USING DELEUZE: THE CINEMA BOOKS, FILM STUDIES AND EFFECT

Dyrk Ashton

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Committee:

Cynthia Baron, Chair
Patrick Pauken, Graduate Faculty Representative
Donald Callen
Jonathan Chambers
Ronald Shields
ABSTRACT

Cynthia Baron, Advisor

Since their publication, Deleuze’s *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (French 1983, English 1986) and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (French 1985, English 1989) have held a precarious position in Anglophone film studies. The difficulties of the cinema books are pointed out by many, a broad range of complaints have been leveled against them, and their usefulness has been widely questioned.

There has, however, been an increase in interest in the cinema books among Anglophone film scholars over the last few years. Still, many of the “complaints” and “concerns” about the cinema books remain. A guiding principal of this dissertation is to provide a “way in” to Deleuze’s work in the cinema books, or a key to assist in unlocking and unpacking Deleuze’s cinema project.

To this end, I have analyzed Deleuze’s approach in the cinema books, their style, methodology, rationale and theoretical framework, utilizing Theodor Adorno’s concept of “parataxis” because I believe it illuminates his metaphysics. I have also explicated key elements of Deleuze’s Bergson-inspired metaphysics, concentrating on what I feel are fundamental aspects that aid in a clarification of “movement-images” and “time-images.” A key concept that I utilized in this endeavor is Deleuze’s “crystal-image” because I maintain that the characteristics of crystal-images are the very foundation of all time-images. I endeavored to “fill in the gaps” in Deleuze’s cinema books by making connections between concepts that may not be apparent, addressing elisions in the cinema books as well as the current body of scholarly work on them. I utilized examples from contemporary films to illustrate Deleuze’s concepts, particularly Peter Jackson’s *The
The Lord of the Rings film trilogy (2001-2003). I demonstrated how certain Deleuze terms can be used in film criticism and provided evidence that Deleuze’s work represents an alternative to theoretical models used in film studies, specifically presenting that Deleuze’s ideas about time-images can suggest new ways to think about the affective qualities of films. Finally, I addressed aspects of the cinema books in regards to their relationship (or non-relationship) to various disciplines and schools of both classical and contemporary film studies.
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INTRODUCTION

Gilles Deleuze was born in 1925 in France and made his residence there until his death in 1995. His French contemporaries included Jacques Derrida, Pierre Bourdieu, Roland Barthes, and Francois Lyotard, and he was a colleague and personal friend of Michel Foucault. Beginning in the 1950s, Deleuze wrote books on a number of philosophers, including Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, Spinoza, Bergson, and Foucault. He also wrote *Difference and Repetition*, published in French in 1968, but not translated into English until 1994, and *The Logic of Sense* (French 1968, English 1990). Deleuze is perhaps most widely known in Anglo-American circles for his collaborations with French psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, the most influential of these being *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French 1972, English 1977), *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French 1980, English 1987), and *What is Philosophy?* (French 1991, English 1994). Deleuze’s works with Guattari, and especially their conceptualization of “rhizomatics,” have contributed greatly to the development of theoretical frameworks in a wide variety of scholarly disciplines.

In 1983, Deleuze surprised those familiar with his other works with the publishing of *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (French 1983, English 1986). Apparently, only Deleuze’s closest friends had been aware of his intense interest in, and indeed love of, film (Bogue 1). *Cinema 1* was followed closely by *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (French 1985, English 1989), which is a continuation of the work begun in the first book. Together, these have become commonly referred to as the “cinema books” for the sake of brevity and greater ease of reading, and following the practice of other Deleuze
scholars, I use the abbreviation “M-I” for Cinema 1 and “T-I” for Cinema 2 in my citations of these sources).

Upon publication, Deleuze’s cinema books were immediately lauded and put to use by film scholars in France, and they have been widely implemented in film studies in Germany, Japan and Italy (Rodowick xi). English speaking film scholars, however, have been somewhat less enthusiastic. D.N. Rodowick, author of Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine (1997), writes that Anglophone “communities of readers in [both] philosophy and film studies have treated the book as an anomaly” (xi). Gregory Flaxman, editor of The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema (2000), explains that in Anglophone film studies, “Deleuze’s cinematographic philosophy was adapted piecemeal, usually based on intersections with prevailing trends in film theory. Soon enough, the books were relegated to intermittent allusions and fugitive references, the initial intrigue having given way to the subtle labor of evasion” (Flaxman 2).

While the complaints about the cinema books range across a spectrum of smaller concerns,” Flaxman observes, “the real sticking point remains the spectrum itself, the grandiose, even gaudy scope of the two volumes” (2). Deleuze’s work in the cinema books “aspires to cover so much ground as to be a world unto itself” (Flaxman 2). According to Flaxman, this has caused many in Anglophone film studies to “reduce Deleuze’s ambitious experiment to eccentricity, as if the books represented a kind of Spruce Goose – bizarre and unwieldy” (2).

There has, however, been an increase in interest in the cinema books among Anglophone film scholars over the last few years, or at least a decrease in resistance to them. “Long a subterranean current,” Robert Stam observes of the use of the cinema
books, “Deleuze’s influence is now becoming more visible within film theory” (An Introduction 257). Still, many of the “complaints” and “concerns” about the cinema books remain, and a guiding principal of this dissertation is to provide a “way in” to Deleuze’s work in the cinema books, or a key to assist in unlocking and unpacking Deleuze’s cinema project. To this end, I: a) analyze Deleuze’s approach in the cinema books because it illuminates his metaphysics; b) provide an explication of key elements of Deleuze’s Bergson-inspired metaphysics; c) clarify Deleuze’s views on “movement-images” and “time-images;” d) demonstrate how certain Deleuze terms can be used in film criticism; and e) provide evidence that Deleuze’s work might represent an alternative to theoretical models used in film studies (such as psychoanalysis, linguistics, cognitivism and empirical studies), specifically proposing that Deleuze’s ideas about time-images might suggest new ways to think about the affective qualities of films. I believe that my study offers a unique perspective on the cinema books and my approach as well as selection and interpretations of Deleuze terminology addresses elisions in existing Deleuze scholarship, contributing significantly to the growing body of work on Deleuze and his project concerning cinema.

Throughout my study I venture to demonstrate that Deleuze’s work can apply to specific contemporary films and not just the oeuvre’s of master filmmakers discussed by Deleuze such as Ford, Welles, Hitchcock, Ophuls, Renoir, Fellini and Visconti. To this end, I utilize examples from films such as Christopher Nolan’s Memento (2000), Mary Harron’s American Psycho (2000), and The Matrix (Wachowski Bros., 1999). The majority of examples by far, however, come from Peter Jackson’s The Lord of the Rings film trilogy (2001-2003).1
In my effort to ease an entry into the cinema books, I attempt to address a number of the more significant barriers to putting them to use in film studies. These include their broad scope, a philosophical basis that is difficult to classify, writing style, methodology, terminology, complex “metaphysics,” and the difficulty of positioning them within film studies. I lay the groundwork for this endeavor in this Introduction by providing basic explanations of key points to my study in an outline, by presenting qualifications, and by discussing my own rationale, methodology and theoretical framework (though these become more developed over the course of this study since Deleuze’s own theoretical framework and methodology is difficult to describe without elaborate explanation of a variety of issues).

In Chapter I I provide an overview of Deleuze scholarship to date, focusing on how Deleuze’s work, including his collaborations with Félix Guattari, have been utilized in film studies. I provide brief descriptions of each book that concentrates specifically on Deleuze’s cinema books (a number of which are also my most significant secondary sources), and discuss how my study differs as well as contributes to this body of work.

In Chapter II I address the broad scope of the cinema books, discussing their relationship to science, art and philosophy. Deleuze “borrows” many terms from a variety of scientific disciplines, and draws heavily on the works of French philosopher Henri Bergson, particularly Bergson’s Matter and Memory (1908) and Creative Evolution (1911), who was attempting to develop a metaphysics that would be compatible with scientific developments of his time, including Einstein’s theory of relativity and “space-time.” Whatever fields or disciplines Deleuze may engage in his writing, the cinema books are first and foremost works of philosophy, and he utilizes film
to help him describe his philosophy of world. D. N. Rodowick posits that the cinema books “can be read as a resume of Deleuze’s philosophical work of the previous 25 years,” and as “part and parcel” of his life’s philosophical project. Since Deleuze’s are basically works of philosophy and not film theory per se, a basic discussion of his “position” within the broader field of philosophy can assist in reading the cinema books.

One key idea of Deleuze and Bergson that I utilize to assist in discussing Deleuze’s philosophical bent is their position that our daily actions and thoughts are governed by a “sensory-motor schema,” or dependence on and belief in the necessity of stimulus-response, definable action and dependable reaction that regulates our normal, everyday, habitual mode of existence. By necessity, it presupposes a perceiving subject and perceived object. For Deleuze and Bergson, however, the sensory-motor schema, even if a necessity, is not the only mode of perception and thought. In discussing other possible modes of existence, I utilize their claim for an “originary” or “transcendental” form of time, where time itself is not linear and chronological, but the past, present and future “exist” simultaneously in every present moment, and their claim that “everything is image.” The claim that everything is image may be best described in terms of the work of Jacques Derrida. If, for Derrida, everything is language all the way down, for Deleuze and Bergson, everything is image all the way up. An implication to philosophy of the claim for originary time and the idea that everything is image involves a problematizing of the concept of a transcendental subject and therefore also the subject/object binary, which bears not only on Deleuze’s philosophy in general but on the classification of Deleuze as a particular “type” of philosopher.
With Chapter III I propose a relationship between Theodor Adorno’s concepts of “parataxis” and “constellation” and Deleuze/Guattari’s “rhizomes” and “multiplicity” in the belief that an understanding of these ideas can illuminate the “difficult” writing style and methodology of the cinema books, as well as Deleuze’s metaphysics. This difficulty as well as the complexity of the cinema books stems from Deleuze’s “paratactical” approach to writing and argument, and on a more fundamental level, his views on paratactic thinking or modes of thought. A familiarity with “parataxis” and how it applies to Deleuze can not only shed light on his writing style and the organization of the cinema books, but also his theories of cinema and his philosophy of world. I posit that Deleuze’s account of the formal strategies of movement-images can be related closely to traditional and logical strategies of description and argument. Time-images, on the other hand, exhibit formal strategies that disclose Deleuze’s affinity with the tenets of parataxis, constellation, multiplicity and rhizomatics.

The purpose of my work in Chapter IV is to describe the regimes of movement-images and time-images in broad strokes. A major tactic of Deleuze’s project in the cinema books is to identify two extremely broad categories of “images” of the “world.” One of these categories of images Deleuze calls alternately “the movement-image,” the “regime of the movement-image,” and “the organic regime” (M-I 11; T-I 127). The other he calls “the time-image,” “the regime of the time-image,” and “the crystalline regime” (M-I 11; T-I 127). Whereas Deleuze may be concerned with concepts of “the cinema” (the cinematic apparatus, the history or development of cinema, certain cinematic movements such as Italian neo-realism, or auteurs’ bodies of work), I am concerned with “film,” meaning I focus on specific films or even portions of specific films. Therefore, I
use the expressions “movement-images” and “time-images” as opposed to “the movement-image” and “the time-image.” For Deleuze, there are not just many kinds of movement-images, time-images or crystal-images, there are eras in the history of cinema from which there developed each of these kinds of cinematic images. In writing about “the movement-image” and “the time-image,” Deleuze is making broad claims about different kinds of cinema as they have emerged and developed over the history of cinema. For example, however, I utilize Deleuze’s concept of “the time-image” to describe “time-images,” regardless of when films were made and without making claims as to the development of cinema or any general kind of cinema. I believe this approach allows me to concentrate on specific concepts from the cinema books without describing Deleuze’s entire cinema project or oeuvre or undermining Deleuze’s work in the cinema books.

When it comes to discussing film, I profer that a helpful manner with which to clarify between and describe Deleuze’s two “image regimes” is in terms of their formal strategies, particularly their “narration” and “montage” strategies, and I frame much of my discussion of Deleuze’s project in these terms. “Montage” involves far more than film editing, and involves the connection between any and all “images.” For Deleuze, we, film and the world are all the same “stuff” – images – moving, changing images. His project is fundamentally concerned with how film models the functioning of perception, memory and thought. When he speaks of the difference between “movement-images” and “time-images” regarding film, he is ultimately and basically invoking the idea of different formal strategies that can represent different modes of these activities of human consciousness.
A brief definition of movement-images is that they exhibit formal strategies of temporal and spatial continuity, are regulated by the sensory-motor schema, and presuppose linear and chronological time. Time-images, on the other hand, are images that issue from and exhibit a conceptualization of time as Bergson’s “originary time,” and I propose that they provide viewers with the possibility of a meaningful experience of human temporal and spatial existence.

I am primarily concerned in Chapters V through VII with describing Deleuze’s basic metaphysics of the world. Though Deleuze’s cinema books may be gaining in familiarity, any work dealing with them generally requires more extensive explanation of the basic theory than studies working within more recognizable frameworks. This is evidenced by the large percentage of many works on the cinema books that is devoted to explication rather than application. Therefore, a major portion of my study is dedicated to addressing key concepts of Deleuze’s Bergsonian “metaphysics of world” and how these concepts relate specifically to cinematic movement-images and time-images. I cover some of the same ground as previous studies of the cinema books, but I believe my approach and interpretations are somewhat novel and that I broach subjects not addressed in previous research on Deleuze and film. Many film scholars working with Deleuze’s writing concentrate on concepts developed by Deleuze in collaboration with Félix Guattari that are not directly addressed in the cinema books, such as: becoming-other, molecularity versus molarity, de-territorialization, haecceity, refrain, nomadology, differenciation/differentiation, monads, cinema of the body and the body without organs, and schizoanalysis. I focus almost entirely on the cinema books themselves, though my study does touch upon Deleuzian or Deleuze-Guattarian concepts that are not discussed
in the cinema books such as “rhizomatics” and “multiplicity.” In addition, I draw upon works of Henri Bergson as well as theoretical writings of Theodor Adorno.

I concentrate on what I feel are fundamental aspects of Deleuze’s metaphysics as they apply to film and from which most of the multifarious, even bewildering characteristics, implications or symptoms of “movement-images” and “time-images” arise. I attempt straightforward explications of these concepts and utilize examples from contemporary films to illustrate. An important aspect of my approach to writing this study is to work outside of Deleuzian language; to describe Deleuze’s concepts in a familiar vocabulary as much as possible and provide clear definitions of terms and consistency of terminology.

I also develop connections and through-lines between concepts in the cinema books in an effort to provide a consistency and coherence to certain aspects of Deleuze’s work that may be obscured by style, terminology, methodology and scope. This endeavor involves making associations between seemingly disconnected or unrelated concepts, concentrating on how these relate to the differences between movement-images and time-images. Certain concepts are dropped or seemingly forgotten as Deleuze proceeds through the cinema books, and at times it seems that terms change in their definition from one part of the cinema project to the next. I therefore attempt to extend certain concepts relating to movement-images through time-images, as well as describe why it is I believe the meaning of certain concepts may seem to change. Throughout my study I endeavor to “fill in the gaps” in Deleuze’s cinema books as well as address elisions in the current body of scholarly work on them.
I concentrate in Chapter V on Deleuze’s conceptualizations of “image,” “movement,” matter, energy, time, space, the “plane of immanence,” the “special (living) image,” and “signaletic matter.” Chapter VI is arranged in sub-sections that explicate “consciousness,” “memory,” “perception,” and “recognition.” In Chapter VII I describe Deleuze’s six movement-image types (“perception-images,” “affection-images,” “impulse-images,” “action-images,” “reflection-images” and “relation-images”), as well as the “sensory-motor link” and “thought.”

In my reading of Deleuze, his entire project of utilizing film to explicate his philosophy relies upon four very basic claims, which he draws from Bergson. The first is that everything is “image.” The second is that everything changes, which is roughly equivalent in Deleuzian terms to stating that everything “moves.” Together, everything is “image” in motion, or what I dub “moving images.” In my reading of Deleuze, “movement” should be understood as involving and arising from the activity of attentive, intuitive, selective human consciousness. Human beings generally and most of the time perceive and think of the moving images of the world as “movement-images.” Intent per se results in “action” (for simplicity, in my interpretation of Deleuze I use the terms “human beings,” “we” and “us” extensively, and “film” in quite a broad sense. However, I do not wish to make any claims for all people of all nations or cultures or all films).

Deleuze and Bergson’s third claim is that time is change, nothing but change. The fourth is Deleuze and Bergson’s hypothesis that time is not linear or chronological, but has the paradoxical form of originary time where past, present and future all co-exist and only exist in every immeasurable moment of the present (T-I 50-52). It is a major objective of Deleuze with the cinema books to utilize film (as itself moving images) to
describe and support these claims, and drawing from Nietzsche, to tease out what he believes to be many of the most profound of their implications (a number of which I address in Chapter VIII). Though it derives from the concept of originary time, another important idea that I discuss in these chapters is Bergson’s rather unwieldy concept of “durée.” If originary time is a form of time, durée, in my interpretation, can be considered the experience of originary time.

My work in Chapters V through VII provides much of the basis for a detailed explication of time-images in Chapter VIII, wherein I bring together the myriad concepts previously discussed. I specifically concentrate on describing Deleuze’s “crystal-images” (which are time-images) because I maintain that the characteristics of crystal-images are the very foundation of all time-images; are that from which most if not all of Deleuze’s implications of time-images arise, and that without a solid comprehension of the basic structure and functionality of crystal-images the concept of time-images or direct images of time can only be partially appreciated or understood. Also, crystal-images are perhaps the least well explained and most under-utilized of Deleuze’s concepts, especially considering what I see as their fundamental importance to the cinema books and their applicability to both film criticism (the analysis of individual films) and the study of effect. I provide evidence of the applicability to film analysis in this chapter through discussions of Peter Jackson’s The Lord of the Rings trilogy while conversely using these films to illustrate Deleuzian terms regarding time-images, as well as propose that employing a reading of certain films through crystal-images can shed light on the metaphysical/philosophical underpinnings of both a film’s formal strategies and story.
It is also in this chapter that I most fully describe how it is that I believe Deleuze may be utilized to discuss the affective qualities that certain films could have on certain viewers. There is no doubt that metaphysics and aesthetics connect, and I propose that Deleuze provides powerful terms with which to discuss manners in which cinema is useable to describe this connection. A crucial aspect of Deleuze’s metaphysics as described through film is that it involves a contemplation of the “reflective” nature of both images and human thought, particularly the “mirroring” of perception in memory (and vice versa), involving what it is that is happening when we “reflect;” what is the “effect” when normal “reflection” is disturbed? Specifically, Deleuze provides a meditation on the effect of a change in the “normal” reflective process of thought with the experience of time-images. I believe that time-images provide an important means to illustrate these ideas of reflection and mirroring.

In this chapter I employ the physical characteristics of geological crystals as well as specific film examples to describe the basics of crystal-images as “reflections” in terms of the indiscernibility between the actual and virtual aspects of images and the relationship between perception and memory, as well as the crystal-images’ aspects of “seed” and “milieu,” which have to do with how certain cinematic images infuse and inundate the “world” of a film. Specifically, I employ images from The Lord of the Rings to illustrate reflections, including Sauron and the Ring, as well as Gandalf and Saruman. I also rely heavily upon the “creature” I call “Gollum/Sméagol.”

I suggest, based on my reading of Deleuze, that the “image” of Gollum/Sméagol can stand in for a direct image of time (or time-image) – a distinct but indiscernible actual/virtual reflection in and of himself; alone a paradoxical figure in its entirety, but
also a figure that imbues the entire film with a paradoxical, crystalline nature. I posit that, even when Gollum and Sméagol are shown in separate shots, following rules of the continuity system (as in a reflection of a character in a pond or the scene where Sméagol “banishes” Gollum), that the common sense connection of space and time that guides the formal strategies of movement-images are suspended or disrupted. In many scenes with Gollum/Sméagol where there is complete continuity of movement, contiguous space and chrono-linear time, there is, for me at least, also “felt” discontinuity. This, I propose, is the result of an alternative formal strategy, a “crystalline formal strategy” which is not regulated by any particular “schema,” but has significant conditions of discontinuity and paradox founded in the originary form of time.

In the section of this chapter entitled “An Interval/Gap Triumvirate,” I endeavor to connect ideas of Deleuze’s “interval,” “gap” and “interstice.” These terms are peppered throughout the cinema books, used inconsistently and in regards to several seemingly unrelated concepts. I propose a tripartite form of the interval/gap that connects these concepts, and that this proposition provides connections and through-lines that are not apparent when reading the cinema books as well as insights into the relationship between movement-images and time-images, what happens to “perception” and “affection” in time-images, the relationship between image and viewer (as well as image and image), and aids in the discussion of effect. Deleuze alludes to the idea that a “cut” between film images (and not just shots) is nothing more or less than the human mind/body as interval/gap. A “cut,” like an image, is not “in” the film or “in” the spectator’s mind/body, it is the spectator’s mind/body. The interval/gap is where thought in time “enters into” the image; where “reflection” occurs.
In describing my idea of the interval/gap triumvirate, I employ Henri Bergson’s “absolute” and “intuitive” vs. “analytic” and “relative” modes of perception and thought, which are concepts that Deleuze does not directly engage or explicate in the cinema books but that I believe are essential to an understanding of many of the ideas contained in them. For this endeavor, I draw upon Bergson’s Introduction to Metaphysics (1912), a text heretofore relatively under-utilized by other film scholars and which is the work wherein Bergson provides the most elaborate description of these concepts. Utilizing these ideas, I propose that emotional and physiological effect can be partially attributable to an experience of a disturbance of a viewer’s everyday, habitual perception and thought where some greater level of an “absolute” relationship between viewer and film “image” is possible resulting in an increased “intuition” of virtual potentiality and a release of “pure feeling.” I also proffer that there is the possibility of stimulation or “re-activation” of the “reflective” nature of human consciousness and thought in the process of the mirroring of images of perception and images of memory, which may provide an intuitive awareness of the constant separation and connection, linking and de-linking of images of the world, including us as “images,” disclosing some greater level or heightened “feeling” of the very nature of our temporal/spatial existence.

The final sections of this chapter involve the manner in which the nature of reflections and crystal-images calls the traditional forms of time and Truth into question, resulting in “falsifying narration” and the “release” of the Nietzschean “power of the false.” My endeavor in this section aids in describing how it is that Deleuze believes a philosophy based in the idea that “everything is image all the way up” and holds to the form of originary time has implications to not only film, but politics, and is potentially
liberating, revealing a manner in which to discuss the ideological quality of how we normally look at images, time and space via film.

The cinema books are, in a way, autobiographical for Deleuze, though he does not discuss his work in this manner. His employment of film to explicate his philosophy of world, or metaphysics, discloses to me that the formal strategies of certain films gave him, personally, a glimpse of what he felt is at least some portion of the “Real” nature of the “world,” including human consciousness, perception, and thought. Concurrently, the cinema books reveal that certain films had an effect on Deleuze, or held an affective quality that he responded to, and provided him with a certain aesthetic experience. I believe that Deleuze’s cinema books also provide me with a manner in which to discuss my own affective experience of certain films.

To say that the viewing of films is an individual experience is not a solipsistic statement. Certain films resonate in certain ways for certain viewers because they are, in a way, private experiences. Therefore, my use of Deleuze is not prescriptive in any way. I make no claim that there is a definite something “in” films that definitively and always has a specific, predictable effect for everyone, but that there are formal strategies at work in some films that, if attended to by certain viewers, may account for these viewers’ affective, aesthetic experience of these films.

I should note that I use the terms “affect” (the verb form) and “effect” (the noun) in the aesthetic sense of how it is that particular films might do what it is that they do to certain viewers – how they resonate with certain viewers emotionally and physiologically, apart from “conscious” or “unconscious” responses to what these films mean or are about.
In Chapter IX, I discuss Deleuze’s work in relation to that of a number of film scholars and attend to Deleuze’s “theory” in terms of areas of film study such as formalism, realism, semiotics and linguistics, psychoanalysis, apparatus theory, spectatorship and reception studies, cognitivism, film-mind analogies, auteur theory, and historical studies. I have placed this chapter toward the end of my dissertation because I believe that a basic understanding of Deleuze’s work in the cinema books (which I attempt to provide in previous chapters) aids in the thorny task of describing Deleuze’s place in film studies.

Deleuze himself does not propose that his work in the cinema books is a theory of cinema, nor does he attempt in any way to identify with a particular theoretical framework. This has not prevented film scholars from referring to Deleuze’s work in the cinema books as “film theory,” or from attempting to categorize his work as one “type” or combination of types of film theory. This attempt to classify Deleuze has led to a number of complaints about the cinema books involving their broad scope, interdisciplinarity, originality, and usefulness to film studies. In order to provide a “way in” to reading the cinema books, however, I undertake to contextualize Deleuze’s cinema project within the broader field of film studies, addressing aspects of the cinema books in regards to their relationship (or non-relationship) to various disciplines and schools of both classical and contemporary film studies. I make an effort to do this throughout my dissertation, but this chapter is dedicated to this undertaking, as well as to addressing the complaints and a number of other reasons that scholars may have for dismissing the cinema books.
The most significant factor to the precarious position of the cinema books may have to do with Deleuze’s antagonistic attitude toward the most widely used models in film studies at the time of their publication; particularly psychoanalytic-linguistic approaches. Rodowick observes that, “from the perspective of contemporary film study,” which could be considered to now focus more on empirical studies of audience and industry, “Deleuze’s ideas are not only far afield of the reigning tenor of Anglophone film theory; in some pages, they are also explicitly hostile to it” (x). Rodowick continues, stating that, “since the publication of _Anti-Oedipus_ and _A Thousand Plateaus_, it is abundantly clear that Deleuze and Guattari have set out to critique and demolish Saussurean and Lacanian foundations on which, coincidently, most contemporary cultural and film theory has been based” (xi). Though the cinema books were written by Deleuze alone, with them he continues a project that he and Guattari had begun, a major objective of which was to “dismantle the discourses that traditionally nourished film studies – phenomenology, and structuralism,” posing a threat to “semiotics, psychoanalysis, and Althusserian Marxism” and challenging basic assumptions of “historicism, spectator studies” and “cultural studies,” all of which have, to a greater or lesser extent, relied upon “schemata, deep structures, [and] rules of signification” (Flaxman 7). I address these issues in this chapter, as well as briefly propose a few ways that Deleuzian ideas may indeed be useful in various approaches to contemporary film studies.

I do not attempt to definitively classify Deleuze myself, but if pinned down, I would have to say that he is closest to contemporary cognitive studies and classical Russian and Czech formalism, though there is also a kinship on many levels with classic
realists such as Kracauer and Bazin. Of course, none of these three mesh particularly well, and the differences between each of them and Deleuze are as significant as the similarities. On one level, however, I see Deleuze as developing a kind of “unified field theory” for film, describing a metaphysics of film and world that is compatible with at least portions of the approaches of many different film theorists and theoreticians throughout the history of film studies. Sergei Eisenstein plays a prominent role in the cinema books, particularly in Deleuze’s conception of movement-images, so in the spirit of discussing Deleuze and film studies, I make a focused study of Deleuze’s work on the theoretical writings of Eisenstein.

When I speak of the cinema books making a contribution to film studies, I feel it important to make a distinction between “film theory” and “film criticism” (though the two cannot always be easily separated). I believe that Deleuze contributes to film theory, part of which is concerned with why it is that films matter to people, through providing ways of looking at film based on a metaphysics of world that calls for the coincidence of spectator and screen and to think about aesthetic effect. I also propose that Deleuze contributes to film criticism, or the analysis of individual films. I provide evidence of this throughout this dissertation, but the most in-depth analyses appear in Chapter VIII.

In the Conclusion to this dissertation I make final remarks regarding my work in this study, summarize key findings, and suggest further areas of inquiry concerning Gilles Deleuze, his cinema books, and his cinematic image types.

Qualifications

I admit to resorting to a certain amount of strategic essentializing in my treatment of Deleuze’s concepts, and I realize that this effort, as well as my desire to make
connections and develop through-lines between concepts, may be effectively antithetical to Deleuze’s philosophical project as a whole. I also acknowledge that my efforts may deprive Deleuze’s work of much of its depth, breadth, and even poetic nature and charm. I do not, however, wish to create a project to be read as a surrogate to the reading of Deleuze’s cinema books, even if that were possible, or to provide an easy way out of experiencing the books themselves.

I do not believe that one needs to be intimately familiar with all of Deleuze’s work in order to appreciate the cinema books or to apply concepts in them to the study of film. I cannot engage all of Deleuze’s myriad concepts, even all of those in the cinema books, and agree with Barbara Kennedy, author of *Deleuze and Cinema* (2000), when she observes that “there are many faces of Deleuze,” and that she “can only engage in a selection” (1). Therefore, I do not attempt to fully contextualize the cinema books within Deleuze’s oeuvre, nor do I endeavor to explain his entire philosophy. In addition, I do not believe that all of the concepts in the cinema books are of use to film studies.

I have found no scholar who has commented negatively on the translations of the cinema books from French to English, though I have been concerned with the fact that I am dealing with a translation from Deleuze’s original French throughout the research and writing of this dissertation and realize that some of the inconsistency as well as ambiguity of terminology in the cinema books could be due to translation.

The translator’s of *Cinema 1* (Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Haberjam) and *Cinema 2* (Tomlinson and Robert Galeta) often clarify when there is no direct translation from French to English regarding certain terms, and they try to provide alternatives. While working this project, I would take these alternative terms into consideration and
look for consistency as well as inconsistency of usage throughout both cinema books. I would then refer to Ronald Bogue’s *Deleuze on Cinema* (2003) and D.N. Rodowick’s *Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine*. Both Bogue and Rodowick use their own translation’s of Deleuze’s French texts in the writing of their books, and both also point out when there is no direct translation of a term from French to English. In addition, they both refer to Tomlinson’s translated texts, particularly if they feel there is a discrepancy or if they interpret something differently. Almost entirely, however, all three translations agree on the terms, though at times there are slight spelling differences, such as “disjunctive” vs. “dysjunctive” and “sensori” vs. “sensory.” In all cases, I utilize the spelling of terms from Tomlinson’s translations.

The major problem seems to come mostly in interpreting Deleuze’s ideas, and not the language. There are not only discrepancies in interpretation of concepts between Bogue and Rodowick, but even within their own texts on the cinema books (and this can be seen in Deleuze’s cinema books as well). In Deleuze, I believe it is at least partially due to his wanting to leave ideas open, to present ambiguities, and to the fact that many of his concepts are very complex. Ultimately I took what I gleaned from other texts and went back to the cinema books and made my own conclusions as to what I thought Deleuze was trying to say.

I concur with D.N. Rodowick, author of *Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine*, when he acknowledges that “many different paths are possible through these books” and he has no “desire to debate what a correct or proper reading of Deleuze would be [since] many other approaches and criticisms are equally possible, and I sincerely hope that other scholars will pursue them” (xv). Differences in interpretations of Deleuze’s work in the
cinema books vary from minor discrepancies to major differences and even contradictory
claims. I offer my own interpretations, alternatives, extensions, interpolations, and
interventions. I draw upon a number of secondary sources in my examination of the
cinema books, but in the end my pronouncements are my own – I alone can take the
credit or the blame for what I use of other Deleuze scholars and especially for my own
personal and perhaps eccentric readings of Deleuze.

A Formal, Aesthetic Engagement

Film scholars have utilized various theoretical approaches in an attempt to
discover what it is about film, and human beings, that causes or allows the cinematic
experience to affect viewers in the ways that it does. While valuable, the collection of
existing conceptual models is not exhaustive in terms of investigating effect. Some have
approached this aspect of film studies in terms of what makes film appealing or popular.
For example, Miriam Hansen presents a study that utilizes Kracauer’s conception of the
“alternative public sphere” and Benjamin’s “optical unconscious” (Hansen 342, 344).
Then there is Stephanie and James Donald’s conceptualization of “cinematic public
space” drawing on Hansen, Adorno, and Habermas, and Jane Gaines’s “Film as Mass
Culture,” grounded in conceptions of “hope” and “fantasy” (Donald 114; Gaines 98).
There is also the work of Linda Williams wherein she employs a framework that
combines feminist criticism, spectator performativity, genre studies, gender studies, and
Tom Gunning’s theory of the “cinema of attractions ” to address the popularity of Alfred
Hitchcock’s Psycho (Williams 351).

I believe that there is something affective about certain films that is not accounted
for by the above approaches. Considerations of the unconscious or of strictly cognitive
processes, whether the approach is semiotic, psychoanalytic, linguistic, based in identity politics, commodity politics, theories of visual culture, postcolonial theory, feminist film theory, gender studies, queer theory, or historical studies are not entirely satisfactory. Nor do theoretical frameworks dealing with genres, apparatus theory, spectatorship, reading formation, reception studies, cognitivism or analytical philosophy’s approaches to cinematic representation, meaning, authorship, intention, ideology, ethics, emotional response, perception, agency, narrative, film technique, desire, identification, or empathy seem to account entirely for the effect of images in films like The Lord of the Rings, American Psycho, or Memento.

In his “Hermeneutics, Reception Aesthetic, and Film Interpretation,” Noel King takes part in an ongoing debate in film studies “over whether or not academic writing on film should continue to generate ‘new’ interpretations of texts or whether it should perform some other, non-interpretive function” (211). His conclusion is that film studies should do both. I agree with King, as well as with Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, author of “How Films Mean, or, From Aesthetics to Semiotics and Half-way Back Again,” who writes that the search for what films mean is well and good, but “films do not just mean,” they “also work in less describable ways” (16). They work “partly through meaning and partly in other ways, partly in ways that have linguistic equivalents and partly in ways that do not” (16). To address the “less describable ways” that films work, Nowell-Smith calls for a return to aesthetic considerations, which must include considerations of effect. Barbara Kennedy claims that “film is an excitingly visceral, vital and dynamic aesthetic experience, and wider frameworks are needed to explain the aesthetic resonances beyond the restrictive codings so far discussed” in film theory, and asserts that “film theory to
date has failed to provide an adequate understanding of how film matters, how it impacts, how it acts as a body in motion, in space and time, with other elements of our world” (46, 47).

For Kennedy, “there are whole areas of experience that lie outside the psychoanalytic model which have a major place in the experience of cinema” (47), and “we need to rethink a post-semiotic space, a post-linguistic space, which provides new ways of understanding the screenic experience” (3). I have come to believe, along with Kennedy and a number of other film scholars, that putting concepts from Deleuze’s cinema books to work in film analysis can contribute to providing answers to aesthetic questions in ways that have not been addressed in other analyses of films and that cannot be found using other conceptual models. I believe that this will prove useful in shedding light on these films’ “non-interpretive” functions, specifically effect, making the “less describable” ways that these films work more “describable.”

For D.N. Rodowick, “Deleuze challenges contemporary film theory to confront its blind spots and dead ends, as well as to question its resistances to other philosophical perspectives on image, meaning and spectatorship” (xi). Rodowick claims that utilizing concepts from Deleuze’s cinema books can “reinvigorate questions and problems that have otherwise reached an impasse” in contemporary film theory (xi), and “extend properly cinematographic questions into the domain of thought and life, where profound and pragmatic concerns come together in an exuberant new aesthetic” (11). Part of the reason for the “impasse” that Rodowick refers to has been that aesthetic questions and problems, approached from a traditional aesthetic point of view, have been answered in an unsatisfactory manner by classical film theory, or are considered by many to be
unanswerable. However, “that some questions were answered ineptly or dogmatically,” states Robert Stam in his *Film Theory: An Introduction*, “does not mean that such questions were not worth asking. Indeed, even unanswerable questions might be worth asking, if only to see where they take us and what we discover along the way” (7). Stam argues that film studies should never allow for the “censuring [of] larger philosophical or political questions about the cinema” (6). In *Film and Theory: An Anthology*, Stam and co-editor Toby Miller also maintain that “theoretical ‘truth,’ in our view, does not lie exclusively in one camp; rather, truth is contingent, mediated, collectively forged in the ‘in-between’ of a polyvocal conversation,” and “while some voices are more persuasive than others, none of these voices annihilates the others. Each has something to say” (xv, viii).

In *Film Theory: An Introduction*, Stam concludes his chapter on Deleuze’s cinema books with the following:

> While one can acknowledge the brilliance of Deleuze’s analyses, and while one can dialogue with Deleuze, try to philosophize like Deleuze, or do with other philosophers something analogous to what Deleuze does with Bergson, it seems somewhat more problematic to ‘apply’ Deleuze, to simply ‘translate’ analysis into a Deleuzian language. (256)

I do not attempt to “‘translate’ analysis into a Deleuzian language” in my study. However, I think it is possible to translate Deleuzian language into film analysis, and in studying why films matter to people, or why they might “feel” the way they do. Deleuze’s work in the cinema books may not be specifically designed to contribute to
film studies, but I believe one can demonstrate that a number of concepts in them can be adapted to do so.

My approach, utilizing Deleuze, is formal and aesthetic in nature. In other words, I take a formalistic approach to an aesthetic analysis of textual elements of certain films. I examine formal elements and strategies including but not limited to: composition, camera movement, framing, editing, lighting, sound design, shot selection, elements within shots, scenes, and narrative. It is from the formal elements of films and formal strategies that Deleuze bases his deduction of cinematic image signs – but his cinematic images are also imbued with content. D. N. Rodowick accurately infers that when Deleuze describes his image types, he is engaging on a certain level with philosophical perspectives on meaning (xi). Therefore content plays a role in my descriptions of Deleuze’s image types as well as other of his concepts in the cinema books, and contributes to the affective quality of film images.

By means of a thorough examination of basic concepts from the cinema books I argue that the experience of formal strategies of cinematic time-images can resonate with certain viewers in a sensory, corporeal, physiological manner – providing an intensive affective experience that does not issue from psychic history or the unconscious and cannot be entirely explained by an examination of cognitive processes. In this manner I address a basic aesthetic question – how do certain films do what they do to certain people? Deleuze himself does not in the cinema books concentrate on aesthetic effect per se, surprising as that may be, perhaps because he feels it to be evident, intrinsically bound up with his metaphysics. Hence, studies of affective qualities of films utilizing Deleuze cannot simply involve the application of an aesthetic model that Deleuze himself has
created, but must derive models from Deleuzian concepts. The deriving of such a model is a major portion of my task in conducting this study.

Barbara Kennedy, one of the handful of film scholars utilizing a Deleuzian aesthetics, calls her approach a “neo-aesthetics,” a reconceiving of the aesthetic that had fallen from view “following a lapse into obscurity as a result of cultural and sociological studies of film” (4). She describes this as a “post linguistic, post-semiotic paradigm;” a “way of thinking beyond the language of desire and pleasure, beyond notions of subjectivity [and identity], through Deleuzian notions of affect” (Kennedy 4, 5). Anna Powell claims that looking at film through a Deleuzian lens can show us that it has “a direct effect on our mechanisms of perception before they reach a more advanced stage of cognitive processing,” where “we meld with and become part of the material technology of cinema in its movement, force and intensity” (5). For my part, cinematic images, whether movement-images or time-images, can work on some viewers on the level of “images” and “thought” before they are put into language, or as sub-textual forms of thought and representation, always closely bound together in a dynamic interplay such that each interprets the other and makes the other possible. This is a very different kind of aesthetic engagement from the “aesthetic contemplation” of more traditional aesthetics or classic film theory, or the “subject/object division of the spectatorial gaze” of phenomenology or structuralism (Powell 5). My approach could be considered a “neo-aesthetics” in Kennedy’s terms, though I utilize quite different elements of the cinema books and of Deleuze’s other works than she or others who have employed Deleuze in studies of film’s aesthetic experience.
I make no claim that my study is exhaustive in terms of formal or aesthetic analysis of film. No one lens works for all films or discloses all possibilities of aesthetic experience. Furthermore, it is not my intention to deny readings made through other conceptual lenses, but to explore the value of another perspective in order to perhaps gain a broader understanding of the affective qualities that certain films can hold for certain viewers.

**Culture Studies**

Some scholars who are familiar with Deleuze’s cinema books may object to applying Deleuze’s work in the cinema books to the films I utilize in this study, such as *The Lord of the Rings*, *American Psycho*, and *Memento*, and be of a mind that these films are not suitable subjects for Deleuzian contemplation. Deleuze has an obvious disdain for the bulk of Hollywood films, particularly those made after 1960, and little use for the vast majority of films, popular or not, made in any country at any time. He has been accused of being elitist in his choice and discussion of films, and concentrates almost entirely on French and Italian independent “art” films in his discussion of time-images. For example, in Deleuze’s descriptions of the four “crystals of time” (a form of time-images) he discusses bodies of work by Visconti, Renoir, Fellini and Ophuls exclusively. Only one American filmmaker, Orson Welles, is mentioned in his entire discussion of time-images.

One may wonder, then, how I can justify using the films that I have chosen, especially the *The Lord of the Rings* films, which are hugely popular, based on enormously successful books, and contain all the trappings of typical Hollywood, big-budget, action-adventure films. These films are seemingly the complete opposite of
Deleuze’s own choices in discussing his concepts, and the kinds of films that Deleuze seemingly disparages. I maintain, however, that Deleuze is more interested in a meditation on cinematic images, which he ties to a contemplation of perception, memory and thought, than with auteurs, styles and budgets – though this may not be evident when reading his cinema books. I would argue that the films I have chosen to study cannot be dismissed outright as improper subjects of Deleuzian analysis, and that utilizing these films actually embraces Deleuze’s greater philosophical project. I wish to help “make sense” of the aesthetic experience of certain films; to open up possibilities of understanding the manner in which they produce effect.

For Deleuze, no one film is constituted entirely of time-images, even if a film can be a “crystal of time” and take the form of a time-image on the whole. By Deleuze’s own account, few if any films contain only one of his cinematic image types, so the fact that *The Lord of the Rings* or *American Psycho* may exhibit predominately movement-images does not preclude them from also exhibiting time-images. Furthermore, I proffer that the changing or morphing from typical movement-image to time-image can make certain moments in these films more powerful, and their time-images all the more evident.

In the cinema books, Deleuze effectively brings high theory to high art exclusively, especially in his chapter on crystal-images where his examples come almost exclusively from the works of Fellini, Visconti, Renoir, and Ophuls, as well as Herzog and Welles. I intervene by presenting evidence that his concept of time-images can also apply to films that could be considered popular culture or “low art.” In the process I update Deleuze by applying his ideas to contemporary films and taking his high theory to popular culture, or what Simon Frith calls “commercial popular culture” (Grossberg
I believe that what I am doing is legitimate, that it is something that needs to be done, and if I did not do this I would be remiss – even if Deleuze might have considered the films I will be looking at as belonging to the “vast proportion of rubbish in cinematographic production” (M-I xiv).

To support my use (or abuse) of Deleuze in this manner, I appeal to a principle of culture studies which encourages a breaking down of the division between high and low culture, including the dividing line between “high art” and “low art.” In the introduction to Cultural Studies (1991), the editors Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson and Paula Treichler claim that culture studies “rejects the exclusive equation of culture with high culture and argues that all forms of cultural productions need to be studied,” and that “cultural studies is thus committed to the study of the entire range of a society’s arts, beliefs, institutions, and communicative processes” (Grossberg 4). Stuart Hall, quoting Antonio Gramsci, writes that “culture means ‘the actual, grounded terrain of practices, representations, languages and customs of any specific historical society,’ as well as ‘the contradictory forms of ‘common sense’ which have taken root in and helped to shape popular life’” (Hall 26). Lorraine Gammon and Margaret Marshment, editors of The Female Gaze: Women as Viewers of Popular Culture (1988), claim that we cannot “dismiss popular culture as merely serving the complimentary systems of capitalism and patriarchy, peddling ‘false consciousness’ to the duped masses. It can also be seen as a site where meanings are contested and where dominant ideologies can be disturbed” (Gammon 1). I should point out, however, as is clearly stated in the introduction to Cultural Studies, that the elimination of the line between “elite and popular culture” is not
a requisite of culture studies, and not all culture studies are concerned with popular culture (Grossberg 6).

In addition, my approach in using Deleuzian ideas as a conceptual lens is distinct from, though not antithetical to, theoretical frameworks in culture studies that are pointedly concerned with identity politics or commodity politics. I acknowledge that the choice of films to study can certainly reveal aspects of a person’s identity. Anyone writing on film could be considered to choose films that are meaningful to that person, particularly in studies of affective qualities of film. I propose that Deleuze may therefore be particularly useful for self-reflexive studies and studies of taste.

Be that as it may, the greater body of work in film studies that aims at applying concepts from the cinema books or the works of Deleuze and Guattari is almost exclusively framed by concerns of identity and/or commodity politics. I am not explicitly concerned with the political nature of Deleuze – in other words, I do not purposefully frame my work in this way. However, as Anna Powell points out, “the conceptual frames of Deleuze and Bergson are primarily life-affirming and politically progressive” (9). Consequently, a certain amount of political engagement in my study is inherent and in a way issues organically from my choice of films and my discussion of Deleuze’s philosophy of world.
Deleuze Scholarship

Deleuzian concepts are widely utilized in scholarly work in a variety of fields other than film, including Anglophone cultural studies. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of these are not concerned with Deleuze’s cinema books and draw mostly on the collaborative works of Deleuze and Guattari. The majority of dissertations and theses concerning Deleuze are no exception, as can be seen in a review of the 322 dissertations and theses that appeared in a recent search I conducted on Digital Dissertation Abstracts using the keyword “Deleuze.” A review of essays and books reveals the same. Recent examples of essays that have appeared in scholarly journals include: Inna Semetsky’s “Deleuze’s New Image of Thought, or Dewey Revisited” (2003, Educational Philosophy & Theory); Keith Faulkner’s “Deleuze in Utero: Deleuze-Sartre and the Essence of Woman” (2002); Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities); Marco Abel’s “Speeding Across the Rhizome: Deleuze Meets Kerouac on the Road” (2002, Modern Fiction Studies); Martin Puchner’s “The Theater in Modernist Thought” (2002, New Literary History); Dorothea Olkowski’s “Flesh to Desire: Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, Deleuze” (2002, Strategies: Journal of Theory, Culture and Politics); Renée Hoogland’s “Fact and Fantasy: The Body of Desire in the Age of Posthumanism” (2002, Journal of Gender Studies); John Drummond’s “Freedom to Roam: A Deleuzian Overture for the Concept of Nursing” (2002, Nursing Philosophy); Charles Stivale’s “Deleuze, ‘l’entre-deux,’ and Literary Style” (2002, Journal of the Twentieth-Century/Contemporary French Studies), and Nick Fox’s “Refracting ‘Health’: Deleuze, Guattari and Body-Self” (2002, Health: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the Social Study of Health, Illness & Medicine).
There are a number of books designed to promote an understanding or argue an interpretation of Deleuze’s general philosophy, providing an overview of his writings from philosophical and/or cultural perspectives. This body of work is written by scholars from a wide variety of fields and covers a broad range of topics from culture studies, sociology, philosophy, comparative literature, political studies, English, science, theology and religion studies, French studies, and more. Recent examples of these include: Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (2003); Jean Khalfa, ed., and Claire Colebrook’s Understanding Deleuze (2002). Others include Deleuze and Philosophy: The Difference Engineer (1997) by Keith Ansell-Pearson; Deleuze: A Critical Reader (1996), Paul Patton, ed.; and two books titled Deleuze, by two different authors.

There are also books that concentrate on interpretations or explanations of specific works or major concepts of Deleuze (or Deleuze and Guattari), and that utilize Deleuzian or “deleuzeguattarian” concepts in analyses of particular issues or subjects (but not specifically film). Books of this type include: A Shock to Thought: Expressions after Deleuze and Guattari (2000) Brian Massumi, ed; Ian Buchanan’s Deleuzism: a Metacommentary (2000); Eugene Holland’s Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis (1999); Alain Badiou’s Deleuze: The Clamor of Being (1999); A Deleuzian Century? (1999) Ian Buchanan, ed.; Dorothea Olkowski’s Gilles Deleuze: The Ruin of Representation (1999); Deleuze & the Political (1999) Patton, Critchey and Ansell-Pearson, eds.; Patrick Hayden’s Multiplicity and Becoming: The Pluralist Empiricism of Gilles Deleuze (1998); Eleanor Kaufman’s Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy, and Culture (1998); John Hughes’s Lines of Flight: Reading Deleuze with Hardy, Gissing, Conrad, Woolf (1997); Philip Goodchild’s

Deleuze and Film Scholarship

The scholarly studies that are concerned with both Deleuze and film make up a small percentage of the body of work on Deleuze. Moreover, the majority of these are, once again, more interested in “deleuzeguattarian” philosophy than Deleuze’s cinema books. Examples of essays of this type are John Marks’s “Gilles Deleuze: Writing in Terror,” (Parallax 2003); Darrell Varga’s “The Deleuzian Experience of Cronenberg’s Crash and Wim Wenders’s The End of Violence (Screening the City, Mark Shiel, ed., 2003); Peter Lang’s “Everyday Matrix: Becoming Adolescence” (Animations of Deleuze and Guattari, Jennifer Slack and Lawrence Grossberg, ed., 2003); Ian Buchanan’s “Schizoanalysis and Hitchcock: Deleuze and the Birds” (Strategies: Journal of Theory, Culture & Politics, 2002); Greg Gow’s “Viewing ‘Mother Oromia’” (Communal/Plural: Journal of Transnational & Crosscultural Studies, 2001); Livia Monnet’s “Montage, Cinematic Subjectivity and Feminism in Ozaki Midori’s Drifting in the World of the Seventh Sense” (Japan Forum, 1999); Sara Ahmed’s “Phantasies of Becoming (the Other)” (European Journal of Cultural Studies, 1999); Allan Thomas’s “The Sheltering Sky and the Sorrow of Memory: Reading Bertolucci through Deleuze” (Literature Film Quarterly, 1998), and Tessa Dwyer’s “Straining to Hear (Deleuze)” (South Atlantic Quarterly, 1997). Another project of this type comes in the form of a dissertation, David Annadale’s “Beast with a Million Eyes: Unleashing Horror through Deleuze and Guattari (Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, H.P. Lovecraft, David Lynch),” wherein Annadale uses
“deleuzeguattarian” concepts to discuss horror fiction from a political perspective (U of Alberta, 1998).

Examples of scholarly books wherein the use of Deleuze’s *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2* are mentioned but are overshadowed by the collaborative work of Deleuze and Guattari include: Laura Marks’s *The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses* (1999); Laleen Jayamanne’s *Toward Cinema and its Double: Cross-Cultural Mimesis* (2001); Angelo Restiva’s *Cinema of Economics Miracles: Visuality and Modernization in the Italian Art Film* (2002); Emma Wilson’s *Memory and Survival: The French Cinema of Krystof Kieslowksi* (2000); Michael Shapiro’s *Cinematic Political Thought: Narrating Race, Nation and Gender* (1999); Gaylan Studlar’s *In the Realm of Pleasure: Von Sternberg, Dietrich and Masochistic Aesthetic* (1993); and *Micropolitics of Media Culture: Reading the Rhizomes of Deleuze and Guattari*, Patricia Pisters, ed. (2001). *Micropolitics of Media Culture* is the twelfth book in the *Film Culture in Transition* series, and is a collection of essays edited by Patricia Pisters. *Micropolitics of Media Culture* exemplifies how Deleuze is most often used in writings on film – the contributors cite Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* and *What is Philosophy?* as well as, though to a lesser extent, Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*, far more than they do his cinema books. A number of the chapters do not reference Deleuze’s *Cinema 1* or *Cinema 2* in any way.

D. N. Rodowick’s *Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine*, published in 1997, eight years after *Cinema 2* appeared in the English language, is the first and perhaps most widely read of the books that have been published in English that concentrates heavily on
Deleuze’s cinema books. Rodowick’s priorities are to contextualize the cinema books within Deleuze’s greater body of work and to promote an understanding and appreciation of the cinema books through a discussion of Deleuze’s oeuvre.

Since the publication of Rodowick’s text, at least six other books written in English and specifically concerned with the cinema books have appeared in print. An increasing number of English language essays have also appeared over the last decade. While this may not constitute a trend, it might indicate a growing interest in Deleuze and his project concerning the cinema, marking a change, as subtle as it may be, in the attitude of Anglophone film scholars. Rodowick’s text and the following works are important secondary sources for my study. None of them, however, address the style and methodology of the cinema books or explications of Deleuze’s metaphysics from the same angles that I do, nor do they contextualize Deleuze within theoretical frameworks utilized in film studies to the extent that I do in this study.

With her *Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation* (2000), Barbara Kennedy “aims to bring back debates about film as an art form – as part of an aesthetic process which incorporates the ‘bodies’ of our material, technological and molecular worlds” (inside front cover). Kennedy approaches her work in this book from the viewpoint of identity politics, which is not the approach I use in my study. She utilizes Deleuzian concepts to create a framework for feminist film analysis, challenging more commonly held views of desire and identity.

The *Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema* (2000), Gregory Flaxman, editor, is a collection of essays that concentrates on explicating various aspects of or concepts contained in the cinema books or applying Deleuzian perspectives to the
analysis of specific films or subjects related to film studies. Flaxman has written an introduction which provides an explanatory overview of the cinema books. Flaxman holds a Ph.D. in Comparative Literature and Literary Theory, and the contributors hail from a variety of disciplines, such as American culture studies, philosophy, and film studies, and include Dudley Andrew, Laura Marks, and Angelo Restivo.

Mediated Associations: Cinematic Dimensions of Social Theory (2002), by Daniel O’Connor, addresses the cinema books from the point of view of a social theorist. O’Connor draws out the social and cultural significance and function of film that are alluded to by Deleuze, providing insight into Deleuze’s ideology.

With his Deleuze on Cinema (2003), Ronald Bogue’s objective is to simplify and explain Deleuze’s cinema books by going through them chapter by chapter, as Bogue writes, “reading along” with Deleuze. Bogue does not attempt to update Deleuze’s work, and utilizes the same film examples as Deleuze to clarify and illustrate Deleuze’s cinematic image types.

Patricia Pisters’s The Matrix of Visual Culture: Working with Deleuze in Film Theory (2003) explores Deleuze’s possible contribution to film theory as well as the importance that Deleuzian concepts have had in understanding visual culture. Her work is similar to mine in intent, and we cover some of the same terms and both utilize contemporary films. However, her choice of key concepts and those that she stresses, Deleuze and Guattari’s “haecceity,” “de-territorialization,” “becoming-animal” and “refrain,” are quite different from mine and she is mainly interested in issues of identity politics, which is not a major concern in my study. Pisters draws on other works by Deleuze (and Deleuze and Guattari) as much as, if not more than, the cinema books.
In her Deleuze and Horror Film (2005), Anna Powell applies a wide variety of concepts from Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative work as well as from the cinema books to offer an alternative to psychoanalysis’s “overlay of symbolic or structural meaning” through a “re-theorizing the horror film from the perspective of Deleuze” (1). Powell claims to work in the realm of what Barbara Kennedy identifies as a “bio-aesthetics” or “neo-aesthetics,” proposing to look at film’s corporeal affect and an “affective dynamic” of horror films that “has so far been downplayed” in contemporary film theory (4). She writes that Deleuze’s view of cinema “embraces the flux of corporeal sensation and sensory perception in the ‘machinic’ connection of the embodied spectator with the body of the text.” Powell updates Deleuze through applying his concepts to current films in a popular mainstream genre. Powell’s work is the most similar to mine that I have found, in intent, scope, methodology and application of Deleuze. Some of her interpretations of Deleuze are quite similar to mine, but others are rather different. I cite a number of these throughout my study. In addition, Powell covers territory that I do not, and vice versa, and I address a variety of genres whereas she concentrates on horror. Powell also engages on a certain level with identity politics, whereas I do not. Overall, I see my study as being complimentary rather than analogous to Powell’s work, as well as the work of others that I discuss in this section of my study.

In addition to the aforementioned seven books concentrating on Deleuze’s Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 that have been published in the English language, I have found two others that have not been translated into English. These are the German Der Film bei Deleuze/Le cinema selon Deleuze (1997) by Oliver Fahle and Lorenz Engell, and the French Après Deleuze: philosophie et esthétique du cinema by Jacques Serrano (1997).
utilize only those works written in English due to the difficulty in obtaining these other
texts and the fact that I do not read German or French well enough to translate the
intricacies of Deleuze (which is not something I am particularly proud of).

Of note are Dudley Andrew’s *The Mists of Regret* (1995) and *Film in the Aura of
Art* (1984). While Andrew is interested in films’ cultural significance in history and the
influence of historical milieu on films, which are not specifically concerns of my study,
he is also proposing and employing an approach to aesthetics that is informed by fresh
theoretical and philosophical perspectives and is concerned with both meaning and effect.
It seems to me that Andrew feels, with analytical tools that are now available, we may be
better equipped to address questions that have haunted the study of film for decades, or to
at least proceed along more satisfactory lines of questioning. These tools are existing
paradigms of aesthetic analysis and critique that can be honed with the help, in Andrew’s
case, of Roland Barthes and Gilles Deleuze. With his approach to film study in *Mists of
Regret* and *Film in the Aura of Art*, Andrew is, in part, attempting to investigate what it is
that makes films powerful, appealing, and socially important. By raising aesthetic
questions and using concepts outlined by Barthes and Deleuze, Andrew offers an
alternative approach to contemporary film theory’s dominant psychoanalytic, semiotic,
materialist theoretical frameworks, as well as an alternative to aesthetic approaches in
classical film theory.

There are a number of essays and dissertations that draw heavily upon the cinema
books. None of these works, however are concerned with effect. Peter Yoonsuk Paik’s
contains an examination of the function of time as it appears in the film *The Sacrifice*
Paik utilizes Deleuze’s time-image to determine the meaning of certain elements of the film through their relation to the Deleuzian conception of time. Alberto Hernandez-Lemus’s dissertation, “The Coalescence of Sign Regimes: Deleuze and Italian Neorealism” (2000, New School for Social Research), makes a detailed study of the cinema books. The approach and argument are, however, quite different from mine. Hernandez-Lemus is primarily concerned with the semiotic origin and development of Deleuze’s sign regime, arguing that Deleuze prematurely dismissed the semiotics of Peirce as fully applicable to his cinema project. Colin Gardner’s dissertation, “Time Without Pity: Immanence and Contradiction in the Films of Joseph Losey” (1997, UCLA), is aimed at exploring difference across and between dialectical and immanent readings, focusing specifically on the impasse between the historicist rationality of Hegelian dialectics and the more libidinal, temporal economies associated with Nietzsche, Spinoza and Bergson. The work’s theoretical springboard is Deleuze’s Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, as well as Jacques Derrida’s extrapolation of the aporia. . . . More specifically, the project deploys Deleuze’s different cinematic image categories to explicate the aporetic issues of immanence and contradiction in the work of blacklisted American director, Joseph Losey (1909-1984). (abstract)

Gardner’s is a very interesting work that has been quite helpful, but it is not my project. Another work similar to my project is “Nolan’s Memento, Memory and Recognition” (2002), by Adrian Gargett. Gargett incorporates Deleuze-Guattarian concepts but also
draws heavily upon concepts from Deleuze’s cinema books to discuss how Deleuze’s cinematic image models thought and uses this in a contemplation of memory and history in Memento. An essay written on Brett Easton Ellis’s novel American Psycho (1991), upon which the film is based, is Scott Wilson’s “SchizoCapital and the Branding of American Psychosis” (2000). Wilson utilizes Deleuze, but draws upon concepts developed by Deleuze and Guattari in collaboration, not Deleuze’s cinema books, and his essay takes the form of a political critique.

**Philosophy and Film Studies**

Since Deleuze is known as a philosopher and his cinema books are primarily an exercise in philosophy rather than film theory, my study takes on some sense of a philosophical engagement with film. The study of film utilizing philosophical approaches, and particularly those dealing with issues of aesthetics, were commonplace in film studies from as early as Hugo Münsterberg’s Photoplay (1916) to the 1960s. Much of this early work is referred to as “classical film theory.” Studies of film utilizing philosophical frameworks or dealing with issues of aesthetics, emotion, and cognition, while they have continued to be done, have not been common in film studies since the 1970s, when the greater body of work took a turn toward the psychoanalytic, linguistic, material or socio-cultural. Essays in philosophy and film have, for the most part, appeared in specialized philosophy journals, not in the more popular or prominent film journals. It seems, however, that there has been a resurgence of interest in philosophical writings on film within the field of film studies. This is in part due to Bordwell and Carroll’s campaign for cognitivism, which is closely related to Anglo-analytical philosophy (not all works in philosophy and film are cognitivistic, however).
CHAPTER II. THE CINEMA BOOKS, SCIENCE, ART AND PHILOSOPHY

Deleuze believed not only “in the necessity of a dialogue between philosophy and science” (Rodowick 19), but also in a dialogue between philosophy and art, following in the footsteps of Aristotle, Hegel, Leibniz, Schlegel, Schiller, Descartes, Nietzsche, Hume, Kierkegaard, among many others. It should not be surprising, then, that the disciplines of philosophy, science, and art co-mingle throughout the cinema books.

Deleuze’s metaphysics is not a science, but it is no mere coincidence if some of his work in the cinema books begins to sound like physics - quantum mechanics, probability theory, even chaos theory and string theory. Deleuze draws heavily upon the works of Henri Bergson, and it was Bergson’s intention “to give modern science the metaphysics that corresponds to it, which it lacks” (T-I 7). Bergson was writing at the same time that Einstein’s theories of physics were being published. Einstein’s theory of relativity states that space and time are interchangeable, claiming that there is not “space” and then there is “time,” but there is “space-time,” and much of Bergson’s work was an attempt to provide a “metaphysics” that supported this concept while also maintaining freedom of thought and human activity. Einstein is considered to be quite deterministic (“God does not play dice”), while Bergson is certainly not.

Bergson may have been writing at the dawn of the 20th century, but his work has not lost its relevance to contemporary science. Ronald Bogue points out that Milic Capek, in his Bergson and Metaphysics (1971), claims that Bergson “provides the key for a conception of time-space that is adequate to the developments of modern physics” (Bogue 204). D.N. Rodowick states that chemist/physicist Ilya Prigogine, winner of the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1977, and Isabelle Stengers, chemist and philosopher, discuss
the work of Bergson at length in their book *Order out of Chaos*, published in 1983 (213). According to Prigogine and Stengers, Bergson’s *Creative Evolution* anticipated “the changing conception of time in studies of complexity and nonlinear change” (Rodowick 213). They quote Bergson in their claim that, even for contemporary science, “‘time is invention, or it is nothing at all.’ Nature is change, the continual elaboration of the new, a totality being created in an essentially open process of development without any pre-established model. ‘Life progresses and endures in time’” (Rodowick 213). ¹

Interestingly enough, Prigogine and Stengers also saw “an equally fascinating anticipation of nonlinear dynamics in the metaphysical speculations of Charles Sanders Peirce” (Rodowick 213), from whom Deleuze draws for the basis of his “pure semiotic” descriptions of images and signs in the cinema books. Rodowick proposes further that, though Deleuze had written his book on Bergson prior to the publication of Prigogine and Stenger’s *Order out of Chaos*, Deleuze’s work in the cinema books was almost certainly influenced by that of Prigogine and Stengers (5).

Whatever fields or disciplines Deleuze may engage in his writing, the cinema books are, as I have stated, primarily works of philosophy. Deleuze draws upon a variety of philosophers, including Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Goethe, Sartre, Leibniz, and Bergson. Though Deleuze’s affinities to certain concepts of Bergson and Nietzsche are the strongest, his own philosophy does not fall neatly into the camp of any of the philosophers that influence his work in the cinema books.

One key idea of Deleuze and Bergson that I utilize to assist in this endeavor is their claim that “everything is image.” An important part of this idea is that the “image of a thing” and the “thing” itself are inseparable. For Deleuze and Bergson, an “image”
is a “thing’s” existence and appearance (Bogue 29; Bergson Matter 10). This may be best described in terms of the work of Jacques Derrida (particularly his Of Grammatology and Writing and Difference). If for Derrida, everything is language all the way down, for Deleuze and Bergson, everything is image all the way up. Philosophy, considered as contemplating and describing the nature of the world and our relationship to it, can be broken down into two basic disciplines: metaphysics, having to do with the fundamental reality of the world, and epistemology, or how we know it. Derrida, in a critique of traditional metaphysics, begins with an epistemology where we cannot know the world because of language, or we never get beyond language. The metaphysics of our presence to the world is all framed in or by language. His is a relatively restrictive epistemology (and metaphysics) that closes us off to other ways of thinking about and describing the world and ourselves.

On the other hand, Alain Badiou, author of Deleuze: The Clamor of Being (1999), proposes that Deleuze’s work flows from a metaphysics that leads to an open epistemology. Since everything is image all the way up, and not all the way down, then from a Deleuzian point of view we cannot think first of human consciousness or perception and then extrapolate all the way down. With Deleuze, we begin with the idea of images and then extrapolate up to human consciousness and perception. An implication of the idea that “everything is image” to philosophy involves a problematizing of the subject/object binary and also the idea of a transcendental subject. This proposition bears on the “classification” of Deleuze as a philosopher, and is one of the issues I explore further in this chapter.
Bergson’s philosophical project is based in his claims that “everything is image” and that the “real” form of time is not linear and chronological, but coexisting past, present and future in every present moment (what Bergson calls “originary time” or “transcendental time”). Bergson’s arguments involve a complex arrangement between perception, memory, matter, energy and consciousness. I discuss these concepts at length further on in my study, but at this juncture, for the purposes of discussing Deleuze’s place in the disciplines of philosophy, suffice it to say that key implications of Bergson’s philosophical project are the rejection of the division between not only past and present, but also the Real and the Imaginary, actual and virtual, true and false, as well as subject and object. The subject/object split is a basic assumption or even tenet of traditional philosophical disciplines such as epistemology, phenomenology and ontology, as well as most schools of philosophical thought (idealism, realism, existentialism, etc.). The function and form of subjectivity is also a major point of contention between these various disciplines and schools. Deleuze, following Bergson, attempts to put this contention aside by claiming that there does not have to be a distinction between subject and object since “everything is image.”

For Deleuze, this distinction presupposes the necessity of what he calls the “sensory-motor schema” (T-I 127). Ronald Bogue, author of Deleuze on Cinema (2003), describes the sensory-motor schema as follows:

Our pragmatic world is structured by our needs, desires, purposes, and projects, and the practical application of our perceptions and actions to meet those ends depends on a coordinated interconnection of our sensory
and motor faculties. Hence, a ‘sensory-motor schema’ shapes our commonsense world. (Bogue 66)

Our daily actions and thoughts are governed by this sensory-motor schema, or dependence on and belief in the necessity of stimulus-response, definable action and dependable reaction. It is necessitated by a perceiving subject and perceived object. For Deleuze, to assume that the world must work this way is not necessary, and closes us off to other ways that we can conceive of the world. Following Bergson, Deleuze claims that “perception” takes place in the object perceived, and not just in the perceiving subject.

The human being, including the human mind, is an aggregate of images. Since everything is image, there is no difference between the perceiver and the perceived. The only subjectivity is the particular assemblage of these images, but the “store” of these images is “in” the world. On a basic level, this makes a definitive identification of Deleuze’s work with any “traditional” discipline or school of philosophy problematic.

Deleuze initially seems to be a pragmatist (what is real or what is truth is what works; it’s not my knowledge that matches the world, but I have an idea that works). However, pragmatists would privilege the sensory-motor schema, claiming it is the fundamental schema of the world (as I will discuss further on, Deleuze’s “cinema of the movement-image” builds itself on this schema). Deleuze does not agree that the sensory-motor schema is the fundamental schema of the world. He thinks there is something more fundamental, based on Bergson, which is the play of images, the indiscernibility of the actual and virtual which can break up the sensory-motor schema and create a possibility for re-configuration of images that is important, not subjectivity.
Deleuze is also not an idealist in the traditional sense, as idealists think of the world as the structure of a subject – whether the subject is the individual or a meta-subject (such as God). Deleuze is not a subjective-idealista à la Berkeley (to be is to be perceived, and God perceives what we cannot), or an absolute idealista à la Hegel (the world is subject coming to know itself through the dialectical process, unfolding linearly in history in a fixed rational sequence toward some teleological end). Though Marx differs from Hegel in his idea of what that teleological end might be, he is nonetheless an idealist, and idealism presupposes the subject/object split as well as a teleological, linear, cause and effect becoming of the world, which Deleuze also rejects.

Deleuze is also not a realista per se, for whom consciousness functions as a window on a world that exists outside of our consciousness and whereby consciousness simply registers what an object really is. However, Badiou claims that Deleuze does have realist tendencies à la Plato (the functioning of the world is based in distinct and eternal categories) because of the way Deleuze categorizes the world as images that act as signs and simply exist on a “plane of immanence” (M-I 58). Deleuze cannot be considered an existentialist either, at least not in the manner of Sartre or Camus (the world is grasped from the individual subject who is free and can choose). He certainly draws heavily upon Sartre, however, and also has strong affinities to Heidegger and Nietzsche, but individual subjectivity still plays a prominent role in their works.

Deleuze’s work in the cinema books has been associated with ontology, epistemology, ethics, constructivism, cosmology, and metaphysics. Deleuze engages all of these on one level or another, but a traditional understanding of them makes each too narrow to cover the far-reaching scope of the cinema books, and each contains
suppositions that are antithetical to Deleuze’s philosophical project as a whole.

Deleuze’s ontology of the world as image cannot be considered to follow along the lines of more traditional ontologies of the cinema. Any of Deleuze’s responses to the questions “what is cinema” or “is film art” are overshadowed by his concerns for “what is thought;” “what is philosophy;” “what is life;” “what is the world?”

Gregory Flaxman, in his The Brain is the Screen (2000), claims that Deleuze’s approach can be considered a form of “constructivism,” which he defines as an “engagement into which philosophy enters with science as well as art,” where philosophy is a “process of constructing, creating, and inventing concepts” (3). The cinema books certainly disclose a form of constructivism in this sense, but Flaxman’s philosophical constructivism should not be confused with cognitivism’s constructive approach to meaning. Deleuze certainly has an affinity to cognitivism, as I describe in more detail in Chapter IX, but Deleuze’s constructivism is not the rigorous “constructivism” as it appears in cognitivism, relying on the construction of meaning by the spectator based solely on solid, recent scientific psychological studies. Flaxman explains that, in regards to Deleuze, “constructivism should not be understood as a process of hermeneutics or even metaphysics, both which presume, albeit often negatively, the presence of an ‘always already,’ an ideal or truth that remains to be rediscovered” (3). Deleuze’s philosophy is, however, definitely a metaphysics, even if it does deny the “always already,” “ideal” and “truth that remains to be discovered.” His metaphysics is an eccentric combination of both descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, which can be considered to be in opposition to one another. Descriptive metaphysics depicts “the basic frameworks of concepts with which thought is (perhaps at a time) conducted” (Blackburn
Revisionary metaphysics, on the other hand, “aims for criticism and revision of some hapless way of thought,” which Deleuze is also certainly interested in (Blackburn 240). “Although the possibility of revisionary metaphysics may be doubted, it continues to the present time: eliminativism in the philosophy of mind and postmodernist disenchantment with objectivity and truth are conspicuous examples” (240). Deleuze does describe philosophical concepts, and in fact “concepts” themselves are very important to Deleuze, but his concepts also challenge many previous paradigms of thought, knowledge and perception (as well as “objectivity and truth”). Claire Colebrook, author of Understanding Deleuze (2002), describes concepts according to Deleuze as “not a generalization or a label that we use to describe the world,” but “creations that testify to the positive power of thinking as an event of life. We create concepts in order to transform life” (xxi).

Important to this discussion is the rather indefinite Deleuzian distinction between “concepts” and “ideas.” Deleuze speaks of images, including film images, as representing or “reflecting” concepts. The cinema books are, in a way, and according to Deleuze, all about concepts and the activity or process of conceptualization. From a traditional philosophical point of view, however, “concepts” are considered to a bearer of our knowledge about things, which implies a distinction between ourselves and the thing we “know,” and are rather determined and fixed. Deleuze believes concepts to be more open and ambiguous, which is much closer to the traditional philosophical definition of “ideas.” Most criticism is conceptually based (consider psychoanalysis, semiotics, Marxism, cognitivism). Deleuze claims to be providing “concepts,” but they are concepts about an interaction with film that are quite “non-conceptual,” more in the realm
of ideas or “ideation,” or the creation or development of concepts as opposed to the holding to ready-made concepts.

As I have stated, however much the cinema books may be about film, Deleuze utilizes film in service of his philosophy, as a means of illustrating, describing or expressing fundamental aspects of his philosophy of the world – in his sense of “world.” For Deleuze, as for Bergson, the “world” is not object separate from subject, but “everything,” including but not limited to: life, thought, consciousness, time, matter, light, the universe and humankind – altogether what Alain Badiou calls Deleuze’s “One-all” (10.1). Robert Stam observes that “Deleuze sees the cinema itself as a philosophical instrument, a generator of concepts and a producer of texts which render thought in audiovisual terms” (An Introduction 258). For Deleuze, then, “a theory of cinema,” as Stam continues, “is not ‘about’ the cinema but about the concept[s] that the cinema itself triggers” (258). The translators of Cinema 1 claim that,

for Deleuze, philosophy cannot be a reflection on something else. It is […] a creation of concepts. But concepts, for Deleuze, are thought of in a new way. They are no longer ‘concepts of,’ understood by reference to their external object. . . . ‘they are intensities which either suit you or don’t, which work or don’t.’ Concepts are the images of thought.

(Tomlinson, M-I xi)²

According to Deleuze, images in film can act as concepts, and therefore as images of thought, where thought is rendered “not in language but in blocks of movement and duration” (Stam, An Introduction 258).
Deleuze may come closest to being a post-structuralist, for whom the subject is not an instance of awareness in the world but a shifting figure not determined by or separate from things outside it. Interestingly enough, Derrida is also considered by many to be a post-structuralist. Deleuze is not, as I have explained, a post-structuralist à la Derrida, for whom the world is text or language all the way down. For Derrida, “seeing” is always “seeing as,” implying that signs are always invoked by the subject. This way of thinking restricts discussions of perception and non-linguistic dimensions of experience of the world. For Deleuze, perception may be surrounded by language, but it is not language. According to Deleuze, following Bergson, the world, and film, are made up not of text or language, but moving images. Everything is “image,” and the “world” or universe is essentially a vast miasma in constant flux. “Movement-images” arise from this miasma and “appear” to human consciousness as “signs” (in a “pure semiotic” sense), “created” through an activity of attention, intention and selection that is framed by an inclination toward closure, coordination and connectedness. These “images” or “signs” exist “beneath” language, prior to language’s “emergence.”

It is tempting when reading the cinema books to describe Deleuze’s work by saying that he uses formal strategies in film as a metaphor for the way the world works (his metaphysics), and text-spectator relations as a metaphor for the way we encounter the world (his epistemology). However, this kind of classification once again presupposes a distinct split between subject and world, and these cannot be so easily separated for Deleuze. One cannot, then, simply detach Deleuze’s metaphysics from his epistemology. This is a traditional split that for Deleuze is secondary, and to delineate between the two would be to undermine his project. To make that distinction is to
identify with the sensory-motor schema and implies a fundamental, given way of the world itself. Any description of world, especially in Deleuze’s sense of “world,” certainly presupposes a way of knowing things. When Deleuze speaks of images, he is addressing both metaphysics and epistemology.
CHAPTER III. A DELEUZE/ADORNO AXIS

Even some of the most ardent supporters of the cinema books have referred to them as “difficult” (Rodowick ix; Bogue 2), “complex” (Rodowick xi), “forbidding” (Flaxman 24), “disconcerting” (Stam 259), “infuriating” (Rodowick xv), “obscure” (Bogue 2; Flaxman 24), “elusive” (Flaxman 36), “polysemic” (Kennedy 2), “disorienting” (Kennedy 3), “allusive” (Bogue 2), “full of intricacies and digressions” and “resisting easy assimilation” (Flaxman 2). When interviewed about the cinema books, Deleuze admitted that some his concepts were “very difficult to think about” (Flaxman 20).

The greatest difficulty of the cinema books, however, may be the manner in which they are written; the writing style itself, as well as their organization. Rodowick states that “writing on a popular art has done little to make [Deleuze’s] philosophical style any easier to comprehend” (ix). Deleuze writes with an admitted non-linearity, and often springs infuriating asides and mutant appendages upon the reader. The “rhetorical shifts in his writing can be unsettling,” and “throughout the two books there is a consistent disjunction, often within the same chapter or section” (Rodowick xiii). For Barbara Kennedy, Deleuze’s “ideas mingle and bounce off each other, split, disperse, fracture or multiply, often colliding with [such] great force and passion, that we feel unable to resolve any formula or stance to his work” (2, 3). Bogue observes that the cinema books “make significant demands of the reader, who must follow Deleuze through thickets of dense reasoning and sweeping synthetic exegesis across the domains of both cinema and philosophy” (2). Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Haberjam, the translators of Cinema I, claim in their introduction that “this Deleuzian approach will
seem strange to those schooled in the more traditional philosophical themes. It will perhaps seem less strange to those who work in the cinema and are constantly involved in processes of creation of their own” (T-I xi). I cannot fully vouch for “those schooled in the more traditional philosophical themes,” but I can say that, at least for myself, neither my education in film studies nor my experience as a filmmaker made my reading of the cinema books any easier.

Parataxis

I maintain that this difficulty or at least the complexity of the cinema books stems from Deleuze’s paratactical approach to writing and, on a more fundamental level, his belief in paratactic thinking or modes of thought. A familiarity with “parataxis” and how it applies to Deleuze can not only shed light on his writing style and the organization of the cinema books, but also his theories of cinema and his philosophy of world.

Parataxis is often associated with the theoretical works of Theodor Adorno, particularly his Aesthetic Theory and essays on music (Hullot-Kentor; Leppert 63). On one level, parataxis is a writing style and methodology; an organizational principle that undermines deductive reasoning and traditional rhetorical methods, calling for “an internal arrangement that avoids the use of either coordinating or subordinating elements” (Leppert 63). A dictionary definition says of parataxis that it is the arrangement of “propositions one after the other, without other expression of their syntactic relation,” without conjunctions, and even “without logical connection” (Webster’s 1775). In his “Parataxis,” Adorno pointed out the paratactic structure of the creative work of poet Friedrich Hölderlin, and parataxis has become associated with hypertext. A text with a paratactic structure may also include the juxtaposition of “mutually contradictory
assertions” (Paddison, qtd. in Leppert 62), and be riddled with paradoxes (Leppert 64). Relationships between ideas or concepts are left out or made deliberately ambiguous. Closure and definitive deductions are difficult to reach, but a project following the organizational approach of parataxis is indeed meant to allow multiple interpretations and further development of its concepts. It is meant to encourage continued, open discourse.

D. N. Rodowick points out that a particular difficulty of the cinema books stems from Deleuze’s “penchant for borrowing and inventing new terms” (36). Barbara Kennedy notes Deleuze’s “language and creation of conceptual personae can often make the reader feel disoriented, lost in space, floundering in a forest of neologisms” (2, 3). He appropriates terms from the fields of film, science, and philosophy and utilizes them in ways that suggest that their meaning has mutated without clearly explaining what this new meaning might be. When Deleuze invents new terms he does not provide clear definitions of them either. Particularly frustrating is the manner in which he utilizes relatively simple film terms such as “shot,” “cut,” “montage” and “depth of field,” among others. Just as Deleuze rarely defines the terms that he uses, whether created by himself or borrowed from others, the same is true of even his major concepts, such as time-images themselves. Rodowick observes that “there is no single place where Deleuze defines outright what constitutes a direct image of time [a time-image]. Instead, the direct image of time gradually begins to distinguish itself through a series of concepts” (89).

In light of parataxis, it could be said that Deleuze does not define concepts because he sees them as evolving. The same goes for the definitions of terms, which Deleuze sees as evolving concepts themselves. Concepts and even terms need to be
described as generally as possible because for Deleuze they need to be left open. They are not settled. They need to be thought about, changed and refined. This reflects Deleuze’s view of philosophical concepts in general. Part of this is historical, having to do with the historical development of concepts as unfolding forms of representation and reality, becoming richer, more subtle – Hegel might say “truer” – but Deleuze would more likely say “making more sense.”

**Constellation**

Parataxis also involves the idea of looking at the subject matter from many angles, from near and far, surrounding it, writing around the subject, circling it, turning it over and over. Drawing upon the features of parataxis, Adorno developed an organizational principle he called “constellation,” a term he appropriated from Walter Benjamin (Leppert 63). Martin Jay, author of Adorno, describes constellation as “a juxtaposed rather than integrated cluster of elements that resist reduction to a common denominator” or “essential core” (qtd. in Leppert 63).

Constellation offers multiple, seemingly unconnected perspectives or viewpoints, as from multiple stars in the night sky. But constellation involves both the idea of looking *at* the stars – multiple disconnected and randomly placed points – and the idea of looking *from* many different stars. Hence parataxis and constellation take into account Adorno’s disdain for the analytical view of only looking at something from the outside, as well the idea of fixed subjectivity (Hullot-Kentor xii, xiii). Adorno wished to “overcome the generally recognized failing of aesthetics – its externality to its object,” and conceive of “an aesthetics that wants to know art from within” (Hullot-Kentor xii, xiii). This is in line with Deleuze’s disdain for the subject-object dichotomy, or the
assumption of a transcendent “something” (matter, the subject, God) from which everything else is “seen” as separate (Colebrook xxix). It also pertains to Henri Bergson’s call for “absolute” and “intuitive” as opposed to “analytical” and “relative” perception, which has an unstated but powerful influence on Deleuze’s work in the cinema books (Bergson, An Introduction 1). In their simplest sense, “intuition” places a subject’s perception “inside” the object of observation and subject and object are therefore coincident or immanent, while “relative” perception assumes a transcendent seeing subject and seen object (1).

While writings with a paratactic structure may seem simply “disorganized” (Hullot-Kentor xiv), lacking in logical order and linear continuity of argument, parataxis is a deliberate methodology that “intentionally thwarts effortless reception by passive readers” (Leppert 63) and is meant as a rejection of linear causality and analytical, progressive rhetoric. It “resists the ‘logic’ of systemized judgment, defined by the expectation that point A leads directly and inevitably to point B” (Leppert 62). It is not meant to be difficult for difficulty’s sake, but to actively engage the reader with the text and its many separate propositions or seemingly disconnected concepts. Readers may be forced to make difficult connections and search hard for underlying meanings, but they are also left free to make their own connections, build their own arguments, find their own meanings, draw their own lines from star to star, as well as take multiple viewpoints by bouncing from star to star. Parataxis “creates a kind of disjunction and non-specificity that undermine[s] logical clarity and causality, leaving room for a certain vagueness, and for interpretation.” (Gillespie, qtd. in Leppert 63). As a writing style and methodology, it is antithetical to tenets of Anglo-analytic philosophy and meant as a “critique of Western
philosophical discursive traditions” (Leppert 63). Paratactic writing is not uncommon in “continental” philosophy, though it is usually seen in less radical forms than practiced by Adorno. Deleuze is, if nothing else, a continental philosopher, and his writing is intentionally paratactic, though it does not go to the extremes seen in Adorno’s work.

In Deleuze’s case, parataxis involves not just multiple viewpoints, but taking the multiple ideas that might arise from these viewpoints to extremes. He treats the act of writing itself as a method of exploring ideas, striking out in any direction at any time, exploring the mind and the world, not as simply an act of following a path, of recording and describing fixed, already solidified ideas or findings. For Deleuze, film itself can do the same. In some ways, writing is for Deleuze like brainstorming, the throwing out of ideas on a particular subject, however farfetched, and he intends for his work to encourage further brainstorming.

**Rhizomatics**

The ideas of parataxis and constellation can apply to Deleuze on a deeper level than just style and methodology, however. Paratactic characteristics relating to how links are made without conjunctions, and the idea of constellation, strongly parallel elements of the concept of “rhizomatics” as developed by Deleuze in collaboration with Félix Guattari. Writing, thought, or the growth or accumulation of knowledge has traditionally been pictured as a tree which rises and develops in and from a central trunk that branches off, occasionally reaches dead-ends, returns to the trunk and branches off again. This “tree of knowledge” continues to grow linearly upward, “producing a distinct order and direction” (Colebrook xxvii). Deleuze and Guattari dispute this analogy, claiming that knowledge, as well as the thought that produces it, should be pictured as not
“arborescent,” as a linear, rising, central trunk with branches, but as a horizontally developing “rhizome” (Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus* 3-25). Instead of a tree, picture crabgrass, a rhizomatic form of life that throws out shoots in any and all directions, each shoot taking root wherever it can to throw out even more shoots in a random but continuous effort to increase itself and survive. As opposed to the tree of knowledge, which has branches attached to a trunk which is the “center,” a rhizome forks and divides endlessly, making “random, proliferating and de-centered connections” (Colebrook xxvii).

Deleuze should not be considered a theoretician à la Lyotard, however, where everything is plurality. For Deleuze and Guattari, though rhizomes may distance themselves further and further from the original plant’s root system, they are still connected to that original plant and are inseparable from it; every part of the rhizome is connected to every other part. However, it is not possible to ever find the “center,” the “original” plant. Beyond that, different (but related because they are all “human”) plants may exist that have thrown off shoots that intermingle and even compete with other plants – but they affect each other in a way that the result is more and further growth of each plant into further territory of knowledge. They intertwine, and though distinct, they become indiscernible from one another. By the same token, multiplicities and concepts in constellation are also connected.

Two characteristics of rhizomes have particular significance for Deleuze. One is that the structure of the rhizome is endless, open, resisting closure, “a rhizome has no beginning or end” (Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus* 25). The other is that any point on a rhizome “is always in the middle, between things” (Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus* 25).
What becomes of greatest importance for Deleuze is how the connections, the arbitrary linkages, are made between rhizomes. Rhizomes can be related to sentences, paragraphs, chapters, propositions, ideas concepts, or images, including film images. The rhizomes, propositions or images themselves are extremely important, but for Deleuze what becomes essential to contemplate is the “space” between them, the linkage that connects them. Their organization is very similar to that used in parataxis.

**Multiplicity**

Rhizomatics, parataxis, and constellation are all closely related to Deleuze’s “multiplicity,” which is “at its simplest, a collection or connection of parts,” and more importantly “an effect of its connections” (Colebrook xxvi). This is associated with Deleuze’s ideas about “intensive difference,” which “cannot be mapped into clear and distinct points” and also “becomes different as it expresses itself through time. It is closer to the dynamism, becoming and temporal fluidity of true difference than the spatialized, structured and organized difference of extension,” or “extensive difference,” which is thought of as a “collection of things, bodies, numbers, qualities or species,” and relies on “spatially distinct and bounded points” (Colebrook xxvi). Extensive difference is a characteristic of movement-images as well as the approaches of Anglo-analytic philosophy and cognitivism in film studies, while intensive difference, or multiplicity, is a characteristic of both Deleuze’s time-images and his continental, paratactic, rhizomatic methodology and writing style.

While parataxis requires that there be no conjunctions between propositions, Deleuze claims that “the fabric of rhizomes is the conjunction, ‘and…and…and…’” (Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus* 25). But this conjunction as used by Deleuze is very
different from deductive, causal, or result oriented conjunctions like “therefore,” “since,” “as,” “consequently,” “then,” “thus” and “because,” or conjunctive phrases like “such as,” “given that,” “as a result” or “for that reason.” Deleuze’s “and” works more like “plus…plus…plus,” after the manner of the organizational strategy of parataxis – which is the same organizational strategy exhibited by the editing and intraframe relationships of Deleuze’s time-images. The manner in which rhizomes are spread haphazardly and in all directions also likens rhizomatics to Adorno’s constellation. Rhizomatics, parataxis, constellation, multiplicity – all require a re-thinking of linkage, of connection, of perspective, of thought itself. But if rhizomes themselves are “between,” and in parataxis there basically is no formal “between,” what is it that links things? For Deleuze, as well as Adorno, it is thought, thinking, the “creating” of links with the “mind.” In the world, for Deleuze, there is no transcendant link between things other than the ones that we as human beings “make.”

Practicing the concepts of parataxis and constellation and promoting rhizomatics and multiplicity invariably give rise to paradox. Both Deleuze’s and Bergson’s philosophical projects are riddled with paradoxical concepts. The cinema books are no exception. Two very basic concepts of Deleuze and Bergson are the ideas that everything is “image,” and that time is not linear or chronological but has a paradoxical form where past, present and future all co-exist and only exist in every immeasurable instant of the present. These two assertions are inextricably tied one to the other, and together they forge the basis for a variety of other paradoxes that emerge in the cinema books. For Deleuze and Bergson, paradoxical statements and their contemplation are powerful methods of challenging thought. To embrace paradoxes is not the same as embracing
contradiction, or simply to accept it, but to challenge thought through the process of attempting to work them out. This is not to say that paradoxes must ultimately be solved – it is the process that is most important to Deleuze and Bergson, not the result. In line with the concepts of parataxis and constellation, Deleuze and Bergson have strategies for making progress with paradox, for moving the process along, and these include presenting, playing on and exploiting ambiguities. Deleuze, even more than Bergson, leaves it to the reader to decide when an ambiguity or a paradox should be worked out in thought or when it should be left alone.

Also, in line with the paratactic practice of leaving concepts and the definition of terms open to interpretation, is the idea that Deleuze deliberately uses terms that are ambiguous and that can help illuminate the basic paradoxes he presents in the cinema books. Two key examples are “identity” and “appearance.” In the tradition of continental philosophy the concept of “identity” is ambiguous in its very nature, whereas in mathematics it simply means “equal to.” Another definition is essentially “at one with” (and this is what is at stake for Bergson when he claims, as I explain in Chapter V, that image = matter = energy = time = space, declaring they are all expressions of the same “stuff”). “Appearance” can mean “to come to be” or “emerge,” “to be present in and/or to other things,” or “to look a certain way.” All of these definitions come into play in Deleuze’s descriptions of various image types and their corresponding signs. Deleuze also deliberately invokes difficult and ambiguous meanings for the concepts of actual and virtual, real and imaginary, consciousness, and perception, among others.

As it applies to Deleuze’s writing, parataxis breaks things up, leaves out connections, which not only forces readers to make their own connections and linkages
(in essence, to “think”), but also leaves open the possibility for new linkages and combinations of concepts as well as further development of his concepts and new perspectives on them. Constellation calls for a methodology and organization that provides multiple views and multiple angles of approach. It can ease an entry into the cinema books if one understands that Deleuze has a very purposeful method to what can appear to be a stylistic and methodological madness. His intentionally disjunctive and complex style is meant to serve a purpose. Deleuze wants us to “read” differently, to think differently, take multiple view points, break away from automatic response, habit and assumption, and make our own connections, not just in the reading of his books, but the world, in a search for modes in which to make sense of the world differently. For Deleuze, this can help us to gain new perspectives and expand our understanding of the world and our place in it, helping us to “see” new possibilities for thought, life and existence. Deleuze believed that “if we create difficult, unmanageable and disruptive concepts, then we will question, provoke and challenge our lives […] The more difficult and challenging our concepts are, the more they allow us to change and expand our lives” (Colebrook xii). This statement illuminates Deleuze’s entire philosophical project and his description of time-images, as well as the organizational strategy of his books on cinema, his methodology, and his style in writing them.¹
CHAPTER IV. IMAGE REGIMES, NARRATION AND MONTAGE

In my reading of Deleuze, his entire project of utilizing film to explicate his philosophy relies upon four very basic claims, which he draws from Bergson. The first is that everything is “image.” The second is that everything changes, which is equivalent in Deleuzian terms to stating that everything “moves.” Together, everything is “image” in motion, or what I dub “moving images.” Since “moving” and “motion” and the related ideas of “movement” and “action” can have a variety of definitions as well as connotations, and are used differently in a variety of fields, it is important at this juncture to clarify how I believe might be most productively thought of in terms of the cinema books.

In my reading of Deleuze, “movement” can be understood as involving and arising from the activity of attentive, intentive, selective human consciousness. Human beings, with attention, intention and selection, generally and most of the time perceive and think of the moving images of the world as “movement-images.” Intent per se results in “action.” Human beings and animals have intention; they “act,” or are involved in “action.” A physicist might speak of rocks “acting,” but Deleuze does not use “action” in the same manner that a physicist might, even if he does draw on physics to some extent in his writing of the cinema books. For Deleuze, rocks do not “act” or take part in “action,” they are involved with “motion.”

To say that something is in “motion” implies no intention and suggests that it “moves” as a result of physical laws of nature – rocks are put into motion or move due to some physical force like gravity or impact. A human being can be involved in intentional movement, or action, as well as unintentional movement, or motion. To swing a baseball
bat is intentional. A twitch on one’s face or a fall down the stairs is (usually) not. The crucial element here, however, is human perception and thought. Even the unintentional “motion” of a rock or falling person, when percieved or “concieved of” by an attentive, intentive human being, is a “movement-image.” In this sense, both the human in action or the rock in motion, in Deleuzian terms, exhibit movement and can be “movement-images.”

When I claim that everything is “moving image,” this applies to both Deleuze’s “movement-images” and “time-images.” Everything is image and everything moves, all the “time.” The question for Deleuze, however, is what kind of time does it move “in,” or more precisely, what form of time is it conceived, percieved or thought of as moving “in?” Generally speaking, movement-images are conceived of in terms of or contextualized by a conceptualization of time as chrono-linear time, and time-images Bergson’s form of originary time.

Deleuze and Bergson’s third claim is that time is change, nothing but change. The fourth is Deleuze and Bergson’s hypothesis that time is not linear or chronological, but has the paradoxical form of originary time where past, present and future all co-exist and only exist in every immeasurable instant of the present (T-I 50-52). It is a major objective of Deleuze with the cinema books to utilize film (as itself moving images) to describe and support these claims, and drawing from Nietzsche, to tease out what he believes to be many of the most profound of their implications.

A major tactic of Deleuze’s project in the cinema books is to identify two extremely broad categories of “images” of the “world.” One of these categories of images Deleuze calls alternately “the movement-image,” “the regime of the movement-
image,” and “the organic regime” (M-I 11; T-I 127). The other he calls “the time-image,” “the regime of time-image,” and “the crystalline regime” (M-I 11; T-I 127). The majority of this chapter is devoted to movement-images. I describe time-images at greater length in later chapters since movement-images have more “definable” characteristics and time-images are more easily described in comparison to movement-images.

Films that Deleuze identifies with movement-images he calls the “cinema of the movement-image,” as well as “classic cinema” or “the classical.” The other he calls alternately the “cinema of the time-image” and “modern cinema” or “the modern.” Examples of each that Deleuze identifies include films with a wide variety of styles and from a myriad of filmmakers. Films that are categorized as belonging to the regime of movement-images are sometimes referred to as “movement-image films” and those belonging to the regime of time-images are sometimes referred to as “time-image films.”

The category of movement-image films is comprised of the vast majority of films produced in any epoch, and Deleuze includes a staggering variety of films and filmmakers in his description of movement-images, from the films of D. W. Griffith, Sergei Eisenstein, Buster Keaton and Charlie Chaplin, to those by Elia Kazan, Robert Wiene, John Ford, Alfred Hitchcock, John Huston, Howard Hawks, Akira Kurosawa and Sam Peckinpah, among many others. When it comes to time-image films, Resnais’s/Robbe-Grillet’s Last Year at Marienbad (1961) is arguably Deleuze’s favorite example (other films of Resnais’s and Robbe-Grillet’s are also included in this regime by Deleuze). Additional films that he identifies as belonging to the regime of time-image films include, among others, Herzog’s Heart of Glass (1976), Welles’s Citizen Kane
(1941) (among others of Welles’s films), and practically all of the films of Fellini, Visconti, Renoir, Ophüls, Rouch, Varda, Bene, and Duras.

In the categories of both movement-image and time-image films, one can see patterns of auteurs, historical eras, genres and “movements” in film take shape – but the emergence of these is symptomatic of Deleuze’s effort and not the purpose of his cinema project. It can seem to be Deleuze’s ultimate goal with the cinema books to categorize or historicize films, but that it not the case. Deleuze utilizes film to describe images and illustrate how and why the world “appears” as kinds of “image(s).” He is mainly concerned with perception and thought, and the image regimes each “represent” different modes of perception and thought, or modes of existence.

There are three other important ideas to consider when contemplating Deleuze’s two categories. The first is that there is not always a distinct split between movement-image films and time-image films, or even movement-images and time-images. Deleuze makes this very clear (though perhaps not often enough), stating that “there are many possible transformations, almost imperceptible passages, and also combinations between the movement-image and the time-image” (T-I 270); “passages from one regime to the other . . . can take place imperceptibly or there can be constant overlapping” (T-I 127), and “it is always possible to multiply passages from one regime to the other, just as to accentuate their irreconcilable differences” (T-I 279). In other words, there are sometimes very slight differences between movement-images and time-images; a transformation from one to the other can occur in the same film, and this transformation can be very striking or very subtle. In addition, Rodowick observes that, “comparatively speaking, there are few ‘pure’ examples of films where direct images of time [time-
images] predominate” (89), Last Year at Marienbad being one of these few; “mixed or hybrid examples are more common” (89). I attempt to demonstrate in Chapter IX that The Lord of the Rings can be considered one of these “hybrid examples.”

It is important to note here that “movement-images” and “time-images” are not exactly the same thing as movement-image films and time-image films – though when reading Deleuze it can seem like they are. More precisely, it is that movement-image films predominantly “exhibit” movement-images; are regulated by the characteristics of movement-images, or exhibit formal strategies consistent with the “appearance” of movement-images. Conversely, time-image films “exhibit” time-images; are regulated by the characteristics of time-images, or exhibit formal strategies consistent with the “appearance” of time-images.

The second thing to keep in mind regarding Deleuze’s broad image categories is that the term “time-image” itself is used in a rather troublesome manner by Deleuze throughout the cinema books. The differences between movement-image films and time-image films are founded in one basic principle: the form of time they represent via their formal strategies. And it is this concern with time that underlies every other subject of Deleuze’s cinema project, with the conceptions of thought, perception, memory, movement, image, montage, narration, etcetera, all being implications of a certain conception of the form of time. This can be quite a source of confusion in the cinema books, but it helps to keep in mind that, when he speaks of a “time-image,” Deleuze for the most part means a “direct image of time” or “direct time-image.” Images that are definitely direct images of time include “crystal-images,” “crystals of time,” and “chronosigns.” The problem here is that even the most representative movement-image
films still exhibit time-images – in fact, movement-images are also time-images. However, these “time-images” are “indirect images of time,” regulated by and contextualized within a conception of time as being chronological and linear (or chrono-linear) and subordinated to movement and space (T-I 237). Time-images proper are for Deleuze “direct images of time” (T-I 132). A simple, broad definition of direct images of time is that they are images that issue from or exhibit a conceptualization of time as Bergson’s originary time, providing a meaningful experience of a human temporal and spatial existence.

Further complicating matters, Deleuze calls all time-images “chronosigns,” whether direct or indirect. However, in Cinema 2 Deleuze takes to referring only to specific direct images of time as “chronosigns,” treating chronosigns as a sub-category of time-images. These are of three “varieties:” two forms of the “order of time” and then “time as series” (Rodowick 82). So it must be kept in mind that when Deleuze speaks of chronosigns in a discussion of movement-images, they are indirect images of time based in a conception of time as chrono-linear, and when Deleuze speaks of chronosigns in the later chapters of Cinema 2 he is speaking of the three varieties mentioned above, which are based in a conception of time as originary time.

The third idea to take into account when considering Deleuze’s two image categories is that, according to Deleuze, there are film images that fall into an intermediate category, “between” movement-images and time-images. These images represent what he calls the “crisis of the movement-image.” In terms of the films that exhibit these images, they are still generally “movement-image films,” but they demonstrate a “transition” between movement-images and time-images. These are not
necessarily films that exhibit a combination of both movement-images and time-images (though they certainly can), but that for Deleuze exhibit a slackening or loosening of the fundamental characteristics of movement-images and move toward the “appearance” of time-images. This area of inquiry regarding film has, for me, particularly ambiguous descriptions and use of film examples. Deleuze’s specific examples include or are drawn from a number of films of the “American auteurs:” Altman’s *Nashville* (1975); *A Wedding* (1978); *Quintet* (1979) and *A Perfect Couple* (1979); Cassavete’s *Too Late Blues* (1962) and *The Killing of a Chinese Bookie* (1976); Scorcese’s *Taxi Driver* (1976); Coppola’s *The Conversation* (1974), and Lumet’s *Dog Day Afternoon* (1981), but also films by Godard, Wenders, Antonioni, Vidor, and what I see as Deleuze’s “favorite” examples in the works of De Sica, Rosselini, Antonioni, Godard and Ozu (though Deleuze wavers between declaring moments in Ozu’s films as being characteristic of the “crisis of the movement-image” and the “direct” time-image) (T-I 207-208).²

In addition, under the heading of “time-image,” as in the title of *Cinema 2*, Deleuze has grouped images that are not quite direct images of time, but that come closer and closer in varying degrees. These are “recollection-images,” “dream-images,” “implied dreams,” various forms of “pure optical” and “pure sound” images, as well as “opsigns” and “sonsigns” (though opsigns, sonsigns, and pure optical and sound images have quite nebulous definitions, and at times it seems that they are one in the same and that they *are* direct images of time, while at other times that they are not the same thing and are *not* direct images of time).
When it comes to discussing film, one way I see to clarify between and describe Deleuze’s image regimes is in terms of their formal strategies, particularly their “narration” and “montage” strategies, and I frame much of my discussion of Deleuze’s project in these terms. On a very basic level, formal strategies of movement-image films essentially exhibit continuity, linearity, cause and effect, and closure, regulated by Deleuze’s sensory-motor schema. From these formal strategies narration “arises” (for Deleuze, narration flows from images and the linkage of images, and not the other way around). Deleuze refers to this as “truthful” and “logical” narration, as opposed to the “falsifying narration” that he sees arise with the “appearance” of time-images (T-I 127). I posit that Deleuze’s account of the formal strategies of movement-images can be related closely to traditional and logical strategies of description and argument. Time-images, on the other hand, exhibit formal strategies that disclose Deleuze’s affinity with the tenets of parataxis, constellation, multiplicity and rhizomatics.

Narrative

In their *New Vocabularies in Film Semiotics* (1992), Stam, Burgoyne and Fitterman-Lewis broadly define narrative as “the recounting of two or more events (or a situation and an event) that are logically connected, occur over time, and are linked by a consistent subject into a whole” (69). What is of prime interest for Deleuze is not determining what narrative is, or defining its “elements,” such as story or plot, fabula or syuzhet, but the interaction of human consciousness and cinematic images; the human effort of fabula construction – for Deleuze, Stam *et al*’s definition of narrative would be a definition of this human effort, but not of narrative itself unless it applied only to movement-images. Bordwell speaks to this human effort when he states that “presented
with two narrative events, we look for causal or spatial or temporal links. The imaginary construct we create, progressively and retroactively, was termed by Formalists the fabula” (qtd. in Stam, *New Vocabularies* 71). Deleuze’s examples of movement-image films exhibit a staggering variety of styles and subjects, but I see a commonality among all of them - the implication of an authenticating and validating “voice” akin to Casetti’s “enunciator – a kind of hybrid of the extradiegetic narrator and implied author” (Stam, *New Vocabularies* 110):

The enunciator’s role is defined here in terms of four functions or manifestations of authority: competence – the knowledge required to relate the story; performance – the ability to relate the story; mandate – designation as the agent responsible for relating the tale; and sanction – the authentication authority to establish the facts of the fictional world, over and above any false reports about the fictional world or its inhabitants. (Stam, *New Vocabularies* 110)

Movement-image films exhibit formal strategies implying that an “authentication authority” can exist. Time-images films, on the other hand, exhibit formal strategies that call this authority, particularly the idea of the “sanction,” into question and give rise to “falsifying narration” (T-I 134).

Falsifying narration should not be confused with what David Bordwell calls “lying narration,” wherein comments of characters or visual events (altogether “images) are purposefully misleading but later become “invalidated” by a “higher” authority (Stam, *New Vocabularies* 117). Christopher Nolan’s *Memento* provides an example of lying narration, where the main character and images of memory mislead viewers and
character alike as to what the “true” story of his life is, but is trumped in the end when the “real” series of events are revealed and “sanctioned.” I believe that Marry Harron’s American Psycho, on the other hand, provides an example of an overall falsifying narration where no one sanctioning authority claims greater truth for the murderous events in Patrick Bateman’s life over any other as being “real” or merely “imaginary.”

A Deleuzian perspective on narrative is not new in itself at its basis. Deleuze’s descriptions of the narrative of movement-image films is similar to descriptions of “classical” narrative developed by many film theorists since the Russian Formalists. His concerns with the temporal qualities of film, the importance of space, time and “style,” what film can do for thought, and that narration arises from formal strategies have been commonplace in studies of narrative for decades. Furthermore, the Formalist interest in formal strategies that “frustrate our fabula-constructing activity . . . [thwarting] the chief method of managing viewing time,” which is the “constructing of a linear fabula,” is entirely befitting of Deleuze’s interest in time-images (Bordwell, qtd. in Stam, New Vocabularies 74, Stam’s elipses and brackets).

Deleuze sounds at times like theorists that claim film is discourse, but at other times he seems to support Martinez-Bonati’s notion of the “mimetic stratum,” where film is not experienced as language or discourse, but as “world” itself (Stam, New Vocabularies 114-115). For Deleuze, however, film is both world and discourse – though not language. Even the basic Deleuzian assumption – that there is not a “narrator” and then a “spectator,” or even a “spectator” and then “film,” but a dynamic interplay of spectator and film, all being images themselves, from which narration arises – does not sound terribly innovative. I believe that what Deleuze does attempt to do in
his contemplation of film that others do not, however, is to provide an elaborate
metaphysics that provides support for why the concerns of earlier narrative theorists are
important to life and even how some seemingly contradictory theories of narrative can all
have valid elements.

I present my interpretation of the basics of Deleuze’s metaphysics in other
chapters of this study, but there a few fundamental principles that I feel should be
discussed here. For Deleuze, how we encounter film is how we encounter the world (a
view he shares with practitioners of cognitivism). This is not a terribly new idea in itself,
but Deleuze brings to bear a deep understanding of the history of philosophical thought
and draws on science, art theory and film studies, going to incredible lengths to provide a
workable metaphysics for his claims involving matter, energy, consciousness, perception,
memory, thought and time. For Deleuze, we, film and the world are all the same “stuff”
– images – moving, changing images. Whatever lines of reasoning Deleuze may pursue,
subjects he may broach, or aspects of film he may discuss in the cinema books, his
project is fundamentally concerned with how film models perception and thought and is
based in an assumption that it does indeed model perception and thought. When he
speaks of the difference between “movement-images” and “time-images” regarding film,
he is ultimately and basically invoking the idea of different formal strategies that can
represent different modes of perception and thought. In developing his argument he must
painstakingly explicate how he believes that “images” and “movement” in film equate to
images and movement in the world. What is at stake is that, if experienceing film is akin
to experiencing the world, if formal strategies model perception and thought, then film
can both reflect and reify modes of perception and thought, or challenge and reinvigorate
them. This is also not a new idea to film studies, which goes back at least as far as Münsterberg’s *The Photoplay* and was a primary concern of the early Russian and Czech formalists. I believe that Deleuze, however, provides some fresh insights in his utilization of Bergson’s metaphysics.

Deleuze cites the Russian filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky in writing that “time in cinema is the basis of bases, like sound in music, color in painting” (T-I 288). Time is the “stuff” of which film is made, before all other elements that might compose it. Therefore, formal strategies of cinema are, for Deleuze, founded in conceptions of time. This is not a particularly original idea, as dramatic structure has been considered to require time since Aristotle’s *Poetics*. Deleuze is not saying, however, that it is time and only time that matters. Drawing on Bergson, Deleuze is fully aware that time and space are inseparable. However, it is time, or more specifically the human conception and perception of time and movement, that is, for Deleuze, also the “basis of bases” of our very modes of existence, the way we connect with and make sense of the world. This claim, along with the equating of image in world to image in film, is the basic manner in which Deleuze equates film and world, and everything else he discusses issues from these two crucial ideas. It is important to note that Deleuze is not specifically concerned with “everything” in film, such as types of colors, but images themselves and more specifically the linkages of them – what is linked and how they are linked, or their relationships to one another. Deleuze is primarily interested in what is “between” images, what “happens” there and how it happens, as well as what the relationships of images are and how these relationships are formed. Deleuze is essentially concerned, then, with a syntagmatic foundation of film.³
Montage

If everything is moving image, including film, then images in film must be more than just shots or individual frames. A film “image” can be any element within a shot (such as an object or person), a portion of a shot, an entire shot, a group of shots, a scene, a group of scenes, or even an entire film. An image can also be visual or auditory or a combination of both. For Deleuze, how images are presented or organized in film relate directly to how “images” of the world “appear” according to modes of existence. In our everyday activities, the “moving images” of the world “appear” and are “normally” and habitually “perceived” as “movement-images” to human consciousness, “formed” or “framed” via attention, intention, selection and the sensory-motor schema. Not surprisingly, then, the vast majority of films exhibit mostly if not entirely movement-images.

Deleuze spends a tremendous amount of effort discussing images themselves, but what is equally or perhaps even more important is the formal presentation, organization, and linkage of images, or how images are put together. In my reading of Deleuze, one can consider “thought” as the “process” or activity of human consciousness’s connecting and relating of images. In film, this is akin to “montage.” From a Deleuzian perspective, however, montage takes on a far broader definition than merely the “editing” of shots or the “cutting” of shots together – though in Deleuze’s very own writing it often seems like it is just editing. Montage involves the linking and relationship of all the “types” of film images discussed above.

Moreover, in Deleuze’s use of the term of “montage” it becomes quite obvious that he not only means the linking of all kinds of images, but also takes into account
many other formal elements that would not traditionally be considered part of “montage” proper. According to Deleuze, drawing from Bergson, human perception filters out or ignores various stimuli or images that are not of interest or use due to physical or mental limitations, intention (having to do with use value), attention and selection or “choice” of what to “look at” or “see.” This happens in the framing of a film image, which has to do with technical as well as aesthetic considerations and implies the relationship of images, but also in what is emphasized in a shot or what gains our attention. Consequently, Deleuze’s idea of “montage” seems to include framing (the choice of the image border and what is seen or even heard and what is not), composition (the arrangement of elements within the frame), camera movement, as well as editing, including sound editing and mixing. Along these lines, lighting, various uses of focus, movement within the frame, even performance (such as gestures, expressions, human movement) can all limit or highlight elements (or images) of a film and must in my view also be incorporated in the Deleuzian conception of montage. Be that as it may, I attempt to limit my use of the term “montage” to the linking of images (though still not just shots), and what could be Deleuze’s grand, ambiguous notion of “montage” I refer to in general as “formal strategies.”

As I have mentioned, Deleuze calls the regime of movement-images the “organic regime,” and the regime of time-images the “crystalline regime.” For purposes of clarity and explication in the remainder of my study, I refer to the montage strategies exhibited by time-image films as “crystalline montage strategies,” their formal strategies as “crystalline formal strategies,” and their narration as “crystalline” (and/or “falsifying”) narration. By the same token, I refer to montage strategies exhibited by movement-image
films as “organic montage strategies,” their formal strategies as “organic formal
strategies,” and narrative as “organic” (and/or “truthful/logical”) narration. The use of
the term “organic” by Deleuze can be quite broad, however, and bears further
explanation.

In _Cinema 1_, Deleuze identifies and elaborately describes four “montage”
strategies exhibited by movement-image films (though there are certainly more and many
variations of each). He calls the first “organic” (as well as “empiricist”) (M-I 55). This
he relates to pre-WWII American cinema and particularly the films of D.W. Griffith (M-I
30-32). The second he claims is Russian “dialectical” montage, which could be either
“organic” or “material,” and the films of Sergei Eisenstein stand as prime examples (M-I
32-40; 55). The third, “quantitative-psychic” montage, is exemplified by pre-war French
cinema “whose recognized leader, in certain respects, was Gance” (M-I 40; 55). The
fourth type of montage exhibited by movement-image films, “intensive-spiritual”
montage, Deleuze identifies with German Expressionism and practically claims is
anything but “organic” (M-I 50-55). However, all of these strategies and films, as it turns
out, belong to the “organic regime.” Though it is obscured by Deleuze’s elaborate and
sometimes eccentric descriptions and analyses of these films, the commonality among
them remains, in my view, that ultimately their formal strategies adhere to linear and
continuous space and time, time “represented” by them is subordinated to space and
movement, and they give rise to organic or truthful/logical narration. Even Deleuze’s
seemingly “un-organic” examples, such as the Robert Wiene’s Expressionist film _The
Cabinet of Dr. Caligari_ (1919) may have a “lying” narration, but it is eventually
subsumed by linearity, continuity and the sensory-motor schema when it is revealed that
practically the entire film has been a figment of the main character’s imagination (Memento can be considered in this way to be like a modern day Caligari).

There are films that may be primarily regulated by organic formal strategies and exhibit organic or truthful narration, but that have images that escape what could be an overall narrative “sanction,” and from them arises a falsifying narration. I believe Peter Jackson’s The Lord of the Rings films contain many such images. One of these occurs in Return of the King, when Frodo has just escaped Shelob’s lair. He collapses from exhaustion onto the dark stony path, but falls into a sunny green meadow and is approached by the Elf queen Galadriel. She reaches out her hand to help him up, and suddenly he arises back outside of Shelob’s lair.

This event plays on both organic and crystalline formal strategies. There is continuity of movement between the stony path, the meadow, and then the path again. We cannot simply say this was a dream, however. Frodo did not fall onto the path, become unconscious, have a dream, and then wake up. Yet Frodo never says anything of this to anyone, and neither does Galadriel, and no “comment” or reaction by him or Galadriel, or any other “voice” in the film validates this event as being either definitively “real” or “imaginary.” There is no direct “link” between this image and the others in the film other than the continuity of movement at the beginning and the end of the shot. This image has become “de-linked” from the others in the film.

The ideas of the de-linking of images and the “indiscernibility” of the real and the imaginary become important in a discussion of time-images. The aforementioned example of Frodo and Galadriel is, in my view, an example of the “many passages” that exist between organic and crystalline formal strategies, though I believe it certainly
comes closer to being crystalline than organic. It also exemplifies, for me, an event where movement-images “morph” or “transform” into a time-image, where it is the very transformation that makes the image stand out and be all the more apparent as something “different,” “strange,” and powerful – and this is not, in my view, just because it is weird. I discuss this “effect” at greater length in Chapter VIII.

Crystalline montage or formal strategies come in a wide variety and are never as clearly “classified” by Deleuze as his four “types” of organic montage. They can also be far more varied and complex than simply the appearance of a seemingly “disconnected” scene or shot like the event in Return of the King that I have just described. However, I believe that it is possible to identify two broad categories of ways that crystalline formal strategies present or organize film images, and that these incorporate many of the characteristics of time-images as described by Deleuze. One of these involves Deleuze’s concept of “crystal-images” and their definitive characteristic of presenting “reflections,” double or multiple images that represent an indiscernibility of the actual and virtual (T-I 68-69). In my reading of Deleuze, this presentation insists that montage involves not just “cuts” between shots, but all film “images.” I explain this further in Chapter VIII of this study, where I make a detailed explication of crystal-images. Another manner in which crystalline formal strategies present images is very close to the Frodo/Galadriel encounter outside of Shelob’s lair, and has much to do with organizing or presenting images in a manner that represents an indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary. There is a sequence in Two Towers that I believe provides an example of this strategy.

This sequence occurs shortly after a typical, “normal,” organic, continuous and linear battle scene where Aragorn has been drug over a cliff by a Warg wolf-creature and
disappeared into the river far below. There is a series of shots of Aragorn, unconscious, floating in the river and coming to rest on the riverbank. “Between” these shots are long dissolves, and superimposed over them are out of focus shots of the running water of the river, adding a “dream-like” quality to the images. These superimpositions remain through the following: a close-up of Aragorn, which goes out of focus and dissolves to a shot of Arwen lying on a couch in Rivendell with her eyes open, then a dissolve to another close-up of Aragorn, still unconscious on the riverbank. In this shot Arwen’s face lowers into frame from an impossible angle, as if floating above Aragorn, and she kisses him gently on the lips, her eyes closed. There is then her voice-over, saying “may the grace of the Valar protect you.” She begins to rise and both she and Aragorn open their eyes at the same time, looking at each other. She continues to rise but fades away before she exits the top of the frame. Aragorn takes a deep breath as if it was his first since he fell in the river. There is then a dissolve to the superimposed water and a dissolve to a pan along Aragorn’s body to his head and a cut to a close-up of his face, where it is obvious that he is unconscious, and this is where the superimpositions of the water end. There is then a series of shots where a horse (Brego) wakes him with much effort and kneels for him to climb on. In another several shots Aragorn is seen riding, wearied and weak. There is then a dissolve to the earlier shot of Arwen lying on the couch, eyes open, and a cut to a wider shot as her father, Elrond, enters the room.

Even with the dream-like quality of this sequence, it is difficult to definitively determine whether the visual and aural image of Arwen “reviving” Aragorn was a dream, a “visitation,” a “vision,” or an actual event that Elves are possibly capable of. Arwen makes no expression or reaction that would indicate a conscious “visitation” to Aragorn.
or that she had a “vision” of him, and makes no indication of this to her father, who has just entered the room, or to anyone else later in the film. We do find out, however, that she was thinking about Aragorn, at least in a general way, while she was lying on the couch, and we already know that her love for him is why she does not wish to do her father’s bidding and leave Middle-earth. Aragorn also never says anything of this event to Arwen or anyone else, even to himself, and makes no indication that he remembers it.

I posit that this “event” escapes narrative sanction. We never know whether it is either definitively “real” or “imaginary.” We have been given “clues” that it was a dream in the dream-like presentation of the images of the sequence, and in that Aragorn was unconscious before and after Arwen’s appearance above him, but I believe this reading of the event is problematized in a number of ways. First, it is never sanctioned as either a dream or as an “actual” event (by the same token, this could be thought of as a “virtual” event, merely “possible” – yet there is no way to “know” for certain if it is supposed to be actual or virtual). Second, by the images of Arwen herself on the couch before and after. Third, I believe we cannot assign the event as having “happened to” or being “initiated by” either Arwen or Aragorn. If it was a dream, or an actual event, was it Aragorn who was dreaming or calling Arwen to him, or the other way around? Or was it both? There is simply no way to tell. The event has been “disconnected” from the linear narrative; separated from the “whole” of the movement-images that predominate in the film.
CHAPTER V. THE WORLD ACCORDING TO DELEUZE

In this chapter I describe some of the basic principles of Deleuze’s Bergsonian metaphysics, elaborating on aspects already mentioned and introducing new ones. My explication may at times sound like science-fiction, or something straight out of The Twilight Zone. Neither Deleuze nor Bergson describe these concepts in this manner, but I believe mine is a valid interpretation of them and a suitable (if peculiar) approach to succinctly elucidating complex principles that unfold over Deleuze’s two books on the cinema (as well as a number of his other writings). Deleuze tends to make broad metaphysical claims for “humankind” as well as “cinema” in general.

Everything is Image

Imagine or image a vast expanse, extending to infinity, a “gaseous state [...] of universal variation, universal undulation, universal rippling” where “there are neither axes nor center, neither right nor left, high nor low” (M-I 59). All is not darkness or void, however, because there is a phosphorescent “glow” everywhere. A great miasma of particle/waves, glowing, vibrating, even glittering or “reflecting,” everywhere.¹ This is the fabric of the universe, the originary primordial ooze, what Ronald Bogue calls “matter-movement” (198).

The miasma flows, undulates, modulates, expands and contracts, tenses and relaxes, constantly and qualitatively changing. Now imagine that moving “things” appear: planets, stars, rocks, streams, land, lakes, and air; animals, plants, people, even the seeming void of outer space – everything in the universe. These “things” are all “formed” of this same phosphorescent, reflective “stuff” and “glow” with its “light.” Their “form,” which is never still or stable, is merely a function of the modulation, flow,
contraction and expansion of this incessantly moving, constantly fluctuating, glowing
primordial ooze. All of these “things” are “images,” in and of themselves, nothing but
“images” - overlapping, intermingling, interacting, moving images, piled one upon the
other, comprising the universe (Bergson, *Matter* 18-20). And all of them glow and
glitter, each of them “reflecting” the other – a vast multiplicity of changing, reflecting
images.

The film *The Matrix* (Wachowski Bros., 1999) offers a simple analogy. When the
characters in the film are in the ship, the *Nebuchadnezzar*, they watch screens that display
what can be thought of as the miasma of the “world” of the Matrix – it is a world of
flowing phosphorescent “numbers” or “glyphs.” There is a scene toward the end of the
film, after Neo “dies” and is brought back to “life” with a kiss, when in the Matrix Neo
“sees” this miasma on his own. He is in a hallway with three Agents, except that
everything is moving phosphorescent glyphs, forming into grids, curves and planes that
differentiate forms and “create” images. Everything is still integrated, connected,
flowing – it’s all just moving “ones and zeros” – but separate images can still be
discerned. And Neo is just another image among them. With his new “view” of the
world, Neo is able to comprehend his “oneness” with the other images and therefore
merge with them to a certain extent, as in when he leaps into the body of Agent Smith,
becoming absorbed by it or one with it.

An extremely important part of this claim that “everything is image” is the idea
that the “image of a thing” and the “thing” itself are inseparable. For Deleuze and
Bergson, an “image” is a “thing’s” existence *and* appearance (Bogue 29; Bergson *Matter*
10). There is not a “thing” and then an “image” of it. They are one and the same, in
every instance. The Matrix again provides an interesting example. Common sense dictates that when Neo is sitting in a chair on the ship and jacked into the Matrix, there is an “image” of him sitting in the chair and then there is an “image” of him in the Matrix. Or we could say that his body in the chair is his “existence” and his “appearance” in the Matrix is his image. However, image, brain, existence, and appearance are so inextricably bound together that they are not just bound but one and the same thing – to “die” in the Matrix is to die in the chair. The characters in the film explain this by stating that the brain is so powerful that if it thinks it is dead, it kills the body, but this situation can also be thought of in more specifically Deleuzian terms – image and thing are the same, a thing’s appearance is its existence.

In addition, since everything is image, images cannot be limited to objects or people. Rocks, trees, rabbits, light, matter, Earth, human beings, even thought, brain, ideas, memories, and concepts, are all “images.” From the tiniest “thing” discovered (or yet undiscovered) by physics to the universe itself, all are images. An idea of something is an image of that thing, whether it be a mathematical concept or the city of Paris. An idea of what the brain looks like as well as how it works can constitute a “brain-image.” Creations of the imagination are just as much an “image” as a spoon in one’s hand. A particular philosophy of world is a particular “image of world.” Ideas or explanations of what perception is would be “perception-images.” Ideas or explanations of what thought is would be “images of thought” or “thought-images.” Memories, as well as ideas of how memory works, are “memory-images.” Ideas of what time is, how it functions, what its form may be, are “time-images.” An idea of what movement is can be called a “movement-image.”
Equally important is the idea that images can be made up of constituent images, or that a group or set of images can together form a larger image and conversely larger images are comprised of smaller images. There are component images of mathematical concept-images, such as formula-images. A Paris-image can be made up of city street-images, building-images and cloud overhead-images, and those component images can be made up of an unquantifiable number of other images. The image of a human being includes foot-image, hand-image, eye-image, skin-image, organ-image, cell-image, molecule-image, etc…

Movement

All images move incessantly, and movement and motion are change. They are part of the miasma that never stops vibrating and undulating. And they move in accordance to natural laws. Stones or stone-images move in reaction to being struck by other stone-images, by force of gravity-image or rushing water-image. Rock-images roll and river-images flow. They and their constituent images expand and contract due to changes in temperature-images. Temperatures change due to other natural moving images. All these images have an equal and opposite reaction to one another, like billiard balls (Bogue 29). This is “natural” or “normal” movement (Bergson, Matter 20; Rodowick 86-87).

But there are “things” that can have “abnormal,” or “aberrant movement” as well (T-I 36-41; Bogue 199; Rodowick 218). These are “living-images” or images “produced” by living images, as opposed to the non-living images described above (Bogue 30). A human being can walk uphill, against gravity, or against the wind. A rock rolls down the hill, but a person can reach to halt it and then fling it from him/herself in
any direction he/she pleases, and even with greater energy than it brought to him/her. People can take pieces of nature, wood, dirt, process it and build a home. In a similar manner a plant as living-image can process earth and water and build itself. A rabbit can see, smell, or hear a coyote and run in the opposite direction, zigzagging to escape, (without having bounced off of it, as a billiard ball would have to do, as slave to “normal” movement). Even thought, as a moving image and a constituent image of the living-image, moves with aberrant movement. Whether normal or aberrant, movement itself is also an image, a “movement-image.” The abnormal movement of living images can be “naturalized” or considered “normal” in our everyday, common sense world ruled by Deleuze’s “sensory-motor schema” of common sense, habit, stimulus and response, action and reaction, cause and effect.

**Movement, Matter and Energy**

The declaration that everything is moving image becomes more complex, or perhaps more simple, with the idea that, if everything is moving image formed of this basic substance, this primordial ooze or miasma, then images must be moving matter, or “matter-movement.” Matter is “not something hidden behind the image, but on the contrary the absolute identity of the image and movement. ‘You may say that my body is matter or that it is image.’ The *movement-image* and *flowing matter* are strictly the same thing” (M-I 58-59, emphasis his; inside quote from Bergson). Images are not strictly moving matter, however, but both matter and energy, which are one and the same thing, where neither can be created or destroyed, only traded, “changed” in the constant flux of the miasma. Hence, we can say that matter equals movement, that energy equals movement, or that there is matter-movement. And all of these are equal to image. All
images, then, are both matter and energy, whether they be objects, people, “visual,” “tactile,” “auditory” or “mental” images. To aid in his explication, Deleuze equates, image, movement, matter, and energy to light – “the image is movement is matter is light” (M-I 60). Therefore image = movement = matter = energy = light. They are not each deduced from the other, they are each other. Thus, there is light in everything, and everything can be thought of as both matter and light.

Movement, Space and Time

In our everyday world, it simply makes sense that movement and motion, or change, be measured in terms of space. Very generally, we can make a measurement of where something is in space, then measure it again, and then calculate how much as well as how fast it is moving through space. Then we can naturally predict, more or less, where it will be in space in the future, or how much its position will change. In the same manner, we can have a measurement of volume, density or external dimensions from before, measure these again “now,” compare them, and predict with some assurance where these measurements might be at some point in time “after.”

What is only implied in the above “calculations” is time. Common sense dictates that movement or motion can only take place through space and over time. In our normal, everyday world, time itself is conceived of in terms of space and movement or motion, as even being subordinate to space and movement or motion. We think about how much time it takes for something to move across a certain amount of space – to travel, to dissipate, to grow, to change. When we speak of the running time of a movie, we think about how long it is. The form of time is thought of, conceptualized, or imaged, as linear, as a line that runs through everything. The present is current, now, and is
merely a point that moves at a constant and consistent pace along the line of time. This movement of the present, along the line of time, is measured chronologically, by calculated ticks of a clock – the movement of minute and second hands that cover so much space – or the movement of the Earth as it rotates so far in space (Bogue 218). Everything before the present or behind the present on the line of time is the past, and the depth of the past can also be measured chronologically, in terms of space and time. Everything ahead of the present on the line is future, and it is measurable in the same way. In our everyday world, then, the form of time is a fixed line. Time is determinate, consistent, universal, and fixed. The line may spiral or modulate, but it is never broken. This is the nice curvilinear form of time understood and espoused by Hegel and Marx, where the line is a picture of eternity, static, and we simply “move” along it in a dialectical unfolding of the Ideal.

According to the Theory of Relativity, space and time are interchangeable, like matter and energy. There is not space and then time, but “space-time.” Bergson’s response to this was to attempt to come up with a metaphysics wherein this could be possible. If the theory of relativity is to be taken seriously, then a single determinate, consistent, universal line of time is not possible, and time is no longer measurable as discrete points along a line or as a function of space. In this case, now it can be said that image = space = time as well as movement/motion, matter, energy, and light.

For Bergson, time is not linear, it is not chronological, flowing from the past through the present to the future along a line from measurable point to measurable point, but has the form of his “originary” time. Time does “move,” but its motion is simply “change.” It changes constantly and even unpredictably. Time itself is change. For
Bergson, time exists as coinciding virtual past, actual present, and possible future, all at once, and all the time, while it changes, all the time, at every immeasurably tiny present moment (Rodowick 82).

At its fundamental level, Bergson’s logic is that we cannot measure the present moment – not because it is so infinitesimally small, but because it is simply immeasurable. There is no point we can look at or calculate and say “that’s it, that’s the present.” Once we try to fix it, capture it, it is not gone, but has become part of another present moment in a constant process of change. There is no “place” where we can put a dividing line between the present moment and the past or future. There cannot be a point where the present ends and past begins, or where the present ends and the future begins. Therefore, the past must exist “in” the present; be “simultaneous” with the present.

For Bergson and Deleuze, time only makes sense if it is conceived of as constantly forking, or splitting in two, between (actual) present and (virtual) past. The very point of this splitting is unquantifiable, and the splitting itself is constant in every immeasurable present moment. One cannot perceive, or even conceive of, the difference between virtual past and actual present. The distinction between the two is “indiscernible” (Rodowick 82). What we have, then, is really a continual past-present. And present and past “reflect” each other in every moment, in every image, just as every image “reflects” the other. The past is not behind us or fixed, as we “normally” think of it to be, but exists only as potential, bound up in the present in the form of memory.

Neither Bergson nor Deleuze discuss the future at any great length, but the subject of the past, or past-present, is treated in detail in the cinema books. In his contemplation of Bergson, Milic Capek deduces that the future simply does not exist (Bogue 204). Ronald
Bogue however, deduces that if “the whole of the past is contracted into the present and thrust into the future,” then “the future may be seen as a projection, or forward thrust, of the past” (213). I believe this can be taken a bit further and proffer that the future exists as an activity of thought, intention and the attentive consciousness, much like the past exists as memory (I discuss both memory and thought more thoroughly in Chapters VI and VII). Deleuze’s discussion of the form of time becomes wrapped up in Bergson’s complex and somewhat unwieldy concept of “durée” (which I discuss most fully in Chapter VI), which is an extension of the concept of originary time and involves consciousness, perception, memory, thought, matter, intention, attention, and the “plane of immanence.”

**The Plane of Immanence**

To review, “everything is image” and “everything moves”. The world or universe is a great primordial ooze or miasma forming into moving images. “Everything” is all that is seen or not seen, discovered or undiscovered, touchable or untouchable, known or unknown, thought (of) or un-thought (of), conceived or un-conceived, actual or virtual, real or imaginary. Groups or sets of images can constitute a thing, and that thing, as a conglomerate of its constituent images, is also an image. And image = matter = movement/motion = energy = light = space = time. There are “in” the world or universe a countless number of images, and an infinite number of ways to configure these images or to create different sets of images, with each set itself also being an image. This limitless set of images, with infinitely reconfigurable sub-sets of images, is what Deleuze calls the “plane of immanence.”

³
Deleuze’s choice of the term “immanence” is telling, while at the same time being subtly ambiguous (as are many of his terms and concepts). “Immanence” has to do with a state of being immanent; a pervading presence. Theologically, this would be a “pervading presence of God” (*World Book* 1055). Philosophically, the “immanent” has been defined as “operating from inside a thing or person; not external or transcendent,” as well as defined with the statement that “by the same process of fusion philosophers assume that one thing exists in another, in which case the former is said to be immanent in the latter” (Blackburn 187; *World Book* 1055). A layman’s definition may be limited almost entirely to “remaining within, inherent.” Deleuze’s “immanence” has a sense of all these, but is not all of them entirely and none of them alone. It also carries with it connotations of the related term “imminent,” which has to do with the impending and immediate, and “eminent,” if it is thought of as not just that which stands above all others, but that which in a way holds domain over all others or keeps its constituent parts together. Gregory Flaxman states that the plane of immanence is “a transcendental, preindividual, and even prephilosophical field of infinite variation” (7). The plane of immanence certainly may be “preindividual” and “prephilosophical,” but I must clarify the difference between “transcendence” and immanence. Claire Colebrook writes that, the key error of western thought has been transcendence. We begin from some term which is set against or outside life, such as the foundation of God, subjectivity or matter. We think life and thought which judges or represents life. Transcendence is just that which we imagine lies outside (outside thought or outside perception). Immanence, however, has no outside and nothing other than itself. (xxiv)
Transcendence, or “the transcendent,” is generally considered as “what we experience outside of consciousness or experience,” where we “experience the real world” as “other than us or as external” (Colebrook xxix). Deleuze does not embrace “the transcendent” because for him everything is immanent, but in a strange twist of terminology he does consider himself a “transcendental” philosopher akin to Kant and Husserl in that he takes a “transcendental approach” to his philosophy of world. For Deleuze, thinking about the transcendental is to think that which is a necessary universal feature of “everything,” meaning the world and relationships between things. (xxix). He seriously engages with the question of how it is that “something like a distinction between outside and inside emerges” to human consciousness, insisting that “we need to know how the experience of the world as a real and external world is possible” (xxix).

Be that as it may, when thinking of the plane of immanence in terms of the cinema books, it can be thought of essentially as the infinite set of all images. The plane of immanence, which is everything, is an image in itself, but this “everything” is expressed in and by the infinite number of images that comprise it. But “immanent” can also mean “in the mind; subjective” (World Book 1055), and even “in the image.” For Deleuze, the plane of immanence has to do with both the “subjective” and “objective,” and his claim, taken from Bergson, that the difference between subjective and objective is itself merely “in the mind.” Deleuze quotes Bergson in stating that “movements of matter are very clear, regarded as images, and there is no need to look in movement for anything more than what we see in it” (T-I 58). Deleuze continues by stating that “an atom is an image that extends to the point to which its actions and reactions extend. My body is an image, hence a set of actions and reactions. My eye, my brain, are images,
parts of my body. How could my brain contain images since it is one image among
others? External images act on me, transmit movement to me, and I return movement:
how could images be in my consciousness since I am myself an image, that is,
movement” (T-I 58). D.N. Rodowick adds that,

the image is not a signifier representing movement here nor vice versa.
The image is immanent in movement: what we see is intrinsically what we
get. Neither Bergson nor Deleuze will hold with solipsistic arguments
concerning the subjectivity or illusoriness of individual perception. This
is why the psychology of Bergson’s Matter and Movement is inseparable
from a metaphysics of his Creative Evolution. (215)

For Bergson, as for Deleuze, the idea that everything is image means that there is
always a problem with the binary separation of inside and outside, subject and object,
mind and body, this and that. Therefore, when reading Deleuze, any time we may
wonder if something is inside or outside, subjective or objective, we might consider that
the two are conflated all the time, and the answer should always be that it is really both
and neither one alone.

The plane of immanence of images is a “virtual” universe, or virtual world, a set
of all possible worlds or possibilities of the world. It is virtual in that it and its images-
as-signs have not yet been realized or “actualized.” Actual and virtual are ambiguous
terms or concepts for Deleuze. As images emerge as “things” from the primordial ooze
they “appear” in the world to and amongst other “things.” These “things” bear with them
characteristics of “originary time.” In emerging, or “appearing,” part of the “actuality” of
a thing is its realized virtuality. The concept of the virtual here includes “potentiality,”
“power,” and “reflection” – and none of the associations with “fake” or merely
“illusory,” as “virtual reality” might suggest. A common antonym of “virtual” may be
“real,” but the virtual is very real. All images carry with them virtualities that are
realized, or actualized, as well as unrealized virtualities or potential – potential for
becoming (or change). They indeed bear relationships with all manner of virtualities on
the plane of immanence. We can think of these “things” as “images” because everything
“reflects” everything else, each is a window on everything else, or following Leibniz,
everything is a window on the world.

I have thus far in this chapter attempted to describe some of the most basic
principals of Deleuze’s Bergsonian metaphysics of “world.” I have not yet elaborated on
how it is that, within this metaphysics, human beings as living images modally connect
with and exist “within” this world. If the plane of immanence is the infinite set of all
images, everywhere, made up of the universal, universe-wide miasma, and is entirely
virtual, then how do we as human beings “see” and “use” such staggeringly complex and
boundless stuff? How do we comprehend the seemingly incomprehensible? In other
words, how do we “make sense” of this world, and ourselves? Also, what are “we” in
Deleuzian/Bergsonian terms, and how do we “appear” in this vast universe?

The Special Image

Picture again the infinite miasma of glowing, oscillating particle/waves, flowing,
changing, expanding and contracting into and out of moving images. Now picture,
imagine, or image that a flat something-image exists as part of this world-image with the
rock-images, stream-images, air-images and animal-images. A two-dimensional object,
incredibly thin, floating vertically, say, six feet off the ground. Its surface is protective, so
it resembles a mirror. This floating mirror-disk is also an “image,” part of and not separate from the other images of the plane of immanence, and is made up of the same phosphorescent “stuff,” radiating light with the same intensity. It is a living-image, and can move with aberrant or abnormal movement, but it is a “special image” (Rodowick 43). It is human (this description of the “special image” is of course more figurative than literal, but it should aid in understanding Deleuze’s metaphysics of consciousness, the mind, thought and perception).

In the surface of the mirror-disk is reflected the phosphorescent surfaces of the moving rivers, the stones, and the effects of the wind. This is the sensory “side” of the disk, picking up sensations of moving images, and these sensations are not just visual, but an aggregate of sight, smell, touch and sound, or visual, olfactory, tactile and auditory images. The disk does not just sense or move to gather senses, it moves in response to the senses; in response to the movement, to the stimulus, that the senses gather. This movement that the disk makes, this “action” it performs, is what happens on the other “side” of the disk, “opposite” of the reflective side, and this we can call the “motor” side. In the normal, everyday, common sense scheme of things, the special image functions through sense-stimulus and motor-response, the governing mode of existence of the “sensory-motor schema.” The sensory-motor schema can also be considered to be a mode of thought or way of thinking. For the purposes of my explication here, thought can be considered as something that happens “inside” the floating mirror-disk.

As this moving, reflective disk advances, retreats, swings its “face” this way and that, different parts of the plane of immanence are sampled or sectioned. Mobile sections of the moving world in front of it are reflected in it, or more appropriately reflected from
it, back onto the world. Also, the disk, because it is limited in size and scope, cannot take
in everything at once. It cannot “look” everywhere at once, and its sensory surface is
only so big. The surface has boundaries or edges. One could even say that what it “sees”
is “framed.” The mobile, framed sections that are sampled are sets - moving, fluidly
framed sets of moving images sectioned from the plane of immanence. These images
and sets of images get put together, are related to one another, “inside” the mirror-disk.
Now, which images and sets from the plane immanence are “seen,” as well as how they
are connected or related to each other, are limited by physical sensory capabilities and
mental processing capacity (we cannot sense everything, and to be mentally aware of all
sense stimuli in every moment would drive us insane). In addition, which images and
sets from the plane of immanence are “seen,” as well as how they are connected or
related to one another, is also a function of the mirror-disk’s unique capacity for
attention, intention, and selection – or for Bergson, “discernment” (Rodowick 36).
Attention/intention are bound up with the sensory-motor schema of stimulus-response,
action-reaction, cause and effect, which is “inherited” by human beings from the basic
“laws” nature. The sensory-motor schema at work with an attentive consciousness, for
Deleuze, govern or regulate both perception and thought, essentially defining the
prevailing mode of existence of human beings, where common sense and an image’s (or
“thing’s”) utility to us determine our thoughts of the world, our actions “in” it, and our
reactions “to” it.

As the floating, mobile mirror-disk perceives more and more, it becomes after a
manner less “reflective.” Some of the light that falls on it is not reflected, not registered
in its surface. It falls dead, is ignored. In a way, it is filtered and the light from certain
things or portions of the world merely flow through or are absorbed as fewer and fewer images gain the attention of the mirror-disk as it becomes “familiar” with them. Another way to speak of this is that the mirror-disk becomes filled with images (memories) and reflects these back on the world in “automatic recognition,” forming the world to the images that interest it (T-I 44-45). What is not registered is what the disk is not interested in, or is *no longer* interested in, or that it knows that it cannot *use* or does not need. Rocks cannot do this. To a rock, everything is as it is, just another image, and the rock “reflects” everything equally, or “sees” everything in its entirety.

Now, Deleuze and Bergson insist that all things are “conscious” in a way, and this would include rocks – but this means that everything “reflects” everything or “registers” everything else and all things bear with them relationships to everything else. When something “acts” on them they change, the “reflection” of the world is altered. “Images” and “images of images” can then be spoken of in two ways. The first is in regards to the relationship of one image “appearing” in relationship to other images. The second is that there is the “appearance” of a “thing” to a reflective, attentive consciousness, intelligence or thought, having to do with to “look” in a certain way or to “look” a certain way. An “image” “appears” to the mirror-disk as a “movement-image,” where the “appearance” is not merely emerging or coming to be, but coming to “look” or have a “look” to the mirror-disk. One stone does not “look” to another stone, but “appears” because it has a “look” to the mirror-disk. This is how the human being registers this “image.”

In a world governed by the sensory-motor schema, common sense dictates that movement of or in an object can only be perceived in relation to that object’s surroundings of which it is part and its constituent images that make it a set. And beyond
its immediate surroundings, greater movements can only be conceived of in relation to a
“Whole.” A Whole must be grasped at, imaged, even *imagined*, in order for movement
as well as relationships to be discerned. Due to its limitations, the floating mirror-disk
must take in the world in pieces. Space pieces and time pieces. Through these sections it
“constructs” the possibility of a “Whole” in which to contextualize images, a whole of
space and a whole of time. But the Whole can never be taken in all at once. It is
necessary to conceive of, but it is always “open,” something that is and must be grasped
*at* but is never truly grasped. However much we may try to think of it otherwise, the
Whole is never-ending, never closed, never “totalized.” It is important here to note that
the Whole and the plane of immanence are not the same thing, though often when reading
Deleuze they seem to be. The plane of immanence simply exists, or subsists, stretching
to infinity in all directions and on all “planes.” The Whole can never be more than a
whole. No matter how it is thought of the Whole is a mental construct, and can only ever
be a portion or section or *some of* the images that comprise the plane of immanence. As I
mentioned, time is also an element or quality of the Whole. This is the “normally”
chronological line of time that is also a mental construct. Images are “seen” in relation to
movement from “before” to “after,” “here” to “there.” For Bergson, time itself plays the
most important role as the “Open” characteristic of the “Open Whole” (T-I 179).

**Signaletic Matter**

As I stated earlier, the plane of immanence of images (which is itself “made of”
the primordial ooze) is entirely virtual. Its images have not yet been realized, or
“actualized” – meaning they have not yet been recognized, analyzed, named, described,
classified, categorized, put in relation or, in essence, put to use. A human being is just as
virtual as any other image on the plane of immanence, but with the emergence or “appearance” of an attentive, intuitive, selective human consciousness, the reflective, image-like quality of the moving images that comprise the plane of immanence is “changed” into what Deleuze describes as “signaletic matter” or “signaletic material” (T-I 29). This material is “reflective” and comes to “appear” to the special image – but is still entirely virtual. I must note that, in my reading of Deleuze, it is the complexity of the reflective quality of actual present and virtual past, due to the conception of time as originary time, that “gives” the “ooze” its “primordial” as well as image-like or signaletic quality, not human consciousness. These qualities exist as possibility “prior” to or “beneath” the appearance of human consciousness. An intentive, attentive human consciousness certainly brings a new way of “reflecting” images, but in terms of the idea that all things reflect or “image” all other things, these qualities do or did not “wait” for the structure of a human subjectivity to give them “existence.”

The signaletic material is, for Deleuze, in itself only an “utterable,” and not yet an “utterance,” meaning its “images” act as signs, but as signs that are not yet put into language (T-I 29). It is “a-signifying,” anterior to language, that which is before or beneath language (T-I 29). However, “when language gets hold of this material (and it necessarily does so), then it gives rise to utterances which come to dominate or even replace the images and signs, and which refer in turn to pertinent features of a language system, syntagms and paradigms, [which are] completely different from those we started with” (T-I 29). Deleuze’s work in deducing signs from images in film is therefore, for him, not an act of linguistics nor of traditional semiology, but following Charles Sanders Peirce, a “pure semiotics” (Rodowick 7).
As I mentioned above, an important factor in what makes the miasma an a-signifying, signaletic material has to do with a conceptualization of time. Movement must involve time, as part of the material itself, since the plane of immanence is made up of space, matter, energy, and time. Through a qualitative relationship between matter, energy, time, and now the presence of an attentive, intent consciousness, the plane of immanence constantly changes in “duration” – “qualitative” duration. This change through duration is a quality of what Bergson calls “durée” – which is a quality, if not the quality of human consciousness’s experience of the plane of immanence. Durée involves change, is in essence itself time, or change, but more precisely it can be thought of as the human experience of change as derived from the concept of the originary form of time.

Images that enter into this equation that I have not mentioned are “images” of memory – and they are vital to the entire process of how we modally connect with the miasma. Memory is what provides any sense of continuity to our lives and to the world, and is necessary to providing any sense of movement – where a thing was compared to where it is now, and now and now. Memory is an important feature of durée, (which is not exactly the same thing as “duration,” which can be thought of as a simple analytical measure, even though many authors writing on Deleuze, and even Deleuze himself, may use the two terms interchangeably). Ronald Bogue quotes Milic Capek, noting that durée is “the most difficult, most elusive as well as the least known and least understood part of Bergson’s thought” (204). In addition, “Capek notes that even Bergson’s most ardent admirers . . . were confused and embarrassed by this aspect of Bergson’s thought” (Bogue 204). Deleuze’s explication of durée is no less difficult. Durée involves so many things – signaletic material, matter, movement, the form of time, memory, change, human
intention, and the list goes on and on – that even a basic understanding of Deleuze’s take on it as a concept can only even possibly arise through a reading of Bergson’s writings, Deleuze’s Bergsonism (1966), as well as his entire cinema project. For my part, a firm grasp of Bergson’s or even Deleuze’s thought on durée is not essential to my project. However, to ignore it completely would be a dereliction. The point I wish to make is that to consider the originary miasma as signaletic material without consideration of durée (and memory) is to overly simplify signaletic material even more than I already have.

Durée is not simply time, an object, a material or an energy. For Bogue, “put simply, memory is the coexisting virtual past, durée the flow of [originary] time whereby that virtual past presses forward into the actual present toward an open future” (16, emphasis his). Durée also “unfolds itself into the future in the various forms of the creative and ever-changing universe,” and this “creative” and “ever-changing” unfolding of durée is what Bergson calls “élan vital” or the vital life force (Bogue 16). Durée is essentially the open and creative quality of the universe, deriving from the originary form of time and the human experience of time. It is incessant change and possibility of the unpredictably new in every present instant. One way to think of durée is that it is the very experience of change through movement via an equation of memory and the now. Another way to think of durée is in terms of the the “experience” of “doing” in the absolute present, the experience of the time of “doing” right now, without a conscious effort to “measure” time; an experience of change, which is time, in the moment.

Deleuze discusses this aspect of durée in terms of “waiting,” experiencing the change of time, but not “waiting for.” Human beings may not often “experience” the originary form of time, from which durée derives, in our everyday, sensory-motor “world,” so part
of what Deleuze is up to with film is to explain that films that exhibit time-images or crystalline formal strategies can possibly provide certain viewers an experience of it, as well as of the essential open and creative quality of the universe that is durée. I return to the concept of durée in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VI. ACTIVITIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Consciousness

After durée, the Deleuzian/Bergsonian conceptions of consciousness, or the mind (as opposed to the brain), thought, perception, memory, and their relationships to each other are perhaps the most difficult to grasp in reading the cinema books, and it does not help that “consciousness” itself is “possibly the most challenging pervasive source of problems in the whole of philosophy” (Blackburn 76). In the cinema books, consciousness, thought, and perception often seem to be interchangeable due to how the terms are used, and this carries over to some degree into the work of many scholars who write on the cinema books. I attempt to use each term as having a particular meaning only. Still, as “everything is image” – consciousness, perception and thought included – they cannot be completely separated from one another.

The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy says of consciousness that “whatever complex biological and neural processes go on backstage, it is my consciousness that provides the theatre where my experiences and thoughts have their existence, where my desires are felt and where my intentions are formed” (Blackburn 76). Consciousness is an overall backdrop of awareness. But for Deleuze, drawing on Bergson, “consciousness is in things” (Bogue 47-48). In my reading of Deleuze, consciousness is not really “in” things, but pervades everything, is “part” of all the material of the universe. The point Deleuze is trying to make in my view is that we as human beings are not alone in being conscious - all things are “conscious.” Consciousness flows, modulates and moves, dilates and contracts, dissipates and concentrates, tenses and relaxes, as part of the originary miasma. Remember also that everything is image, and images are different
images merely as a result of changes in tension and concentration of the primordial ooze.

By the same token, human beings are foci for consciousness, they tend toward a tensing, concentration or dilation of consciousness. Inanimate, non-organic objects maintain only a very relaxed “consciousness” – this is not to say that everything is conscious in varying degrees – everything may be conscious, but human consciousness is different in kind.

At times when reading the cinema books it seems that Deleuze is saying all consciousness originates in human beings, and then flows from human beings and pervades, seeps into every fiber of the “rest” of the universe (and it must be kept in mind that “universe” does not mean the infinite “way out there,” but every single thing from that which is closest, even “inside,” to that which is farthest away – including each other as human beings). But this would imply a kind of idealism, which I believe Deleuze would deny. Some of Deleuze’s statements regarding consciousness may sound like this because, for him, consciousness is extremely concentrated for human beings and so much less so for non-organic objects. Be that as it may, it is probably best to hold to the basic Deleuzian/Bergsonian claim that everything is image and say that consciousness is both “inside” and “outside” human beings due to the “reflecting” or “mirroring” quality of everything, including the human mirror-disk. A rock may reflect and be reflected by its world, but this is an indiscriminate reflection as versus the discriminate reflection of the mirror-disk originated by and toward the formation of concepts. For my part, one way of thinking about Deleuzian consciousness is that it is everywhere, in everything, and when it flows through human beings (and everything flows, modulates, moves, “reflects” through their relationship to time to everything else), it “changes,” becomes tightly
dilated, focused, attentive, intentive, even selective, but it also flows from human beings, relaxing as it goes, and pervades everything.

Now, having briefly discussed consciousness, I wish to return to Bergson’s concept of durée. In my understanding, durée is intrinsically tied to Bergson’s concept of originary time where past, present and future exist mutually in every moment – but it is also tied to consciousness – which is, as I have stated, both “in” us and “in” things. So durée is also “in” us and “in” things – but it is directly related to, relies upon, our experience of time as originary time and not as linear and chronological time. It is we who “formulate” durée from the primordial ooze, it is “created” by our consciousness, and since everything is image, and our consciousness pervades everything (the “consciousnesses” of all other things or the world), so does durée. It is because of durée, a factor of which is human attentive consciousness, that “things” “appear” and are made part of what we are aware of – and durée also informs these things. The attentive and intensive “nature” of human beings “changes” the “consciousness” of the world, focuses it, and “mutates” the originary form of time to the chrono-linear, “re-configuring” the troublesome form of originary time in an effort to “make sense” of things. “Raw” durée bears the mutual actual and virtual quality of things, makes things bear potential for appearing anew, but this potential is by and large “masked” by the sensory-motor schema in our normal, everyday mode of existence.

Memory

Deleuze’s conceptualization of memory, drawn from Bergson, is vitally important to Deleuze’s entire project, and applies to both his discussion of movement-images and time-images. As I have discussed, in Bergson’s conception of the originary form of time,
the past, present and future paradoxically co-exist in the present only. The present, or a present, cannot exist without the or a past by which to judge it, therefore bringing the past to the present in every present moment, and the past is but a former present. The only past is that which is carried along in the present. How does the past exist in the present? As memory. Essentially, for Deleuze and Bergson, the past *is* memory, and only memory. We, as human beings, “create” memory as an assemblage of images, creating particular and personal “memory-images.” Like consciousness and durée, though, or even *with* consciousness and durée, memory flows out of human beings and pervades the other images of the world. Memory then is in us and in the world. The only subjectivity is the particular assemblage of these images. Hence Deleuze says,

> memory is not in us; it is we who move in a Being-memory, a world-memory. In short, the past appears as the most general form of an already-there, a pre-existence in general, which our recollections presuppose, even our first recollection if there was one, and which our perceptions, even the first, make use of. […] From this point of view the present itself exists only as an infinitely contracted past which is constituted at the extreme point of the already-there. The present would not pass on if it was not the most contracted degree of the past. In fact it is striking that the successive is not the past but the present which is passing. (T-I 98)

How memory exists for Deleuze is intrinsically tied to the form of originary time. Since time is for Deleuze not linear and chronological, then neither are past or memory. The past is not behind us like a road we have traveled, but a vast amorphous store of memory. Alain Badiou claims that for Deleuze history is timeless, all of history is this
moment, contemporaneous with us, and for Deleuze we can “leap” to different parts or “sheets” of history, or past moments, and from past moments to other past moments, in no chronological order (T-I 98-100). We do not bring these moments forward into the present, they are contemporary with us in every present moment. History is now. The present moment contains everything, all of the past, all of the present, and opens to all of the future.

Bergson states in his An Introduction to Metaphysics that in the present “every feeling, however simple it may be, contains virtually within it the whole past and present of the being experiencing it, and, consequently, can only be separated and constituted into a “state” by an effort of abstraction or of analysis,” which ties into the idea of the activity of linking back to the “thing” of concepts in human consciousness (25). In the regime of movement-images, where our mode of existence is regulated by the sensory-motor schema and common sense, the past is “behind” us and the future “ahead.” Time-images, on the other hand, disclose qualities of durée, the Deleuzian/Bergsonian notion of memory, and the originary form of time.

Perception

Perception, like consciousness and durée, can be a very slippery concept where clear definitions are hard to pin down, especially when it comes to discussing Deleuze and Bergson’s ideas of the relationships between perception, memory and thought.

First, let us consider the floating mirror-disk or special-image that I spoke of earlier to be the human mind and body together, or mind/body. Deleuze, following Bergson, characterizes the human mind/body itself as a “gap,” or “interval,” and Bergson goes so far to as characterize it as “a void, nothing but a void” in its basic, primordial
form (T-I 211). It is a “space,” break, or interruption in the continuous flux and modulation of space-time-matter-movement (the primal miasma from which the plane of immanence of images is “materialized”). It is called the interval or gap in that it is “between” the (rest of the) images of the plane of immanence. It is engaged in the activity of reception, processing and organization of images, between received (initially perceived) moving images and returned moving images (actions) where images are put together and movement can be altered or redirected.

Bergson also calls the interval/gap a “center of indetermination” (Bogue 30). “Indetermination,” however, “has a specific sense here: it is a range of responses available for selection as the appropriate response or action with respect to an analyzed stimulus or perception” (Rodowick 87). While for Bergson “this definition fits any living entity, no matter how simple or complex” (Rodowick 87), in human beings the range of responses, as well as the range of perceivable images or stimulus, is the broadest of all living things (that we know of). In addition, “center,” has only to do with an activity of these things happening and has nothing to do with it being a “place” or a center of all things. Subjectivity or perspective are only a particular organization of particular sets of images and this cannot, for Bergson and Deleuze, constitute a genuine separation of subject and object.

Since “perception” itself can be such a variegated and awkward term, I feel it is helpful to think of it as having three qualities or “forms” in regards to Deleuze and Bergson: initial perception, perception in a grander form, and the “perception-image” (T-I 71). For Bergson, as for Deleuze, initial, basic perception is what happens at contact. It is to “sense.” On this level, even rocks perceive. When one rock hits another, they


“perceive” or “sense” each other, and have “perception.” A flower can perceive or sense the Sun, or at least the light that comes from the Sun, is contacted by it, opening in response to it in the morning, following it throughout the day and closing at night. It might seem that a rabbit that visually, aurally or olfactorily encounters a coyote has not actually come in “contact” with it. However, the “image” of the coyote where it is and the “image” that the rabbit receives of it are one and the same thing – there are not two coyote-images. Therefore the rabbit-image and coyote-image have indeed come in “contact.” Everything is indeed in “contact” with everything else. For Bergson and Deleuze, perception, like consciousness, is “in” things, and not merely “in” the mind. Remember that there is not an image of something, the image is the thing. However, it can be easy to interpret Deleuze and Bergson’s idea of perception as being quite animistic, where rocks are every bit as conscious or perceptive as human beings. I have claimed that for Deleuze everything is image all the way up – and not all the way down. From a Deleuzian point of view, we cannot think first of human consciousness or perception and then extrapolate all the way down to rocks in terms of the same consciousness or perception. With Deleuze, we begin with the idea of images and then extrapolate up to human consciousness and perception.

The grander idea of perception would have to do with the entire process of perception and perceiving, including basic initial perception or contact and perception as an act or function, whether of an inorganic object or living being. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy claims that a conceptualization of perception “explains how we can have direct acquaintance of the world” (Blackburn 280). This falls in line with Bergson and Deleuze, but for them perception happens at the thing perceived and not “within” the
perceiver: “perception is in things,” having to do with attentive, intentive, selective human consciousness focusing on things. A traditional definition of perception states that “to have perception is to be aware of the world as being such-and-such a way, rather than to enjoy a mere modification of sensation” (Blackburn 280). That definition is applicable to Deleuze and Bergson’s ideas of human perception as a mode of “appearing,” coming to be, or coming to be for another thing, in this case coming to be for a human being driven by attention and intention to selection, regulated by the sensory-motor schema, where things “appear” as particular “images.” But for Deleuze “perception” is a bit broader concept. “To be aware of the world as being such and such a way” is befitting of his “perception-image,” and applies to the regime of “movement-images.” But “a mere modicum of sensation” can also be considered a quality of initial perception. Moreover, for Deleuze, there is an alternative (or are alternatives) to either of these definitions: perception that is “in between” the two, between a mere sensation but before or alternatively to awareness of the world as being such and such a way, where consciousness is in the “process” of “making sense” of the world but has not yet “made sense” of it. And this is a realm of possibility and change, open and creative; the realm of perception, I maintain, that Deleuze implies can come into play with the experience of time-images.

**Recognition**

For Deleuze, drawing from Bergson, perception is intrinsically tied to recognition, recollection, or the access of memory. Without memory, and the ability to access it, human perception could never be more that the initial perception of sensation. There would only be instants, one instant of sensation after another, though we could not even
conceive of “after,” and there would be no “thought” as we normally understand it. We
would be lost in the most profound sense of the word. Metaphorically, this can be
thought of as one still frame only, a world completely devoid of motion or movement.
The film *Memento* shows that even the loss of a certain amount of short term memory
can have serious effects on a person’s ability to function in the world. Imagine if all
memory were lost at every instant, instead of every ten minutes as it is by the main
character in *Memento*. According to Deleuze, there would be no experienced past
without memory; there would be no “duration;” nothing could “endure.” Yet this is an
impossibility. Things and human beings do endure and do move, constantly and always.
For Deleuze, and Bergson, there can be no such thing as “instants.” The past is *always*
“reflected” in the present, whether or not via memory, because of the “reality” of the
originary form of time, whether or not we as human beings are “aware” of it. This is one
way of thinking about Deleuze and Bergson’s “world memory.”

In discussing how it is that we as human beings access memory, Deleuze draws
upon Bergson’s theories of “recollection.” The act of recollection results in
“recognition.” Following Bergson, Deleuze breaks recollection down into two types of
recognition. The first is “habitual recognition,” also called “automatic recognition,” and
the second “attentive recognition” (T-I 44).

**Automatic Recognition**

Automatic recognition happens when we immediately recognize an image when it
is perceived (seen, heard, sensed). We immediately know what the “thing” perceived is,
and know what action to take or not to take. This action can be anything from
immediately raising our arm in defense to labeling it with a named emotion, to putting it
into words (or language), to making plans for the future. In other words we know what it is or what it is called right away, and what its uses are or are not – we know what to do with it or what not to do with it. Successful or achieved recognition is in itself an “action.” We immediately “know” the thing’s virtual potential and how to actualize it. As I have pointed out earlier, for Deleuze perception is actual and memory is virtual. In the automatic recognition of something, an actual perception is “matched” with a virtual memory that is actualized “in” the thing. With automatic recognition, the virtuality of a thing is framed by habit (but keep in mind that virtuality emobodies the ideas of “potentiality” and of “power”). While it is simpler to describe the process of automatic recognition by speaking of recognizing an object, recognition can apply to any image that is initially perceived, and we know now that for Deleuze “everything is image.” For this reason, Deleuze interchangeably speaks of both images and “situations” when speaking of the “thing” being recognized or the “object” of recognition.

In automatic recognition, we take from what we “see” only that which immediately makes the image come to us as what we recognize. We are selective in what we “see,” and we do not really “look” closely at the thing, or only closely enough to get that immediate recognition. We distance ourselves from the object, and replace what we see with a recognition, or memory, of what we already “know” of it. Replacing the object with a virtual memory is what actualizes the memory. We reflect the phosphorescent light that it gives off back to it, but filtered or altered by our own perceptual abilities or inabilities. We erase the original thing and replace it with our own image of it. Hence, we in a sense do not “see” the thing at all, but an actualized virtual memory, or memory-image, of it, a pre-constructed idea of it, even a cliché. This is an
example of the sensory-motor schema at work in our consciousness on a very basic, even instinctive, level. Deleuze even calls the “perceived” image a “sensory-motor image,” where we take in its movement (sense it or receive its stimulus) and immediately produce movement out (have a motor response).

I maintain that there are many different levels, or varying degrees, of automatic recognition. A most basic level, perhaps even before “recognition” at the most primal level of stimulus-response, can be seen in Fellowship when Frodo reacts to being stabbed by the Witch-King on Weathertop – the stimulus is immediately apparent as the sword entering his shoulder, resulting immediately in pain, and his reaction is to scream. A slightly higher degree of automatic recognition might be when Frodo then presses his hand to the wound. A similar instance can be seen in Return when the soldiers of Gondor recoil when they hear the ear-splitting screams of the Nazgûl during the attack on Minas Tirith. A slightly higher level would be when these same soldiers cover their ears. Even if they have not recognized the sounds as coming from Nazgûl, they are still capable of reacting, or taking appropriate action to the stimulus, the initial perception or sensation of the screams. Another degree of automatic recognition might be when Aragorn sees Legolas, he immediately “knows” him as Legolas. He can immediately go from initial perception to action, labeling Legolas, knowing him for what and who Aragorn has always known him to be and to be capable of. In Two Towers, when Éowyn is practicing with her sword, Aragorn approaches her from behind. She turns quickly and swings her sword overhead. Aragorn, even if surprised, automatically recognizes this movement and performs an action to defend himself, raising his knife to block the blow in mid-air. In Two Towers, Saruman raises an eyebrow as he recognizes an opportunity when Grima
Wormtongue tells him that King Théoden of Rohan will have women and children with him when the citizens of Edoras flee to Helm’s Deep. Another level, or at least example, appears in Fellowship. Frodo, Sam, Merry and Pippin have fallen down a hill onto a road after their escape from Farmer Maggot. Frodo starts and bristles, sensing a presence on the road, and though he may not “recognize” that it is the presence of a Nazgûl, which he knows to have bad intentions, he can still recognize it as a presence and take appropriate action, getting himself and his friends into hiding beneath the roots of a tree. All of these are various degrees of automatic recognition.

**Attentive Recognition**

Attentive recognition is what is necessarily resorted to when automatic recognition just does not work. Images or situations are more difficult, perhaps even more abstract, and we do not immediately recognize them. We can not directly recall a memory-image to replace the image with. We must return our attention to the thing to take more information from it in order to better understand what it is, what it is doing, how to make use of it, or what to do about it. We take different features of it, describing it to ourselves in pieces, trying to recognize or find matching memories of these pieces, then trying to put together different memories to determine what it is. The thing is in question, provisional. We constantly erase or displace and replace it with new recognitions (T-I 20). We make mental descriptions of it and try to put the pieces together. This “description” is a basic principal of “reading” an image, as when Deleuze’s talks about “reading” the image, or in this case, thing or object (T-I 20, 279). In other words, we have to “think about” the thing in order to grasp it – though attentive recognition is not necessarily a conscious process.
Attentive recognition can happen rather quickly, or it can “take awhile.” However, how long it takes is not really the factor, as the process cannot be measured in terms of time. What is more important is how difficult the image is to recognize. The more difficult the image to recognize, the harder the process of attentive recognition must work. Just as there are various degrees of automatic recognition, the same can be said for attentive recognition. In addition, there is no clear division between attentive and automatic recognition. An example of the fine line between automatic and attentive recognition might be in Return, when Sméagol/Gollum’s brother Déagol finds the Ring at the bottom of the lake after he has been yanked out of the boat by a fish on a line. As he is being dragged through the water, something catches his eye. The Ring is the last thing he would expect to find, and he has just had the shock of being dunked in the lake, but it seems that that there is a double-take when he first sees the Ring. Does he immediately recognize it as a ring? Does he recognize that it is a ring when he first grasps it in the muck, or has he had to make a description of it – it’s shiny, it’s curved, therefore it might be part of a ring, or it may take more attention to recognize it as a ring. He may not even recognize it as a ring until he climbs out of the water and pokes through the silt in his hand. There may be automatic recognition here, but it may be a basic level of attentive recognition. We simply cannot tell.

In the process of automatic recognition, actual perception and virtual memory follow each other in a fairly clear, defined order. In attentive recognition, however, the actual and virtual follow each other, cycling, as if chasing each other on a continuous circuit (T-I 70). They reflect each other, one after another (T-I 70). Sometimes it can be difficult to tell which came first. On the actual side, as the process of attentive
recognition goes on because the image is difficult to recognize, the more closely we must
“look” at the image and its parts. We must immerse ourselves in it in an attempt to gain
more detail or make a more detailed description. On the virtual side, we dive deeper and
deeper into memory, into the domain of the virtual, passing through or accessing the
virtual in a broader and broader circuit moving from actual to virtual, searching for
memory-images to piece together and attain recognition. As this process of cycling
between actual image and virtual memory happens, according to Deleuze, the image or
“present situation attains ‘deeper levels of reality,’” and therefore we, going through this
process, can be said to “see” deeper levels of reality (Bogue 115).

Per Deleuze, what we are doing as the process of attentive recognition goes on,
after the initial perception but before recognition succeeds, is constituting “pure optical or
sound images” of the thing or situation (T-I 55). They are “intermediate” images, created
of an image from memory and the perceived image or pieces of it. What we are “seeing”
in these images is “pure” because they have not been replaced successfully by an image
from memory. We are “seeing” the thing-image itself, in its “purely” optical state. When
pure optical and/or sound images appear in a film, they must be described, or read, in this
process of trying to recognize them.

In film, different images can stand in for the circuitous movement from memory
to thing, actual to virtual, the erasing and replacement of the thing, or they can be images
that can be read through this process. Additionally, until attentive recognition succeeds,
we have no action to take in response to the image. The sensory-motor schema is not
succeeding in linking perception to memory to action, or as Deleuze puts it, the sensory-
motor schema has become relaxed. Though Deleuze does not state it as such, I believe
that this “relaxation” is directly related to my interpretation of the Deleuzian idea of consciousness as being more “relaxed” in other things of the world and more intensely concentrated by human beings. I propose that with the relaxation of the sensory-motor schema in the ongoing process of attentive recognition that Deleuze writes about, human consciousness becomes less concentrated and seeps into or “reaches out” or becomes more a “part” of things, and vice versa. At the same time, sensory-motor thought and perception becomes disturbed, changes, with intention, attention and selection becoming more or less distressed and even confounded.

It is when the sensory-motor schema becomes relaxed that we begin the “transition” from the regime of movement-images, or organic formal strategies, to the regime of time-images, or crystalline formal strategies. Deleuze frames much of Chapter 3 of Cinema 2 as a discussion of images that come closer and closer to being full blown time-images, or direct images of time, but do not quite get there. The basic criteria for the change from organic formal strategies to crystalline involves the relaxing of the sensory-motor schema, the gradually increasing difficulty of attentive recognition to succeed and common sense to work in connecting perception to action. But what interests Deleuze most about recollection is this - what happens when even attentive recognition fails (T-I 54)? And this is where we enter the realm of “crystal-images,” which are described in detail by Deleuze in Chapter 4 of Cinema 2 and are definitely time-images or direct images of time.

Note that “reflect” and “reflection” can have the same meaning as “recollect” and “recollection,” as in “to reflect upon” something. This will become important when I discuss “reflections” and crystal-images at length in Chapter VIII.
CHAPTER VII. THE SIX MOVEMENT-IMAGES AND THOUGHT

Via a human being’s common sense, everyday mode of existence that is driven by intention and regulated by the sensory-motor schema, practically every “moving image” that “appears” “in” the “world” falls, for Deleuze, into six major categories of “movement-images.” These are “perception-images,” “affection-images,” “impulse-images,” “action-images,” “reflection-images,” and “relation-images.” It is “through” these “images” that the other images of the world come to have a “look” for the special image, the floating mirror disk, attentive human consciousness, and it is with and through these images that we “normally” modally connect with, experience, and make sense of the “world.” According to Deleuze, the majority of films (those of the “cinema of the movement-image” or that exhibit organic formal strategies) are comprised of images that correspond directly to these six movement-images (T-I 32).

The idea of “movement-images” has a number of senses here. On one hand individual images can be movement-images. On the other hand, groups of images can be movement-images. In fact, an entire film can be a “movement-image,” if it is comprised (at least mostly) of movement-images, and not only that, but the “world” of a film can be seen as a movement-image. Deleuze carries this even further in basically claiming that the very world we live in is a movement-image, comprised (at least mostly) of movement-images because, for Deleuze, the world is “perceived” via the sensory-motor schema. It is a world of common sense and habit, of chronological and linear time, of contextualization within a presumed Whole. Bound up with durée, memory and intention, this regulating schema makes “movement-images” out of the “moving” “images” that are themselves “made of” the signaletic material of the primordial ooze.
Movement-images “arise automatically when a center of indetermination [a special-image/human being] comes into existence in the midst of the matter-flow of universally interacting” moving images (Bogue 38). This “mode of existence” after a manner actually forces the world to conform to common sense, to preconceived notions of what is “real” and what is not, what is useful and what is not, what is necessary and what is not, and it regulates the movements and images or movement-images that we return to the world – how we “respond” to the world with appropriate “action.” Time is a crucial element here, but movement is more “real,” more “grasp-able,” than the ethereal notion of “time.” Movement (and matter) “we” can get our hands on. Movement is “automatic” and “natural,” seen as what it is. Time is either just “experienced” or must be conceptualized, and the most “practical” or pragmatic way to conceive of time is as being chrono-linear. This is a very simple way of describing how, for Deleuze, the regime of movement-images is the more prevalent and “natural” regime than the regime of time-images.

Deleuze draws from Bergson in identifying three primary movement-images, “perception-images,” “affection-images,” and “action-images,” and follows Bergson in giving each of these images certain characteristics and functions. Deleuze then employs Charles Sanders Peirce’s elaborate taxonomy of images and signs to deduce three more images of his own, “impulse-images,” “reflection-images” and “relation-images.” Deleuze spends the most time discussing the first three images named above and the other three effectively cease to be mentioned as Deleuze progresses through the cinema books. This is not because they are not important or distinct, but their characteristics tend to become wrapped up in one or more of Bergson’s three primary images.
Deleuze utilizes the works of Bergson and Peirce to assign to all six images a number of “signs” each. Ronald Bogue claims that Deleuze assigns between 14 and 25 signs to the six movement-images – it is difficult to identify exactly how many – which should give one some notion of the complexity of Deleuze’s taxonomy of signs (107). The signs themselves require meticulous and lengthy explication – but what is important for my study is that images do indeed act as signs, and especially that they act as signs in what Deleuze claims is a “pure semiotic” sense, as signaletic material that in and of itself contains no meaning (until intention, purpose, memory, and the sensory-motor schema get ahold them).¹

**Perception-Images**

Perception itself, for Deleuze, is also an image. A “perception-image” appears at or as the “incoming” “side” of the interval/gap. It is like an organic, living cell that exists on the sensory side of the interval/gap at “initial perception.” The cell’s membrane grows, stretching across the interval/gap, encompassing or absorbing all the “images” related to that initial perception, including but not limited to the resultant action taken in response to the initial perception, as well as “relation.” Action and relation are by necessity part of perception – both are “perceived” every bit as much as a “thing.” The perception-image then encompasses all of the six images. It is the image “through which all other images are perceived” (Bogue 67). When it comes to perception’s relationship to the interval/gap, the perception-image, then, can be initial perception and/or a grander idea of “perception” as described earlier – it is both to “sense” (initial perception) as well as to be aware of or even act in the world in such and such a way. It must be kept in mind that perception-images per se are movement-images and are therefore created via
and slave to intention, attention, and the sensory-motor schema. Also, perception-images are only a “type” of the grander idea of perception as described in the previous chapter.

When Deleuze moves from describing perception-images to citing examples of them in films, one gets the feeling that all perception-images are simply “shots” representing a “point of view.” They indeed contain a sense of point of view, of contextualizing, of being “framed” in a certain way, and having a certain “perspective” – but it is not always or necessarily an identifiable perspective. Perception-images in films can for Deleuze be objective or subjective, or not identifiably either, but following Jean Mitry, “semi-subjective” (M-I 72). Ronald Bogue describes them as being images that are “noticeably perceptual as taken by a perceiving camera,” a perception of a perception (73, emphasis his).² It is “a perception in the frame of another perception,” a “set of elements which act on a center, and which vary in relation to it” (M-I 217, emphasis his). In film, as in the world, images cannot be truly subjective or objective, but fall in between or contain elements of both. No shot is fully subjective, though it may come close, nor is it fully objective.

For my part, what is important is that a “perception-image” as it relates to film appears as a self-conscious attempt at simulating a perspectival “view.” It should not, however, be strictly identified as being fully subjective or as being strictly a “POV (point of view) shot.” Drawing upon the theoretical works of Pasolini and Bakhtin, Deleuze claims that “the perception-image finds its status, as free indirect subjective, from the moment that it reflects its content in a camera-consciousness which has become autonomous” (M-I 74). Recall that for Deleuze perception is “in” things, not “in” the perceiver.
Deleuze’s examples of perception-images that appear in films are extremely varied, as are his examples of all of the six movement-images. I feel that breaking a film down into specific perception-images, affection-images and action-images is not only difficult, but problematic. I maintain that separating any of the movement-images into isolatable, representative images in film or pointing out specific examples is for Deleuze more of an explanatory strategy than a definitive classification. Consider that all images contain some element of perception, and the passage from initial perception to action can be imperceptible (Bogue 35). The complete separation of perception-images from affection-images or action-images from perception and affection, is, then, practically impossible. Recall also that perception-images are those “through which all other images are perceived” (Bogue 67). Any of the other movement-images then contain some sense of being a perception-image; a “perception of a perception.” What is important for me is Deleuze’s idea that film models, in the regime of movement-images, a particular mode of existence (and not just that he states this, it is not a new idea, but that he provides a metaphysics of world describing how and why “we” have this mode of existence and conversely how and why film can and does model it). The classification of “shots” into specific image categories is, for my part, of secondary importance.

Nonetheless, Deleuze does identify a variety of specific examples from films as “perception-images.” In doing so, he traces what he sees as a change from “solid, geometrical and physical” perception (the most clear example of a perception-image per se), to what he calls “liquid perception,” and then to “gaseous perception” (M-I 71-80). Solid perception provides the simplest examples. These are most easily identified as subjective POV shots such as a blurry, out of focus pipe seen “through the eyes” of
someone with damaged vision (from Abel Gance’s *La Roue*, 1922) (M-I 71). A more “liquid” perception-image might be a shot of a parade as “seen” through the legs of a person in the crowd, but not attributable to the POV of a child or other character in the film. For Deleuze, some of Dziga Vertov’s work moves very close to, but does not necessarily achieve, pure gaseous perception. Extreme examples Deleuze draws from Vertov’s *The Man with a Movie Camera* (1929), where the movement of images is stopped, reversed, edited and otherwise manipulated “from the point of view of another eye. . . the pure vision of a non-human eye, of an eye which would be in things,” just as perception is “in” things (M-I 80-83).

What I believe Deleuze is trying to do in pointing out these various examples is to show that there can be different kinds of perception, and that these different kinds of perception can appear in film. Solid, everyday, common sense perception, the basic “form” of perception-images, belongs most firmly to the regime of movement-images regulated by intention and the sensory-motor schema. It is what I call, drawing on Bergson’s *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, “analytical” and “relative” perception. As solid perception transforms to liquid and then moves toward gaseous perception, what Deleuze is showing is a progression toward a very different kind of perception than we normally experience in our everyday lives. For the sake of clarity and consistency, one would like to say that this different “kind” of “perception” is the kind that will appear in the regime of time-images, which is what I label, again following Bergson, as “absolute” and “intuitive” as opposed to analytical and relative, but I feel that it would be problematic to claim that “perception” of/or “in” time-images is directly correlative to gaseous perception – though it may be close. Deleuze does not clearly make this
connection himself, and his description of gaseous perception does not entirely jive with his later explications of time-images or the film examples he uses to illustrate them.

A contemporary example that may shed light on the basic premise of perception-images can be drawn from a scene in *The Fellowship of the Ring*. Frodo and Sam have come across Merry and Pippin, who have been stealing produce from Farmer Maggot. The four of them escape the enraged farmer, but fall down a ravine onto a dirt road. Frodo “senses” something and looks down the road. From what can be considered Frodo’s point of view, the road morphs, stretching, and a shrieking sound like nails on a chalkboard is “heard.” There is no indication here, or later, that this morphing of the road or this shriek is subjective, a figment of Frodo’s imagination or an effect on him alone, or objective. This illustrates the “semi-subjective” aspect of perception-images. After “seeing” this bizarre morphing effect, Frodo shouts for his companions to “get off the road, quick!” They do so, and hide against the berm of the road beneath the roots of an enormous tree. A Nazgûl approaches on horseback and stops directly above them on the road. After a shot of Frodo turning to look back, we see the horse’s feet “framed” between the roots. This shot can be considered to be from Frodo’s point of view (though it would have to be a “cheat” because Frodo is not sitting with his eyes level to the road). The next shot, however, is of the horse’s muzzle, which Frodo could not possibly see from his position. The next shot is from the same perspective (or angle) as the earlier one of the horse’s feet. Framed by the roots, the Nazgûl’s boot hits the road as he dismounts. The following shots cover the action of the Nazgûl leaning down and sniffing for his quarry. One shot is from above the roots, looking down at Frodo, who is looking up and sees the Nazgûl’s iron-clad hand just above him. Another is the hooded Nazgûl sniffing
the air from roughly Frodo’s perspective. Frodo then closes his eyes as he is compelled to don the Ring, but shots of the hooded Nazgûl, and of the horse’s eyes, follow. In this short scene, the shots that are framed by the roots, those of the horse’s feet and the Nazgûl’s boot, and even the shots of the hooded Nazgûl from below (from roughly Frodo’s perspective), could be considered to be “perception-images.” Claiming them to be strictly subjective, from Frodo’s point of view, however, is problematized because they could not be seen directly through his eyes (even if they are meant to seem that way), and because of the intercutting of these with other perspectives that could not be his at all. The camera has been consciously placed to frame “the perception of a perception,” but it does not, and cannot, frame perception itself, even if it is meant to compose a “POV” shot. This sequence exhibits organic formal strategies. The shots are organized and composed following continuous action or movement and linear time, and the specific “framings” and “perspectives” I have described would then make them fairly typical “perception-images” in the regime of “movement-images.”

Affection-Images

Affection-images are essentially feelings, pure feelings, deriving from the “contact” of the special image with the world. Bogue states that, for Deleuze, “what we commonly call perception is actually a mixture of external perception and internal affection, and this mixture is necessitated by our corporeal existence” (Bogue 37). It is initial perception and feeling in combination that aids us in generating, or giving rise to, appropriate action. This feeling is “pure” in that affection-images are visceral sensations, felt resonations, intensities, or qualities, before they are identified, as “pain,” “love,” “awe,” “fear,” “danger,” etcetera. The instant that they are “identified” they become
action-images, every bit as much as raising one’s arm in defense, a sensory-motor response, is an action-image. Affection is “felt rather than conceived: it concerns what is new in experience, what is fresh, fleeting, and nevertheless eternal” (M-I 98), a “quality when considered without regard to its actual manifestation in a specific situation” (Bogue 78). Deleuze also describes affection-images as “imprints” (T-I 272).

Deleuze assigns the traits of Peirce’s “firstness” to affection-images, claiming that “these are qualities or powers considered for themselves, without reference to anything else, independently of any question of their actualization. It is that which is as it is for itself and in itself” (M-I 98). Deleuze uses the idea of “red” to aid in his explanation (M-I 98). At the initial perception of “red,” before it is conceived of, recognized, or understood as the word “red” (which is merely a representation) or categorized as a “color,” it is a mere intensity, an unassigned sensation or feeling. Once it becomes “catalogued” as “red” or a “color,” or once it signifies “danger,” or is “seen” as “blood,” this intensity, affection or affective quality has become no longer specifically an affection-image but has been transformed into action or an “action-image.” Following from this, affection is “the quality of a possible” action, with action coming in the form of idea, reaction, connection, recognition or identification – in short, any “response” arising from “stimulus” (M-I 98). There is this initial collision between the “world” and the interval/gap or mirror-disk from which arises feeling before that feeling is identified, that is, turned into action. “The affection-image connects and relates perception to action, it ‘reestablishes the relation’ between the two movements, not through a third ‘movement of translation,’ or actual movement in space, but through a ‘movement of expression, that is, quality’” (Bogue 38, inside quotes from M-I 66). But affection-images are not
themselves a “link” between perception and action, it is the “sensory-motor link” (which I describe in more detail later in this chapter) that binds them together and makes action “appear” as a result.

An affection-image is “the category of the Possible: it gives a proper consistency to the possible, it expresses the possible without actualizing it” (M-I 98). Deleuze continues by stating that “it is quality or power, it is potentiality considered for itself as expressed” (M-I 98). In this way, affection-images possess “power,” which can be regarded like potential energy. This potential energy is released and becomes “force” in action-images. Affection-images are virtuality, or the virtual quality of images as experienced by human beings.

Furthermore, while “perception takes place in the object,” affection takes place “in the body” (Bogue 37). Affection incorporates a “motor tendency,” where there are “micro-movements” (Bogue 37). These are what is expressed as we, the special image, initially “perceive.” They are sensations, tinglings, pure feelings, in the body. In addition, in affection the special image “experiences its interiority” (Bogue 38). This is not to say, however, that affection is strictly “inside” us, as opposed to “outside” us. Perception and affection are bound together, and perception is “in” things, so affection is also in things. Affection is the expression of our coincidence with the world, not our separation from it as action-images attempt to reify (even though they ultimately cannot). Perception, as I have claimed, encompasses affection, impulse, action, reflection, and relation, all six of the movement-images. Remember also that affection-images are still movement-images, slave to intention and the sensory-motor schema. The status of
affection itself will, like perception, change when it comes to the experience of time-images.

In his explication of affection-images, Deleuze draws upon Eisenstein, Balázs and Epstein’s musings on the affective power of close-ups, particularly close-ups of the face (M-I 87, 95, 96). Not surprisingly, then, the close-up of the face becomes for Deleuze the ideal example of affection-images in films – particularly a face that does not register recognition or understanding, but that simply “expresses” “feeling.” The close-up of the face, however, is merely an example and not an exacting criterion. In fact, I believe that Deleuze’s use of close-ups of the face as examples of affection-images and in describing them is more limiting and distracting than illuminating. Affection-images *per se*, for Deleuze, have as one of their “criteria” an element of decontextualization, of close framing that cuts the “image” off from the rest of the “world.” This can also include a lack of depth in a shot, or a lack of “reference” to off-screen space. Close-ups of the face can fulfill this criterion, but so can any number of other shots. Deleuze himself implies that close-ups of other than the face can express affection, and beyond that, medium shots and long shots can at times function like “close-ups” in terms of affection. Recall also that affection is an integral part of any perception, and the change from perception to action is imperceptible. Any of the six movement-images, then, bear with them an affective quality. In his reading of Deleuze, Ronald Bogue states that “if qualities/power may be extracted from any entity, and if medium shot and long shot can function as close-ups, perhaps affects in themselves may be made visible in ways that are unrelated to the specific objects presented or the type of shot employed” (80). What is important, in my view, is not the ability to point out “affection-images” in films, but Deleuze’s
description of affection-images as part of the perceptual process of inteventive, attentive human consciousness of both “world” and “film.”

**Impulse-Images**

Deleuze does not spend nearly as much time on impulse-images as he does perception-images, affection-images and action-images. Indeed, as the cinema books progress, impulse-images, as well as reflection-images and relation-images, become seemingly less “important” than Bergson’s three primary images and are practically ignored.

Impulse-images in a way fall “between” affection and action. Deriving from initial perception and affection, they represent the impulse to action, though are distinct from action itself. In describing impulse-images, Deleuze uses very intriguing terms and phrases such as “originary worlds” beneath a realized milieu and “elementary impulses,” “primordial acts,” “symptoms,” “idols” and “fetishes” (M-I 123-125). Ronald Bogue speaks of impulse-images in terms of “instinct,” “drive,” “primal swamp,” “primal origin,” “primordial domain,” and “fragments wrested from the real” (Bogue 82-85).

Deleuze’s film examples of impulse-images come mostly from films by Stroheim and Buñuel, and they range from the mountain peak in Stroheim’s *Blind Husband* (1919) and the drawing room in Buñuel’s *The Exterminating Angel* (1962), to a “shoe as sexual fetish” that appears in both Stroheim’s *The Merry Widow* (1925) and Buñuel’s version of *Diary of a Chambermaid* (1964) (M-I 125-128).

**Action-Images**

Of the six movement-images, Deleuze pays by far the most attention to action-images. In a sense, action-images are “the nucleus of the regime of movement-images”
(Rodowick 68), elucidating most clearly how the attentive, intentive, selective, sensory-motor mode of existence “operates.” Like perception-images, action-images in a way incorporate some aspect of all of the six movement-images. Deleuze states that an action-image, “in its widest sense, comprises received movement (perception, situation), imprint (affection, the interval itself), and executed movement (action properly speaking and reaction)” (T-I 272). In the regime of movement-images, regulated by the sensory-motor schema, perception and action are inseparable (Bogue 35). Perception “leads to” action and indeed encompasses action. Action is the ultimate “goal,” the given “response” and “motor” aspect of the sensory-motor schema. Action-images “fulfill” the sensory-motor schema – but it is also action that “reveals” the other movement-images.

Affection and impulse are after a manner simply used by perception and action. They are “things” to be “linked together” and gotten through to action. Action-images can in a way be thought of as even encompassing, along with perception-images, both reflection-images and relation-images.

Recall that “action” is not just physical action or response. Putting “feelings” into words or language, identifying something, assigning names, recognizing a feeling as a particular emotion or mixture of emotions, drawing a conclusion, determining relations, making plans, all enter the “realm” of action-images. When these “things” “appear in” or are exhibited by films, they are all action-images. An action-image is, therefore, not the same thing as an “action film,” though action films certainly exhibit action-images and most always appear as one large action-image. In Deleuze’s discussion of action-images, it becomes clear that entire films can function as action-images or one complete action-image. Between this idea and the “intentive” quality of action itself, it is not surprising
that action-images become most representative of the regime of movement-images or the “cinema of the movement-image.” In fact, the characteristics of action-images coincide with the basic concepts of movement-images in their entirety.

Deleuze’s idea of what constitutes an action-image covers an amazingly broad range of types of images, and examples of cinematic action-images come in a staggering variety. At the core, however, there are a few concepts that are fundamental to all action-images. Basically, action-images are the “response” of “stimulus-response;” the “effect” of “cause and effect.” Of course, a stimulus or cause can be another action of its own, and therefore an action-image can be the “reaction” of “action-reaction” (where we would then essentially have “action-action”). Action-images are in essence the returned movement or changed movement that Deleuze and Bergson speak of special images being capable. They can therefore be seen in a single film “image,” or they can arise from an overall formal strategy of images that encompasses entire films. This becomes most apparent when Deleuze discusses his “large form” action images and “small form” action-images (M-I 142). At its basis, large form action-images are films which follow the common sense formula of the presentation of a “situation,” which is in turn followed by a responding “action,” and concludes with a resultant “situation” – situation-action-situation, or the formula “SAS” (M-I 142). This corresponds to the everyday world and the sensory-motor schema. So does the small form action-image, but the formula for small form films proceeds from action to situation to action (“ASA”) (160). Deleuze’s description of each form is quite elaborate and is presented almost like a complex metaphysical version of Syd Field’s three-act paradigm of Hollywood narrative cinema, but essentially, for Deleuze, all action-images, including the grander formulas of the large
form and small form, all follow the same basic rules where “the sensory-motor schema moves forward by selection and co-ordination. Perception is organized in obstacles and distances to be crossed, while action invents the means to cross and surmount them” (T-I 40).

Reflection-Images

“Reflection-images” maintain a particularly odd status in Deleuze’s taxonomy of movement-images. Alternatively called the “image at transformation,” reflection-images are described as not only appearing “between” action-images and relation-images, but also as a transitionary image between large form action-images and small form action-images (T-I 29, 32; M-I 178). They are, in this way, what Bogue describes a “deformation, transformation, or transmutation of the action-image” (93). Deleuze’s explication of reflection-images is one of the oddest in the cinema books, and becomes more of an elaboration on action-images than a description of a “new” kind of image. This may be why he does not actually call them “reflection-images,” naming them definitively as one of the six movement-images or a separate movement-image from the other five, until his review of Cinema 1 in the first chapter of Cinema 2 (T-I 32). What I must point out and stress, however, is that reflection-images have little relevance to “reflections” as they pertain to crystal-images.

Relation-Images

Like reflection-images, Deleuze does not definitively claim for “relation-images” the status of being one of the six movement-images until Cinema 2 (T-I 32). In Cinema 1, where he describes them most thoroughly, he calls them “mental images” (though not “mental-images”) which have to do with “relation” (M-I 200). Relation-images may for
Deleuze be “mental images,” but when we come to the regime of time-images, “mental images” do not go away, they are simply “overwhelmed” (M-I 218) and the “relation” of images changes.

In relation-images as they apply to the regime of movement-images, “action, and also perception and affection, are framed in a fabric of relations,” and “it is this chain of relations which constitutes the mental image” (M-I 200). As in his description of large form and small form action-images, Deleuze tends to treat entire films as “relation-images.” His favorite examples come in the films of Alfred Hitchcock. Bogue succinctly describes in his reading of Deleuze on relation-images that, “the action in Hitchcock is structured around mental relations. Each of his films is conceived of in terms of what Hitchcock calls a postulate, a set of relations, which then undergoes logical development” (101, emphasis his ). What intrigues Deleuze the most about Hitchcock’s films seems to be that they are incredibly complex and “mental,” and yet still regulated by intention and the sensory-motor schema.

Deleuze describes a number of forms of relation-images in his discussion of their various signs, but ultimately and essentially relation-images bring perception-images, affection-images and action-images (indeed, all of the images of the perceived “world” and of films exhibiting organic formal strategies) into relation with one another through the idea of a common sense, assumed “Whole” which they have presumably been part of all along. Deleuze describes relation as “law” (M-I 218), and Bogue speaks of it in terms of “continuity, regularity, habit,” or “rule,” as well as “interpretation, representation, and thought” (99). In the regime of movement-images, this is the “rule” or “law” of the sensory-motor schema itself, which is supposedly the basis of our everyday mode of
existence. And it is “interpretation,” “representation” or “thought” as regulated by the sensory-motor schema and common sense.

The Sensory-Motor Link

The six basic movement-images can be thought of as steps in a process, and it is often easiest to think of them in this way. A number of qualifications must be kept in mind, however. First, these “steps” for the most part must be considered as “happening” all at once, or at least do not each happen in any measurable amount of time or determined order, e.g.: there is not a “perception” or “perception-image,” then a step to “affection-image,” then a step to “action-image.” Affection-images are immediate, “existing” simultaneously with perception. Second, all of these images are part of or “enveloped” or “framed” by perception-images.

Second, to think of each of these images as being distinctly separate from each other is detrimental to an overall understanding of Deleuze’s project. They overlap and meld as well as issue from one another. Third, it is easy to think of a single perception-image “existing” or “happening” at a time in the activity of the interval/gap of the special image, but of course there are multiples of all of these images at any one “time.” And last, in this scenario it is the sensory-motor schema of common sense and determination of the utility of images that “bridges” the interval/gap, that provides the “link” from initial perception through action and relation.

The human mind/body as interval/gap engages in an activity or process of combining images via the sensory-motor schema that provides a link “between” initially perceived or sensed images and appropriate action. This is Deleuze’s “sensory-motor link” (T-I 272). At the same time, the sensory-motor schema links initially perceived
images to each other and to “images” from memory, as well as linking “us” as human beings to the “world” in a common sense manner. Deleuze states that, “the sensory motor-link [is] the *unity* [emphasis mine] of movement and its interval, the specification of the movement-image or the action-image *par excellence*” (T-I 272, emphasis his).

Recall also that this process involves, even requires, that the only way this link can work, the only way we can make sense of the world via the sensory-motor schema and contextualize its images and we as images of the world is to grasp at, attend to, “believe in,” a greater Whole, a greater “image” of the world if you will. Grasping at an idea of a Whole is what makes the parts make sense, relative to one another, and helps us connect these parts. At the same time, the parts themselves continually form and reform the Whole.

The Whole, as well as the parts, do not just consist of space, but time as well. Only in thinking of a day, a week, or a lifetime as wholes, or even eternity as a whole, do the minutes and hours or any of the smaller “moments” or events makes sense. Parts of space, of movement, and of time are thought of as contiguous, linear and measurable. It is the sensory-motor schema that provides a sensory-motor-link between images, and this link provides the continuity, the common sense organization of images. The sensory-motor link bridges initially perceived images from the plane of immanence, as well as images from memory or different “points” in time, to action and provides them, and us, with a common sense relationship between them, ourselves, and the world.

In my reading of Deleuze and Bergson, the interval/gap (as mind/body) can be conceived of as merely a particular, complex aggregate of images (as well as an “image” itself). It is a processing “space” for the activity of organizing and linking images: for the
sensing, recognition, connection, and determination as to the interest and use of images, as well as the determination of appropriate action to take and the appropriate relationship to the world.

If the link is thought of as organizing images in a chain, the chain can be thought of as not stretched out linearly, but in a coil or even a pile. Adding the idea of chrono-linear time to the concept of the linking and organization of images, the chain can then be thought of as stretching out, comprising a kind of chain bridge, “spanning” the interval/gap from initial perception through to and including action or response and providing us with a common sense relation to the world as well as what we perceive as the Whole.

**Consciousness, Perception, Memory, and Thought**

While any of the movement-images can appear in and of themselves and in no particular order, in the interval/gap they are arranged, or are conceptualized as being organized, in something like a perceptual “process” or “activity.” In my reading of Deleuze, this process is “thought,” an activity of the assemblage and organization of images. The interval/gap (the “center of indetermination” or “contingent center”) is in a way what is “between” one “moving image” or group of moving images from the plane of immanence and the next. Attention, intention, selection and the sensory-motor schema “make” them movement-images and regulate thought. The link connects “in-coming” movement or perception-image through affection to “out-going” movement or action-image.

Concentrated human consciousness gives us a heightened awareness of perception and the ability to process what is perceived with thought. But according to Deleuze,
following Bergson, there can be no human perception without memory. At the same time that perception-images, affection-images, impulse-images, memory-images, reflection-images, action-images and relation-images are “organized” by the interval/gap, and initial perception is linked and combined with the other images through to action and relation, new memories are “made” to be “accessed” in the continuing activity of combining and linking images.

I believe a helpful way to think of the relationship between images, consciousness, perception, memory and thought is that human consciousness provides the “real estate” (though it is not a “place” *per se*) and “power” for the “assembly plant” and its “machinery” that are the mind and body (interval/gap). The “raw material” is images, provided by perception, affection and memory in the form of initial perceptions, affections or “feelings,” and memories. The “products” are actions taken and relations made, as well as “new” memories to be “warehoused” or “stored” and retrieved when needed. “Thought” is the “assembly” or “manufacturing process.” It is an organizational strategy that regulates how images are put together, combined, or linked. The everyday, “natural” thought process is regulated by the sensory-motor schema and creates sensory-motor links between images in a common sense manner, based on how they should fit together in relation to an assumed Whole to which they must belong, a “space” and presumed chronological line of time that they must fit into. Across the gap, initial perception is linked to action and to world, and we, who are an aggregate of organized images, are also linked to world.

How we “perceive” is an “image” of perception, and how we “see” the “world” is an “image” of world. Our particular image of world is filtered and processed by
consciousness via sensory-motor perception and thought. It is filtered by our physical perceptual or sensory limitations, our own interests and needs, by the memories from which we can draw, as well as by the thought process of the organization of images which we utilize. Sensory-motor thought, I contend, can be considered to be the organizational strategy used in putting images together with attention, intention, and selection, or for a purpose. And this process of organizing images is a sensory-motor thought process. Any particular organizational strategy or thought process can then be thought of as an “image of thought,” or “thought-image.”

My claim above for a “thought-image” may seem contrary to Deleuze’s use of the term “thought-image,” for he never speaks of this particular process in these terms, and he uses “thought-image” almost exclusively when referring to time-images. But I believe that he does this because he does not consider the sensory-motor image of thought as being “thought” at all, but merely a process “inherited” from nature, based in the “natural laws” of cause and effect, stimulus and response – and that there are other ways to think that, while still necessarily bound up with intention, attention and the activity of “making sense” of the world, can operate without the sensory-motor link, or at least without being determined by his link. Deleuze never claims that there is only one thought-image, and indeed to do so would cut against the grain of his entire project. In fact, Deleuze never actually describes an alternative thought process for time-images, but merely claims ultimately that there are alternatives to sensory-motor images of thought. Therefore, I believe it is valid to claim for the sensory-motor thought process the status of being a type of thought-image, “a sensory-motor thought-image.”
Deleuze does, however, speak of the appearance or release of the “un-thought” in the experience of time-images (T-I 278). This is not a particular “thought-image” in itself, however Deleuze might phrase it, but represents the idea that in experiencing movement-images “we are not yet thinking” (Rodowick 181) and in experiencing time-images there is an opportunity or even impetus to really think. This does not necessarily mean that there is no thought whatsoever in the experience of movement-images (though for Deleuze it may come very close). What I propose that Deleuze is saying is that a time-image’s organization of images does not follow or is not regulated by any particular process, while movement-images are organized via the sensory-motor thought process. Time-images represent an experience where there is no manner through which to “make something” definitive of the initial perception and affection. We do not “know” or automatically recognize what perception is giving to us; we cannot identify the affection or feeling that it gives us, so we do not know what to make of it – we cannot connect through to action. For Deleuze, what this can do is open our minds to the possibility that there are alternative thought processes or organizational strategies of linking or combining images.
CHAPTER VIII. TIME-IMAGES AND EFFECT

In this chapter I describe what I consider to be basic characteristics of Deleuze’s time-images utilizing examples from *The Lord of the Rings* to illustrate. In addition, I utilize Deleuze’s concepts to discuss aesthetic effect, positing how it is that crystalline formal strategies might have the effect that they do for certain viewers.

I concentrate on Deleuze’s idea of crystal-images because I maintain that the characteristics of crystal-images are the very foundation of all time-images; are that from which all of Deleuze’s implications of time-images arise, and that without a solid comprehension of the basic structure and functionality of crystal-images the concept of time-images or direct images of time can be only partially appreciated or understood. Furthermore, I feel that crystal-images most clearly illustrate how a direct image of time, or originary time, “appears” in films. It can be quite difficult to keep in mind when reading *Cinema 2* that all of the complex myriad and at times seemingly disconnected ideas, terms and concepts that Deleuze speaks of regarding time-images issue from, are an implication of or symptom of the fundamental concept of Henri Bergson’s originary time, and for Deleuze, this is the Real form of time.

All of the films Deleuze speaks of in *Cinema 2* regarding time-images exhibit some variation of a crystalline formal strategy, and Deleuze uses certain films because they have specific examples that most clearly illustrate the characteristics or implications of time-images that he wishes to address at that juncture. “Free-indirect discourse” and the “spiritual automaton,” “any-space-whatevers,” “falsifying narration,” the “true” and the “false,” the “incompossible” “paradox,” the “eternal return,” “fabulation”/“mythmaking”/“storytelling,” “thought,” the “un-thought,” the “inside” and...
the “outside,” dispensing with the distinction between subject and object, crystal-images, chronograms, actual and virtual, real and imaginary, reflections— all of these are characteristics or implications of time being conceived of as originary time, and certain films or certain film images, for Deleuze, best exemplify one or more of these ideas.

Thus, when Deleuze begins his discussion of “chronograms” as direct images of time in earnest and when he speaks at length of Resnais and Robbe-Grillet, then of Rouch, then of Duras or Bene, etcetera, he is not pointing out a completely separate “thing” that exists only in this film or that film, or that are separate from other concepts concerning direct time-images. Each new concept he addresses is but a further implication, symptom, or characteristic of the originary form of time being considered as the Real form of time. The films of certain filmmakers contain the most clear examples for Deleuze to utilize to illustrate this new implication or symptom. Thus, when Deleuze states that with the chronograms he is “no longer concerned with the indiscernibility of real and imaginary,” and implies that he is also no longer concerned with the indiscernibility of actual and virtual, he is really saying that since this is a fundamental aspect of time-images, he is moving on to additional things. A crystal-image is not a completely new and different thing from an opsign, and a chronogram is not a completely new and different thing from a crystal-image. What we “see” in direct time-image chronograms are simply more complex reflections, or movements between perception and memory than the simpler reflections discussed in his chapter on crystal-images.¹

When speaking of chronograms of direct images of time, Deleuze states that he is moving from “the domain of the real and the imaginary” to “the more alarming domain of the true and the false,” but he qualifies this statement with “of course the real and the
imaginary continue their circuit, but only as the base of a higher figure” (T-I 104). This progressive nature of his descriptions of time-images is something that is overlooked or relatively ignored by other scholars utilizing or writing on Deleuze’s cinema books. Deleuze, however, says that what is happening in the circuit of the first variety of chronosigns “is no longer, or no longer only, the indiscernible becoming of distinct images; it is undecidable alternatives between circles of past, [and] inextricable differences between peaks of present” (T-I 104, emphasis his). The “real and the imaginary” and the “indiscernibility” referred to here by Deleuze involve none other than fundamental characteristics of crystal-images – which involve the indiscernibility of the real and imaginary as well as the actual and virtual – and remain fundamental characteristics of all direct images of time, including the varieties of direct time-image chronosigns.

It is my contention, then, that the indiscernibility of the true and the false in chronosigns issues directly from the fundamental characteristics of crystal-images, which are explained in terms of reflections. Therefore, the idea of reflections that describe the characteristics of crystal-images form the foundation upon which all Deleuze’s characteristics and implications of chronosigns are based – including the calling into question of the true, which gives rise to or “releases” the power of the false in films that exhibit crystalline formal strategies (I discuss Deleuze’s writing on the power of the false later in this chapter).

Qualities of Geological Crystals

In the cinema books Deleuze does not discuss physical properties of crystals or crystallization and does not adhere to them in strict analogy. Yet there are a number of
important properties of geological, manufactured or “natural” crystals that I believe directly relate to characteristics of his concept of crystal-images, and I propose that a description of them can significantly illuminate an understanding of this concept.

Crystals can be formed through the “crystallizing” of an amorphous substance out of a liquid or gas. This crystallization is a taking of shape or form, a bringing or coming together in a very tight, structured, replicating manner. Crystallization can also be brought about through the application of an outside force on a particular substance, such as when diamonds are formed out of coal under pressure of the Earth’s crust, or due to a change in temperature, as when water crystallizes below 32 degrees Fahrenheit.

Crystallization can also be initiated by the introduction of what is called a “seed crystal” into a solution, vapor, or “melt” (Manutchehr-Danai 421). The solution, however, must be conducive to crystallization. A common elementary or secondary school experiment requires the making of rock candy. The experiment calls for the super-saturation of water with sugar. If the water is not saturated to the correct level, or there are other imperfections in the water, or the temperature is not ideal or within a certain range crystallization may not take effect. While it may not be officially called a “seed,” a simple cotton string can be hung into the sugar-water, and it will act as a catalyst or bonding surface for the crystals to begin forming. Once crystallization begins, the initial tiny crystals act as seed crystals for the accelerated growth of larger crystals.

Crystals also have various characteristics regarding light. A crystal’s surfaces can refract or bend light, sending it in different directions from which it strikes the surface. They can diffract, disperse or split light into different wavelengths as well. A light beam entering a crystal is split, and the various split “beams” bounce around inside the crystal.
Crystals can of course reflect light, and a crystal’s facets are considered “multiple mirror planes” (Wood 4). The surfaces of crystals can have imperfections, and sometimes crystals have fault-lines that can cause reflections to be distorted. A crystal can also be thought of as being able to trap light. Light enters and then reflects from internal facet to internal facet, moving about, cycling, returning on itself, as in a prism. Gems or jewels, which are crystals, owe their lustrous quality to this phenomenon. A properly cut diamond may look brilliant and sparkling from the top, but will look opaque when viewed from the bottom because the light does not escape (Wood 123).

Gems or jewels owe their color to the canceling out of certain light waves inside the crystal, and can hence be said to have the quality of absorbing light (Wood 144-145). “Crysalloluminescence” is a property of certain crystals wherein the crystals will emit light during the crystallization process (Manutchehr-Danai 117). In addition, some crystals will emit light when rubbed through what is called a “triboelectric effect” (Manutchehr-Danai 482). Crystals can be transparent, translucent, or opaque, in varying degrees. An outside force such as a change in temperature can effect these properties in some crystals, and this property can affect a crystal’s ability to transmit and reflect light (Britannica 179).

Changes in temperature or the application of pressure or electricity can cause crystals to vibrate to greater and lesser degrees (Wood 11). “Pyroelectric” crystals will develop electrical polarization when heated and, developing a static charge, can attract various substances to them (Manutchehr-Danai 386). “Piezoelectric” crystals will do the same when rapped or squeezed under pressure. Piezoelectric crystals will also change
size, expanding or contracting, when an electric charge is applied to them (Manutchehr-Danai 368; Academic, “Crystals”).

**Reflections**

Deleuze begins his discussion of crystal-images using the idea of “reflections” (T-I 78). Ronald Bogue writes that Deleuze treats the appearance of reflections in films in the broadest sense of the term. At times he speaks of actual mirror images in such films, at others of mechanical reproductions of images in photos, films, or video clips. But he also treats paintings and theatrical performances as reflections of objects [as well as of people and situations], extending the notion as well to include simulations, mimings, and the enactment of roles as so many mirror images. Finally, he treats resemblances and correspondences between objects, settings, characters, and actions as reflections – perhaps prismatically distorted, tinted, bleached or clouded, but reflections nonetheless. (Bogue 121)

Important ideas for Deleuze are that reflections of many types are used in crystalline formal strategies, and they represent the originary form of time, where everything, including we as human beings, is doubled in every instant. To “see” the world in terms of the originary form of time, is to see “the world as a proliferation of reflections” (Bogue 122).

Deleuze’s simplest example of a reflection in film is that of a character looking in a mirror. For example, in *Return of the King*, in a relatively wide shot, Gollum approaches a pond and looks into it, seeing his reflection. From the use of relatively common sense angles drawing from conventions of the continuity system when the shots
change from wider to closer, it appears to be clear when it is that we are looking at the “actual” Gollum and when we are looking at the “virtual” reflection of Gollum. We can “look” from one to the other in a wider shot, back and forth, and “know” which is the reflection and which is the character, and as closer shots cut back and forth, we still know which is virtual reflection and which is actual character. In this analogy the reflection can stand in for virtual memory and the character for actual perception. In this example, actual and virtual follow each other, where each is distinct and they are discernible from one another (this gets far more complex, with actual and virtual distinctions becoming problematized in the manifestation of Gollum’s two personalities, but I address this later in this chapter). In a similar example from Fellowship of the Ring, Frodo’s reflection is seen in a mirror and it is clear which is actual and which is virtual as they follow each other. These examples of “reflections” in The Lord of the Rings are examples of “reflections” as presented via organic formal strategies, and can be thought of as representing Bergson’s “automatic recognition.”

In organic formal strategies of films of the regime of movement-images, ruled by the common-sense conception of time as chrono-linear, present follows the past, and the future follows the present. Actual and virtual then follow each other. A virtual memory becomes actualized in the present, which returns again to virtual memory which is again actualized in the present. The process of moving from initial perception to virtual memory can be thought of as a circuit, with virtual and actual following after each other and each is more or less clearly defined. We “know” what is actual and what is virtual in movement-image films. The initially perceived image is reflected into memory, then reflected from memory to perception.
In attentive recognition the actual is reflected into memory, which reflects back to the object just like with automatic recognition. But with attentive recognition the process continues in an ongoing cycle of actual object reflected into virtual memory and virtual memory reflected onto actual object. According to Deleuze, in films that incorporate crystalline montage strategies or time-image films the form of time expressed is Bergson’s originary time. In this form of time, past present and future are mutual, coincident. Past exists only as memory, and memories that are accessed can be considered reflections, just as to access memory can be considered to enter into reflection. In this way, the originary form of time and the process of attentive recollection are closely related.

As I have described, the present and initial perception are actual, while the past as memory is virtual. According to Deleuze, then, in the Real of originary time, actual and virtual are also coincident. There is actual/present and virtual/past, both at the same time, “distinct” from each other, but “indiscernible,” in every present instant. Every initially perceived actual image is immediately doubled, becoming virtual memory, at the same time that virtual memories are accessed and actualized in the image. Every image then has two aspects, there are two indiscernible aspects to every image, an actual “side” and a virtual “side.” In every present moment, at least, we cannot “really” tell which is which. D. N. Rodowick discusses this in terms of Bergson’s answer to the question “how is memory formed?” “We can only have an image of time passing if, while an image is formed in perception, it is simultaneously preserved in the past as the image it once was. . . This is the deepest paradox of time that the time-image presents” (Rodowick 126). Rodowick continues, claiming for Bergson and Deleuze that,
the ‘smallest possible circuit forms an incommensurable division between perception and memory, the actual and the virtual . . . Bergson characterizes this phenomenon as a continuous duplication of the present into perception on the one hand and recollection on the other: ‘Our actual existences, then, whilst it is unrolled in time, duplicates itself along with a virtual existence, a mirror-image. Every moment of our life presents two aspects, it is actual and virtual, perception on the one side and memory on the other.’ (Rodowick 126, inside quotes from Bergson, *Mind-Energy* 135-138)

Based on Bergson’s concepts of automatic and attentive recognition, Deleuze claims that there is a circuit, a constant elliptical track, being run by images between the two aspects (or doubles) of present, initially perceived, actual objects or things, and past, virtual memory. In movement-images composed through organic montage strategies and based in automatic recognition, these aspects follow one another, actual to virtual, making them seemingly “discernible” from each other. In crystal-images, composed through crystalline montage strategies and based in the process of attentive recognition, this circuit is so small that it is “indiscernible” as to which aspect the image is taking on at any given instant or on the whole of the image, though they are still separate and distinct (T-I 70). Imagine two lights side-by-side, one “actual” and one “virtual,” close together and each flashing, alternating so quickly as to make it impossible to tell which is on and which is off. While they are distinct, they are not perceptively separate. They appear as one image of light. Deleuze describes the two aspects in such a scenario as being “reversible,” in continual exchange, and “indiscernible” from one another (T-I 70).
He also describes this quality of indiscernibility as following an “uncertainty principle” (T-I 71). It is uncertain as to which aspect is which and when it is one or the other; they exist in a state of being a “mutual” image (T-I 69, 74). It is in this smallest of circuits that the various sides or aspects (whatever the pairs may be), become so close, so mutual, distinct but indiscernible, that they “crystallize” – become “crystalline,” a “crystal-image.”

Crystal-images also bear for Deleuze the sense of multiple reflections, as from multiple facing mirrors or the many facets of a crystal. With the “appearance” of crystal-images, Deleuze claims that film images first achieve a direct image of time, an “image” of the originary form of time, or time-image. This notion of an image appearing as a time-image stems from Bergson’s conceptualization of time as taking the form of originary time, where every immeasurable present moment exists in a form of duality, being mutually and simultaneously both actual present and virtual past, each distinct but indiscernible from the other, each “reflecting” the other. (T-I 81-82, 98, 271).

“They are One”

Recall that film “images” can be an element of a single shot, an entire shot, a section of a film, a film as a whole, as well as the “world” of a film, and not just a physical if fictitious world (such as Middle-Earth), but the metaphysical world or universe, of a film and of our own. And an image can be sound, picture, or both at once. These descriptions of film images apply to Deleuze’s “crystal-images” as well. In addition, “images” standing in for the actual or virtual aspects need not be contained together in one shot or in the same framing, and each can appear separately throughout a film. I propose that, in Deleuzian terms, Sauron and the Ring of The Lord of the Rings...
can serve as “reflections” of one another, together functioning as a distinct but indiscernible actual/virtual circuit and crystal-image. I also propose that The Ring can also be seen as a Deleuzian “seed crystal” on a number of levels (72, 73).

In *Fellowship*, the wizard Gandalf says that “they are one, Sauron and the Ring,” and the Elf king Elrond echoes this statement later in the same film, even though Sauron and the Ring are separate “things” and separated by great distances. In the long “past” of the story of *The Lord of the Rings*, the two were “one,” in more than a physical sense, and then were “separated” with the cutting off of Sauron’s finger by Isildur. Since Sauron had, as Galadriel narrates at the beginning of *Fellowship*, “poured all his cruelty, his malice, and his will to dominate all life” into the Ring, he did not just make it part of himself, incorporating it into himself or adding it onto his body, he gave a large part of himself for it to exist, as if literally splitting himself in two, then putting on the Ring to be whole again. When they were separated, they did not become just a piece of metal and a “person” with amputated fingers, but dismembered parts of one entity that remain “living,” neither one whole without the other. Yet they are, they remain “One,” distinct but indiscernible.

Because the Ring survived the battle that rendered Sauron bodiless and dispersed his powers, Sauron too survived – but as a “reflection,” a “virtual image” of the Ring like a reflection in a mirror. Regaining some of his former power and now embodied in the Great Eye, it could be said that Sauron has arisen from the past, is in a way a representation of the past itself and, as creator of the Ring, the past of the Ring. The Ring, however, was created by Sauron, the bodily Sauron, and not the other way around, and much of himself was put into it, so it follows that the Ring can also be seen as a
reflection, a virtual image of Sauron. It is difficult to determine from one instance to the next of the Ring’s “communications,” the whispers, or the un-intelligible spells it casts, whether it is the Ring or the spirit of Sauron that is “speaking.” Sometimes it seems that Sauron is speaking through the Ring, but at other times it seems that this cannot be the case, such as when the whispers are heard by Frodo as he stands at the precipice above the fires inside Mount Doom toward the end of *Return*. At this point in the film Sauron’s attention is drawn to Aragorn and his army at the Black Gate, yet the Ring still “speaks” to Frodo. This may be a bit confusing, but I believe it illustrates extremely well Deleuze’s “indiscernibility” of the two aspects of a single image.

Though the Ring and Sauron are separate, distinct entities, it is almost impossible to tell when it is one or the other – because they are essentially two aspects of the same entity. The Ring “feels” its “master” Sauron, “perceives” him, and in a way communicates with him, and he with it (as well as possibly through it at times). Each “desires” the other. The Ring is what Sauron needs to take material form, to become whole, to reach his full potential. The Ring needs Sauron also, to be whole and to reach its full potential. When worn, the Ring draws the Eye, the “mind” or spirit of Sauron, to it and reveals to him its bearer and their position. It also draws the Nazgûl, the Ringwraiths, who are slaves to Sauron’s will and to the Ring. It could be said that the Ring can focus Sauron’s attention and power, his spirit, to where it is, and it is Sauron who through his supernatural link with the Ring and the Nazgûl, tells them where the Ring is. But it is not often clear which is doing this – the Ring or Sauron. I maintain that during these points in the film it is the Ring itself, as its own entity. Sauron and the Ring, then, can be thought of each as reflections of the other, actual/present *and* virtual/past –
and as Sauron/Ring together they constitute a Deleuzian crystal-image. But I see the levels of indiscernible actual/virtual pairs that constitute a crystal-image and issue from the relationship between Sauron and the Ring only beginning here.

The Ring itself can be seen to have dual or mutual actual/virtual qualities apart from Sauron. Its actual aspects are that it is a simple piece of jewelry, existing as an actual, perceivable “thing” in the present, whether it be on a chain, in the pocket, in the hand or on the finger. It is of a dense, heavy metal. It is shiny, golden, and beautiful to gaze upon. These are qualities of its “actuality” and how it functions as limpid (clear), or visible. Deleuze writes of “limpid” and “opaque” as functions of an image moving from virtual to actual and actual to virtual (T-I 70). When a virtual image moves to an actual image (or actualizes) it becomes more limpid, or clear, and as an actual image becomes a virtual image it becomes more opaque. For Deleuze the limpid is clear, transparent, apparent, having light upon it, white, constructive, visible. For the image to be clear, however, it does not need to have all of these qualities at once, and can have only one, as long as there is also a quality of opacity on a mutual virtual “side.” A “reflection” is not always as clear to the eye as the “original” being reflected, just as a memory is not always as “clear” as a “thing” right in front of us. And the light reflected from a mirror can be dimmer, and in various stages of dimness, depending on the reflective qualities of the mirror itself. In addition, the surface of the mirror can have various degrees of distorting qualities. By the same token, memories can be considered to have various levels of clarity or to be distorted. This bears on Deleuze’s quality of reflections (and memories) as having various levels of actual-limpidity (clarity) and virtual-opacity (T-I 70).
The virtual aspects of the Ring are its “unseen” supernatural power, its own consciousness, its connection to Sauron and the Nazgûl, and its hidden letters that can be revealed only by intense heat and that compose a terrible spell. The Ring is not simply a conduit for Sauron’s consciousness, power or voice. It “chooses,” when it can, whom to stay with and when to leave them. It “perceives” its place, its spatial situation, and those around it. It is said in the films that “the Ring wants,” “the Ring perceives,” “the Ring saw its opportunity,” and “the Ring betrayed Isildur.” It calls out, after a fashion, to those whom it wishes to possess it, those whom it wishes to corrupt, to draw inside its (and Sauron’s) will, and influence them and trap them there like light in a crystal. These are all qualities of the Ring’s opacity – its hidden, dark, opaque, virtual “side.” For Deleuze, the opaque can have the qualities of being murky, dark, confusing, black, destructive, or invisible. The Ring always has both actual and virtual, limpid and opaque qualities at the same time, and therefore can be said to function as a crystal-image on its own. As it stands, the One Ring can be seen as a crystal-image in addition to the Sauron/Ring crystal-image. This creates a second level of crystal-images or “multiple reflections” that issue from the relationship between Sauron and the Ring and multiply in *The Lord of the Rings*.

Using Deleuzian concepts to illuminate aspects of the film, I propose that other crystal-images that are directly related to Sauron and the One Ring appear in the form of the Nazgûl – the Ringwraiths or “Black Riders.” The Nazgûl are also called the “Nine,” as there are nine of them, all of whom are commanded by Sauron and drawn to the Ring. The Nazgûl were kings of Men who were several thousand years ago each given rings of power by Sauron. With the forging and donning of the One Ring, Sauron corrupted them
utterly. In the process, they “faded,” becoming literally invisible, were rendered “neither living nor dead,” made immortal but, unlike the immortal Elves, practically un-killable by traditional methods. They are a part of Sauron almost as much as the Ring is, and part of the Ring almost as much as Sauron is.

On a basic level, through their relationship to Sauron and the Ring and the manner in which the Nazgûl are formally presented in *The Lord of the Rings*, they can be considered to be multiple reflections of Sauron himself, as well as reflections of the Ring in much the same manner that Sauron is. As Sauron’s power grows, so does the power of the Nazgûl. And like Sauron, their fate is also tied to the fate of the Ring. Sauron senses or is drawn to the Ring, and so are they. When the captain of the Nazgûl commands Sauron’s armies in *Return* he looks extremely similar to the armored, embodied Sauron from the flashback at the beginning of *Fellowship*. His death is also somewhat similar as he crumples in an implosion and is rendered formless.

I suggest that one scene in particular provides a striking example of Deleuze’s idea of multiple reflections, indiscernibility of the actual and the virtual, and the limpid/opaque exchange of actual and virtual regarding Sauron, the Ring, and the Nazgûl, and this centers around the ability of the Ring to render its bearer, and at the same time itself, invisible when it is placed on its bearer’s finger. When the Ring is worn the bearer cannot be seen by normal vision, but he cannot be “sensed” by Sauron or the Nazgûl when he is not (at least not early on in the film, and never as strongly). On the other hand, while Sauron and the Nazgûl seem to always have some sense of the Ring, some idea of where it might be, their “vision” is focused, directed on the Ring, when it is worn.
In *Fellowship*, Frodo, Merry, Sam, and Pippin are camped out at night on “Weathertop,” also called the “Watchtower of Amon Sul.” While Aragorn is out scouting the area, a group of the Nazgûl attack in an attempt to regain the Ring for Sauron. Unable to defend himself against the Nazgûl, Frodo dons the Ring in an attempt to become invisible and escape – but the effect is not at all what he expects. Frodo can still see his own body and the Ring becomes an even more brilliant gold. To Frodo’s eyes, the Nazgûl go from being figures in black robes with armored gloves and boots to being clearly seen, dressed in white, wearing crowns, with white faces and hands. The Nazgûl look right at him, “seeing” him and the Ring more clearly than when he does not wear the Ring, and come right for him. In addition, Frodo can still see the rest of the world and other people around him, but these images become drained of color, smeared, smudged, and everything moves in slight slow motion. Natural sound drops away or is subdued and there is an onerous, wailing wind. This same effect happens when the Ring “falls” onto Frodo’s finger in the Prancing Pony Inn and when he dons the Ring to escape from Boromir toward the end of *Fellowship*. When Frodo wears the Ring to escape Boromir, and when he is not even wearing the Ring at the beginning of *Two Towers* but its power over him is growing stronger, Frodo sees the space between Weathertop and Mordor collapse as Sauron’s Great Eye atop the Tower of Barad-dûr comes rushing forward to glare directly upon him. The Great Eye does not appear at Weathertop, but in the last two scenes mentioned it is limpid or clearly seen by Frodo, but remains unseen, still virtual to others around him.

The Ring, when worn, becomes clear, or limpid, to Sauron and the Nazgûl, while at the same time becoming invisible, or opaque, to everyone else (except its wearer). The
bearer himself, Frodo, is caught in this cycle, this circuit, when he wears the Ring. The “real” world cannot see him, but the Nazgûl and Sauron can. Frodo can see the Eye, and the faces of the Nazgûl, which none can see unless wearing the Ring.

In the scene on Weathertop, the Nazgûl also act as reflections of themselves in perhaps the most conspicuous example of indiscernible actual/virtual exchange in The Lord of the Rings, adding yet another level of overlapping, multiple, indiscernible actual/virtual circuits to this scene on Weathertop. The Ring here acts as its own mutual actual/virtual image and draws other elements of the image of this scene into the same circuit. The Ring and Frodo have become virtual, invisible or opaque to Sam, Merry, and Pippin, while at the same time becoming actual and limpid to both Sauron and the Nazgûl. The Nazgûl remain opaque to the other Hobbits, while becoming limpid to Frodo. Yet they are also actual and limpid as hooded figures to the other Hobbits while these same hooded figures have become opaque and virtual to Frodo. In this scene, all of these elements or images have crystallized, becoming indiscernible, mutual or dual actual/virtual images, with the Nazgûl being salient examples. In addition, this crystallization pervades the entire image of the film, causing a complete sequence of images to crystallize. There is no image in this sequence that is not presented as both actual and virtual at the very same time.

Here it can be seen that while there is a movement from actual/limpid images to virtual/opaque images when Frodo puts the Ring on, the virtual/opaque images also act as other actual/limpid images, and the actual/limpid images act as other virtual/opaque images. With a cutting back and forth in this and other scenes in the film between Frodo’s situation when he is wearing the Ring and, say, Boromir or Aragorn looking for
him, there is even more swapping back and forth, more reversibility and exchange of actual/limpid and virtual/opaque images.

In all of these situations, but especially at Weathertop, Frodo in a way enters a “world” or “dimension” of the virtual. He “sees” virtuality actualize but it still remains virtual on another level. Normal, common-sense space and time break apart, becoming no longer relevant. The “normal” manner in which actual and virtual relate to each other on a circuit where they follow each other and we can tell which is actual and which is virtual disappears in an indiscernibility of actual and virtual. The normal linkage of initial perception to action crumbles like a bridge under demolition. Drawing on what I believe is Deleuze’s reasoning behind his description of crystal-images, I propose that Frodo can be thought of as gaining a deep intuition, more than a mere glimpse, of the Real. He gains an absolute perception of the originary form of time where past and present, virtual and actual coincide, and “sees” images of the plane of immanence that are normally hidden by the overlay of common sense and the sensory-motor schema.

Seed and Milieu

Deleuze’s third characteristic of crystal-images, beyond actual-virtual and limpid-opaque, involves another mutual pair, that of “seed-milieu” or seed-environment (T-I 70-74). Unlike the limpid-opaque pair, seed-environment is not a function of exchange as images actualize or virtualize, but a quality of the indiscernible actual-virtual image as a mutual pair itself. The examples that Deleuze uses to describe this characteristic are quite broad, as are his examples of reflections.

The seed-environment pair seems to have two distinct but closely related aspects. In his Deleuze on Cinema, Ronald Bogue does not divide these two aspects, but I believe
that seed-environment might be more easily explained if they are addressed separately. Both aspects involve the ideas of the process of crystallization and a crystal’s ability to trap light, but most importantly, of crystallization induced by a seed crystal. A seed crystal is introduced into a conducive “environment,” causing that environment to crystallize around it. The seed then becomes the environment, at the same time that the environment becomes the seed – or even another seed to a greater environment. However, Deleuze’s concept of seed-environment involves a double movement where a reverse action is possible. A solution, melt, or environment can be conducive to condensing or evaporating and forming a crystal, creating what could be used as a seed in the same kind of conducive environment. Hence seed-environment also has the capacity to be dual, or have the capacity to be both seed and environment at the same time, distinct but indiscernible.

Consider the scene on Weathertop when Frodo dons the Ring in an attempt to escape the Nazgûl. The Ring, which can be seen as a crystal-image, can be considered to serve as a seed crystal that catalyzes the crystallization of multiple overlapping images in and of an entire sequence of shots into a greater crystal-image. Also consider what is perhaps the most well known quote from *The Lord of the Rings*, which is written on the Ring itself, “One Ring to rule them all, One Ring to find them, One Ring to bring them all and in the darkness bind them” (Tolkien 59). In the fictitious “past” of the story of the films, the Ring was used to corrupt leaders of the peoples of Middle-Earth – particularly the kings of Men that became Nazgûl - bringing them under the ultimate control of Sauron. These kings of men, “who above all else desire power,” were given rings of power by Sauron. This created a conducive environment into which the One Ring was
introduced as a seed crystal, and the seed spread to crystallize this environment. At the same time, the environment of other regions of Middle-earth became more conducive to the further spreading crystallization. Also, Sauron’s will, through the Ring, was invasive and pervasive; his influence a veritable environment, and the Ring the seed of this environment – yet Sauron and the Ring are One. Deleuze claims that the disposition of the seed “echoes” the disposition of the environment, and the disposition of the environment echoes the disposition of the seed (T-I 71). The environment of Middle-earth was not conducive enough, however, and the crystallizing “world” of Sauron evaporated, leaving only the seed; the Ring. Since the Ring was not destroyed, Sauron survived, even though his bodily form was taken from him and his “spirit” and power dispersed. He still remained in the environment, diluted and amorphous, and the Ring’s survival again acted as seed to the slow crystallization of Sauron into the Great Eye, the coming together, taking shape or form of an amorphous substance.

In the fictitious “present” of the story, the Ring functions as seed to the journey of the Fellowship, as well as the search of the Nazgûl and mission of the first party of Saruman’s Uruk-hai who killed Boromir and captured Merry and Pippin. The Ring also acts as seed to those who bear it, influencing them, spreading through them, enveloping them, creating its own environment within and around them. Consider Frodo’s visions induced by the Ring and its growing influence on him, Boromir’s desire and temptation when Frodo says to him “you are not yourself,” Gollum’s insanity, Galadriel’s “test” when Frodo offers her the Ring, as well as Gollum and Bilbo’s attachment to the Ring and their “unnatural long life” brought about by it.
According to Deleuze, “seed” functions as “the internal limit of all the relative circuits” and environment “the outer-most, variable and reshapable envelope, at the edges of the world, beyond even the moments of the world (T-I 80-81). As I have attempted to demonstrate, the One Ring can be considered to contain all of Deleuze’s basic characteristics of crystal-images (the smallest internal circuit), and hence functions as “the internal limit of all the relative circuits.” It functions as circuits of actual-virtual, past-present, limpid-opaque, and as a seed crystal. To discuss how the Ring functions as “outer-most, variable and reshapable envelope,” I must return to my descriptions of the physical properties of crystals and crystallization and Deleuze’s Bergsonian concept of originary time. But first, to reiterate and develop a bit further, it is important to keep in mind that for Deleuze, the smallest internal circuit “carries everything” and, by the same token, “everything is included in the capacity for expansion of the collection constituted by the seed and the universe” (T-I 69, 81). For Deleuze, “everything” means everything, including life, consciousness, and time; past, present and future, future being possibility, for growth or decay (T-I 89-97).

Consider again the occurrence of crystallization itself, the coming together or taking form of an amorphous substance. Sauron can be thought of as amorphous substance, and only the Ring can cause him to take form, or crystallize. The future, too, is amorphous and virtual, as the past is virtual, and depending on what happens to the Ring, the future, the coming present of Middle-earth, will also take form. Recall that for Deleuze, everything is image, and that the plane of immanence is the infinite set of all images, actual as well as virtual. Also, recall that for Deleuze the plane of immanence can be thought of as being made up entirely of light. The property of a crystal to trap
light, to circulate it within itself, applies particularly well to the function of the Ring if light can be thought of as standing in for “everything,” for all images, and in the current analogy, particularly life or consciousness, and time.

Think of a crystal as a vessel that keeps things in, the inside of this vessel being the internal limit, out of which its contents cannot escape. By the same token, the vessel also serves paradoxically as outermost, external limit. The One Ring was used to “trap” the leaders of the people of Middle-Earth (e.g. the Nazgûl), keeping them within its “world,” corrupting them, keeping them cycling within it, contracting their world, while expanding its (and Sauron’s) own. When Fellowship begins, Sauron’s power has grown as he has crystallized, while the “free peoples” of Middle-earth have weakened, making the environment more conducive to further crystallization. Middle-earth is in a way already crystallizing, and continues to do so throughout the film, while another environment of freedom evaporates into a few seeds of hope that could reverse the crystallization of Sauron/Ring and re-crystallize a freer environment.

Frodo, Sam, Aragorn, Gandalf, Gimli, Legolas, Boromir, Merry, Pippin, all the free peoples of Middle-Earth, the minions of Sauron, Saruman, indeed Middle-Earth itself, are trapped by the Ring, the crystal, caught in its crystalline circuit. And the Ring does this while, at the same time, operating as “internal limit,” with all the crystalline conditions of the relative circuits – distinct but indiscernible actual-virtual exchanges of limpid-opaque – influencing those individuals within the Fellowship, as well as many outside of it. These characters’ indiscernible cycling between actual/virtual, limpid/opaque, is influenced by the Ring as seed crystal (Gollum’s split personality,
Frodo is himself and not himself, his visibility and invisibility, Boromir’s temporary insanity, Galadriel’s passing of the “test” at the Mirror).

While in a geological, physical crystal, light *enters* and cycles inside but of course does escape, which is how we are able to see its luminescence, in Deleuzian terms we can think of the light as not entering or leaving, but simply *being in* the crystal as if created by triboelectric effect, the facets reflecting and cycling it, even keeping it reflecting and cycling, unable to escape. This movement of light – of time, of life, of consciousness – is the crystalline circuit. The crystal, the vessel, however, depending on the behavior of the reflecting and cycling of the light, (the behavior of all the relative circuits), is flexible, reshappable, capable of expanding or contracting, reacting to possibilities.

Another property of crystals that I mentioned is their ability to split a beam of light. This relates to the conceptualization of originary time. Like light being split in the crystal, time is split within the vessel (in the “world”), always having the duality of past-present, where “time simultaneously makes the present pass and preserves the past in the present” (T-I 98). The point of this splitting, happening in every moment, is the “vanishing limit between the immediate past which is already no longer and the immediate future which is not yet” (T-I 81, quoting Bergson). The story of *The Lord of the Rings* is steeped in the past; the past is all pervasive. Family lineage, former glory, artifacts, ruins, origins of peoples, cities, and kingdoms, history of all sorts are constantly referred to, visually and verbally. Yet the past is what drives the present. It is what drives the Fellowship, it is what motivates the characters as much as, and as well as, their concern for the future, for the possibilities of the world, for salvation of the world and a return to former glory. At the same time, the reflections of mutual virtual/past and
actual/present express the paradoxical nature of splitting, forking form of originary time. These films are an excellent example of how the characters and the story exist firmly at the point, at the peak, of the splitting of time. Indeed the characters and story, personify the duality of past-present, while at the same time incorporating or actually containing the possibilities of the future. And all of this revolves around, is influenced by, is indeed contained within, the One Ring.

This is not to say the “world” would not exist without the Ring/Sauron and their mutually dual nature, but that it would be a very different world – and not the world of The Lord of the Rings. In the books and films, the Ring is the internal and the external limit of the world. The One Ring functions as, and stands for, everything. The Ring, containing everything, (the internal limit of all the relative circuits), contains therefore the possibility of the expanding, reshappable universe. The Ring is the seed, if it returns to Sauron, of making him whole, then he as “seed” could grow to “make” the world as he sees fit. The Ring is the seed of the film, of the story and the world. If “planted” with Sauron, it contains the possibility of the world becoming plunged into darkness, of Sauron creating an ever expanding, darker environment – the virtual/opaque aspects of Sauron/Ring becoming the actual/limpid of the world of Middle-earth. There would be no more possibility for change, no more real movement, no alternative ways of living or thinking. Without change, time itself would effectively stop. And yet, the Ring carries with it the potential for a new world of possibilities. With the destruction of the Ring this cycle can be broken, its crystal shattered. If it is destroyed, the world can be reclaimed, the belief in the world reclaimed, and there can be the prospect for expansion of a new world of potential and greater possibilities.
Seed and environment only work, or exist, in an image or entire film, if the other relative circuits as dual pairs can be “seen” in the image. A movie centered around the search for a bomb carried by a terrorist cannot necessarily be said to have a crystalline form, where the bomb would be called seed and the world environment. There must be a consistent montage strategy of distinct but indiscernible actual/virtual images, or crystalline concepts tying into Deleuze’s concept of direct time-images. As I have attempted to demonstrate and will expand upon in the following sections of this chapter, *The Lord of the Rings* can illustrate multiple levels of crystal-image characteristics as well as other characteristics of direct-time-images. Much of this concept has to do with what I see as the film’s fundamental philosophical argument for continual change, a presentation of an originary form of time, and an expressed openness to alternatives to teleological, dialectical becoming, totalization and Truth.³

**Limpid and Opaque: The Actual/Virtual Exchange**

Because of their many similarities, and the fact that they are both Wizards, I propose that Gandalf and Saruman act as reflections of each other, both in the simplest sense where actual and virtual follow each other via organic formal strategies, as well as reaching the crystalline state of indiscernibility of actual and virtual, hence providing us with the possibility of an intuition of Bergson’s form of time as well as the Deleuzian conception of perception and memory.

Following the tenets of parataxis, constellation and multiplicity, a characteristic of an object and its reflection is that they offer different views, or different angles, of something, and in seeing these, one can get a “bigger picture” of the thing, a better view of it from more angles. It is like an act of contemplation, inspection, and even analysis,
but providing a deeper understanding of the thing, leading to a more absolute understanding, or intuition of it. On this level, then, seeing Gandalf and Saruman reflected in each other provides a better understanding of the being that is “Wizard.” At the same time, an object and its reflection are juxtaposed, and in this juxtaposition, who and what Gandalf is and who and what Saruman is are each informed by the other. We get a better understanding of Gandalf due to his juxtaposition with Saruman, and vice versa.

Recall that Deleuze’s idea of reflections stands in for the Bergsonian function of memory and perception, which calls for every image in every present moment to have aspects of both actual/present and virtual/past. When we perceive Gandalf we draw upon all sorts of memories, reflecting, making a description of him, and reflect those back onto him. At the same time we make memories of him and his features, they are “stored,” and we recognize him more easily the next time we see him. What we do when we recognize him is replace the actual image of Gandalf with our memories of him, actualizing those virtual memories into a predetermined image of Gandalf. When we see Saruman, features of Gandalf are reflected onto him from our memories of Gandalf, while at the same time memories are made of Saruman, which are in turn reflected back onto Gandalf because of their many similarities, including that they are both Wizards. Gandalf and Saruman together can be considered a cycle of reflections, which in one way could be considered discernible if we think only in terms of limpid (“White”) and opaque (“Grey”), but I contend that in another way it is indiscernible since they are each reflections of the other.
In terms of “recognition,” we look at one of them and pull up a memory of the other, and create a memory to then compare to the first. But how automatic recognition fails here is that the description of one cannot replace the other. And how attentive recognition fails is that with two of them the image of each is constantly re-described by the memory of the other and the description is never complete. We are, however, getting a fuller and fuller description of each, and of “wizards” even, of what they look like, think like, act like, are like. And this ties into what Bergson says about the ever expanding circuits taking us to a deeper understanding of the Real, an intuitive experience of the Real. As the memory of neither can replace the other and descriptions become more and more detailed, there is a possibility to really “see” them, to see “wizard,” since we can not just fit them into some preconfigured mold. Gandalf and Saruman have become two “sides” of one image, an “image” of “Wizard.” They are each still images on their own, but each has become both actual and virtual at the same time. And, as I will describe shortly, Gandalf himself can be seen as both actual and virtual at the same time due to Saruman’s appearance in the film, and so can Saruman, because of Gandalf.

A way to consider Gandalf and Saruman together is in terms of actual/limpid and virtual/opaque. Just as there are degrees of limpidity and opacity, Deleuze’s assigns different qualities to limpid and opaque. To review, Deleuze describes limpid as clear, transparent, apparent, having light upon it, white, constructive, or visible. Opaque can be murky, dark, confusing, distorted, black, destructive or invisible.

From this perspective, Gandalf can be seen as opaque, or virtual, and Saruman as limpid, or actual. Even what they are called is telling – Gandalf the Grey and Saruman
the White. It would seem that Gandalf is merely a virtual reflection of Saruman.

Saruman’s higher level of limpidity is supported by the fact that he is the head of
Gandalf’s order, supposedly wiser and more powerful than Gandalf.

Deleuze speaks of images in films as either being actual and limpid or virtual and
opaque, or as making the exchange from actual/limpid to virtual/opaque or vice versa. In
one sense, there is a slow progression where Gandalf and Saruman exchange positions,
Gandalf becoming actualized and Sarumon becoming virtualized, or where Gandalf and
his power as Wizard actualizes while Saruman and his power as Wizard virtualizes.

Another way to consider this exchange is that a virtual power in Gandalf actualizes, while
an actual power in Saruman virtualizes. At the same time, a virtual power for evil, latent
in Saruman, begins to actualize, and an actual Gandalf, the one we knew, begins to
virtualize.

In Two Towers, Aragorn, Gimli and Legolas enter Fanghorn Forest in search of
Merry and Pippin. Trekking through the forest, Legolas, whose senses are very keen,
tells Aragorn that “the white wizard approaches.” Believing this to be Saruman, they turn
quickly in an attempt to catch the approaching Wizard off guard, before he can put a spell
on them. Bathed in a blinding white light, the Wizard blocks arrow and axe with his
staff, and then causes Aragorn’s sword to glow so hot that he is forced to drop it. The
voice that comes from the Wizard is strangely distorted, and sounds for all the world like
Saruman’s, though it is also mixed with Gandalf’s. Aragorn demands that the Wizard
show himself, and he steps forward, the light fading. It is of course Gandalf, much to his
companions’ surprise.
Gandalf has clean white robes, straighter and whiter hair and beard, and a staff very similar to Saruman’s. Legolas apologizes for the attack, saying that they thought he was Saruman, to which Gandalf replies “I am Saruman, Saruman as he was meant to be.” Moments later, Gimli calls him “Gandalf,” and Gandalf responds, “that is what I used to be called, Gandalf the Grey. I am Gandalf the White.” I propose that the moment when Gandalf appears, bathed in white light, with a voice that is a mix of Gandalf and Saruman, exemplifies a crystal-image *par excellence*, with complete indiscernibility between Gandalf and Saruman, actual and virtual. Even limpid and opaque become completely indiscernible. Even though the image of Gandalf/Saruman is bright white, and thus limpid, the whiteness itself obscures the image and it is therefore also opaque. In addition, we may believe this to be Saruman, the more limpid of the two, but it is Gandalf, who has been the more opaque – and whom we believed to be dead. If this were the only image of Gandalf in the film, or of Saruman, or Gandalf and Saruman had not been presented earlier in the film as I have described, I could not make such a claim. In order for an image to “crystallize” or be a crystal-image, the images do not have to be in the same shot or even in the same scene, but can be spread out across an entire film (or in this case, three films that together constitute one film). But in this scene, the exchange of Saruman from actual to virtual, limpid to opaque, and of Gandalf from virtual to actual, opaque to limpid, is unmistakable.

The exchange is not complete in this film, however. We do not know if Gandalf has completely actualized his Wizard’s power while Saruman’s has virtualized until Gandalf meets Saruman face to face again in Isengard toward the beginning of *Return*. Until then, the exchange continues during Gandalf’s attempt to exorcise Saruman from
Théoden in what I contend is one of the most complex and exemplary examples of the indiscernibility of actual and virtual and the exchange of limpid and opaque on film.

An important idea for Deleuze regarding reflections is that the virtual can be seen as potential, as power unrealized or unreleased. The actual can then be looked at as how potential becomes realized; where power becomes useable or used force. When Gandalf expels Saruman from Théoden in *Two Towers*, Théoden actualizes in Edoras while Saruman virtualizes in Edoras and actualizes in Isengard. Here Saruman virtualizes and actualizes at the same time, but we have Théoden only actualizing. Because Théoden was possessed by Saruman from Isengard, one could argue that a virtual Théoden, the one that actualized in Edoras, existed in Saruman in Isengard, and remains virtual in the actualized Saruman as Saruman’s potential *power to possess*. By the same token, what has virtualized in Théoden is the potential *to be possessed*. Be that as it may, the point I am trying to make is this: though there is a logic to the assignment of actual/virtual sides and the exchange of actual/limpid and virtual/opaque, this is not a logical problem to be ultimately solved. It presents a paradox, the basic paradox founded in the originary form of time, where actual and virtual, like present and past, coexist, simultaneously, and do not by necessity follow one after the other in a linear progression or in any separable, measurable increment.

Sauron, the One Ring, the Nazgûl, Saruman/Gandalf, Théoden/Saruman, all make for striking examples of Deleuze’s ideas of reflections, but I believe that it is with Gollum that these and even more characteristics of Deleuze’s direct images of time can be more fully demonstrated, as well as in whom the more profound implications of Deleuze’s crystal-images might become exemplified.
Gollum/Sméagol as Reflection

“Gollum” is the common name that most in Middle-earth know him by. This name is an onomatopoeia deriving from the odd coughing sound that he makes. As we see in these films, Gollum can be considered an alternate personality to Sméagol, the “original” personality of the entity I call “Gollum/Sméagol.”

I propose that there are three ways to describe the two personalities of Gollum/Sméagol as distinct but indiscernible actual/virtual reflections of each other. The first is that they are contained in one physical entity, no matter which personality we think we might see or hear speaking, and there are times when we simply cannot tell which it is. The second is that there is not a good Sméagol and a bad Gollum that are continuously at odds concerning what is “right” and what is “wrong.” Their goals are ultimately the same, and in this Sam is completely correct, to retrieve the Ring at whatever cost to others. To this end they do not compete with each other. This leads to the third manner in which I believe Sméagol and Gollum are connected as reflections, which is through the Ring. As I suggested earlier in this chapter, the Ring itself is like a circuit upon which many actual/virtual reflections are caught. I believe Gollum/Sméagol can be seen as one of these.

The Ring can be seen as part of the creature Gollum/Sméagol. It is as if the three are one, not just Gollum and Sméagol as one, but as if the Ring were in itself one of three “personalities” of a Gollum/Sméagol/Ring being. And it is the Ring that caused the “split” between Gollum and Sméagol, yet at the same time it is what combines them into one, though separate from them. Like Sauron himself, Gollum/Sméagol cannot be “whole” without having posession of the Ring.
Gollum/Sméagol De-linked

Even when Gollum and Sméagol are shown in separate shots, following rules of the continuity system (as in the scene at the pond and when Sméagol “banishes” Gollum), it seems to me that the common sense connection of space and time that guides organic formal strategies is suspended or disrupted. In many scenes with Gollum/Sméagol where there is complete continuity of movement, contiguous space and chrono-linear time, there is, for me, also a complete, “felt” discontinuity. This can be seen as the result of an alternative formal strategy, a crystalline formal strategy which is not regulated by any particular “schema,” but has significant conditions of discontinuity and paradox founded in the originary form of time. Deleuze’s concepts provide a way to see that the “image” of Gollum/Sméagol stands in for a direct image of time – a distinct but indiscernible actual/virtual reflection in and of himself; alone a paradoxical figure in its entirety, but also a figure that imbues the entire film with a paradoxical, crystalline nature. I believe the other examples of time-images that I have described from The Lord of the Rings, Frodo’s encounter with Galadriel after escaping Shelob’s lair and the sequence of Arwen’s “resuscitation” of Aragorn at the river’s edge, also illustrate this same paradoxical nature and “felt” discontinuity. All of these cases seem to exhibit not only the indiscernibility of actual and virtual or real and imaginary, but also the coincidence of these seemingly “opposite” aspects in the same image.

Regardless of the many variations of how organic formal strategies may present or organize film images, the images are presented and perceived as movement-images and, in essence, it all “makes sense,” even if only after much contemplation or a strenuous effort of fabula. Crystalline formal strategies, on the other hand, are those that
present, even “create” time-images or direct images of originary time, which do not
“make sense” in a “normal,” everyday manner. These images present a viewer with a
possibility to experience some degree of the suspension of the sensory-motor schema,
some intuition of the paradoxical form of originary time, and not just the originary form
of time, but also the possibility of alternative ways of perceiving, thinking, and, I believe,
*feeling*, that is different from everyday, habitual sensory-motor perception and thought.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to explicating and supporting this theory.

The degree to which the above effect, or any that I describe later in this chapter,
“happens” or is “experienced” by a viewer, depends on how conducive or receptive an
individual is to such a thing, or on their personal proclivities. In his reading of Deleuze
on Resnais’s and Robbe-Grillet’s *Last Year at Marienbad* (arguably Deleuze’s favorite
example in describing time-images), D. N. Rodowick points out that when watching this
film, “we are only confused or disappointed to the extent that we cannot or will not adapt
to this new logic.” The film seems weird; hard if not impossible to “understand.”
Certain viewers feel they must be able to figure it out, or, rightly or wrongly, have
figured it out, or they dismiss it as boring or not making any sense and can not wait for it
to be over. I do not think it radical to claim that different viewers have different
proclivities to an experience of certain films. I make no claim as to what this proclivity
entails in its entirety or who may be more or less receptive to the effect of time-images
that I propose is possible. It undoubtedly has to do with innumerable matters of taste,
personal experience, inclination, and perhaps biological factors, but a thorough study of
these factors is outside the scope of my current project.
Earlier I spoke of the “discontinuity” in the seeming continuity in the image of Gollum/Sméagol. This idea is based in part on my assertion that Gollum/Sméagol is in himself not one image but multiple images. With crystalline formal strategies, I believe that continuity or discontinuity can take place between any two or multiple film images, and not just between shots. “Discontinuity” in film can then be more than just “discontinuity editing.” Unfortunately, Deleuze very often uses discontinuity editing to exemplify crystalline formal strategies. When reading the cinema books, it can seem that only through discontinuity editing can direct images of time arise in films – but I argue that this is simply not the case, and that to hold to this traditional idea of discontinuity editing as being a criterion for time-images can be quite detrimental to Deleuze’s cinema project in its entirety.

An Interval/Gap Triumvirate

In many theories of montage there is the idea of a “gap” that exists between shots. There is a “cut,” a physical “splice,” but this is also a theoretical “space” that is crossed by the mind in order for the shots that are “cut” together to have meaning or to make sense. Deleuze is not very consistent in his use of many terms in the cinema books, and one term can mean many things, but perhaps the most confusing of these cases have to do with his use of the terms “gap,” “interval,” “cut,” “irrational interval,” and “interstice.” I propose that there is an interval/gap triumvirate for images, particularly as they relate to film, that applies to both movement-images and time-images. This interval/gap can be thought of as existing: 1) as the mind/body of the spectator, 2) “between” image and image, and 3) as a film character’s “mind/body.”
Deleuze goes to considerable length in *Cinema 1* to describe Bergson’s conceptualization of the attentive human mind/body (the special image, or what I have called a “mirror-disk) as a “gap,” an “interval” “between” received (initially perceived) images and returned images (actions), where images are “put together.” Bergson goes so far as to say that this interval/gap is a void, empty in its basic, primordial form. What “fills” the gap is perceived actual images and remembered virtual images. I propose that the first of the three components of the interval/gap is the mind/body of a spectator.

Deleuze alludes to, but merely alludes to, the idea that a “cut” between film images is nothing more or less than the human mind/body as interval/gap. A cut, like an image, is not “in” the film or “in” the spectator’s mind/body, it *is* the spectator’s mind/body. Although Deleuze does not stress this “identity” of interval/gap and cut, I feel it is an extremely important idea to Deleuze’s entire cinema project. In addition, I believe this idea can be carried further. Interval/gaps, or “cuts,” can be considered to exist not just between shots, but between all images, including all images in films – whether movement-image films or time-image films. This notion of the identity of human mind/body and cut, “together” being what lies “between” images, is the second component of the triumvirate of the interval/gap.

There is yet a third component of the interval/gap. When discussing various concepts, Deleuze will sometimes speak of what is happening to, with, or “in” the “mind” of a character in a film. At other times, however, it seems that he is more concerned with what is happening “in” the “mind” of a film’s spectator. In yet other instances, he will discuss what is happening in a film, in regards to images or cuts, without regard to character or spectator. Most disconcerting, however, is that he will often discuss certain
concepts without giving us a clue as to “where” this is supposed to be “happening” or whom it is supposed to be happening to – is it “in” the film, “in” us, “in” the world, where?

I believe that much of the reason for the ambiguity as to whether Deleuze is speaking of a film, a character in a film, a spectator, or the “world” issues from the very basic assumption that “everything is image,” the implications of which Deleuze assumes we can keep in mind at all times, as well as Bergson’s conceptualizations of “absolute” and “intuition” – which I elaborate on shortly – but first let us consider this third component of the interval/gap to be the mind/body of a character “in” a film. And let us think of the character’s surroundings, the film world, as that character’s “world” of images, just like our world of images exists for us. The images that the character “perceives” have gaps, “cuts” or intervals “between” them, and these cuts are the mind/body of the character, just like they are in our world.

It is tempting to claim that there might be two more “interval/gaps,” one between a character in a film and an “image” in the film that they “perceive,” and another between spectator and film, but if we follow the implications of the basic claims that “everything is image” and that film images are the same as any others, then this distinction becomes problematized. It is not just that “the brain is the screen,” as in the screen “acts” as a brain, but that the relationship between the “spectator brain,” the “screen brain” and the “character brain” is that they are coincident, one and the same. Even if we can think of their being a distinction between them – because of a common sense, sensory-motor mode of existence – we “create” this distinction between these three components, and the distinction between us as subject and film as object simply may not exist in the Real.
In the regime of movement-images, a sense of the linear and chronological, a Whole, and the distinction between inside and outside is inherently assumed. The interval/gap provides common sense relationships between images, linking them via a “belief” in common sense movement, space and time. Perception and thought in this mode of existence are what Bergson calls “relative” and “analytical.” Deleuze uses the terms “relative” and “analytical” occasionally in the cinema books, but he does not define them to any great length. In An Introduction to Metaphysics Bergson expounds upon these concepts, and they are an integral part of his entire project in both Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution.

For Bergson, the sensory-motor mode of existence is generally relative and analytical. Parts are analyzed, related to each other and to the Whole, and “seen” in relation to ourselves. In its simplest sense this can be equivalent to studying pieces of a thing in science in order to get an understanding of the thing. We pull things apart and put them back together, just like perception and thought does with the Whole of the “world” of movement-images. When perceiving a “thing,” studying it, trying to “know” it, this concept also involves remaining “outside” of the thing and utilizing “ready-made concepts” and “symbols” (Bergson, An Intro 1, 68).

The notion of “absolute” perception and thought, on the other hand, carries with it a sense of “absolution” or purification – a purification of habits of thought, of the “illusions” of linear time, the “imaginary” distinction between image and image and subject and object, even the sensory-motor schema itself, providing a different “perception” with which to “see” and alternatives to link the images of the world in ways other than strictly with the sensory-motor link. According to Bergson, an absolute
understanding, perception or thought of something is only “achieved” through a high degree of an “intuition” of it, which should not be thought of as an immediate grasp or especially an automatic recognition of a thing. In Bergsonian intuition we enter “into” a thing, in essence become not just a part of it, but one or “coincident” with it, and I posit that conversely the thing must also become coincident with us (Bergson, An Intro 5). For Bergson, absolute perception and thought are preferrable in the pursuits of science, philosophy, and even our everyday lives. But according to Bergson, this is a difficult and rare, even painful thing, to achieve, and always has a sense of the strange or uncanny. In intuition “the mind has to do violence to itself, has to reverse the direction of the operation by which it habitually thinks, has perpetually to revise, or rather to recast, all its categories” (Bergson, An Intro 69). It is a process of forming a reflective idea of a thing, an experience of a thing in which coincidence prevails over sharp distinction according to fixed, previously “known” concepts. I propose that the experience of time-images presents the possibility for viewers to enter into some greater degree of intuition of images, an absolute perception of images, including a deeper intuition of the coincidence of viewer and image.

However, drawing from Deleuze’s discussion of the “out-of-field,” I believe that there is some sense of the absolute in the perception and thought of movement-images. When Deleuze speaks of the relative and the absolute in the cinema books, he does so for the most part in terms of the “out-of-field,” and not specifically in reference to Bergson’s “relative” and “absolute” perception and thought, though I believe this belies his interest in and even reliance upon these notions of Bergon’s, even if he does not explicitly state it.
For Deleuze, Noel Burch’s “six spatial axes” of the out-of-field, “above or below the frame, to the right or the left, in depth away from the camera ... or toward the camera and beyond it in the audience’s direction” are all “relative” (Bogue 43, T-I 17). Deleuze then adds an “absolute out-of-field,” which refers (in a typically ambiguous manner) to both the expression of a Whole by the images “in” the frame and to an “Outside” (T-I 17). The Outside is not conceptualized as a binary opposite to “inside,” however. In the regime of movement-images, the Outside is one and the same as the assumed but ever-changing Open Whole, an “expression” of the “inside.” The Whole or Outside of the regime of movement-images, the absolute out-of-field, is both something that can be consciously conceptualized and/or in a way “felt” of “felt for” (Bogue 169) – through what I propose might be some “sense” of Bergson’s “intuition.”

Via crystalline formal strategies, the interval/gap “becomes” what Deleuze calls the “interstices” as well as the “irrational interval.” This is an “interval” where the “common sense” of things is suspended. Deleuze is no more consistent in his use of “interstices” than he is with “gap,” “interval,” or “cut” (T-I 277). He is, thankfully, more consistent in calling this “form” of interval/gap the “irrational interval” (T-I 277). For example, the interval/gap between Gollum/Sméagol’s multiple but mutual images can be seen to illustrate interstices or irrational intervals. I make the same suggestion for the “cuts” from the stony path outside of Shelob’s lair to the grassy meadow and back in the example of Frodo and Galadriel’s encounter after Frodo’s passage through Shelb’s lair, and the “cuts” between shots of Aragorn on the riverbank and Arwen on the couch, as well as “between” the images of Aragorn and Arwen when she revives him.
Images presented via crystalline formal strategies cannot be “linked” through a sense of a greater Whole because the “parts” do not “add up.” They do not connect in a common sense manner. When this “happens,” for Deleuze the Whole disappears, and what enters into the image is the “Outside” (T-I 278). In my reading of Deleuze, the Outside is in its simplest sense the previously hidden “plane of immanence” (the infinite set of all images). The Outside can be considered as that which is “outside” the images (and sets of images) that are “normally” and habitually perceived and thought via the sensory-motor schema. Movement-images can be considered to comprise only a portion of the plane of immanence of all images. With time-images, the “outside” “appears” not as the or a “Whole,” but as images and even aspects of images (such as the mutual actual/virtual and real/imaginary nature of images) that are not usually and habitually perceived; that may have been “hidden” by everyday, common sense sensory-motor activities of attentive, intentive, selective human consciousness. With crystalline formal strategies, the “absoulute out-of-field” becomes part of or infused in the image itself and “testifies to a more distrubing presence, one which cannot even be said to exist, but to ‘insist’ or ‘subsist,’ a more radical Elsewhere, outside homogenous space and time” (T-I 17). This Outside bears with it characteristics of the originary form of time, the “Open” nature of the “Open Whole,” and teams with unactualized virtuality. With time-images, I proffer that the Whole does not actually “become” the Outside at all, but the Outside in varying degrees “seeps into” the image or comes crashing in like the thunderous clap of air rushing into a vacuum after the exploding of an atom bomb, providing a possibility for certain viewers to experience anything from a glimpse to an eruption of the Real and any degree of intensities in between.
Earlier in this chapter, I described my hypothesis of an “interval/gap triumvirate.”

In summary, I submit that Deleuze’s “cut,” “interval” and “gap” can be thought of as one and the same, and that this “interval/gap,” as I refer to it, “exists:” 1) as the mind/body of the spectator, 2) “between” film images (and not just shots) and, 3) as a character’s mind/body (when there is a character “in” a time-image). In addition, I propose that all three of these components are one and the same interval/gap. There is for Deleuze no difference between perceived image and perceiver. This same hypothesis applies to the interstice or irrational interval. Therefore, if an interstice “exists” or “appears” “on screen” as “2” or “3” above, it exists or appears as the mind/body of the spectator as well.

I propose that in a viewer’s experience of time-images, which are not presented via organic formal strategies, the sensory-motor, common sense distinction between perceiver and perceived, subject and object, viewer and film image can become disturbed or disrupted. The effect of this alone can be bizarre, and the “source” of it unassignable. This idea I draw from Bergson’s notion of absolute or intuitive perception. As Bergson states, achieving an absolute relationship to a thing can cause “violence” to the mind (An Intro 69). With this experience, there may be no clear distinction between this strange “feeling” as coming from or being “in” the film image, or coming from or being “in” the viewer, and can be described in terms of varying degrees from a loosening to an eradication of the suspension of disbelief, or a disruption of the sense of fiction. I also propose that this experience is one of a greater “realization” or “feeling” of the coincidence of mind and body, as well as mind/body and image.

Something to keep in mind regarding my idea of the interval/gap (and interstice) triumvirate is that there can be far more than just three interstices “between” film images.
They can exist “between” any number of film images. Deleuze’s description of crystal-images involves not just two or a few reflections, as in a character in front of a mirror or even a mirror in front of a mirror, but multiple reflections, a hall of mirrors, reflections upon reflections, which is why Deleuze calls it the “crystal-image,” and not the “mirror-image.” In my earlier discussion of the indiscernible actual/virtual nature of Sauron, the Ring and the Nazgûl, I presented that these “images” can be seen as reflections upon reflections, and therefore exhibit multiple irrational intervals or interstices.

An important aspect of the interstice that Deleuze describes is that, when the interval/gap of movement-images becomes an irrational interval in direct images of time, the “cut” (now the interstice) between images becomes something on its own, and not part of another image. In terms of shots, for Deleuze a “cut” can be considered as either part of the last shot, as the end of it, or part of the next shot, as the beginning of it (T-I 180; Rodowick 143). In direct time-images, the interval/gap is “freed,” becomes “autonomous,” becoming not simply a part of other images, but infused as a component of them, and they as a component of it (T-I 180; Rodowick 16, 143). The “cut” is not just between images, but in a sense both between and within them, crossing them, overlapping them and overlapping over them.

I propose that the “continuity” of images in organic montage strategies can be thought of as “relative continuity,” and the discontinuity of images in crystalline montage strategies as “absolute discontinuity” – as opposed to what could be called “relative discontinuity” that we might see in discontinuity editing in a film such as a Renny Harlin directed fight scene or Michael Bay directed car chase. Absolute discontinuity forges paradox, and reveals as well as issues from the paradox of the originary form of time and
its distinct but indiscernible actual/virtual and real/imaginary aspects. I believe the examples of crystal-images that I have discussed from *The Lord of the Rings* exhibit what I have called “absolute discontinuity.”

**Effects of the Crystal-Image**

In the rare and strange cases that a film exhibits crystal-images, they cannot be dealt with in a thought process that is regulated strictly by the sensory-motor schema. There is not just “normal” action to be “normally” linked to a “normal” reaction via sensory-motor links (rational intervals). This is no everyday stimulus to be linked to a common sense response. The sensory-motor link from movement-image to movement-image, from action to action, can weaken or break like a bridge demolished. The interval/gap is, to a certain extent, left not completely or easily “crossable” with sensory-motor thought. There is not simply common sense continuity between images – for example between Sméagol and Gollum, or Sméagol and Gollum and the Ring, between Gandalf and Saruman, Sauron and the Ring, or Arwen and Aragorn. The Whole becomes more difficult to “grasp.” The weakening of the link “in” the interval/gap, now an interstice or irrational interval, can be thought of as creating a vacuum, and what comes rushing into this vacuum is the Outside – in essence, previously undisclosed aspects of the Real. The interval/gap as interstice could be said to come closer to its primordial, most basic, or originary state, to Bergson’s “void,” before images are or were perceived as just movement-images and processed or put together via the sensory-motor schema. This condition could perhaps also be thought of as being *beneath* this sensory-motor process. Recall that, for Deleuze, film, like the world, at its very essence exists as signaletic material – non-linguistic signs, moving images prior to, antecedent to, or
beneath language – and that language “arises” as a response, an action, when the sensory-motor schema seizes moving images and sensory-motor links are “made.” I propose that some time-images might provide a possibility for certain viewers, on some level, to experience moving images as moving images and not just movement-images, as indescribable, unlink-able signaletic material.

The interval/gap, “failed” by the sensory-motor link, is no longer able to link to definitive action. The movements from one image to another or between images across the interval become to some degree incommensurable, irrational. In response to my suggestions here, one might say that Gandalf and Sarumon are both Wizards, or that Gollum and Sméagol are both parts of a split personality, and I would agree – if they are “seen” entirely via sensory-motor perception and thought. But which “aspect” of Wizard is actual or virtual, or of Gollum/Sméagol is real or imaginary? Or are they both at once, paradoxical in their very nature?

Based on concepts from Deleuze’s cinema books, I have thus far in this chapter described a number of ways in which time-images might affect certain viewers. Specifically, I have discussed the affect that some “images” in The Lord of the Rings might have on certain viewers. Much of this, at its basis, has to do with a disturbance of the sensory-motor schema, which in itself can be affective, even disturbing. I believe there are, related to a disturbance of the sensory-motor schema, a number of other ways to talk about why time-images may have an affective quality for certain viewers.

I proffer that in the experience of time-images, automatic or habitual recognition does not entirely work, and the process of attentive recognition “fails” (it does not stop, that may be possible only in death), it simply goes on and on in the cycle between actual
perception and virtual memory, oscillating back and forth so quickly that the actual/present and virtual/past are at least somewhat indiscernible from one another. The mirror-disk, after a manner, could be considered to become more “reflective.” This may be an element of the affective experience of time-images, and resonate with certain viewers.

Deleuze ceases to speak of the “perception-image,” itself a movement-image, once he gets deeply into his discussion of time-images, and he does not describe what it is that “happens” to perception-images in the experience of time-images other than to infer that perception changes. I propose that the “perception-image” per se might become no longer relevant. In the experience of time-images, when the sensory-motor schema is disrupted, the ability to link initial perception to affection to action becomes troublesome. The “cell membrane” of perception-images can no longer stretch to and through and “contain” affection, action and relation. Recall that initial perception is simultaneous with affection, which is “pure feeling,” intensity and quality. If affection can no longer be linked through to or used to get to action; if relation cannot be easily made, if made at all; if there is no definitive habitual sensory-motor response to be had when confronted with an image, then I propose that affection is “released,” in varying degrees, providing a coincident image/viewer with a feeling, intensity and “quality” that is not “normally” experienced in our everyday lives.

There is another aspect of Deleuze’s work that I believe can be used to describe why certain films might affect different viewers in different ways, and why certain films might have more of an effect on some viewers than others. As I have interpreted Deleuze, it is attentive human consciousness, intent on action and selection and regulated
by the sensory-motor schema that “produces” movement-images from the moving images of the world. I propose that in the experience of time-images, “selection” becomes difficult and “intention” distressed, and that “attention,” depending on the individual viewer, can become either relaxed (in the case of viewers who may not be as receptive) or heightened (in the case of viewers who may be more receptive), in varying degrees.

Though this may seem contrary to Deleuze, I proffer that, with crystalline formal strategies, the other “images,” our comfortable, everyday movement-images, do not completely disappear. They are still there. We do not necessarily “see” something completely “different” or “other,” but might perceive and feel something more in the image, with the image. In line with Deleuze, however, I propose that the experience of time-images offers the possibility to “enter” a realm of virtuality and potential. Once the sensory motor-link between images is disrupted, we have the opportunity to “see” that there are other possibilities, multiple possibilities of how to perceive images and put images together, or make sense of them, other than strictly through the sensory-motor schema. In the cinema books, Deleuze does not tell us how images should be put together. What is important to him seems to be that we realize that there are other possibilities, even an infinite number of possibilities, of both how to process images and to reconfigure or combine images – to come up with an infinite variety of combinations of images – even of images we may already be familiar with. With this alternative “mode of existence,” Truth with a big “T,” like the Whole and chrono-linear time, is only something to be grasped at, never “found,” proved, uncovered or revealed to us – originary time will not allow it. And “truth” is the subject of the following section of this chapter.
Truth and the Form of Time

In my reading of Deleuze, any image that qualifies as a crystal-image justifies, at least on some level, the calling into question of the basis of “Truth.” According to Deleuze (and many other philosophers throughout history, including St. Augustine, Kant, Hegel, Liebniz, and Nietzsche), the conceptions of any kind of truth and of “thought” are intrinsically tied to a conception of the form of time. If time is considered to be a single unbroken line, linear and chronological, then thought must develop and proceed along this line. D.N. Rodowick observes, however, that in chronological time, the present has a curious existence. It is simply a point moving continuously on a line where the present burrows into the future, leaving the past behind in its wake. The present is the constantly moving division of the future into the past. But if we look directly at the actually given ‘present’ considered as an interval of time, time appears as a paradoxical image. The linearity of time begins to break up. How are we to grasp the present and distinguish it absolutely from the past it has already become and the future it is too rapidly overtaking? The point is, we cannot. Following St. Augustine, we see passing time shatter into an event composed simultaneously of a present of the future, a present of the present, and a present of the past, each of which is distinct and incommensurable. (125-126)\(^5\)

If time is considered to be not chrono-linear, but Bergson’s originary form of time, as Deleuze insists, then thought itself must split, fork, double itself in every moment, continually and exponentially. But in a world regulated by common sense and
the sensory-motor schema, past, present and future cannot exist at the same time. Such a fundamental paradox cannot be tolerated.

In the early to mid 1700s, Gottfried Leibniz was the first to consider seriously and receive attention for a contemplation of the seemingly indisputable paradox of time and truth and its implications to our lives and the world we live in. He framed his consideration of this paradox as a problem of “contingency” having to do with the future (Rodowick 96). Rodowick notes that “the paradox of ‘contingent futures’ assumes, of course, that the future is indeterminate or contingent,” which puts it into direct counterpoint to the concept of fate, which is by definition deterministic (everything that happens is meant to happen and is based on past events) (96-97). But “without this assumption the possibility of exercising free will is lost” (97). Rodowick observes that “Deleuze characterizes Leibniz’s position on contingency as an argument that the past may be true without being necessarily true.” For Leibniz, as a philosopher and man of logic, the paradoxical nature of time and truth exists, but this cannot be so in only one “world.”

Leibniz wants to preserve equally the universal power of an omniscient God for whom time is irrelevant, and the freedom of choice for individuals whose actions will nonetheless produce determinate consequences in the historical fate of their world. Leibniz’s solution is to assert that [future events] may and may not take place, but in different worlds. Both worlds are equally possible and consistent within themselves. And being different worlds they do not contradict one another. They are, Leibniz argues, not ‘compossible’ with one another. (Rodowick 97)
Deleuze, however, wants us to be, believes us to be, in one world, *this* world, so the “true” or truth must indeed be contingent in every moment. In every present moment everything has a virtual aspect, and a characteristic of this is the possibility or potential of being true – and therefore, since *only* a possibility, it also has the possibility of being false. True and false are there, in every moment and every image, distinct but indiscernible, all the time.

A film that exhibits crystalline formal strategies can present this paradox formally in the fundamental composition of crystal-images described through the idea of reflections, images which have distinct but indiscernible aspects of actual and virtual as well as real and imaginary and present the form of time as paradoxical, which brings the notion of Truth into question. For Deleuze, this formal strategy presents a “falsifying narration,” and releases the “power of the false” (T-I 132). “The force of time puts truth into crisis, then, because in these images it is no longer possible to think in direct relation between truth and the form of time. Similarly, it helps us understand how ‘the power of the false is also the most general principle that determines all the relationships in the direct time-image’” (Rodowick 137; inside quotes from Deleuze, T-I 131). Deleuze further specifies that “the formation of the crystal, the force of time and the power of the false are strictly complimentary, and constantly imply each other as the new co-ordinates of the image” (T-I 132).

The subjects of perception, memory, reflections, crystal-images, falsifying narration and many others may seem to be separate or even unrelated in the cinema books, but they all tie together, though Deleuze, with his paratactic writing practices, does not directly connect them for us. Many of Deleuze’s most fundamental ideas get
lost or forgotten in his lengthy descriptions and digressions. What he is ultimately leading up to, though his writing often has elusive or nonexistent connections to earlier concepts, is that movement-images are basically put together through common sense ruled by a human need for truth and totalization, while direct time-images release the power of the false and “describe” a universe of multiple possibilities that is non-totalizable. For much of his argument along these lines, Deleuze uses Bergson as the basis for a discussion of the philosophical writings of Friedrich Nietzsche.

Rodowick succinctly interprets Deleuze on Nietzsche by observing that “if the forms of truth are temporal, then we are freed from the reactive or passive position of ‘discovering’ a preexisting truth. Instead, we are active and creative, inventing our world as we move through it” (130). It is Nietzsche who most fully developed the concept of the power of the false that I mentioned earlier. For Nietzsche, the false is a necessary and given alternative to the true. For Deleuze, it is given to us via the paradoxical form of time that exists in this one world, our world. A number of elements of *The Lord of the Rings*, particularly the character of Gollum/Sméagol, illustrate Deleuze’s take on Nietzsche quite well. The oscillation or indiscernibility of the true and the false, though it can be considered on the level of story (and I do so in utilizing *The Lord of the Rings*) it can also be exhibited by and experienced via crystal-images and “felt” in the reflective mind/body, resonating on a physiological and emotional level like the indiscernibility of actual and virtual or real and imaginary.

**Judgment and the Will to Power**

For Nietzsche, judgment is intrinsically tied to truth. Judgment requires truth, or an ideal, against which to judge. If truth is based in the form of originary time, then truth
itself is in question at all times. Therefore the ability to judge is also in question. For example, in *Fellowship* Gandalf makes a very clear statement against judgment regarding Gollum. When Frodo sees that Gollum is following them through the Mines of Moria, he says to Gandalf, “it’s a pity Bilbo did not kill him when he had the chance,” to which Gandalf replies, “Pity? It was pity that stayed Bilbo’s hand. Many that live deserve death, and some that die deserve life. Can you give it to them Frodo? Do not be too eager to deal out death in judgment... even the very wise cannot see all ends.” For Nietzsche and Deleuze, judgment is the basis of the “will to truth” – which requires Truth and Ideals, which in turn necessitate an extreme effort of totalization or at least a strong belief in the possibility of it.

Nietzsche’s “will to power” is the will to falsehood. It is important to note that the will to falsehood does not completely replace or even stand in complete contradiction to the will to truth. Truth is not completely illusory for Deleuze. It is an essential idea, we just never come across it. But we cannot just agree that all is plurality either. Even the “rhizomes” of Deleuze and Guattari are connected. Truth is a formal thing we need to grasp at, like the Whole, but only to help form bridges between multiplicities. We need to look for connections to multiple meanings in order to make sense of the world. This is the “synthesis” side of Deleuze’s “disjunctive synthesis” (which has ties to Kierkegaard’s “leap of faith”). Movement-images make sense of the world through the sensory-motor schema, common sense, linearity and continuity, and for Deleuze, a will to truth that requires judgment, totalizing, and resistance to change.

For Deleuze, however, we may never really make sense of the world, and just because something makes sense does not mean that it can be considered the Truth.
Nevertheless, we can only function or survive by engaging in the sense making process. This sense making process – and particularly the way we go about it – is vitally important for Deleuze. Per Deleuze, we must continue to try to make sense of things, but by different means, or we stagnate in our ways of thinking and fall into relying upon “truths” and habit. We need alternative paths or multiple possibilities in order to stay fresh, and to stay “alive.” Rodowick claims for Deleuze that truth is not opposed to the false as its opposite or negation; rather, the powers of the false are a measure of truth in its temporal, and therefore fragile and embattled, forms. Nor is truth an identity waiting to be recovered. ‘The idea that truth is not preexistent,’ writes Deleuze, ‘something to be discovered, but instead, must be created in every field, is easily seen in the sciences. Even in physics, all truths presuppose symbolic systems, even if only coordinates. All truths ‘falsify’ pre-established ideas. To say ‘the truth is a creation’ implies that truth is produced by a series of processes that shape its substance; literally, a series of falsifications. (16; inside quotes from Deleuze’s Negotiations 126, 172)

The power of the false and the will to falsehood arise with crystal-images, and at their very basis they require continuous change and multiple possibilities for the future and life. The inability to judge and the multiple possibilities that come with the power of the false relate directly to Nietzsche’s concept of “beyond good and evil.”

Gollum – Good and Evil

Strict ideas of what is “good” and what is “evil” are requirements of judgment. To define things as good or evil is to judge – and a will to truth requires continual
judgment. Deleuze carefully states that Nietzsche “warned his readers: beyond good and evil does not in the least mean beyond the good and the bad” (141). Deleuze describes the bad as “the will to dominate,” an “exhausted and degenerating life, all the more terrible, and apt to multiply itself” (141, 142). For example, in *The Lord of the Rings*, Sauron and the Ring are both called “evil” on numerous occasions, and whether they are or not, they both certainly fit Deleuze’s description of “bad.” Sauron wishes to “dominate all life,” as Galadriel puts it, and he multiplies himself in Saruman, whose “badness” spreads to Grima Wormtongue and King Théoden. Sauron “multiplies” himself most conspicuously in the Nazgûl, and the Ring’s power to “degenerate life” is visible in Gollum and the Nazgûl. There is no doubt that for Deleuze the bad is something to be fought against – but for Deleuze and Nietzsche, the will to truth, the belief in Truth, are definitely bad, since they cannot help but judge the world, attempt to totalize it, and “discover” or uphold Truth.

The good, for Deleuze as well as Nietzsche, is creative, universal becoming, “outpouring, ascending life, the kind which knows how to transform itself, to metamorphose itself according to the forces it encounters, and which forms a constantly larger force with them, always increasing the power to live, always opening new ‘possibilities’” (T-I 141). Deleuze compares the good to what scientists call “noble” energy and the bad to scientific “base” energy,

according to physicists, noble energy is the kind which is capable of transforming itself, while the base kind can no longer do so. There is will to power on both sides, but the latter [bad or base] is nothing more than will-to-dominate in the exhausted becoming of life, while the former is
artistic will or ‘virtue which gives,’ the creation of new possibilities, in the
outpouring becoming. The so-called higher men are base or bad. But the
good has only one name; it is ‘generosity.’ (T-I 141, inside quotes from
Nietzsche)

Deleuze notes, however, “of course there is no more truth in one life than in the
other; there is only becoming, and becoming is the power of the false of life, the will to
power” (141). In my reading of Deleuze, “becoming” can be thought of as basically
change, continual change, and it is only through continual change that the good can come
forth. Recall that for Bergson and Deleuze, the basic form of originary time itself is
change. In addition, since no one life has more truth than another, even the line between
good and bad can be a fine one. Which leads me back to the resistance to forms of
judgment. Let us again consider the image of Gollum/Sméagol.

In the climax of The Lord of the Rings, toward the end of Return, after all that
Frodo has been through, after all his sacrifices, and in spite of his best intentions, it is not
he who destroys the Ring and saves the day at all, but Gollum/Sméagol.

Gollum/Sméagol, who could possibly be considered the most vile and treacherous
creature in the entire story, is in the end the “hero,” responsible for the final destruction
of the Ring. Frodo certainly had a hand in it, wrestling with Gollum/Sméagol for the
Ring and in part causing them to fall over the precipice. And Gollum/Sméagol certainly
did not destroy the Ring on purpose – but neither did Frodo.

Both Frodo and Gollum/Sméagol hold a strange position in relation to what could
normally thought of as a “hero.” Gollum/Sméagol cannot be regarded as a tragic hero.
Consider Gollum/Sméagol in relation to another of the most vile “villains” in
contemporary cinema, Darth Vader. What Gollum/Sméagol does in biting off Frodo’s finger and causing the destruction of the Ring cannot compare to what Darth Vader does when he chucks the Emperor over the railing in *The Return of the Jedi* (Marquand, 1983). Darth can be considered a tragic hero in the true sense of the phrase (especially knowing more about his earlier identity as Anakin Skywalker now that the prequels have been released). Gollum/Sméagol is something entirely different. What was done to Sméagol by the Ring and what was done to Anakin by the dark side can be compared in that they were both corrupted, both seduced, both “turned.” But Darth was a decent person, even a good person, before his corruption. We cannot definitively say the same about Sméagol (he did strangle his own brother after only a glimpse of the Ring). More importantly, however, is that Anakin *chooses* to save the day, to save his son, to end the rule of the Sith. Gollum/Sméagol does nothing of the kind.  

From an orthodox Christian point of view, it could be deduced that Gollum/Sméagol must go to Hell, or at least be damned for all eternity – yet ultimately it was he who saved the world, not Frodo. In spite of his motives, Gollum is the one that leads Frodo and Sam to Mordor, and ultimately is the one who both saves Frodo from the Ring and destroys the Ring, saving the world. How then is Gollum/Sméagol to be judged? The point may be that he cannot. In a Deleuzian/Nietzschian sense, Gollum/Sméagol is simply another force in the world, beyond “judgment,” beyond good and evil. This does not in any way mean that Gollum is the kind of character anyone should aspire to be. He, his life, his actions, simply present to us the illegitimacy of judgment and the conflicted nature of truth.
The Scorpion

Gollum is neither a Nietzschean “ubermensch” nor “creative artist,” but I believe he does contain some characteristics of Deleuze’s interpretations of Nietzsche’s “scorpion” and “forger” (T-I 140). Deleuze relates Nietzsche’s story of the scorpion and the frog, in which a scorpion desires to cross a body of water. The frog offers to let the scorpion ride on his back if it promises not to sting him. The scorpion promises, and climbs onto the frog. Half way across, the scorpion stings the frog. The frog dies, and the scorpion drowns. But the scorpion is neither evil nor good – it simply does what it does. Scorpions sting. This is certainly a bad thing, especially for the frog, but can the scorpion be judged just for doing what a scorpion does?

Now, the scorpion may have lied to the frog when it said it would not sting him, but it may not have. Why would the scorpion maliciously do what would certainly cause its own death? Considering The Lord of the Rings in Deleuzian/Nietzschean terms, Gollum/Sméagol is very similar to the scorpion. He does only what he can do. The Ring has such a hold on him that he must get it back, no matter what. He does in the end say that he lied when he took his oath to obey and help Frodo, but we cannot be certain that he knew he was lying at the time that he took the oath (as Gollum/Sméagol is strangling him, Frodo shouts “but you swore,” to which Gollum/Sméagol replies with a grin, “Sméagol lied”). But for Deleuze, following Nietzsche, lies and trickery are every bit as legitimate as telling the truth and being honorable. This is not to say that tricksters are better, only just as legitimate, and I believe Gollum/Sméagol is a perfect example of this idea.
Gollum, like the scorpion, is “the animal sick with itself,” “sick with life itself” and degenerate, but still very much alive, as opposed to the “truthful” man who judges life itself against some transcendent Ideal, which is actually against life and is a longing for the self-same, a stagnant life, a desire for conformity and a will to dominate, all leading to a point where all change practically stops (T-I 141). This is very similar to what Sauron wants. Though Sauron is not “truthful” in the traditional sense, he wishes to make the world in his own image, erase difference, arrest change and “totalize” the world under one “eye,” one vision, one law, one name, one word – his own. Other than possibly Sauron, the “truthful man” may not exist in Middle-earth. Not the Elves, they are leaving. Not Gandalf, he is also leaving, and his effect could be seen as maintaining difference, and he is against judgment. Not even Aragorn, who does not judge, does not look to achieve anything in particular for his own benefit. When in Return Elrond gives him the sword re-forged and says “I bring hope to the world of Men,” Aragorn replies “I keep none for myself.” And in Two Towers he stays Théoden’s sword on the steps of Edoras, not allowing him to judge even Grima Wormtongue for his terrible betrayal.

Gollum/Sméagol, as the scorpion, may be reprehensible, but he does not seek to dominate or to arrest change. The scorpion may judge in his own way, but “it is not a matter of judging life in the name of a higher authority which would be good, the true, it is a matter, on the contrary, of evaluating every being, every action and passion, every value, in relation to the life which they involve. Affect as immanent evaluation, instead of judgment as transcendent value” (T-I 141). This may not be what Deleuze or Nietzsche are ultimately looking for in humankind, but it is a start and, for them, better than the judgment of the truthful man or relying on transcendent ideals or Truth.
An Image of Originary Time

Considering *The Lord of the Rings* via Deleuzian concepts, it is possible to look at the character of Gollum/Sméagol as a figure of paradox on a number of levels. On the level of “image,” Gollum/Sméagol exists as crystal-image, reflections of multiple, distinct but indiscernible actual/virtual and real/imaginary aspects in and of himself. But in Gollum/Sméagol there is not only the indiscernibility of the actual and virtual and real and imaginary, but “undecidable” aspects of the true and the false (T-I 144; Rodowick 86). On the level of story, we paradoxically have a reprehensible character who saves the world. We have a “bad” character who in many ways is better, or at least more effectual, than the “good” character Frodo, and who even saves the good character. His “bad” qualities as liar, sneak and cheater end up being more necessary, or at least equally as necessary, to victory than Frodo’s good or bad qualities. Remember that it is not Frodo’s desire to save the world that had him grappling with Gollum/Sméagol for the Ring and causing them to fall.

In terms of story, Gollum/Sméagol’s actions indicate a strong presence of a Nietzschean power of the false in *The Lord of the Rings*. In evidence, we see arising from the power of the false the ideas of beyond good and evil, the illegitimacy of judgment, and the equal legitimacy of lying and trickery and “bad” intent to truth and “good” intent. There may be other instances of all of the above in *The Lord of the Rings*, but I propose that they can be thought of as being collectively embodied most strongly in the character Gollum/Sméagol. In him as crystal-image, as well as in his actions, there is the possibility of “seeing,” of gaining some degree of an intuition of the Real, of some level of absolute perception of the originary form of time, the plane of immanence, the
power of the false, and paradox. Deleuze states that “contrary to the form of the true, which is unifying and tends to the identification of a character (his discovery or simply his coherence), the power of the false cannot be separated from an irreducible multiplicity” (T-I 132). I suggest that Gollum/Sméagol is an “irreducible multiplicity.” He is multiple reflection, crystal-image, direct image of time, power of the false, beyond good and evil, paradox... and all of the implications or symptoms of these ideas. In essence, embodying everything that Deleuze describes as arising from conceiving the form of time as Bergson’s originary time.
CHAPTER IX. THE CINEMA BOOKS AND FILM STUDIES

In the previous chapter I employed elements of the *The Lord of the Rings* film trilogy to illustrate various terms and concepts that relate to Deleuze’s time-image. I pointed out specific examples from these films that I believe embody the most fundamental characteristics of time-images, hopefully describing them in a way that will help others “identify” time-images in other films. In addition, I explained how the “appearance” of time-images might have implications to both the affect of these images on certain viewers and the underlying “meaning” of a film, or more specifically the underlying philosophy or metaphysics that it portrays.

A discussion of effect can be considered to “belong” to film theory, part of which is concerned with why it is that films matter to people. To “read” a film through a specific conceptual lens (such as Deleuze’s crystal-image or time-image) might be considered more of an effort of film criticism or individual film analysis. Deleuze’s concepts are such, however, that they present one of those instances when theory and criticism cannot be easily separated. The “appearance” of time-images themselves, if one follows Deleuze, inherently bear meaning with them (consider the power of the false, for example), but I have also proposed that they might be responsible for affective qualities of films that can be discussed independently of social or cultural conditioning, historical or psychological development, or even scientific cognitive processes.

Regarding effect, I have specifically addressed the question: why might certain images “feel” the way they do, or “make” certain people feel the way we do when experiencing them? I have proposed that Deleuze offers terminology with which to discuss “causes” of these effects, as well as how they might be “produced.”
In summary, I have described in Deleuzian terms how time-images may disturb the “normal” manner of “linking” images with thought, upsetting the “everyday” way a viewer “reflects” between perception and memory. I proposed that for some viewers this might result in an increased “reflectiveness” of the mind/body, a relaxation of intention, and an increase of attention, while it might result in the opposite effect for other viewers. Employing Deleuze’s conceptualization of the six movement-images, I have proposed that affection or “pure feeling,” “normally” “used” to aid in determining appropriate action or response, is “released,” simply “felt” rather than “identified” or utilized. Drawing upon Deleuze’s basic Bergsonian metaphysics I have submitted for consideration that certain viewers may experience with time-images a greater “sense” 1) of coincidence with the film image, 2) of images “beneath” language after a Deleuzian pure semiotic manner, 3) of the “vacating” or “absolution” of the mind/body of action-oriented thought, and 4) of “Real” human temporal-spatial existence. I propose that any of these might provide a meaningful, emotional and physiological experience of film, and that any of these ideas can be utilized to discuss why time-images might “feel” the way they do, or how it is that they do what they do to certain viewers.

Regarding film analysis or even hermeneutics, Deleuzian terminology can be used to disclose metaphysical, philosophical and ideological bases behind or beneath the formal strategies utilized in films. Deleuze’s concepts can also provide a manner in which to discuss how film might reveal the ideological quality of how filmmakers, viewers, or human beings in general “look” at “images,” time, space, and “thought.”

If a person has an indescribable “feeling” when viewing certain images or scenes which cannot necessarily be ascribed to content, an analysis of formal strategies utilizing
Deleuze’s time-images may be able to aid in explaining what it is that is “causing” this feeling, and perhaps even how it is being “caused.” In addition, I feel that there are many films that exhibit crystalline formal strategies, at least in part, and that if looked at through a “crystalline lens,” much could be said concerning what the film might be “about.”

The application of Deleuze can provide a different way of looking at the relationship between viewers and film, and of thinking about the experience of film. Deleuze terminology can possibly illuminate the formal strategy of a film, the filmmaker, as well as the personal proclivities and inclinations of the viewer – mentally, physiologically, and ideologically, making it perhaps pertinent to auteur study, reception studies, and spectatorship.

Deleuze himself does not propose that his work in the cinema books is a theory of cinema, nor does he attempt in any way to identify with a particular theoretical framework. This has not prevented film scholars from referring to Deleuze’s work in the cinema books as “film theory,” or from attempting to categorize his work as one “type” or combination of types of film theory.

In the remainder of this chapter, in order to aid an “entry” into reading the cinema books, I undertake to contextualize Deleuze’s cinema project within the broader field of film studies based on my previous interpretations of Deleuze, attending to aspects of the cinema books in regards to their relationship (or non-relationship) to various film scholars, disciplines and schools of both classical and contemporary film studies. I also make an effort to address certain complaints and a number of other reasons that scholars may have for dismissing the cinema books.
A Film Theory for Deleuze?

The chapters of Robert Stam’s *Film Theory: An Introduction* follow a roughly chronological order, with a section on Deleuze appearing among descriptions of approaches to the study of film in the 1980s. However, while Stam groups various film scholars defined by their theoretical approaches, Deleuze is given his own section. I believe this is telling in two ways. First, Stam finds Deleuze to be important enough to deserve his own section. Second, Deleuze’s work on film simply does not easily mesh with other theoretical frameworks used in that decade (or any other, for that matter). This may have to do with the fact that Deleuze engages a staggering variety of theoretical frameworks, though none in particular, and puts his own spin on each and combines them in a dizzying manner. In addition, many of the approaches Deleuze “dabbles in” seem to be entirely disparate.

Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, in their “Translator’s Introduction” to Deleuze’s first cinema book, warn against attempts to classify *Cinema I* as a work of film theory in their statement:

> in one sense, this a work of philosophy, [but] on the other hand, it is plainly a book ‘about’ the cinema. Not only does it discuss a large number of images from particular films, but it also advances a series of general views about the ‘types’ to which particular films belong. This may lead the reader to classify it as a work of ‘film theory,’ in the traditional sense. This would be a mistake. (Tomlinson xi)

Alain Badiou, author of *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*, makes an even stronger statement along these lines, claiming that “Deleuze in no way considers his exposure to
cases-of-thought related to the cinema (however thorough this exposure may be) as being equivalent to producing a theory of cinema” (Badiou 16.6, emphasis his).

The relationship between film studies and Deleuze’s cinema project has been troubled since the cinema books were first published. Badiou attributes much of this to the basic philosophical nature of the books, stating that “however supple [Deleuze’s] individual film descriptions may be in their own right, this malleability seems nevertheless to function in philosophy’s favor, rather than to fashion, in any way whatsoever, a simple critical judgment that film enthusiasts could draw on to enhance the authority of their opinions” (Badiou 14.5). Badiou also claims that “in the volumes on the cinema, what one learns concerns the Deleuzian theory of movement and time, and the cinema gradually becomes neutralized and forgotten” (Badiou 16.6). I believe Deleuze is more concerned with cinema than Badiou allows, but there is some weight to Badiou’s words. Nevertheless, I see nothing preventing one from taking these philosophical concepts which Deleuze sees as being generated in and from the cinema and employing them to look at film.

Much of the problem of situating Deleuze’s work in film studies has to do with the incredibly broad scope of the cinema books. Ronald Bogue observes that a particular difficulty of the cinema books is that Deleuze presumes “an intimate familiarity with the films, directors, and cinematic movements [that Deleuze] treats, a firm grasp of the extensive literature of film criticism and theory that has taken shape over the last century, and a detailed knowledge of the individual philosophers whose analyses he weaves into his own thought” (2). In addition, D. N. Rodowick points out that,
with each new book, Deleuze writes as if his reader were familiar with everything he has published before. This is especially true of the cinema books . . . Deleuze takes for granted the reader’s familiarity with an argument that has unfolded over thirty years through his books on Bergson, Nietzsche, Kant, Spinoza, and Foucault, as well as *Difference and Repetition, The Logic of Sense,* and his books co-written with Félix Guattari” (Rodowick x).

I heartily agree with both Bogue and Rodowick’s statements.

Paisley Livingston asserts that Deleuze’s general approach in the cinema books is an “example of ‘irrational interdisciplinarity’” (Stam, *An Introduction* 262). The “interdisciplinarity” of the cinema books is evident. Deleuze makes use of philosophy, psychology, biology, mathematics, physics, linguistics, semiotics and film theory, and engages with many varieties of each. That Deleuze’s approach is “irrational,” however, is a matter of conjecture and opinion. I posit that Deleuze feels there must be a manner in which all of these fields of study can intertwine in a mutually beneficial relationship, and much of his work in the cinema books is in support of this conviction. I believe that he has succeeded on a number of levels. However, as I have indicated, Deleuze wants concepts to be left open. In my view, he means the cinema books to be a starting point, not a final statement on any subject or approach.

Gregory Flaxman observes that the cinema books “emerged from within, or from, an intellectual climate [in France] that had begun to veer away from structuralist and psychoanalytic models that still dominated discourse in England and the United States” (1). According to D. N. Rodowick, “since the publication of *Anti-Oedipus* and *A
Thousand Plateaus, it is abundantly clear that Deleuze and Guattari have set out to critique and demolish Saussurean and Lacanian foundations on which, coincidently, most contemporary cultural and film theory has been based” (xi). Though the cinema books were written by Deleuze alone, with them he continues a project that he and Guattari had begun, a major objective of which was to “dismantle the discourses that traditionally nourished film studies – phenomenology, and structuralism,” posing a threat to “semiotics, psychoanalysis, and Althusserian Marxism” and challenging basic assumptions of “historicism, spectator studies” and “cultural studies,” all of which have, to a greater or lesser extent, relied upon “schemata, deep structures, [and] rules of signification” (Flaxman 7).

Deleuze’s clearest comments on his approach in the cinema books are made in his “Preface to the English Edition” of Cinema 1. Even here, however, Deleuze never states what it is that he is doing in the cinema books. He instead states what he is not doing:

This book does not set out to produce a history of the cinema but to isolate certain cinematographic concepts. These concepts are not technical (such as the various kinds of shots or the different camera movements) or critical (for example the great genres, the Western, the detective film, the historical film, etc.). Neither are they linguistic, in the sense in which it has been said that the cinema is a language. (Deleuze ix)

These statements problematize categorical identification of the cinema books as historical study, formalist study, genre study, or any study that might fall under the influence of linguistics. However, among the many digressions and sidebars, odd appendages and seemingly unconnected passages in the cinema books, one begins to realize that what
Deleuze is ultimately interested in is how films can model perception, the mind’s access to memory, and thought, providing illustration of his philosophical point of view. Regardless of what else may be said of Deleuze’s work in the cinema books, it engages with at least some element of spectatorship and apparatus theory, reception and or reading theory, cognitivism, auteurism, historical study, semiotics, and formalism.

**Antecedents**

Robert Stam writes that “Deleuze picks up some of the perennial themes of film theory – realism, modernism, the evolution of film language” and that a number of “analysts have pointed to Deleuze’s debts to antecedent film theory . . . When reading Deleuze one hears frequent echoes of other theorists – Bazin on neo-realism, Kracauer on contingency, Brecht on autonomous scenes, Bordwell on classical cinema, Pasolini on free indirect discourse (An Introduction 259). Stam also likens certain elements of the cinema books to those in the works of Bakhtin¹ (An Introduction 257). There are indeed many others, which can make Deleuze’s work seem like an expansive patchwork of pre-existing theories. As a result of seeing resonations with so many other theorists, “many critics have questioned Deleuze’s originality” (Stam, An Introduction 261).

Deleuze was almost certainly familiar with all of the theorists he is compared with. His depth and breadth of familiarity with theories of film is staggering, especially for a non-film scholar. Deleuze’s research in the cinema books is incredibly thorough and generally well documented. Regarding Deleuze’s debt to antecedent film theories, Stam grants that “to be fair, Deleuze himself acknowledges many of these debts” (An Introduction 259). Still, Deleuze may not have been as thorough as he could have been in his acknowledgments and citations. Two things should be kept in mind, however. First,
Deleuze assumes his readers have an intimate familiarity with the history of film theory. He assumes that his readers will recognize what is taken from pre-existing theories and be able to distinguish between those ideas and Deleuze’s own. Second, Deleuze comes from a very different background than film studies or analytic philosophy. His scholarly research is no less rigorous, but he may not have felt bound to the same painstaking clarity, consistency, and documentation of supporting works required by analytic philosophy or film studies.

What we often see in the cinema books seems to be Deleuze picking pieces from a wide variety of theorists’ findings, utilizing what he feels works, and discarding (and sometimes discrediting) what does not. On the other hand, we see Deleuze pay homage to his antecedents, providing elaborate recaps of various theories of film as well as writings on film history, attempting to do them justice. In addition, it becomes apparent in reading the cinema books that Deleuze wants to keep in mind the entire experience of film – and hence touches on numerous theoretical framework that has been used in film studies. Through his philosophical sensibility he attempts to keep in mind the entire body of theoretical and historical work done in film studies. From this perspective, he is not just picking and choosing what works for him, but attempting to tackle many of the hard questions about film that many scholars have felt are unanswerable. On one level, I see Deleuze as attempting to develop a “unified field theory” for film. This is not to say in the least, however, that Deleuze implies a prescriptive approach to film studies. Even if he proposes that psychoanalytic-linguistic models are limited and ultimately have produced dubious results, it is quite clear he believes that any and all approaches are
legitimate and must be explored, even pushed to their very limits. If nothing else, Deleuze is a proponent of multiple perspectives, in any form, on any subject.

On another level, Deleuze could be attempting to describe a metaphysics of film and world that makes the findings of many different film theorists and theoreticians possible. This is similar to the approach taken by Bergson in his attempt to give scientific developments of his time, such as Einstein’s theory of relativity, a compatible metaphysics. Therefore Deleuze tries to interpose the broadest range of disciplines and historical epochs of film studies and film theorists and historians possible. Hence he draws from or has obvious affinities with Bazin, Bordwell, Burch, Bakhtin, Pasolini, Bellour, Balázs, Eisenstein, Faure, Artaud, Epstein, and many, many others.

One element of Deleuze’s work in particular that draws criticism for its parallels with the work of others has to do with his conceptualization of “the movement-image” and its most representative form, the “action-image.” Stam notes that “Deleuze’s account of the movement-image [bears resemblances to] the work of Bazin, Heath, Bordwell [particularly his arguments in The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style and Mode of Production to 1960 and Narration and the Fiction Film] and Burch on classical cinema” (Stam, An Introduction 259). It is also in ways very similar to “Raymond Bellour’s account of the textual organization of classical Hollywood films” and “the theory and practice of Sergei Eisenstein” (Rodowick 10).

Eisenstein plays a prominent role in cinema studies and in the cinema books, particularly in Deleuze’s discussion of movement-images or films exhibiting organic formal strategies. Therefore, it is important to look more closely at Deleuze’s reading and use of Eisenstein.
Deleuze writes of Eisenstein in *Cinema 1*, but it is not until late in *Cinema 2*, after he has already addressed time-images in great detail, that he elaborates on Eisenstein’s theories of montage and claims them to be valid for the entire regime of movement-images. According to Deleuze, “the whole of [Eisenstein’s] analysis is valid for […] the cinema of the movement-image” (T-I 157) and “Eisenstein, like a cinematographic Hegel, presented the grand synthesis of this conception” (T-I 210).

Whatever Deleuze may concern himself with regarding Eisenstein, I see five main points emerge: 1) to aid in explicating Deleuze’s own conceptualization of movement-images; 2) to support his idea that encountering film is akin to encountering things in daily life; 3) to acknowledge his debt to Eisenstein in creating Deleuze’s own theories of movement-images, including his deduction and description of the six movement-images, as well as his aspect of movement-images that requires a Whole that connects images while at the same time images express the Whole; 4) to support his claim that narration arises from images, and not the other way around (via Eisenstein’s “internal monologue”), and 5) to support his idea that narration in movement-image films is a “truthful,” logical narration.

Beginning on page 157 of *Cinema 2*, Deleuze goes into great detail describing Eisenstein’s three “moments” in the human experience of the cinematic image. He writes that, “according to Eisenstein, the first moment goes from the image to thought, from the precept to the concept” (T-I 157). The “concept” here is the Whole, a presumed “organic totality” that unites the images (T-I 158; Bogue 167). In this “moment,” there is a shock of images between themselves according to their dominant characteristic, or shock in the image itself depending on its components,
and, again, shock of images depending on all their components; the shock is the very form of communication of movement in images. (T-I 157)

According to Deleuze, this is a “dialectical,” “sublime conception of cinema” where “the imagination suffers a shock which pushes it to the limit and forces thought to think the whole as intellectual totality which goes beyond the imagination” (T-I 157). However, this “moment” also produces a profound “harmonic,” a “shock wave” or “nervous vibration which means we can no longer say ‘I see, I hear’ but I FEEL, ‘totally physiological sensation’ (T-I 158, emphasis his, inside quotes from Eisenstein’s *Film Form*).

Deleuze then describes Eisenstein’s second moment, “which goes from the concept to the affect, or which returns from thought to image. It is a matter of giving ‘emotional fullness’ or ‘passion’ back to the intellectual process” (T-I 158). Deleuze emphasizes that “not only is the second moment inseparable from the first, but we cannot say which is first” (T-I 158).

According to Deleuze, Eisenstein’s “third moment,” which is “equally present in the two previous ones,” goes “not from image to concept, or from concept to image,” but forges “the identity of concept and image. The concept is in itself in the image, and the image itself is in the concept” (T-I 161). Deleuze calls this the “action-thought,” which “indicates the relation between man and world, between man and nature, the sensory-motor unity, but by raising it to a supreme power (‘monism’). Cinema seems to have a real vocation in this respect.” (T-I 161, emphasis his).

I propose that in the first two “moments” Deleuze is implying that we can distinguish the “precept” as initial perception or perception-image, which “produces” an
immediate, even simultaneous “harmonic” that is affection-image, and forges a “concept” or “whole” that is relation-image. Deleuze’s description of the third “moment” correlates to both “relation-image” and “action-image.” It is important to keep in mind that neither Eisenstein’s three “moments” nor Deleuze’s six movement-images occur in “steps,” one after the other, for they are concurrent. In addition, in my interpretation, the three “moments” do not represent three separate shots in a film any more than the six movement-images literally represent six different kinds of shots. Also, for Eisenstein, as for Deleuze, film montage does not simply equal the editing of shots, and formal strategies work like the mind’s perception and thought or way of thinking, indeed our very everyday mode of existence, “Eisenstein himself did not hide the cerebral model which drove the whole synthesis, and which made cinema the cerebral art par excellence” (T-I 210, emphasis his).² Even though Deleuze calls Eisenstein’s montage a “dialectical” montage, he states that “if Eisenstein is a dialectician, it is because he conceives of the shock in the form of opposition overcome, or of the transformation of opposites: ‘from the shock of two factors a concept is born’” (T-I 158, inside quotes from Film Form.) Altogether, Eisenstein had essentially already “theorized” the sensory-motor activity of consciousness, perception and thought at work in film – or as Deleuze might prefer, as manifesting itself through film.

Deleuze’s interest in Eisenstein stems from other aspects of Eisenstein’s theories of “montage” as well, including his related contemplations of “image” and “theme.” For Deleuze, the implications of movement-images or organic formal strategies are many, but on a fundamental level organic formal strategies imply or assume the search for an existing Truth as well as a totality of a Whole. Eisenstein’s cinema, representing for
Deleuze the cinema of the movement-image, presents “the ideal of knowledge as harmonious totality” (T-I 210). The entire process flows as “the internal monologue of the brain-world” of the regime of movement-images (T-I 210). Eisenstein’s “internal monologue” is narration, narrative at its fundamental level as it exists in movement-image films. It is the “truthful” or organic narration of movement-images at work via the sensory-motor schema.

A key aspect to Deleuze’s conception of narration and the Whole has to do with his idea that a prevailing narrative “voice” or “concept,” founded in the assumption of linear time, common sense, habit, purpose, the sensory motor-schema, and totality is a fundamental element of movement-images. Deleuze believes that Eisenstein’s theories support this same notion, whether Eisenstein himself believed this to be true of the cinema or not. In his “Word and Image” from The Film Sense, Eisenstein writes that “montage has a realistic significance when the separate pieces produce, in juxtaposition, the generality, the synthesis of one’s theme. This is the image, incorporating the theme” (30). He continues, stating that, before the inner vision, before the perception of the creator, hovers a given image, emotionally embodying his theme. The task that confronts him is to transform this image into a few basic partial representations which, in their combination and juxtaposition, shall evoke in the consciousness and feelings of the spectator, reader, or auditor, that same general image which originally hovered before the creative artist. This applies to the image of the work of art as a whole and the image of each separate scene or part. (Eisenstein 30-31)
As “abstract” as some of Eisenstein’s images and juxtaposition of images might be, they are nevertheless meant to be validated or “sanctioned” by an authenticating and authoritative “voice,” which Eisentstein intends to “guide” the viewer’s own inner monologue, connecting all of the images one to the other by a common thread toward a common goal. “The spectator,” Eisenstein writes, “is compelled to proceed along that selfsame creative road that the author travelled in creating the image” which is “the highest possible degree of approximation to transmitting visually the author’s perceptions and intention in all their fullness, to transmitting them with ‘that strength of physical palpability’ with which they arose before the author in his creative work and his creative vision” (The Film Sense 32). It is not so much the “author” that is of concern in a Deleuzian sense, but an authenticating, sanctioning “narration” that assumes or presumes a “whole,” corresponding to Eisenstein’s “theme” and authorial “intention.” This is essentially, for Deleuze, the way that the sensory-motor schema “works” in our “everyday” mode of existence, where human consciousness engages in the activity of “selecting” and “combining” images of the “world,” “writing” and “following” an internal monologue with attention and intent in an attempt to forge unity with and of the world through grasping at a whole and “closure.” For Eisenstein, relevant to this part of the discussion is Marx’s definition of the course of genuine investigation: ‘not only the result, but the road to it also, is part of truth. The investigation of truth must itself be true, true investigation is unfolded truth, the disjuncted members of which unite the result.’ (The Film Sense 32)
I do not wish to imply that Eisenstein is a dogmatic Marxist, but this statement disclose his affinity for a dialectical nature of montage as well as world, which is a basic characteristic of Deleuze’s movement-images or films exhibiting organic formal strategies.

There are two other aspects of Eisenstein’s montage theory that are of importance to Deleuze’s conception of movement-images. The first is that, for Eisenstein, feeling, emotion, or physiological intensities play an extremely important role in the activity of “montage.” In my reading of Deleuze on Eisenstein, the “totally physiological sensation” aspect of the effect of montage that Eisenstein speaks of not only corresponds closely to Deleuze’s affection-images, but is, like affection-images, regulated by the sensory-motor schema, framed by and subordinate to perception and especially action. Affection is “invoked” by images and montage, as is “theme” or Whole, based on a spectator’s “character, habits, and social appurtenances,” and “creates an image in accordance with the representational guidance suggested by the author, leading him to understanding and experience of the author’s theme” (The Film Sense 33).

Second, Eisenstein’s conception of the relationship between spectator and author “via” image, where the spectator “envisions” or “experiences” “the same image that was planned and created by the author” sounds particularly deterministic, but Eisenstein makes it very clear that he believes “the image is at the same time created also by the spectator himself . . . with his own individuality, and in his own way and out of his own experience” (The Film Sense 33). This idea is befitting of Deleuze’s perspective on the film experience, but in my reading of Deleuze’s contemplation of Eisenstein, Eisenstein’s
theory and formal practice describe an “analytical” and “relative” experience of film (and world) and remain firmly rooted in the regime of movement-images.

In previous chapters I have noted Deleuze’s affinity with certain traditions of the early Russian and Czech Formalists. Deleuze’s approach in the cinema books, however, incorporates aspects that are in line with the interests of Formalists such as Eisenstein, Arnheim and Balázs, as well as Realists such as Bazin and Kracauer. Deleuze claims that his concepts “are not technical,” having to do with kinds of shots or camera angles, but he often discusses kinds of shots in the cinema books, particularly the close-up, and is intensely interested in depth of field, montage, shot duration, lighting, pictorial composition, and aural-visual arrangements in film, relying heavily on formal strategies when he conceptualizes his cinematic image types. Both formalists and realists work with formal elements in film over content and stress, though in different manners, that film has the potential to provoke thought and alter perception. Both assume that a film’s formal strategies, images, or individual moments are part of a film’s meaning making process, and that formal strategies can disclose a world view. Deleuze’s work in the cinema books is in line with all of those ideas.

Eisenstein, Bazin and Kracauer all believe in the democratizing potential of cinema, proposing that film can reconnect human beings with each other and with the world, returning to us the real world that we have lost, forgotten, or come to ignore, forging a “unity between humanity and the world, or between humanity and nature” (Rodowick 183). “Eisenstein located this global unity in the concept of montage as a principle for organizing images,” writes D. N. Rodowick, “Balázs defined it as a physiognomy in images, where humanity and nature show their common force. For
Bazin, an emphasis on unbroken duration founds a temporal realism that unifies humanity and nature in a common act of perception” (183). From a Deleuzian perspective, these similarities have basically to do with the descriptions of cinematic practices as positing and reaffirming linear and causal relationships between parts (or sets) and wholes, as well as a chrono-linear form of time, and describe the basic nature of movement-images.

Deleuze’s study of film departs from both Eisensteinian Formalism and Bazin or Kracauer’s Realism on a number of levels. For Deleuze, the democratizing hopes for cinema never came about, and likely never will. Film is no more suited to connect human to human or humankind to the world than the world is itself. Film is also not capable of revealing reality in the sense that it is thought of by the classical Formalists or Realists. Deleuze notes that early theorizing on Italian Neo-Realism defined it by its social content, but then Bazin came along and said it was not that, but how these films represented what was “real.” For Bazin, reality was interpretable and ambiguous. Deleuze does not disagree, but he is “not sure that the problem arises at the level of the real, whether in relation to form or content. Is it not rather at the level of the ‘mental,’ in terms of thought?” (T-I 1).

Drawing on Bergson, Artaud, Schefer, Pasolini, and Nietzsche, among others, Deleuze builds an argument that what film can do is disconnect, de-link images from each other, including human from human and human from world, breaking with common sense and “reality” and give us an intuition of the underlying Real – which for Deleuze is quite different from Bazin’s or Kracauer’s “reality” (though once again in line with early Russian and Czech Formalists). Stam discusses the work of Bazin and Kracauer under
the rubric “phenomenology of realism,” but he does not categorize Deleuze in the same way (Stam, *An Introduction* 76). Stam writes that, for Deleuze, realism “no longer refers to a mimetic, analogical adequation between sign and referent, but rather to the sensate feel of time, to the intuition of lived duration, the mobile slidings of Bergsonian durée. (Stam, *An Introduction* 259, emphasis his). Deleuze’s elaborate description of movement-images and time-images nowhere discredits Formalist or Realist theories wholesale. I believe Deleuze presents us with a metaphysics of world where elements of these and many other different and even seemingly contradictory theoretical approaches are validated. For example, if the formalists are thought of as being about de-linkage and the realists are about linkage, Deleuze is about both. It is not just the breaking up of images that concerns Deleuze, but what happens in the reflective process of the mind and to thought in the activity of “re-linking” images.

**Apparatus, Spectatorship, and Reception**

In contemporary film studies, apparatus theory, spectatorship and reception studies have become closely related. In short, the ‘cinematic apparatus’ refers to a psychoanalytic model of spectatorship based on an analysis of the basic conditions of reception delving into the psychological determinations originating from the unconscious mechanism of the film viewer, and “apparatus theory” *per se* has been for the most part absorbed into what we now call “spectatorship studies” (Pearson 79-80; 366-370). Reception theory is closely related to literary theories of “reading,” and has to do with audience research and effect on the audience (mostly empirical studies), and though generally concerned with data originating culturally and socially, (who, where, how, when, with whom, etc…), also psychologically (Pearson 366-370).
The psychoanalytic and unconscious dimensions of these approaches are not of particular interest to Deleuze, and same goes for the conditions of reception of apparatus theory or spectatorship and the collection of empirical data. However, an interest in spectatorship can be deduced from his work in the cinema books. Deleuze’s project defines relationships between the film and viewer – for Deleuze they are coincident, there is no difference between image and perceived image, and in films exhibiting movement-images, “image and thought are in mutual accord . . . allowing a ready passage between the screen world and the world of the spectator” (Bogue 7), and “the integration of parts into ensembles and ensembles into whole culminates in a totality where image, world, and spectator are identified through a grand image of Truth” (Rodowick 12). Rodowick comments that assuming “cinema is a technological apparatus – a machine organizing the space and time of meaning in the image for the spectator – is a commonplace of contemporary film theory” (174). Deleuze, however,

is pursuing different philosophical quarry. Spinoza formulated this idea by defining the task of philosophy as giving knowledge of our powers of thought, as opposed to providing knowledge of things. The task of the philosophical idea is not to make something known, but rather to make known our power of thought. (Rodowick 174, emphasis his)

This interest in the “power of thought” as opposed the epistemological concern with knowledge puts Deleuze more in line with contemporary film theory since Althusser’s notion of “symptomatic reading” (Stam, An Introduction 134) than traditional apparatus theory, and separates him from theorists such as Kracauer, for whom the
cinema can create viewers that are “shackled captives of a high-tech version of Plato’s
cave” (Stam, An Introduction 139).

Reading the cinema books from the viewpoint of spectatorship, however, is not
particularly helpful since, as Stam writes, “virtually all film theories have implied a
theory of spectatorship,” from “Münsterberg’s idea that film operates in the mental
sphere,” or “Eisenstein’s faith in the epistemological leaps triggered by intellectual
montage,” to “Bazin’s view of the spectator’s democratic freedom to interpret” and
“Mulvey’s concern with the male gaze” (Stam, An Introduction 229). Be that as it may,
further study of Deleuze’s ideas of image, movement and time could possibly add a new
dimension to contemporary spectatorship as well as reception studies.

Cognitivism and Film-Mind Analogies

Cognitivism claims to work independently of matters of the unconscious, lack,
representation, or desire that are crucial to psychoanalytic analysis. It deals with the
processing of information, the mental operations of awareness of objects, of thought or of
perception, and the capacity for knowledge or the very act of knowing, as well as rational
mental processes having to do with the production of meaning and effect and the making
sense of conventions and codes (Pearson 92-95). Cognitivism also claims to work
outside of linguistic approaches – though it could be argued that Saussure-inspired
linguistic analysis of film “as a sytematic set of codes, conventions and structures which
can be learned, modified and represented” is basically cognitive (Pearson 94). A broad
and variegated “program” rather than theoretical model, cognitivism generally insists on
“clarity of exposition and argument” based much in cognitivism’s adherence to methods
of cognitive science as well as Anglo-analytic philosophy as advocated by Bertrand
Russell (1872-1970), which developed in opposition to the methods of the “continental” philosophy that Deleuze practices (Currie 108, 119; Blackburn 14, 335). Cognitivists embrace recent developments in science, preferring empirical scientific approaches of psychology, psychiatry and biology, over what they feel are the speculative approaches of psychoanalysis (Currie 105-106). Cognitivists see our processing of film as being rational, and the way that we make sense of film as being the same as the way we make sense of the world (Currie 106).

The clearest similarities between Deleuze’s work and that of the cognitivists are the rejection of psychoanalytic and linguistic models, the use of science, and the belief that how we experience, process and make sense of film, and specifically movement, mirror how we experience, process and make sense of the world. In his Negotiations (French 1990, English 1995), Deleuze clearly states that “it’s not to psychoanalysis or linguistics but to the biology of the brain that we should look for principles” in assessing film (60). Cognitivists might also find some common ground in Deleuze’s interest in memory access and the operation of perception. The differences between Deleuze’s approach and that of the cognitives are, however, significant.

Cognitivists would have little tolerance for Deleuze’s broad appropriation and invention of terms, some drawing from science but none clearly defined, or his paratactic approach in non-closure of arguments, his Nietzschean claims for the true and the false in narration, or his metaphysical speculations on durée, world memory, originary time, the Real and the Imaginary, or the actual and the virtual (Currie 108, 119).

Certain efforts of cognitivism echo those of film-mind analogies that go back as far as the earliest writings on film by Hugo Münsterberg. Deleuze can be thought of as
edging into the film-mind analogy, but phrases like “the brain is the screen” as it appears in the title of Flaxman’s anthology on the cinema books, on page 33 of Rodowick’s Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, and described by Deleuze himself (T-I 215), while in some ways illuminating, can also be misleading. “The brain is the screen” for Deleuze is a small part of his film-consciousness-mind-perception-memory-thought initiative, and can be detrimental if considered a rigid metaphor for Deleuze’s work on the cinema.

For Deleuze, it is not that film images represent thought, or that the functioning of film images is precisely equivalent to the functioning of the brain. It is that, for him, the compositional/montage strategies of film images can provoke, or invoke, an “image of thought” or of the brain’s functioning in a philosophical sense. There may be a subtle difference between saying that film represents, stands in for, is a metaphor or analogy for thought or the brain and saying that it invokes a concept, but this is an important distinction. An image of thought is a description, a visual or audio/visual description of thought.

One important aspect of this line of thinking is that there are several “images of thought.” When philosophers describe how they believe thought to work or function, they are describing an “image of thought” for their particular era (Deleuze, What is Philosophy 37). For Deleuze, different kinds of films and different images in films, and how these images are organized and presented, can provide different philosophical descriptions, or conceptions, in an audio-visual sense, of an image of thought. Movement-images, according to Deleuze, present one image of thought; time-images the possibility of others. For Deleuze, film provides metaphors for thought and human experience. Deleuze’s work is not specifically apparatus theory, not spectatorship theory,
not cognitive theory, and not a film-mind analogy *per se* as they are generally understood in film studies. There are certainly ways in which Deleuze edges into these areas, and this does not help when it comes to making his approach clear, but his work is not any one of them, nor is it really a combination of all of them.

Once again, I stress that the cinema books are a case of philosophy utilizing film, and not the other way around. Deleuze uses film to describe his philosophy because he believes that the different types of cinematic images, specifically movement-images and time-images, can be for us various concepts of thought, perception, or philosophies of the world – of how the world does or could function, and how we do or could function in it and as part of it.

**Semiotics and Linguistics**

In the cinema books, Deleuze does not directly address psychoanalysis (as he had done in his work with Guattari, though not related specifically to film), cognitivism, or film-mind-analogies. He does, however, openly engage Metz, Pasolini, and others utilizing linguistic or semiotic approaches to film. In looking back on his work in the cinema books, Deleuze states flatly in *Negotiations* that “it’s catastrophic to try and apply linguistic models to cinema” (52). Deleuze continues, stating that “this might lead one to think that applying a linguistic model is a detour that’s better left avoided” (53). However, as I have claimed, Deleuze is a proponent of multiple perspectives on any subject. I believe Deleuze felt that it was *no longer* useful to utilize linguistic approaches in the study of cinema, but it is evident that Deleuze felt this work was worthwhile in his statement that “thinkers like Metz, or Pasolini, have done very important work,” even if,
and perhaps because “their application of a linguistic model always ends up showing that cinema is something different” than language (52-53).

In the cinema books, Deleuze readily admits that he is working in the realm of semiotics. But he is clearly against “reductionist, code-seeking Saussure-based film semiology” (Stam, An Introduction 257). Deleuze insists that “linguistics is only a part of semiotics,” and draws on the studies of Charles Sanders Peirce, whom he claims is working in the realm of what Deleuze calls a “pure semiotics,” broadly defined as “the system of images and signs independent of language in general” (T-I 29). This plunges us immediately into the very depths of the most intricately complex components of Deleuze’s metaphysics, ones that take him two books to use film to describe. Though I have addressed some of this subject in previous chapters, the following passages are meant to support the idea that Deleuze’s work is not linguistic or semiotic in the traditional sense.

On a very basic level, Deleuze describes a philosophy of world where everything is moving image and part of the ever-changing undulation and modulation of the universal miasma, primordial ooze, or material, if you wish. Images “arise” from this material. This material, and these images, have no meaning, no codes, and signify nothing. Once the mind, or a filmmaker, gets ahold of this material, however, various levels of signification can occur. This takes the form of types of images, organizational strategies of images, and signs. These types of images, organizational strategies, and signs “don’t already exist, they have to be created” or “recreated – signs, if you like, always imply a signature” (Deleuze, Negotiations 49). Signs, in Deleuze’s usage of the term, can be thought of in and of themselves as containing no meaning; not being signs of
things from which they arise – or they can contain significant meaning, once we give it to them, being then signs of things (Deleuze, T-I 33). A broad spectrum of signs and images, then, with various levels of signification, appear in the world, and in film – language being only one of them. Film indeed has linguistic qualities, but it is more than language. It can also be assumed that all signs are images for Deleuze, but not that all images are signs – at least not in the Saussurean sense. Deleuze claims that all images are different combinations taken from the same basic pool of signs – but here I maintain that he speaks of movement-images and time-images – not all images (Negotiations 49).

Yes, there are images in the world, without us, but they have no meaning until “we” give it to them.

Auteur Studies

Robert Stam points out Deleuze’s closeness to Bazin’s auteuristic tendencies (An Introduction 259). Deleuze does indeed tend to refer to specific filmmakers, such as Hitchcock, Welles, Fellini, Resnais, or Renoir, as being “masters” of certain kinds of images that appear in film, and treats their bodies of work as being consistent in their use of these images. For Deleuze, kinds of formal strategies used in filmmaking arise from a filmmaker’s conscious or intuited notion of the form of time. These formal strategies also give rise to various kinds of signs (in the Deleuzian/Peircean pure semiotic sense). For Deleuze to see a consistency in the form of movement-images or time-images in a body of work by a certain filmmaker should not be surprising. Deleuze’s “auteurism” then is more of a symptom of his deeper interests in image and sign than an approach to film analysis as developed by the Cahiers critics, preoccupied with the “subject” and that can be likened to 19th century romanticism, or even as re-invented by Andrew Sarris in
his “Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962.” I propose, however, that if a film image can be considered an image of thought, then there may be some application of Deleuzian concepts to studies of certain filmmakers regarding their own thoughts or thought-image, including views of time, image, world, ideology, and even intuitive metaphysical or philosophical inclinations.

**Cinema History**

Deleuze indeed regards the cinema in a historical sense, relating movement-image films to “classical” cinema as it developed prior to WWII and time-image films to certain filmmaking practices that developed during and after WWII, what he calls “modern” cinema (David Bordwell points out Deleuze’s debt to Bazin in regards to this classical/modern relationship of the movement-image and time-image) (Stam, *An Introduction* 262). Deleuze’s historical classification of these types of filmmaking and his use of the terms “classical” and “modern” to describe them are in my view both problematic. Examples of time-images appeared in the cinema prior to WWII, and movement-images do not go away and moreover time-images certainly do not predominate after the war. Also, the distinction between what he calls “classical” and “modern” is quite troublesome in that classical filmmaking can be considered to be closely associated with the modern and particularly Modernist sensibilities.

What is most important for Deleuze, however, is that movement-image films represent or exhibit a mode of existence and its related, intrinsic modes of perception and thought that he believes has governed our very existence for thousands of years. This mode of existence basically causes “movement-images” to arise from the raw material or primordial ooze of the universe; causes us to “see” the world in the form of movement-
images and combine them in thought in a common sense, chrono-linear manner. The “regime of movement-images” follows these “laws.” Time-image films express the possibility of alternatives to this mode of existence, and together constitute the “regime of the time-image.” Deleuze attributes the appearance of time-images in films to what European society experienced with WWII, particularly the Holocaust and the first use of nuclear weapons.

In speaking of the historical aspect of the cinema books, Deleuze calls it a “natural history rather than a historical history” (Negotiations 49). He denies that it is in any way teleologically oriented, implying a progressive development of images, signs or thought. Deleuze also claims that there are no “lines of descent or filiation” in the appearance of specific images or signs, it is just that particular images or signs can only appear under certain conditions, and these conditions happened to coincide with certain eras. I am not entirely sure that I believe Deleuze’s denial, and propose that any historical studies based on Deleuzian concepts might tell us more about Deleuze than they would about film history.

Chapter Conclusion

Many of the theoretical approaches in film studies overlap or borrow from one another. Robert Stam observes that “generalizations about theoretical ‘schools’ elide the manifest exceptions and anomalies … The slicing up of a theoretical continuum into neatly separated movements and schools, moreover, is always somewhat arbitrary” (An Introduction 3). He continues, stating that “‘feminism,’ ‘psychoanalysis,’ ‘deconstruction,’ ‘postcoloniality,’ and ‘textual analysis’ are [in Stam’s book] discussed separately and in succession, for example, yet nothing prevents a psychoanalytic
postcolonial feminist from using deconstruction as part of a textual analysis” (3).

Deleuze may push this multifaceted approach to film studies to its extremes, working within (and without) a multiplicity of theoretical frameworks, but as Stam implies, it is relatively common practice to combine multiple approaches in film studies. The fact that the cinema books echo a wide variety of previous theories should not be a reason to dismiss them outright, nor should it impede the reading of them or the use of them in film theory or criticism.
X. CONCLUSION

With this Conclusion I summarize key concepts covered in this study, propose further areas of study, and discuss my intentions regarding future research. I approached this study of Deleuze’s cinema books with two basic intentions: 1) to address what I felt are the real sticking points to reading and studying the cinema books, 2) to address concepts that were: a) most interesting in terms of the philosophical foundations of film and the meaningful affective experience of film, and b) fundamental concepts that best illuminated as much of the cinema project as possible.

In Chapter I of this dissertation, “Survey of Related Scholarship,” I provided an overview of Deleuze scholarship in three sections. In the first section, I discussed general Deleuze scholarship, reporting that the majority of scholarly work in any discipline draws for the most part on Deleuze’s collaborations with Félix Guattari. In the second section, I concentrated on how Deleuze has been utilized in film studies, provided summaries of my most significant secondary sources, and addressed how my study differs from them but contributes to the body of work on Deleuze and the cinema books. Most of the work in cinema studies that utilizes Deleuze once again draws more from Deleuze-Guattarian concepts than Deleuze’s cinema books. In the third section I attended to the body of scholarly work on philosophy and film.

In “Chapter II. The Cinema Books, Science, Art and Philosophy,” I addressed Deleuze’s interdisciplinary approach, discussing Deleuze in relationship to a variety of philosophers and philosophical disciplines, and deducing that Deleuze is closest to a post-structuralist. Instead of epistemological thinking of everything as language and working one’s way down, however, Deleuze begins metaphysically from image and works his
way up, side-stepping “how we know,” embracing “how we think” and denying the subject/object binary.

In “Chapter III. A Deleuze/Adorno Axis,” I approached what are arguably the greatest difficulties of the cinema books: Deleuze’s writing style, methodology, and ambiguous terminology. I posited that Adorno’s documented style and methodology involving parataxis and constellation can be directly related to Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas of rhizomatic knowledge and multiplicity. These Adorno terms together illuminate both the philosophical concepts of rhizomatic knowledge and multiplicity and Deleuze’s conceptualization of time-images. I proposed that Deleuze purposefully writes paratactically (failing to make clear connections, leaving gaps, utilizing ambiguous terms and concepts) and uses methodology akin to constellation (approaching the same ideas from many different angles in a seemingly sporadic manner) in an effort to promote thought and encourage multiple perspectives.

In the next chapter, “Image Regimes, Narration and Montage,” I proposed that movement-images and time-images can be thought of as arising from or exhibiting formal strategies that can be broken down into “montage” (which involves the connection or disconnection of all film images) and narration. Movement-images are regulated by a conception of time as chrono-linear and presume a Whole, following what I call organic formal strategies (organic montage that expresses what I call organic or truthful narration). Time-images exhibit what I call crystalline formal strategies, expressing crystalline montage and Deleuze’s falsifying narration.

With “Chapter V. The World According to Deleuze,” I addressed some of the most fundamental concepts of Deleuze’s Bergsonian metaphysics. In this chapter I
utilized the notion of a floating “mirror-disk” as a metaphor for the human mind/body in a discussion of the “appearance” of human consciousness among other “images” of the world. I believe this metaphor aids in an understanding of the reflective quality of images and the reflective activity of human perception, memory and thought.

“Chapter VI. Activities of Consciousness” is where I continued my work on ideas essential to Deleuze’s metaphysics, concentrating on my interpretations of basic human consciousness, memory, perception and recognition. I interpreted consciousness as being both “in” us and “in” things, though human consciousness is different than the “consciousness” of a rock. A rock may reflect and be reflected by its world, but this is an indiscriminate reflection as versus the discriminate reflection of the mirror-disk originated by and toward the formation of concepts. Memory, or memory-images, are “created” “in” the process of an assemblage of perceived images and “previous” memory-images – but they are “stored” “in” the world. For Deleuze and Bergson, the past exists only as memory, memory is virtual, and is that which mirrors perception in the reflective activity of human consciousness. I proposed that “perception” is perhaps easiest to describe if considered to have three qualities or “forms:” initial perception, which happens at contact, perception in a grander form, and the “perception-image” (which is a movement-image).

In “Chapter VII. The Six Movement-Images and Thought,” I provided a basic explanation of Deleuze’s movement-images and proposed that it may be helpful to think of human consciousness as providing the “real estate” (though it is not a “place” *per se*) and “power” for the “assembly plant” and its “machinery” that are the mind and body (interval/gap). The “raw material” is images, provided by perception, affection and
memory in the form of initial perceptions, affections or “feelings,” and memories. The “products” are actions taken and relations made, as well as “new” memories to be “warehoused” or “stored” and retrieved when needed. “Thought” is the “assembly” or “manufacturing process.” It is an organizational strategy that regulates how images are put together, combined, or linked. The everyday, “natural” thought process is regulated by the sensory-motor schema and creates sensory-motor links between images in a common sense manner, based on how they should fit together in relation to an assumed Whole (a “space” and presumed chronological line of time) that they must fit into. Across the gap, initial perception is linked to action and to world, and we, who are an aggregate of organized images, are also linked to world.

“Chapter VIII. Time-Images and Effect” is where I described crystal-images and attempted to bring together much of the work in the previous chapters to discuss effect. I proposed a number of ways that the affective experience of time-images might be illuminated utilizing Deleuzian terms.

I proposed that a disturbance of the sensory-motor schema itself can have an odd, even disturbing effect. This involves the ongoing process of reflection between actual images of perception and virtual images of memory in the activity of attentive recognition – which also possibly creates a quality of increased reflectivity of the mind/body as mirror-disk. I posited that another manner in which to discuss the “cause” of an affective experience of time-images is in terms of the “vacating” of the interval/gap, providing the possibility of an experience of the signaletic material beneath language. I also proposed that there is a possibility for a greater intuitive experience of film with the
viewing of time-images, utilizing my idea of an interval/gap triumvirate where all “cuts”
“between” images are one and the same as the viewer’s mind/body as interval/gap.

I also posited that “perception-images” and “affection-images” *per se* may
become no longer relevant when the ability to link initial perception to affection and to
action becomes troublesome, proposing that with the experience time-images affection is
“released,” in varying degrees, providing a feeling, intensity and “quality” that is not
“normally” possible or experienced in our everyday lives. I proffered that in the
experience of time-images, “selection” becomes difficult and “intention” distressed, and
that “attention,” depending on the individual viewer, can become either relaxed (in the
case of viewers who may not be as receptive) or heightened (in the case of viewers who
may be more receptive), in varying degrees.

Finally, in this chapter I discussed the idea that time-images express falsifying
narration utilizing Gollum/Sméagol as a crystal-image to illustrate that the
indiscernibility of true and false is a continual oscillating reflective process. I also
proposed that an experience of a mutual true-false image can be as affective as any other
characteristic of time-images.

In “Chapter IX. The Cinema Books and Film Studies,” I discussed my
interpretations of Deleuze’s work in the cinema books in terms of their application to film
studies, stating specifically that Deleuze terms might be useful to reception studies,
spectatorship and auteur theory. I also related the cinema books to scholars and
approaches from classical and contemporary film theory, paying particular attention to
Deleuze’s use of Eisenstein.
I believe that there is much more of interest and use in the cinema books than I have been able to address, and perhaps these can stand as suggestions for further study. Topics that I feel are particularly worth further consideration include the following: “impulse-images,” “opsigns” and “sonsigns,” “dream-images,” “implied dreams,” and the four “crystals of time.” I also feel that much more could be done in regards to an investigation of the affective qualities of films utilizing the Deleuzian concepts of “perception-images” and “affection-images” than I have been able to address.

A related topic of inquiry that I suggest might be of value would be a study of the relationship between Derrida’s contemplations in his *Writing and Difference* of Freudian theories of memory and perception and Deleuze’s Bergsonian descriptions of memory and perception in his *Bergsonism* and the cinema books. This might be particularly interesting considering the fundamental linguistic nature of Derrida’s work and Deleuze’s skepticism of this approach, as well as what I see might be striking similarities in the theories of both men.¹

I have stated that in the cinema books Deleuze prescribes no alternative method of perception or thought to the sensory-motor schema for the regime of direct images of time or the “experience” of time-images. However, I believe a study of his concept of “disjunctive synthesis,” as described in his earlier works, might aid in an understanding of at least some aspects of what this “alternative” might be.²

In continuing my own research on the cinema books, I am considering a monograph for film scholars and philosophers interested in Deleuze and film that also addresses using Deleuze to discuss effect, and then a text for Tolkien/The *Lord of the Rings* scholars, film scholars, and philosophers that steps through the “transition” from
movement-images through time-images in detail (which are some of the least covered terms in Deleuze scholarship). I intend to describe what might be “happening” in the The Lord of the Rings films in terms of images (including scenes and characters) using Deleuzian terminology. I believe this study will also describe unlikely but striking similarities between Deleuze and Tolkien’s views of the world. This study would be framed as a response to other readings of the books (both Deleuze’s and Tolkien’s) and the The Lord of the Rings films, as well as a response to two well respected books on Tolkien by Tolkien scholar Verlyn Flieger, illuminating and expanding significantly upon Flieger’s work, as well as illuminating Tolkien and The Lord of the Rings (in perhaps a radical manner).

I hope that, with this dissertation, I have eased entry into the cinema books for those who have not read them and have an interest in doing so. I also hope I have been able to provide some insight into Deleuze’s cinema books, his metaphysics, and his greater philosophical project, as well as demonstrate that some of the concepts contained in the cinema books might provide interesting and useful ways of looking at certain films and in describing the affective experience of film.
NOTES

Notes to Introduction

1. When I make use of examples from the three *The Lord of the Rings* films I generally treat the trilogy as a singular film in this study. *The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring* (Jackson, 2001), *The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers* (Jackson, 2002), and *The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King* (Jackson 2003) are each a segment of one continuous story, with no “story” time elapsing between them. In addition, I utilize the extended versions of these films released on DVD, as they are more complete and coherent films than the theatrical versions.

2. There are certainly more categories, but Deleuze only briefly mentions what some of these might be toward the end of *Cinema 2*.

3. It has become common practice in film studies to use the term “affect” as a noun. I, however, follow traditional grammatical standards where “affect” is a verb and its corresponding noun is “effect.”

4. Frith’s “commercial popular culture” includes films, television programs, and pop records (Grossberg 179).

Notes to Chapter II

1. Bergson’s quotes appear on pages 361 and 54, respectively, of *Creative Evolution*. Prigogine’s quote appears on page 92 of *Order out of Chaos* (Rodowick 213).


3. Alain Badiou denies the post-structuralist reading of Deleuze, claiming that he is more of an old-fashioned metaphysicist who is struggling with issues of Being and the attempting to re-address the question of the One and the Many - except that for Deleuze
the endeavor to “make sense” of the world is more important than the search for 
Truth (10-1). I myself make no claim one way or the other.

4. When it comes to discussing Deleuze’s work in the cinema books, “metaphor” 
should be reserved for very special signs functioning among other signs. For example, 
when Deleuze uses the term “crystal” in the expression “crystal-image,” he invokes a 
metaphor to help us understand how certain kinds of images work. We should not, 
however, generalize to say that all of the various kinds of images that Deleuze discusses 
function as metaphors.

Notes to Chapter III

1. Deleuze does not mention Adorno in the cinema books, and describes neither 
parataxis, constellation nor rhizomes. He does speak of Adorno in some of other of his 
works, but not in relation to parataxis or constellation (that I have found).

Notes to Chapter IV

1. There are certainly more categories, and Deleuze briefly mentions what some of 
these might be, but they are of only minor concern to Deleuze in his cinema project.

2. These examples and others are scattered throughout both Cinema 1 and Cinema 2.

3. It is also important to note that, just as there are many “varieties” of movement-
images and movement-image films, and time-images and time-image films, and many 
“shades” between the two regimes, it is doubtful Deleuze would claim that any one 
person “lives,” perceives, or thinks of the world exclusively via one mode of existence.

Notes to Chapter V

1. Neither Bergson nor Deleuze speak specifically of particle/waves, but I believe it 
aids in explication and does not go against the grain of Deleuze’s ideas here.
2. Deleuze’s conceptualization of time draws primarily from Bergson, but the influences of a number of philosophers on both Deleuze and Bergson are apparent. These include Kant, Sartre, Leibniz, St. Augustine, and (for Deleuze, at least) Nietzsche, among others. Deleuze acknowledges many of them, but in considering elisions in his citations one might consider that Deleuze assumes that readers of the cinema books are familiar with his earlier work, where in most instances he has already diligently cited his sources.

3. Deleuze discusses the plane of immanence in a number of his books, and at length in *What is Philosophy?* (1994), co-written with Félix Guattari. D. N. Rodowick notes that, “like many of his philosophical ideas, Deleuze’s definition of the ‘plane of immanence’ shifts in subtle and interesting ways in different books,” including the cinema books themselves (215).

4. I derive the idea of the “floating mirror-disk” from a combination of Bergson’s “mirror-image” and his models of light and mirrors in *Mind-Energy* (1920) (which I thank D. N. Rodowick for pointing me to) regarding past, present, memory and perception, as well as Ronald Bogue’s description of consciousness as a “mirroring configuration of light” (35) and Deleuze’s description of a crystal-image as a “mobile-mirror” (T-I 81).

5. It can be deduced from Deleuze’s writing that all images are signs, but it cannot necessarily be said without doubt that all signs, or “a-signifying” material, can automatically be called images.

Notes to Chapter VII

1. Deleuze claims that it is the six movement-images that make the miasma (or moving matter), a “signaletic matter” or material to us as human beings. He continually moves back and forth between what is the “cause” and “what” is the “effect” of “what,” with his argument amounting to what seems to be an elaborate and extremely complex “chicken and egg” scenario. Essentially, it is that we cannot tell, or we cannot know, what comes “first.” It is also important to note that this claim made by Deleuze that movement-images make the signaletic material implies that with time-images there is no longer this signaletic material. This is, in my view, not the case. It is that the manner in which the signaletic material is “perceived” changes.

2. In describing perception-images, and in his general discussion of film itself, Deleuze draws upon Pasolini, and through Pasolini, Bakhtin, as well as Bergson and Peirce (M-I 72, 73).

3. Deleuze separates the six movement-images for purposes of explication and to drive home how film images can act as them – but I believe this approach to be a somewhat troublesome – much like my problem with his declaring that a particular shot is definitively a perception-image, affection-image, or action-image. An entire film can be an action-image, and of course it also encompasses all the other movement-images.

Notes to Chapter VIII

1. The “progression” from movement-images to direct time-images does not necessarily involve a progression in the history of film. The later chronosigns that Deleuze discusses did not necessarily appear in later films. Deleuze’s film examples come from a variety of years and in no particular order. This includes his films that
manifest the “crisis” of movement-images, opsigns, crystal-images, and chronosigns.

For example, Deleuze claims that Ozu was the “inventor” of opsigns, though the films of Ozu that he uses as examples appeared before films that he uses to discuss even the crisis of movement-images. Also, the progression I speak of should not be considered to be related to a teleological nature of cinema.

2. Ronald Bogue uses a number of physical properties of crystals in his discussion of crystal-images in his *Deleuze on Cinema*, but I add significantly to these and apply them to a description of crystal-images as they might appear in contemporary films.

3. The One Ring has other characteristics that are strikingly similar to those of geological crystals which may or may not be relevant to Deleuze’s work in the cinema books, but I believe they nonetheless point to its functioning as a crystal in the sense of Deleuze in *The Lord of the Rings*. The Ring itself is effected by heat, like certain crystals, and even emits light. In *Fellowship*, when Gandalf tosses the Ring in the fireplace at Bag End, and when the Ring is brought into contact with the molten lava in *Return*, the Elvish letters glow brightly. Rubbing a crystal, or force such as pressure or the application of electricity, can cause a crystal to glow. The entire Ring glows brightly when it is worn. Conversely, when the Ring is “removed” from its master by Isildur in *Fellowship*, the glowing letters fade as if it is removed from the outside force that makes it glow.

The Ring changes size, larger or smaller, like certain geological crystals do when energy is applied to them. When Isildur picks the Ring up after severing it from Sauron’s hand, the Ring shrinks. When he puts the Ring on to disappear and escape marauding Orcs, the Ring grows larger as he swims and falls from his finger. When a geological
crystal grows or shrinks, its density changes. The Ring changes density, becoming very heavy, as Frodo approaches Mordor in Two Towers and Return, in order to make it more difficult for Frodo to travel and easier for him to be captured. This becomes particularly evident in Return when Frodo and Sam are mistaken for Orcs and forced to join the march to the Black Gate. Frodo is bent over, barely able to stand, and Sam sees the chain upon which the Ring hangs digging into the back of Frodo’s neck. This makes it evident that when Frodo states that the Ring is becoming heavier it is actually becoming heavier, he is not speaking figuratively and that this is not just a mental trick that the Ring is playing on him.

In addition, the Ring acts as a crystal on the life or life-force of the Nazgûl, as if Sauron as light entering the Ring is dispersed into wavelengths, each being a Nazgûl, a lesser version but nonetheless a kind of splitting of Sauron himself. It could also be said that it is the power of the Ring that corrupts Sméagol and “splits” him in two, creating the schizophrenic Gollum/Sméagol.

4. In Deleuze’s other writings he prefers that an alternative method of perceiving and thinking of the world involves “disjunctive synthesis,” his alternative to the Hegelian dialectic.

5. I agree with Ronald Bogue when he claims that that Deleuze does not believe St. Augustine promotes this view of time himself (213).

6. I propose that this is one way to describe how The Lord of the Rings is quite different from other films of its type (fantasy or sci-fi) as well as from more traditional movement-image films.
7. Others have written on the “power of the false” in terms of The Lord of the Rings, but in terms of story and not Deleuze, crystal-images (on the level of “image” or formal strategies), the originary form of time, or the absolute and intuitive.

Notes to Chapter IX

1. D.N. Rodowick observes that Deleuze treats Bakhtin and Volosinov as the same person. Rodowick, however, writes that he himself takes “no position on whether Volosinov is a pseudonym for Mikhail Bakhtin” (212). I myself also make no claim either way.

2. Ronald Bogue points out and Deleuze himself acknowledges that art historian Eli Faure wrote theories of cinema quite similar to Eisenstein’s in this regard previous to the publication of Film Form and The Film Sense.

3. Special thanks to my friend and colleague Tony Avruch for pointing out this aspect of Eisenstein’s writing on montage theory.

Notes to Chapter X

1. Thanks to Dr. Cynthia Baron for pointing me in this direction of Derrida regarding Deleuze.

2. Special thanks to Dr. Don Callen for enlightening me on this subject.


