a demand that originates in the commercial interests of governing bodies and is passed down through a chain of command, leaving little room for faculty choice. Boyer never intended for this movement to be administered in a top-down fashion, and as Susan McLeod writes in “Scholarship Reconsidered: A View from the Dean’s Office,” this is a movement that works best as a faculty-led initiative. However, the majority of the initiatives across the country, it seems, are ushered in a top-down fashion, and this is tied to matters of funding through the legislature. “Making scholarship accountable to those who fund it” has become the new catch slogan. It does not encapsulate, however, what is at the heart of Boyer’s idealistic mission or what university administrators are trying to salvage out of engagement. As already mentioned, though, engagement is being pursued as a solution to the crisis of funding in higher education. Chapter Five on “New Scholarly Citizenship” will consider specific ways that faculty can redefine or reorganize their roles to navigate this difficult dialectical space between consumer culture and the values of liberal arts education.

From the vantage point of rhetoric and composition, this dissertation argues that SoE is something more than straddling the legislative fence—or at least it can be. From the purview of the humanities, specifically the English department, this dissertation explores two viewpoints regarding civic engagement that will limit the future growth potential of humanistic and English studies. The first viewpoint characterizes faculty who seek dispensation from ‘doing engagement’ altogether because they do not see its applicability, or they see it as detracting from other basic research, teaching, and service required of them professionally. Even more pervasive
is the attitude that humanistic training, and the critical thinking associated with it, already instills civic values in students; therefore, further engagement on the part of faculty is not needed. Both of these positions are potentially harmful to the future of the humanities, generally, and English studies, specifically.

However, when administrators issue institution-wide scholarship requirements, some faculty members are further alienated. Compositionist and dean David Schwalm discusses the divide between faculty and administration, which he says are “culturally antithetical” to one another:

As a rule, faculty members are not generally team players. … They are independent thinkers who have consistently been rewarded for intellectual independence, unconventional approaches, and intellectual troublemaking….They tend to be more loyal to the discipline than to the institution…and they are adamant defenders of academic quality. (127)

On the other hand, administrators must consider the institutional perspective. The difference in these perspectives can often lead to hostility on one or both parts when something new, like the scholarship of engagement, is handed down. Susan McLeod has advice on this matter:

For faculty to be able to use Boyer’s ideas, it is essential that upper-level administrators take Scholarship Reconsidered off the shelf and get it into the hands of English department chairs, who should in turn share it with their faculties (…. Boyer’s ideas will be more acceptable to those who discover them for themselves.) Once the expansion of the notion of scholarship and the validation of the importance of teaching is being discussed among the faculty, administrators can announce their support of those ideas and ask for help in implementing them within the faculty evaluation process. (181)
This is why this dissertation seeks to address faculty concerns first and foremost as opposed to administrative matters. A metastrategy is needed, a rhetorical one at that, to phrase what we do in better terms and to reconsider what we do on a fundamental level, issues explicitly addressed in Chapter Five. Furthermore, many books on the issue of engagement, like Bringle et al.’s *Colleges and Universities as Citizens* (1999), do not explicitly take faculty into account as part of their audience. Most of the language in Bringle et al. is phrased in terms of obligations of faculty to society and school, not in terms of what engagement can do for faculty in return. Anne Colby et al. take a friendlier approach toward faculty, addressing this part of their audience directly, and indicating that faculty are, in fact, the “cornerstones” of engagement.

Do the pressures pushing engagement dictate that traditional academic values must be molded to the demands of legislators, or in a worse-yet scenario, corporations? Does this mean that intellectual freedom will be compromised? Those are the questions faculty should be asking instead of assuming the worst. If the scholarship of engagement were the only form of scholarship proposed, the situation could be dire. However, the scholarship of discovery, akin to our familiar basic research, is still fundamental in Boyer’s schema, as are the scholarship of teaching and integration. It is the scholarship of application that asks us to look for new connections amongst our other scholarly resources. All four varieties stand on equal footing in theory. Boyer explains:

The first two kinds of scholarship—discovery and integration of knowledge—reflect the investigative and synthesizing traditions of academic life. The third element, the *application* of knowledge, moves toward engagement as the scholar asks, “How can knowledge be responsibly applied to consequential problems? How can it be helpful to
individuals as well as institutions?” And further, “Can social problems *themselves* define an agenda for scholarly investigation?” *(Scholarship Reconsidered)* 21

As Ernest Boyer warned in 1990 when he wrote *Scholarship Reconsidered*, however, this model for research is not just about any kind of service. This model is about scholarship originating from professional concerns and situated within one’s area of research, because, “All too frequently, service means not doing scholarship but doing good” (22). Boyer’s vision includes service as contiguous with professional activity, demanding the same rigor in this area as for evaluation of other scholarship.

By attempting to redefine scholarship, Boyer’s work has led to questions about the common ground upon which it could be evaluated. Charles Glassick, Mary Taylor Huber, and Gene Maeroff followed Boyer’s monograph with their own Carnegie Foundation report *Scholarship Assessed* (1997) to offer models for assessing the broadened notions of scholarship.

A late study by Boyer summarized common values upon which scholarship is assessed: clear goals, adequate preparation, use of appropriate methods, production of significant results, [and work] that has been effectively communicated and engages in reflective critique (Glassick, “Ernest” 27). These are the same instruments that Glassick et al. recommend for use in refiguring scholarship evaluation.

Among those who write on scholarship and its evaluation, Boyer’s model is not without its critics. Even though he has argued elsewhere for revising models of intellectual work and scholarship, specifically in English studies, in “Preserving Critical Faculties,” James Slevin takes an antagonistic stance towards “engagement” as it is currently pursued in universities. He sees a threat from any model that places demands on the academy’s right to define and create knowledge, that threatens to combine “a discourse of commerce and a discourse of community”
This commercial base for pursuing civic engagement, one motivated by funding, he says, intentionally mystifies the commodification process and undermines “fundamental academic values of inquiry and knowledge creation” (22).

Slevin certainly has found his audience in academia and English studies faculty, especially, often deeply mistrustful of corporatization and in deep denial about the reality of its encroachment. However, as Richard E. Miller reminds us in “From Intellectual Wasteland to Resource-Rich Colony: Capitalizing on the Role of Writing Instruction in Higher Education,” we would be well-advised not to ignore the changes in the university system going on around us, even when those changes, corporate or otherwise, violate our values as a discipline. Writing programs, if we’re savvy, Miller says, offer us a source of leverage for bargaining on the university level. It is by our very nature as a service course provider that we factor so predominantly in the undergraduate curriculum; however, the same benefits and resources we offer the university, namely engaged and service-oriented scholarship, are not widely valued under traditional definitions of scholarship. Miller says we should use our resources to barter an even more central role in the university which may also refashion the mission that rhetoric and writing faculty envision for themselves: “what would happen to work in the field if composition understood its role to be better serving both the students and the entire university community?” (37)

Similarly, Laura Micciche takes a pragmatic stance towards the changes ongoing in our field and the humanities in general at the same time as she explores the difficulty of WPA work. She says that academia, largely, has become a “culture of disappointment…an exacting bitterness, or disappointed hope, in what the academy has become and failed to become” (433). Contributing to this disappointment, she says, is the lackluster scholarship that characterizes
English studies (432), constraints that can be linked to basic scholarship which churns out redundant theory, making it difficult for us to differentiate our theoretical paradigms from those of our predecessors (432). In her mind, then, and echoing Jeffrey Williams (2000), scholarship is already being influenced by commercial forces that have led to “market-driven reliance on the already-said, the safe bet” (433). Perhaps broadening definitions of scholarship offers us an opportunity to reinvigorate English studies on the whole, in addition to composition.

**Dissertation Overview**

“One of the most interesting forms of complexity is contradiction. We need to rediscover contradiction as a creative force…. Beginning with Aristotle, the Western thought tradition outlawed contradiction as the presence of the impossible, and consequently, as an index of the false and the illogical. Hegel, alone, had the vision, subtlety, and hospitality of reflection to acknowledge contradiction as the complex force of growth that disavows mere linear progress in order to awaken all the aggregate energies of an experience. It is the turbulence and conflict of their inner conversation that brings an integrity of tranfiguration and not the mere replacement of one image, surface, or system by another, which so often passes for change. This perspective makes for a more complex notion of truth.” (O’Donohue 114, emphasis mine).

This quote by poet and Hegel scholar John O’Donohue suggests that dialectical tensions, far from representing only conflict, are also a “creative force,” one that can be useful in guiding the trends of engagement and rhetoric in the academy. The scholarship of engagement, an effort to redefine faculty scholarship in ways that emphasize communal outreach, and rhetoric, which
is epistemologically relevant to our modern academic lives, are both widely criticized as models for the future of higher education that are too pragmatic, weakly professionalized, and naively focused around ethics. Throughout its remaining chapters, this dissertation will set up a conversation among these competing forces structuring the debate over scholastic reform, historicizing the trends and arguing that the contradictions inherent in the reforms represent a rich dialogue currently taking place.

Such dialogue is inherently complex, as alluded to in the O’Donohue quote, and appreciation of contradictions in higher education reform can help explain transformation while avoiding the traps of dualistic thinking. O’Donohue brings out the relationship between dialectical theories of knowledge and the philosophical tradition, noting that rarely was contradiction allowed to structure our understanding of reality. While not identical to Hegel’s theory of dialectic, this notion of creative tension between opposites is echoed in Bakhtin’s dialogism, Davidson’s paralogic hermeneutics, Booth’s pluralism, Derrida’s deconstruction, and the triadic theories of American pragmatism. A broad view of “dialectical tension” and “dialectical spaces,” synthesized from these different but somewhat sympathetic traditions, will be the theoretical lens used to connect the chapters and overarching project of the dissertation. Specifically in this dissertation, these dialectical spaces refer to areas of tension brought to the fore by both scholars in the field of rhetoric and composition and the reform initiatives driving engaged scholarship.

My argument in this dissertation is in part that the scholarship of engagement works in rhetoric and composition because of the field’s resistance to simplifying the theory/practice binary, its long-standing concern for the contingency of knowledge, its discussions of how ethics are implicated in decisions given such contingency, and its struggles with professionalization as
a result of these orientations. Quintillian wrote of *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, the good man skilled in speaking, and classical sophists were the first teachers of civic discourse and community involvement. This tradition, despite its limitations for us today, still organizes much of the knowledge in the field. This leads me to my second assertion in the dissertation, that by studying the broader intersections of the scholarship of engagement with rhetoric and composition’s disciplinary identity, I have found existing theories that may prove useful as rhetoric and composition, English studies, and perhaps other fields try to overcome points of resistance to engaged scholarship.

Chapter Two on “Action in an Uncertain World” explores the way that rhetoric, pragmatism, and—by analogy—engagement rest upon a complex conversation between foundational and antifoundational knowledge and between practice and theory. Beyond a philosophical orientation toward pragmatism, however, there are several practical factors that unify pragmatism, rhetoric, and engagement. For one, pragmatism offers an experiential and empirical basis upon which to base decisions about action. This orientation makes agency possible, even in postmodern classroom environments. Such agency, as engagement and rhetoric make use of it, offers space for the private and public to converge, thus leading to a focus on community.

Chapter Three entitled “Up Through Professionalism” argues the notion of academic professionalism that casts rhetoric and engagement in a controversial light emanates from a dualistic logic that pits professional against postprofessional scholarship. Looking at the ways that the field of rhetoric and composition has worked to resolve this tension, this chapter demonstrates how “dialectical spaces” can be complex areas for growth. One of the main reasons rhetoric and composition was able to cohere as a field, even when it was interdisciplinary
in method, approach, and sometimes subject matter, was the presence of shared external pressures that members of the field discussed in academic journals and presses. Similarly, engagement is a response from academics across the curriculum to external pressures closing in on higher education. These external pressures emanate from socially restructured definitions of academic professionalism.

The fourth chapter, “Ethics as a Traveling Concept,” argues that similarly, a naïve notion of ethics-based reform has hampered the progress of engaged scholarship. By considering, again, the ways that the field of rhetoric and composition has navigated this complex space structured by tensions between public and private good, this chapter uses postmodern models of scholarship ethics to argue for complex possibilities for ethics and public good in scholarly work. Both movements, inasmuch as they draw common heritage from pragmatism, the rhetorical tradition, moral philosophy, and post-professionalism, offer real strategies for building agency in human subjects in an uncertain world. While “Action in an Uncertain World” is actually the title of the second chapter dealing with pragmatism, the same issues resurface in varied form in the fourth chapter about the shared emphasis on virtue in both rhetoric and engagement. Both movements have sought to resurrect ethical agency in the vacuum of postmodernism, and it is on this point that the second, third, and fourth chapters converge: pragmatism offers a method for proceeding with engaged scholarship in the face of postmodern academic environments, and rhetoric and composition serves as an interesting case study of a discipline that has constructed an ethos of engagement for an otherwise divergent and multimodal field.

The fifth and final chapter, “Toward a New Scholarly Citizenship,” integrates the dialectical spaces carved out in the preceding chapters into a model of an engaged scholar, arguing such an individual must be comfortable with research, knowledge-making, and reform
despite sometimes irreconcilable contradictions in today’s scholastic life and higher education reform. Chapter Five discusses five domains of engaged scholarship in the field of rhetoric and composition, and these domains are useful for discussions beyond the field about the integral nature of engagement and rhetoric.

While it is primarily the scope of this dissertation to consider overlap in the two traditions and forces that have made engaged scholarship successful in rhetoric and composition so far, the dissertation also offers a possible starting point for further discussion of field consensus. Such diversity in practice and self-concept as characterizes rhetoric and composition, while not inherently a weakness, may prevent the field from usefully communicating valuable lessons, gained through pedagogical and methodological experimentation, to others. If the scholarship of engagement is embraced by the field, and if we use this political moment to extend our work beyond the discipline, we may be able to offer principles that make engagement successful heuristically to other fields in English and the humanities. Teaching and research are integrated in inextricable ways in the work and history of rhetoric and composition, and the rhetoric and composition teacher-scholar is already in many ways a model of “engagement.” Thomas Miller agrees. He says:

As our colleagues in English consider how to ‘go public,’ they should look to rhetoric and composition because we are already there. Unlike most English professors, many of us already collaborate with schools, community colleges, corporations, and agencies, and we do research on service learning, community literacies, workplace writing, political rhetoric, computers, and writing in the disciplines. Research, teaching, and service are indistinguishable in much of the work done in rhetoric and composition because we
research teaching, write about our collaborations with schools, and assign our students to write about their work with social service agencies…. The civic tradition in rhetoric presents many other sources that can be reinterpreted against changing conceptions of service, teaching, and research to make remediations of literacy central to the public mission of college English. (“Future” 32)

So, while this is a dissertation situated in and growing out of concerns in rhetoric and composition, it is also necessarily situated within English studies, the humanities, and larger university contexts as well. Each chapter will move dialectically from an inward to an outward focus and back again, arguing on multiple levels that rhetoric is vital to the success of engagement and vice versa. While there is still considerable resistance to the scholarship of engagement, as explored in the “Limitations” section of this chapter, rhetoric and composition professionals have a stake in the success of this movement, and because of that, field members should educate our colleagues about the full range of implications.

While this dissertation cannot possibly address all of the different manifestations of rhetoric, scholarship, pragmatism, professionalization, and/or ethics as these intersect with the scholarship of engagement and the New Scholarly Citizenship, it will trace key parallel developments within both rhetoric and composition as a field and higher education reform, broadly-defined. Ultimately, the dissertation will turn outward to analyze how a field consensus converging around the notions of active scholarship, new scholarly citizenship, and engaged rhetorics may improve prospects for the liberal arts in the university of tomorrow and may also improve and solidify the disciplinary status of rhetoric and composition, which is now entering the glory years of its maturity. In part, our central disciplinary identity as engaged scholars grows out of the rhetorical tradition and our considerations of the “values” question. Regarding the
question “whose values” should guide reform in higher education, I believe, with Thomas Miller, that at the very least the discussion should include us.
CHAPTER II. ACTION IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD

“Belief is that upon which man is prepared to act”

(Bain qtd. in Shook).

“Even the act of the citizen in his civic relations, in other words, retains some of the \textit{taint of practice}” (Dewey qtd. in Bushman 29, emphasis mine).

... 

Pragmatism, rhetoric, and engagement share underlying assumptions, exigencies, and strategies to an extent even few rhetoric and composition faculty involved in them understand. This chapter explicates these shared origins in order to help rhetoric and composition faculty become more aware of their stake in the engagement conversation. To begin this explication, “The ‘Tacit Tradition’” will unpack some of the common epistemological assumptions in classical pragmatism, rhetoric and composition scholarship, and the newer conversation surrounding engaged scholarship. “The ‘Taint of Practice’” clarifies one commonality already underlying pragmatism \textit{and} rhetoric—the practical, process-oriented nature of both—and argues that this “taint” has also disoriented many faculty across the academic disciplines from the scholarship of engagement as well.

Building on the shared epistemologies overview in the first two sections, the chapter then provides a genealogy of “pragmatisms” within rhetoric and composition as a way to scaffold a potential genealogy of “pragmatisms” within higher education broadly considered, arguing that the scholarship of engagement is a natural outgrowth of the “classical” strand of pragmatism specifically. This distinction is crucial because of the vast changes in social attitudes toward knowledge represented by the reemergence of classical pragmatism in the wake of other
“contextualist” philosophies. Following from classical pragmatism’s influences, rhetoric and the scholarship of engagement, in their present iterations, share sympathies with “constructive” and hopeful branches of the genealogy. Building from this intellectual family tree, the chapter broadens the scope of the discussion to isolate key historical tensions between grand Philosophy and Rhetoric/Pragmatism in higher education. These are the same areas of friction, the chapter ultimately argues, that are structuring debates over engaged scholarship presently. Without such awareness of the “tacit tradition” and genealogies of pragmatism culminating in the scholarship of engagement, the academy may again find itself embroiled in a reincarnation of a very old and bitter turf battle: between the orators and philosophers with their different views of knowledge.

Classical pragmatism offers one possible resting place from extreme positions that have structured and defined modes of inquiry in the academy over the last century—modes which are, in essence, at the heart of debates on engagement.

Moreover, as this chapter examines the philosophical tradition of American pragmatism, it will emphasize a series of dialectic tensions relevant to the larger project and identity of the New Scholarly Citizen advanced in Chapter Five of this dissertation, among them a practice versus theory binary, a focus on the scholar as a public intellectual versus an isolated researcher, and a view of truth as either foundational or antifoundational. Classical pragmatism also emphasizes tools for bringing abstract value systems into contact with real world experience, and for this reason, if preserved in its complexity, the system can be used to guide reformers out of the postmodern impasse of agency and into dialectical space where a theoretical basis for action, even ethically-motivated action as drives the scholarship of engagement and civic component of rhetoric, is feasible. Through its “triadic” theories of knowledge, pragmatism offers a means of
navigating such dialectical spaces productively. A triadic theory of knowledge or the idea of amelioration of binaries will be used in the other chapters of this dissertation as well.

**The “Tacit Tradition”**

A number of scholars working in rhetoric and composition have claimed that the legacy of classical pragmatist and radical educator John Dewey is, in fact, the “tacit tradition” for the field (Emig; Fishman; Fishman & McCarthy; Jones), or that Dewey is, at the very least, a highly influential, useful, and underrecognized figure (Phelps, *Composition*; Crick; Newkirk; Russell, “Vygotsky”). Somewhat independently of this conversation, a separate camp in the field is focusing on a different strand of classical pragmatism as highly influential in the work of rhetoricians, that of the triadic theory of knowledge, which descends most directly from the work of the classical pragmatist C.S. Pierce (Berthoff; Rhodes; Rosenblatt; Royer; Smit; Beale; Roskelly & Ronald; Downing). Still, others claim allegiance with neopragmatism, a movement similar to classical pragmatism for its emphasis on relativistic knowledge, but drastically different in its conclusions about reality, language, and objectivity in the face of relativism. The most influential modern figures in this domain are Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish who work in literary and legal studies, but many in composition claim adherence to the neopragmatist camp as well (Bernard-Donels; France; Mailloux, *Rhetoric*, R. Smith III).

It seems, then, when we talk about the “tacit tradition” in rhetoric, we are actually examining multiple *pragmatisms* instead of a unified or easily delimited body of knowledge that informs part of our work. Nonetheless, the predilection for contingency and relevant, practical experience that marks *most* branches of pragmatic philosophy does indeed mirror many of the values in rhetoric and composition. And, these are important touchstones that have led many
philosophers and theorists to different conclusions about present-day reality, different conclusions which structure much current debate over hierarchies of scholarship and modes of inquiry in the academy. This chapter focuses on similarities above differences, however, trying to point to the scholarship of engagement as a dialectical space for deeply entrenched epistemological approaches. One reason for the similarities in rhetoric and pragmatism may be their shared roots: if the revival of the rhetorical tradition directly influenced the development of classical pragmatism, then both pragmatism and composition studies are entailed within a longer tradition and share many of the same values.

Furthermore, many pragmatic values are coming to the fore in broader discussions of higher education reform. For instance, Bruce Kimball has argued that the modern university’s focus on service learning is evidence of the revival of such pragmatic concerns. Compositionist David B. Downing places these issues in a broader context of the political consequences of pragmatism. He writes:

[S]ome of the issues that Dewey was grappling with in 1894 may speak to our contemporary issues regarding the political consequences of various intellectual debates in the American academy…. [Two of Dewey’s projects] speak directly to my own and others [sic] current interest in the political critique of the disciplines and institutions of the American academy…. In addition, these projects initiate a concern for the newly emerging technologies and their effect on academic scholarship…. Finally, Dewey’s views of pedagogy and its relation to rhetoric, politics, and social change… mirror the contemporary concern for pedagogy and the transformation of the traditional relations between teaching, scholarship, and cultural politics. (182, emphasis mine)
While Downing describes how Dewey’s projects were ultimately unsuccessful in their own time, Downing seems to suggest a lineage from Dewey’s early educational work to more contemporary debates over academic scholarship and the role of the academy in society. While neither Downing nor Kimball directly addresses the scholarship of engagement in considering the influences of pragmatism on the academy, both pave the way for an argument that pragmatism may be a tacit tradition shaping the scholarship of engagement as well.

The “Taint of Practice”

Elsewhere in the field of rhetoric and composition, Dewey’s influence has been described as tacitly underlying the practical nature of our work. Borrowing John Dewey’s phrasing, Donald Bushman argues that a “‘taint of practice’ holds sway against composition instruction and the work of WPAs” in the university today (40). In other words, such practical leanings, while central to pragmatic thought, have traditionally hampered composition’s scholarly reputation. This practical orientation may derive in part from the subject matter of our discipline: namely, the active processes of writing and reading. Jasper Neel explains:

Rhetoric/composition teachers can truly claim nothing but the act of teaching and the study of the act of teaching…. [T]he mission of rhetoric/composition is transformative. The rhetoric/composition teacher faces the task of “preparing” students for the challenging work that lies ahead. Like any other type of housekeeping, this job remains always to do, by definition it cannot be done. And since it is never done, it can never be described as having been done well. (“The Degradation” 80)

Throughout Neel’s description is the subtext of a field defined by study of an active process that is always in flux. David Russell concurs in his article “Vygotsky, Dewey, and Externalism: Beyond the Student/Discipline Dichotomy”: 
General composition courses have tended to be oriented toward the how of writing, not the what, toward the structure not the function, the skills not the content. Partly as a result of this orientation, composition teachers have traditionally been more attracted than have so-called content-area teachers to that Romantic version of progressive education that is variously termed student-centered or child-centered pedagogy. (174)

Russell goes on to argue, however, that such process-centric and student-centric approaches as follow from the writings of Dewey and Vygotsky are actually oversimplifications of their philosophical work. In fact, he argues, “By denying the conceptual split between student and subject matter, scheme and content, Dewey and Vygotsky not only critique certain Romantic notions of student-centered pedagogy but in doing so also challenge the very idea of general composition courses in higher education” (174).

So while the “taint of practice” and the orientation toward practical training and vocational preparation may be a concern that seems to link composition and pragmatism, or even engagement and pragmatism, it is reductive to conflate “practice” and “process.” A central tenet of classical pragmatism was the triadic theory of knowledge, which rejected such dualisms as structure/function, practice/theory, and skills/content. This triadic approach may help redeem engaged scholarship from “the taint of practice” that such community-oriented, interdisciplinary, and practical work can often acquire. To put it differently, recovering the richness of Dewey’s “practical” work can be potentially redemptive for rhetoric and composition scholarship and the scholarship of engagement in the academy today.

It is especially significant, however, that underlying all of these arguments about the “taint of practice” and the role of process is a definition of scholarship that makes possible some form of “action in the real world.” Such action is not solely characteristic of rhetoric and
composition or engaged scholarship; however, it is also a defining principle in the philosophy of pragmatism, as Alfred North Whitehead has famously pointed out in his “process theory.” According to James Mackin, “Pragmatism bases itself in an integral relationship between action and meaning” (275), so much so that this type of philosophy is deeply suspicious of theory not based on action and real world consequences. It is from experiential data that pragmatists and composition researchers alike draw their beliefs about best practices, especially as these inform the educational process, and this is why many critics reduce pragmatic thought and composition pedagogy to mere “practice.” However, there is a transactional, theoretical component between experiential data and real world consequences. Nathan Crick explains, “The vision of composition that emerges from [pragmatist] Dewey is grounded on a relationship of experience and communication that is mediated by the practice of mind” (273).

As mentioned above, the scholarship of engagement (SoE), too, is an approach that originates in practice and action and is a direct outgrowth of the scholarship of application; and consequently, it holds much of the same “taint” and brings much of the same consternation from members of the academy as rhetoric and composition scholarship often does. Edward Schiappa explains a general social shift may be implicated in changes in the academy. Schiappa says:

The study of the ancient Greek sophists, rhetorical theory, and American pragmatism has enjoyed a renaissance in the twentieth century, especially in the past few decades. That all three areas of inquiry have become the ‘cutting edge’ of various disciplines is no mere coincidence. A profound dissatisfaction with both the transcendental metaphysics of Plato and the brute empiricism of Positivism has rekindled interest in alternative perspectives. (33)
While these “alternative perspectives” offer us some basis upon which to argue for more practically-oriented scholarship, it is important not to assimilate too much in that direction. Daniel Royer warns against the side effects of embracing these “alternative perspectives” unquestioningly: “the history of philosophy reveals that often the alternatives to dualistic views of reality eventually get reduced to one of two extremes: the purely objective views or the purely subjective views…. Both become dogmatic systems—direct realism by reducing appearance to reality, subjective idealism by reducing reality to appearance” (293). “Epistemic rhetoric,” as investigated by Robert Scott in 1967 in the Central States Speech Journal, an antifoundational philosophy that provides an “alternative” to outdated Positivist views of knowledge, has seduced many in rhetoric and composition who struggle to define themselves apart from the rest of the traditional academy. Royer says, “[M]any in the field of composition have more dangerously assumed, without debate, that a certain epistemology is part of the tacit tradition” (283, emphasis mine). However, Royer contends, “[E]pistemic rhetoric ends up guilty of the very dogmatism to which in reaction it began” (293). Therefore, if we are to claim a “tacit tradition” for the field, it should be one which redeems practice without exalting it. “[Models that avoid the problems associated with dualism] insist there is a reliable core of objective knowledge, [though] they temper this claim by recognizing all human knowledge is fallible” (Royer 294).

It will be the task of this chapter to first outline the “genealogies” of pragmatism within rhetoric and composition because such a comprehensive treatment of the “pragmatisms” does not presently exist and doing this for the field can serve as a model or analogy for exploring “pragmatism” in the scholarship of engagement, which has received little to no attention from scholars to date. Pragmatism and rhetoric are vying separately for influence over the future of knowledge production in the academy, but this chapter contends the two are highly
complementary and already engrained in modes of academic inquiry; therefore, both should be considered in discussions of restructuring the scholarly reward system in the academy.

Rhetoric and the Pragmatic Tradition

Rhetorical Pragmatism. Antifoundational Rhetoric. Rhetorical Hermeneutics. Pluralistic Rhetoric. Contextualism. Growing out of different epistemological traditions and at varied kairotic moments, these intellectual movements, when brought into alignment with the field of rhetoric and composition, can be amalgamated in light of a disciplinary commonality: a long-standing recognition that language, knowledge, and truth are contingent and relative. The world, it seems, for both our students and us, is an uncertain place.

However, despite this contingency, a large portion of work in the field of rhetoric and composition is highly practical and action-oriented. This generates a tension that places much of the scholarship in the field on the margins of the traditional academy, and subsequently, also predisposes field members to engaged scholarship as well. The difficulty lies in the juncture of the contingency principle and the practical nature of much modern-day academic work that focuses on student- and community-need. This creates a seeming contradiction, wherein scholarship generates broad principles to guide practical action based on what must be acknowledged as relativistic knowledge. As Steven Mailloux argues, this tension can generate uncertainty: “Is pragmatism, like sophistry, open to the Platonic charge of relativism? Does rhetorical pragmatism thus lead to political quietism, because it provides no objective basis for ethical choice; or to social anarchy, because it provides justification for any political choice?” (Reception 22). In other words, given the probabilistic basis of knowledge favored by rhetoric and pragmatism both, how can either argue for one practice over another?
This chapter addresses this central question, and the fourth chapter, “Ethics as a Traveling Concept” offers some potential answers to it. While the section that follows will trace genealogies of pragmatism in rhetoric and composition research, rhetoric’s scholarship is discussed as a parallel to the scholarship of engagement. Rhetoric and composition has ventured several theories that attempt to provide a basis for “action in an uncertain world,” and classical pragmatism is regaining popularity in other parts of the academy for a similar reason.

Moreover, as this chapter shows, the question of best practice in the face of uncertainty is not an easy question to answer, and it is for this reason that so many different theoretical camps have emerged to explore the issues, as is indicated by the multitude of antifoundational theories within rhetoric and composition: social constructionism, particularistic rhetoric, perspectival rhetoric, social-epistemic rhetoric, performative rhetoric, contextualism, constructive postmodernism, deconstruction, paralogic hermeneutics, post-process theory, post-Theory, answerability, mutuality, and postmodern sophistry, to name a few our journals and presses have seen. If the centrality of a concept is marked by the proliferation of terms to describe that concept, then it should be clear that “contingency” and “fallibility” are indeed vital notions within the field of rhetoric and composition, a field that matured during the heyday of postmodernity. A central concern raised by critics in and of these substrata, inasmuch as the critics raise questions of agency, ethics, and the grounds for action in an era of uncertainty and fragmentation, is the feeling of hopelessness and lack of purpose brought on by such utter contingency and relativism, what Lester Faigley has called the postmodern “impasse of agency” (Fragments). If agency has been short-circuited in this post-foundational era, and reality can be open to relativism and plurality, what can individuals do to make a difference? What changes are worth attempting? Whose values determine the changes to be wrought?
Compositionist Kristine Blair offers one possible answer to the postmodern impasse of agency in her suggestions for implementing dialogic pedagogies that call the students, in their various postures of resistance and engagement, into a discussion to help revise “textuality,” “culture,” “authority,” and “subjectivity” (161) in and outside the academy. In her piece “Resisting and Revising Culture: From Modernist Theory to Postmodernist Pedagogy,” she calls field members to help redefine culture “as something lived and experienced by human agents capable of action, reaction, and resistance, an empowered subject position that neither modernist conceptions of preferred texts and their univocal meanings and postmodernist conceptions of text and information overload can fully foresee” (162). Furthermore, Blair sees the place for such redefinition as necessarily situated in pedagogy. She argues, “[R]ather than talk only to ourselves in our major theoretical journals and anthologies, we must also actively engage our students in the question of culture so that such understanding and attempts for change can take place outside the halls of academe” (163).

The approach Blair pioneers is akin to that found in classical pragmatist pedagogy, which has reemerged in discussions of the agency dilemma. As compositionist Donald Jones has argued, whereas in postmodern anti-foundationalism, “the autonomous writer … becomes a situated object, something ‘subjected’ to the influences of the dominant discourses” (81), a pragmatic pedagogy offers students a new source of nonfoundational control over their environments. As Jones says, in Deweyan pragmatic pedagogy, “Language influences an individual’s knowledge and a critical knower can influence discursive practices. Through these complex conceptions, Dewey can help us realize a pragmatic theory of agency, one that creates a new theoretical context for the best aspects of two supposedly competing pedagogies: writing process and postmodern composition instruction” (82). A pragmatist model of composing,
which Jones likens to an explicit version of Donald Murray’s implicit pedagogy, would avoid the extremes of “foundationalists’ autonomous individualism and postmodernists’ agentless subjectivity” (83). It is appealing precisely because it is both epistemologically responsible in the realm of theory and useful for getting things done in the practical realm. This general approach and that suggested by Blair above are part of a larger discussion of solutions to the “agency problem” that have emerged in relatively recent field scholarship.

In particular, the commonality in discussions of agency suggests that there is more than mere coincidence in the field’s competing drives to preserve the contingency principle and to resurrect agency in the wake of postmodernity. In choosing such a hopeful pedagogy to deal with contingency—perhaps a result of the practical and process-oriented nature of the discipline—the field moves into alignment more with classical pragmatism than with neopragmatism or mere anti-foundationalism. We practitioners, because we are no longer capable of naïve foundationalism in this postmodern era, have a great deal at stake in the question of whose values ought to guide our actions. Whereas neopragmatism, with its inherent mistrust of objective reality independent of language and the possibility for sound principles on which to act, has held sway as the dominant version of pragmatism in rhetorical theory for the last couple of decades, the field now seems to be leaning toward what Hephzibah Roskelly and Kate Ronald have called “romantic/pragmatic rhetoric”—a mediating concept that both acknowledges the uncertainty principle and recognizes that values upon which actions are based can still be determined through consensus and experience. Agreeing with Roskelly and Ronald, Keith Rhodes estimates that classical pragmatism is both an answer to the postmodern impasse of agency and a critique of foundationalism. While pragmatism, like rhetoric, has remained on the margins of intellectual life for most of the twentieth century, it has remained viable precisely
because it recognizes “all human knowledge is fallible,” even as it admits the possibility of a “reliable core of objective knowledge” (Royer 294).

Domains of Pragmatism in Rhetoric and Composition

Attempts to connect rhetoric and composition with pragmatism have appeared somewhat sporadically in the field’s history and have enjoyed limited longevity. In 1980 and 1981 respectively, Janet Emig and Anne Berthoff may have been two of the first to explicate the pragmatist tradition in rhetoric and composition by connecting Dewey and Pierce, respectively, with field knowledge. Further, Kenneth Bruffee and James Berlin in the mid-1980’s and Patricia Bizzell in the early 1990’s may have sponsored the most popular dialogues on the role of pragmatic thought in composition pedagogy. However, the strands of pragmatic thought referenced above are considerably disparate: Emig and Berthoff cite classical pragmatism as an organizing influence for the field, while Bruffee, Berlin, and Bizzell—working in the midst of the “social turn” in composition—cite neopragmatism and antifoundational thought as unifying concerns in composition. Considering these separate legacies for pragmatism is important when tracing lines of influence. Specifically, the following section begins with the most popular and attention-drawing “pragmatisms” in the field and works up to the emergence of classical pragmatism, which is pivotal in this chapter’s discussion of “action in an uncertain world.”

Neopragmatism in Rhetoric and Composition

The common denominator for neopragmatism is a belief in anti-foundationalism, or a denial of foundational truths, and a belief that because language organizes thought and reality, it is necessary for the existence of both; however, these beliefs are best placed along a continuum when describing various neopragmatic theories. It is commonly alleged that neopragmatism
offers useful critiques of modernity’s foundations for knowledge; however, this approach does not offer a basis for action or interaction in the real world. In contrast to some of the preceding arguments about neopragmatism’s preoccupation with language at the expense of reality and agency, David Blakesley situates the movement as constructive nonetheless. He says, “Neopragmatism shares pragmatism’s emphasis on agency, or process, and thus both describe the world in terms of how it works, not in terms of what it is” (199). This does not explain, however, why so many scholars feel frustrated by Richard Rorty’s legacy as they seek to apply his philosophical tenets to their classrooms. In fact, it is almost a cliché to dismiss Rorty’s contributions to our work, and in many cases such adherence has produced dogmatic responses. To a large extent, we cannot blame Rorty or his theoretical work for the ways it has been appropriated in composition—he does not even recognize his own influence on the field and sees Freshman English as mostly about learning to write in complete sentences (Olson 232).

Nonetheless, Rorty has theoretically influenced some of our most trenchant battles as a field, and Keith Rhodes succinctly iterates the “Rortyan creed” for composition scholars: “Reality is socially constructed by discourse communities” (97). Blakesley characterizes the chief difference of Rorty’s neopragmatism from earlier pragmatisms as showing “heightened awareness of the rhetorical nature of any systematic inquiry, the idea that our knowledge of how the world works is mediated, if not controlled, by the social nature of language” (199). While the neopragmatists recognize the influences of James, Dewey, and to a lesser extent Pierce, they go beyond what they see as their naïve foundations based in language. The result is more telling than the theory itself, though. Much of neopragmatism has rooted itself firmly in hermeneutics and phenomenology, having little influence on teaching or practice. In fact, neopragmatist and
literary and legal critic Stanley Fish has characterized the notion of “theory” as a foundation for “practice” to be a somewhat foolish “theory hope.”

Patricia Bizzell has responded to Fish’s presuppositions about composition and praxis; however, she has done so within the realm of social epistemic rhetoric. She says, “The tendency, … is to hope that by becoming aware of the personal, social, and historical circumstances that constitute our beliefs, we can achieve a critical distance on them and change our beliefs if we choose…. That is what Fish calls the ‘theory hope’ of anti-foundationalism” (205). She concludes:

I simply say that we must overcome this particular version of bad faith if we are to acknowledge the full implications of the social turn in the humanities, and to help students from a culturally diverse and far from classless society enter the academic discourse community. We must stop seeking a theory that would enable us to screen out these concerns. Let us embrace rhetoric. (220)

What is particularly interesting about the exchange between Bizzell and Fish is that while both are willing to unseat foundations of knowledge, Bizzell wants to do so to rescue the political consequences of critical consciousness and Fish wants to do so to show the absurdity of “theory hope” in the real world. Bizzell is working from a position of critical consciousness, articulated by Paulo Freire and Ira Shor, that all students are situated in certain socio-economic contexts and increasing awareness of these contexts increases student empowerment and power; however, this epistemic position questions all but its own philosophy.

While this may seem to be a small weakness, it is actually the crack in the foundation of any philosophical approach that seeks broad-based support; and the Brodkey-Hairston University of Texas standoff shows some of the difficulty that such “political projects”—if they do not
recognize their own fallibility and contingency—can encounter in application. Fish, on the other hand, recognizes the limitations of epistemic rhetoric’s political project, but he does not offer a way out of “the hall of mirrors” and in fact critiques all foundations upon which one is willing to act. The classical pragmatists, while critiqued by the neopragmatists for seeming theoretically unsavvy, at least offer viable solutions to impasses posed by both Bizzell and Fish: through triangulation, experiential data, and recognition of fallibility.

Neopragmatist influence has also found its way into the field through the work of Kenneth Bruffee whose “Collaborative Learning and the ‘Conversation of Mankind’” and “Social Construction, Language, and the Authority of Knowledge: A Bibliographic Essay” rely heavily on Fish and Rorty. These articles helped facilitate and articulate the social turn in rhetoric and composition by offering the notion of “discourse communities” and a practical “social constructionism” through collaborative pedagogy. Bruffee’s ideas were at once theoretical and practical, and they were also kairotic—his articles were part of a thorough-going critique of dominant “theories of composition.” The models of composition that preceded the social turn brought with them assumptions about the identity of the student as isolated individual and the role of the academy as scientific purveyor of objective knowledge obtained empirically. These early isolationist approaches helped to partially structure the field around empirical research practices and expressivist recovery of knowledge from the self. Social constructionism’s legacy was in part that it brought the student learner out of isolation and into contact with the community; further, social constructionism questioned all forms of empirical research, initiating a spate of new research practices, ranging from teacher-action research to ethnographic and qualitative methodologies from the soft sciences.
Another mainline of neopragmatic influence in the field is found in epistemic rhetoric as it was articulated first by Robert Scott and later by James Berlin. Cornel West, whose pragmatic leanings defy easy categorization but go beyond Rortyan neopragmatism and classical pragmatism both, makes a useful distinction regarding epistemicism and anti-foundationalism. He says, “All pragmatists are epistemic antifoundationalists, though not all epistemic antifoundationalists are pragmatists. To be an epistemic antifoundationalist is simply to agree with the now familiar claims that ‘all interpretation is value laden,’ ‘there are no unmediated facts,’ ‘there is no such thing as a neutral observation language,’ and so on” (315).

Social epistemic theory in rhetoric and composition also owes much to James Berlin who articulated its major tenets in *Rhetoric and Reality: Writing Instruction in American Colleges, 1900-1985* and “Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories,” and it has become a commonplace in our scholarship. Richard McNabb argues, “Given the prolific nature of epistemic rhetoric theories, its reception has become so significant to the field that claiming rhetoric as epistemic today seems redundant” (105), and “current rhetorical theory, then, is largely based on and situated within a social-constructionist framework—a framework that implies and gives rise to a rhetoric that is epistemic” (106). At the base of “epistemic rhetoric” is the notion that “there is never a division between experience and language, whether the experience involves the subject, the subject and other subjects, or the subject and the material world” (Berlin, *Rhetoric* 16). Epistemic rhetoric, then, completes the full spectrum of neopragmatist theories, with its claims that “knowledge is constructed through one’s language practices” (McNabb 106).

Two of the most popular areas that continue to champion political and epistemic rhetorical ideas are cultural studies and critical pedagogy. Richard Fulkerson describes the
assumptions of courses based on these epistemologies: “The epistemological assumptions always include a claim that knowledge is socially constructed through dialectic exchanges. After all, such courses are part of the ‘social turn’ in composition” (661-62). However, Fulkerson critiques the practice of teaching Critical and Cultural Studies courses, because he says they can downplay the teaching of writing by focusing on textual interpretation instead, leading teachers to privilege certain “unquestionably” socially responsible and specific ideological interpretations of texts above others. This can lead to mimeticism from the students who feel pressured to parrot the teacher’s views, and it can downplay the agency of the student writer in selecting and learning from a topic.

It is the tendency of neopragmatism to downplay the basis for action and agency in real world contexts that weakens its hold on rhetoric and composition scholarship and the broader academy. Because the scholarship of engagement is centrally concerned with the agency of faculty, students, and community members, neopragmatism can only partially explain its tenets. Before we turn to the more constructive pragmatisms which this chapter argues have informed the scholarship of engagement in particular, first it is important to analyze pragmatisms that overlap neopragmatism and have paved the way for classical pragmatism’s reemergence.

**Rhetorical Hermeneutics**

Rhetorical hermeneutics is another substrata influenced by the larger questions of pragmatism, and it is pragmatic insofar as it encourages multiple readings of texts (Jost & Hyde). One of the most outspoken theorists in this domain is Steven Mailloux, who both extends and goes beyond epistemism with his rhetorical hermeneutics. He describes how “rhetorical hermeneutics uses rhetoric to practice theory by doing history” (*Rhetoric* ix) in his ambitious history of rhetorical pragmatism that links current practices in rhetoric to assumptions underlying
the rhetorical tradition and philosophy. His is a value-laden pragmatism, though, that engages with culture as text. Mailloux proposes that rhetorical hermeneutics can solve the previous problems of neopragmatism: namely, “how viewing understanding as articulation contributes to clarifying the theoretical problems of relativism, incommensurability, and ethnocentrism…. A rhetorical hermeneutics claims that [one’s] cultural context cannot be completely transcended but it can be slowly and significantly changed” (389-90). Further, it posits “incommensurability” which “means accepting that in order to make sense of an alien culture’s actions, those actions, including speech acts, must be placed in their own contexts of vocabularies, beliefs, and desires” (390). And, finally, Mailloux’s rhetorical hermeneutics is transactional: It “argues for the pragmatic intimacy of understanding and articulation both within cultures and between them” (391). While Mailloux has rescued some agency for neopragmatism and provided a more temperate reading of Rorty, his work is highly theoretical, which often sets it above and apart from the “taint of practice” which this chapter claims orients the field toward pragmatic theories and pedagogies. Mailloux’s project supports but does not seem to further an engaged pragmatism in the field of rhetoric and composition.

**The Pluralist Strand in Rhetoric and Composition**

A catch-all form of non-foundationalism within rhetoric and composition calls itself “pluralist” and is largely influenced by rhetorician Richard McKeon and his student Wayne Booth. Booth has worked primarily with McKeon’s “pluralism,” but in his 2004 *Rhetoric of Rhetoric*, he extends his discussion to the works of Derrida, Toulmin, Kuhn, and a wide range of others who recognize the role of rhetoric and contingency in knowledge-making. Booth argues that rhetoric, rather than pragmatism, is the solution to the trap created by dualistic thinking in modern and postmodern thought. Booth also points to rhetoric’s newly realized role in other
disciplines within the academy and its increasing importance outside higher education, and he advocates a form of “listening rhetoric” as a hopeful pedagogy akin to transactional theories of knowledge. Because the pluralist strand supercedes neopragmatism, it offers critiques of its narrow approach. However, again, pluralist theory is often less-than-accessible and less applicable to the practitioners who need it most. Put differently, it neglects the romantic leg of Roskelly and Ronald’s “Romantic/Pragmatic Rhetoric.”

The Third Sophistic and Pragmatic Rhetoric

Perhaps most relevant for those of us within rhetoric and composition is “sophistic rhetoric,” which Steven Mailloux has argued is an ancestor of American pragmatism. Mailloux summarizes, “Since Plato, the older Sophists have often been condemned as subjectivists and skeptics, unscrupulous traders in opinion rather than knowledge, rhetorical mercenaries who taught their clients to disregard objective truth in making the weaker case appear to be the stronger” (Reception 21). Mailloux finds the renewed interest in classical sophistry in the 1990s interesting, especially because it coincides with a revival of American pragmatism. Pragmatism has been reintroduced to philosophy and literary studies as well as to “American studies, political science, historiography, speech communication, composition, law, and religious studies” (22).

However, Mailloux argues that “despite the enormous growth of publications on rhetoric, on pragmatism, and most recently on Greek sophistry, discussion has only just begun concerning the relationship between American pragmatism and sophistic rhetoric” (22). He also considers a contextual question related to this renewed interest: “How do the pragmatist and rhetorical turns in academic disciplines relate to recent issues in a wider cultural politics outside the university?” (22) Sophistic rhetoric, while particularly meaningful for the field of rhetoric and composition, is received pejoratively elsewhere for reasons far more complicated than mere critiques of
pragmatism have offered. While this chapter focuses on similarities in the pragmatisms it describes, this particular form is working against centuries upon centuries of consternation and may have the hardest time surviving beyond the confines of rhetoric and composition, such as in the scholarship of engagement movement or other reforms.

**Contextualism**

Walter Beale has described the diversity of pragmatisms specifically within rhetoric and composition in his 1987 book-length theoretical work *A Pragmatic Theory of Rhetoric*. And, he does so by drawing on broader philosophical contextualism, a term based on the work of Stephen Pepper. Beale and Louise Wetherbee Phelps would both connect Pepper’s work to composition studies; however, Beale’s is the most pragmatically-oriented of the two genealogies. Responding to Kinneavy’s lead, Beale distributes the chief concerns of rhetoric and composition along four axes: scientific discourse, poetic discourse, instrumental discourse, and rhetorical discourse. He positions “rhetorical discourse” between relativism and empiricism, between action/performance and “thing as experienced” (162). This is yet another instance of rhetoric occupying a dialectical space between opposites. The primary concern of “rhetorical discourse,” according to Beale, is the ethical/pragmatic dimension, what philosophical historian Stephen Pepper has described as the “contextualist” tradition, which is “also known as pragmatism” and is best represented as the “act in context,” where “change” is the only constant (70-71). Beale goes on to summarize the four commonalities between Pepper’s “contextualist” paradigm and rhetoric. The first point of contact is the shared notion of “change” as central: “Rhetoric is an art enveloped in change: It operates in the world of change, and its purpose is change—change of hearts, of minds, of the world itself” (76). Secondly, Beale epitomizes the shared notion that rhetoric operates through probability (77). While this particular feature has been long debated in relation to morality and
values, *probability* as a feature of rhetoric allows it to mediate between the axes of extreme positivism and complete relativism (77), yet another dialectic space. A third overlapping feature is pluralism (78). Beale also says that rhetorical discourse is motivated by generalist aims, seeking to emphasize the unspecialized and interdisciplinary (78). This leads to the validation of “different ways of knowing, appropriate to different spheres of human concern” (80) with a view towards the interpenetration of all of the modes and motivations for discourse as they are employed within rhetorical discourse. Based on these features, Beale ultimately argues for “rhetoric’s importance to modern education and intellectual life” (80). Beale’s work is perhaps more resonant now than it was when it was written for reasons discussed in the “Classical Pragmatism” subsection below.

**Constructive Postmodernism in Rhetorical Thought**

Postmodernism and poststructuralist thought also show the influences of pragmatic philosophy, although postmodern thought takes a substantially more subjectivist, relativistic, and nihilistic view of reality and knowledge. In composition, this epistemology is often the guiding theory of cultural studies pedagogies; however, explicit postmodern composition theories have been addressed as well (Harkin & Schilb; Faigley, *Fragments*; France; Berlin; Bizzell). Something that is often overlooked in field-specific treatment of postmodern theory is what David Ray Griffin has termed “constructive postmodernism,” which concerns itself not with “eliminating the possibility of worldviews (or ‘metanarratives’),” but with:

constructing a postmodern worldview through a revision of modern premises and traditional concepts in the light of inescapable presuppositions of our various modes of practice. That is, it agrees with deconstructive postmodernists that a massive deconstruction of many received concepts is needed. But its deconstructive moment,
carried out for the sake of the presuppositions of practice, does not result in self-
referential inconsistency. (xiii)

Griffin’s is a “reconstructive” alternative to deconstructive postmodernism, which means that it offers solutions to the problems of postmodernism. Anti-foundationalism, neopragmatism, postmodern critiques, and the like are responses to the contemporary social context in and outside the university; constructive postmodernism, agent-centered pedagogies, and the scholarship of engagement present themselves as proactive (instead of reactive or retroactive) solutions to the problems implicit in that social context. This strand of pragmatism can be seen as a parallel and complimentary development alongside the reemergence of classical pragmatism. Its existence in the larger academy signals the vastness of frustrations over agency and pedagogies of despair that make classical pragmatism so appealing. However, I do not choose it as a direct progenitor for the scholarship of engagement for the mere fact that it is a reinvention of the wheel and as a result can pick and choose its intellectual influences cafeteria style. A tradition detached from its roots negates the possibility of a robust genealogy rooted in, instead of ignorant of, historical developments, overlapping traditions, exigencies, and structuring influences.

**Classical Pragmatism in Rhetoric and Composition**

Critics of classical pragmatism claim that it is a naïve approach to solving the agency impasse because it was born prior to the critiques of modernism and postmodernism. This is perhaps the chief reason there are a few safeholds for this older pragmatism within rhetoric and composition that are directly influenced by the early pragmatists and acknowledge this influence. However, classical pragmatism undergirds more influential epistemologies in the field than any other “pragmatism.” Furthermore, classical pragmatism is not as naïve as its critics would have
us believe—this is an anachronistic assumption based on a narrative of ideological progress in which later theories are assumed to be more complete and informed than their predecessors.

Keith Rhodes, in “Rhetoric, Pragmatism, and Quality Management” suggests, along with Emig and Roskelly/ Ronald, that a broader notion of pragmatism is supplanting the notion of social-epistemic rhetoric that has defined knowledge in the field for the last two decades.

Rhodes explains the apparent consensus around epistemic rhetoric:

Within composition scholarship, as Berlin predicted, the more postmodern “epistemic” viewpoint—compatible with Rortyan “neo-pragmatism”—has become theoretically dominant; one almost feels the need to say ‘amen’ to our collective, highly Rortyan creed as composition scholars: “Reality is socially constructed by discourse communities.” (“Rhetoric” 97)

However, Rhodes goes on to argue that the epistemic strand is but one within the larger framework of pragmatisms, one which has gained preeminence because of its affinity with postmodern theories of truth and knowledge in the academy (97-98). Such constriction of the pragmatic lens to mere epistemic rhetoric, despite what it has done for composition pedagogy to date, unintentionally creates a pedagogy of despair, however. Rhodes claims:

What we see converging in composition may be nothing more than a harbinger of a very widespread intellectual movement. This movement, strongly catalyzed by Peirce’s work in the late 19th century, dispersed by the vagaries of his personal and professional career, converging into a second wave in the 1930s and now coming into its full force, may well position rhetoric as a dominant mode of knowledge-making, and in ways more ambitious and more genuinely potent than current epistemic theories can countenance. Such an historical tide also has very interesting consequences for composition as a discipline. (98)
In Rhodes’ view, then, the movement away from the epistemic and neo-pragmatic and to the larger pragmatic frame of thought offers a more optimistic pedagogy, one which unites the social and personal, also recovering the hope lost along with postmodernism. “Although that …is no reason to adopt a grand narrative, the idea that there may be a narrative that meets the postmodern critique and can move beyond it is very good, welcome, and even necessary news for most of us who work to improve and to evaluate student writing” (98). The same can be said for those faculty who wish to produce effective and useful scholarship while tropes of fragmentation surround them, warning them from grand narratives of service, virtue, and making a difference.

**Transactional Theory/Triangulation/Melioration**

One fundamental and clear line of descent of classical pragmatism within rhetoric and composition is found in the notion of triangulation, although different composition scholars have imported the theory from different historical sources. Anne Berthoff, perhaps most notably, has worked to apply C.S. Peirce’s triadic relations among signs to the actual work done in composition, which is useful because “a triadic semiotics escapes the twin ‘meaninglessness’ traps of semiotic dualism—that either there is language that ‘gets it right’ or else ‘everything is right.’” (Rhodes, “Pragmatic” 235). Triadic semiotics ameliorates the problem of transaction among the mind, language, and reality, offering an alternative to the myths of complete objectivity and complete subjectivity. While Berthoff has written on triadic semiotics, it is her practical applications of these theories that have enjoyed the most success in the field, especially her double-entry journal.

Compositionist David Smit, who has written sympathetic critiques of the antifoundationalist position that there is no way out of the “hall of mirrors,” considers
philosopher Donald Davidson’s theory of triangulation. Triangulation, in Smit’s retelling, is perhaps the most useful antifoundational theory for the actual practice of rhetoric and composition, but Smit resigns himself to the limitations of any theory in instruction: “I doubt any argument in favor of a particular method of instruction will win broad-based support in our discipline if it does not provide both a philosophical justification and evidence of its successful application” (150). One of the strengths of triangulation, in Smit’s opinion, then, is the way that Davidson uses the empirical tradition to test the usefulness of his theory that truth is found in the negotiations between reality and subjectivity and is mediated through the communicative act.

Davidson’s theory is applied by Thomas Kent to composition as “paralogic hermeneutics,” and Kent believes triangulation is useful because it enables “language that helps us get things done in the world” (90); however, Kent’s emphasis on using real world writing as a primary teaching method suggests that writing cannot easily or fruitfully be taught in schools (139). Reed Way Dasenbrock also applies Davidson to composition, and he takes away from triangulation that students can learn conventions of language to better prepare them for real world interactions.

Other importations of triangulation into composition are less direct, and these often take the form of critiques of “social constructionism” and/or critiques of process theory (Bernard-Donals; Kent; Rothschild-Ewald). These particular critiques argue for instruction that is based on material realities while also arguing that knowledge of these realities is fallible. Classical pragmatism addressed these same concerns about contingency and action a century ago by developing empirical methodology to test philosophy and by theorizing transactional relations between dualisms. While the recent critiques are in many cases useful within immediate conversations and field paradigms, they are not as fully elaborated as some of the earlier philosophical texts.
The multitude of these transactional theories also point to Bakhtin’s “dialogism” and his notion of “interstices,” in his argument that meaning is created and situated in the gaps between language users. While literary theorists and composition scholars have discussed Bakhtin’s “dialogism,” much less attention has been paid to his related notion of “answerability.” Helen Rothschild-Ewald recovers Bakhtin’s often-overlooked notion of “answerability” for composition. She describes how this concept adds an ethical dimension to our intellectual work. “Answerability” has dual meanings: “double-voicedness,” which is recognition of the simultaneous existence of self and other who both have a reciprocal responsibility, and as “answerability-as-response,” where reading is the completion of the discourse act that rescues the author from egocentrism. In this second sense, the “obligation to reply” becomes linked with a notion of social justice. This ethical dimension complicates the work of current neopragmatist research that largely negates foundations for action; however, it merely augments and elaborates on the earlier work of the classical pragmatists, who defined “belief” as “that upon which man was prepared to act” and from which “pragmatism is scarcely more than a corollary” (Bain qtd. in Shook).

The scholarship of engagement, too, seems to rely on transactional theories and the notion of “answerability,” even though these theories have not yet been articulated for the movement. SoE transcends the dualisms of public and private meaning, of real world and academy, of theoretical and useful knowledge, and even of objective and subjective value, raising many of the same questions philosophers prior to and since Descartes and Kant have considered. Further, by invoking a sense of responsibility on the part of researchers and educators, SoE proposes and broadens a model of “answerability” as a standard for scholarship.
That rhetoric and composition scholars take these two principles as foundational for the theories and practices of the field is again instructive.

... If we are to, as Rhodes suggests, go “beyond epistemic rhetoric,” to move beyond a “fear” of “being sullied by the dross of commerce,” and finally “bring our ways and ethics and insights to bear on the generation of more fully humane modes of production” (107), then we need to look for a more hopeful alternative to the “political quietism” or “social anarchy” which likely result from some antifoundational theories. Recent alternatives, which have begun to influence field practices, are far from naïve, reactionary, or retroactive; rather, they are proactive, practical, and positive. By rescuing and refiguring useful concepts from earlier periods of thought we avoid “throwing out the baby with the bathwater,” even as we critique some of those periods. As the fourth chapter, “Ethics as a Traveling Concept,” argues, these hopeful theories of postfoundational thought also solve the impasse of agency posed by Faigley for rhetoric and composition. Whether this hopeful new paradigm takes the form of rhetorical hermeneutics, classical pragmatism, rhetorical sophistry, constructive postmodernism, or the like, it is important that we recognize these different approaches attempt to address the same postmodern problem. And, it is these shared ontologies and sympathies that have paved the way for the scholarship of engagement, as the remainder of the chapter shows.
From Pragmatic to Engaged Practice

If the scholarship of engagement movement mediates the extreme realms of public and private meaning, of real world and academy, of theoretical and useful knowledge, and of objective and subjective value, then it stands to reason that the subtleties of engaged scholarship may be lost in the seeming incommensurability of some of these dualisms. This is the risk in claiming melioration between extremes as a philosophical approach. The section that follows explores some of the competing dualisms that have historically structured the current debate over contingency and the basis for action, and to do so, it moves beyond the field of rhetoric and composition. By recounting the influences feeding and emanating from classical pragmatism, this section advances the thesis that the older pragmatism is as much a tacit tradition for the scholarship of engagement as the last section argued it was for rhetoric and composition.

The Divergence of Rhetoric and Pragmatism

Influential pragmatist and liberal arts historian Bruce Kimball argues in his extended essay “Naming Pragmatic Liberal Education” that the history of liberal education is marked by a rotating tension between the dual meanings of “logos” from the ancient Greek, namely “speech” and “logic.” The history of liberal arts education, then, is actually the story of constant competition between “orators” and “philosophers,” each gaining favor throughout different eras and holding that favor for centuries until the cultural context surrounding the university shifted significantly enough for the other camp to gain influence and garner a following. The “orators” are the progenitors for both rhetoricians and pragmatists, according to Kimball, and both are at odds with the pure logical orientation of the “philosophers.” But, he argues, the tension between the two is always fueled by an unwillingness of either side to fully understand or accurately
represent the values or types of knowledge of the other: “Proponents of each tradition hold a diminished view of the other because each makes different assumptions about the nature of reason, language, knowledge, and value” (9).

This tension and accompanying misunderstanding is perhaps most compellingly epitomized by the early debates between the sophists, the ur-orators, and Plato and Aristotle, the ur-philosophers. Such debates, with advocates of mathematics and syllogistic logic on one side and grammar and rhetoric on the other, were passed to the Romans as a deep divide between ratio and oratio (Kimball, “Naming Pragmatic” 4). The Romans preferred oratio and its educational philosophy that emphasized values and persuasion, and they built their artes liberales on these principles. From the Romans, this philosophy was passed to the Christian scholars, including Augustine. Despite sidelines of dissent, the rhetorical model of education held sway in higher education until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when recovered Aristotelian, Islamic, and philosophical and mathematical tracts engaged the attention of the Scholastics (5). Thomas Aquinas was among the Scholastics who shifted the focus of liberal arts education from values and probability to formal logic. Consequently, at this time, rhetoric almost disappeared, grammar was dissociated from literary texts, and the liberal arts became a brief training ground for more specialized and advanced study (6). In The Rhetoric of Rhetoric, Wayne Booth singles out Adam Smith and Giambattista Vico as transitional period rhetoricians who continued to teach rhetorical theory even though there was pervasive skepticism about its usefulness in those periods of transition and decline. Booth says:

…[T]he requirement all students study rhetoric had almost disappeared, both in England and America, except in some departments of Speech and Classics and some preparatory courses in writing and speaking. Attention to it did continue to flourish for a while in
Scotland and on the continent, and textbooks for introductory courses continued to sell for a long time. And some scholars like Richard Whately and Richard Claverhouse Jebb, continued to do serious scholarly inquiry into the nature and value of rhetoric. (30) Booth also warns those studying rhetoric’s rise and fall to have a healthy dose of skepticism about the specific social causes, such as Kimball enumerates in his history, because effects are often difficult to distinguish from causes in such recounts.

From within rhetoric, we more commonly attribute this constriction of rhetoric’s scope and purpose to Ramistic influence; however, Kimball’s explanation of a broader shift in preference toward logic provides a context for Petrus Ramus’ views. Kimball pinpoints the swing away from philosophy and back to oratory in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when Renaissance humanists rediscovered Cicero. Significantly, this shift back to oratory began outside of the university and did not infiltrate academe until the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Characterized by Christian ethics and notions of values borrowed from medieval knighthood, this reinvigorated oratory yielded a new ideal of Christian gentility, which dominated in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England and, in turn, influenced American higher education (6).

Kimball continues the story on American soil with the beginning of Harvard and the other early American colleges in the seventeenth century, where Christian gentility and the oratorical tradition easily became the ideal. Following the Civil War, however, this oratorical model of higher education once again shifted as it was supplanted in American colleges by leaders of the seventeenth-century Scientific Revolution and eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophy. A pendulum swing slowly took place in American thought, following on the heels of these movements, and by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the philosophers
were again dominating discussions of liberal arts education (7). This led to a new spate of specialized and advanced German-modeled research universities that appeared across America (7). This pendulum swing towards the philosophical tradition and away from the oratorical tradition has consequently structured many of the assumptions and foundations of the modern academy, such as its research and tenure and rewards systems for faculty. Kimball argues, however, that the pendulum is currently swinging back towards oratory, pragmatism, rhetoric, and I would add, engagement.

Classical pragmatism shares some of its roots with oratory, and both claim affinity with the ancient sophists to some degree (Kimball). Despite any possible shared origins of pragmatism and rhetoric and trends of popularity and influence in intellectual history, however, the two have diverged considerably in America’s intellectual tradition. Pragmatism, which was not fully articulated as a distinct philosophy until the end of the nineteenth century in America, gained and lost influence in the early part of the twentieth century; whereas, rhetoric’s influence steadily declined during the same era. Furthermore, many characterize “pragmatism” as inherently American, rooted in the soil of Puritanism which helped define early American thought, whereas rhetoric is associated with ancient philosophical traditions.

The depiction of pragmatism as a uniquely American philosophy that embodies those values the United States holds so dear can be traced to attempts to deeply implant the philosophy in American thought. More accurately described, pragmatism is the only major philosophy, alongside transcendentalism, to have originated and fulminated on American intellectual ground. Roskelly and Ronald put it another way:

[The ideal of Nature and the importance of the individual…the romantic tenets that developed in Puritan/Colonial North America] became … philosophical principles as
well. Friere calls this combination *praxis*. Peirce defines it as *pragmatism*. Both words describe the connection between self and community, belief and action that characterized the attitude of the colonists and the eventual American philosophy that derived from their actions. (38)

In other words, pragmatism, despite its ancient and/or European intellectual heritage, is still uniquely American, shaped by the particular constellation of social, religious, and political forces that shaped the American intellect from the beginning.

Articulated at the end of the nineteenth century by a group of philosophers who called themselves the “Metaphysical Club,” the tenets of the philosophical tradition are not themselves the innovation. This group of individuals, populated by professors and lawyers acquainted from their time at Harvard, met routinely to address pressing philosophical issues of their day. Charles Sanders Peirce was a prominent figure in the group, as was William James. The group largely shared the view that truth is fallible, but various members of the group cited different intellectual orientations: Peirce was influenced by rhetorical history and the group’s emphasis on scientific methodology while other members focused on utilitarianism.

As the movement gained popularity and matured as an egalitarian and “public” philosophy, the philosophy itself began to fall apart. Peirce and James would later differentiate their understandings of pragmatism, Peirce going so far as to change the term to “pragmaticism,” a term so “ugly” he thought it would not be absconded and made derivative by James and his following. Above all, though, and despite internal fractures within the way the movement was articulated, the appeal of pragmatism was its public role and interdisciplinarity. As a group defined in part by their opposition to over-professionalization and over-specialization of philosophy within the academy, two beliefs that ran counter to the increasing influences of the
German research university model, the group wrote primarily for a popular and informed audience, making their work by modern standards highly engaged. John Dewey, largely influenced by James but not a member of the Metaphysical Club itself, applied many of the original group’s theories on knowledge to education and democracy, carving out a separate tradition of influence for himself in educational theory. While there were other influential early pragmatists such as George Herbert Mead and perhaps Ralph Waldo Emerson, Peirce, James, and Dewey are most often credited with articulating and popularizing the philosophy.

Another historian of philosophy Bruce Kuklick makes the distinction between different eras of American philosophy as these have shaped the emergence, disappearance, and resurgence of pragmatism. The first era dates from the middle of the seventeenth century to World War 1, and he says it “embraces those people commonly regarded as American thinkers from the early Puritans to the classic pragmatists” (142). He summarizes this era’s epistemology as one of integrated human knowledge: “Knowledge of the world, knowledge of man, and knowledge of God were seen to fit together and support one another” (142). In a crude way, then, science, humanities, and religion were intricately connected. Also distinct for this period, Kuklick says, was the belief by thinkers that “their enterprise had consequences for mundane affairs: the philosopher was a public person” (142). During the era in which Emerson, James and Peirce were writing, there was no conflict between moderate religious beliefs and scientific empiricism.

The next era of American philosophy spans the two World Wars. Americans rejected the intimacy between science and theology during this time, while also denying the public value of philosophy. As Kuklick says, “By World War II the intellectual defense of religion was unpopular and philosophers had simultaneously retreated to the ivory tower” (145). This change was also related to the rise of professionalism in the academy. The transitional era, marked by
the first generation of purely professional philosophers in the United States, as Kuklick calls them, gained stature between 1910 and 1950 (145), but these individuals did not maintain the legacy of pragmatism in the same way. Instead, the transitional group sponsored the shift to specialization in knowledge-making fields. Science was their gospel; it seemed to offer the most hope for secular society. “Scientific” became a laudable adjective, meant to exempt an area from criticism (146). Unlike later pragmatists, though, his group believed that Science could somehow supplement public values, filling the void left in the absence of religion. Science offered a means to “establish and justify a scheme of values and the good society” (146). Kuklick says this legacy, which owes a great deal to John Dewey during the height of his influence, is the iteration that survives in the social sciences today.

Postwar philosophy, Kuklick’s third category, is the era of the professionalized philosophers who found little credence in the “scientific” morality of the transitional generation (147). This group eschewed attempts to unify the humanities and make them public. Further professionalization and specialization in the academy during this period led to what pragmatist Cornel West has described as a crisis of vocation. Knowledge was spread across discrete departments throughout the curriculum and subsequently lost its ties to public and interdisciplinary need. Fewer and fewer academics were willing to speak out on public issues because of increasing research demands on them on a long road to tenure. Kuklick clearly describes the social context between 1880 and 1920 in which these changes were occurring:

Various disciplines, limited fields of knowledge distinguished by special techniques and accepted sets of doctrines, grew up in the university. Universities defined the integrity of a discipline by the number of positions it would finance in a department. The training and placing of teachers in a field took place through an intensified apprenticeship leading
to the doctorate and appointment as a college professor. The paraphernalia associated with the social organization typical of the modern professoriate came into existence: the scholarly bureaucracy in the university, the codification of ranks culminating with tenure, academic journals, and professional associations. While this process occurred before World War II, it was first entrenched as a social fact for the bright young men who exhibited philosophy’s aspirations after the defeat of the Nazis. For them the goal was specialized research published for technically competent audiences in technical journals with popularizations frequently relegated to hacks, has-beens, and incompetents. (146-47)

In summary, pragmatism’s popularity, with its focus on the philosopher as a “public man,” began its rapid descent as a new group of professional philosophers emerged and the academy grew increasingly specialized and segmented. This narrative of evolution helps explain why classical pragmatism lost respectability almost altogether. However, it suggests potential unresolved conflicts that survived the era of increased professionalization in the academy and allowed the scholarship of engagement to slip through at century’s end. These potential gaps in the professionalization narrative are considered in the chapter that follows, “Up Through Professionalism.”

Meanwhile, as pragmatism’s popularity was declining and standards of professionalism were growing increasingly rigid, the “oratorical” strain of education continued to survive, if not thrive, in small, special-interest colleges with religious affiliations and those founded for minority students, as these institutions emerged throughout the first part of the twentieth century (Kimball, Naming 7-8). It was not until the 1960s, though, that the neopragmatists and new rhetors, working separately, spawned a shift back toward the oratorical tradition on a grand scale. Walter Beale describes how the new rhetors worked against or apart from neoclassicists to bring
about the return of rhetoric. The new rhetors are attributed with an overt concern for formal and scientific concerns related to rhetoric, while the neoclassical rhetors are said to have focused on more ethical and pragmatic dimensions of the field (170). Both are responsible for revalidating the concerns of rhetoric within liberal arts education, despite the ways that professionalizing influences in the academy have shaped such concerns.

Bruce Kimball sees pragmatism as again moving to the forefront in the realm of liberal arts education reform, emerging as the unifying factor in changes ranging from service learning across the curriculum to revaluing teaching as scholarship. While Kimball’s history is the story of a rift between advocates of different forms of knowledge—absolute truth versus arguments about truth as probability—and concomitant notions of value—value-laden education versus value-neutral education—he does not provide a smooth transition in his description to explain how pragmatism diverged from the lines of this rhetorical or oratorical tradition. Accordingly, Edward Schiappa warns that:

[W]e should refuse to continue to repeat the rhetoric versus philosophy turf battle when interpreting the contributions of the ancient Greek sophists. That particular map of ideas is no longer believable, nor is it helpful. The task for historians as well as contemporary theorists is not simply to switch our pledges of allegiance from philosophy to rhetoric or from Plato to the sophists, but to call into question the assumption that the choice is either/or. (60)

Kimball does say, however, that by defining themselves against the philosophers, resulting “significant themes are held in common by rhetors and pragmatists, such as concerns for values, community, citizenship, and general education” (56). A chief point of departure between pragmatism and rhetoric, according to Kimball, is the divergence of the oratorical tradition from
“the pragmatic influence on liberal education” (98), leading him to surmise that pragmatism is a “better fit for the collective pattern of reform in liberal education” (98) than rhetoric. Kimball ultimately ends his essay with a somewhat limiting view of rhetoric’s scope within liberal arts reform, restricting related fields to the narrow “linguistic” content aspect of logos. However, in rhetoric and composition, there is a growing preference for classical pragmatism with its practical, pedagogical, communal, value-driven, and rhetorical focus that leads beyond the esoteric confines of language philosophy.

The Convergence of Pragmatic Philosophy and Engagement

As the chapter has shown, rhetoric is, in significant ways, pragmatic in its orientation toward practice, pedagogy, and the public. And much the same is true of the scholarship of engagement movement, as is suggested by these items from Bruce Kimball’s list of pragmatic influences on higher education:

2. Pragmatism’s emphasis on the centrality of value considerations—supports the recent attention on college campuses to student involvement in service projects.

3. The key role pragmatism gives to intersubjectivity in the determination of warranted belief—justifies campus efforts to help students develop a sense of community and citizenship….

5. Pragmatism’s egalitarian approach to education—gives salience to the need for educators at all levels, from kindergarten to graduate school, to understand themselves as part of a common enterprise: habits of learning developed early are the key to later success.
6. The primacy pragmatism gives to experimental inquiry—justifies a learner-centered pedagogy, one that emphasizes discussion, collaborative research, and hands-on activities.

7. Pragmatism’s insistence that learning something must make an identifiable practical difference—is consistent with the recent focus on standards and assessment. (“The Condition,” emphasis mine)

This list reverberates with many of the changes Ernest Boyer outlined for higher education during his career, including the emphasis on the transition from high school to college, the focus on the student learner, and—specific to the discussion of engagement—a focus on service learning and community. Even early on, the proponents of pragmatism saw the community and the social as central to the purpose of philosophy (Stuhr 3-7). This is related to centrality of “meliorism” in pragmatism, the notion that “human action can improve the human condition” (6). Even the pragmatists who focused on individualism shared the view that the self could not be divorced from its social context.

These core beliefs of the pragmatic philosophy have led Cornel West to connect it to present day scholarship. He suggests humanistic academicians are undergoing a crisis of purpose and vocation, promulgated on the idea that we are no longer able to morally and/or politically justify the isolated nature of our scholarship vis-à-vis university budget crises. Cornel West says, “To take seriously one’s vocation as an intellectual is to justify in moral and political terms why one pursues a rather privileged life of the mind in a world that seems to require forms of more direct and urgent action” (West, “Theory, Pragmatisms, and Politics” 318). If he is right, then the scholarship of engagement is a movement that most directly challenges our rationales for the privileged life of the scholar and echoes Boyer’s call for answerability among
the faculty. As discussed in the beginning of the chapter, the close relationship between scholarship and accountability argued for by Boyer and his colleagues finds its mirror image in pragmatism, which “bases itself in an integral relationship between action and meaning” (Mackin 275). David Downing, as introduced earlier, further reconsiders scholarship through the lens of pragmatism in his discussion of Dewey’s projects, in which “Dewey’s views of pedagogy and its relation to rhetoric, politics, and social change… mirror the contemporary concern for pedagogy and the transformation of the traditional relations between teaching, scholarship, and cultural politics” (182, emphasis mine). Along with these projects of challenging scholarship often come allegations about the “taint of practice,” which Donald Bushman and David Russell warn theorists to avoid oversimplifying in the real work of the academy.

*Understanding the Scholarship of Engagement as Pragmatic Civic Service*

Finding an *ethical basis* for scholarly endeavor is radically different from promoting *civic service* through scholarship, which is actually what the scholarship of engagement seems to suggest. Taking a pragmatic approach to redefining scholarship, however, allows us to integrate ethics, scholarly activity, and service. James Perry and Ann Marie Thomson in *Civic Service: What Difference Does it Make?* claim that civic service “acknowledges the personal and voluntary nature of volunteerism so engrained in the American psyche” (36). But, they make a useful distinction between “volunteerism” and “civic service” as two forms of distinct civic action. “Volunteerism” is defined by traditional values of intrinsic worth and morality, emphasizing the individual, informal, and sporadic nature of such action. On the other hand, “civic service” emphasizes institutional value, and it is motivated by the need to solve problems on a collective level with expectations for regular, reimbursed, and long-term action. A
volunteer engages in a project, while a service provider is part of a stable program (39).

Engaged scholarship, then, seems to work in conjunction with traditional categories of institutional service. While the argument that service (instead of volunteerism) is also scholarship is rather new and controversial, service is already a built-in expectation for faculty. This shift which renders disciplinary-grounded service as scholarship seems threatening because scholarship has long been private instead of public, while service was traditionally public instead of private. Boyer’s scholarship of engagement, then, in effect argues for a transactional theory of service and scholarship in which the boundaries are collapsed and the two are seen to mutually reinforce one another.

Perry and Thomson claim that the deeply engrained commitment to service is as American as pragmatism itself. Rejecting early notions of pragmatic service by James and others, they instead turn to another figure that casts long shadows over American thought:

For de Tocqueville, a fundamental reality of democracy is that its citizens, as free and equal participants in the demos, are, in the end, ‘powerless if they do not learn voluntarily to help one another’…. In a postindustrial world, characterized by increasingly complex social problems and concerns, we view civic service as one valuable means for developing pragmatic joint action that involves individual citizens and the social, economic, and political institutions they create (145, emphasis in original).

It is the increasing recognition of social problems left in the wake of disappearing value systems and critiques of grand narratives that have created a vacuum and opened the door to what Edward Schiappa calls “alternative perspectives” in the academy. The postmodern impasse of agency and the scholarship that perpetuates the impasse have finally led to the scholarship of
engagement in much the way that the impasse has led to pragmatic theories of knowledge and action.

While the discourse surrounding the scholarship of engagement emphasizes the service component, other pragmatic considerations must be addressed as well. It is a practical and unromantic reality that universities draw government funds based on the seeming relevance of higher education to the voting public. An increasingly practical public has grown less patient with education that is not strictly vocational in character. While some blame this attenuation of higher education content on pragmatism’s practical orientation, as I discussed in the above section entitled “The Taint of Practice,” this is an oversimplification of pragmatism and of the problem posed by purely vocational education. Underlying these allegations are questions of values: assumptions about disciplinary knowledge, the nature of reality, and the basis for action. These issues will be the focus of the fourth chapter, “Ethics as a Traveling Concept,” which will discuss in greater depth the question of “whose values” should guide higher education reform. If we can learn to re-conceive of the university as a single organism, with the ethical/pragmatic/rhetorical dimension at the heart of the curriculum, we can actually move within and beyond postmodern critiques of values to resuscitate the liberal arts. After all, Bruce Kuklick’s definition of a discipline is telling of the role values play in structuring it: “Disciplines are strategies for investigation that have a cultural source and that can consequently change; their existence today depends in part on the politics of the university. Without a defensible mission, philosophy might be in danger of going out of business” (148).
Rhetoric is inherently public-oriented—if we acknowledge our tacit tradition—and our practical experience with teaching, service, and administration-as-scholarship offers much to other humanities disciplines who now face the changing expectations of the scholarship of engagement. This does not mean that any given discipline’s current forms of inquiry are to be rendered invalid; rather, as a survival strategy, at least some of what disciplines do needs to be “useful” and conversant with other disciplines. Rhetoric is one tool for demonstrating and discovering that usefulness and common language. Because rhetoric has lain dormant during intense periods of professionalization in the research university, our connection with our pragmatic past can perhaps be more easily recalled than that of the social sciences or the more professionalized and specialized philosophy departments of today. However, the high level of engaged practices in the field have emerged from a complex tradition, one which has shaped and, to a large extent, is still shaping higher education today.

Pragmatism is a “tacit tradition” for rhetoric and the scholarship of engagement both, which also indicates that rhetoric and the scholarship of engagement are significantly linked through the influences shaping each this century. This will be the purview of the chapter that follows, “Up Through Professionalism,” which addresses forces of professionalization in the academy that have structured debates over scholarship and the role of rhetoric, pragmatism, and engagement. While the era of professionalization has given us the model of the university we are so familiar with today, the next chapter will explore the unresolved tensions during the same time period that have culminated in the scholarship of engagement.
CHAPTER III. UP THROUGH PROFESSIONALISM

“The early institutionalization of research careers merged, in America, with the pragmatic and utilitarian orientations imposed upon even the most traditional universities by outside financing; both factors helped the rapid development of applied sciences or ‘quasi-disciplines.’ The American university acquired, therefore, centralized and quasi-monopolistic power to sanction many different specialties as legitimate forms of knowledge and expertise” (Larson 153).

“For compositionists [to draw upon practical knowledge embodied in the practices of traditions of writing and the teaching of writing] means foregoing the distinctions between professionals and laity, renouncing intellectual property rights over writing instruction, and sharing responsibility for and control over our work with the public in ways for which academic professionalism has not prepared us, indeed which it has actively worked against (see Zeichner). It means, in short, redefining the work of Composition and ourselves as workers working with, rather than for, on, or in spite of, students and the public” (Horner, “Traditions” 388).

As the first quote above from sociologist Magali Larson suggests, external pressures for utility and vocational training partially formed the early American research institutions and gave rise to the present model of professionalization through pure or basic research in the academic professions. Today, however, external pressures from legislative bodies and the general public for utility and vocational training are still being exerted on institutions of higher education, resulting in what this dissertation calls a post-professionalization trend in scholarship, in which models of professionalization have expanded. One sign of this trend is the emergence of the scholarship of engagement, with which this dissertation concerns itself.
Also addressed within this chapter are post-professionalization pressures on the local level within English departments, pressures which have resulted in a return to rhetorical instruction and the rise of rhetoric and composition as a field since 1950. The second quote above from rhetoric and composition scholar Bruce Horner suggests that pressures to professionalize have devalued the intellectual work of composition that often rests on service-oriented material practices. Bruce Horner in his article “Traditions and Professionalization: Reconceiving Work in Composition” argues for viewing composition’s traditionally marginal status in the academy as a sign of its resistance to professionalization, of opting out of the cycle that commodifies scholarship. He says:

Rather than defining themselves as academic entrepreneurs pursuing private interests or engaging in purportedly ‘disinterested’ scholarship, Composition faculty who understand writing classrooms as working at the point of production of society could align with public constituencies in redefining and pursuing the public good in their work with students, resisting reductively utilitarian definitions of those goods in terms of ‘growth’ and the production of exchange value … and fighting for education’s—and writing’s—use value for and by the public. (394)

Horner is speaking to what this chapter names “post-professionalism” trends, which challenge dominant practices at the traditional center of the academy and, as Horner argues above, may also actually create a new place for rhetoric and composition—and, by analogy, the scholarship of engagement—to make intellectual work visible.

This chapter explores changing models of professionalism and scholarship in the academy and rhetoric and composition, ending with a focus on how engagement fits within the modern university. The first section, “Professionalization in American Higher Education”
considers broad social, economic, and intellectual climates that influenced the ways knowledge has been organized in the American academy, culminating in the university-wide model of academic professionalism still in force today. The remainder of the chapter is divided into subsections based on trends in professionalization: The Organization of Knowledge (1860-1920), High Professionalism (1920-1970) to Post-Professionalism (1970-1990), Rhetoric and Composition Professionalizes (1950-1970), and Rhetoric and Engagement in the “Post-Professional” Milieu (1970-Present).

After discussing trends in the organization of scholarly knowledge that created our modern notion of academic professionalism—namely specialization, the diffusion of authority, and the rise of the expert—the chapter addresses how American higher education’s golden age of surplus resources and demand for academic professionals that outstripped supply further isolated it from society. This growth cycle culminated in what this dissertation calls an era of “Post-Professionalism” or what Donald Schön described in 1979 as a “crisis of confidence in the professions” (4) that led to critiques, demands for accountability, funding cut-backs, and restructuring of professional life in the university. Specific responses to the crisis will be addressed in Chapter Five on scholarly citizenship, but this chapter investigates how this post-professional environment led to the emergence of the scholarship of engagement, arguing that the current debates occupy the dialectical space between professionalizing and post-professional practices and between pure and applied scholarship.

Also within the broad timeline from 1860 to the present, the chapter examines how knowledge organization has affected and continues to affect rhetoric and composition as the field emerged around 1950. In a related vein, the chapter considers how the late professional period and the field’s epistemological roots both worked to strengthen the field’s internal focus on
engagement. Finally, the chapter will argue that the return of rhetoric to the curriculum and recent emphasis on engagement are interrelated changes and that rhetoric and composition’s historical identity crisis and resulting self-reflexive scholarship are *not* “detrimental to our disciplinary growth” (Kopelson 775), but rather productive *modes of inquiry* that can now be exported in discussions of engaged scholarship across the curriculum.

**Professionalization in American Higher Education**

Much of the dialectical tension structuring debates over the scholarship of engagement stems from the contrast between the traditional “professional” and the emerging “post-professional” roles for faculty in the academy. These roles for faculty, as historians have shown similarly for other classes of professionals, parallel broad social and economic changes. Furthermore, changes in faculty roles are linked to changing technologies, modes of production, and the dissemination of information that further structure faculty identities. To better understand these forces, this section will trace early examples beginning with the organization of knowledge and emergence of the academic professional class.

In *The “True Professional Ideal” in America*, Bruce Kimball makes a convincing argument that the growth of professional fields follows largely from the linguistic shifts in the term, applied first to clergy who “professed” and eventually encompassing the legal “profession.” Much has already been written on these histories (Bledstein; Larson; Kimball, *The “True Professional Ideal”;* Abbott) and about the “professionalization” of the academy specifically (Veysey; B. Clark; Kimball, *The “True Professional Ideal”;* Schön) outside of histories of specific disciplines.
Central to defining the academic “profession,” an idea nascent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, was the tension between teaching and research. According to historian Edward Shils:

The balance between teaching and research was never free from stress. It was a delicately poised equilibrium in which each part appeared to be ready to fly off centrifugally. Yet the break never occurred. Fragile and distressing though it often was, the equilibrium was held within the institutional vise of the university as an institution, and sustained by the German ideal of what a university should be. (29)

The “delicately poised equilibrium,” which we have come to know as the “old teaching versus research debate” (Shils 29), has played a significant role in shaping the professionalized academy throughout the twentieth century. Moreover, this tension emanates from the American milieu itself. As the last chapter argued, the uniquely American philosophy of pragmatism has shaped expectations for scholarship; so too have evolving expectations for an American-based model of teaching and research defined by an emerging professionalism in the academy.

Scholarship is often taken for granted as a key component of academic professionalism, and, as has already been discussed, this category is valued *prima facie* over the other required aspects of academic life, namely service and teaching. However, there is more to the consideration of professionalism in the academy as it has emerged following the German research ideal, and even the foundational role of the German research model is too often oversimplified. The history of the academic profession in America is actually a story of ushering an unwieldy democracy of intellectuals through a decentralized network of emerging practices that bore a distant resemblance to the professional codes of law and medicine. These processes were shaped in unique ways by the political, economic, industrial and then post-industrial, and
intellectual climes of America and responded to specifically American needs that led to increased federal backing of higher learning. Also, the complex tensions, such as the feminization, marginalization, and public criticism of teachers, which Margaret Marshall describes in *Response to Reform: Composition and the Professionalization of Teaching*, posed challenges in the professionalization process and in defining the profession.

To further complicate definition, academic professionals hold multiple roles in the institution and society, ranging from teaching, administration, committee work, knowledge formation through research, knowledge regulation through editorships and peer reviewing to grant work and service beyond the institution. All of these have been traditionally placed on a rubric that could be quickly reviewed under the headings of teaching, scholarship, and service. However, such a definition does not even begin to address the material realities that contingent faculty face, marginalized employees who may or may not be candidates for tenure-line jobs with increased security and freedom and who must carry out professional activities without the status of “academic professional.”

Chris Gallagher in “We Compositionists: Toward Engaged Professionalism” cautions that the term “profession” has become a specious “placeholder,” a useful but too easy shortcut, that glosses over a complex set of social relations and historical developments. He says, “[T]his reification is particularly dangerous because it invokes the most regressive vestiges of an anachronistic model of professionalism” (83). Gallagher’s chosen term “managerial professionalism,” the model upon which academic professionalism was based, grew out of: [I]ndustrial capitalism and constituted a thoroughly modernist response to the fragmentation and social tumult of the time period that has been variously called The Gilded Age, the Age of Efficiency, and the Progressive Era…. It trained and installed a
new class of ‘experts’ to handle the technical problems and challenges emerging during that time… managerial professionalism valued above all efficiency, rationality, and economy. (83-84)

Further, in what is largely an historical accident, education became the seat of science, which contributed to academic professionalization also, giving us a “particular professional ideal” and helping us “to see how education itself was professionalized around this ideal” (84). In America, this ideal was also shaped by democracy and capitalism. Because of the rise of capitalism alongside standards for professional practice, the expert could be said to control a “market” of information or services (Larson; Bledstein). With the emergence of institutions and bureaucracies, these features of the “professional ideal” were further entrenched, along with the notion that merit controlled and justified the elite social status enjoyed by professionals.

According to Gallagher, this model of “managerial professionalism” influenced academic professionalization, and the latter developed in response to increasing university bureaucracy. A profession, under the managerial model, must regulate a body of knowledge, the new members entering the profession and their credentials, expectations for service to society, autonomy from external regulatory bodies, and prestige (83). Academic professionals, though, also defined themselves against corporations and in the spirit of intellectual freedom. Because of this, most academics today count on aspects of academic professional life like isolation, autonomy, self-regulation, and the “curious blend of ‘free practitioner’ and ‘salaried specialist’” (85).

The next few sections will unpack how the organization of knowledge led to our notion of the academic profession today, because, as Gallagher explains, “We must recognize … why and in whose interests this model of professionalism developed as it did” (Gallagher 83).
Higher Education Professionalizes: The Organization of Knowledge (1860-1920)

External pressures have played a large role in shaping higher education in America, and consequently, in shaping the distinction between “pure” and “applied” scholarship—or basic and engaged scholarship. One example of external pressures shaping scholarly norms, as Laurence Veysey discusses, is seen in the decline of the “gentleman scholar,” which was a direct result of the waning of liberal capitalism and the rise of the corporate economy. Small liberal arts colleges which concerned themselves with mental discipline, well-roundedness, and pietistic education were the home of the “gentleman scholar” before the Civil War. After the economic upheaval of the Civil War, however, a series of changes in professional models in the United States led to a series of changes that placed new demands on higher education and altered its structure. The Morrill Act, which established land grant institutions dedicated to agricultural and mechanical instruction, fostered an environment of vocationalism and utility as the primary objectives of a college education. After this trend, Cornell pioneered the elective curriculum in 1868, which led to specialization within instead of unification across higher education institutions. Alongside these changes was the rise of schools and organizations devoted to pre-professional training with an emphasis on efficiency and expertise in their curricula. Additionally, the business world exerted pressure on higher education through funding, as is shown specifically in the formation of the Rockefeller Institute and the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching between 1880 and 1910. And, finally, the emergence of the first graduate school at Johns Hopkins in 1876, amidst the German research fever that infiltrated higher education institutions, exerted pressure from the ground-up for even more specialization.
As Magali Sarfatti Larson articulates in *The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis*, specialization within the academic profession was a response to standardization and pressures for evidence of higher education’s effectiveness:

In a sense it was contradictory that the makings of an academic career pattern should owe so much to the promotional efforts of “pure” researchers on behalf of research. Most of these men, indeed, shunned the utilitarians’ concern with practical professions and vocational pursuits; most of them were only dimly aware of the fact that their conception of the university, to say nothing of their own livelihood, depended on the professionalization of teaching. The research function was institutionalized, however, by administrators who could not be, and almost never were, advocates of “pure” research. In their hands, evidence of original research became an important condition for hiring and promoting faculty, as well as a result that could be shown to legislators, or an enticement for powerful business donors. (152)

Larson explains how from this “phase of competing ideals emerged an eclectic institutional model in which two conceptions of research coexisted, separated by a blurred and imprecise boundary” (152). First, there was the ideal of “pure” research, founded upon the scholarly and scientific research of the graduate school which prepared academic professionals who would go on to teach. The other research ideal was utilitarian, with an emphasis on public service and client-need (152). The German model, which has often been cited as influential in shaping the modern research university, is what actually allowed the competing models of pure and utilitarian research to coexist: both models shared the German influenced preference for specialization, a trait that would become standardized as a hallmark of American higher learning.
Much like in the other professions, professionalization in higher education followed the changing economic climate of the time. The economic structure moved from liberal capitalism to free market to corporate-driven market and finally to monopolistic marketplace. In higher education, these changes parallel the shift from the private college with its emphasis on mental discipline and piety to the emphasis on social utility precipitated by the Morrill Act’s land-grant institutions to the vocational model required to train business professionals with aspirations for improving their social status. All of these early changes reified professional values as reflected by economic trends. After that, universities moved even more toward corporate and monopolistic models when they became the centers and impetus for most of the research done in the country.

Now, this chapter will address the specific tensions outlined above that shaped higher education reform following the Civil War: the solidification of specialization, the emergence of discipline-specific professional organizations, and the rise of the notion of expertise.

**The Solidification of Specialization**

The professions were influential in America before the academic sector professionalized. John Higham in his historical account “The Matrix of Specialization” argues that historians of the academic and scholarly professions have overestimated the centrality of professionalization in shaping the academic infrastructure. Instead, Higham argues that the reordering of intellectual life, which took place from 1860-1920 in America, was actually the result of specialization, the “multiplication and differentiation of bodies of esoteric knowledge” which “made the new professions possible” (4). This tendency violated the ideal of the “gentleman scholar,” who was well-versed in connections among branches of knowledge, and it also went against the idea of
practical knowledge available to Everyman, which the pragmatists favored. Instead, specialization, which Higham argues was rooted in an American interpretation of the models of European intellectual traditions, was superimposed on the institutional structure of higher education out of necessity, what Higham calls “a historic compromise” (6), favoring progress. This model took on a unique character on American soil; “the best strategy for American specialists was to play down vertical relationships, expand horizontally, and thereby erect a great decentralized democracy of specialists” (10). Because of the inherent preferences buried in the national style, ranging from puritanical, pragmatic, and liberal arts influences, the specialist’s ideal of professionalization had to remain at once flexible and presbyterian while also providing some form of organization. This lead to bifurcation amongst colleges with the onset of research universities. Specialization in America was of a far more egalitarian and democratic character than it was in European institutions of higher learning; because it lacked central organization, it also risked losing some of the methodological rigor found in more compact fields of knowledge abroad.

This increasingly specialized but decentralized intellectual clime led to a near ambivalence from American professional scholars about competing with German scientists or European philosophers. Edward Shils describes the intellectual community of the time period as “too attenuated to produce the necessary self-confidence” (20). Because of dissatisfaction with the rhizomatic structure of institutions of higher learning in America, a trend toward increasingly centralized professional training did begin to take root by the end of the nineteenth century. Shils pinpoints this change with the founding of Johns Hopkins University in 1876, Clark University in 1887, and the University of Chicago in 1892. He alleges, “the establishment of Johns Hopkins was perhaps the single, most decisive event in the history of learning in the
Western hemisphere” (28), leading to demands for research provisions at high profile institutions so they could remain competitive (29).

As research gained prestige and was integrated into the structure of higher education, the tension between research and teaching, absent from the liberal arts colleges and from the experimental land grant institutions, came into focus. The new “pure research model,” precipitated on the German ideal, removed the scholar from society, divesting him, and later her, from practical and useful research that made a clear contribution, something that had been a hallmark of the vocational colleges which preceded the preeminent research institution. It was, at least in part, the grafting of the German ideal of research on the eclectic American higher education structure that led to the creation of a specific kind of expertise where elite intellectuals would demonstrate their merit by navigating an elaborate institutionalized reward system.

**Diffusion of Authority: The Emergence of Discipline-Specific Professional Organizations**

As mentioned above, the German research model as applied to the American university took the shape of a “great decentralized democracy of specialists” (Higham 10). Unlike their European counterparts, the American specialists had to play down vertical relationships that would signify mastery of a subject and instead expand horizontally. According to John Higham, this is the result of a “conflict between a Jacksonian distrust of privileged elites and the advance of specialization,” which was resolved by “widening immensely the opportunity to specialize and restricting the opportunity to dominate” (10). As a result of this tendency, perhaps, a sharp reversal of attitudes occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century. Learned societies were insufficient for regulating such a decentralized network of specialists across institutions of higher learning. Between 1870 and 1910, John Higham argues in “The Matrix of
Specialization,” a pattern developed in an ad hoc way that would coordinate research activities and help form the professional identity of scholars. First among the features of this pattern was the call for a “standard entrance requirement,” which consisted of using the Ph.D. as a badge of specialization granted through completion of a dissertation (11). Because of the pressure for advanced degrees and the absence of government regulation of degrees offered, between 1872 and 1887, the number of Ph.D. programs increased from 14 to 60. The Association of American Universities was founded in 1900 to “protect the dignity” and secure “greater uniformity” in the American doctorate (11-12).

Another feature of the pattern of professionalization within higher education was the shift of the academic department to “a society of equals” (Higham 12). Whereas, in Europe, “to become a professor… was not a normal career expectation but a sacred calling reserved for a very few exceptional individuals,” in America autonomous individuals shared mostly unchallenged control of discipline subdivisions (12). The diffusion of power characteristic of American disciplines and departments made it difficult for fields to communicate with one another, but Americans turned to reference works, bibliographers, and librarians as a source of such leadership. Beyond this, the use of funds from nonresearch agencies to sponsor research contributed to the ethos of decentralized professionalization.

Perhaps in part because of the democratized structure of American higher learning institutions, the regulatory function of professional organizations also took longer to solidify and held less power over knowledge than such organizations did abroad. As Shils explains, the appearance of journals and learned societies helped “German-returned” academic professionals found and further a more rigorous American intellectual life than they could sustain in their universities alone. Shils writes, “The journals that they founded were, of course, a means of
communication but more important they and the learned societies served to sustain the faith of young scientists and scholars in the value of their undertaking by bringing more impressively into their consciousness the similar interests and activities of others” (35). This method of organizing outside of academic departments provided a new audience for intellectuals, one engendering a hierarchy of elites within disciplines that was previously not possible within academic departments alone. This new system of indirect rewards further solidified the competition differentiating one graduate program from another and led to more consistent standards for research.

**The Rise of the Notion of Expertise**

As the previous two subsections indicate, American universities were unique because they were comprised of a relatively egalitarian democracy of specialists who felt increasing pressures in the latter part of the nineteenth century to narrow standards and create a more uniform professional identity. These late stages of professionalization in the Progressive Era, characterized by rapidly expanding knowledge and the need for theoretical guidance in the public sector, gave way to a uniquely American version of “expertise.” David Levine describes in *The American College and the Culture of Aspiration: 1915-1940* that “with the extraordinary proliferation of knowledge in field after field in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was no longer possible for dedicated amateurs to keep up with the explosion of important and increasingly complex discoveries” (33). Even though Americans were deeply distrustful of expertise and centralization, experts worked their way into the good graces of the public during the Progressive Era. Especially in the postwar world and during the depression, society turned to the academic expert as an advisor in federal government. But, this newly valued expert
knowledge had the effect of removing the scholar from society. As Levine states, “Ironically, as American higher education has moved into the mainstream of American life, its faculty, its research and training, its graduates, and its potential personal and social benefits have been put on a pedestal” (38). This trend is regrettable because as higher education became more central to American life and progress, it also became more tenuously connected to the needs of that society.


With the changing technologies and related economic shifts in America, the demand for college education increased, and the professional status of academics was further defined. At the same time applied scholarship and social service were distanced from faculty roles. After World War I, economic and social life influenced knowledge and higher education institutions expanded rapidly with new populations of students matriculating. One of the changes unique to America during this time that reflected the symbiosis between economic and social life in shifting academic structures was the professionalization of businessmen through college degrees. Whereas the learned professions found a home easily in all universities, only American universities were gathering new constituencies. According to Levine, “Business provided the means for expansion; in return, the university gave the business profession legitimacy…. Collegiate business education on a broad scale was an American innovation, blamed by the Europeans on our ‘cult of the ‘concrete’” (66).

While expanding vocational training needs made the university indispensable, the university itself was torn amongst competing values, such as “expansion and consolidation, utility and liberal culture, democracy and elitism” (Levine 89). These dialectical tensions, which
continue to structure the modern American university to this day, also helped shape expectations for faculty at these institutions.

John Thelin describes the period from 1920 to 1945 as one marked by success and excess in higher education reform in America. “The nation was edging toward a commitment to mass higher education…. Between World War I and World War II, enrollment in colleges and universities increased more than fivefold, from 250,000 to 1.3 million” (205). This increasing popularity also led to a boom in diverse institutional structures, such as new technical institutes, junior colleges, teachers’ colleges, business schools, municipal colleges, women’s colleges, labor colleges, Catholic colleges, two-year junior colleges, and regional state colleges (206). Because of this growth, the period from 1945-1970 directly following this time period was the “Golden Age” of higher education. Thelin describes the transformations of the period from expanding mass access to the upward movement toward advanced and selective professional programs, a landscape changed further by “the emergence of a popular for-profit higher-education sector, including vocational institutes and trade schools” (260). As a result of these expansions, enrollments increased by about 80 percent from 1940 to 1950, and would continue to expand until the figure was over 7.9 million in 1970 (261-262). Part of the cause for these changes was state government support for colleges, combined with federal backing of advanced research and access to higher education. Major foundations also increased their support through grants in exchange for universities subsuming more tasks as daily rigors of university operation. This latter period saw the introduction of the GI Bill, government assistance to promote access, emphasis on intellectual freedom, and expansion of graduate programs.

On the whole, these higher education trends are well-documented and explored. What is less discussed, however, are the effects these broad-based expansions, reforms, and tensions had
on the shape of the academic profession during the period from 1920-1970. Between 1945 and 1970, faculty made the biggest gains in “income, power, prestige, and protections” (Thelin 310). At some institutions, faculty were even granted shared governance. The calendar and criteria for promotion and tenure during this time became consistent and standardized across institutions, faculty unions became more popular, and faculty were less likely to be dismissed for arbitrary or questionable reasons (Thelin 311). It was the prosperity in higher education combined with the demand for faculty generated by expanding enrollments that made faculty contracts somewhat flexible in terms of teaching loads, institutional space demands, and book budgets. The country was firmly behind higher education, and this led to rapid exaltation of the academic profession, broadly-conceived.

However, at some point during this time period, the tensions between utility and liberal culture within institutions and curricula exerted influence on the scholarship that faculty completed. Whereas early scholarship had been tied to an explicit public need, the golden economic age in higher education in combination with the rise of the research institution and the “pure” research model led to a movement away from applied research and a disciplinary downplaying of scholarship tied to real need. Nor was there a pressing need any longer to translate scholarship for Everyman. Even though higher education itself was increasingly tied to vocationalism, the leading research prized within the disciplines was more and more removed from it. The exception to this rule is research that was driven by grants for public programs. Apart from that, faculty within nearly all disciplines could pursue their interests with relatively little interference or pressure to address how their work contributed to public service.
Richard Ohmann writes of the materialist conditions that structured intellectual life in America in *English in America*, especially those that separated the scholar from social action. He writes:

I think that in retrospect we can see the origins of our present malaise in the core of our earlier beliefs. We wanted to move out of social action; we wished politics out of existence. But as Georg Lukacs says, "everything is politics"; every human thought and act is "bound up with the life and struggles of the community." The denial of politics could not continue forever. For one thing, external events caught up with us and disturbed the great bourgeois peace of the fifties—the war in Vietnam, the uprising of oppressed peoples here and abroad, the destruction of the biosphere through un-checked forces of the free-market economy. No walls built around the free play of intellect could exclude these world-historical events.

As Ohmann states, despite its period of seeming isolation, politics would eventually exert pressure again on English studies and academic life in general. For Ohmann, this rift is represented by the dichotomy between thought and action, a separation which masks the training of the “administrative class” with the concomitant distribution of power and wealth. Ohmann says, “In this … task the American literary profession has cooperated, in part by insisting that the means to personal well-being and wholeness is through withdrawal from social action and the achievement of all-embracing states of mind.”

Therefore, the period of prosperity came to a halt with a series of political forces, among them federal budget cuts for higher education. A model of scholarship had evolved within the university during a time of prosperity and freedom and had largely structured the professional ideal, but when external legislative and economic pressures began to squeeze operating budgets
at large and small institutions alike, the administrative bodies of universities were left with a gaping disconnect. Waking as Van Winkle after a long slumber, universities looked around at their constituencies and students and found that professionalism trends had led to highly-specialized “pure” scholarship that was not remediating some immediate needs. Meanwhile, the practices of preparing future faculty continued around the new ideal that had taken root.

It is at this point, this dissertation argues, universities entered a “post-professional” era. Evolving practices of professionalization that had structured higher education for over 100 years were being called into question. The nature of knowledge itself was debated across many disciplines, perhaps most notably in Thomas Kuhn’s work on paradigm shifts. This self-referential and questioning turn was also a rhetorical turn. Dualisms, such as science versus art, were no longer convenient, but rhetoric was well-suited for a post-dualistic environment, and it was also well-suited for the turn to utility that would be necessary for English departments to survive.


The professionalization of the humanities occurred within the broader trend of professionalization described above. The historical evolution of these trends in the humanities is crucial for understanding the ways that applied scholarship and praxis, often associated with rhetoric and composition, were devalued in the humanities. According to Bruce Kuklick in “The Professionalization of the Humanities,” the humanities and the social sciences split off from older “learned domains.” In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the two domains were unified in theological study, moral philosophy, and then philology:
Professionalization and homage to applied science had exacerbated the conflict between the relevant and the otherworldly claims of the learned ideals. The social scientists took over the relevant aspects of these ideals; what was called the humanities took over the otherworldly. That is, from my perspective the learned endeavor today embraces in two separate areas what in the nineteenth century was one. The social sciences codify the practical, the humanities the eternal dimensions of the old moral philosophy. (Kuklick 53)

This history of the humanities is characterized by a specialization in “pure” research, but the outcome of the liberally trained student was to produce a service-oriented leader in society. When professionalization changed the institutional structure of higher education, the humanities were forced to specialize away from the practical, a factor that causes difficulty for these disciplines even today. Nonetheless, Kuklick goes on to explain, English and the modern languages “were almost completely the creation of the professionalizing drive” (51), and their study replaced the classical languages as the university shifted to a more practical focus. This resulted in an English studies organized around a scientific model. Historian Bruce Kimball explains the scientific nature of the early humanities:

This scientism appeared as well in fields that eventually became known as “the humanities.” Philosophy hatched out psychology, while the modern languages found their scientists in German-trained philologists who “wanted to teach modern languages on a scientific model” and organized the Modern Language Association in 1883 to do so. Hence, the humanities also drew upon scientific methods and concepts, as did the learned professions. (B. Kimball, Orators 206)
Specifically within English, the professionalizing drive would generate other dialectical tensions. David Russell explains how English departments emerged during the time period when rhetoric was fading into the background of the curriculum. These departments eventually defined their object of study as literature, but they also acquired the service function of teaching composition, which was loosely termed “literary skill” instruction. Russell says, “English professors were and were not composition teachers. English submerged the contradiction—and then harnessed it—by constructing two new and largely separate activities, each with different motives, under one covering term, English, and then marginalizing one in their own work while promoting it as a service to other disciplines” (53). Within this professionalized, or “purified,” model of English that emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, rhetoric as it had been taught in the oratorical colleges was regarded as part of a bygone era.

Many historians of rhetoric and composition have described the marginalization of composition instructors in the academy (Berlin, *Rhetoric & Reality, Writing Instruction*, Goggin; Kitzhaber; Marshall; R. Miller, “Composing”; S. Miller; Russell, *Writing, “Institutionalizing”*) as well as the disappearance of rhetorical instruction (Brereton, *Origins, “Historiography”*; Clark & Halloran; Connors, “Composition,” *Writing*, Halloran, “Rhetoric”; W. Horner; McKoski; T. Miller, *The Formation*; J. Murphy) within a two-tier English department structure that favored literature over rhetoric as research institutions emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Maureen Daly Goggin’s analysis of this trend is particularly lucid, and in *Authoring a Discipline: Scholarly Journals and the Post-World War II Emergence of Rhetoric and Composition*, she summarizes three factors that placed rhetoric in the “low estate” (Kitzhaber qtd. 10) in American higher education until around 1950. She explains:
One part of the answer lies in how rhetoric was conceived, and then ignored, during this time. For one thing, the early modern era witnessed the crumbling of some of the intellectual foundations of rhetoric; it was, in Kitzhaber’s words, a time of ‘low estate’ for rhetoric. Another part of the answer lies in how discontinuous concepts of literate practices transformed both rhetoric and poetics, driving a wedge between the two. Still another part of the answer lies in the ways fields had to define themselves to achieve disciplinary status; fields configured themselves along different combinations of the three ideals of research, liberal culture, and utility to establish separate identities and garner separate intellectual turf. (Goggin 11)

So, rhetoric disappeared because of a culmination of factors in the intellectual climate of the day, factors that had been mounting since the time of Ramus, Bacon, and the rationalists. Further, however, rhetoric was marginalized by institutional factors that left it stranded between the classics curriculum and the English department. Goggin says, “For many in the nascent discipline of English, study of the vernacular would come to mean a disciplined and critical study not of rhetoric but of literature” (11). The easy dualisms of the modern era left the complicated field of rhetoric without a home.

Pressures that were shaping the professional identity of higher education across the country, namely the three models of learning that were replacing classical education, also contributed to rhetoric’s decline. Higher education became increasingly focused on teaching the liberal ideal, promoting the discovery of knowledge through research, and training new segments of the population for useful work (Veysey). In particular, the German research ideal, as it was applied to American institutions by ambitious young graduates after the Civil War era, pushed rhetoric to the background. Goggin explains that the German ideal was imported into English
studies in America through philology “as an already tested and acceptable method from the German universities” that gave English “intellectual rigor” while ignoring rhetoric (18). In other words, to achieve disciplinary status and professionalize their faculty along with the rest of the specialized departments, English departments gravitated toward the precedent in the German universities, which valorized philology, criticism, and literary scholarship as scientific studies. Rhetoric, which could not be neatly categorized as an art or a science, was truncated and relegated to the practical and “unpleasant” task of writing instruction in the new two-semester freshman writing sequences that replaced the eight-semester oral rhetoric instruction at institutions across the country.

The German tenet of Wissenschaf (learning), which guided emerging scholarly practices in this era, was initially developed to ward off a danger that had been clear and present during the eighteenth century, and especially during the decades immediately before 1810. The danger was that the state, the university’s sole support, would insist on immediately practical learning and that it would reduce the universities to mere training schools for higher officials. In response, the combination of research and teaching came to be regarded as essential to the character of the German university. Only contact with pure scholarship was thought to have the effect of Bildung. A bias developed, at least in principle, against applied research, and even the proverbial “freedom of Wissenschaf” was sometimes interpreted as though “pure” learning and “free” learning were essentially identical (Ringer 412). Also, this preference affected rhetoric in association with composition. Goggin explains, “Because textbooks were not (and still are not) regarded for tenure and promotion in the same manner as scholarly monographs, the rewards for work in rhetoric and composition were kept small as compared with those for work in literary studies. In this way, the field of rhetoric and composition was kept marginalized” (30).
In her article “The Politics of Professing Rhetoric in the History of Composition and Communication,” Nancy McKoski shows some of the complexity of rhetoric’s disappearance and reemergence. She claims that the social sciences are responsible for the reforms in higher education this century and that the liberal arts have often openly resisted some of the trends. In particular, she cites the principles of scientific naturalism—objectivism, particularism, and functionalism—as structuring attitudes towards scholarship (15). She claims that the rise of rhetoric in the 1950s actually dated back to the neoclassical movement of the 1930s, a movement that directly countered “what many humanists viewed as the destructive influences of the new social sciences in American education, culture, and politics” (16). This backlash against scientism and narrow specialization led also to the general education curriculum and the progressive education movement, both of which sought to counteract the degeneracy of the modern world.

McKoski traces how general education addressed the institutional need for composition instruction by implementing a communications course requirement and by scaffolding efforts with the “new scientific language studies,” such as linguistics, which challenged traditional language instruction. According to her historical account, it wasn’t until the 1954 CCC convention that a series of papers on rhetoric were introduced to counter the implications of the new linguistics studies for composition (18). However, Gerald Mulderig says, not until 1963 can rhetoric really be said to have gained entry to English departments. “[The 1963] conference featured seven speakers on rhetoric, including Booth on the rhetorical stance, Christensen on generative rhetoric, and Corbett on the usefulness of classical rhetoric” (165). Rhetoric was on its way to becoming the informing discipline for composition, and a new discipline with old roots was taking form.
Others have pinpointed the emergence of the New Rhetoric in the 1970s. According to D’Angelo:

In the second phase of the professionalization of the discipline of rhetoric and composition, which I shall label the ‘quest’ stage, we ventured forth to claim an identity…. We were enthusiastic about Christensen’s generative rhetoric and the possibilities of new rhetorics. We were excited about Kinneavy’s theory of discourse, Corbett’s classical rhetoric, tagmemic rhetoric, linguistic stylistics, transformational sentence combining, literary structuralism, and more. (271)

Regardless of when rhetoric rose to prominence within composition in the twentieth century, it helped structure the professional identity for the field and became a center space for discussion and publishing.

Such considerations of rhetoric’s rise and fall, however, should be seen without the narrative of progress or decline, praise or blame. Clark and Halloran describe the disappearance of rhetoric along with the oratorical culture as linked to the rise of professionalization and specialization. They describe how, alongside professionalization, general shifts in the ideal of the individual and that individual’s education were occurring which transformed the oratorical culture of the nineteenth century. In their estimation, “A powerful physical aspect of the American setting invited a shift in the culture of the United States from a social morality grounded in the community to one grounded in the individual” (9). The individualist rhetoric that replaced the earlier communal rhetoric was not argumentative, but relied on identification and entertainment. Identification is the method that Andrew Jackson used in 1828 to overcome classical rhetorician John Quincy Adams in the bid for the presidency, an event that signals the beginning of this shift in rhetoric. From this model of public representation along with the rise
of professionalism, it can be argued that current traditional rhetoric emerged with its emphasis on exposition and delivery of knowledge instead of argument and inquiry.

Persuasion or argument was limited within the professional environment to logic, which was thought to be morally neutral, and appeals to emotion and authority were devalued (21). Clark and Halloran summarize the connection:

The rhetoric of identification does not necessarily preclude all logical argument, though it does tend to deemphasize it. The rhetoric of professional expertise does not suppress all passion and moral commitment, though it tends to undermine their legitimacy. These rhetorics did not counterbalance each other so much as the latter grew out of the former as the cultural situation of life in the United States changed. Our immediate argument in this essay is that by the end of the nineteenth century, the dominant aspects of American culture in general and the theory and practice of its public discourse in particular had been transformed by the emergence of the practical and seemingly apolitical ideals of professionalism. (25)

Therefore, if an argument can be established that the rise of professionalism marginalized the robust ideals of classical rhetoric, it stands to reason that some shift in the model of professionalism had to occur before rhetoric could return to the curriculum. This chapter argues that the return of rhetoric as it was synthesized with composition is causally linked to the trends in professionalism after 1950 and changing forms of scholarship during that time period. As rhetoric reentered the curriculum, with its valuing of the personal, ethical, and broad range of appeals within scholarly argument, it did so as the economy began dispersing the power of the professional. Rhetoric, the dialectical space where the common meets the learned, in other words, is linked to “post-professionalism,” both within and outside the academy.
Becoming a Discipline

There are as many histories of our field as there are historians, each with situated perspectives, it seems. Robert Connors in “Writing the History of Our Discipline” claims that composition is both the oldest and newest of the humanities (49). In between our modern discipline and the tradition of composition and/or rhetoric instruction that precedes it is an historical void, which Connors claims, “for most of the twentieth century left written rhetoric without a history” and was “the unfortunate result of the rise of departmentalization in American Universities” (50). Connors elaborates on how these extrinsic factors shaped composition:

In early American colleges, oral rhetoric and writing were usually taught by the same generalist professor. There were no academic departments. After the Civil War, however, when scholars began traveling to Germany and bringing back the ideas that would create modern American higher education, the organization of the university into departments of scholars studying similar phenomena seemed natural. Modern English departments appeared quickly, teaching philology, literature, and composition. The older field of oral rhetoric, however, having no Germanic scholarly pedigree, never found a comfortable home in English. In 1914, rhetoric teachers, discouraged by their inferior status in English, left the National Council of the Teachers of English to form the National Association of Academic Teachers of Public Speaking, which became the Speech Communication Association—and to form their own Departments of Speech. (51)

Connors presents above a condensed version of the longer story of the rift in rhetoric. When the colonial colleges were formed around the liberal arts, oral rhetoric played a large role; however, following the Civil War, when specialization and departmentalization began to increase, rhetoric
lost its institutional standing and scholarly backing. While both rhetoric and composition remained as activities in higher education, they were relegated to different departments. Within the English Department, as multiple recent histories of English have pointed out (S. Miller; T. Miller, *Formation*; Russell, *Writing*) there emerged a two-tiered structure, which prioritized the scholarly content of literature over composition. During this time, Connors says, “Composition teaching was done, but no degree specialties in composition existed, and no real scholarship surrounded it except for a few articles in education journals and in *College English*. From 1885 until after World War II, composition existed as a practice without a coherent theory or developed history” (52).

It may be useful to consider what forces formed the discipline before mapping the evolution of the field’s professional identity itself. “Discipline” and “profession” are distinctly different, when considered historically. A “profession” became possible only following the shift in the notion of expertise and specialization. “Disciplines” were instruments of specialization, but their roots extend to before the era of professionalism. A “discipline” can be seen as a response to a problem, but it is a unified and codified response to a specific problem. After the Civil War and World War II, the problem for universities became one of increasing enrollments with changing demographics that required new ways of teaching literacy. It was during these two time periods that composition made strides toward disciplinarity. In the Gadamerian sense, to become an academic discipline, “rhetoric needed practices, theories, and traditions (as canons and histories) that it could call its own. Humanistic disciplines do not form and then find distinctive practices, paradigmatic theories, and canonical traditions. Rather, emergent sets of practices, theories, and traditions constitute what counts as a discipline and interdiscipline” (Mailloux 184). In other words, rhetoric and composition emerged out of a set of practices that
were generated by need, first externally and then, when codified, from inside the field. This need can be understood also in the Foucauldian sense: “Disciplines are structured by problems or questions that are in some way self-reproducing” (qtd. in Shumway and Dione 6).

However, as Stephen North and Louise Wetherbee Phelps have both described, our response to the practical need for writing instruction created a discipline of practitioners who relied on “lore” and “practical wisdom,” and as Susan Miller claims, the sorts of writing we were affiliated with from our early days set us up as the “less professional” members of English Departments. So, given these disciplinary roots, how did we construct the professional ethos that would legitimate the field’s work after 1950, culminating in the establishment of Ph.D. programs and a broad spectrum of journals and finally lending us the prestige of “academic professionals”?

Professionalization trends on the institutional and departmental levels continued to push composition studies to the margin until around 1950. In 1949, the Conference on College Composition and Communication formed and established their journal. Connors attributes this change in part to a “GI Bill generation of teachers” who were responding to burgeoning enrollments and an increased interest in general education curricula to bring departments into discussion again (“Writing the History” 52). Furthermore, during periods of high rate enrollment growth, rhetoric actually becomes more important. As Thomas Miller argues in The Formation of College English, it is specifically during periods of expansion in higher education that rhetoric and composition finds its way into the curriculum. Andrea Lunsford draws on similar ideas when she says, “If students from widely varying backgrounds were coming to college (whether the colleges wanted them there or not) someone had to offer instruction in the linguistic practices of the academy. This someone was increasingly the teacher of composition” (8).
This generation of composition teachers who responded to the changing educational climate in twentieth-century America included Albert Kitzhaber, whose 1953 dissertation, under the guidance of Porter Perrin, contributed an outline of composition instruction’s history from 1850-1900. By the end of the 1950s, individuals interested in issues affecting composition instruction were beginning to articulate the theory behind the practice for a nascent field (Connors, “Writing the History” 53). The group of scholars from this era, Connors loosely terms “first-generation” (“Composition History” 3). “Second-generation” compositionists were, according to Connors, those who were trained in the late 1960s and entered the field when “there was a literature and a lot of excitement but no possibility of official doctoral recognition” (9). Members of the second generation also “had to retool as writing specialists after literary doctorates” (9).

The roots of the early generations may, in part, explain what Janice Lauer has described as the “multimodal” nature of research in the dialectical field spaces that continues to this day (“Rhetoric”). As Andrea Lunsford has pointed out in her overview article “The Nature of Composition Studies”:

As a field, we traditionally ask questions about texts, readers, writers, and contexts—and about the dynamic relation among them through which multiplicitous meanings or realities are constructed. Thus composition studies views composing not as a series of discrete skills or a package of processes to be practiced but as the very way we constitute and know our worlds…. Such a position leads composition studies to look well beyond its own borders and to challenge divisions between disciplines, between genres, and between media. Thus a scholar of composition may draw on anthropology, linguistics,
psychology, philosophy, literary theory, neurobiology, or other disciplines in studying the creation and dissemination of written texts. (9)

The nature of this multimodal scholarship that has evolved out of our distinctive past has been part of the challenge of our discipline’s formation for first- and second- generation members. By contrast, “third-generation” compositionists were those who emerged after composition studies began granting specialized doctoral degrees (Connors, “Composition History” 9), and this group was able to work within the precedents for research from earlier groups.

Because of the many different periods of professionalization within the field of rhetoric and composition, this dissertation argues, the somewhat chaotic process of our formation derives from more than disciplinary knowledge or pragmatic tendencies, as Chapter Two discussed. Instead, we must look also at the ways that broader professionalization trends in the economy and higher education have shaped our field’s mercurial identity from 1950 to the present day. This panorama will enable us to bring rhetoric and composition, once the field clearly established itself within the narrative of institutional progress, back into the broader discussion of the scholarship of engagement.

**Forming a Professional Identity for Rhetoric and Composition**

One of the key factors that established us, according to Frank D’Angelo’s narrative of the field’s progress, was the networking that occurred amongst early members of the field. He says that in the “Initiation Stage” there was a camaraderie that grew out of shared need. He describes one of his early experiences from 1974:

The [emerging Rhetoric Society of America] meeting was held in Winterowd’s living room in Huntington Beach and chaired by Ed Corbett…. This was an important early
meeting of a small group of teachers and scholars who were to form the nucleus of the Rhetoric Society, which gave impetus to scholarly interests in classical rhetoric and in the history of rhetoric…. I believe it was groups such as these that constituted a genuine turning point in the professionalization of composition studies. They gave composition teachers, who had neither identity nor status in their own departments, a place to gather, to talk, to deliver papers, to exchange ideas, and to develop professionally. (270-271)

In the second phase described by D’Angelo, the “quest” stage in which composition ventured out to claim an identity, the field continued to network on a personal level. According to D’Angelo, again: “I am convinced that it was in these small groups that professionalism was emerging as a way of holding ourselves together” (273). He gives a personal account of the many instances where collaboration within small groups led to important publishing projects that determined the direction the field would take. These small groups also spurred further interest in research; therefore, according to D’Angelo, these grassroots efforts were a formative, early influence.

Another factor beyond the networks that articulated the field’s professional identity early on was the type of research that members of the field produced. Early field research was dominated by scientism, following from the professional models established in the disciplines throughout the early twentieth century. This type of empirically-oriented research was represented in the 1963 publication *Research in Written Composition*, an NCTE sponsored publication, edited by Richard Braddock, Richard Lloyd-Jones, and Lowell Schoer. As already discussed, during this quest phase, the new rhetoric also emerged as a dominant model for field research. However, even though both of these models sought to secure a type of “pure” research for rhetoric and composition, the draw for many in the field seemed to be the practical, pedagogical, and student-centered nature of its primary work. According to Joseph Harris:
Coming across work in composition gave me a way of imagining teaching as an integral part of (and not just a kind of report on) my work as an intellectual. I had never looked forward very much to a career as a scholar writing to a small clique of other specialists, and so was pleased to find a field where so many people seemed to try to speak to the concerns of experts and students alike. I was especially struck by how the writings of students were made part of many books and articles on teaching. (A Teaching x)

Ultimately, the material realities of composition instruction, which necessitated studying student learners regardless of the theoretical models brought to bear, resulted in what Janice Lauer has described as a “multimodal” research ethic. These practices which allowed rhetoric to remain interdisciplinary and generate a broad range of intellectual work also generated some conflicts for the field as it defined emergent research practices. This admixture of methodology relied upon a generalists’ variety of research methods apprenticed from specialized disciplines, once again calling attention to the field as specialization in a generalist domain.

As the field matured, its research continued to diversify, and the trend away from a centralized set of methods also continued. One dominant influence on third-generation members of the field was literary and critical theory. Given the politics within English departments, as Susan Miller has reminded us, this development alongside literary theory remained controversial. Some members of the field found the movement into theory and polemics somewhat regrettable inasmuch as it competed with student-centered pedagogies, what Robert Connors has called “the problems of answered prayers” (“Composition History”15).

This fear of having lost the student focus may prove exaggerated, however. As Gerald Mulderig found in a survey of dissertations completed between 1990 and 1994, composition pedagogy still accounted for 47% of the subjects covered in a sample of 218 job applicants.
Linguistics accounted for 8%, professional writing for 5%, rhetorical criticism for 16%, rhetorical history for 9%, and rhetorical theory for 6% (168). These findings indicate that much of the first- and second-generation focus remained on students and pedagogy instead of pure theory well into the emergence of the third generation of field members who were trained in rhetoric and composition doctoral programs. Such a focus, after the field had gained disciplinary status, possibly suggests a unique model of professionalism that not only guided its emergence but also sustained its development in the 1990s.

Mulderig’s results stand in contrast to those of Karen Kopelson as articulated in a June 2008 CCC article entitled “Sp(l)itting Images; or, Back to the Future of (Rhetoric and?) Composition.” Kopelson surveyed graduate students and faculty at two institutions granting doctorates in rhetoric and composition with “very different identities and areas of specialization” (753). Kopelson cites the responses to the survey throughout her article, mostly to support the notion that the scope of the field has been restricted to pedagogy in its most common articulation, and that theory isn’t accorded due disciplinary space, thereby endangering the ability of the field to produce new knowledge of its own in broader domains of writing and literacy in society. Her findings seem to directly dialogue with Robert Connors’ fear that theory would be favored by the third-generation scholars of rhetoric and composition, to the detriment of a student focus. Kopelson even addresses Connors’ concerns explicitly, admitting that she uses him as a “straw man” (762) in discussing the “theory divide” and the future of the discipline. She says:

Motivated in large part by the pedagogical (or at least pragmatic) imperative, we have separated, and valued respectively, theory that we perceive as clearly “of use,” “in service to,” from theory that is not. In short and, I argue, to our detriment, many of us have
asked, and are still asking, Connors’s question or some variation thereof: “Whom does the theory serve?” [15], a question that, as North puts it … “rather misses the point” [97].

Chapter Five of this dissertation will address Kopelson’s “epideictic” of field scholarship and disciplinary identity, arguing that she has missed how tensions she usefully articulates can actually be productive in field research, self-identification, and exporting of knowledge, especially in light of external pressures on the modern university. Chapter Five will address how the types of self-reflexivity Kopelson calls “detrimental to our disciplinary growth” (775) actually indicate an emergent form of knowledge that is a strong center space for the field, a form of knowledge that is dialectical, oriented toward praxis and theory, and which has been latent/invisible content in our disciplinary discussions and informing traditions since the 1950s.

Not only do these surveys of the way knowledge is organized in the field help describe changes in professional identity over time, such as the changing modes of inquiry described by Mulderig and Kopelson above, but such surveys also provide useful contexts for discussing how publications have shaped the professional identity of the field as well. Publications, publisher influences, journals, book reviews, editorial practices, conference proceedings, research awards, and other artifacts that increasingly guided the field from first- through third-generation professionalism are artifacts of disciplinary formation through research interests. Many of these artifacts of intellectual production have been analyzed by members of the field in useful ways (Goggin; Connors, “Composition History”; Phelps, “Recovering”; D’Angelo). As Kopelson points out, a large body of this defining scholarly work is self-reflexive; however, such “navel-gazing” can be seen in Bruce Horner’s terms as important reconstruction of “traditions” that
because of composition’s marginalized status are also sites of resistance to academic professionalism (“Traditions”).

Also, central to articulations of a dominant research model for the field during the years of disciplinary solidification were books such as Stephen North’s *Making of Knowledge in Composition*, published in 1987, and Louise Wetherbee Phelps’s *Composition as a Human Science: Contributions to the Self-Understanding of a Discipline*, published in 1988, that helped to reflect back to the field the ways research had helped organize disciplinary knowledge. Beyond this, taxonomies that in part polarized the field, such as James Berlin’s *Rhetoric and Reality* and Lester Faigley’s “Competing Theories of Process,” also served as important forms of disciplinary knowledge because they led to widespread discussion of how knowledge shaped field practices. Because of these taxonomies, members of the field were also able to recognize and articulate the significance of changing preferences within field scholarship (Hairston, “The Winds”; Young, “Paradigms”), such as the move from expressivist to cognitivist to communitarian models and beyond.

In addition to the practices of networking and publishing, there were also material, institutional realities that helped to structure the field. Rhetoric and composition’s fundamental role as service course providers and administrators within the larger institution led to a subsequent boom in these jobs during a time period when other English faculty jobs were scarce (Connors, “Composition History”). This was significant in our professional development because it attracted bright young graduate students to the new field and also encouraged some who had completed doctoral work in other specialties to retool as rhetoric and composition professionals. These early efforts lent a lot of energy to the work that grew out of professional development activities. Furthermore, rhetoric and composition was linked to substantial
resources that were often also part of English department budgets. Nonetheless, even then, composition scholarship remained marginalized.

Gaining professional status as a field has been difficult specifically because of the separation of intellectual work from material social production. Attempts to redefine and validate scholarship in the field of rhetoric and composition and the scholarship of engagement movement both seek to reunite the intellectual work of faculty with the material social conditions of its production and dissemination, turning it from exchange value to use value. According to materialist critic Bruce Horner, “As a result of [the suppression of the material social process], the work of art—and, by extension, intellectual work generally—is separated from the material social conditions of its production, and so imagined as, at most, acting autonomously on, against, or in spite of but not with and within such conditions” (xvii). This means uncovering and valuing intellectual work done in less valorized spaces, such as skills courses and community service projects. In Horner’s words again:

The competing identifications of composition work mark Composition’s location on the periphery of the academy. The economic capital it ostensibly produces in the form of writing skills, for which it is valued outside the academy, serves only to secure the marginality of its status within the academy. Meanwhile, both the academic and non-academic spheres refuse to recognize, and so devalue, the cultural capital represented by compositionists’ attempts to achieve professional academic status through the production of abstract knowledge. (xxi, emphasis mine)

The devaluing of intellectual work causes tensions between professional identifications, including work valued outside versus within the academy and professional versus marginal status.
The field formed at an historical moment due to external pressures—such as the “Johnny Can’t Read/Write” press, increasing enrollments, and changing literacy levels—and its growth was fueled not only by these external circumstances but also by internally-generated legitimation narratives and research questions from first- and second-generation members. Also, because of the influence of the New Rhetoric focus in the late 50s and early 60s and our roots in the oratorical college system, there was some shared sense of field ethos organized around service, civics, and ethics. In the 1980s and 1990s, the field ethos shifted along with changing modes of discourse production, technology, and access to higher education, and again, the field responded with a cultural studies model of composition (Fulkerson). Throughout rhetoric and composition’s professionalization, members of the field have repeatedly cited a preference for composition as a type of “reasoned action in the world” (Young, “Watson” 212). It is this articulation, a focus which makes us a uniquely engaged discipline and also makes the social material conditions explicit, that the remainder of the chapter will address.

**Rhetoric and Engagement in the “Post-Professional” Milieu (1970-Present)**

Even though Connors made the argument in 1996 that the field was drifting toward a theory-heavy focus that neglects student learning, this dissertation argues it has retained its practitioner and service focus, making the field explicitly engaged. This focus may have cost rhetoric and composition faculty a bit of struggle in reaching professional status alongside their colleagues in other English specialties, as narratives of disciplinary formation indicate. However, it is this uniquely situated professionalism, emphasized in this chapter, in addition to the pragmatic/sophistic roots of the field and the ethical/rhetorical turn in composition that have positioned the field for scholarly engagement in the academy. As a result of its past struggles,
the field offers a model of how the scholarship of engagement can be a legitimizing and legitimate activity for a discipline and the academy, one that makes social material conditions of intellectual work explicit.

This chapter began by considering the dangers of the “managerial model” of professionalism that Gallagher argued was guiding rhetoric and composition. However, the chapter ends with the model of the “intellectual bureaucrat” as a possible model to guide engaged practice. In his 1999 article “Intellectual Bureaucrats: The Future of Employment in the Twilight of the Profession,” Richard Miller offers a view of these changes toward a model this dissertation calls “post-professionalism.” He says:

For those who study the job market in higher education, it is clear that the nature of the work in the academy is undergoing a radical reformation. The declining tax base, the rise of animosity for education as a kind of “social engineering,” the steady replacement of tenured lines with temporary professionals, the encroachment of total quality management and outcomes assessment, and the public cries for tangible evidence of the “products” of education—all of these events have served to change what it means to be a teacher in the academy and what it means to be a graduate student training for entry into this profession. (321)

The conglomeration of factors Miller describes has contributed to new opportunities, in his opinion, even as it also signals the end of a market for “pure” education and “endless cultural critique” (321-322). Miller describes how the new academic “professional” has more opportunities for public intellectualism, reaching underprepared populations, and encountering diversity. He describes how this trend may also set in motion “a range of pedagogical and
bureaucratic practices designed to provide instruction in the arts of working within and against dominant systems of constraint” (322).

Miller’s last point can’t be stated too strongly. His vision of the post-professional milieu is one characterized by “intellectual bureaucrats” who artfully negotiate institutional constraints. In offering this avenue into the future of higher education, he cautions that we must refigure the negative connotations of “bureaucrat” for members of the academic profession, and we must embrace the “real sense of agency” bureaucracy makes possible by “preserving and creating the sense of self-worth” within extant constraints (328). He is mindful of detractors throughout his argument, but ends with a hopeful definition of the new “intellectual bureaucrat,” which requires the following:

- a remarkable tolerance for ambiguity,
- an appreciation for structured contradictions,
- a perspicacity that draws into its purview the multiple forces determining individual events and actions,
- an understanding of the essentially performative character of public life,
- a recognition of the inherently political character of all matters emerging from the power/knowledge nexus (330, bullet points not in original).

It perhaps bears pointing out that Miller’s list of traits includes skills specifically cultivated within the study of rhetoric. As Chapter Two argued, rhetoric makes the antifoundational and contingent nature of knowledge explicit, showing this “tolerance for ambiguity.” As Chapter Five argues, rhetoric is also found in dialectical spaces which are formed through structured contradictions. Political rhetoric and the civic focus, as are discussed in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, has long been an overt focus of field scholarship, showing a sensitivity to
“multiple forces determining individual events and actions” and the “inherently political character of all matters emerging from the power/knowledge nexus.” And, finally, rhetoric’s long oral tradition has placed the “performative character of public life” at the heart of nearly everything we do as a field.

This new rhetorical and bureaucratic role for the intellectual, which seems eminent in many ways, requires a studied awareness of cultural critique and public representation. Post-professionalism is, in other words, a rhetorically savvy sort of professionalism, one which seeks to connect contradictory forces through a dialectical relationship. It is also a professional ideal in which rhetoric’s subfield connections to civic education, service learning, writing across the curriculum, and multimodal research will prove highly useful. This type of work, which has existed on the margins through the rise of the research institution with its associated model of the academic profession, is now moving to the center. And, engagement is the centrifugal force.

**Conclusion**

While the era of rising professionalization from the Civil War through the “golden age” of higher education in the 1970s has given us the model of the university we are so familiar with today, several unresolved professional tensions that may be restructuring academic life persist. It is these external forces and the material realities within higher education that have led us to reconsider academic professionalism and the evaluation instruments that reinforce our professional models. The scholarship of engagement is a prominent example of how external pressures from economic trends and guiding cultural ethos can further modify the role of the professions in society.
This chapter presented a brief version of the professionalization of higher education and rhetoric and composition. Further, it argued that we have entered a post-professional era in which university administrators and governing boards are urging faculties back towards utility and values-based curricula. Administrative bodies and external pressures are not the only sources of the shift toward engagement. In some cases, faculty who seek more cohesive and fulfilling roles within the changing academic structure are pushing for this change, relying on the engagement-themed books and documents from the Carnegie Foundation to initiate changes. These engaged values have in many ways been in the forefront of rhetoric and composition’s work, scholarship, commitments, and discussions. Such values are further reflected in the gathering momentum around the scholarship of engagement, as the university extends its services beyond the campus and across disciplinary boundaries to create a sense of institutional coherence that has been disappearing since the emergence of the academic professional model. These movements downplay the isolated, autonomous character of professionalized academic life. Such redefinition is a secondary effect of connecting intellectual work to public and community need. Rather than try to understand this effect by looking only at the scholarship of engagement, it is essential to contextualize it by unpacking the intellectual, economic, and social climate in which this trend is emerging. When these factors are brought into sharp focus, especially within a larger history of institutional restructuring in American higher education, it becomes clearer universities will continue to move towards engagement as a professional model for the foreseeable future.

Rhetoric and composition’s long-standing commitment to engaged work moves the field into a new position in synch with this larger trend. As a result of changing constituencies, the previously marginalized content of the field also plays a more central role in this post-
professional milieu. The field of rhetoric and composition has been marginalized most notably during periods of academic professionalization, and it deals with writing and literacy practices that are often also marginalized in the academy. Because composition instruction is “simultaneously an activity, the product of an activity, and the place of its practice” (B. Horner xvii), when the university must address social needs in external sites, rhetoric and composition is uniquely poised to be central in those efforts.

This dissertation has already explored the return of pragmatism and the rise and fall of professionalism as both have structured definitions of and expectations for scholarship in the American academic professions. Now, the dissertation will turn to another central influence that has long structured the relationship between the professor and the rest of society, namely the debate over ethical responsibilities of the scholar, another area in which rhetoric and composition scholars have made many contributions. As Shils reminds us, even after the academic profession emerged, disagreement remained about how knowledge should advance in the academy—whether it should be through emphasis on “theoretical and fundamental knowledge in comparison with practical, useful discoveries, or on the value of immediate intervention into practical affairs as against the postponement or avoidance of intervention until knowledge was sufficiently reliable” (46). These debates, woven as they are in the American fabric, endure even today. Furthermore, the issues remain difficult in light of modernist and postmodernist critiques of knowledge because ethics structures the heart of debates over the usefulness and relevance of knowledge generated. For these reasons, the fourth chapter of the dissertation, “Ethics as a Traveling Concept,” will explore ethics in scholarship production, from knowledge creation to dissemination, before turning in the final chapter to models of engaged professionalism in rhetoric and composition and intellectual life today.
CHAPTER IV. ETHICS AS A TRAVELING CONCEPT

In their 1996 book *Ethics and Representation in Qualitative Studies of Literacy*, Peter Mortensen and Gesa Kirsch hailed “the ethical turn” within the field of rhetoric and composition. Mortensen and Kirsch were specifically referring to research ethics, and since the publication of their book, rhetoric and composition specialists have contributed substantially to the ongoing discussion about human subjects in research (Anderson; Powell & Takayoshi; Schneider; McKee & Porter; Barton). This specific focus referred to as “the ethical turn” is one strand within a wide-ranging treatment of ethics in the field of rhetoric and composition. This chapter will analyze four areas of rhetoric and composition scholarship on ethics and four models that emerge from that scholarship, arguing that ethics is yet another area of convergence for rhetoric and engagement. Furthermore, by pointing to the complex treatment of postmodern ethics in rhetoric and composition scholarship, the chapter will offer theoretical background for a form of engaged scholarship that is ethically responsive to the community but not naively so.

In the 2002 book *Travelling Concepts within the Humanities*, Mieke Bal addresses a series of ideas that “travel” across disciplines. He says, “To make your fortune you have to travel. Hazardous, exciting, and tiring, travel is needed if you are to achieve the gain of new experience” (4). The transdisciplinary concepts of values and ethics also travel across the curriculum, and, like the task of teaching writing, they are not the property or responsibility of any one discipline. As James Kinneavy comments, speaking of the seeming lack of fit of ethics in the curriculum, “The ethics issue parallels the rhetorical issue—it must be done somewhere” (“Kairos” 219). Engagement, too, is a traveling concept with a transdisciplinary focus, and it needs to be guided by concepts that can speak across disciplines and to the public from tenuous center spaces. That is why this chapter investigates ethics, first within the field of rhetoric and
composition, but ultimately, beyond that discipline to generalize models to serve as important pillars in the university of the future.

Current scholarship on ethics does not fully address the changing needs of faculty in the academy. Two possible dominant strands for research on ethics in higher education emerged through a review of literature: most often, ethics research refers to a narrow focus on treatment of human subjects as sanctioned by the Institutional Review Board, or it refers to the content in an abstract and amorphous ethics curriculum. Both of these views are limited. One of the reasons that ethics should not be constricted to discussion of human subjects or curricula alone is the way it usefully addresses relationships among community, institution, teachers, researchers, students, knowledges, discourses, and curricula. These overlapping domains are vital aspects of the post-professional faculty role, and these very same relationships are foundations for the scholarship of engagement.

Furthermore, not only does ethics structure academic professionalism, it does so in ways that are necessarily rhetorical. Ethics is an area that has long been associated with rhetoric, and according to some theorists, the two cannot be separated. “Ethics is the practical art of determining the social (as well as personal) good; politics is the practical art of implementing the social good; rhetoric is the productive art enabling ethical and political action” (Porter, “Postmodern,” 210). Within this three-part relationship, ethics and rhetoric are connected by the concept of “phronesis (judgment or practical wisdom)—which is the basis for both ethical and rhetorical activity” (215). Furthermore, both ethics and rhetoric share a dependence on context, community, and contingency, concepts that this dissertation previously argued were connected to engagement also.
Too often, in discussions of ethics, an earlier ideal of abstract, rigid ethical principles is brought to bear. This rigidness then shapes the relationship between values and higher education, complicating the discussion within the antifoundational and post-professional milieu; however, the field of rhetoric and composition has provided useful models for situational ethics in the classroom and in research. According to Katrina Powell and Pamela Takayoshi, rhetoric is well-suited to this environment: “To recognize the context-bound nature of rhetoric is to recognize that there are no universally right or appropriate ways of working with participants—there are only contingent truths determined by the community of people” (416). Rhetoric recognizes contingency and defines itself with a communal ethos, both of which can usefully structure the broader debate about ethics in higher education today.

To get at these connections between rhetoric and ethics as they shape engaged scholarship, the chapter will examine areas of scholarship on ethics within rhetoric and composition to build a theoretical background for the model of the “citizen scholar” developed in Chapter Five. The first section, “The Ethical Turn in Composition,” will examine four areas of ethical scholarship in the field, areas referred to in this dissertation as “ethical theory,” “ethics of practice,” “ethics and technology,” and “research ethics.” From these four areas, the “Postmodern Rhetorical-Ethical Models” section argues, emerge a set of postmodern principles that can guide discussions of ethics across the curriculum, emphasizing the reciprocal, heuristic, analytical, and reflexive nature of postmodern ethics. Finally, in a section labeled “Convergences,” the chapter seeks useful common ground among the “arts” of rhetoric, ethics, and, more recently, engagement, especially as all of these areas seek to redefine scholarship, professionalism, and knowledge in the academy.
The Ethical Turn in Composition

“As I write this today I pause, momentarily stunned. That we have no source of common moral knowledge is a truly frightening idea” (Halloran, “Further Thoughts” 116).

S. Michael Halloran, quoted above, describes his scholarly career as seeking a way out of the “denial of the possibility of sane public life” (116). As his quote suggests, discussions of values as part of “sane public life” are often fraught with emotion and can evoke anything from fear to contempt. However, as the work of Halloran and other historians in rhetoric and composition have repeatedly emphasized, for ethics to be vital once again to the curriculum, it will need to consider groups that have been marginalized by dominant value systems, recognizing the situated nature of the ethical dilemma and the ways communities structure values and communicate them through discourse (Jarratt, “The First Sophists”; T. Miller, “Reinventing”; Faigley, Fragments; Halloran, “Further Thoughts”). In other words, the relationship between rhetoric and ethics has grown increasingly complex, and this becomes a vital consideration when presenting a new model for scholarship that is responsive and active in the public domain.

Because ethics in public and intellectual life began shifting early in the twentieth century, the complex ethical basis of modern rhetorical instruction is not new even if interest in this tradition has been renewed through an ethical turn in the last ten years. The first area of ethics research this chapter will address, ethical theory, has been important as a backbone for our field since the 1950s when the New Rhetoric emerged. The new rhetoricians examined the rhetorical tradition emanating from Plato’s critiques of rhetorical sophistry, which was considered debased and immoral; Aristotle’s pairing of the arts of rhetoric and ethics; Cicero’s De Oratore; and
perhaps most popularly, Quintillian’s famous “good man skilled in speaking” in his *Institutio Oratoria*. “Ethical theory,” as this chapter discusses it, also examines the work of the moral philosophers who have long been associated with rhetorical instruction, such as in the Scottish colleges during the Enlightenment. The theoretical treatment of ethics in the field also reaches beyond our disciplinary tradition to engage with contemporary moral philosophy and critical theory, where Foucault, Bakhtin, and Lyotard have made contributions to understandings of postmodern ethics.

To further construct the idea of the “New Scholarly Citizen,” this section theorizes three other areas beyond ethical theory affected by the ethical turn. The “ethics of practice” refers to a less recognized area of scholarship within the field that deals most directly with teaching and administrative practices. This is the area where theory meets practice, and it is the area that has a direct effect on the education students receive; therefore, it is necessary for understanding engaged faculty roles. The third domain, “ethics and technology,” refers to the quickly growing area of research on “digital ethics,” including communication ethics, the ethics of access to information, and intellectual property boundaries in the information age. Much of the cutting edge work in these areas is being carried out in technical writing and computers and composition specialties; therefore, it has been treated under a separate heading here. Based on shifting modes of production, this domain also will be important for considering shifting forms of scholarship. Finally, the “research ethics” section in this chapter examines interactions among researchers and participants, especially human subjects in literacy research. This section directly addresses the dialectical tensions between the scholar and the citizen, or the academy and the community, which are fundamental concerns for the engaged scholar.
This section also presents the argument that these areas of ethics research exist in a symbiotic and transactional relationship to one another within the broader ethical turn. In fact, if each subfocus is mapped onto the familiar rhetorical triangle, a useful model can be produced for viewing the field’s scholarly work on ethics. In his *Theory of Discourse*, James Kinneavy maps author, audience, universe, and text onto a triangle (Figure 4.1):

![Rhetorical Triangle](Image)

This model can also be used to represent the rhetorical appeals with ethos, pathos, and logos mapped onto the points of the triangle (Kinneavy *Theory*).

Similarly, if we map the subdomains of ethics onto this triangle, we can see how they overlay the parts of the rhetorical situation, emphasizing the close relationship between ethics and rhetoric (Figure 4.2):

![Ethics Rhetorical Triangle](Image)
In the model above, I have mapped “ethical theory” onto the author-driven branch of ethics; “ethics of practice” onto the audience-, public-, or student-driven branch of ethics; the “rhetoric of technology” onto the text-driven branch of ethics because it deals mostly with access to and control of technology artifacts; and “research ethics” onto the context-driven branch because it emphasizes reciprocity and human relationships that shape ethical decisions.

As the triangulation emphasizes, however, no one domain is isolated from the others. There is constant movement along the planes of the triangle, with context connecting the various ethical domains. We can usefully apply the postmodern rhetorical-ethical models that emerge from these areas across domains, and each part of the triangle continuously revises and comments on the other parts. Viewing field ethics from this vantage point is useful as we move outward to engagement beyond the field.

It is not within the scope of this dissertation to cover ethical models in the intellectual tradition. Nonetheless, the chapter foregrounds a general outline of how ethics has been transformed over time before discussing the ethical models useful in the field of rhetoric and composition. Viewed in broad strokes, ethics has moved from the realm of absolutes, as Kant envisioned it in the Categorical Imperative, to a consideration of how consequences reconfigure ethical decision making, as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill articulated in what would become Utilitarianism. Recent models of ethics have focused on the contextual nature of ethical decisions, articulating situational ethical models and resulting in what may be called ethical relativism, where, much like Kinneavy’s fourth component of the triangle, context further
complicates ethical decision making. If we plot these components of rhetorical theory that have emerged over time onto the earlier triangle, it would look like this (Figure 4.3):

In this model, ethics can be shown in its transformation away from a focus on the ethical agent (author) to include an awareness of rigid principles (the text of ethics) to an awareness of consequences for people (audience) and finally to include an awareness of situatedness in the ethical context. Just as with the first two models, there is a constant interchange among parts of the triangle as each transformation refigures and interacts with earlier ethical systems.

It is the context-based group of ethical theories that dominates ethical scholarship today; however, most discussion of values curricula still focuses on the three outermost points of the triangle, neglecting the ways context has refigured ethics. Contextual or flexible models of ethics can be problematic for fields that came of age during professionalizing periods in the academy, because those fields often rely on premises about truth, knowledge, and ethics as rigid, foundational concepts (Booth). When these fields are faced with real world and interdisciplinary situations through engaged scholarship, their paradigms can be thrown into crisis. By contrast, rhetoric has never been entirely innocent of contingency and relativism specifically because of its sophistic tradition. In the long tradition that treats rhetoric as epistemic, ethics includes an awareness of *kairos*, or situatedness. This may in part explain why so many useful models for postmodern ethics that involve agency have emerged from rhetoric and composition scholarship.
Fields built on an earlier professional/ethical model may need to work context into the research practices they espouse as well as an awareness of movement among points on the triangle, recognizing the way they work together to shape knowledge and the communication of knowledge. For engaged research, this refiguration can be mapped onto a triangle as follows (Figure 4.4):

In this model, there is interaction between the researcher and his/her methods, the research situation, the subjects, and the ways that the research results are formulated and communicated. This model of research ethics displays awareness of basic components of the ethical research situation as these map onto the rhetorical situation.

Therefore, the recognition of an ethical turn per se in composition is in some ways misleading, even though it does describe a renewed awareness of disciplinary assumptions and roots. Nonetheless, it can be usefully articulated in a transdisciplinary context, as a traveling concept, to guide an ethical turn as part of engaged scholarship, generally considered. To this end, next, this section will explore four areas of scholarship on ethics within rhetoric and composition.
Ethical Theory

As the several rhetorical/ethical triangle overlays above suggest, “ethical theory” deals prominently with the “rhetorical agent,” the speaker in the rhetorical situation, the masculine “logos” principles or methodologies in the research setting or ethical dilemma, or the scholar formulating general principles. Historically, this entity was considered a unified whole, evoking the ideal of the Orator in the rhetorical tradition:

The tradition of classical rhetoric, then, is defined principally by the image of the Orator as a cultural idea. He appears in Greece as the man who possesses arete, in Rome as “the good man skilled in speaking,” later as The Renaissance Man, and later still as the Enlightenment’s “man of reason.” He takes all knowledge as his province, becomes a kind of living repository of the accumulated wisdom of the culture, and puts what he knows to practical use in guiding the conduct of human affairs. The existence of such a cultural model implies certain assumptions about the world, namely that it is knowable, that values are coherent, that wisdom is public and can be fully mastered by one man, who in turn can relate the accumulated wisdom of mankind to the particular case at hand in a clear and persuasive fashion. (Halloran, “On the End of Rhetoric” 333)

With the shift away from “the good man skilled in speaking,” ethical theory in rhetoric has challenged knowledge, context/community, and class divisions that situate the speaker and his/her identity. However, many ideals from this long tradition have been influential in shaping even our postmodern ethical theory, so a brief overview of the tradition will be presented here. Moreover, the ways that ethics and rhetoric have transformed one another over time, then, is also relevant to the transformation of rhetoric from liberal art to attenuated, style-centered content, and then back to epistemic discipline.
With the emphasis on the New Rhetoric, a call to which, to some extent, the emergence of rhetoric and composition as an academic discipline responds, there has also been a broadening of what knowledges and activities belong to the realm of “rhetoric” itself. Petrus Ramus is often a chief villain in rhetoric’s history, for, in the sixteenth century, with his philosopher’s scalpel, he dissected morality, ethics, invention, arrangement, and memory from rhetoric, “returning” these to dialectic. This left, for the next 400 years, delivery and style as the sole responsibility or only rightful subject matter of rhetoric, leading, it is often claimed, to a preoccupation with correctness and grammar in composition training. Considering these dominant Ramistic attitudes, contention over the purview of rhetoric was still active and can be seen in the work of George Campbell and others up to the point of rhetoric’s rebirth with the “New Rhetoricians” in the mid-twentieth century.

Richard Young in his 1978 bibliographic essay on developments in rhetorical invention claims that “the position one takes on the nature and function of ethos has strong implications for what one considers to be the proper scope of rhetoric” (Young 19), and with the notion of ethos comes the notion of the character of the speaker. Some scholars, Halloran among them, have viewed an under-realized but governing notion of ethos as responsible for the preoccupation with “correctness” that marks what we describe today as “current traditional rhetoric” (in Young 20). One of the faults of the “current traditional” paradigm is the neglected aspects of kairos, which scholars like James Kinneavy have sought to resurrect from classical rhetoric.

For Kinneavy, kairos, the rescued notion, refers to “proper measure and right time,” but has an ethical component to it closely related to “justice” (214). For some of the sophists, kairos as situational determinism led to “extreme relativism,” an accusation often lodged against Gorgias (214). Whereas, Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle reacted against the complete relativism
they saw in the sophists’ approach to truth and knowledge, Kinneavy describes how the moral component of *kairos* is foundational in both the work of Plato and Aristotle themselves. Plato uses *kairos* to “construct the doctrine of virtue as the mean between two extremes (excess and deficiency). This notion is further developed by Aristotle and emerges as the classical Greek doctrine of virtue….This aspect is continued in the Latin concept of propriety [as]…the basis of [Cicero’s] entire treatise on duties” (214-15). Therefore, in these classical ethical models, virtue is situated in the center space between extremes; in other words, it is found in the dialectical spaces.

There is some debate about Aristotle’s position on the interrelatedness of ethics and rhetoric (A.O. Rorty). Some scholars contend that because Aristotle did not fully treat ethics in his *Rhetoric*, and because he separates rhetoric from ethics and politics, he did not believe that the three are enmeshed. James Porter in his chapter on the “Postmodern Ethics of Rhetoric and Composition” claims that Aristotle’s use of the three arts is mutually reinforcing, even operating in a hypertextual relationship, especially when all of Aristotle’s works are reclassified according to their purpose and considered together (210). Also, one of the passages found early in the *Rhetoric* portrays Aristotle’s speaker as inherently ethical. In Book I, he claims, “One should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a question, just as in the use of syllogisms, not that we may actually do both (for one should not persuade what is debased) but in order that it may not escape our notice what the real state of the case is and that we ourselves may be able to refute if another person uses speech unjustly” (Kennedy 34). What separates dialectic from rhetoric, then, in this case, is that dialectic expresses both sides of the issue, reasoning toward truth; whereas, rhetoric, constrained necessarily by the mass audience’s lack of knowledge, must seek to persuade from a position informed, presumably, by ethical theory. Once again, rhetoric roots
ethical matters in the dialectical spaces, this time in the space between informed speaker and uninformed masses.

Furthermore, these early rhetorical models of ethics incorporated awareness of not only context but also the interaction with audience. Karen Burke LeFevre sees *ethos* as a vital part of invention, and in her *Invention as a Social Act*, she attributes Aristotle with holding social views of invention. She says, “Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* presupposes a social context. Aristotle’s three kinds of rhetoric (deliberative, forensic, and epideictic) are determined in reference to others as ‘three kinds of hearers’” (45). The most pertinent aspect of Aristotle’s work to the social perspective, she says, though, is his “ethos,” which refers not to a private construct like “personality,” rather it “arises from the relationship between the individual and the community” (45). LeFevre cites Karlyn Kohrs Campbell who claims effective *ethos* reflects the degree to which you represent the “qualities that are valued by your culture or group” (45). In fact, the Greek meaning for “ethos” was a “habitual gathering place,” which LeFevre says calls forth “an image of people coming together” (45). When considering implications for engaged scholarship today, it becomes clear that classical notions of *ethos* and *kairos* are appropriate models for working in changing community environments with diverse audiences.

Isocrates, quite often cited as a sophist himself, was also against the unethical sophistic practices of orators. He disavowed those who abuse the powers of language by applying it to the “barest pursuits” (*Antidosis* 78). For him, the “upright” are “the men who take advantage of the good and not the evil things in life…those who pursue and practice those studies which will enable us to govern wisely both our own households and the commonwealth—which should be the objects of our toil, of our study, and of our every act” (78). For Isocrates, rhetoric can itself
instill ennobling qualities to the speaker as well as the audience (Covino and Joliffe 62). Further, for Isocrates, a “successful rhetor is a useful citizen who makes useful citizens of others” (61).

Similarly, Cicero in the Roman tradition took a broad view of rhetoric as an art that combined “sophistic, philosophic, and technical rhetorics” (De Oratore 38), but his writings focus more on technique than on duties of the rhetor to the audience. To him, the rhetor improves himself by studying political and moral science and having a wide education (298-99). To Quintillian is more often attributed the position that the orator must be “ethical,” in his characterization, “vir bonus dicendi peritus” (Covino and Joliffe 77), or “the good man speaking well” (77). Eloquence was built upon personal virtue combined with the arts of persuasion. He says:

Will not an orator have to speak much of justice, fortitude, abstinence, temperance, piety? Yet the good man, who has knowledge of these virtues, not by sound and name only, not as heard merely by the ear to be repeated by the tongue, but who has embraced them in his heart, and thinks in conformity with them, will have no difficulty in conceiving proper notions about them, and will express sincerely what he thinks. (Institutes of Oratory 420)

Both Cicero and Quintilian’s views of education itself as an ethical obligation further help us structure the role of the modern engaged scholar, who must bring disciplinary knowledge to bear in public contexts.

As mentioned before, Ramus removed the moral component from Quintillian’s ideal orator. Moral values were not part of Ramistic rhetoric but fell under the province of philosophy and dialectic and remained this way until Enlightenment rhetoric. Rhetorician George Campbell was a minister and principal of Marischal College in Aberdeen, Scotland (Bizzell and Herzberg 898). For him rhetoric dealt with moral proofs and demonstrative proofs, moral evidence being
the harder to express with certainty. However, he says, “The proper province of rhetoric is the second, or moral evidence; for to the second belong all decisions concerning fact, and things without us” (912). Hugh Blair, also a Presbyterian minister, was a Professor of Rhetoric and Belle Lettres at Edinburgh (Bizzell and Herzberg 947). In his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, he, too, addresses ethics, which he says move with “logic” in a “higher sphere” (953). These relate to and constrain man’s faculties in his “proper pursuit of good” (953). Further, “they point out to man the improvement of his nature as an intelligent being; and his duties as the subject of moral obligation” (953). By this point, ethics was the concern of all learned men, it seems, and not merely the province of the ideal orator. However, Enlightenment era ethics were foundational and scientific in nature, a stigma that remains attached to ethics to this day and which hinders the progress of ethically-motivated reforms that are part of engagement.

Chaim Perelman, who together with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca may have coined the term “New Rhetoric,” did so, according to Perelman, in thinking about the importance of “value judgments.” Perelman says, “Without either knowing or wishing it, we had rediscovered a part of Aristotelian logic that had been long forgotten or, at any rate, ignored and despised…. We called this new, or revived branch of study, devoted to the analysis of informal reasoning, The New Rhetorìc” (1390). They articulate that values are group specific and therefore are difficult to apply in argument; however, a characteristic of values, or “informal reasoning,” is “that they can become the center of conflict without thereby ceasing to be values” (1394). Ethics as “informal reasoning” moves closer to the situational ethics of postmodernism.

Lester Faigley is quick to point out that in our aspirations towards unified value and knowledge systems, historical studies should “remind us that we cannot go back to the golden age of rhetoric” (71). Faigley argues that this age was not so golden as we imagine because it
targeted a ruling, male elite. Today, “the diversity of contemporary American culture, the speed of cultural change, and the multiplicity of the mass media demand that we find new ways of studying the possibilities for rhetoric” (71). Walter Ong in Orality and Literacy and Jay David Bolter in Writing Space theorize these changes. In describing the migration of rhetoric from an oral to chirographic world, Ong explains, “But no one ever consciously launched a program to give this new direction to rhetoric: the ‘art’ simply followed the drift of consciousness away from an oral to a writing economy…. Once it was completed, rhetoric was no longer the all-pervasive subject it had once been” (116). In Bolter’s terminology, then, rhetoric has been “remediated,” bringing with it a “different claim to reality” (23). This new reality necessitates, once again, a more robust rhetoric, one that addresses ethical concerns as changing technologies demand. This is very important space to consider for the modern engaged scholar.

“Ethical theory,” understood in the way it has shaped knowledge in conjunction with technological shifts, needs to be revisited to better understand and legitimize the scholarship of engagement as a “practical” and epistemic art.

**Ethics of Practice**

Also relevant to engaged scholarship practice are the ethical principles or codes that guide professionals in practical contexts working with real audiences and constituencies. This conception of “ethics” as best governing practices is addressed in this section as the “Ethics of practice,” referring to ethical issues facing teachers and administrators, primarily. It deals with issues ranging from power relationships in the classroom, politicized curricula, and overt value-based course content to evaluation instruments and the role of writing programs as institutional service.
It might be useful to begin with “ethics of practice” from the student subject-position, such as John C. Bean’s demonstrates by assigning a series of “closure-delaying assignments” in which students wrestle with multiple perspectives through writing and examine their own divided and contradictory values (78-79). David Jolliffe in “The Myth of Transcendence and the Problem of the ‘Ethics’ Essay in College Writing Instruction” claims that too often the values-based content of composition is viewed as “transcendent”:

The problem with asking students to moralize in college composition—the problem with the ethics essay as a genre—lies in the way most assignments that elicit the writing are construed…. Instructors present students with an ethical issue and ask, in so many words, “What does this mean to you?”…. This method of inviting the ethics essay is troubling because it is complicit with the very aspect of our culture that… makes public discussion of ethical issues impossible…. (192).

In both of these approaches, explained by Jolliffe and Bean, rhetoric and ethics are treated as epistemic; perhaps more accurately stated, rhetoric is treated as a way to discover values and ethics. The potential of this method aside, student-situated ethics purports its own set of practical ethical complexities, including how best to respond to personal writing in which students grapple with values (Morgan, 1998).

The next strand of research that looks at ethics in the classroom does so from the perspective of the teacher. In the series of articles that composes the balance of Part I in Michael Pemberton’s edited collection *The Ethics of Writing Instruction*, students are considered almost indirectly, as passive recipients of ethical or unethical practices on the part of teachers. The focus of this group of articles is the debate over “politicized” composition classrooms, dealing with “the complex discursive responsibilities of writing teachers who explicitly advocate
political views in the classroom by foregrounding these for students in both content selection and interpretive method” (Toner 3). The consensus amongst this group of scholars, those in favor of politicized composition, is to build in methods for assuring students that opposing views will be respected. Lisa Toner advocates “discourse ethics” to address this difficulty (3). Discourse ethics is an adaptation of Jurgen Habermas’s theory. Habermas sees:

> Ethics as a process of evaluating social norms, which set out expectations governing social relations among individuals and groups; these norms are formed through our communication with each other, and we recognize and understand these expectations through language…. Discourse ethics is a dialogic procedural framework for making visible and critiquing reasons for a social norm so that we can determine if that norm—arising from within a specific social group—deserves to be recognized as ‘universalizable’ in the interests of fostering a democratic society. (Toner 8-9)

Habermas’ model relies on “intersubjectivity” and generation of both consensus and dissensus, as made possible through the teacher’s position of power. William Thelin adds that in politicized classrooms, political positions need to be represented as equally complicated for the instructor as for the students (45). Similarly, the engaged scholar dealing with a public constituency will need to foreground political positions in research.

Toner’s politicized pedagogy can be contrasted with John Ruszkiewicz’s approach. Ruszkiewicz openly decries politicized classrooms, but he does say, “I consider political topics thoroughly appropriate in writing courses and think it healthy for students and teachers to confront vibrant political ideas that challenge their opinions and prejudices” (27). The chief difference in the two approaches is that Lisa Toner and William Thelin espouse advocacy classrooms based on responsible liberatory rhetoric and openly teaching resistance while
acknowledging political agendas (See also, Crowley; Bizzell, “The Politics”; Jarratt; France and Fitts; Katz; Lynch); whereas, John Ruszkiewicz, Louise Phelps (“A Constrained”), and Maxine Hairston (“Diversity”) question the role of activist rhetoric and political content as ethical constraints within which students can work. The latter group does not rule out student-based inquiry into politics; again, they place the burden of this value-laden work on the epistemic nature of rhetoric and ethics themselves. The distinction is between ethical principles that target teachers and pedagogy directly in the former group or students directly in the latter group, a distinction that highlights either invisible or visible ethical content respectively. The engaged scholar will need to be aware of how both forms of ethical and political discourse can structure the relationship between scholar and public subject.

Furthermore, ethics factors into representation of scholarly authority. Andrea Lunsford explicitly addresses classroom authority, which she believes is changing in higher education. “Our classrooms have been built on—and have valorized—individualism, ranking, hierarchy, and therefore—we have belatedly come to understand—exclusion” (“Refiguring” 69). It is this focus within composition on refiguring authority that leads Mary Trachsel to discuss the problems of working within a “feminized” field. She says:

When we refer to composition as a feminized field, we are generally talking about transformations in the teaching of composition—the shift in emphasis from written product to writing process, the attention to collaboration and sharing, the insistence on respectful response to student texts, and the use of developmental, “student-centered” pedagogies that seek to acknowledge and honor the diverse experiences and language abilities students bring to the classroom. (167)
Trachsel pits these “feminized” practices against the emerging professionalization practices where the field is “departing from its pedagogical origins to assume a disciplinary identity defined by research and scholarship” (167). Lunsford calls the academy’s “traditional ways” of authorizing or deauthorizing forms of knowledge, such as valuing the scholarly over pedagogical knowledge in Trachsel’s dichotomy, a “fact of academic life” (“Refiguring” 70). Such practices may be changing, though, and, Lunsford says, are subject to a “serious and ongoing critique of the ethics of institutional authority/power, but also to attempts to refigure authority and to develop new relationships and new ways of being in the classroom and in the academy” (70). It is interesting to note these changes in classroom and institutional understandings of authority and ethics are concomitant with the rise of engagement. Furthermore, as researchers who represent institutional authority move outward into the public domain, such authority issues need to be foregrounded.

Also relevant for the cross-institutional focus of engagement is the scholarship on the ethics of writing program administration and assessment. This area considers ethics at yet another remove from the student, from the perspective of the program administrator who must consider multiform practices of teaching and evaluating the work of composition. These demands necessarily create a practical focus to better enable administrative decision making and perhaps explains the emphasis in titles like David Brinthurst’s “Identifying Our Ethical Responsibility: A Criterion-Based Approach” and Stuart Brown’s “Applying Ethics: A Decision-Making Heuristic for Writing Program Administrators” on criteria and heuristics, both of which aim to facilitate ethical action. In designing program continuity and coherence, WPAs are often faced with stark divisions, such as between intellectual freedom and standardized outcome
requirements in curricular decisions, aside from other more obvious personnel issues, and their stance is as Kinkead and Simpson and others have said, a necessarily rhetorical one.

Carrie Shively Leverenz describes this rhetorical and practical position as requiring an "applied ethics":

> While much of the history of moral philosophy focuses on the search for universal or normative moral principles, theorizing the ethics of writing program administration moves one into the area of applied ethics, an arena characterized not by abstract moral reasoning but by what Aristotle called “phronesis,” practical judgment gained from experience. (109-110)

Leverenz describes the tension found in the multiple roles WPAs occupy: teacher, scholar, and administrator. Each role attaches different ethical responsibilities:

> What the WPA might do in her own class—teach controversial topics or use portfolio evaluation—might not be appropriate as requirements for all teachers in the program she supervises. As a teacher, she recognizes the importance of intellectual freedom; as an administrator, she knows she will be called on to vouch for the outcomes of all sections of the same course. (105)

Furthermore, as Leverenz points out, WPAs are also responsible to several, often contradictory, constituencies, even though they themselves are often marginalized in the academic hierarchy (104-105). In fact, it is the deeply-seated value of “intellectual freedom” for faculty that inhibits the articulation of an ethical code for postsecondary teaching, Leverenz argues, casting the other “ethics of practice” dilemmas in a more complicated light for administrators. These multiple roles and issues are relevant across the curriculum for those wishing to pursue engaged
scholarship primarily because engagement invites interdisciplinary and cross-institutional work where various faculty identities converge and policy decisions must be made.

**Ethics and Technology**

Another highly practical area of ethics theory from the field that will be useful in guiding today’s engaged scholar falls under the heading of “ethics and technology.” This chapter uses this label to refer to the diverse category of practices associated with “digital ethics,” including communication ethics, the ethics of access to information, and intellectual property boundaries. This area is complicated by its synthesis of subspecialties and interdisciplinary foci, ranging from computers and composition to scientific and technical communication theory to the growing body of work on access and intellectual honesty as explored in higher education administration scholarship. Negotiating such vast territory makes articulation of a guiding ethical framework difficult.

Part of this difficulty lies in articulating the new discourse conventions in digital environments, as Bolter, Bolter and Grusin, Johnson-Eilola, and others have discussed. From these new spaces emanate new practices in relation to ethics, ranging from new citation needs, access (Fortune; Schwartz), hypertextual composing practices (Friend; Gilbert; Porter, *Rhetorical Ethics*), and research subject guidelines and digital representation (McKee & Porter; Sullivan & Porter) to shifting notions of intellectual property (Howard).

It is this latter category that is drawing the greatest interdisciplinary attention. Rebecca Moore Howard makes the point in “The Ethics of Plagiarism” that plagiarism is a notion tied to authority: “By maintaining the stable, autonomous agency of the author, the notion of plagiarism protects a status quo in which student writers are deemed the lesser of, and are barred from full
access to, the literary texts that they are assigned to read” (79). In direct contrast to shifting practices of intellectual property, “academic dishonesty” policies at institutions operate on clearly articulated principles. Howard describes the crux of the issue: “To assert plagiarism as a moral issue is to assert that it is a matter of free choice. The plagiarist is either unethical or pre-ethical: the writer either understands the ethical issues and chooses to violate them, or he or she does not yet know the ethical issues” (85). Others have written extensively on the issues involved in plagiarism ethics, both inside (Brooks; DeVoss & Porter; Spigelman, “The Ethics”; Valentine) and outside composition (Jameson; Josephson; McCabe & Trevino; Townley & Parsell).

As the new discussion on intellectual property demonstrates, technology itself certainly reconfigures the discursive act, teaching practices, and the interface with students, specifically. Shaping democratic citizens in networked environments calls for awareness of changing roles and environments that are part of the democratic process. Moreover, within the area of new media writing, the ethical issue becomes one of preparing students for dealing with their increasingly digital environments and changing practices of literacy. When extended to the practice of engaged scholarship, the issues of digital public scholarship spaces arise.

James Porter in his 1998 *Rhetorical Ethics and Internetworked Writing* asks important questions on the issue of advancing with technology in ethical ways. He questions the role writing teachers participating in networked environments play and the direction network ethics may take: “either (a) a liberal-individualist position… based on an Enlightenment trust in the sanctity of the individual man, or (b) an extremely ironic postmodern position that leaves the ethical issues unaddressed, more or less” (19). He does not believe either approach is adequate and instead theorizes a community-based notion that treats ethics as invention.
Technology also reconfigures discursive space itself, which James Porter refers to as “interfaces.” Hart-Davidson, Zappen, and Halloran recast these technologized spaces as “little democracies.” Little democracies are small scale, local communities, based on the idea that:

It is possible to see the rhetorical tradition at work, either in the past or in the present historical moment, at points where institutions and technologies are in process of being shaped. Both institutions and technologies are social structures that discursively position those who inhabit or use them, enabling and constraining people as they move into specific subject positions to participate in those social structures in specific ways. (129)

This process of analysis also makes the work of technology development visible as a discursive process, albeit one that limits participation. Nonetheless, these little democracies are spaces for engagement with the public domain for scholars.

The field of scientific and technical communication contributes a series of ethical considerations to this area also. The Society for Technical Communication has a “Code for Communication” (1978) that specifies language and visuals should be precise, expression should be simple and direct, audience information needs should be met in a way they can understand, and conduct of the communicator should be professional and respectful (Ornatowski 142). The assumptions buried in these codes have been critiqued (Johnson-Eilola), but that does not change the realities of the technical communication act. Ornatowski explains the conundrum:

For those scholars serious about ethics, the major challenge may be to develop a workable (and teachable) framework to foster responsibility for words that realistically takes into account the conditions under which professionals make decisions and communicate; the multiple (and often conflicting) contexts in which they act and which exert their (again often contradictory) claims on their attention and loyalty; the
impersonality of the “systems” in which actors operate and which to a large extent
determine their agendas and options; and the difficulties and complexities presented by
the vagaries of language, interpretation, and epistemology. (161)

This ethical communication is not a simple task in a postmodern environment.

Furthermore, communication ethics deals specifically with the area within technical
writing that governs delivery of information. This can refer to anything from graphic design,
visual rhetoric, and new media writing to traditionally written reports and technical documents.
The ethical decision for the technical writer becomes one of selection and dissemination as
constrained by context and audience needs. A popular technical communications textbook
explains ethical communication dilemmas faced on the job:

Should the technical writer include this information, exclude it altogether, or
demeanphasize it by using a small font? These are not simple questions. Taking an ethical
stance requires a personal decision on your part as to how to balance your ethical and
moral beliefs with the realities of the job. It requires you to consider the effects of your
decisions on the users of your product, on your company, on society at large, and on your
job. Sometimes standing your ground on an ethical issue may mean losing your job or
suffering retaliation from coworkers. (Gurak & Lannon 96)

Considered as a category, ethics and technology is one that will be increasingly important in
showing how ethical practices follow economic, cultural, and technological changes across the
curriculum, especially as these shape engaged professionalism.

*Research Ethics*
The engaged scholar is also often working directly with the public for the collection and dissemination of research data. Ellen Barton makes clear in her recent *CCC* article “Further Contributions from the Ethical Turn in Composition/Rhetoric: Analyzing Ethics in Interaction” that there is a strong relationship between ethics and rhetoric when researchers work with human subjects:

The fundamental insight that composition/rhetoric offers to the literature on ethics and bioethics is that decision-making with ethical dimensions is most often interactional and therefore rhetorical. In other words, such decision making takes place between real people, in real time, in (semi-)ordinary language that is typically more indirect than direct, within complex situations that are institutional and asymmetrical, and thus within a rhetorical context that always involves persuasion and, sometimes, resistance. (599)

This summary of the interactional nature of the research relationship extends to the work of applied and communal scholarship more generally. In a statement that is also true of engagement, Gesa Kirsch describes how the field itself sits on this rhetorical-ethical nexus. She says, “As the field diversifies (including the participants we study, the methods we use, and the questions we ask), so, too, will the potential for ethical dilemmas, for contested research sites, for political controversy, and for conflict within the profession” (137), all of which she says are signs of our field’s growth. In fact, Kirsch sees these discussions moving to the foreground through more “conference sessions, journal articles, edited collections, and full-length books” (138).

Some have suggested that the field and academy are moving into new forms of scholarship that will require ethical guidelines. Todd Taylor describes how the field will continue to explore conflicts that result from the “postmodern condition,” including issues of
“race, class, gender, culture, disability, sexual orientation, religion, ecology, technology, media, and (most recently) geopolitics” (148). While he foresees most of our arguments as theoretical, he claims that a tolerance for a variety of approaches, including nontheoretical, will also increase (148–49). This increasing diversity, then, leads us into value-laden territory, refiguring power relationships, knowledge, and values, considerations which surface as a tension between foundational and antifoundational principles.

On the same note, Gesa Kirsch sees the field moving toward a “more interactive, reciprocal, collaborate, qualitative research that is conducted in a range of new settings with increasingly diverse populations” that also challenges “boundaries among theory, research, and practice” (131). This work, Kirsch claims, will connect “classrooms with communities, teaching with research, community service with students,” and it will go “across disciplines and across campus” (131). Among these new sites for research, she lists community centers, cyberspace, religious settings, youth centers, workplaces, the streets, and nursing homes, to name a few, all of which boast diverse research participant opportunities (130). Because of these changes, the field will have new needs for ethical guidelines:

First, as researchers engage in more qualitative, collaborative, and socially responsible research, they are more likely to encounter ethical dilemmas in their interactions with participants and community members; second, as scholars examine theories and histories of composition studies, they are beginning to uncover omissions, gaps, and silenced voices; and third, as writing teachers assign more fieldwork and service-learning in their courses, they are creating new relations with community organizations and putting students into potentially vulnerable positions, both of which warrant a careful examination of our ethical obligations. (136)
The same need for guidelines is also present as engaged scholars move beyond the academy and into new public environments. Kirsch describes how the increasing orientation toward ethnographic and qualitative work that grows out of “social-activist, feminist, postcolonial, and postmodern traditions” (129) has already established some guiding ethical behaviors. Currently, these scholars seek ways to address the following issues: participant voice, questions relevant to the participants, collaboration throughout the process, nonhierarchical relations that benefit all involved, benefits of research to the community, and socially and ethically responsible designs and methods of dissemination of the work (130).

This suggests that we have come a long way towards addressing the gap Paul Anderson recognized in “person-based composition research” in 1998. He claimed that even though the major work in the field has “been driven by moral purpose” since the 1970s, “our moral gaze has almost completely overlooked one crucial area of our personal and disciplinary responsibility, namely our ethical obligation to the persons whose words and actions we transform into the ‘data’ of our research” (63). When we specifically target students as student researchers or as sources of data, our disciplinary responsibility also involves training them and inviting their research into the discourse (Schneider 86; see also Jeff Smith, “Students”). These dynamics hold for engagement also.

Katrina Powell and Pamela Takayoshi delve into specific strategies that seek to protect participants in person-based research, discussing feminist research principles that redefine relationships between researchers and participants. Specifically, within these methodologies, the authors advocate “building reciprocal relationships” that are not only collaborative but also mutually beneficial for all involved. This requires, they say, a context-based approach that constantly renegotiates relationships:
Shifting our thinking from the methodological… to the ethical illuminates several issues that a methodological lens does not foreground: the influence of our presence on the research site and in the participants’ lives, the relationship we build with participants, the type of person we want to be in working with others. Shifting our lens to the ethical involves, in other words, a concern with the quality of the relationships we build with research participants. (397-98)

Building reciprocal relationships also includes, where appropriate, engendering “informed disobedience” (Powell & Takayoshi 418). The many issues raised through reciprocity need further ethical consideration, especially as communities are transformed by the work of the academy in direct ways. Communities need to have a say in this process also.

These reciprocal relationships are relevant in the work of Ellen Barton, who teases apart feminist (ethics of care) and principlist (ethics of rights) research methodologies in relation to ethics, which she says are both addressed in our field literature. The alternatives represented by feminist principles in research are promising with their focus on context and avoidance of a single ethical code that may not be universal as much as it operates in favor of the dominant group (598). Taking her cue from Nel Noddings, she says, “The traditional Western approach of Logos underlies what is called a principle-based ethics of rights. An ethic of care based on the affect of Eros is one of the leading alternatives within the feminist critique of ethics” (597-98). However, Barton claims that neither approach alone fully addresses the “interactional and rhetorical” nature of ethics (599). It is a language-based approach to ethics through discourse analysis that she advocates: “Our perspective on language as interactional and rhetorical is unique to the understanding of ethics not only in the literature but also in the application of ethics in the real world context of research regulation” (625).
Furthering the focus on context within the recent ethics literature, Heidi McKee and James Porter argue for the use of a “casuistic-heuristic” approach to tough ethical decisions, especially in digital research environments. They claim, “The art of rhetoric by its very nature teaches us the importance of audience and of situational circumstances; the field of composition teaches us to be attentive to individual writers as persons” (713). The casuistic approach they advocate, Barton’s discourse analysis method, and the reciprocal/kairotic approach discussed by Powell & Takayoshi will all be addressed further as “postmodern rhetorical-ethical themes” in the section that follows.

Overwhelmingly, the new visions for research ethics focus on relationships and reflexive representation. In their collection, *Ethics and Representation in Qualitative Studies of Literacy*, Peter Mortensen and Gesa Kirsch emphasize the multiplicity and voices of participants; the collaborative nature and negotiations of such work; and even subjective notions such as aesthetics, fidelity, and silence that structure these relationships. From this volume, Thomas Newkirk’s metaphor of “rendering” the research relationship is apt, because it reminds us that we, as engaged scholars, actively construct representations and interventions through our research. The breakdown in principlist ethics and values should remind us continually that we are not merely observers but rather participant-observers, and in some cases, teacher-action observers, where the end results of good research have real effects in specific communities. The goal is to structure our interdisciplinary activist research so that it also follows ethical guidelines in the community, but as this section depicted, determining those guidelines is not simple. The emphasis on context and interaction, though, in this communal research, is a rhetorical focus, and as higher education renegotiates research methodology for the scholarship of engagement, these same rhetorical, contextual, and interactional principles will apply.
The beginning of this section showed a series of possibilities for mapping areas of ethics scholarship in rhetoric and composition onto the rhetorical triangle to view the interrelated workings of the ethical agent, the human subject, the communication of results or ethical theories, and the context that shapes the ethical situation, all of which can be seen in a transactional relationship. (Figure 4.2)

(E. Th.=Ethical Theory; R.E.=Research Ethics; E. of P.=Ethics of Practice; R. & T.=Rhetoric and Technology)

The section that follows, “Postmodern Rhetorical-Ethical Models,” will build off of these four areas where work is being done on ethics within rhetoric and composition, distilling useful principles about the relationship between components of the ethical triangle in a postmodern context and exploring them in more depth. Each of the four subsections to follow—on Reciprocal, Heuristic, Analytical, and Reflexive Models of Ethics—reviews research currently being done in rhetoric and composition that illustrates the postmodern, transactional, and contextual nature of ethics in application. These subsections are meant to suggest themes to frame a postmodern rhetorical-ethics in research practice. Whereas the previous section worked from theoretical principles to suggest four possible different ways ethics can be understood and practiced, the following section works from existing practice to distill four possibly useful theoretical principles about postmodern ethics in action. The principles from the preceding and
following sections are intended as possible starting points for discussion as the scholarship of engagement gains legitimacy across the curriculum.

Moreover, the section that follows is a problem-setting section for broader discussions of engaged scholarship across the university. Donald Schön, in his work on reflective practice describes “problem-setting” as “a process in which, interactively, we name the things to which we will attend and frame the context in which we will attend to them” (40, emphasis in original). Working from theory, as the last section did, the ethical principles can be named as content for engaged scholarship, and working from practice, as the following section does, the scholarship of engagement can be framed as a context for the exercise of postmodern ethical principles. These models are not meant to create a rigid taxonomy but to suggest potentially useful categories of postmodern ethical theories that could help validate engaged scholarship’s focus on service. They also offer a means of preserving transactional relationships between the ethical agent, human subjects, and dissemination of results by emphasizing the role of “context” throughout the process.

Postmodern Rhetorical-Ethical Models

In the preface to their edited collection *Foregrounding Ethical Awareness in Composition and English Studies*, Sheryl Fontaine and Susan Hunter acknowledge “a conceptual shift in the way ethics has informed the discipline” (5). This shift entails changes “from creating and providing systems that ensure ethical behavior, to creating environments that will promote the awareness necessary for ethical reflection, to providing an epistemology to which the essential qualities of ethical exigency are central—from teaching ethical behavior to adopting an ethical awareness” (5). In other words, this recent shift has brought a series of ethical models to the
forefront of the field. The specific models that emerge from an analysis of scholarship on ethics can be applied across the areas of ethical research in the field already described: ethical theory, ethics of practice, ethics and technology, and research ethics. In this section, postmodern traits of these areas will be emphasized, and the models provided will serve to guide application of postmodern ethics for scholars, practitioners, students, and administrators. Once these models are articulated, especially in their sensitivity to postmodern values, they can usefully be extended beyond the field and applied in discussions of engaged scholarship.

These postmodern rhetorical-ethical models, this section argues, can be understood through four categories: reciprocal models, heuristic models, analytical models, and reflexive models. These can also be mapped onto the rhetorical triangle to show the way each focuses on a different component of the rhetorical situation (Figure 4.5):

With this model, there is interaction among the author who must invent ethical decisions, the consequences for the audience, the analysis of the ethical situation (the text), and the context in which relationships constantly rewrite the ethical guidelines.

Each one of these models organizes a series of approaches and theoretical considerations within them. As each one unfolds in the subsections below, the dual ethical roles of “author/reader,” “researcher/participant,” and “teacher/student” are meant to be interchangeable. Each model is first and foremost intended to present principles for postmodern research ethics,
which challenge “the foundational assumptions that reside at the center of most ethical discussions” (Porter, “Developing” 216). Also, each is “grounded in community or local standards” (216) to avoid universalizing principles and resist relativism at the same time. Once articulated, these themes can then be used to guide discussions of postmodern, engaged ethics across the curriculum.

Reciprocal Models of Ethics

Postmodern ethics are, by and large, reciprocal ethics, an understanding that has grown out of feminist scholarship. Katrina Powell and Pamela Takayoshi describe reciprocity as “a complex interaction that sometimes requires that we ourselves and our relationship with our participants must shape-shift, processes that are dependent on context and cannot be articulated up front” (414). It requires vigilance of participants’ needs and desires over the course of a project and an “alert attention to context” (414), requiring the researcher to practice kairos.

Reciprocity also implies a high-level sensitivity, as we find throughout the feminist research literature on the “ethics of care” (Barton 164). This sensitivity can be likened to Bakhtin’s notion of “answerability,” or rather, the notion that the text and the act of authorship is a two-sided response, where “meaning is created by both writer and reader” (Ewald 341); researcher and participant; teacher and student. A model of this is found in Helen Rothschild Ewald’s work on Bakhtin’s “answerability,” which she sees as a useful tool in structuring the classroom environment. She addresses the dual nature of Bakhtin’s “answerability” as both double-voicedness, or the simultaneous existence of self and other which have a reciprocal responsibility, and as answerability-as-response, where reading is the completion of the discourse act that rescues the author from egocentrism. In this second sense, the “obligation to
reply” becomes linked with a notion of social justice, one that is not foreign to the editorial genre (341). In Bakhtin’s words: “As we know, the role of the others for whom the utterance is constructed is extremely great. We have already said that the role of these others, for whom my thought becomes actual thought for the first time (and thus also for my own self as well) is not that of passive listeners, but of active participants in speech communication” (Bakhtin, qtd. in Kent 24). In this model, agency is recognized not only on the part of the author/researcher/teacher, but also on the part of the reader/participant/student.

**Heuristic Models of Ethics**

Heidi McKee and James Porter advocate the “casuistic-heuristic” approach to ethics, a concept they borrow from Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin’s *The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning*. This ethical model and others that can be grouped in the decision-making/heuristic category all deal with ethics as a process of invention. McKee and Porter say: “Like rhetoric and sophistry, casuistry is one of those historically degraded terms. Unfortunately, in popular parlance casuistry has become synonymous with ‘moral laxity’—coming up with good moral reasons to support whatever you feel like doing (aka moral rationalizing)” (721). This approach uses both invention and analysis to guide the art of moral reasoning through paradigm cases. The paradigm case, here, is an obvious case where the moral principles are easy to apply, and borderline ethical cases are then compared to the paradigm case to reach a decision. These decisions are reached through what Aristotle called *phronesis*, or practical wisdom, precisely the form of reasoning one finds in the art of rhetoric (724).

The art of casuistry is already a teaching strategy used throughout the field of rhetoric and composition, thanks to the models of Peter Elbow’s “believing/doubting game,” Carl
Rogers’ “empathic listening,” and Wayne Booth’s “listening rhetoric.” In all cases, these models ask students to consider an issue from multiple sides before engaging in argument. This harkens back to Gorgias’s technique of sophistic instruction that required argument on both sides of an issue as a process of invention. It also recognizes the role of invention in decision-making and the ways that ethical assumptions can operate within enthymemes, which if left unanalyzed can be unethically persuasive.

Another approach that acknowledges the heuristic nature of ethics is stasis. Michael Carter believes the best way for us to approach an understanding of kairos is through examination of this different, but perhaps related, ancient concept of stasis. He explains that Kinneavy’s theoretical approach "understands rhetorical kairos as situational context and uses that principle to emphasize the contextual nature of all discourse, even the discourse of the composition class . . . [however], stasis was the method by which rhetors in the classical tradition identified the area of disagreement, the point that was to be argued, the issue on which a case hinged." He continues, "The stasiastic procedure not only identifies the rhetorical issue, but also leads the rhetor to topoi appropriate to that issue" (Carter 98-99). In this way, postmodern ethics can be used epistemically to both generate and structure new knowledge in interaction with context.

**Analytical Models of Ethics**

Analytical models of ethics recognize the ways that language structures reality, and they situate ethical analysis on the level of the discursive act. Ellen Barton perhaps most prominently has called our attention to this level of ethical understanding by pointing us to language itself, the building blocks of rhetoric. The methodological approach she advocates “claims that analyzing
the language of decision making interactionally and rhetorically identifies and complicates certain concepts and assumptions within ethical frameworks, whether that framework is a traditional ethics of rights or a feminist ethics of care” (599). Barton has published extensively on this mode of analysis in connection with our field, as has Gail Stygall. Broadly conceived, analytical frameworks can also rely on what Sonja Foss has described as “rhetorical criticism.” With the importation of these models, postmodern ethics is able to continuously check the discourse that structures the research environment as well as interrogate its own practices.

**Reflexive Models of Ethics**

Foucault and Lyotard have both theorized the possibility and even the necessity of postmodern ethics, although this strand of their work is often seldom acknowledged. For Michel Foucault, ethics was a necessary third axis along with the genealogy and archaeology of knowledge. James Porter explains, “Foucault’s discussion also insists that the power-knowledge investigation will be necessarily incomplete without a consideration of the moral/ethical component that always presupposes a ‘should,’ serving as a driving and motivating force for action within the power-knowledge matrix” (Porter, “Developing” 218). In Foucault’s model, the self is defined “in relation to” something else, whether it be codes, mores, or communities. In other words, it involves a positioning and manifests itself through discourses, stances, and rhetoric. Foucault portrays ethics in a way that relies on “ethos” (218). It is the process by which the “individual character is constructed, through an alignment with and within, various communities” (218).

Jean Francios Lyotard, often acknowledged as the father of postmodernism, perhaps appears on the surface to be the culprit behind the disappearance of agency from ethics.
However, he, too, articulated the necessity of an ethics that acknowledges the inescapability of obligation and judgment—a “should” for a “we” (Porter, “Developing” 216) and allows the “we” to act. Lyotard concluded we have a “duty ‘to be obliged’ (that is, to something), an attachment, a commitment, a belief” that ultimately drives political action (216). This implies a commitment to a local community instead of to universal principles.

These two formulations by Foucault and Lyotard have led James Porter to theorize that ethics in the postmodern sense is not a set of answers, but “a mode of questioning and a manner of positioning” (“Developing” 218). Porter’s model also acknowledges that ethics hinges upon decision making, but it is “decision making that involves question and critique. It is informed, critical, and pluralistic decision making” (218); therefore, it is also reflexive. Porter cites Susan Miller and Louise Phelps as members of the field who have articulated a practice-oriented, reflexive model of ethics. Miller describes “praxis,” which is “a middle ground between theory and practice… a practice, conscious of itself, that calls upon ‘prudential reasoning’ for the sake not only of production but for ‘right conduct’ as well. It is informed action as well as politically and ethically conscious action” (220).

Ultimately, the reflexive model relies less on sophistry or sensitivity than it does on dialectic and reasoning. In the postmodern sense, this reasoning escapes principlist ethics by analyzing the position of the decision-maker and those affected by the decision in a community. Practiced in conjunction with the other models, this adds back the dimension of postmodern subjectivity to the ethical triangle, albeit an informed and communally-situated subjectivity. It is an ethics that is also aware of how communities can marginalize groups of people.
Ethics across the Curriculum

While the categories in the “Postmodern Rhetorical-Ethical Models” section above recognize artificial divisions between models that necessarily overlap and inform one another, the distinctions are meant to be heuristic in nature themselves. All of the rhetorical-ethical categories above depict a postmodern ethics that operates on the local level and is directly involved in ethical decision making in communities. These models also acknowledge a necessary reflection on subjectivity, a reciprocal awareness of individuals involved in the ethical situation, and analysis of the rhetorical components of the situation. In the case of the heuristic model, it also depicts an ethics that is a practical art, an ethics that can be epistemic and operates beyond the confines of traditional moral principles. These areas of overlap are extremely important in presenting a problematized scholarship of engagement and successfully integrating it into the existing and postmodern research world of the academy.

As a practical art, ethics is constantly in flux and is located within a situation involving a speaker, audience, text, and context, rather than within a set of abstract, general principles. Jonsen and Toulmin say, “In short, Aristotle declared, ethics is not and cannot be a science. Instead, it is a field of experience that calls for a recognition of significant particulars and for informed prudence: for what he called phronesis, or practical wisdom” (19). This awareness of “practical wisdom” can be useful as our discussion of postmodern rhetorical-ethical principles moves beyond the field, which this section will now address briefly.

In 1980, the values development dilemma of whether higher education had a responsibility to transmit moral and ethical values was considered possibly “the single most important task facing higher education” (McBee 1). Mary Louise McBee describes how
traditionally American colleges and universities “not only taught ethics—they practiced them!”

(2) But, she laments that since the 1960’s, this is no longer the case:

In the last two decades the picture has changed. We have seen questionable practices in business and political life; price-fixing, pay-offs, illegal campaign contributions, wiretapping, and other such activities at home and abroad have been daily news items. It has been in this same period that higher education has moved to a position of moral neutrality. This is understandable, for higher education is a product of the times. (2)

Furthermore, historical surveys seem to bear out this relationship between higher education and society. In *Professors and Public Ethics: Studies of Northern Moral Philosophers before the Civil War* Wilson Smith presents an overview of the values-driven college:

Clergyman, teacher, and college president were frequently one and the same person in the antebellum college. With the course in moral philosophy these men performed a common educational function. Year after year they presented a senior class with the climax of its curriculum. It was a badge of merit and respect to be worn by graduates…. After the student was introduced to classical studies and became acquainted with the remnants of Puritan scholasticism, he met with moral philosophy, where more than in any other course, wide intellectual horizons were seen…. In content, however, moral philosophy was increasingly lessened here or expanded there to include the nascent social sciences—political science, history, legal philosophy, economics, social psychology. (9)

In this case, again, the college and society were in agreement about the role of values in shaping the gentleman scholar.

Even the early intrusion of the social sciences described above by Smith was value-driven, as David Michael Grossman describes in his dissertation *Professors and Public Service,*
Universities and their presidents were not, however, as receptive to activism expressed in other than educational terms. Their response to the public activities of faculty members was often something less than enthusiastic. University of Chicago President William Rainey Harper, for example, encouraged his staff to involve themselves in the Chicago community, to enlist local support the university, but to avoid politics and controversy. Edward Bemis, a member of the Chicago political economy department, exceeded those limits and lost his faculty position. (10)

On the whole, though, these early American colleges maintained a focus on ethical principles and social service. Somewhere in the mid- to late-twentieth century, a change began to take place, shifting to the model where large and prestigious institutions declared themselves, “neutral regarding every value save that of truth and perhaps of aesthetic beauty” (Monan qtd. in McBee 2).

The shift away from the values-driven institution occurred alongside the rise of the vocational curriculum. Edward Eddy describes this relationship:

Obviously the usefulness of knowledge is paramount to students. With the strong trend toward professionalism, they are more concerned with living for what is beyond college… To the student, the answer [to the question of what awaits beyond college] lies in the accumulation of knowledge—the very purpose of going to college. The college experience must give the student something that he or she can turn into productive money, not necessarily enriched “living.” (21)
This trend extends to faculty as well: “Most academic people, by their nature, prefer to squirrel themselves away in labs and cubicles, to get as far back in the stacks as possible, and to leave the roar of the crowd well behind. Basically, they may have a good bit in common with today’s students: ‘live and let live’ may be a lot less troublesome than ‘live and help live’” (22). This statement summarizes expectations for the professional scholar throughout most of the twentieth century.

The rise and influential nature of subcultures may be partially responsible for this trend toward isolation instead of relevancy also. Eddy explains, “The students are in control of their own system on the great majority of campuses. The value system that operates within it is self-perpetuating” (22). Add to this the fact that students are less naïve and more critical, exerting additional inside demands on faculty. This new student body complicates the administrator’s task of promoting order while the faculty and students promote disorder (Eddy 24).

In his 1976 Change article, Derek Bok raised the question “Can Ethics be Taught?”, and he acknowledges that professional schools have tried to account for the disappearance of values education by “attempting to weave moral issues throughout a variety of courses and problems in the regular curriculum” (271). Once again, as James Kinneavy reminded us, ethics must be done somewhere (“Kairos” 219), so it is often left up to disciplines and departments. However, the distribution of ethics across the curriculum creates another crisis: “If a professional school divides the responsibility for moral education among a large number of faculty members, most instructors will not have a knowledge of ethics that is equal to the task” (Bok 271). Where a course on ethics is set apart from other content, there is still the danger that poor instruction will lead students to believe moral reasoning is “inherently inconclusive” and full of the “private prejudice of the instructor” (274). Bok warns that overcoming the deficiencies of moral
education will require “serious interdisciplinary programs for students seeking careers of teaching and scholarship in this field” (274), a gap which rhetoric and composition may in fact partially fill, in light of the contents presented in this chapter.

**Conclusion**

Extending beyond the problems of values in the curriculum, engaged scholarship and practice poses its own ethical dilemmas that correspond, roughly, to the categories set out in this chapter. These components of engagement will be discussed in the fifth and final chapter of this dissertation, “The New Scholarly Citizenship.” As Chapter Five will address, failure to articulate the rhetorical nature of ethics can lead to invisible content that is uninformed, unreflexive, untrustworthy, and easily dismissed. Currently, the discussions of ethics and engagement across the curriculum run the danger of relying on this invisible content or on enthymemes that leave the guiding principles of engagement unarticulated. Chapter Five will examine how ethics, professionalization, and pragmatism risks becoming such invisible content for the scholarship of engagement, potentially threatening its legitimacy in efforts to redefine scholarship. Rhetoric can usefully step forward to reveal the guiding concepts and dialectic tensions, making the invisible visible, because it is, as Chapter Five will argue, a predominantly engaged field. The postmodern rhetorical-ethical models currently guiding the discipline—the reciprocal, heuristic, analytical, and reflexive models—can be usefully applied to scholarship that reaches beyond university boundaries. The different domains of ethics—ethical theory, ethics of practice, ethics and technology, and research ethics—may also be useful in the broader discussion. Using Schön’s terms, this chapter has sought to “name” the content and “frame” the context for such a discussion beyond the field (40).
The final chapter will knit the themes of convergence from the first four chapters into a discussion of engagement as a form of scholarly citizenship, with an eye toward situating the engaged scholar within the postmodern university. The chapter will also present several domains of engaged practice and examples from the field of rhetoric and composition, arguing these domains can usefully serve the cross-disciplinary redefinition of scholarship along engaged lines, as we work to articulate a model of the postmodern, engaged scholar.
CHAPTER V. TOWARD A NEW SCHOLARLY CITIZENSHIP

“Civil society’s character is inherently rhetorical. *Its web of associations are rhetorical arenas* in which ‘strangers encounter difference, learn of the other’s interests, develop understanding of where there are common goals, and where they may develop the levels of trust necessary for them to function in a world of mutual dependency’… Its relations are collaborative as well as contestive.” (Hauser, “Rhetorical Democracy” 9, emphasis mine).

“The conditions I have described as characterizing the present moment in composition studies—a focus on the constructed or composed quality of all experience, of all texts; the pressing against disciplinary, genre, and media boundaries; the move to connect the academy to other forums in the private and public space—are all movements beyond the center, all voyages outward, all inviting, I believe, a broad definition of literacy or literacies as the business composition scholars must be about…. I see this space, this ‘nature’ of composition studies, as large and loosely bounded, informed by cross-disciplinary, trans-institutional, multiply mediated, multi-genred, multi-voiced, and radically democratic principles.” (Lunsford, “The Nature of Composition Studies” 11, emphasis mine)

This is a dissertation structured by *dialectical tensions* between the public and academic, and it is also about the *dialectical spaces* in which those tensions are resolved, as the quote by Gerard Hauser above suggests. Because the dissertation originates in the fertile and changing ground of rhetoric and composition scholarship, epitomized by Andrea Lunsford in the second
quote above, it is also a dissertation that uses theoretical, historical, and pragmatic methods to investigate the changing institutional spaces and products of higher education.

The dissertation has explored several of the tenuous, volatile, and confrontational spaces that structure both rhetoric and engagement: community/academy, theory/praxis, service/scholarship, professionalized/not, responsive/isolated, foundational/antifoundational, marginal/center, and visible/invisible. While potential conflicts for the future of rhetoric and composition scholarship and the scholarship of engagement initiative can be found in these pairings, this dissertation argues that the tension between such contraries should be viewed as productive sites for knowledge creation rather than hostile sites of resistance. In other words, between these contraries exist spaces that act as “contact zones” (Pratt) or “visiting rooms” (Wells)

This dissertation has been moving toward the argument that the engaged scholar is practicing a form of citizenship, based on the model of the “New American Scholar” Rice and Boyer have articulated. To put it succinctly, because the ideas of public and citizenry have changed dramatically, so must the idea of being a “scholarly citizen.” In his article “On the Origin of Citizenship in Education: Isocrates, Rhetoric, and Kairos,” Lance Massey provides a “kairotic” definition of citizenship. He says:

[C]itizenship implies a profound obligation to identify self with other, self as other—to identify one’s community, and hold its interests as dear as one’s own (should they conflict), no matter if that community is a town, city, state, or country…. So, as we move out of ancient Greece toward our own time, we can begin to see how citizenship can never be finally and completely defined; wedded to kairos, its definition must change to fit its specific historical situation.
Scholarly citizenship, therefore, is also a “kairotic” notion, one that “can never be finally and completely defined.” This mutability may pose challenges as faculty tenure and promotion guidelines are revised, especially where those guidelines are built on fixed notions of scholarly identity.

Models that guide and define the engaged scholar will have to build in this sense of “kairos” and contingency if they are to remain vital to the institutions that organize them. As the second chapter’s discussion of pragmatisms emphasized, the scholar-citizen will need to work actively with antifoundational knowledge in real environments. Chapter Three, “Up Through Professionalism,” sought to contextualize and historicize academic citizenship by explaining the transformations of the scholar within the institution over time. Chapter Four, “Ethics as a Traveling Concept,” following on the heels of two chapters that discussed collapsing foundations in knowledge and institutional structures, partially scaffolded a postmodern ethical identity for the academic citizen in his/her multiple roles within and beyond the academy.

Also, in the “Convergences and Dialectical Engagement” section of this final chapter, key themes will be discussed as they emerged related to academic citizenship. Briefly, these themes are: the invisibility of intellectual work in engaged scholarship, the grand narratives that hinder the movement, the transactional nature of such work, and the metanarratives that can bridge the dialectical tensions of engaged spaces. The engaged spaces themselves are often confrontational, institutionally constrained, part of a “tacit tradition,” characterized by the “taint of practice,” part of a “post-professional” environment, lacking a disciplinary home or center space, central features in a larger shift ongoing in the academy, and based in reflective practice or the praxis of engagement.
An example of such a multiform, kairotic space is found in the research of rhetoric and composition scholar Ellen Cushman in “The Rhetorician as an Agent for Social Change.” Her work within the community offers a model of engagement that integrates the new research sites themselves into the scholar’s shifting identity. Another example of work that is powerfully engaged, aware of kairos, and navigating the new spaces that Lunsford’s quote at the opening of this chapter stressed, is the work of Jeff Grabill with community literacy. His book *Community Literacy Programs and the Politics of Change* suggests that communities are too often pressured to change rather than the institutions that serve the community.

Keeping in mind these themes and the overlapping areas between rhetoric and engagement, the “new scholarly citizen” that this dissertation puts forward will be based on the following understandings:

--Citizenship as a scholar is also rhetorical citizenship (Chapter One, Chapter Four).
--This rhetorical citizenship requires negotiating the space of contact zones and changing public spheres. (Chapter Five)
--Furthermore, the scholarly citizen will need to work within institutional constraints, allowing these to partially structure his/her role. (Chapter Five)
--These roles in a post-professional environment are likely to remain in flux, especially in this transitional period as knowledge frameworks and reward systems are restructured. (Chapter Three, Chapter Five)
--Some of the responsibilities of this citizen will be transdisciplinary. (Chapter One, Chapter Five)
--The scholarly citizen will also need to understand the “answerability” of his/her work which partially structures it. (Chapter Four)
--He/she will also often work with content that may seem to lack a disciplinary home or that may be part of a “tacit tradition” and will need to critically evaluate pedagogies and institutional developments that emerge in association with engagement. (Chapter Two, Chapter Five)

--And, to practice this critical evaluation, and counteract the “taint of practice,” the scholar should adopt as part of his/her scholarly identity an understanding of “reflective practice” and a willingness to construct “metanarratives” to support his/her work. (Chapter Two, Chapter Five)

Therefore, “new scholarly citizenship” incorporates these basic ideas of civic duty and responsiveness to communal need, but does so from the vantage point of the scholar. Thinking of scholars and citizens as analogous may help rescue some of the connections that have hindered engagement so far, such as overspecialization, lack of interdisciplinary communication, inattention to public constituencies, and resistance to accountability measures. Does this mean that the values that have traditionally guided the university must be molded to the demands of legislators, or in a worse-yet scenario, corporations? No, nor does it mean that intellectual freedom need be compromised. Rather, this notion emphasizes that a scholar plays a role within a network of communities, and that role must be made explicit in the university of the future.

The present and final chapter, “Toward a New Scholarly Citizenship,” will explore another form of metaknowledge the field of rhetoric and composition can offer the scholarship of engagement movement, moving toward engaged scholarship models extant in much current rhetoric and composition research. Here, the emphasis will be on theories of rhetorical citizenship as seen through examples of field scholarship along with analysis of the ways this
work can inform emerging definitions of the “new American scholar” (Rice, *Making a Place*). To prepare for the concluding definition of “scholarly citizenship,” this chapter will summarize areas of overlap between rhetoric and engagement discussed in the earlier chapters.

In the first section of this chapter, “Convergences and Dialectical Engagement,” dialectical tensions and areas of convergence synthesized from the preceding chapters are made visible in rhetoric and engagement. In the section that follows, “Domains of Engaged Rhetoric,” a systematic lens is turned on the field of rhetoric and composition to yield examples of engaged scholarship. The information in this section is systematized to facilitate its transfer as a possible model beyond the field. The section entitled “New Scholarly Citizenship Models” explores systems of faculty rewards that will ease the transition for the engaged scholar who must reflect critically on the work he/she does in order to make applied content visible in a changing academy.

**Convergences and Dialectical Engagement**

Practical considerations have been at the forefront of discussions about redefining scholarship; however, broader discussions of engagement have so far glossed over the challenges to the postmodern scholar who faces the difficult task of meeting these demands by determining values (Chapter Four) and a basis for action in a post-foundational (Chapter Two) and post-professional university (Chapter Three). Furthermore, many of the models today’s scholar is given for engagement are at odds with his/her home discipline or institutional reward system. Rhetoric and composition is one field that has navigated this complex terrain between the foundational and postfoundational worlds while maintaining a civic-mindedness. And, as was earlier argued, rhetoric and engagement are more than accidentally-linked in the modern
As explained in Chapter One, the scholarship of engagement stems from Ernest Boyer’s 1990 monograph on redefining scholarship, specifically his concept of the “scholarship of application”:

The scholarship of application is the application of disciplinary knowledge and skill to help address important societal and institutional problems…. Although the purpose of any of the four domains is to generate new knowledge and disseminate it to others in various forms, the scholarship of application focuses on utility to constituencies outside a discipline and, more important, to society in general. (Braxton et al 27)

Therefore, one primary focus of the scholarship of engagement is bridging the divide between two antithetical worlds, the private and codified world of the scholar and the broad, public domain of the community. As also mentioned in Chapter One of the dissertation, when the public and the academic converge, rhetoric becomes increasingly important as a way to bridge this transition. Therefore, built into the foundation of both engagement and rhetoric is a confrontational space where public and private come into contact.

Furthermore, both engagement and rhetoric operate within institutional constraints, imposed from the outside on the university. Both can be seen as responses to these constraints, responses that seek to strike the delicate balance of “intellectual bureaucracy”—simultaneously artful and utilitarian, theoretical and practical. Because of this dual tension, as Chapter Two emphasized in its discussion of John Dewey’s legacy in higher education reform, the engaged
seldom claimed, recognized, or articulated. Furthermore, both rhetoric and engagement, because of this pragmatic focus, bear the "taint of practice" because they often work from practice to theory instead of from theory toward practice as more traditional domains of scholarship do (Braxton et al. 27).

The scholarship of engagement and rhetoric also, as Chapter Three highlighted in its history of academic professionalization, respond to a post-professional environment, one for which most of the faculty within the institution have not been prepared. According to Eugene Rice, this transitional period will be difficult for current junior faculty because we may not have moved from "espoused theory" of new scholarship to "theory-in-practice" supported by restructured faculty reward systems. He says:

Our formal statements are beginning to align faculty priorities and basic institutional purposes, but have we moved beyond espousal to concrete practice? The second problem is that in tenure decisions, particularly where appointments are perceived to be made for life, it is the disciplinary agendas, the old "assumptive worlds of the academic professional," and not the new institutionally aligned guidelines that surface as dominant. Again, junior faculty are caught between the times. (31, emphasis mine)

In other words, while the purpose of higher education is changing, shaped by a nexus of forces outside the university and leading to changes in the nature of knowledge production and dissemination itself, the university structure has not shifted along with it. This creates yet another dialectical tension. Faculty are still evaluated by mostly disciplinary, rather than also by institutional, standards; and the interdisciplinary nature of engaged work that crosses disciplinary
boundaries is often devalued within such a hierarchy. Add to this the active and concrete origins of engaged work that, even if it relies on academic theories as a foundation, must be presented in ways that are immediately useful. The “assumptive worlds” guiding the academic profession have not yet transitioned to accommodate such changes in knowledge value. Therefore, these tensions found in the post-professional academy are yet another area of convergence for engagement and rhetoric.

Beyond the material realities for members of the academic profession involved in engagement and/or rhetoric are the challenges that have long faced civic reform initiatives, namely that civic reforms lack a disciplinary home or center space. As a result, they are often within the domain of the administration or an office closely tied to administrative functions, such as a community outreach office or service-learning program. This institutional affiliation can in many ways lead to a sense that “engagement is being done somewhere;” therefore, it is not relevant to the operation of academic departments. Moreover, this lack of understanding about how the civic focus fits within the curriculum, uncertainty about the invisible scaffolding of the civic values that inform the initiatives, and increasingly its role in determining or informing the traditional scholarly agenda can all lead to mistrustfulness on the part of researchers, as Chapter One discussed (McLeod, “Scholarship Reconsidered”). When the administration “prescribes” this thoroughgoing focus by, for instance, rebuilding institutional mission statements and faculty evaluation systems around a civic focus without preparing faculty, this further complicates its integration. In fact, as Eugene Rice has discussed, at least two types of misunderstandings have resulted from early efforts to revise faculty tenure and promotion policies:

[First,] some recommend that faculty be required to demonstrate excellence in all four forms of scholarship, leading either to justifying only mediocre to passable work across-
the-board, or to setting standards so high in all four areas that, as one junior faculty
member put it: “It turned out to be a prescription for humiliation, setting junior faculty up
for failure.” The second misunderstanding has led to the development of separate faculty
tracks, e.g., one in research, another in teaching, and a third in service. Faculty would
choose and then stay with their choices throughout their careers. (22).

In other words, then, not only are engagement and rhetoric, inasmuch as they share a civic focus,
constrained by material realities, but they are also constrained by the transitional philosophies
that guide them. This is one of the primary reasons this dissertation advocates a “dialectical”
approach to understanding and implementing these reforms.

It may at first seem in this recapitulation of converging spaces between rhetoric and
engagement that the areas of overlap mostly address obstacles and negative reception. However,
the way these tensions structure academic life indicate both rhetoric and engagement are central
features in a larger shift in the academy. In fact, they can even be said to “inform” one another
because of their shared responsiveness and tenuous positions. One of the solutions this
dissertation advocates to avoid hostility and transitional difficulty is to rely on rhetoric as an
informing discipline as we shift to the new knowledge infrastructure of the university of the
future. This informing role for rhetoric can be both practical and theoretical: practical inasmuch
as the shift to community-responsive scholarship is a rhetorical move explaining how academic
researchers already respond to community need through their work and theoretical so far as the
work grows out of a rhetorical tradition. The dialectical pairing of practice and theory that
characterizes engaged rhetoric results in a “reflective practice” or “praxis of engagement” that
has successfully guided rhetoric and composition scholars and is built into many subspecialties
within the discipline.
Another area of conversation or convergence is in the “invisible” theoretical underpinnings shared by both engagement and rhetoric that nonetheless manifest in very real ways across the university, such as in community outreach offices, values-based interdisciplinary grant programs, and service learning programs, all of which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Again, however, the “invisible” scaffolding of such work is a poor fit with the structure and content of many disciplines themselves, rendering the work somewhat suspicious in the minds of faculty conducting research.

An impediment for the research metanarrative in both rhetoric and engagement are the terministic screens of “service,” “civic virtue,” and “making a difference,” which, as Chapter Two and Four on pragmatism and postmodern ethics respectively discussed, are no longer innocent, but nor are the terms expendable. The engaged scholar is forced to mediate the awkward space between university and social need, with little dialogue between the long-estranged constituencies. 

Grand narratives of “civic progress” and “social duty,” such as we risk if we rely on an abstract values curriculum or a communally driven body of scholarship, have long been treated dismissively by the academy (as reflected in traditional scholarship guidelines) and misunderstood by the public. For these reasons, it is important that a theoretical foundation be laid for the scholarship of engagement that addresses latent ideological content in responsible ways.

Another unifying feature for rhetoric and the scholarship of engagement that this dissertation has addressed is the dialectical nature of the spaces they inhabit—interstices between community and academy (Chapter One), foundational and postfoundational thought (Chapter Two), applied and pure scholarship (Chapter Three), ethically responsive and isolated research (Chapter Four). In those spaces, we can usefully revisit pragmatism’s transactional and triadic...
theories first discussed in Chapter Two of this dissertation. Chapter Four also broached the transactional nature of the work of ethics in rhetoric and engagement, arguing that the triangle traditionally representing the rhetorical situation, which is itself transactional in nature, can be compared with a triangle representing constant movement among the individual, text, audience, and context in the ethical situation as well. When applied to the scholarship of engagement, the transactional relationships also hold, and new relationships are formed among the scholar/rhetor, the audience/public, the text/scholarship, and the context in which all of these are located.

Because of the risks involved in scholarship that rests on invisible foundations (Chapter Two) or scholarship that draws on grand narratives relegated to earlier intellectual periods (Chapter Three), the scholarship of engagement and rhetoric must make the transactional and dialectical foundations upon which it rests apparent. Beyond merely stating such aspects of this type of work, engaged scholars must also foreground these aspects in a metanarrative that they attach to engaged work. To better understand how metanarratives work to aid legitimacy, think of a teacher presenting students with a rationale for the learning skills gained through a group activity that would otherwise seem like “busy work.” Students enter into an agreement with the teacher, based on the premise articulated in the metanarrative, that they will learn from the activity. For engaged scholarship, a metanarrative might take the form of preparing the tenure and promotion review committee with a rationale for engaged scholarship, making the connections to the intellectual work of a scholar’s home discipline more explicit. Metanarratives offer hope for making the invisible visible and unpacking the theoretical assumptions of an initiative that does not have an informing discipline.
Another reason metanarratives are crucial to the scholarship of engagement, and also to rhetoric and composition, is both are based on Process-oriented activities. Just as the teaching of an active and multidimensional skill like writing requires an emphasis on active composing and modeling of process to an extent that, say, a lecture course on history might not, the scholarship of engagement, with its emphasis on actively remediating communal need through scholarly knowledge also must foreground the active work process that sustains its interdisciplinary and community projects, as the next section will address.

**Domains of Engaged Rhetoric**

If the scholarship of engagement is a form of applied scholarship that responds to community need and the notion of the greater public good, then rhetorical engagement as an associated concept in this dissertation, will refer to scholarship within the field of rhetoric and composition that demonstrates principles of engagement or emphasizes the areas of convergence outlined above.

In the first subsection of this section, “Rhetorical Engagement,” a model of engaged scholarship by Richard Gebhardt is explained, and it is compared to a quadrant model of engaged scholarship by Boyer’s protégé Eugene Rice. The two, both of which treat the purpose and content of engaged research, are synthesized in order to define rhetorical and engaged scholarship. The five subsections that follow diverge from the Gebhardt/Rice synthesis to consider domains of engaged work in the field based on faculty role rather than content. These subsections are entitled “Theory of Rhetorical Citizenship,” “Civically-Engaged Pedagogies,” “The Analogies Found in Institutional Service,” “Public Intellectualism,” and “Challenges across the Domains of Engaged Rhetoric.” The section that follows the discussion of domains of
rhetorical engagement is entitled “New Scholarly Citizenship Models.” This section will address practical considerations in restructuring faculty roles.

**Rhetorical Engagement**

In a 2008 CCCC paper entitled “Composition Scholarship and the Scholarship of Engagement,” Richard Gebhardt identified four categories of engaged scholarship currently at work in the field of rhetoric and composition: *Explicit Engaged Scholarship*, *Background Engaged Scholarship*, *Broad Engaged Scholarship*, and *Public-Writing Engaged Scholarship*. Since the scholarship of engagement, in its responsiveness to public good and community need, is not limited to one approach, Gebhardt maps the engaged research of the field through these four types. The first is “Explicit Engaged Scholarship,” which describes research where “the topic or object of research is an enterprise like a literacy or social service program, whether local or not, or an on-campus enterprise where the author works to engage her specialty on behalf of the college or community.” The second type “Background Engaged Scholarship,” “does not grow out of research in an off-campus or campus enterprise …. [T]he topic that is being researched and written about is one that could be of interest to engaged researchers, and the article develops perspectives or approaches that could help future engaged researchers.” The third kind is “Broad Engaged Scholarship,” and it includes scholarly work in which “an author may draw on disciplinary expertise to clarify a problem or issue…. And authors may work toward a solution to a critical social problem” even though there may not be a “specific community (or campus) connection of *Explicit* or *Background* Engaged Scholarship.” Finally, “Public-Writing Engaged Scholarship” is an area in which “rhetoric and composition scholars work as public intellectuals rather than writing for academic audiences,” but more often, “they
argue that our field *should* engage social conditions and issues through language aimed at broad public audiences.”

Gebhardt’s classification helps organize discussion of scholarly work done in the field and beyond. Furthermore, it provides a framework for understanding work that is not as obviously engaged but which contributes intellectually to engagement initiatives. Eugene Rice maps a model that could be synthesized with Gebhardt’s schema (Figure 5.1). Rice suggests that scholarship redefined, in general, works along two axes. First, along the horizontal axis, there’s a continuum of active practice to reflective observation. The vertical axis that divides the first plots scholarship on a spectrum from concrete, connected knowing to abstract, analytic knowing (*Making* 14). These axes divide scholarship into four quadrants (addition of arrows and numerals is mine), but the divisions among the quadrants are not genuine divisions, and as the arrows suggest, there is constant movement among the quadrants. Mapping Gebhardt’s four types onto Rice’s framework might place “Explicit Engaged Scholarship” in quadrant I, “Background Engaged Scholarship” in quadrant II, “Broad Engaged Scholarship” in quadrant III, and “Public-Writing Engaged Scholarship” in quadrant IV. Rice places the scholarship of engagement most notably in quadrants I and IV, even though he suggests overlap with the other quadrants is possible. Again, these are not static boundaries in the model; however, doing this mapping shows that Gebhardt’s notion of engagement is actually broader and more encompassing than Rice initially proposes. This may, once again, suggest how the overwhelmingly engaged work that has characterized rhetoric and composition since it’s disciplinary formation can further the conversation beyond the field.
As Thomas Miller says, the goal of training students as “engaged” democratic citizens is not new to us in rhetoric and composition (The Formation, 32), nor is the emphasis on the scholarship that engages with the public good or community. Throughout our recent history, the discipline has sought connections between practical, service-oriented scholarship and the tradition of “the good man skilled in speaking” which precedes us. The rest of this section will seek to reveal several strands of engagement in rhetoric and composition faculty roles, beginning with definitions of “engaged” and “civic” rhetorics and moving towards an exploration of what the current reform initiatives could mean for us today. Beyond that, this section argues that multiple conceptions of civic discourse, what this chapter refers to as “engaged rhetorics,” are part of the field of rhetoric and composition. Because of this, rhetoricians should use this strong “tacit” tradition to be instrumental in the shift towards engagement more broadly conceived, to the betterment of their institutions, the field, curricula, future careers of students, and the community itself.

The domains that follow mostly address the multiple roles of the faculty member who must determine where his/her scholarly interests are best placed, and there are pedagogical, theoretical, and service-oriented concerns addressed through the domains. Some of these strands have led us to intersections with engagement reform efforts, such as we find with service learning and scholarship. As this section argues, these multiple notions of the civic in rhetoric deserve more exploration.

**Theory of Rhetorical Citizenship**

Variously treated as civic and public discourse, my description of “rhetorical citizenship” brings with it an emphasis on community. It has broad appeal for rhetoricians because it
subsumes the recent epistemological emphasis on social rhetoric, but it also extends beyond to include traditions in classical rhetoric where important background research is being done. As scholars work to apply their disciplinary knowledge to remediate social need, they should work from theoretically rigorous notions of “rhetorical citizenship” (Halloran; see below) that make manifest issues of civic involvement, authorial voice, the role of the personal, and the way that rhetoric can be used to shape public change.

S. Michael Halloran is often cited for a germinal article on rhetoric and citizenship. According to Halloran in “Rhetoric in the American College Curriculum: The Decline of Public Discourse,” “the revival of rhetoric in the field of English composition has thus far failed to address the need for a revival of public discourse” (246), which he describes as a “rhetoric of citizenship.” The revival of rhetoric this century “addresses students under three aspects of their identity: personal, intellectual-academic, and professional” (263). On the other hand, though, according to Halloran, rhetoric’s revival does not as often emphasize the political responsibility of these same students (263).

Some have critiqued Halloran’s position, saying that his notion of a full-fledged rhetoric does not account for the differences between the closed-system of knowledge that past rhetoric was understood to be and the existing, more open system that characterizes knowledge after postmodernity and the information age. His critics have further described how the physical location of the university has shifted along with the changing forms of knowledge, shaped by the new focus on distance education and on the changing demographics of matriculating students. In other words, critics of this theory of “rhetorical citizenship” claim it is no longer possible to know everything, and there are no clearly identifiable publics able to receive knowledge (Virilio, Baudrillard).
Kate Ronald, in her 1990 article “A Reexamination of Personal and Public Discourse in Classical Rhetoric,” argues that Halloran oversimplified his arguments about the supremacy of “public” discourse over what she classifies as “personal” discourse. In her estimation, “ethos” is a more complex “tension between the speaker’s private and public self” (39). Also, she argues that Socrates and Plato’s rhetoric focused on the individual recovery of knowledge, study that was done more privately than the mere public oratorical performances that Halloran valorizes (39-40), and such study included critiques of the public sphere (40). Candace Spigelman in “Argument and Evidence in the Case of the Personal” (2001) adds to Ronald’s critique that political and personal lives were historically more intertwined than acknowledged, and she points to Aristotle’s valuation of personal “experience” in constructing wisdom (74). Lance Massey has described how this focus on the individual is tied to the notion of “ethos” in Isocrates’, and later Aristotle’s, methods of educating citizens. In fact, as Massey states, Isocrates saw impersonal discourse as potentially dangerous and as integrally related to the speaker. Massey goes on to provide discussion of contemporary consequences found in divorcing ideas from their speakers, such as the development of atomic weaponry whose effects were blamed on the politicians who used them rather than the scientists who invented them.

Moreover, Richard Gebhardt in the opening chapter of Academic Enhancement in Composition Studies (1997) has argued that such tendencies as personal writing have claimed their place in diverse conceptualization of scholarship in rhetoric and composition, which might be important considerations in redefining scholarship itself in the field. He says, “Increasingly, too, composition scholars use their own experiences as illustrations, or as ‘personal validation and expression of knowledge’ [Branscomb 477], or even as the central focus of scholarship” (“Evolving” 5). Jane Hindman calls for a discursive ethics which will make us consumers as
well as producers of this subversive, embodied personal writing. Further, Olivia Frey has argued that academic discourse, the more public voice of our discipline, can, for female academics, silence the voices of the women who use it. Both Hindman and Frey seem to be pitting personal writing against masculine traditions, but, as Spigelman’s exploration of narrative and experience shows, the tradition of the personal for academics is more inclusive. Ultimately, it might be the untenured faculty member’s voice or the fuller portrayal of disciplinary knowledge in composition that are silenced by academic discourse more than the tenured female.

Moving from the personal to the public again, both Gerard Hauser and Cynthia Miecznikowski Sheard have debated whether epideictic can be a useful tool in the formation of public morality. Sheard suggests a progression from epideictic to other forms of discourse, as the epideictic can have educative value and even instill “a sense of responsibility for and possibility of change for the better” (786).

The issues discussed by Halloran, Ronald, Spigelman, Sheard, and others are important considerations as scholars move between community work and traditional venues for scholarship. These issues, as made manifest in the public/private and masculine/feminine “dialectical spaces,” becomes very pressing as the community and university intersect. By anticipating such challenges as voice and leading the public toward change through responsible rhetorical appeals, a theory of “rhetorical citizenship” will be an important “Background Engaged Scholarship” concern.

**Civically Engaged Pedagogies**

Another way engaged rhetoric can affect the intellectual work of faculty is through pedagogies, and service learning and civic writing are two of the most common “engaged
pedagogies.” The real world environments treated in the theoretical work on service learning are the same environments where the scholarship of engagement often takes place, making this type of scholarship what Gebhardt calls “Explicit Engaged Scholarship.” In the introduction to their edited collection on service learning, rhetoric and composition scholars Linda Adler-Kassner, Robert Crooks, and Ann Watters describe service learning as a “microrevolution” for faculty and students that has radically transformed “experiences and understanding of education and its relation to communities outside the campus” (1). They describe it as a “microrevolution” because despite its successes in our discipline, few instructors in composition know about it (1). Furthermore, they explain that the logistical and administrative challenges of such a program often dissuade those who would try to forge connections with community through service learning pedagogies. Their volume addresses these challenges, especially as they relate to matters of communication.

Elizabeth Ervin provides an honest account of the limitations of the service learning approach in “Learning to Write with a Civic Tongue,” and she explains constraints such as ethical considerations of these pedagogies and the uncooperativeness and uncontrollability of real world environments where learning is still expected to take place. Aaron Schutz and Anne Ruggles Gere call service learning an “entry point” into the reclamation of the public (146). Also, service learning is a good first step because, as they say, it is an effective tool for helping English Studies reconsider “its own boundaries and internal relationships …mediating the relationships between the discourses and needs of the academy and those of actual community contexts” (147).

The theoretical work of Susan Wells (1996), Ellen Cushman (1997), and Bruce Herzberg (2000; 2003) also evince this more philosophical approach to “Explicit Engaged Scholarship”
through service learning and civic engagement. Ellen Cushman argues that actively engaged and civic rhetorics can help us form theory from the “bottom up” instead of “top down” by working more closely with members of the community. Based on her experience, she concludes that we often exclude the people we are trying to liberate when academies operate in isolation (24). Hers is an argument for involvement in social change. Bruce Herzberg works in somewhat the opposite direction of Cushman when he claims that “service-learning writing courses and programs do seem undertheorized” (“Service Learning” 403), but he says, like Cushman, that it is through maturity and experience in the community that such programs work out their problems. A new dialectical space emerges in this pairing, namely the contrast between whether practice or theory should come first in engaged work.

This binary seems to be resolved by the transactionally based work represented in Susan Wells’ “Rogue Cops and Health Care: What Do We Want from Public Writing?” which is guided by her critical reflection on and consequent theorizing of the public domain and students’ relationships with it. She describes the service learning environment as a “visiting room” which encourages the teacher-scholar navigating it with his/her students to enter into the dialectical space between community and university without rushing closure. She says that we must work hard to create an authentic, instructive public space for students. “The space within which a new kind of public writing might be read, and therefore the incitement to read it, must be constructed, just as the culture of workingmen’s colleges and ladies’ physiological societies was constructed in the nineteenth century, just as MOO’s and newsgroups are being constructed now” (328). Furthermore, the task is complicated because “all speakers and writers who aspire to intervene in society face the task of constructing a responsive public. Nobody, not even the president
speaking on national television, enters it without difficulty” (329). Her solution is to offer students a “provisional public,” composed of “alternate publics” and “counter publics” (335).

According to Wells, the teacher could create a space like a visiting room (such as in a prison) where students would be able to participate in both their personal and public lives simultaneously (335). The Enlightenment public sphere revolved around participants who were male, adult, and properties, but the reconstructed public sphere, she says, will require a willingness to enter space that is “universal without being foundational” (335). What public discourse offers “identity politics” pedagogies, she claims, is the element that combines action with discourse (337). Her strategies for teaching include advice that we should see the “classroom as a version of the public sphere: as a model of the public, or a concentrated version of the public”; “[teach] public writing…with the analysis of public discourse, including the texts produced in alternative and counter publics”; “produce student writing that will enter some form of public space”; and “work with the discourses of the disciplines as they intervene in the public” (338-39). Wells’ work, while it includes “Explicit Engaged Scholarship,” seems to fall more in the realm of “Background Engaged Scholarship.”

Sandra Stotsky offers a more aggressive approach toward the civic that illustrates service learning pedagogy as “Public-Writing Engaged Scholarship,” but for students. Her model focuses on the technical details of what “civic writing” would actually look like in the classroom. For her, “participatory writing—the unpaid writing that citizens do as part of the process of democratic self-government—is a necessary and inseparable component” of that process of government (“Civic Writing”). She defines the purposes of such writing: “to personalize civic relationships with public officials and/or to express a civic identity with other citizens”; “to
Before a public-writing pedagogy will work, however, students must understand the dialectical spaces where it takes place and value them. Jeff Smith claims that today’s college-educated student is wholly “illegerate,” a term that he uses to signal an inability to understand the terms of American culture, a failure to see choices worth arguing about within that culture, and an “abdication” by students of their ability to determine the direction society will take (pp. 201-210). However, Jeff Smith indicates that this illegeracy may in part stem from the oversegmentalization of academic departments and the assumption that civic matters are taken care of somewhere. He says, “The quality of students’ knowledge and thinking should be the concern of the whole college faculty” (217). It is this cross-disciplinary focus that I will turn to next in discussion of how engaged rhetorics work within institutional service roles for faculty in rhetoric and composition.

The Analogies Found in Institutional Service

Faculty inhabit many roles beyond their scholarly lives, but as the Chapter One discussion of Boyer’s Scholarship Reconsidered emphasized, these roles are not mutually exclusive. Institutional service is a form of “Broad Engaged Scholarship” in the field of rhetoric and composition, where disciplinary expertise is used to solve administrative problems. Similarly, a defining trait of engaged scholarship beyond rhetoric and composition is its explicitly “interdisciplinary focus,” making the idea of “connections” a major focus of the movement. Writing Across the Curriculum (WAC) programs share Boyer’s concept that knowledge is a web, always connected to other knowledge. In fact Victor Bloomfield, in
response to a proposal by Bernadette Longo to “infuse public engagement” in classrooms much as WAC has “infused writing,” says WAC and Engagement have analogous properties:

Clemson University, Prof. Longo's previous institution, worked to develop a culture of writing across the university. Faculty came together at lunches to talk about writing in their disciplines and in their courses. Writing faculty co-authored articles with colleagues in other disciplines on how to write for those disciplines. Writing consultants went out to talk to professors to help them integrate writing into their curriculum, as part of faculty development. A website and a research institute were established. Writing became viewed as another way to achieve disciplinary learning objectives.

The analogy to engagement is obvious. There are general writing/engagement skills that must be developed, but professional writing/engagement is discipline-specific. On the other hand, disciplinary specificity is not enough; you need to be able to write for/engage with many audiences, not just insiders. Effective written communication about your discipline is an important component of professional success, and so is effective engagement with a variety of public audiences.

Perhaps we can learn from such writing-across-the-curriculum efforts how to grow the intellectual community of those interested in civic engagement as a teaching and learning strategy. (“Engagement and Writing”)

Such an initiative, as Bloomfield describes, would exacerbate some of the displacement of civic objectives in the curriculum.

There is a more profound problem of engagement related to institutional service, however, and it dovetails with writing program administration scholarship in the field. This
problem is articulated by Porter et al. in their “Institutional Critique: A Rhetorical Methodology for Change.” The authors state:

Many forms of institutional action have been prominent in our field, especially in the work of writing program administrators (WPAs). As a field, we seem to be particularly good at critiquing our positionality and history (especially within departments of English), and we have a strong track record for enacting change (if nothing else, we now have a field where once there was none). Those of us who are WPAs content (if not outright fight) on a daily basis with our academic institutions for material resources, control over processes, and disciplinary validity. (614, emphasis mine)

The authors here are describing the reflexive turn within a body scholarship and the process of institutional change, two ideas this chapter argues are inseparable. Karen Kopelson’s research subjects categorized the self-reflexive tendency in composition scholarship as the rehashing of tired tropes of disciplinary formation, and Kopelson herself critiqued an overreliance on this habit as potentially “detrimental to our disciplinary growth” (775). However, as Porter et al.’s quote suggests above, the reflexive and metanarrative quality of some field scholarship can serve a necessary institutional purpose and allows those performing unrewarded intellectual work to make an argument that their work is valid. Administrators must deal with material realities, and “metanarratives” can be a dialectical bridge to facilitate this process and retain site of theoretical objectives. Such a process of reflection and metanarration will also be helpful for the scholarship of engagement as faculty reach beyond traditional boundaries, worksites, and venues for publication.

Duane Roen tackles the specific challenge of “Writing Administration as Scholarship and Teaching.” He echoes Christine Hult’s claim that we should expand Boyer’s model to include
the Scholarship of Administration. Writing Program Administrators are quite often junior faculty or even newly minted Ph.D.s who take on the job but delay their possibility for tenure as a result. The duties involved in such positions, such as curriculum development, staff training, mediating conflicts, etc., while they may draw heavily from rhetoric and composition theory and research, do not fit the traditional categories of basic scholarship. For instance, Roen claims that the job often leads to the production of “hundreds of pages of memos, letters, reports, plans, and proposals…400-600 pages a year—equivalent in length, if not coherence, to a book manuscript” (52) that are comparable to other scholarly activity and should be rewarded as such. If it is not, the administrator’s potential for advancement can be stunted.

“The Portland Resolution” advanced in 1991 by the Council of Writing Program Administrators as “Professional Standards for Writing Administrators” says that WPAs should be evaluated based on “clearly defined guidelines” in a way that is fair and that determines how “administrative work is to be compared to traditional definitions of teaching, research, and service in decisions involving salary increases, retention, promotion, and tenure” (353). The specific intellectual work of writing administrators has been more explicitly described in a report by the Council of Writing Program Administration entitled “Evaluating the Intellectual Work of Writing Administration.” The authors state that writing administration work can be considered scholarly when it meets two tests based on the MLA Commission’s Making Faculty Work Visible: First it needs to advance knowledge—its production, clarification, connection, reinterpretation, or application. Second, it results in products or activities that can be evaluated by others—for instance… “the activity requires a high level of discipline-related expertise; the activity … is innovative; the activity can be replicated or elaborated; the work and its results can be
documented; the work and its results can be peer-reviewed; the activity has significance or impact (14)” (*Disciplines Speak* qtd. in “Evaluating”).

Even if these standards help clarify ways for the WPA—and, by analogy, the engaged scholar—to gain recognition for work, such recognition still requires rhetorical skill on the part of the faculty member who must present him or herself:

First you have to be able to specify exactly what it is that you do as a WPA; then you have to convince people that your work is intellectual work, grounded in disciplinary knowledge, demanding expertise, and producing knowledge or other valued ends, not simply busy work or administratrina that anyone with a reasonable intelligence could do; and finally you have to demonstrate that your work has been both professional and creative—worthy of recognition and reward. (“Evaluating”)

In particular, echoing the parameters of redefining “engaged scholarship” across the institution, the WPA may be performing intellectual work without recognition along the lines spelled out by the report: program creation, curricular design, faculty development, program assessment and evaluation, and program-related textual production. The final step, then, for the WPA, an important one, involves persuading others to consider their work valuable. As Rita Malenczyk claims:

Though WPAs might create and use theories in any number of ways, what lies at the heart of WPA work—as Edward M. White has pointed out—is rhetoric (1995, 133). Not only does rhetoric ground the courses we teach and oversee, it occupies much of a WPA’s daily work outside of traditional research or teaching. WPAs are engaged in an ongoing struggle to persuade, whether at the local level or the national” (79).
Duane Roen also suggests an accurate gauge of scholarly administrative activity may be whether the scholar uses methods appropriate to the goals, keeping in mind that these goals should be translated to the WPA’s publics or, in other words, to produce “the kind of nuggets parents and administrators will understand” (Roen, “Reconsidering” 163). These discussions, if used analogously to scholarship of engagement initiatives can be models to develop a “metascholarship” that prioritizes “intellectual work” of faculty based on disciplinary knowledge, regardless of their role within the institution. This same “meta-“ function is prized in the next domain, public intellectualism, but the service now moves beyond the institution or local community and to the larger public domain.

**Public Intellectualism**

Yet another role that faculty occupy, and one which grows increasingly important in engaged scholarship, is the role of the public intellectual. This is the clearest example of what Gebhardt calls “Public-Writing Engaged Scholarship.” This is an emphasis on writing about issues that grow out of disciplinary roots, but appeals to a broader public, wherever that public is found. In other words, faculty are needed as public intellectuals to champion causes and make sure that “engagement” initiatives are explained sufficiently. Stanley Fish offers a controversial take on the public intellectual:

A public intellectual is someone who takes as his or her subject matters of public concern, and *has the public’s attention*. Since one cannot gain that attention from the stage of the academy (except by some happy contingency) academics, by definition, are not candidates for the role of the public intellectual. Whatever the answer to the question
“How does one get to be a public intellectual?” we know it won’t be “by joining the academy” (qtd. in Weisser 118).

Douglas Hesse and Barbara Genelle Smith Gebhardt’s “Nonacademic Publication As Scholarship” offers a more hopeful take of the academic as public intellectual and argues that such work, growing out of disciplinary knowledge, can be rewarded as scholarship. Peter Mortensen has also argued in “Going Public” that the compositionist can make a substantial impact beyond the discipline, and Christian Weisser has argued that to make a difference, the scholar must move beyond the traditional sense of being a public intellectual. Weisser says, “I would argue that it is necessary for us to rethink what it means to be an intellectual working in the public sphere today, and this rethinking requires us to take into account the particularities of the postmodern world in which we live and work” (121). Works that respond to these public needs must take into account how the notion of the public sphere itself is changing and how this further problematizes engaged practice.

**Challenges across the Domains of Engaged Rhetoric**

As the quote by Weisser above states, an issue that will surface repeatedly throughout these domains of engaged rhetoric, and that will also be relevant to the larger discussion of the scholarship of engagement, is the notion of the changing public sphere. Consideration of this theoretical space is a form of Gebhardt’s “Background Engaged Scholarship.” The public sphere according to communications theorist Jurgen Habermas was a new social order that began with spaces in “coffeehouses, salons, societies, newspapers, and periodicals of all types,” and these spaces were for “public debate by private persons” (Weisser 72). Habermas notes that literacy was vital to these spaces, and the stabilization of a “reading culture” laid the foundation for a
political public sphere. Gradually, however, this public sphere eroded as “newspapers had transformed from institutions for the publishing of news to instruments in the ‘arsenal of party politics’ (182)” (Weiser 73). Beyond this, newspapers and forums for public debate became preoccupied with their own commercial success, putting an end to the public sphere.

This issue has been discussed within rhetoric and composition, often in connection with the rhetorical tradition. Both “the” rhetorical tradition and “the” public sphere (Frazer) have been critiqued for their exclusion of marginalized publics who were unable to enter into debate as a result of power relations or who were excluded from literacy altogether. Cultural studies theorists Jean Baudrillard and Paul Virilio have both described the end of the logic of public representation, wherein the masses have become a screen to reflect back messages rather than act as participants in the feedback loop. The loudest cry about the disappearance of the public sphere is a protest about the “profound deterioration of political discourse and action in the United States… in a country that has historically celebrated the virtues of open dialogue, citizenship, democratic participation, and public access to governmental decision making” (Boggs vii). In the classroom, this disappearance is perceived in increasing student disengagement, civic apathy, and general “illegacy” (J. Smith “Against ‘Illegacy’”).

Perhaps a better way to view this fundamental shift in the notion of the public and public sphere, however, is as a natural ebb and flow cycle that shifts along with the technologies and geographies that comprise our social, intellectual, political, and economic worlds. Rather than viewing the public sphere—the spaces where engagement most notably takes place—as disappearing entirely, it is more productive to describe the shifts in the understandings and socio-economic structure of such spaces. Some have postulated that the Internet and other computer-mediated environments offer opportunities for a new kind of public sphere that may be all-
inclusive. Barbara Warnick and Irene Ward take somewhat skeptical stances about these possibilities, warning of the access issues, the uncertainties of the rhetorical situation for these environments (Warnick), and the individualized nature of each encounter with it (Ward). On the other hand, Bruce McComiskey in “Visual Rhetoric and the New Public Discourse” takes a positive view of technology’s role in constructing the public sphere. Even though mass media are often blamed for “social homogenization and reduced critical participation in democratic processes and public discourse” (192), he says the rise of the visual in our society has not diminished public participation in democracy (200). What we really need, he says, is to theorize the implications of the visual and accept it, integrating it into our notion of the public sphere.

Other challenges for engaged rhetoricians involve reconceptualizing actual physical spaces that serve as publics, including the classroom (Harris), writing groups (Spigelman, “Reconstructing”), and venues for the circulation of writing (Trimbur). In a 2005 CCCC talk, Linda Flower described her own pedagogy of “local inquiry,” a way of forming smaller publics within the fragmented larger institutions so that we can make a difference where we are able (see also Wells). Halloran’s presentation at the same conference emphasized ways that we can construct “little democracies,” brought about by coordination in pedagogy and curriculum that will expose the rhetorical construction of our institutions, delivering more power to the constituents of these institutions. Gerard Hauser’s work in rhetoric also emphasizes these smaller publics that fit within our postmodern world, emphasizing the “vernacular voices” that characterize them. Regardless of the term or metaphor used to describe such public spaces reconsidered, these challenges that face communication theorists, writing teachers, and society in general are also relevant to scholarship of engagement reforms. The interstices where the public and academy intersect are undertheorized “contact zones” or dialectical spaces in which the
interaction of estranged constituencies may lead to rapid restructuring of the university and of
faculty roles. If left unexamined, the new roles faculty find themselves inhabiting may not be the
ones they would choose. As Hauser stated in the quote that opened this chapter, the “web of
associations” in civil society are inherently rhetorical, collaborative, and contestive (“Rhetorical
Democracy” 9). Just as Hauser points out in the quote that opens this chapter, and as the
transactional theories discussed earlier in the chapter attest, the engagement of the future will
necessarily be aware of new publics, new relationships, new spaces, and new methods of
communication.

These domains are a beginning of a discussion about the work that engaged rhetors do
and how this work and the categories that can be used to describe it offer to inform the
discussion of engaged scholarship beyond the field. The remaining section turns beyond rhetoric
and composition and projects ways field knowledge might help guide applied scholarship in
other disciplines.

**New Scholarly Citizenship Models**

Making the intellectual work and roles of faculty visible, however, has proven
challenging. As mentioned in Chapter One, Charles Glassick, Mary Taylor Huber, and Gene
Maeroff followed up on Boyer’s monograph with their own Carnegie Foundation report
*Scholarship Assessed* (1997) that developed methods for assessing the broader model of
scholarship. Boyer had done a study before his death in which he discerned common values
upon which scholarship is assessed: clear goals, adequate preparation, use of appropriate
methods, production of significant results, that has been effectively communicated and engages
in reflective critique (Glassick, “Ernest” 27). These are the same criteria that Glassick et al. recommend for use in refiguring scholarship.

Robert Bringle, Richard Games, and Edward Malloy in their *Colleges and Universities as Citizens* offer a model that will help us see ways that Boyer’s model will work so we can tailor rewards accordingly. The model features four circles labeled “Community,” “Teaching,” “Service,” and “Research.” The community circle intersects with the rest of the three, and the union of the circles is labeled “engagement.” In the space where community and teaching overlap, the authors place the label “distance education.” The space where community, teaching, and service overlap is labeled “service learning.” The space where service and community overlap is labeled “professional community service.” The space where community, service, and research overlap is labeled “participatory action research.” Finally, the area where community and research overlap is labeled “research site,” referring to places for research within the community (5). This model visually represents the interstitial spaces where engagement takes place.

The MLA Commission on Professional Service sought to make faculty work explicit in order to better reward it (*Making Faculty Work Visible*). In his discussion of these efforts, James Slevin points to the inadequacy of dominant models that rank faculty activities for promotion and tenure. In Slevin’s assessment, the values of the academy and the values expressed in models of assessment do not match. It does not even match, he says, “claims made about ourselves in the course catalog” (“Engaging” 295) at his institution. New models for scholarship would refigure hierarchies that suggest basic scholarship is more important than teaching and service and the rigid classifications of tasks into these categories. Instead, a redefined model would seek connections where values and “sites of work” overlap. According to Slevin, “intellectual work”
includes “various ways faculty members can contribute individually and jointly to projects of producing and testing knowledge” (297). These rewarded scholarly tasks include:

- Creating new questions, interpretations, frameworks of understanding;
- Clarifying, critically examining, revising knowledge claims of others and oneself;
- Connecting knowledge to other knowledge;
- Preserving, restoring, and reinterpreting past knowledge;
- Arguing knowledge claims in order to invite criticism and revision;
- Making specialized knowledge accessible (to students, nonspecialists, the public);
- Helping new generations to become active knowers themselves. (297-98)

Ultimately, the aim is to place intellectual values held by faculty at the heart of models of assessment. As all of the above examples suggest, once again, models to reevaluate new scholarship must also evaluate work done in the interstices, a notion that does not translate easily into a rubric for assessment and communication of quantitative results to governing boards.

Perhaps part of the complications in restructuring assessment systems stems from the transformative rather than additive nature of these changes (Rice, “Future” 307). Eugene Rice says:

[P]roponents do not assume that improvement can be made by only introducing another responsibility to work that is already required. Transformational change calls for rethinking the whole professional role and choosing among many important tasks… or devising new ways of organizing academic work. Clearly, although the profession values independence and autonomy, it will have to move toward much greater collaboration and
cooperation. Evaluation processes and reward systems will need to shift attention from individual performance to the achievements of departments and the shared contributions of more comprehensive units. (307).

Part of what Rice describes involves “unbundling the faculty role” (309) and will radically reshape our institutions as labor traditionally done by faculty is outsourced or reallocated.

Elsewhere, Rice has also claimed, “Many accommodations are being patched together to permit individual faculty and institutions to make it through this turbulent time. We have not, however, addressed the serious organizational implications of these changes for the patterning of faculty careers” (“Making a Place” 20). Some of the changes he outlines include a shift towards a complete and connected scholar with “a primary focus on learning, increased faculty involvement in institution-building, greater collaboration (‘our work’), career resilience, and greater faculty responsibility for public life and the quality of democratic participation” (20).

Rice also explained organizational-level models of a series of schools that integrated Boyer’s initiatives. The first category of schools is “the New American College,” a group of private colleges and universities that met to construct an educational model apart from the liberal arts college and research institution. “The new model would place a high priority on an integrated academic culture and connected learning, while also valuing applied learning and the usefulness of knowledge in addressing issues and problems confronting the larger society” (18). The other category, the “Metropolitan Universities” were a group of large public institutions that often dwell in the heart of the inner cities amidst great social need. These institutions “for some time have served ‘the new majority’ of students in and around the nation’s cities, and take as a central part of their mission responsibility for responding to community needs and demands for applied research and public service” (18). For both categories, Scholarship Reconsidered has
been a catalyst, and the two groups have organized conferences and journals where ideas and policy options can be discussed. Furthermore, the AACU and the Council of Graduate Schools has launched the “Preparing Future Faculty” project to better prepare graduate students for new roles (19). Maurrasse’s 2001 book *Beyond the Campus: How Colleges and Universities Form Partnerships with Their Communities* takes a detailed look at many of these reforms within a group of specific institutions around the country.

These discussions of new models for academic citizenship models, when considered together with specific examples of engaged scholarship in disciplines like rhetoric and composition, can usefully guide future scholars in disciplines across the university as long as institutions take the initiative seriously and update their faculty evaluation practices accordingly.

**Conclusion**

In an era of disjointedness in our institutional and private lives, where can a movement like the scholarship of engagement be sponsored and by whom? This concluding chapter has argued that engagement, much like rhetoric, operates in dialectical spaces that are constantly changing. As the preceding chapters of this dissertation have argued, the scholarship of engagement, only a little over a decade old, is increasingly relevant to the university, and it is not likely to disappear precisely because it emerges out of a constellation of current intellectual, economic, and social forces reshaping the modern university’s role in society. Because of the unique constraints the engaged scholar faces, he/she must make the theoretical underpinnings of his/her work visible and communicate them in “metanarratives” to both the academy and the community. Many of these lessons have been articulated and explored in the scholarship of rhetoric and composition. Therefore, as a model of the “new scholarly citizen” emerges, based
on principles of engaged scholarship, leaders in the movement should look to rhetoric and composition’s theoretical and practical precedents and groundwork.

The universities of the future and the roles of faculty within those institutions will look radically different than they do today. Certain faculty worksites will grow more common—such as distance education, service learning, reflective practice, professional community service, participatory action research, community action sites—while other valuable worksites may shift, change, or disappear altogether. Throughout these changes, faculty roles will also shift, as will the way that institutions structure and evaluate those roles. As this dissertation has argued, these changes are thoroughly contextual, rhetorical, and dialectical, and they should be guided by a postmodern notion of ethics. Because such concerns have long been addressed through theory and reflective practice in the field of rhetoric and composition, this dissertation has also argued that the field should assume a leadership position and public intellectual role in communication about these changes also.

The rhetoric and composition teacher-scholar is in many ways a model of the “engaged scholar” or “new scholarly citizen.” The field is characterized by an innovative combination of theory and practice in the classroom that has in many ways necessitated our push for redefinitions of basic scholarship to improve tenure and promotion potential for our professionals. We have led the way with portfolios for assessment and research that has centered on students as learners, critiquing our own pedagogies as we go, and this makes us a valuable resource to those studying ways to implement engagement in the curriculum. As the Lunsford quote that opens this chapter states, the field has also pioneered scholarly worksites beyond the traditional institution and has been the guiding force behind existing programs that reach across disciplines, such as with writing across the curriculum initiatives and, often, service-learning
offices. What has been alleged, that we are a content-less discipline, really does speak to the meta-teaching/research/writing functions and interdisciplinarity of our field. Engagement itself is a “metamovement” (Kezar) that houses multiple currently disconnected movements. The field of rhetoric and composition is positioned—rhetorically, theoretically, and pedagogically, if not practically—to guide this movement and help better inform its progress. This is an opportunity for us to export, rather than primarily importing, our scholarship, something that rhetoric and composition scholar Karen Kopelson and others in the materialist tradition have faulted us for in the past. Whereas Kopelson implies our failure to “export” scholarship results from the paucity of our intellectual work, such as when she cites those who claim “Process” theory is our only original theory, this dissertation argues such criticism may be overlooking the theory of engagement undergirding much of rhetoric and composition’s intellectual work, a theory that is so ubiquitous that it has not even been fully articulated despite its central role in much field scholarship. This dissertation argues, contra Kopelson, that the fieldwork of rhetoric and composition, has produced a large body of original practical and theoretical knowledge, especially growing from its orientation as a discipline operating in dialectical spaces. In other words, this dissertation argues that “engagement” is the lens Kopelson is missing as she considers how the field will change in the future. Such a lens could offer a view of the field’s praxis-oriented and interdisciplinary content as productive, theoretical, exportable, and legitimate scholarship. In this way, the field would benefit from participation in cross-disciplinary work associated with the scholarship of engagement.

There is still considerable resistance to the scholarship of engagement, as Chapter One discussed through concerns like those of James Slevin that corporate values would control the scholarly lives of faculty. Because this broader scholarship reform movement shares many
foundations and exigencies with the field, it is also arguable that the field of rhetoric and composition has a stake in the success of the movement. “Engaged rhetorics” may become the “extracurriculum” of composition, to borrow Anne Ruggles Gere’s term, operating in the interstitial spaces of the new university. Also, rhetoric’s civic discourse and Boyer’s far-reaching “engagement” should be more conversant in this new environment, entering into what this chapter referred to as “dialectical” engagement, because we have a long tradition of research and a useful view of marginal institutional histories to offer. Regarding the question “whose values” should guide reform in higher education, I believe, with Thomas Miller, that at the very least the discussion should include us.
Works Cited


Bennett, William. “The Teacher, the Curriculum, and Values Education Development.” McBee. 27-34.


Blair, Hugh. _Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres_. Bizzell and Herzberg. 950-980.


Bledstein, Bernard. _The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of


http://blog.lib.umn.edu/victor/publicengagement/2006/02/engagement_and_writing_across.html


Champaign, IL: NCTE, 1963.


Bushman, Donald. "The WPA as Pragmatist: Recasting 'Service' as 'Human Science.'"


Campbell, George. _The Philosophy of Rhetoric_. Bizzell and Herzberg. 902-946.


Cicero. _De Oratore_. Bizzell and Herzberg. 289-338.


Connors, Robert. “Composition History and Disciplinarity.” Rosner, Boehm, & Journet. 3-22.


Downing, David B. “The Political Consequences of Pragmatism; or, Cultural Pragmatics for a Cybernetic Revolution.” Mailloux. 180-205.


----. “Veteran Stories on the Porch.” Rosner et al.


Fleming, David. “Rhetoric as a Course of Study.” *College English* 61.2 (Nov. 1998): 69-?.


----. “Evolving Approaches to Scholarship, Promotion, and Tenure in Composition Studies.” Gebhardt & Gebhardt. 1-19.


----. *Dissoi Logoi.* Bizzell and Herzberg.


Griffin, David Ray. “Introduction to SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought.”


Enos and Brown. 109-119.

----. "Rhetoric in the American College Curriculum: The Decline of Public Discourse."


Harris, Muriel. “Presenting Writing Center Scholarship: Issues for Faculty and Personnel Committees.” Gebhardt & Gebhardt. 87-102.


----. “Critical Literacy and Service Learning.” Shamoon et. al. 123.

Hesse, Doug and Barbara Genelle Smith Gebhardt. “Nonacademic Publication As Scholarship.” Gebhardt & Gebhardt. 31-41.


Isocrates. *Antidosis.* Bizzell and Herzberg. 75-79.


Josephson, Michael. “Character Counts: Why Plagiarism is Wrong.” *Ventura County Star* 17 (July 2006).


----. “Watson Conference Oral History #3: The Breadth of Composition Studies:
Professionalization and Interdisciplinarity.” Cauthen Interview. Rosner et al. 205-213.


Lunsford, Andrea. “Refiguring Classroom Authority.” Pemberton. 65-78.


Malenczyk, Rita. “Administration as Emergence: Toward a Rhetorical Theory of WPA.” Rose and Weiser.


http://cicero.smsu.edu/journal/articles97/massey.html

Mauk, John. “Location, Location, Location: The ‘Real’ (E)states of Being, Writing, and Thinking in Composition.” *College English*. (March 2003):


----. “Scholarship Reconsidered: A View from the Dean’s Office.” Gebhardt & Gebhardt. 177-189.


---. “Rhetoric Within and Without Composition: Reimagining the Civic.”  Shamoon et al. 32-41.


Mulderig, Gerald. “Is There Still a Place for Rhetorical History in Composition Studies?” Rosner, Boehm, and Journet. 163-175.


Neel, Jasper. “The Degradation of Rhetoric; or, Dressing Like a Gentleman, Speaking Like a Scholar.” Mailloux. 61-81.


Newkirk, Thomas. “Seduction and Betrayal in Qualitative Research.” Mortensen & Kirsch. 3-16.


----. “Recovering History as Alternate Future.” Rosner, Boehm, and Journet. 39-58.


Powell, Katrina & Pamela Takayoshi. “Accepting Roles Created for Us: The Ethics of Reciprocity.” CCC 54.3 (Feb 2003): 394-422.


Reynolds, Nedra. “Composition’s Imagined Geographies: The Politics of Space in the Frontier,


Rosenblatt, Louise. *The Reader, the Text, the Poem: The Transactional Theory of Literary


----. “Pragmatism and Instrumentalism.” Kennedy. 239-243.


Schutz, Aaron, and Anne Ruggles Gere. "Service Learning and English Studies: Rethinking


http://www.pragmatism.org/history/metaphysical_club.htm


----. "Preserving Critical Faculties: Faculty Leadership in Rethinking Tenure and Sustaining the Academy's Values." *Liberal Education* 86:3 (Summer, 2000): 20-27.


http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V15_I1_Smit.htm


----. “Conceptualizing Writing as Moral and Civic Thinking.” *College English* 54.7 (Nov 1992): 794-808.


Trachsel, Mary. “A Conflict of Personal and Institutional Ethics: Writing Instruction and Composition Scholarship.” *Pemberton.* 167-190.


Valentine, Kathryn. “Plagiarism as Literacy Practice: Recognizing and Rethinking Ethical


Virilio, Paul. Interview. Details missing.


Wells, Susan. "Rogue Cops and Health Care: What Do We Want from Public Writing?" *CCC* 47.3 (Oct. 1996): 325-341.


