COMPLEMENTARITY IN POLITICS-ADMINISTRATION RELATIONSHIP:
INTERPERSONAL TRUST BETWEEN POLITICAL APPointees AND
CAREER PUBLIC MANAGERS IN STATE GOVERNMENT

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Dissertation

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ABSTRACT

An examination of variables deemed fundamental to the complementary relationship between the political and administrative leaderships remains imperative discourse in the realm of scholarship. This study was premised on that assumption. It examined interpersonal trust as a fundamental anchor of harmonious and mutually respectful working relationship between the political and professional actors in government. Focusing on state government, a survey was carried out to establish the extent to which career managers perceive their relationships with political appointees as trustful. It further related the perceived levels of trust among career managers to the extent of professional discretion, participation, communication, and commitment. Two reform models were created for the purpose of comparative analysis regarding the implications of the contemporary radical changes in public management.

In the multivariate analysis, perceived level of interpersonal trust among career managers was found to be positively related with professional discretion, participative management, communication, and commitment. On the extent to which the variables manifest or predict interpersonal trust, the multiple linear regression model revealed that discretion and communication were the significant predictors. In-depth interviews conducted among a selected segment of the respondents complemented most of the findings from the quantitative analysis, particularly relative to the relationship between
interpersonal trust and variables such as professional discretion, communication, and commitment. On the implications of the radical changes, a two-tailed t-test analysis revealed that career managers in the states that have adopted more radical management principles (*Pro-political model*) reported no significant difference on the issues of professional discretion, interpersonal trust, and commitment than their counterparts in the states that have adopted moderate management principles (*Pro traditional-oriented model*).

The study therefore re-echoed the need to initiate policy measures that would improve interpersonal trust by focusing on enhancing professional discretion, interpersonal communication, and participative management. Given the dynamics of today’s socio-economic and political environment and the findings contained in the present study, it was concluded that the states currently considering adopting more radical measures regarding public management should exercise caution and look at the potential paradoxical implications particularly in the area of public service motivation.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my only but late lovely daughter, Veronica Amma Nyarko Boateng, whose passing occurred at the very time I was getting close to completing my long academic pursuit. Her presence in my life signified a lot as it marked the beginning of new opportunities. For me, she came with the requisite blessings that I so much desired following series of life challenges. It was indeed on that very score that she meant more than a daughter to me.

Amma! I am yet to come to terms with the fact that you are no more, and I doubt if I will ever do. Writing the last chapter of this dissertation proved to be daunting because it was at this particular juncture that I was told of your passing. Yet, I gathered courage to complete it so that I can have something valuable in my life to constantly remind me of how you meant to me. I know my heart is never going to be healed, but I will seek solace in the fact that God knows what is in our best interest.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am most grateful to my committee members for their unflinching guidance and support towards the successful completion of this dissertation. My foremost thanks go to Dr. Raymond Cox III who was not just my committee chair but a father figure. His scholarly guidance and mentorship have been very instrumental in my present accomplishment. He offered me the requisite platform to interact with him both formally and informally to shape my research ideas and direction. I am also thankful to Dr. Nancy Grant for her willingness to serve on my committee when I desperately needed her huge academic experience to complement those of the other committee members. Her interventions and suggestions, particularly at my proposal defense, helped me to appropriately define my research objectives.

I am grateful to Dr. Steven Ash who inspired much confidence in me beginning from my first encounter with him. His suggestions in regards to my research questions and the relevant literature significantly shaped my focus. Indeed, he guided me to pay attention to the significance of the study. I am equally thankful to Dr. Ghazi Falah. My short but valuable academic experience with him at my master’s level underpinned my relentless efforts to get him to serve on my Ph.D. committee. His ability to combine bluntness with a sense of humor made learning from him, a great experience. I am grateful to Dr. Namkyum Oh for his open-door policy with me. His attention to precision and recourse to appropriately defined concepts were the critical impetus to my insight on
the parameters of social science research and the appropriate tools and approaches to be used.

I cannot leave out Mr. Anthony Wade Serpette, a Web Developer at the University of Akron Webmaster’s office. His tolerance, understanding, and his readiness to assist enabled me to conveniently collect the data for this dissertation. I thank Dr. Baffour Takyi for his support and candidness which have been the major sources of my motivation and resilience in the course of my academic pursuit. And to Dr. Sheldon Wrice, I say thank you for your solid support, encouragement, and motivation. Your intervention, when it mattered most, has been instrumental in my academic accomplishment. And to Dr. Chris Opoku-Agyeman and Mr. Benard Appiah-Kubi, I say thank you for the relevant technical assistance.
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Centrality of interpersonal trust among other managerial values in the complementary relationship between political appointees and career managers.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Where political appointees invade too far the province of respective career services, there is a threat to substantive effectiveness, and invitation to inefficiency and even scandal. Where the political appointees are driven out, there is a threat to the general interest in favor of special interests, to “the public” in favor of self-directed or entrenched bureaucracy. (Mosher, 1982, p. 185)

A democratic society thrives on competent and responsive delivery of public service to its citizens (Freedman, 1978; Rourke, 1992). Invariably this has been the fundamental goal of the various administrative reform initiatives at the national, state, and local government levels since the beginning of the 20th century (Kirlin, 1996; Kellough and Selden, 2003; Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson 2001). Effective human resource management system has always been considered central to the accomplishment of competency and responsiveness in public service (Kellough and Selden, 2003). The primacy of the human resource management system stems from the fact that it channels the processes by which competent and dedicated people are selected, recruited, developed, motivated, and retained to work in the public service. These competent and dedicated personnel become the prime movers of the objectives and legitimacy of government business (Kellough and Selden, 2003).

Though the personnel management system is deemed crucial, it has consistently proven to be a challenging task in the country’s administrative history (Kellough and Selden, 2003; Nigro and Nigro 2000; Ban and Riccucci, 1997; Lynn, 2001). The
challenge emanates from the nature of the democratic environment in which public personnel management is invariably placed, as Kellough and Selden (2003) indicate, “at the intersection of competing values” (p.166). These competing values are constantly but contentiously being mediated by the rational for political oversight and the imperativeness of administrative flexibility and professional responsibility (Kellough and Selden, 2003; Selden, Brewer, and Brudney, 1999).

History bears ample testimonies to the unyielding efforts to find and develop a common platform to reconcile political and administrative values to improve public service delivery. At first, efforts were directed at the unbridled patronage system perceived then as the source of government inefficiencies and ineffectiveness (Kaufman, 1956; Ingraham, 2006; Rosenbloom 2008; Gathrop, 1998). Kaufman (1956) has argued that by the middle of the 19th century, it had become obvious that the Jacksonian paradigm of representation with its emphasis on legislative supremacy, expanded electoral franchise, and patronage system was not the best alternative for effective governance. The common feature under the patronage system was the overbearing partisan political dominance and influence over the public administration (Kaufman, 1956). Government machinery was placed within the domain of partisan politics, making it feasible for politicians to accomplish their parochial and partisan interests at the expense of public interest (Kaufman, 1956; Gathrop, 1998; Kim and Wolff, 1994). The common understanding was that government work can be done by any ordinary person without recourse to any specialized competencies (Adams, 1992; Pfiffner, 1987). Moreover, the public personnel system was characterized by constant turnovers as new party in power meant different set of personnel in the entire public service (Adams,
Thus, the common phenomenon was constant fear and lack of spirit de corps among public servants (Adams, 1992).

The merit system and neutral competence emerged as ground breaking paradigm to mitigate the challenges that were confronted under the patronage system (Hays and Kearney, 1997; Ingraham, 1992; Kellough, 1998; Walker, 1989). Beginning from the passage of the Pendleton Act, emphasis was placed on competency and insulation of the administrative system from partisan political influence (Kaufman, 1956; Kellough, 1998; O’ Toole, 1984; Skowronek, 1982). The selection and recruitment of personnel were given to the experts to handle instead of politicians. These and other subsequent developments precipitated the growth of professionalism and the idea of professional autonomy in the public service (Kellough, 1998; O’ Toole, 1984; Skowronek, 1982). Adams (1992) has argued that the “scientific-analytic mindset and technological progress which combined during the progressive era unleashed a powerful current of technical rationality and professionalism” (p. 365). The strongest echoes in terms of public personnel management at the time were specialization and expert knowledge which according to Adams (1992) constitute the major lynchpins of professionalism. Thus, technical rationality and professionalism became ultimate anchors of objectivity and precision in the affairs of government (Graebner, 1987; Bendix, 1956; Adams, 1992; Skowronek, 1982; Kettl, 2000).

Efforts to depoliticize and professionalize the civil service were not limited to the federal government but to the state and the local governments as well (Hays and Kearney, 1992). New York State for example was the first to pass civil service law in 1883, the same period that Congress passed the Pendleton Act (Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson,
2002; Wiebe, 1967). Indeed at some point in time, states and local initiatives were adopted at the federal level (Hays and Kearney, 1992; Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson, 2002). The chair of the then US Civil Service Commission, Alan Campbell, noted in 1978 that the states had been instrumental in charting the paths of administrative reforms that had been worth emulating at the federal level (Campbell, 1978, in Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson, 2002).

The growth of professionalism in public service and the quests to insulate and protect the professional integrity of bureaucrats from possible political machinations have ironically become the major source of uneasiness among political actors and public administrators (Kearney and Sinha, 1988; Durant, 1995; Aberbach and Rockman, 1988; Svara, 2001). Appleby (1947) indicates that the fundamental obstacle now is how to reconcile the relationship between sustainable democracy and the growing dependence on professional expertise in government (Hummel, 1987). Kaufman (1956) has posited that “[j]ust as the excessive emphasis on representativeness brought with it bitterly disappointing difficulties unforeseen by its advocates, so too the great stress on neutral competence proved to be a mixed blessing” (p.1062). Similarly, Kettl (2012) argues that the strategies to strengthen the bureaucracy to address the post war problems have created a paradoxical situation where the bureaucracy is perceived to have become oversized and domineering. The difficulty now rests with how to merge administrative values and political values (Aberbach and Rockman, 1988; Svara, 2001). Scholars contend that crave for administrative professionalism and political responsiveness has become the most enduring phenomenon but a source of tension in the modern democracy (Olsen, 2008; Stillman, 1997; Svara, 2001).
In spite of the acceptance that professional values and professional autonomy are a challenge to government responsiveness and accountability, a distinctive coherent doctrine specifying what ought to be has not strongly emerged (West, 2005). Weber’s postulations regarding modern bureaucracy has not been accomplished neither has there emerged a dominant paradigm (Olsen, 2008). Rather, there has always been a continuous manifestation of tense relationship between the political authority and the career administrative personnel (West, 2005). The persistent tension between careerists and political office holders emanates from their respective but conflicting claims for legitimacy to exercise power and authority (Ingraham, Thompson, and Eisenberg, 1995; West, 2005; Svara, 2001).

The political leadership claims legitimacy and demands absolute commitment from the bureaucrats to support the political efforts to reformulate and redirect public policies to commensurate with electoral mandate (Ingraham, Thompson, and Eisenberg, 1995; Rourke, 1992; Aberbach and Rockman, 1988). Therefore, the bureaucrats’ claim for professional autonomy and legitimacy is nothing less than an impediment to the political mandate (Ingraham, Thompson, and Eisenberg, 1995; Rourke, 1992). The bureaucrats on the other hand believe the curtailment of their professional power and mandate through political interference is a threat to sustainable long term policy goals (Ingraham, 1987; Ingraham, Thompson, and Eisenberg, 1995). This is because the political authority often brings nothing but a short-term and in most cases amateurish inputs into the policy formulation and implementation processes (Ingraham, 1987; Ingraham, Thompson, and Eisenberg, 1995; Cohen, 1998; Lewis, 2008; West, 2005;
Kellough and Nigro (2006) describe the politics-administration relationship as antagonistic of values where each is seeking to assume dominancy over the other.

Ingraham and Moynihan (2003) have observed that the persistent uneasy relationship between civil servants and political office holders is as a result of the civil service laws and regulations which “have always had a split personality” (p.183). That is, the laws and the regulations promote measures to protect and insulate civil service from partisan political influence while at the same time making sure that civil servants are responsive to the political leadership (Freedman, 1978; Ingraham and Moynihan, 2003). Dresang (2007) points out that a common platform in pursuant of political mandate and professional autonomy simultaneously “is bound to generate conflict and distrust” (p.25).

The emphasis placed on bureaucratic professionalism and autonomy relative to government responsiveness, accountability, and performance, are a subject of debate between two schools of thoughts (Durant, 1995; Aberbach and Rockman, 1988; Svara, 2001). There are those who strongly contend that professionalism and professional values as espoused under the classical administrative model is out of tune in the contemporary public policy environment (Hummel, 1987; Adams and Baffour, 2004; McGubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1989; Moe, 2006; Mosher, 1982). There are others who also argue that professionalism in public service remains an indispensable link between public service responsibility and democratic accountability (Olsen, 2005; Gilmour and Lewis, 2006; Goodsell, 2005).

Most pundits, including scholars and politicians, argue that adherence to professional autonomy in public administration undermines government responsiveness and democratic accountability (Peters, 1993; Hummel, 2008). For those pundits, what is
imperative is the administrative system that facilitates a timeous response to the demands of the public policy directives (Hummel, 2008; Fox and Cochran, 1992). However, this key attribute is lacking in the administrative setup at all governmental levels. The avalanche of government problems including inefficiencies, ineffectiveness, unresponsiveness, and supposedly misplaced priorities are conveniently linked to the bureaucracy’s unbridled rigid procedures and adherence to professional values (Goodsell, 2003, 1994; King and Stivers, 2009). Hall (2002) finds in a study conducted on 103rd and 104th Congresses that congressmen have often pejoratively used the term bureaucracy to support policies that target the size and operations of government.

Hummel’s (2008) views about bureaucratic professionalism and bureaucrats’ quest for professional autonomy, arguably, stands out as one of the most disparaging commentaries about the bureaucracy in recent times. Hummel (2008) illustrates what in his views constitute contradictory understandings or misrepresentations of the actual nature and roles of the bureaucracy in its classical sense. Socially and culturally, the bureaucrats are deemed to deal with people and for that matter, are governed and guided by the socio-cultural values, and are also exposed to all human feelings just as every member of society (Hummel, 2008). On the contrary, Hummel (2008) argues that bureaucrats consider humans as cases and that their only focus is to gain control and achieve efficiency. Hummel (2008) points out that the position that bureaucrats are humans and are therefore predisposed to the psychological, linguistic, cognitive, and political experiences just as every other member of society is a misrepresentation. The reality, according to Hummel (2008), is that bureaucrats are different sets of personalities with no souls and heads. They do not communicate but rather seek to shape and inform,
and in terms of cognitive process, they are programmed like computers to follow only logic rather than combining logic with sensibility (Hummel, 2008). In regards to politics, Hummel (2008) further argues that the bureaucracy as an institution, controls and dictates to “society, politics, and government” rather than rendering service and remaining accountable to the politics and government (p.9). In a gist, Hummel (2008) implies that bureaucrats are trained and turned into machines of rationalization and routinization to the extent that they have become unresponsive and unaccountable to the society that they are supposed to serve.

Adams and Balfour (2005) argue that the persistent phenomenon of technical rationality in organizational culture and the premium placed on task specialization, skills, and knowledge are a great challenge to ethics and moral responsibilities. They argue that “professional ethics, co-opted by a culture of technical rationality, offers little assistance in avoiding administrative evil” (p.207). In the views of Fox and Cochran (1992), there is the tendency that professional values could become a source of justification for bureaucratic autonomy and power which could be exercised at the detriment of the larger society. White and McSwain (1993, p.21) echo that the bureaucrat as “the legitimate expert might become a self-effacing manipulator”. For many of such critics, the classical definition of democracy stands to be replaced with, as Kearny and Sinha (1988) review, “government of the technocrats, by the technocrats, and for the technocrats” (p. 551). The underlying assumption here is that the bureaucrats would rather determine on their own terms what constitutes public good or what is good for the public with no inputs whatsoever from the citizens and the political authority (Hummel, 2008; Mosher, 1982).
From another angle, and largely from the principal-agent theoretical perspectives, bureaucrats are perceived as opportunists capable of capitalizing on their expertise and job protection for their personal gains (Rourke, 1992; Kearney and Sinha, 1988; Wood and Waterman, 1991). In this regard bureaucrats are considered not to be committed to alternative programs that do not reflect their specific desires and interests (Rourke, 1992; Wood and Waterman, 1991). McGubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1989) reiterate that the bureaucrats’ strength over other stakeholders is reinforced by their long tenure, expertise, and control of vital information. Moe (2006) argues that bureaucrats’ edge over the elected political officials originates in their access to information and their ability to indirectly participate effectively in the electoral processes. In an environment where bureaucrats have meaningful control, they are able to manipulate the system to suit their parochial interests (Moe, 2006; Huber and Shipman, 2002). The possible result is that the principal which is the political authority would rather act as “agent of the agents”, an indication of the collapse of the top-down hierarchical control, control of the personnel system, budgeting, and performance expectations (Moe, 2006, p.4).

However, the proponents of bureaucratic professionalism argue that critics sidestep the fundamental issues regarding the germane role of professional values in public service (Goodsell, 2005; Rose, 1985; Meier, 1997; Strieb, 1992; du Gay, 2000; Cohen, 1998). Meier (1997) indicates that the democratic norms and policy process have direct relationships with bureaucratic behavior. Thus, how much the bureaucrats can be influenced to be more responsive depends on how the environmental demands conform to the bureaucratic mission, capacity, and the tenets of democratic decision making (Meier, 1997). In recounting several experiences, Rourke (1992) argues that politicians over the
years have come to realize that the professional competencies of bureaucrats are indispensable to the success of their policies.

Green, Wamsley and Keller (1993) echo Fisher’s (1975) view that administrators through their professional competencies establish trust, commitment, and the skills to facilitate and sustain dialogue among stakeholders in the public policy discourse. Thus, professionalism enhances the capacity to demonstrate the prerequisite insight, integrity, and fair judgments pertinent to institutional mission and goal (Green, Wamsley, and Keller, 1993). Fox (1992) indicates that the expert knowledge can be used to traverse boundaries of diversity to coordinate efforts to accomplish the common goal of society. The professional competency closes the yawning gap between the objective and subjective administrative responsibilities to ensure accountability and sense of duty (Kearney and Sinha 1988). According to Kearney and Sinha (1988), the professional capabilities serve as panacea to resuscitate public administration from “bureaucratic inertia” and the unproductive strict adherence to the “status quo” (p. 575). Beard and Beard (1986) describe professional public managers as “great moral stabilizer” in the American society, and reiterate that society needs a bureaucracy composed of men and women who are trained to serve with loyalty (p. 112).

Goodsell (1992) argues that public administrators carry out their professional mandates not only on the basis of science but more so in an artistic manner to the benefit of the citizenry, including the administrators themselves. He indicates that as parallel to other professions including architecture, medicine, potting, and weaving, the public administration profession consists of the fine skills to create a result that is not only worth utilizing but also pleasing. Goodsell (1992) indicates further that the art aspect of public
administration manifests in the skills and the compassion with which professional bureaucrats are able to engage people of diverse backgrounds and interests in the public policy arena. The “mastery, identity, responsibility, and practical learning”, according to Goodsell (1992, p. 247) come with pride and sense of identity not based on one’s rank or job, but more importantly the feelings of being active participant in the decision making process. Goodsell (2005) finds that among the political actors including political parties, contractors, election bodies, media, advocacy groups, and not-for profit organizations in Britain and the United States, the public bureaucracy was the only body endowed with most governing abilities (see also Olsen, 2005). Gilmour and Lewis (2006) find that government programs that were administered by professional bureaucrats scored higher in terms of effective management than those administered by political representatives.

It is argued that in spite of the fact that individual bureaucrats have their own policy preferences, they work effectively towards the realization of the goals of the policies preferred by the political heads of their organizations (Goodsell, 2005). However, the dedications and commitments of the bureaucrats in support of the policy initiatives of the political officials are usually weighed against organizational capacity and political feasibility (Goodsell, 2005). The bureaucracy in the United States is composed of more technocrats than elites, and is arguably more effective and responsive to the demands that are politically legitimate, relative to what pertains in other countries (Rose, 1985; Meier, 1997). Aberbach and Rockman (1988) indicate that for effective governance, the “political impulses” must usually be tempered with a “test of sobriety” (p. 610). Impliedly, administrators bring their professional acumen to bear on the decision making process of the political authority (Aberbach and Rockman, 1988).
Strieb (1992) finds in a study on some selected local governments in Northern Illinois that in real terms there was a positive relationship between professional skills and attitudes towards citizen participation and attitudes towards political leadership. Strieb (1992) therefore concludes that increasing administrative professionalism improves respect for democratic principles and managerial capacity. du Gay (2000) posits that the ethos of bureaucratic professionalism enhances virtues such as conformity to procedure, commitment, and subordination to authority which enable the bureaucrats to safeguard the citizen’s right, eschew partisanship, and maintain integrity. These virtues, according to du Gay (2000), reinforce the tenets of democracy. Fesler (1983) observes that because most careerists have served under multiple administrations they have been able to developed and internalized commitments and loyalty to the incoming governments, and have also developed the capacity to resist any illegality for the sake of public interest. On that same score, Cohen (1998) also notes that contrary to the view that bureaucrats are rigid and adhere strictly to fixed rules, they have developed pragmatic capacities to confront realities of the policy environment.

Instructively, the middle line between the preceding opposing perspectives in regards to the role of the bureaucracy in the modern democracy should be the ultimate focus in both theory and practice (Ingraham and Ban, 1988; Aberbach and Rockman, 1988; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981; Mouritzen and Svara, 2001; Svara, 2001). The orthodoxy has treated politics and administration as dichotomy of values (Svara, 2001; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981). Short of that tilts the power and the authority towards one side (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981; Barret and Greene, 2005; Kearney and Hays, 1998). In favor of the political leadership, concerns are raised
about the issue of patronage, inefficiency, fear, corruption, and incompetency in public management (Barret and Greene, 2005; Kearney and Hays, 1998; Mosher, 1982). In favor of the bureaucratic leadership, questions are raised about democratic accountability, government responsiveness, government adaptability, and success of political mandate (Kaufman, 1956; Kellough, 1998; O’Toole, 1984; Skowronek, 1982; Mosher, 1982).

Balancing the scenarios has necessitated administrative reforms that prioritize complementarity and reciprocity of political and administrative values (Ingraham and Ban, 1988; Aberbach and Rockman, 1988; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981; Mouritzen and Svara, 2001; Svara, 2001). On that course, it is believed that the purpose of democracy would be better served to accomplish the ultimate interests of the citizenry (Ingraham and Ban, 1988; Svara, 2001). Therefore, it remains an imperative discourse in both theory and practice to continue the search for the fundamental elements that are considered indispensable to promote collaborative and harmonious working relationship between the political representatives and the professional bureaucrats in government (Behn, 1995).

This study takes cues from the preceding observations, and therefore adopts exploratory approach to examine interpersonal trust as an underpinning element relative to the complementary relationship between political appointees and career managers. Moreover, given the trend of the contemporary public management approaches sweeping across the states and the reservations among pundits regarding the public service environment, this study undertakes a comparative analysis of two categories of administrative paradigms. The implications of the findings to policies and suggestions for future studies are outlined.
The primary variables under study are interpersonal trust, professional discretion, participative management, interpersonal communication, and organizational commitment. In the context of the present study these variables are often loosely captured respectively as trust, discretion, participation, communication, and commitment. Similarly, career managers are in some instances referred to as professional bureaucrats. Also political appointees, political representatives, and political managers are used interchangeably in the study.

**Problem of Study**

Forging reconciliation between political directives and professional responsibility remains utmost objective of public management reforms (Svara, 2001). This is primarily because good public management requires consistent trade-offs between politics and expertise (Ingraham, 1987; Carboni, 2010; Svara, 2001). Wilson (1966) has admonished long ago that even though politics defines the tasks for administration, “it should not be suffered to manipulate its officers” (p. 371). The political values and directives should not supersede professional expertise, and in much the same way, professional values should not supersede political values and directives (Ingraham, 1987; Bok 2003). Woodruff, writing in 1919, argued that politics and administration “are two parts of the same mechanism, related in much the same way as to two elements in one chemical compound whose combined qualities give the character to the substance” (quotes in Svara, 1998, p. 53). Ingraham (1987) indicates that administration and politics are components that make the whole public service and as such it is important that political and professional actors work together.

In order to balance political values and directives with professional competencies, there has to be an environment that promotes harmonious interpersonal relationship
between political executives and career executives (Ingraham, 1987). It requires prioritization of the human factor, development of sense of direction, and building of trust and mutual respect so that political and professional skills could be utilized appropriately together (Ingraham, 1987; Pfiffner, 1987). Governor Winter alluded to the imperativeness of the “human dimension to public service” and echoed that effective executive leadership is sustained on collaborative vision in service of society (National Commission on the State and the Local Public Service, 1993, p. viii; Nigro and Kellough, 2008). Thus, collaborative and reciprocal relationships between political executives and career executives are imperative conditions for government effectiveness and performance (Lorentzen, 1985; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1982; Nyhan, 2000; Ingraham, 1987; Svara, 2001; Park, 2012; Thompson and Riccucci, 1998; Kettl, 2012; Nigro and Kellough, 2008; Mouritzen and Svara, 2001; NPR, 1993).

Classical approach to the human dimension in regards to organizational power relations and accountability has been one sided and often founded on coercive and authoritative mechanisms (McGregor, 1956; Perry, Mesch, and Paarlberg, 2006). Mostly, employees are considered to be inherently opportunistic with the tendency to maximize their personal interests by any means necessary. Thus, unless laws, rules, and guidelines are put in place to streamline their behaviors, public interest could be compromised to satisfy self-interest (Donaldson, 1990). Moreover, employees are considered as passive objects that need to be influenced either through reward or coercion to elicit their work attitudes as expected (McGregor, 1956). The primary focus is to identify employee behaviors and develop the intervening tools to reinforce such behaviors to increase organizational performance (Perry, Mesch, Paarlberg, 2006; McGregor, 1957; Eylon,
1998; Stajkovic and Luthans 1997). It is assumed that rewards such as pay increase, promotions, and time offs when combine with punitive measures such as demotion, threat to job security, and withdrawal of privileges, employees would adopt behaviors that could inure to the advantage of the organization (Ingraham and Barrilleaux, 1983; Perry, Mesch, and Paarlberg, 2006).

However, theorists of organizational behavior argue that the classical approach is counterproductive to the needs and objectives of organizations of today (McGregor, 1956; Bok 2003; Perry, Mesch, Paarlberg, 2006; Perry and Wise, 1990; Eylon, 1998; Pitts, 2005; Kellough and Lu, 1993; Hackman and Oldham, 1980). It is assumed that the individual assigns greater value to self-government, therefore, the traditional notion of overhead control through rigid rules, extrinsic rewards, and threats of sanctions are rather impediments to organizational productivity (Eylon, 1998; Pitts, 2005; Svara, 2001; Nigro and Kellough, 2008). Osborne and Gaebler (1992) posit that the rule bound bureaucratic system “may prevent some corruption, but at a price of monumental waste” (p.112). As quoted in Kettl (2012, p.285), Zell Miller, a former Governor of Georgia, stated that “…a solution in 1943 is a problem in 1996”, implying that the existing structures and work functions of the public administration in the classical sense are an impediment to government responsiveness today. This notion can somewhat be premised on Friederich’s (1940) postulation that rules, regulations and guidelines as external controls over the bureaucracy are of little use. Friederich has argued that irrespective of strict controls bad people would still have room to maneuver whereas good people would not need such rules and controls to be of good behavior. What is important is the enhancement of the
McGregor (1956), in advancing Maslow’s theory in what he refers to as theories X and Y, indicates that human motivation to work does not reside in coercion or the carrot and stick metaphor (theory X). It rather requires mutual understanding and cooperation (theory Y). McGregor therefore advocates a shift from the traditional mode of management (theory X) to a new mode of management (theory Y). Theory Y assumes that employees are inherently active, capable of self-direction and control, and seek to work for pleasure. It also assumes that employees are not rigid, opportunistic, and do not resist attempt at change but seek responsibility to work towards organizational goals (McGregor, 1956; Donaldson, 1990). Simon (1944) indicates that subordinates in an organization are not influenced solely on command but largely through the mechanisms that stimulate their organizational loyalties and efforts for efficient course of action. Eylon (1998) re-echoes Follett’s view that organizational objectives are effectively accomplished when power relations are based on “power with” rather than “power over”. The concept “power with” denotes “co-active” and jointly developed power whereas “power over” suggests coercion (Eylon, 1998, p.19). Under the “power with” model the individual members of organization view each other as equal partners, feel equally empowered, and are encouraged to work effectively towards organizational goal attainment (Eylon, 1998; Cawley, Keeping, and Levy 1998). Bernard (1938) argues that it takes both formal and informal organizational systems to build effective collaborations between management and employees.
Direction of Contemporary Public Management

At the state and local government levels, various taskforces of public management reforms have reiterated that the fundamental barrier to government performance is the persistent limited interpersonal trust and collaboration between political officeholders and professional bureaucrats (Nigro and Kellough, 2008). The manifestation of this situation, and therefore the resultant problems, is the continuous promulgation of rigid rules, formalization, and limited discretion in public management (Behn, 1999). Calls have been made to replace the paper processing based management with a new management model that would make managers more pragmatic in meeting organizational challenges (Winter Commission, 1993; Nigro and Kellough, 2008). In finding antidotes to the challenges, the private sector practices, principles and values are readily embraced as ultimate options (Kettl, 2012). Various commissions including recent ones such as National Performance Review Commission, Grace Commission, and Winter Commission that were tasked to examine and recommend measures to make government work effectively have all given significant impetus to the private sector or business model as better alternative to conduct a responsive and accountable government business (Hays and Kearney, 2001). This is not very surprising because in the United States the most innovative management ideas are located in the private sector (Kettl, 2012). Moreover, what make the private sector approach more viable and attractive are the persistent budget constraints, economic difficulties, and the increasing general dissatisfaction regarding government service delivery (Kettl, 2012; Brudney, Hebert, and Wright 199990). The proponents of the business model believe that when government work is approached from an entrepreneurial perspective, managers can manage with flexibility,
and as a result, nurse the capacity and commitment to initiate innovative ideas for greater performance (Brudney, Hebert, and Wright 1999; Kettl, 2012). The underlying assumptions are contained in the New Public Management propositions which have become the heart of all recent public management reforms at all levels of government in the country (Kearney and Scavo, 2002).

The reform propositions are largely akin to the underlying assumptions of theory Y and the “power with” model (Kellough and Lu 1993; Hackman and Oldham, 1980). The reforms tend to focus more on the internal organizational culture by changing the incentive systems rather than increasing the political control (Kettl, 2012; Van Wart, 1999). Among others, frontline managers are given greater responsibilities, encouraged to adopt entrepreneurial behavior, and made to be active participants of the major decision making processes (Pitts, 2005; Mouritzen and Svara, 2001; NPR, 1993; Winter Commission, 1993). In this regard the classical mode of authoritative management is presumed outdated and as such relegated to the background (Pitts, 2005).

Invariably, the positive attributes of professionalism in public management are gracefully acknowledged under the reforms and as a result, structural and cultural changes have been initiated and presumably implemented (Kearney and Scavo, 2001; Kearney and Hays, 1998; Kettl, 2012). Recourse to the essence of professional competency regarding government performance are the emphasis placed on elements such as decentralization, deregulation, managerial flexibility, employee involvement, effective communication, and other means of galvanizing interpersonal cooperation in public management (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Thompson and Riccucci, 1998; National Commission on the States and Local Public Service, 1993; Kearney and Scavo, 2001).
The assumption is that by empowering professional managers through participative management, information sharing, flexibility of professional discretion, and encouraging risk-taking behavior, the necessary trust could be built between them and the political authority (Thompson and Riccucci, 1998). Moreover, government can easily adapt to change, become responsive, and efficient in providing quality services to the citizens (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Barzelay, 1992; Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson, 2002; Kearney and Sinha, 1988; Freedman, 1978; Rourke, 1992; Green, Keller, and Wamsley, 1993).

The role of the political leadership in facilitating the congenial environment to actualize the key tenets of the reforms cannot be discounted (Park, 2012; Rainey and Steinberger, 1999; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009; Svara, 2001). Agencies with greater political support, greater autonomy, clarity of goals and mission, and effective leadership are found to be responsive and effective (Wilson, 1989; Wolf, 1999; Moynihan and Pandey, 2004). Cohen (1998) has indicated that bureaucrats need freehand and political cooperation to be able to diligently apply their skills and competencies in the interest of good governance. The National Performance Review Commission noted in its report that civil servants are endowed with ideas, competencies, imaginations and motivations to work towards achieving efficiency and responsiveness (Cohen, 1998). Pfifner (1987) finds overwhelming positive accounts by political appointees relative to the potentials and competencies of career managers that those political appointees had worked with. In several instances the appointees described the careerists as untapped valuable resources, good advisors, and dedicated personnel with commitment to work (Pfifner, 1987). What is significant therefore is the enabling environment to tap into such valuable attributes
(Pfifner, 1987; Cohen, 1998; Mouritzen and Svara, 2001; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981; Sherwood, 1997). In the estimation of Cohen (1998), the requisite political environment to activate the valuable attributes of career bureaucrats is the one that allows flexibility, passion, energy, commitment, and values choices in the policy making processes. Invariably, those elements are points of emphasis under the contemporary reforms.

**Uncertainty About the Outcomes of the Reforms**

Fundamentally, the contemporary public management reforms seek to reconcile values that have proven to be irreconcilable (Barret and Greene, 2005; Kearney and Hays, 1998). It remains to be adequately evaluated and understood the extent to which this effort has become successful (Barret and Greene, 2005; Kearney and Hays, 1998; Kearney and Scavo, 2001; Kettl, 2012; Van Wart, 1999). There is limited clarity in terms of the result or the expected results of the reforms (Overman and Boyd, 1992; Bowman and West, 2007). Kearney and Scavo (2001) argue that the existing “body of work is theoretically self-validating, biased, and limited in its scope of investigation” (, p. 45).

However, the conclusions drawn in the available literature paint a picture of significant level of skepticisms about the long-term implications of the reforms (Coggburn, 2006; Maronto, 2001; Hays and Sowa, 2006; Durant, 2008 Kearney and Hays, 1998; Bowman and West, 2007). For many scholars and observers, the reforms have rather increased the perceived tension between the political authority and the career bureaucrats, and have also become the bane of what are intended to be accomplished (West, 2002; Coggburn, 2006). Scholars as well as practitioners are of the view that the reforms have created a paradoxical situation since the organizational environment created
as a result, has become an obstacle to the intended goals and objectives (Kettl, 2012; Kearney and Scavo, 200; Kearney and Hays, 1998; Condrey and Battaglio, 2007).

At the federal level for instance, the Performance Management Act was perceived as panacea to reduce the excessive paper work and rigidities and also to reduce the politicization of the budgeting process (Light, 1997). However the implementation outcomes have become very contentious as problems that the reforms intended to mitigate have rather been exacerbated by several factors including over politicization (Radin, 2000). Government Accountability Office noted in its 2004 report that the downsizing implementation was done without effective planning. Though the hiring freeze helped to cut the number of employees, it made it impossible to retain and attract committed and skilled people into the public service (GAO, 2004). Kettl (2012) argues that at the core of the reforms “are important but often unrecognized contradictions that threaten the success of reforms effort…” (p. 197). The reforms may have been overly ambitious in an attempt to correct the weaknesses of the civil service and as such, the core values of public service stand to be undermined with possible serious ramifications (Kearney and Hays, 1998; Van Wart, 1999).

**Concerns About the Return of the Patronage System**

Among the key issues fueling the increasing skepticisms about the potential contradictory implications of the reforms is the personnel deregulation system and the increasing influence of the executive arm of government over the bureaucracy via political appointments (Kearney and Hays, 1998; Ingraham and Jacobson, 2002; Durant, 2008; Condrey and Battaglio, 2007). The personnel management reforms are framed under the assumption that the individual, rather than the institution as a whole, is the
source of contemporary organizational challenges (Bowman and West, 2007). The way out, therefore, is to temper with the traditional merit system in order to enhance the capacity of managers to manage with flexibility (Bowman and West, 2007; Coggburn, 2006). The traditional centralized personnel management system, civil service protection, and rigorous grievance procedures are no longer countenance under the new changes in most of the state administrative systems. The belief is that little threat of job loss and avenues of rewarding job performance are a recipe for commitment, loyalty, and greater performance (Bowman and West, 2007; Bardwick, 1995).

What is now assiduously gaining grounds in the states and local governments is the “at-will employment system” (Ingraham and Jacobson, 2002; Bowman and West, 2007; Hays and Sowa, 2006). The “at will” based personnel management system discards the traditional personnel management principles of employee property interest and grievance procedures (Walter, 2002; Lasseter, 2002). Classified positions are being declassified, and most senior positions including deputy director positions have been subjected to the “at-will” conditions. The civil service recruitment process based on valid or objective job analysis criteria has been relegated to the background substantially, giving managers an expanded latitudes of recruiting people they believe can do the job (Guy, 2004; West, 2002). Coggburn (2006) argues that the “at will” advocates see it as panacea to promote bureaucratic responsiveness to the political mandate since it will enable or compel the top bureaucrats to respond effectively to policy initiatives of the political authority.

Increasingly, many states and local governments are drifting towards this radical personnel management reforms (Thompson, 2008). In some instances, scholars consider
the move as apparent “tidal wave” of changes following the path of Georgia, Florida, and Texas (Condrey and Battaglio, 2007; Hays and Sowa, 2000). Condrey and Battaglio (2007) contend that among the New Public Management propositions, personnel reforms at the state levels stand out as the most unsympathetic to the traditional merit system. Hays and Sowa (2006) find that by 2005, out of the 50 states, 16 had adopted the radical personnel management system incorporating rigorous decentralization, deregulation, and “at-will” employment system. At that same period, 28 of the remaining states were making serious moves towards similar direction (Thompson, 2008; Klinger, 2006; Hamilton, 2010; Hays and Sowa, 2006). There is, however, no uniform approach to the personnel reforms given the fact that whilst some states adopt the extreme approach, others adopt a relatively limited approach (Nigro and Kellough, 2008; Elling and Thompson, 2006). Ingraham and Jacobson (2002) indicate that rigorous changes are occurring in the state civil service system with a shift from uniform traditional forms of recruitment, classification, and compensation to varying but flexible forms.

Skeptics believe that the reforms have opened avenues for the political authority to reintroduce the spoils or the patronage system which was discarded long ago (Kearney and Scavo, 2000; Kearney and Hays, 1998; Van Wart, 1999; Condrey and Battaglio, 2007). Several research findings identify a considerable level of apprehension among many professional public managers regarding job security, professional integrity, and the future of public service (Durant, 2008). Kearney and Hays (2006) have noted that the business approaches to public management portend “pernicious attack on bureaucracy that may ultimately undermine the professional civil service” (p.39). Durant (2008) indicates that many career bureaucrats believed that most of the radical initiatives,
particularly the “at will personnel system” were rather meant to victimize career personnel for political purpose. Hays and Sowa (2006) observe that the traditional pillars such as job security, appropriate benefits and public service-based satisfaction, risk being undermined. In this regard there could be a challenge in retaining or attracting motivated and competent people into the public service workforce (Hays and Sowa, 2006).

Even some advocates of the personnel deregulation reforms caution that the radical approach may expose the state and local administrative systems to patronage abuses with several ramifications including lack of cooperation, mistrust, and lack of mutual respect between the career executives and the political executives (Maronto, 2001). Bowman, West, and Gertz (2006) reiterate that the reforms’ focus is off-target since removing the protection of civil service job tenure only facilitates “patronage, graft, and corruption” (p. 161). It appears the old values of politicized loyalty and greater political responsiveness are increasingly replacing the traditional values of competency and professionalism. Freedman (1978) argues that the professional expertise upon which the judiciary over the years has justified its support for bureaucratic participation in policy making could be tempered with and rendered useless on the altar of political responsiveness.

One particular concern among pundits in respect of the paradoxical implications of the reforms is the growing influence of the executive branch over the bureaucracy. The political oversight over the bureaucracy conventionally rests with the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary (West and Cooper, 1990). However, theorists and practitioners of public administration and government business have often sought solace in the executive branch of government to ensure bureaucratic responsiveness,
accountability and effectiveness (Kaufman, 1956; West, 2005; Moe and Wilson, 1994; Welborn, 1993; Kagan, 2001; Heclo, 1988). The plausibility of executive control stems from the assumption that the congressional oversight responsibility over the administrative agencies is ineffective because such responsibilities hardly go beyond issuing of general standards regarding the exercise of administrative discretion (Kaufman, 1956; Ingraham, 1987; Moe, 1985; Nelson, 1982; Rourke, 1992). Moreover, the judiciary is equally not positioned to exercise control over the administrative agencies besides its traditional duties of deliberation and resolution of disputes, and even some of the judicial decisions have tended to favor the executive control argument (Kaufman, 1956; West, 2006).

Consequently, recent administrative reforms have favored executive control over the bureaucracy (West, 2006; Kaufman, 1956). Carroll (1995) has observed that the National Performance Review Commission (NPR) rejected congressional control but clamored for increase in the executive control over the bureaucracy. Again, rather than enhancing the capacity of the bureaucracy to apply competency, the NPR turned the bureaucracy into presidential policy instrument, exposing it to severe executive control (Carroll, 1995). As West (2006) points out “the prescriptive model of a strong administrative presidency has integrated managerial norms of efficiency and effectiveness with value focused on political accountability to a broad national constituency” (p. 434). The key elements of the reforms at both national and state levels signal acceptance of the managerial approach with greater emphasis on executive control over the bureaucratic agencies (West, 2006).
At the state level, gubernatorial control over the state bureaucracy has been steadily supported under the state administrative reforms (Herbert, Brudney and Wright, 1983; Gosling 1994; Conant, 1988). Conant (1988) observes that the comprehensive reform initiatives at the state levels spanned between 1965 and 1987 with over 22 states changing their constitutional provisions to increase the authority of the governors. Bowman and Kearney (1988) observe that the governors assumed more stronger and authoritative position regarding appointment and removal of agency heads, exercise of veto powers, budget controls, and reorganization of the executive branch (also in Brudney, Hebert, and Wright, 1999).

The justification for increasing gubernatorial influence rests partly with the particularistic nature of the state legislatures which makes statewide policy goals sometimes unrealistic (Peterson, 1995). Barrileaux and Berkman (2003) argue that it was imperative to empower governors to mitigate this anomaly since unlike the state legislators the governors have the entire state as their constituent. Woods (2004) has observed that most often the state legislature and the executive have invoked their constitutional mandates under the doctrine of separation of powers in exerting influence over the administrative set up leading to conflicts. However, the courts have often tended to side with the position of the executive (Woods, 2004).

Political appointment to management positions of the bureaucratic agencies serves as conduit through which the political executives exercise its oversight responsibility over the bureaucracy (Ingraham, 1987; Lewis, 2009; Heclo, 1988). Ingraham (1987) indicates that the resort to political appointments originates from the constitutional, political, and the practical realities of the democratic process. Political
appointees occupy vital positions within the policy process since they are able to explore and exploit the vagueness of the law to suit policy goals and objectives of the political authority (Ingraham, 1987). Lewis (2009) contends that there is a multiplicity of agency responsibilities in policy areas such as budgeting, personnel management, rulemaking, and management of resources within the agencies. Those pertinent policy areas need to be coordinated, supervise, and monitored by loyal political appointees to help in the accomplishment of the vision of the chief executive (Lewis, 2009; Olsen, 2008). Heclo (1988) argues that as the spoil system gave way to the merit system, the American politics was ushered into a challenging realm of how to deal with the vacant positions at the upper echelon of the bureaucracy. Strenuous efforts have been made to mitigate this challenge via political appointments to such vacant positions (Heclo, 1988).

Indeed for many critics, the combinations of political and career managers at the leadership positions of public organizations are an imperative path to facilitate government effectiveness (Lorentzen, 1985; Moe, 1985; Bok, 2003; Riccucci, 1995; Krause, Lewis, and Douglas, 2006). In the views of Lorentzen (1985), a thriving government is wheeled by change and continuity. The change is energized by the constant turnover of the political officials via the electoral processes. The continuity on the other hand, is maintained and protected by the permanent bureaucracy through its institutional memory (Lorentzen, 1982). Lorentzen (1985) maintains that the bureaucracy requires, and indeed reclaims and strengthens its legitimacy and mandate through outside redirection and scrutiny. These external redirections and questionings are a fundamental tool to nib in the bud the potential complacency and stagnation on the part of the bureaucrats (Lorentzen, 1985). In much the same way, the political authority needs expert
advice so that the potential policy pitfalls could be avoided in the best interest of the public (Lorentzen, 1985). Dunsire (1973) has argued that citizens in a democracy need two categories of public servants. The first category should consist of people who have short term tenure and can easily be taken out of office based upon the accounts of their stewardships (Dunsire, 1973). Such process, according to Dunsire (1973) enhances continuous process of innovation. The second category should also consist of people with long term tenure “so that there can be assurance of the development of skills and expertise; experience and specialization;…” (Dunsire, 1973, p. 159).

The problem now is not about the legitimacy of political oversight responsibility over the bureaucracy through appointment of loyalists to management position per se (Aberbach and Rockman, 1988). Because, as West and Cooper (1990) indicate, “it remains a legitimate purpose of oversight to ensure that agencies have correctly defined the boundaries of their policy-making discretion, and that the logical and empirical premises behind their actions are sound” (p.585). The fundamental problem is how that constitutionally and practically legitimate right and responsibility of the executive have been exercise to commensurate with the requisite environment for bureaucratic performance (Nigro and Kellough, 2008; Cohen, 1998; Lorentzen, 1985). In other words, the concern now is how the reform initiatives have anchored the direction of political oversight responsibility over the bureaucracy such that what are intended to be corrected are not rather worsened (Nigro and Kellough, 2008; Cohen, 1998; Lorentzen, 1985).

For many critics the problem of public management today is the consistent solidification of political influence through political appointments at the leadership positions of the bureaucratic agencies (Sherwood, 1997; Carroll, 1995; Dilulio, 1994;
Hays and Sowa 2006; Terry, 1998; Heclo, 1988). Sherwood (1997) observes that the last quarter of the 20th century witnessed a growing political appointment in the bureaucracy, an indicative of less emphasis on professionalism in government. The power of political appointees over agency management has substantially increased compared to the career managers. This is often premised on the assumption that “at the highest levels public management is political management” (Carroll, 1995, p. 306). At the states and local levels, the situation has not been different as bureaucratic responsiveness has become the nerve of almost all reforms leading to increasing gubernatorial influence and appointments (DiIulio 1994; Hays and Sowa 2006; Terry 1998). Hays and Sowa (2006) point out that the forces behind several administrative changes in most of the states were the “activists” governors whose interests have been focusing on directing the bureaucracy to be responsive to the executive to accomplish political goals.

The personnel deregulation reforms have made it possible for the elected executives to appoint more loyalists to positions previously occupied by career managers (Hays and Sowa, 2006). Many pundits believe that the process portends partisan abuses likely to exacerbate the mistrust and tensions between those appointees and careerists, and that may have serious ramifications on managerial competencies (Cohen, 1998; Heclo, 1988; Ingraham, 1987; Lorentzen, 1985). The bureaucracy’s legitimacy declines and efficacy becomes impaired when the number of political appointees increases (Cohen, 1998; Heclo, 1988). Fesler (1983) reiterates that as the number of political appointees increase, professional manager are drifted away from policy making positions. Thus, leading to problems such as demoralization, attrition, and decline in incentives
among the career managers (Suleiman, 2003). This is particularly so when appointees occupy the higher rewarding and influential policy positions (Suleiman, 2003).

Such development can sow the seed of discontent which may reflect on employee turnover (Gailmard and Patty, 2007; Lewis 2009). It can also impede recruitment of qualified people into the public service (Gailmard and Patty 2007; Lewis 2009). For instance, declassifying senior management positions and subjecting them to “at-will” conditions may serve as disincentive to competent career managers to aspire to those positions (Hays and Sowa, 2006). There are instances where some high ranking career bureaucrats have refused to accept promotions for the fear that their new positions could be subjected to political machinations when there are any new executive or gubernatorial appointments (Hays and Sowa, 2006). Certainly, this lack of trust can impact negatively on the fundamental principles of the reform initiatives such as empowerment, communication, participation, and commitment on the part of the career bureaucrats (Durant, 2008; Nigro and Kellough, 2008; Hays and Sowa, 2006; Krause, Lewis, and Douglas, 2006; Dunn 1997; Golden, 2000; Heclo 1977; Huber and McCarty, 2004).

The paradox however is that those appointed politically, largely lack the prerequisite experience and competencies needed for effective decision making and implementation (Fesler, 1983). Given the limited tenure of the appointees, the organizations are likely to be exposed to the negative ramifications of turnovers (Fesler, 1983). Such experience, Fisher (1983) argues, impairs the capacity to reap the benefits associated with learning by experience, teamwork and networking among the organizational leadership. Ingraham (1987) recounts such experience under the Reagan
administration, and indicates that while the political executives were always “learning the ropes” the careerists were equally always “teaching them the ropes” (p.426).

In the views of Cohen (1998), the plaguing multitudes of challenges afflicting government performance, productivity, and responsiveness can be traced largely to the growing number of political appointees at the management positions of organizations. Often, the managerial and leadership skills among political appointees are relatively low, and indeed such skills are the least considered in the selection criteria (Thompson and Riccucci, 1998; Sundquist, 1995; Heclo 1977). Cohen (1998) rhetorically questions whether the practice whereby people with less experience regarding organizational procedure and culture would be allowed a managerial position in any private corporation as being done in government. In the political realm the prime concern is not the competency or the technical knowhow, but the political and the ideological leanings of the candidates (Cohen, 1998). Though some appointees may have some managerial competencies acquired through their experience in the private sector, government or public service is different (Appleby, 1947). The corporate cultural strength does not match the strength needed to deal with government ethics including issues bothering on conflict of interest (Cohen, 1998).

Political appointments to positions akin to career or expertise positions bring into question the role expectations between the appointees and the professional bureaucrats, their respective skills, and more so the appropriate definition of what constitutes political and what does not (Ingraham, 987). There is also the issue relating to the stage at which political direction becomes very pertinent, or unnecessary, or a limitation. Ingraham, Thompson, and Eisenberg (1995) find that the quest to increase responsiveness by
increasing the number of political appointees has made it difficult to demarcate the boundaries between optimal political and optimal professional roles and positions. The likelihood challenge is the intensification of the existing tense relationship between the political office holders and professional bureaucrats (Barret and Greene, 2005; William and Bowman, 2007). There is the possibility that some of the appointees may have existing prejudice against the bureaucracy prior to assuming office, therefore, their approach to implementing organizational changes may be contrary to the expectations (Nigro and Kellough, 2008). Heclo (1988) contends that “without good faith efforts at the highest political levels, the upper reaches of the bureaucracy go to seed” with ramifications including disgruntlement, cynicism, bickering, and in some instances, sabotage (p.44).

There is no doubt that the issue of interpersonal trust is pertinent, given the direction of the radical changes in the state administrative system (Battaglio and Condrey, 2009; Nyhan, 2000; Lindquist and Condrey, 2006; Bowman and West 2007). Several scholars illustrate the view that the underlying assumptions of the reforms have leveraged the political authority with the tools capable of swinging the pendulum in its favor (Denhardt, 1993; Rainey, 2003; Coggburn, 2006; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000). Given the instances detailed in some research findings about the growing displeasure among career personnel in states where the reforms have taken radical dimension, it is not farfetched to conclude that there might be growing tension and possibly a considerable level of mistrust between the politically appointed managers and the incumbent career managers (Kellough and Nigro, 2006; Condrey and Battaglio 2007). It remains to be determined whether the apprehensions are indeed a reflection of the reality
(Battaglio and Condrey, 2009). Also, it is worth considering whether the perceived tension, fear, and mistrust will have implications on other work attitudes of the careerists (Battaglio and Condrey, 2009; Kellough and Nigro, 2006). Battaglio and Condrey (2009) for instance conclude that “…it is hard to predict the path that EAW [(employment at-will)] will take in the American states” (p. 704). Hays and Sowa (2006) contend that “the verdict is still pending on the long-term impacts and ramifications” of the reforms (p. 103).

To be able to ascertain the actual impacts of the radical changes, the political influence on the organizational environment provides solid basis, particularly in reference to the accounts of the career executives (Svara, 2001; McHugh and Bennett, 1999). The assumption is that the changes pave ways for more political influence via appointment of more political sympathizers to management positions of the bureaucratic agencies (Ingraham, 1987; Pfiffner, 1987; Kearney and Hays, 1998). Therefore it is important to unravel how career managers in similar positions feel in performing their day to day tasks. Moreover, explorations are warranted particularly so when the new system pursues measures to expand the operation capacities of the career managers whilst at the same time instituting measures that limit the job protection of the career managers (Kettl, 2012; Van Wart, 1999; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009). It remains to be established whether the cooperation and complementary relationship that the reforms seek to garner are truly being manifested (Barret and Greene, 2005; Kearney and Hays, 1998; Kearney and Scavo, 2001; Kettl, 2012; Van Wart, 1999; Thompson and Riccucci, 1998). And if so, does it have link to the issue of interpersonal trust? It also remains to be ascertained whether such developments, if any, is peculiar to a specific form of administrative model.
In the realm of scholarship, studies focusing on the dynamics of the relationship between political executives and career executives in public organizations, particularly under the current public management reforms, remains to be exhausted (Nigro and Kellough, 2008; Kearney and Hays, 1998; Thompson and Ricucci, 1998). Kellough and Nigro (2008) underscore the fact that the Winter Commission’s recommendations as well as several other recommendations on reforms including those of the Volcker Commission and the reinventing government have substantially been embraced by many states particularly in the area of personnel management. However the key foundations such as trust building, cooperation, and mutual respect between the career bureaucrats and political office holders have not been adequately examined. It therefore remains an important task to conduct further studies particular as most states and local governments are approaching the reforms from different dimensions (Kearney and Hays, 1998; Nigro and Kellough, 2008).

Objectives of the Study

In the estimation of Selden, Brewer, and Brudney (1999) “[a] more reasonable approach to understand bureaucratic control is to expect a dynamic relationship between public administrators and elected officials and to acknowledge that forces in the political environment help shape this relationship” (p. 174). The fundamental objective of this study is to assess the dynamics of the interpersonal relationship between political appointees and the career managers in the top management positions of public organizations. Given the underpinning assumptions of the reforms and the imperativeness of the political environment, the core issue to be considered is interpersonal trust. Battaglio and Condrey (2009) have argued that given the extent to which the merit
system has been tempered with under the guise of promoting managerial flexibility, trust remains the central determinant of organizational and managerial behavior. Thompson (1979) argues that there is lack of clarity regarding the extent to which mistrust of politicians by career bureaucrats manifests a dysfunction “in terms of broader democratic values” (p. 155). This lack of clarity justifies the avalanche of research questions pertaining to trust (Thompson, 1979). It also justifies the need for public administration researchers to maintain solid interest in studies pertaining to political mistrust and the effective functioning of the bureaucracy (Thompson, 1979).

Behn (1995) advances three key questions and implores public administration scholars to find answers to them. These are questions bothering on micromanagement, motivation, and measurement (Behn, 1995). Behn (1995) argues that questions on these three key issues are interrelated, therefore answering one of them leads to answering the rest. The key to the micromanagement question and largely to the other two questions is trust (Behn, 1995). Behn asks about the ability of political and career public managers to “break the micromanagement cycle of distrust, rules, poor performance, more distrust, more rules, more…” (p. 316). Among other suggestions, Behn (1995) implores scholars to continue to explore the dynamics of trust in public management in reference to the relationship between the political leadership and career bureaucrats. By so doing the cycle of distrust, more rules, and poor performance could be curtailed (Behn, 1995).

The clues to the trust question in responding to the bigger questions, according to Behn (1995), originate in policy recommendation that “first answer a number of smaller but still important theoretical and empirical questions about trust…” (p.317). Answers to the trust questions are relevant when they are linked to the extent to which certain key
work related attitudinal variables influence and manifest trust (Nyhan, 2000; Nigro and Kellough, 2008; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009). In this regard, the present study looks at the relationship between interpersonal trust and the manifestation of variables such as flexibility of professional discretion, participative management, interpersonal communication, and commitment which are core elements of the reforms. The underlying assumption is that the manifestation of these important managerial values imply greater levels trust (Nyhan, 2000; Nigro and Kellough, 2008; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009; Perry and Hondeghem, 2008; Park, 2012).

**Significance of the Study**

Effort aimed at understanding the dynamics of the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is an imperative discourse (Hansen and Ejersbo, 2002; Behn, 1995). This is because such endeavor could help to appropriately appreciate the processes and the directions of the governance system especially in the consistently changing socio-economic and political environment (Hansen and Ejersbo, 2002). This study basically seeks to add to the limited studies in regards to the interpersonal relationship between political and career managers in public organizations. It is focused only on the career public managers, an approach which is either absent or limited in the literature. Similar studies focusing on interpersonal trust vis-à-vis the reforms exist, yet the considerations are mostly from the perspectives of general career bureaucrats or middle level career supervisors who are below the top management positions (Nyhan, 2000; Nigro and Kellough, 2008; Yang and Pandey, 2008; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009). Few studies focusing on the topmost positions have been specific to certain managers, with majority being human resource managers (Nigro and Kellough, 2008; Battaglio and Condrey,
2009; Yang and Pandey, 2008). Pfifner (1987) undertook similar exercise at the federal level by examining how interpersonal relationships are perceived and interpreted by top organizational leadership. However, Pfifner’s focus was on how political appointees perceived and interpreted their relationship with the career managers they had work with. The present study, in a way, takes the reverse direction by examining how career managers perceived their relationship with the political appointees and how such perceptions influenced their (career managers) work attitudes.

Focusing on top career managers as this study seeks to do is important since career managers’ perceptions about the external and internal organizational environment influence their behavior and that of the lower ranking employees (Denhardt, Denhardt, and Aristigueta, 2012). Career managers serve as a conduit of communication and influence between the political authority and the entire rank and file of the bureaucracy (Yeager et al, 2007). Brewer (2008) argues that supervisors or managers serve as critical link between human capital and organizational performance in the public service. It is argued that organizational outcomes, relative to strategies and effectiveness, are a reflection of the cognitive values held by the powerful stakeholders or actors in the organization (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Fernandez and Rainey (2006) indicate that leaders in organization verify and consent to change and also persuade other organizational members and external stakeholders regarding the necessity for the change. Holzer and Callahan (1998), for instance, find that award winners of state and local public service innovative models attributed their feat to supportive top agency executives. Moreover, it is at the top managerial positions of the public agencies that a clearly defined functional boundary between political appointees and professional bureaucrats
relative to policy decisions remains hazy (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1982). It is also at that level that the tension between politics and administration manifests strongly (Ban and Ingraham, 1990).

The study also focuses on the state governments. Focusing on the states is important due largely to the fact that states are vital agents of the successful implementation of federal government or congressional policy initiatives (Derthick, 1987; Seldon, Ingraham, and Jacobson, 2001). Crotty (1987) for instance observes that the “primacy” scheme of implementation in which the states carry the primary responsibility of enforcing federal policy is an indicative of the vitality of the state administrative systems. Moreover, states have often time been considered as incubators of innovative public management initiatives that could be replicated nationwide (Garnett, 1980; Conant, 1988; Brudney, Hebert, Wright, 1999; Hays and Kearney, 1997).

Although state governments’ approaches to reforms are primarily founded on the New Public Management paradigm, there has not been uniformity (Brudney, Hebert, Wright, 1999; Kearney and Scavo, 2001; Hays and Sowa, 2006; Kellough and Selden, 2003; Seldon, Ingraham, and Jacobson, 2001; Selden, 2006). There are those who adopt radical approach by dismantling the traditional merit system substantially. There are also others who have adopted relatively less radical approach by relaxing the rules and formal procedures whilst maintaining certain key aspects of the traditional merit system (Ingraham and Selden, 2002; Hays and Sowa, 2006).

It should be noted that the entire reform approaches are founded on business principles (Frederickson, 1996; Thompson and Riccucci, 1998; Lynn, 2000; Hood, 1995). However, for the purposes of the present study, the states with radical approach to
reforms are described as *Pro-political-oriented model*. The less radical states are also classified as *Pro-traditional-oriented model*. This categorization serves as important premise to juxtapose the actual impacts and ramifications of the reforms in two scenarios. This approach is to advance the literature particularly in reference to the contentions that in spite of radical changes, the fundamentals of public management system relative to the relationship between political officials and career managers remains significantly unaffected (Lynn, 2000; Frederickson, 1996; Hay and Sowa, 2006; Overeem, 2005).

**Research Questions**

Among others, Behn (1995) has implored scholars to find answers to the circumstances that precipitated the reduction in distrust. By so doing, success stories, with respect to trust, could be replicated elsewhere to improve the overall levels of trust among key actors in government. Primarily, the study assesses how career public managers perceive their relationships with the political managers in terms of interpersonal trust. It relates perceived interpersonal trust among career managers to managerial values such as flexibility of professional discretion, communication, participative management, and organizational commitment. It also attempts to find out whether there are variations given the varying approaches to the reforms at the state levels in terms of trust. In this regard the following research questions are considered;

a. What is the perceived level of interpersonal trust among career managers in their relationships with political appointees?

b. Do the manifestations of the underlying management strategies such as flexibility professional discretion, participative management, communication, and commitment under the reforms have implications on interpersonal trust among
career managers? In other words, does the extent of interpersonal trust among career managers imply significant levels of flexibility of discretion, participative management, communication, and commitment?

c. What implications do the various approaches to reforms (*Pro-political-oriented model and Pro-traditional-oriented reform models*) have on interpersonal trust, professional discretion, participative management, communication and commitment among career managers?

**Theoretical Framework**

The relationship between politics and administration in democracy has been theorized from variety of perspectives (Ingraham and Ban, 1986; Overeen, 2005; Kettl, 2000; Jacobson, 2006; Svara, 2001). Nyhan (2000) observes that a variety of taxonomies explains the various frameworks in respect of public management particularly the politics-administration relationship. The classical model of politics-administration relationship envisages two separate functions of government such as policy formulation and policy implementation (Overeen, 2005; Rosenbloom, 1983; Lynn, 2002; Sayre, 1958). The policy formulation and implementation functions are respectively assigned to the political authority and the professional bureaucrats (Sayre, 1958; Svara, 2001). Ingraham and Ban (1986) describe it as “neutral competence”, Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981) call it “image I”, and under the framework developed by Mouritzen and Svara (2001) it is described as “separate roles”. The underpinning assumptions are those propounded in the works of Wilson (1887) and Weber (1968). Lynn (2001) also indicates that besides Wilson and Weber, the classical public administration model could be traced
to the works of Taylor (1911), Gullick (1937), Goodnow (1900), and the report of the Brownlow Committee.

The primary assumption under the classical public administration model is that government’s task of policy implementation requires specialized expertise and technical know-how devoid of any partisan considerations (Lynn, 2001; Ingraham and Ban, 1986; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981). Thus, as an instrument or machinery for executing the goals of democracy, the administration needs to be insulated from political influence, and its members protected from the competitive political environment (Weber, 1968). Weber’s rational model postulates that the modern bureaucracy’s composition and essential elements such as political neutrality, hierarchical structures, formalized system of procedures, and specialized knowledge and functions are basic preconditions for government predictability and reliability (Rosenbloom, 1983). Just as Weber, Wilson argued that separation of technical competency from political objectives is a necessary condition to promote efficiency, effectiveness, and economy (Pugh, 1989; Rosenbloom, 1983).

Although Wilson and Weber underscore the essence of separate and neutral role of the administration, their postulations were framed under different assumptions (Overeem, 2005; Sayre, 1958; Waldo, 1948; Appleby, 1952). Wilson (1887) and later Goodnow (1900) argue that politics can have an overbearing influence over the work of administration, therefore it is imperative to restrain or take politics out of administration. Weber (1968) on the other hand envisages the reverse and argues that politics is weak to contain the powers of the administration therefore there is the need to restrain administration from the political process (Overeem, 2005). Weber (1968) observes that
the bureaucracy has the tendency to be consummated with procedures and rules such that its means could become an end in themselves (Hummel, 2008). There is also the possibility of the bureaucracy perpetuating its power and dominance in the polity (Hummel, 2008).

Sayre (1958) contends that under the dichotomy model, the administration became “self-contained world of its own, with its own separate values, and methods” (p. 102). It was therefore assigned to play a strict subordinate role with responsibilities determined by the political authority (Sayre 1958). Normative standards underlying this relationship are reliability, legality, and justice (Sayre, 1958). Overeem (2005) indicates that the dichotomy argument envisages that bureaucrats play subordinate and technocratic roles, and are therefore below the level where political questions may be of any interest to them. Under what is referred to as “bureaucratic ethos”, the elected officials are considered the legitimate representatives of the sovereign citizens and as such public administrator have no locus to resist their will (Finer, 1941; Saltzstein, 1985). Thus, the bureaucracy does not represent the citizens in policy deliberations rather it serves as a tool to implement policies formulated by the elected representatives (Saltzstein, 1985). The common expectation is that the administrators would be apolitical and apply technical competence to politically defined goals (Saltzstein, 1985).

Bowman (2000) echoes that the core values of the “bureaucratic ethos” are “efficiency, efficacy, expertise, loyalty, and accountability” (p. 674). These values are pursued within the framework of the laws, rules, and codes of conduct, primarily specifying the parameters within which administrators can work (Bowman, 2000). Essentially, according to Bowman, the model resonates “minimal expectations and
external controls” (p. 675). Internal socialization and intrinsic factors are of no paramount concern since everything is taken care of by the laws, rules, procedures and codes as externally determined (Bowman, 1998). Arguing from ethical perspective, Bryer (2007) indicates that the classical model assumes lack of trust, and that the only way bureaucrats can conform to the expectations of the political leadership is the law, norms, and structures.

Subsequent to the classical paradigm are other models that took cognizance of the socio-economic and political dynamics particularly after the Second World War (Overeem, 2005; Waldo, 1948; Sayre, 1958; Frederickson, 1997; Appleby, 1949). The classical notion of political neutrality of the bureaucrats came to be recognized as only an ideal situation. For many pundits bureaucrats are indeed active participants of the policy formulation process (Waldo, 1948; Sayre, 1958; Svara, 2001). Friederich (1940) argues that politics and administration are bedfellows, and as such are closely intertwined under the same process. Appleby (1949) contends that both the political and policy values merge and reconcile themselves in public administration. Subsequent to this realization are the efforts to redefine the politics-administration relationship in pursuant of bureaucratic accountability, responsiveness, and responsibility to ensure democratic sustenance (Selden, Brewer, and Brudney, 1999). The assumption is that values such as laws, expertise, technical skills, and professional autonomy as expounded under the classical model are impediments to bureaucratic responsiveness and accountability (Ingraham and Ban, 1986).

Ingraham and Ban (1986) describe this era of paradigm shift using a model they refer to as “responsive competence”. The responsive competency assumes a fuzzy
relationship between politics and administration. The basic assumption is that many bureaucratic decisions in administering programs have political and policy implications (Ingraham and Ban, 1986). Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981) “describe it as image II”. They indicate that both the politician and the bureaucrat at the top management position participate in the policy formulation process, though their roles may be different. The bureaucrats are concerned with the “technical efficacy of policy” whilst politicians contend with the policy “responsiveness to the relevant constituencies” (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981, p. 6). Under this model the bureaucracy was placed directly under the control of the executive branch of government (Ingraham and Ban, 1986). In other words, the competency of the careerists was placed at the disposal of the political executives to accomplish the political mandates (Moe, 1985).

Two major options but challenging scenarios manifest under both the classical and the responsive competence models (Ingraham and Ban, 1986; Krause, Lewis, and Douglas, 2006). The need to subscribe to the responsive competence model is the contention that the classical model constraints responsiveness and accountability (Ingraham and Ban, 1986). However, the approach to derive responsiveness and accountability under the responsive model excessively increases the overhead political control over the bureaucracy (Ingraham and Ban, 1986; Svara, 2001). The excessive overhead political control creates a tense relationship between the political officials and the professional bureaucrats. The ramifications include distrust, lack of commitment, and lower job satisfaction on the part of the professional bureaucrats (Ingraham and Ban, 1986). Moreover, the likelihood of sacrificing public interest for egocentric political interest is also not in doubt (Ingraham and Ban, 1986).
The contemporary managerial approach which embraces business model in public administration appears to contain answers to the challenges that are confronted under the classical and the responsive models (Ingraham and Ban, 1986). The managerial competence model falls between neutral competence and responsive competence, and emphasizes the need for managers to apply technical skills and be politically responsive (Ingraham and Ban, 1986). In this regard, it calls for elimination of structural constraints and enhance managerial flexibility and discretion (Ingraham and Ban, 1986). One of the key concentrations of managerial model is to empower public employees to be more responsive whilst applying professionalism (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). However, the new market-based managerial model has not escaped criticisms (Ingraham and Ban, 1986; Lynn, 2001; Frederickson, 1996). Ingraham and Ban (1986) for instance argue that the model suffers from its reliance on the market principles, and also fails to clearly define its object of competency (Ingraham and Ban, 1986). Frederickson (1996) on his part describes the reinventing government which is founded on the new managerial approach as nothing different from the previous approaches. According to Frederickson, the new reform is “ideally suited to executive electoral politics” (p.266). What it means is that the new model of reform has not been able to mitigate the excessive political influence on the work of the bureaucrats (Lynn, 2002; Frederickson, 1996; Ingraham and Ban, 1986).

Importantly, none of the models exists in its practical terms or appropriately establishes the realities of the interactional discourse between politicians and professional bureaucrats (Kaufman, 1956; Lynn, 2002; Ingraham and Ban, 1986). Ingraham and Ban (1986) indicate that “these models of the political-career executive relationship have
evolved over time and are not mutually exclusive” (p. 153). What perhaps differentiate the models is their respective emphasis on what Nyhan (2000) identifies as “structural versus social and psychological factors in the workplace” (p. 87). However, what is clear is the understanding that politicians and bureaucrats play complementary roles in accomplishing public service and democratic goals (Svara, 2001). Svara (2001) argues that the complementary relationship between politicians and administrators is not new since such relationship is recognized under all forms of administrative models. Svara posits that it is “a deeply rooted model that continues to evolve” (p.180). It is indeed recognized as phenomenon embedded in the United States administrative system (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981). That is, the United States consists of “a system of bureaucratized politics and politicized administration” (Aberbach and Rockman, 1997, p. 325).

The present study is framed within the complementary model. The complementarity assumptions manifest under several theoretical postulations (Svara, 2001; Mouritzen and Svara, 2002; Ingraham and Ban, 1986; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981). The model acknowledges the distinctions between elected officials and professional administrators in terms of values, positions, and perspectives but emphasizes the shared responsibilities, continuing interactions, and the reciprocity of good will (Demir and Nyhan, 2008; Nalbandian, 1994; Svara, 2001). Demir (2009) indicates that the relationship between the top level bureaucrats and political officeholders can be represented in a form of continuum with politics at one end and management at the other such that policy and administration find place in the middle. The model accepts the overlapping roles and recognizes the fluidity, flexibility, and the broad nature of
interactions between the bureaucrats and political officials (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002; Mynard-Moody, 1998; Wheeland, 2000).

In the policy formulation process, professional public administrators complement efforts in shaping and providing meaning to the policy content and also facilitate policy implementation through their expertise. In much the same way, the political officials complement efforts in policy implementation through oversight in the forms of receiving, evaluating, and addressing complaints to meet the desire interests of the public (Svara, 2001; Thomas, 1990). Aberbach and Rockman (1997) describe the model similarly by referring to it as “hybrid image”. They point out that under the hybrid image, civil servants offer ideas that the politicians may upon reflection consider them as compatible to their policy objectives. Thus, the civil servants provide the political leadership with the “detailed map for getting to where they want to go” (Aberbach and Rockman, 1997, p. 324).

Under what is referred to as “public service model” Ingraham and Ban (1986) indicate that a key to serving public interest is the commitment of both careerists and political appointees to complement each other in the discharge of their respective mandates. Thus, it is imperative to strive for mutual dialogue between the careerists and the political officials at the management level (Ingraham and Ban, 1986). But the greater responsibility is placed on the political executives to be committed to management competency and create the appropriate environment with their career counterparts (Ingraham and Ban, 1986). Ingraham and Ban (1986) emphasize the need to “move away from the insularity of both neutral competence and partisan responsiveness to a common ground where goals and priorities are informed by systematic consideration of the public
good and the public interest” (p. 159). Basically the complementarity framework embraces the key attributes of the other models pursuant to addressing the perceived tensions between political values and professional values (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002). In the words of Svara (2001):

Complementarity stresses interdependence along with distinct roles; compliance along with independence; respect for political control along with a commitment to shape and implement policy in ways that promote the public interest; deference to elected incumbents along with adherence to the law and support for fair electoral competition; and appreciation of politics along with support for professional standards. (p. 179)

O’Toole and Meier (2006) argue that there can be no best option but a reciprocal relationship between the political and career executives in the public service because the overhead political control of the bureaucracy remains unrealistic.

Given the underlying assumptions of the complementarity framework, the present study assumes that trust, particularly interpersonal trust, is central. Ingraham and Ban (1986) maintain that between the career and political executives, the bond of trust is indispensable. The model of complementary relationship dwells very much on reciprocity of political support from the political officials and technical support from the careerists. Therefore it takes an environment that enhances greater level of trust to bring such relationship into fruition. Lorentzen (1985) argues that the usual tensions that often characterize the political-career executive relationship are a deep seated but unavoidable part and parcel of the American democratic governance. It is basically on this note that the environment that undergirds mutual understanding regarding differences in orientation and perspectives has become so imperative (Lorentzen, 1985).

An environment that exudes trust is indispensable to enhance the development of collaborative or cooperative working relationship (Lorentzen, 1985; Ingraham and Ban,
1986; Svara, 2001). The motivation for the career bureaucrats to work towards the goals of the political leadership, and the motivation for the political leadership to facilitate the environment for the career executive to make satisfactory and committed contributions, invariably rest on trust (Lorentzen, 1985; Nyhan, 2000; Condrey 1995; Yang and Kassekert, 2009; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009). As Lorentzen (1985) indicates “for a cooperative atmosphere to start replacing the usual initial environment of suspicion, some sparks of beginning trust must be engendered in the interaction between new appointees and their inherited career staff” (p. 413).

**Conceptual Framework**

**Interpersonal Trust**

Trust is conceptualized in the organizational literature from a variety of standpoints. This may be explained by the multifaceted and multidisciplinary nature of trust particularly when it comes to its role in organizational performance (Christensen and Laegreid, 2005). Some scholars have attempted to simplify the conceptualization of trust by breaking the numerous constructs of trust into categories. Sitkin and Roth (1993) conclude that as a concept trust can be understood from four dimensions namely, trust as individual traits; trust as behavior; trust as a situational feature; and trust as organizational arrangement (also in Bigley and Pearce, 1998, p.405). Hosmer (1995) maintains that trust can be conceptualized from the perspectives such as interpersonal relationships, economic transactions, ethics, social structures, and individual expectations. From a multidisciplinary perspective, Lewicki and Bunker (1995) describe three main approaches to conceptualizing trust. The first is the theory of personality which focuses on the individual differences. The second is the sociological and economic
Theories which place emphasis on the institutional dynamics. The third is the psychological perspective which underscores the expectations of parties in a transaction. Other scholars examine trust from two major perspectives namely the behavioral and psychological traditions (Hardin, 1993). The behavioral tradition views trust as rational-choice or cooperative choices in a game (Hardin, 1993). The psychological tradition on the other hand focuses on the complex interpersonal states associated with trust, including expectations, intentions, affect, and dispositions (Williams, 2002; McAllister, 1995).

It is abundantly clear that just as the volume of research on trust has expanded, trust as a concept has equally been subjected to different uses and meanings (Bigley and Pearce, 1998). However, the increasing but diverse approach to conceptualizing trust has become a great impediment to the scholarship on the role of trust in the organizational processes (Bigley and Pearce, 1998). Hosmer (1995) has argued that “there appears to be widespread agreement on the importance of trust in human conduct, but unfortunately there also appears to be equally widespread lack of agreement on a suitable definition of the construct” (p. 380).

Moreover, a number of antecedents and moderating variables come to play in examining trust as management concept (Kim, 2005; Choudhury, 2008). Choudhury (2008) argues that this development pose a challenge because in most trust models the most recognized antecedents and moderating variables “rest on a static and serial understanding of trust relations and hence they have been found wanting” (p. 588). Shapiro (1987) has reiterated that the scholarship approach to the concept of trust has led to “a confusing potpourri of definitions applied to a host of units and levels of analysis (p.
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) equally underscore the fact that in spite of the greater attention in the literature, trust as a concept lacks precise definition; lacks clarity relative to its relationship with risk; and lacks delineation in terms of the level of analysis. Moreover, scholars have not been able to consider the party to be trusted and the trusting party, and have also not been able to adequately consider the antecedents of trust (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995).

Often, certain terms have been used synonymously with trust leading to complications regarding the precise understanding of trust. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) outline these terms as cooperation, confidence, and predictability. Gambetta (1988) for instance has conceptualized trust based on cooperation, and postulated that trusting a party means the probability that he or she will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to the sustenance of cooperation with that party. Deutsch (1960) indicates that one’s trust for a party to act beneficial is the confidence that the party has the ability and intention to act that way (also Cook and Wall, 1980; Coleman, 1990). According to Luhmann (1979), trust represents the confidence levels between parties in terms of fairness, ethics, and predictability. Moreover, other pundits also look at trust as the extent to which a party can predict the behavior of the other regarding the expectation that the other party will act in good faith (Gabarro, 1978; Dasgupta, 1988; Good, 1988).

According to Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995), trust cannot be an exclusive condition for cooperation to occur neither is cooperation a manifestation of trust. Thus, there could be cooperation without necessarily the existence of trust, particularly in the instance of strict enforcement of control mechanisms by management (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995).
Schoorman, 1995; Kee and Knox, 1970). Luhmann (1988) agrees that trust and confidence connote expectations with the possibility of disappointment however the two concepts are different. Trust differs from confidence because it involves prior engagement on one’s part (Luhmann, 1988). On the score of predictability and trust, it is argued that trust goes beyond predictability (Deutsch, 1960). To equate trust and predictability is an endorsement that a party who can always be expected to be consistently selfish can be trusted because his or her action can be predicted (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995).

In spite of the obvious difficulties and contradictions in conceptualizing trust for the purpose of scientific endeavor, Bigley and Pearce (1998) contend that the situation offers an opportunity to consider several aspects of the role of trust in the organizational literature. They maintain that “efforts to incorporate existing trust perspectives under one conceptualization are likely to result in concepts that are either unreasonably complex or inordinately abstract for organizational science research purpose” (p. 406). In a theoretical framework dubbed “problem-centered”, Bigley and Pearce (1998) posit that the complexities relative to trust as a concept can be addressed by focusing on the aspect pertinent to the issues at stake. That is, researchers should shift their focus from “what is trust” to “which trust and when?” (p. 406). In other words, trust should be conceptualized on the account of the focus of the research in question. Indeed, the preceding proposition serves as premise of conceptualizing trust for the purpose of the present study.

The present study is focused on how interpersonal relationship in a work setting influences the perceptions relative to vulnerability, and therefore, the disposition to engage in risk taking behavior. This approach to conceptualizing trust finds support
among several scholars particularly with respect to the issue of risk taking or vulnerability. Mishra (1996) attests to the underlying factor of vulnerability in conceptualizing trust, and argues that when a discourse does not entail vulnerability trust is not necessary, because the consequences of the outcomes are of limited value to trustors. Nyhan (2000) contends that trust has three major but overlapping components or constructs such as confidence, fairness, and risk taking. Rousseau et al (1998) define trust as the psychological disposition with the intention to “accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (p.395). Significantly, what differentiates trust from the other constructs which are often used synonymous to trust is the issue of risk taking (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995). Thus, trust cannot be exhaustively examined without looking at the risk factor.

McAllister (1995) looks at interpersonal trust from two different perspectives namely cognitive and affective. The cognitive form of trust relates with issues such as reliability, integrity, honesty, and fairness of the referent. The affective form on the other hand concerns with the relationship that has the tendency to influence the referent to demonstrate attention or concern regarding one’s welfare. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) illustrate under their risk taking relationship model (RTR) that trust could increase the likelihood of trustor’s formation of affective link with the trustee and allow personal vulnerability. In a nutshell, Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) define trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (p.712).
The present study assumes a subordinate-superior relationship in organizational setting in which a number of variables count to elicit actions and inactions that reflect the level of vulnerability. In this case the party in the subordinate position is presumed to be the trustor, and the one in the superior position is the trustee. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) and also Cunningham and McGregor (2000) posit that in a superior-subordinate relationships, the inferences of the subordinates relative to the dependability, reliability, capability, and fairness of the superior have implications on the subordinates’ work behavior and attitudes. However, holding other factors such as ability, benevolence, integrity, and propensity to trust constant, the level of trust could also be consequential to the stakes involve, balance of power, perceived level of risk, and the options available to the trustor (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995).

For interpersonal trust to be properly understood, factors that lead to trust and therefore, one’s willingness to engage in trusting behavior need to be examined (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995). The appropriate focus in this regard therefore should be the characteristics or the traits of both the trustor and the trustee (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995; Dasgupta, 1995). A person’s predisposition to trust, or what Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) describe as “propensity to trust” is essential element in organizational research relative to behaviors of interest and performance of organizational members. Essentially, a party’s (trustor) disposition or propensity to trust could determine the trust for the other party (trustee) even before any prior available information about the trustee (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995). In a context of unfamiliar actors, propensity to trust is an important trust antecedent (Colquitt, Scott, and LePine, 2007).
However, the trustor’s propensity to trust alone is not enough to understand trust since a given trustor may express varying levels of trust for different trustees. In this instance, it is important to also focus on the characteristics or the trustworthiness of the trustee (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995; Good, 1988). Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) look at the ability, benevolence, and integrity as the major elements of the trustworthiness of a trustee which cannot be overlooked in an empirical understanding of trust in an interpersonal relationship. The ability is the various skills, competencies, and other attributes that place a party in an influential position (Cook and Wall, 1980; Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995). Benevolence is the belief that the trustee is oriented to act in the good interest of the trustor. The integrity, relative to trust is the belief or perception by the trustor that the trustee would act based on certain specified principles deemed acceptable and faire by the trustor (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995; McFall, 1987). The trustee’s past action, credibility and reliability of communication and sense of justice largely determine the level of integrity perceived by the trustor (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995).

There is difference between trust and trusting behavior. The willingness to assume risk defines trust whereas assuming risk in actuality determines the trusting behavior. Therefore, one’s level of trust affects the amount of risk that he or she is willing to take in a relationship (Mayers, Davis, and Schoorman 1995). In a subordinate-superior relationship as the present study assumes, it is envisaged that the subordinate’s willingness to engage in certain work behaviors that in a way can jeopardize his or her wellbeing depends on the level of trust for the superior. That is, the extent of the subordinate’s belief that the superior is reliable both in words and in deeds to defend the
subordinate when certain work related actions go wrong determines the extent of trust in that relationship.

Theorists suggest that parties in organizational relationship process information about others to inform their next line of actions including actions involving risk taking (Carnevale and Wechsler, 1992; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009; Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis, 2007). Where there is perceived limited level of trust parties in organizational relationship will not be willing to engage in actions capable of rendering them vulnerable. Thus, for particular organizational interactional processes to be activated with certainty there must first be a considerable level of trust between the organizational leadership and employees (Carnevale and Wechsler, 1992; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009).

It is assumed for the purpose of this study that political appointees and career managers tailor their work attitudes in accordance with their perceptions and interpretations of the organizational environment. For lack of trust, it is assumed that the political appointees would place emphasis on strict rule, controls, and possibly engage in limited information sharing with their counterpart career managers. In much the same way, the career managers in similar situation would prefer to apply the rules relative to task performance, information sharing, and contributions towards the decision making processes. Indeed the lack of trust may reflect their perceived resentment on the work environment and for that matter their job attitudes.

Because the present study examines the issues from the perspectives of the career managers, it is assumed that the manifestation of interpersonal trust on the part of the career managers relative to their relationship with political appointees would reflect on the extent to which they agree to the existence of greater levels of professional discretion,
communication, participation, and commitment (Dirks and Ferrin, 2002; Friedlander, 1970; Carnevale and Wechsler, 1992). In other words, the manifestation of these organizational variables will be an indication of strong presence of trust among career managers.

**Professional Discretion**

Professional discretion is simply understood as the latitude of actions available to managers or executives to influence important organizational outcomes (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Carpenter and Golden, 1997; Sowa and Selden, 2003). Nyhan (2000) describes it as empowerment, meaning the “environment in which employees receive more authority for accomplishment of tasks in exchange for accepting responsibility for work outcomes” (p.92).

The relationship between discretion and trust is the assessment of risk. McAllister (1995) posits that managerial trust is important factor in organizational coordination and control. Sowa and Selden (2003) indicate that in spite of the organizational structural controls, the individual administrators have their own sense-making mechanisms to determine from the environment the latitude of authority that is tolerated in the organization. Therefore, where there is limited trust, managers may be unlikely to grant or be guaranteed the flexibility of discretion. In much the same way, employees who estimate higher risk culture may be unwilling to go beyond their specified bounds (Khan, 1997; Sowa and Selden, 2003). Managerial discretion or empowerment is also perceived as important pre-condition for trust building in organization. In other words, trust and managerial empowerment have bidirectional relationship (Navran, 1992; Khan, 1997).
Interpersonal Communication

Interpersonal communication is conceptualized from variety of perspectives (Jablin, 1979). However, for the purpose of present study, it may be defined as the exchanges of information between members of organization, one of whom formally occupies superior position to direct the actions of other members (Jablin, 1979). Katz and Kahn (1966) look at the communication flow between superior and subordinate as downward and upward. The downward communication consists of information flow from the superior to the subordinate. It includes information such as job instruction, organizational procedure and practices, subordinates performance, and organizational goals and objectives. On the other hand, upward communication is the information emanating from the subordinate to the superior. It usually consists of information about the subordinates themselves, organizational practices and policies, and the direction of the organization (Katz and Kahn, 1966).

A culture of trust is imperative for effective downward and upward interpersonal communication in public organization (Zammuto and Krakower, 1991). Creed and Miles (1996) contend that organizational leadership control the flow of information therefore the subordinates access to vital information is a manifestation of the level of trust. In a distrustful organizational setting, usually vital information are hidden; members do not open up; goals are not made clear; and people doubt the validity of information being made available (Diffie-Couch, 1984). Dirk and Ferrin (2002) review that the extent of a party’s apprehension relative to the other party’s honesty, integrity, and disposition to take an undue advantage can affect the belief in the authenticity of information provided by that other party.
O’Reilly (1978) reviews that there are three basic variables such as the level of trust, influence, and mobility that often determine information transmission in an organization. The sender’s trust in the receiver of the message, the sender’s perception about the magnitude of the receiver’s influence over the sender, and the mobility aspiration of the sender can all influence the levels of screening and suppression of information flow. In a study relative to these propositions, O’Reilly (1978) finds that certain types of information transmitted upwards are subjected to bias screening. Also, when there is low trust in the receiver of information the sender tends to suppress the information more significantly, particularly if the information is deemed to reflect unfavorably on the sender (O’Reilly, 1978).

**Participative Management**

Participative management is conceptualized from different standpoints, and as such comes with variety of labels including democratic leadership, industrial democracy, worker-self management, employee involvement, power equalization, and autonomous work group (Dachler and Wilpert, 1978). Mostly, scholars agree that participative management entails broadening of the decision making capacity and responsibility of the frontline employees such that they could feel their involvement in the activities of the organization (Kaufman, 2001). From among other perspectives, Dachler and Wilpert (1978) look at organizational participation from human growth and development perspectives. They indicate that organizational participation goes beyond just decision making to include processes such as “joint ownership of organizational change programs, and sharing of ideas, feeling, information, knowledge, and other resources” (Dachler and Wilpert, 1978, p.7). Lawler, Albers, and Ledford (1992) equally agree that participative
management basically entails sharing of power, reward, and information with frontline employees, and also significant investment in training.

Culture of trust, openness, and support are essential elements for empowering the front line employees to facilitate responsive reforms (O’Brien, 2002). Kearney and Hayes (1994) contend that for participative management to occur there should “be basic level of trust and mutual respect” (p.47). Spritzer and Mishra (1999) indicate that involving subordinate in decision making poses risk to management. Therefore, among the contextual variables that could facilitate involvement, trust comes across as fundamental (Spreitzer and Mishra, 1999).

**Commitment**

Organizational commitment can be conceptualized from two basic perspectives namely “affective” and “calculative” (Angle and Lawson, 1993; Cohen and Kirchmeyer, 1995; Meyer, Allen, and Gellatly, 1990; Nyhan, 1999). Nyhan (1999) indicates that employees’ affective commitment is expressed in their belief and acceptance of organizational goals and values; their willingness to provide greater efforts in the interest and wellbeing of the organization; and their unflinching desire to remain members of the organization. It is the internalization and incorporation of the organization’s goals and values by the employees, and the extent to which employees identify with the organization (Yang and Pandey, 2009; Stazyk, Pandey, and Wright, 2011; Buchanan, 1974; Wiener, 1982). Whyte (1956) describes a committed individual member of an organization as “organization man” who does not just work for the organization but actually feel as part of the organization. A committed individual member of an
organization develops job satisfaction, eschews absenteeism, and demonstrates higher dedication with limited tendency to quit job (Nyhan, 1999; Mathieu and Zajac, 1990).

The calculative commitment on the other hand, implies the development of a sense of allegiance by the individual employees to their own actions rather than to the organization (Nyhan, 1999). Calculative commitment manifests the employees’ tendency to be consistent to particular course of actions so that certain invested values will not be lost at a cost if they decide to leave the organization (Becker, 1960). It is often associated with extrinsic rewards including status, pay, benefits, privileges, and promotion (Nyhan, 1999). Nyhan (1999) indicates that “trust is the key correlate of affective commitment” (p. 59). Blake and Mouton (1984) observe that trust enhances mutual respect which is a key to commitment. Organizational entropy occurs when employees believe that their actions or decisions will not be supported (Nyhan, 1999). Nyhan (1999) finds that supervisory trust correlate significantly with employees’ affective commitment.

Figure 1. A model of relationship between interpersonal trust and professional discretion, participation, communication and commitment
Organization of the Study

The study is organized into five chapters with sub-sections. Chapter one which includes this section is the introductory chapter. It discusses the problem of the study; objectives and significance of the study; and the research questions. The chapter further discusses the theoretical and conceptual frameworks. Chapter two reviews the relevant literature in reference to the main variables. It first examines the relevance of interpersonal trust; how it has been pursued in public management; and the outcomes of the recent reforms on interpersonal trust as variously contended in the scholarship literature. The other variables such as managerial discretion, participative management, communication, and commitment are discussed in similar fashion but are linked to the outcome of interpersonal trust. The tail end of the chapter is the research hypotheses.

Chapter three captures the research methodology. It discusses the rational for combining quantitative and qualitative approaches. The chapter also discusses the measures and the associated survey instruments in reference to each of the variables. It further discusses the data collection by looking at the sampling methods and the survey administration in both the quantitative and qualitative approaches. Chapter four looks at the quantitative data analysis and presentation of the result. It indicates the various statistical analytical tools used and the theoretical assumptions that informed the utilization of those tools. Chapter five is the discussion section under which the results from quantitative data are discussed together with the results from the qualitative data. The chapter also deals with research implications, research limitations, and the way forward in regards to future studies. It also consists of the concluding section which provides the summary accounts of the study.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Though trust is broadly recognized as fundamental to organizational outcomes, it appears to be recent in public management compared to concepts such as responsiveness, accountability, discretion, effectiveness, efficiency, economy, and participation (Choudhury, 2008). The role of trust regarding organizational outcomes is examined from external and internal environmental perspectives in the literature (Nyhan, 2000). From the external perspectives, the concentration is usually on how trust, as fostered in the external climate, impacts on organizational outcomes. Examples of such concentration are citizen trust in government and government performance (Wildavsky, 1980; Rockman, 1981; Gay, 2002; Citrin and Green, 2009), citizens trust in institutions (Carnevale, 1995; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Berman, 1997); citizens trust and e-governance (Belangera and Carter, 2008; Warking, Gefen, Pavlou, and Rose, 2002); trust and effective public participation (Wang and Wart, 2007; Yang, 2005; Berman, 1997); trust and knowledge utilization by firms (Moormann, Zaltman, and Deshpande, 1992); and inter-organizational trust and cooperation (Newell and Swan, 2000; Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011).

From the perspective of internal organizational environment, the literature primarily treats trust as instrumental variable for the sustenance of the requisite interpersonal or group relationships in organizations (Nyhan, 2000; Condrey, 1995;
Morris, 1995; McCauley and Kuhnert, 1992). Though the literature treats this facet of trust as vital in regards to effective organizational outcomes, it is yet to be accorded the deserving prominence (Nyhan, 2000; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009; Park, 2012). Park (2012) for instance maintains that besides the limited scholarly attention to “the peculiar and distinctive constructs of public organizational trust”, the organizational literature has not been able to extensively explore the role of organizational leadership in fostering a sustainable interpersonal trust (also, Chua, Ingram, and Morris, 2008).

The positive impacts of interpersonal trust are numerous and diverse (Nyhan, 2000). It establishes support, legitimacy, and commitment (Nachmias, 1985). It creates and sustains system cohesion, fuels organizational effectiveness, and enhances group capacity towards problem solving (Barber, 1983; Blau, 1964; Friedlander, 1970). Golembiewski and McConkie (1975) find that trust is the precursor of interpersonal behaviors that promote mutually reinforcing relationship and higher performance. Where trust is lacking, cynicism, poor attitudes, and lack of commitment and motivation thrive (Carnevale and Wechsler, 1992). A culture of trust promotes sharing of vital values that together enhance higher performance and organizational responsiveness (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993; Covey, 1991).

When a relationship is firmly established on trust, according to Dirk and Ferrin (2002), a common feature is reciprocity of good deeds or good work behavior and attitude. For instance, the individuals in that reciprocal relationship demonstrate commitment to task and may even take additional task which can lead to greater “performance and organizational citizenship behaviors” (Dirk and Ferrin 2002, p. 613). Fairholm and Fairholm (2006) indicate that leadership is collective and relation-based
and as such thrives in an environment of mutual trust and coordination. Under the theoretical framework of leader-member exchange, Danerau, Cashman, and Green (1973) find that the key factor to facilitate leadership exchange is trust. Benis (1993) argues that what fertilizes good leadership relationship in an organization does not reside in excessive oversight or control but a trustful environment.

Interpersonal trust is pertinent to effective public management because of the unavoidable uncertainties, goal ambiguities, and value conflicts that most often confront managers in public organizations (Nyhan, 2000). In public organizations the actions and inactions of the individual members usually lead to a complex situation characterized by constant rule change and strategic receptivity (Nyhan, 2000). The principal determinant in this complex discourse is interpersonal trust (Nyhan, 2000). Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) and also Cunningham and McGregor (2000) discuss that in a superior-subordinate relationships, the inferences of the subordinates relative to the dependability, reliability, capability, and fairness of the superior have implications on the subordinates’ work behavior and attitudes. Bozeman and Kingsley (1998) aver that the behavior of organizational leadership, however minimal or subtle it may appear, can significantly influence subordinates’ perceptions about the plausibility or legitimacy of risk taking.

Professional public managers interpret political actions and adjust their behaviors accordingly (Yang and Pandey, 2009). Therefore when the political environment is conducive, they are likely to report greater trust, satisfaction, and respect in dealing with the political leadership. But in an event of the opposite, they are likely to become frustrated, defensive, and in most cases prefer adhering strictly to rigid procedures and rules (Wilson, 1989; Bok, 2001; Perry and Porter, 1982). Bok (2001) has argued that in
an excessive distrustful environment, government and organizational leadership become more cautious, rigid, and indecisive such that they are unable to respond timely to the demands of the public. Mintzberg (1985) has indicated that pervasive politics or political influence in organization can have negative implications on interpersonal relationship among the key actors in government.

Although the implications of interpersonal trust are well acknowledged in theory and practice, public management continues to be confronted with the difficulty of nurturing the pre-requisite environment to enhance interpersonal trust between political and career managers (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998; Behn, 1995). In a comparative study of public and private sectors, Bozeman and Kingsley (1998) find that risk-taking disposition among public managers was low compared to their counterparts in the private sector. Factors that explain the phenomenon of low risk-taking behavior among public managers include lack of goal clarity, distrust, and red tape and formalization (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998). The persistent adherence to rigid rules, formalized procedure and processes as pertained to the traditional civil service system is believed to be one of the major impediments to nurturing interpersonal trust and development of risk-taking culture among career bureaucrats (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998; Wilson, 1995). This is because the existence of those elements signals and sustains the notion that risk-taking in public management is greatly discouraged (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998). Wilson (1995) echoes that leadership in public organizations can use power in two ways. These are power to dominate and influence subordinates to comply with decisions, and power to be cautious and responsible to motivate and commit subordinates to organizational goals.
What can inure to the benefit of the organization is the later but for lack of trust it has not been effectively pursued (Wilson, 1995; Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998).

The advent of the recent public management reforms under the banner of the New Public Management paradigm has given impetus to the calls for rigorous appraisal of organizational trust (Park, 2011; Nyhan, 2000; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009). The values such as flexibility of discretion, ethical responsibility, participative management, effective communication, job satisfaction and commitment are fundamentals of the reforms (National Commission on the State and Local Public Service, 1993; Nigro and Kellough, 2008; Lynn, 2000). As a matter of fact, the recent reforms seek to address the difficulties inherent in the traditional civil service system (Nyhan, 2000). However, the manifestations of the key values of the reforms are predicated on the environment in which the political and career personnel could work in close collaboration. Nyhan (2000) argues that the current public management reforms seek to create the enabling environments to enhance employees’ physical, psychological, and social wellbeing as preludes to positive organizational outcomes. In this regard, interpersonal trust is the fertilizing agent (Nyhan, 2000). Nigro and Kellough (2008) describe the recent reform agenda as driven by “public service bargain”. Primarily, the public service bargain model calls for the utilization of both formal and informal means to establish mutual responsibilities, expectations, and rights between civil servants and political officeholders (Hood and Lodge, 2006; Nigro and Kellough, 2008). Central to those expectations is the issue of interpersonal trust (Nigro and Kellough, 2008).

Condrey (1995) hypothesizes that the reforms themselves may not yield the expected positive outcomes unless they are solidly facilitated through congenial
organizational culture. Thompson (2000) argues that the success of the reinvention propositions and other closely related reforms largely depend on the nature of the organizational climate and culture. The reforms could yield the expected objectives when they are firmly grounded and pursued through trustful relationship between the political and career managers (McHugh and Bennett, 1999; DePree, 1997). Nyhan (2000) concludes in a study that trust is the core elements in facilitating participation in decision making, feedback, and empowerment. Higginson and Waxler (1989) equally acknowledge this in their study and indicate that development of culture of trust is critical in any attempt to restore an image of dignity to the bureaucracy.

Following the reforms several studies have been undertaken to examine how organizational trust, particularly interpersonal trust has been impacted. Battaglio and Condrey (2009) examine Georgia’s administrative reforms of “employment at will’ and its impact on managerial and organizational trust. Kellough and Nigro (2002) examine the outcome of Georgia’s human resource reforms dubbed “Georgia Gain” in relation to employees’ perception of trust and other related variables. Condrey (1995) looks at the impact of federal human resource reforms dubbed “Performance Management and Recognition System” relative to organizational trust. Focusing on what is referred to as “trust-based model”, Nyhan (2000) examines the influence of interpersonal trust on attitudinal variables in the supervisor-subordinate relationship in organization.

Yang and Pandey (2008) look at the perception of public managers about organizational environment in relation to the successful implementation of the “result-oriented reform initiatives (Managing for Result). In their study, Yang and Pandey (2008) focus on trust as a crucial determinant of work related behaviors and attitudes among
political and professional actors in public organizations. Grey and Garsten (2001) compare the bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic paradigms in relation to the crucial role of intra-organizational trust. Yang and Kassekert (2009) use trust as moderating variable to examine how the recent reforms, particularly those specified under the Title 5 exemptions and management for reforms initiatives have influenced employee attitudes and behaviors in federal agencies. Feldheim (2007) examines the influence of 1970s and 1990s reform objectives such as “reduction-in force”, cutback management”, “contracting out and “privatization” on employees’ trust and work attitudes. Crowell and Guy (2010) look at the impact of Florida’s “Service First” reforms on employees’ perceptions about their work attitudes as affected by trust in the political system.

The preceding studies and several similar others acknowledge the instrumentality of interpersonal trust in public service. However, there is limited consensus regarding the implications that the reforms have had on interpersonal trust (West, 2002; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009; Ho, 2006; Yang and Kasskert, 2009; Kellough and Nigro, 2006; Nigro and Kellough, 2008). It is worthy to note that while some scholars believe that the reforms may have culminated into a paradoxical situation in term of organizational trust, others maintain a firm belief that there have been positive outcomes (Maesschalck, 2004; Ho, 2006). However, others contend that there have not been any substantial implications of the reforms regarding interpersonal trust (Ho, 2006; Frederickson, 1997).

For many a pundit there is ample evidence to conclude that the organizational environments have been characterized by excessive apprehensions about job security and career prospects following the reforms (Rubin, 2009; Crowell and Guy, 2010; Kellough and Nigro, 2002; Condrey, 2002). These developments may have culminated into lack of
employee trust in the organizational leadership and the organizational systems (Battaglio and Condrey, 2009; Nyhan, 2000; Nigro and Kellough, 2008; Condrey, 2002). Rubin (2009) examines the relationship between procedural justice and employee trust in management following the personnel management reforms at the federal level. Using data on employees of Department of Defense, Rubin (2009) finds that changes in the existing procedural justice system negatively affected the satisfaction and trust levels of managers in that department. Rubin (2009) concludes that changes that appear to temper with employee property interest in their job positions can have serious implications on their work attitudes. Similarly, using the Social Security Administration as case study, Thompson (2000) concludes that in general terms, the reforms have not succeeded in eliminating the classical command and control mechanisms. In addition, field managers continued to entertain fears about their job security due largely to the employee downsizing (Thompson, 2000).

Hays and Sowa (2006) find that most states have embraced fully or are making moves to adopt the principles espoused under the reinventing government reforms such as decentralization, deregulation, and managerial flexibility. They observe that most affected is the traditional merit system as “at-will employment system” has become the major focus. The previously classified civil service positions are being declassified and in addition to that the due process rights of civil servants are being restricted (Hayes and Sowa, 2006). They conclude that the reforms rather represent an attack on the professional civil service system with ramifications including distrust and lack of job satisfaction as job security is perceived to have been undermined considerably. Hayes and Sowa observe that even in states where there was modicum of avenues to seek
redress on grievance issues most employees were reluctant to avail themselves because of the perceived precarious nature of the political environment.

Nigro and Kellough (2008) examine the extent to which the states government have been able to embrace and implemented the recommendations contained in the Winter Commission’s report. They find that most states have or were applying certain aspects such as personnel deregulation and recruitments system but the fundamental propositions in respect of development of trust and collaborative leadership have not been significantly embraced. Nigro and Kellough (2008) maintain that there has been growing tension between the professional bureaucrats and the political officials. Gossett (2000) equally observes that the reforms have increased the managerial capacity of organizational leadership but the right and protection of public employees have dwindled, and that may have paradoxical implications.

Following Georgia’s human resource reforms, Battaglio and Condrey (2009) examine the perceptions of human resource professionals in relation to job security, procedural justice, tendency to report wrong doing (whistleblowing), and return of the spoil system. Looking at those issues from the perspective of managerial and organizational trust, Battaglio and Condrey (2009) report that human resource professionals who believe that their job security is threatened under the “employment at will system” expressed less trust in management and the organization. Those who believed that the system is a challenge to ethical responsibility such as whistleblowing also reported less trust in management and the organization (Battaglio and Condrey, 2009). Moreover, those who perceived the system as a return of the spoil system reported less trust in the management and the organizational systems (Battaglio and Condrey,
Battaglio and Condrey (2009) conclude that fundamentally, the “employment at will system” has serious negative implications on trustful workplace environment. The fundamental contentions, according to Battaglio and Condrey (2009), bother on the removal of tenure protection and the restriction of the grievance procedure which were previously guaranteed under the traditional merit system.

Kellough and Nigro (2002) equally find that the overall impression of state employees about Georgia’s human resource management reforms dubbed “GeorgiaGain” was not impressive as most respondents were cynical about the system. The reform was to create a working condition that would enhance employees’ confidence in the fairness, objectivity, and equity of the personnel management system particularly with regards to the performance reward system (Kellough and Nigro, 2002). However most of the respondent, according to Kellough and Nigro (2002), expressed lack of trust regarding how the new measures were being implemented Kellough and Nigro (2002) observe that more than half of the respondents believed that the performance ratings were influenced by “office politics” rather than the actual performance of the worker. Comparing their data with the previous data, Kellough and Nigro (2002) indicate that there has been a decline from 64 percent to 50 percent between 1993 and 2000 in regards to positive attitudes of employees about the fairness and objective implementation of the reforms. Similarly, Condrey (2002) concludes that whatever the case is Georgia’s reforms constitutes an anomaly likely to be adopted by other jurisdictions.

Crowell and Guy (2010) find that there has been growing apprehension among employees relative to Florida’s “Service First” reforms that targeted the human resource system. Following the reforms, the process and duration of terminating employees’
tenure reduced from six months to thirty days (Crowell and Guy, 2010). Crowell and Guy (2010) observe that whereas some managers felt the reforms have enhanced their capacity to get rid of non-performing employees, most employees felt that the intended objectives of the reforms could not be achieved because of lack of trust in the performance incentive system that was implemented. Employees felt that there was no fairness and objectivity in job evaluation, and more so, the selection and recruitment processes were characterized by patronage considerations (Crowell and Guy, 2010). According to Crowell and Guy (2010), many employees, including even those who were not initially affected, reported fear of possible job lost.

Contrary to the preceding research findings, other scholars have argued that the radical reforms per se may not offer adequate explanation in regards to the dynamics of the organizational environment. This is because the fundamental values of public administration will always remain unchanged irrespective of the nature, approach, and the energy of the reforms (Maesschalck, 2004). Lynn (2000) for instance indicates that just as many doubt if there is a new paradigm in public administration, others doubt if there has actually been an old public administration. In essence, at any given point in time, public administration is confronted with the capacity to serve public purpose and ensuring accountability within the constitutional framework (Lynn, 2000). As long as reforms are unable to fundamentally douse the tension between those contentious issues, work relationships and work attitudes in public organization are likely to remain the same (Lynn, 2001). Frederickson (1996) observes that the changing measures “are all metaphors of political power that speaks to the alignment of that power in the direction of elected executives” (p. 267). The shifts are considered more as vision of governments
rather than a substantive shift of the fundamentals of administrative values. Hays and Sowa (2006) observe that many civil servants have survived in their career under several gubernatorial administrations irrespective of whether or not they hold “at-will” positions. In much the same way, radical political leaders have succeeded in forcing a careerist out of office irrespective of whether or not that careerist serves under the “at-will” or protected positions (Hays and Sowa, 2006).

It is further observed that there is limited or no evidence to suggest that public employees have been unwarrantedly subjected to any negative political influence following the reforms. Condrey and Battaglio (2007) attest to the fact that contrary to the initial fears about the radical reforms in some states, “there appears to be no wholesale rush to the spoils in the states…” (p. 426). In a similar vein, West (2002) counters the findings on Georgia’s reforms by Condrey (2002) and others, and argues that the early fears regarding possible political and partisan manipulations of the personnel system were yet to be substantiated. Coggburn (2006) also observes that there have not been reports of any substantial partisan or cronyism in the personnel management system following Texas’ radical reforms. According to Coggburn (2006) this finding suggests that the reforms may have no significance negative influence on the organizational environment.

For other scholars, the reforms may have rather improved interpersonal trust in public management. Yang and Pandey (2008) contrast the notion that the New Public Management and its related models have created an uneasy organizational environment with negative implications on work outcomes. They reiterate in their findings that managing for result initiatives can impact positively on trust and trust related variables
including “structure, communication adequacy, goal clarity, and commitment” (p.354). Yang and Kasskert (2009) support the views that the reforms may have led to certain level of apprehension among public employees but it will be oversimplification to equate all the reform propositions in terms of their effect on the work environment and work attitudes of employees. Using trust in leadership as moderating variable, Yang and Kasskert (2009) finds that even though managing for result initiatives and Title 5 exemptions have similar assumptions and objectives under the public management reforms, both have dissimilar implications on employees’ job attitudes and job satisfaction. Whereas positive job outcomes were found to be associated with managing for result measures, it was the opposite in the case of Title 5 exemptions. In explaining this as “discrepancy”, Yang and Kasskert (2009) attribute it to the fact that the Title 5 exemptions may have been perceived by most civil servants as conscious efforts by the political players to undermine their job security rather than empowering them.

The preceding discussions bear ample testimony to the fact that the existing studies on the dynamics of interpersonal trust vis-à-vis public management reforms are limited even though diverse. This is partly so because even studies that found significant relationship between the reforms and interpersonal trust concede that the scope has not been extensive. For instance, Battaglio and Condrey (2009) recognize that focusing only on human resource professionals as they did in their study poses a limitation. They therefore call for a broader approach to include other key actors so that a more comprehensive assessment could be done to ascertain the true outcomes of the reforms. Bowman and West (2007) attest to the fact that indeed opinions and perception regarding human resource reforms vary among different professionals. In their study Bowman and
West (2007) find that whereas professional human resource directors perceived the reforms in a positive light, other frontline employees expressed opposite opinions. Similarly, Condrey and Battaglio (2007) confirm in their study on Georgia that professional human resource directors and other frontline managers in state organizations maintain different perceptions about the plausibility of the human resource management reforms.

Kellough and Nigro (2002) also conclude that given that their respondents differ in their responses in terms of rank and years served in public service, it is important to conduct further studies that would provide a more detailed understanding regarding the consequences of the reforms. The argument of Kellough and Nigro (2002) is that those who were employed prior to the implementation of the “GeorgiaGain” may express low satisfaction and trust in the new system than those who were employed after the introduction of the reform. This observation manifested in Condrey and Battaglio’s (2007) finding which suggest that human resource professionals who have been in the public service much longer perceived the reforms as inherently negative in terms of good governance and good treatment of employees.

Yang and Pandey (2008) articulate a view consistent to the observation made by Yang and Kasskert (2009) that different aspects of the reforms have different implications. Yang and Pandey (2008) acknowledge that failure to account for that may be a limitation in their study. They point out that it may also serve the purpose to differentiate employees from managers in such studies because in most cases opinions and perceptions and the resultant work attitudes differ between managers and subordinates. Luhmann (1979) has argued that the influence of trust over work attitude in
organization varies according to the structural relationship among employees. West (2002) points out that the varying methods and approaches may have accounted for the different results. In the words of West (2002) “firm conclusions await quantitative analysis of hard data allowing for comparisons on various dimensions of before and after reforms” (p.90). Hays and Sowa (2006) maintain that the long-term impact of the reforms remain to be digested.

Given the underlying theoretical assumptions, the trust question cannot be adequately answered without relating it to other key but related managerial variables (Behn, 1995). The basic tenets of public management reforms such as share leadership, interpersonal communication, employee empowerment, and commitment, as noted already, are linked to the trust question (Behn, 1995; GAO, 2004; Winter Commission, 1993; Moynihan, 2006). Behn (1995) echoes that the trust questions should be translated into governance questions so that we can aptly appreciate and understand the sharing of responsibilities between political actors and civil servants regarding policy making and implementation.

Moreover, the underlying managerial values under the reforms have been variously examined yet there are gaps to be filled with respect to their implications on interpersonal trust (Condrey, 1995; Yang and Kasskert, 2009; Atkinson and Butcher, 2003). Condrey (1995) argues that even though the literature on the role of trust in human resource management reforms is extensive, the empirical results regarding the impact of trust on the attitudes of managers towards other work related variables have not been adequate. It is imperative to expand the theoretical underpinnings regarding the processes by which trust is developed and translated in managerial relationship (Atkinson and
Butcher, 2003). According to Atkinson and Bucher (2003), “established theories of trust development based on relationship history and close interactions do not easily fit the experienced realities of managerial relationships where politics and networks of short-term relationships are the norm” (p.287). Albrecht and Travaglione (2003) argue that empirical evidence supporting the imperativeness of trust in organizational context is abundant but equal attention has not been given to the nature, determinants, and influence of trust on senior managers.

Organizational behavior and outcomes are affected by a myriad of complex variables related to structure, culture, and the environment (Moon, 1993). Therefore, trust may not be the only moderating variable in managerial relationship (Moon, 1999; Atkinson and Butcher, 2003; Buchanan and Badham, 1999). In other words, certain managerial values may be present and applied irrespective of the level of trust. Yang and Kasskert (2009) conclude in their study that trust may not be the only significant moderating factor in organizational outcomes because there may be other organizational characteristics that can influence organizational environment and therefore the job attitudes of employees. Higher or lower trust levels may not necessarily reflect the effectiveness of management (Atkinson and Butcher, 2003). Hermes (2005) argues that in reality organizational responses to reforms are a “hybrid of the ideal-type” (p.8). Albrecht and Travaglione (2003) find that trust partially rather than absolutely moderates affective commitment, continuance commitment, cynicism toward change, and turn over intentions of senior managers. Perry and Mankin (2007) indicate that “[a]n important theoretical and practical issues lies in whether trust differs across levels of management, and if so, whether the same factors explain trust at each of these levels” (p.277).
In an attempt to appreciate the implications of interpersonal trust as perceived by career managers, it is imperative to address certain pertinent questions in reference to the underlying principles of the public management reforms. First, how does the level of interpersonal trust as perceived by career managers in their relationship with political appointees relate to flexibility of professional discretion? Is there evidence to link participative management to the perceived level of interpersonal trust among career managers? Can the perceived level of interpersonal trust among career managers be explained by interpersonal communication? Is the perceived interpersonal trust among career managers a manifestation of organizational commitment?

**Trust and Professional Discretion**

Carl Friedrich’s (1935) views about the primacy of the “psychological factor” was to the effect that when bureaucrats are made to see their profession as public service and are allowed to utilize their expertise, democratic responsibility and accountability would be better served than would have been under any form of a patronage or control arrangement. Bureaucrats are endowed with the professional expertise therefore by allowing the political partisan goals to override their professional judgment, or by limiting their functions with excessive rules and procedures, a disservice could be rendered to society (Friedrich, 1978). Aberbach and Rockman (1988) posit that efforts at increasing the political or presidential powers over the bureaucratic institutions through personnel management, restrictions, and centralization of decision making have paradoxical implication of robbing the government of its efficacy to confront policy realities. Most importantly, such action becomes demoralizing for the professional public managers (Aberbach and Rockman, 1988). Bozeman’s (1993) definition of red tape as
“rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail compliance burden for the organization but have no efficacy for the rules’ functional object” (p.283) sums the predicament of public managers when discretion is restricted through excessive rules.

Because of the growing demands of the contemporary society and the increasing complexities of the policy environment, it is important that professional public managers are allowed to discharge their duties with greater professional latitude (West, 1984; Lipsky, 1980; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989). Kettl (2002) indicates that globalization, technological advancement, and the consistently growing number of partners in public service delivery, place an overwhelming responsibility on governments at all levels. Kettl (2002) avers that the “standard responses, structures, and processes that have gradually accumulated in America” cannot facilitate the task of government to meet the growing responsibilities (p. 490). The congress, as well as the other branches of government are virtually trapped under avalanche of workload or are only disposed to address problems symbolically because of lack of technical knowhow (Kettl, 2002). Epstein and O’ Halloran (1994) argue that it is “impossible”, and in fact “undesirable” to exert stricter control over the bureaucracy given the need and the nature of information, cost of monitoring, and the unpredictable nature of the policy environment (p. 698). It is imperative that a new mechanism that galvanizes technical expertise and maintains democratic accountability is instituted so that governance could be facilitated with effectiveness and responsiveness (Kettl, 2002; Epstein and O’ Halloran, 1994).

Flexibility of discretion encourages experimentation and development of innovative ways of addressing emerging challenges (Yang, 2009; Mulgan and Albury, 2003; Walker, 2006; Thompson, 2000). Excessive legalisms can constraint productivity
and innovation by restraining productive innovators from exploring outside the remit of the law for alternative solutions. Damanpour (1996) indicates that organizations need two sets of innovations namely technical and administrative. The technical innovation deals with the improvement in the technical systems so that the organization can easily adapt to changes. The administrative innovation on the other hand, has to do with the improvement in the relationships and interactions among members of the organization. Damanpour (1996) indicates that when both technical and administrative innovations are pursued together, organizational performance and responsiveness improve. The technical and administrative innovations are accomplished when managers are empowered and have enough room to exercise their discretion (Damanpour, 1996).

Rubin (1990) finds that without greater levels of flexibility of discretion managers in shrinking or constrained agencies face uphill task of readjustments. Organization’s ability to cope with constraining and uncertain environment requires the creativity and innovativeness of its managers (Rosner, 1968). For instance, in the 1980s when states were tasked to undertake numerous but unfunded or underfunded federal mandates, many agencies were pressed upon to initiate innovative ideas to make do with the limited resources through strategic planning (Osborne, 1988; Berry, 1994). Invariably, this was tied to the level at which discretionally powers could be exercised by the professional personnel in the agencies (Hubber and Shiban, 2002; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999). Epstein and O’Halloran (1994) assert that “the more congress limits discretion, the less flexible the agency is when responding to changing circumstances” (p. 697).

The advocates of representative bureaucracy look at administrative flexibility and managerial discretion as key ingredients of achieving policy goals and objectives
Meier and Stewart (1992) argue that it is through exercise of discretion that professional administrators are able to offer services that reflect values and beliefs of the public they serve. Sowa and Selden (2003) find in a study conducted on rural housing loan eligibility of the minority population that administrative discretion has positive relationship with the percentage increase in rural housing loan granted to the target population.

One key contentious issue in the literature with respect to managerial discretion and empowerment is the exercise of ethical responsibility in public administration (Van Wart, 1996; Cox, Buck, and Morgan, 2011; Bryer, 2007; Bryner, 1987; Dobel, 2006). Dobel (2006) has argued that administrative discretion is placed at the intersection of “nexus points of three lines of moral judgment” (p. 161). First is how administrative discretion is linked to democratic accountability. Second has to do with the emphasis of moral responsibility of the public managers. Third is the institutional design to ensure competency, effectiveness, and accountability with greater recourse to ethics (Dobel, 2006). Under the traditional civil service model, laws, rules, standard procedures, and formalization have been the guiding principles of ensuring ethical responsibilities among public managers (Adam and Balfour, 2006; Bowman, 1990). Founded on the technical-rational or neutral objectivity values, the traditional civil service system envisages that ethics and moral standards could be obtained through objective means or application of abstract or calculated principles (Zanetti and Adams, 2000). Skeptics of bureaucratic discretion contend that when professional public managers are granted the greater latitude of making choices regarding what is right or wrong on behalf of the public, there is the
tendency that they would rather pursue their parochial interest or a course that would not
serve the good of society (Cooper, 1982; Rohr, 1978; Hart, 1974; Cox, Burke, and
Morgan, 2011). Finer (1941) argues that the inner capacity of the bureaucrats to exercise
moral or ethical judgment is paramount but that is not enough to determine whether what
is construed as moral and ethical by the individual are a reflection of the general values of
society. This argument is in support of the view that externally determined parameters
can anchor the expected moral and ethical responsibilities of public managers (Adams,

In contrast, other pundits argue that an environment that enhances flexibility of
discretion and empowerment also ensures administrative ethics (Friedrich, 1940; Fox and
Cochran, 1990; Kass, 1990; Kearney and Sinha, 1988; Stever, 1988). Therefore, just as
rules, formalization, standardization, laws, and red tape hinder flexibility of discretion
they equally impede ethical responsibility (Mosher, 1982; Bowman, 1990; Menzel, 1995;
Adams and Balfour, 2006). In reference to what they term as “administrative evil”, Adam
and Balfour (2006) point out that administrators may commit errors or engage in
unethical behavior without being conscious of it, or even when conscious, they may seek
to justify their actions on the premise that the rules as laid down were being complied
with. Thus, emphasis placed on rules and structures of organization as determinants of
ethical behavior make it impossible to identify the source of irresponsible actions since it
is the entire organization that is held responsible not the culprit individual (Thompson,
1990). Certainly, it is imperative to ensure that managers develop the inner moral
capacities to exercise ethical responsibility. This can be optimally achieved in an
environment where greater latitude of discretion is allowed (Adams and Balfour, 2006; Thompson, 1990).

Essentially, contemporary public management reforms including those initiated under the Reinventing Government, National Performance Review, National Commission on State and Local public service, and the more recent radical “at-will employment system” have all embraced the concepts of managerial discretion and employee empowerment (Brudney, Herbert, and Wright, 1999; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009). For instance, the Government Performance and Result Act sought to remove all the perceived impediments to “make managers manage” with an enhanced discretions (Behn 2001; Page, 2005). Career managers were therefore to function as “entrepreneurs” and accept greater responsibility to improve performance (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The National Performance Review concluded in its report that “we cannot empower employees to give us their best work unless we eliminate much of the red tape that now prevent it” (NPR, 1993, p. 14). Brudney, Herbert, and Wright (1999) echo that the reinvention and its associated models were basically founded on private sector and business administration techniques of enhancing agency mission, measuring performance, and most of all, relaxing the “internal rules and regulations” (p.354). Page (2005) indicates that in line with the New Public Management principles, most states and local governments have reform their human service agencies by granting more discretionary functions to the managers and local actors in exchange for more performance outcome. The Winter Commission on its part, focused on the organizational structural changes and empowerment of managers through internal deregulation (Thompson, 2008; Cox, 1994). Public managers were to be granted flexibility of
discretion particularly in areas such as budgeting and purchasing (Thompson, 2008). Bryna (2008) argues that one of the key concentrations of the Winter Commission was to remove barriers to managerial authority so as to facilitate the “trust and lead” agenda (p. 70). Kellough and Nigro (2006) observe that the goal of reformers regarding the “at-will employment system” was to “arm managers with flexibility across a wide range of matters…” (p. 448).

The emphasis being placed on managerial flexibility under the present reforms is because the traditional public management system is deemed to be characterized by pervasive narrow techniques and rule-governed processes and procedures (Hays and Kearney, 2001). Coggburn (2006) indicates that the call for managerial flexibility, particularly in the personnel management, is because of the fact that the traditional management approach is out of tune, rigid, and cumbersome to meet the present needs. It is envisaged that if managers have the ability and flexibility to manage their own budget, decide on hiring requirements and job placement, and exercise enough discretion in other management functions, organizations could attract and retain more qualified employees (Horner, 1994; Coggburn, 2006; Lavigna, 1996).

Even though managerial flexibility has become the popular mantra, there are fundamental questions that need to be addressed relative to the extent to which public managers are able to exercise it as envisaged under the various reforms (Bataglio and Condrey, 2009; Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998; Bellone and Goerl, 1992; Bozeman, Reed, and Scoth, 1989; Rainey, Pandey, and Bozeman, 1995). Largely the available literature is mixed on the state of managerial discretion in public management at present (Coggburn, 2000). Whereas some studies reveal significant enhancement of flexible professional
discretion in public management today, others hold the contrary position with the argument that the situation has even worsened (Maesschalck, 2004; Nyhan, 2000; Moynihan, 2005).

Coggburn (2000) examines the impacts of personnel management deregulation reforms on management values such as economy, efficiency, and flexibility of discretion. Contrary to the notion that the deregulation mechanism would enhance efficiency and economy, Coggburn (2000) finds negative relationships. On the issues of discretion in personnel management, Coggburn (2000) finds that personnel managers in most of the states are able to decide on personnel issues such as recruitment and condition of service. It was observed that though predicated on the political environment, personnel managers were able to decide on the size of part-time employment and full-time employment (Coggburn, 2000). In the states where the politicians were presumed to be labor friendly, managers exercised the leverage of discretion to maintain large size of full-time employees (Coggburn, 2000). However, Coggburn (2000) finds that in the state where anti-labor protection politicians dominate, managers rather opted for more part-time employees. Coggburn’s (2000) finding, particularly with regards to the political factor, is not clear. It is difficult to draw the line between political restriction on managerial discretion and political facilitation of managerial discretion.

Feeney and Rainey (2010) find that government agency managers perceived greater restrictions in terms of personnel management as compared to their counterparts in not-for profit organizations in Georgia and Illinois. However, whereas respondents in Georgia reported more flexibility, their counterparts in Illinois felt they experience relatively more restrictions in personnel management (Feeney and Rainey, 2010). Feeney
and Rainey (2010) attribute this development to differences in personnel management reforms in the two states. In relative terms Georgia’s reforms expanded managerial flexibility than that of Illinois (Feeney and Rainey, 2010).

Brudney, Hebert, and Wright (1999) examine the perspectives of professional bureaucrats on the extent to which state governments have successfully implemented the reinvention proposals. It was found that most of the states have implemented proposals such as “customer service training” (81.5 percent), “strategic planning” (79.4 percent), and “measurement of customer satisfaction” (51.7 percent). However, the issue of managerial flexibility which was at the core of the reinvention propositions had not been given the prominence as expected (Brudney, Hebert and Wright, 1999). Brudney, Hebert and Wright (1999) find that only few states (20-30 percent) acknowledged that steps have been taken to relax the old hierarchical control and strict adherence to administrative processes in areas such as human resource management, procurement rules, and the use of carry over fund. In a longitudinal study of public management reforms at the federal level between 1978 and 2002, Lee, Cayer, and Lan (2006) find a consistent decline of employee attitude in relation to empowerment. Employee perception relative to their job empowerment decreased from a mean level of 3.54 in 1979 to 3.47 in 2002 in terms of positive ratings (Lee, Cayer, and Lan, 2006).

Moynihan (2006) indicates that the management for result initiative has two key elements namely performance measurement and managerial authority. However, in a survey analysis, Moynihan (2006) observes that there was a conspicuous failure on the part of state governments to consider the result component in tandem with the managerial empowerment component of the reforms. Even though most states reported they have
expanded managerial discretion, it did not reflect areas such as financial control, contracting, use of resources, and procurement (Moynihan, 2006). The areas in which managers tend to have leverage of discretion were performance benchmarks and performance appraisals (Moynihan, 2006). Moynihan (2006) contends that even in those two areas managers are still guided by strict specifications with no authority to vary compensation to reflect performance.

Many studies indicate that the environmental challenges that impede much of the efforts of enhancing managerial discretion have not been resolved (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998). Nigro and Kellough (2008) find that even though most of the propositions of the Winter Commission have been embraced by the states, to the greater extent the old top-down model remain in practice. Thompson (1999) has argued that the National Performance Review for instance did not change the approach to public service delivery but rather sought for reorganization. Brudney, Hebert and Wright (1999) observe that the reforms, in effect, “are more of a response of executives to deal with the public's anger toward government than a management tool” (p.26). Nyhan (2000) argues that in reality the same control characteristics that have plagued the classical public management model persist under the new reforms. Canevale (1995) indicates that evidence regarding the persistence of the old legalistic principles is when conflict arises between the political leadership and the career managers. When there is a conflict or tension, political managers are quick to use the old “authoritative mode” of controls (Canevale, 1995, p.44).

Maesschalck (2004) reiterates that “NPM [(New Public Management)] could be seen as a further step in the bureaucratization, rather than a move away” (p.484). At the
federal level, GAO report indicates that few agencies are making use of the new provisions that relax personnel management procedures (GAO, 2004). Using the Department of Homeland Security as a case study, Moynihan (2005) points out that political influence and the fear of political abuse account for managers’ reluctance to take advantage of the provisions that underscore and seek to materialize managerial flexibility. Meyer (1979) finds in a study that state bureaucrats have had to put up with rigid administrative procedures relative to personnel management because of political pressure. Bozeman and Rainey (1998) also finds that per the political environment, public managers rather prefer to follow strict rules and controls in order not to attract sanctions. Feeney and DeHart-Davis (2009) underscore the fact that excessive formalization, standardization, centralization, and red tape have negative implications on public employee’s creativity, productivity, and risk-taking behaviors. Among others, Feeney and DeHart-Davis (2009) find that centralization emerged as a significant factor relative to how employees perceived their environment and for that matter job performance.

The difficulty regarding the expansion of the parameters of managerial flexibility is attributable to the fact that answers to the ethical questions have not been found, and that the classical approach remains largely the viable option (Goodsell, 1993; Moe, 1994; Bowman, 1990). Adams (1992) indicates that the “depth and breadth with public administration literature on ethics is to be applauded; yet, it is quite unclear whether such theoretical formulations make an appreciable difference in the internal standard norms of practice in public administrators” (p. 120). Adams (1992) finds that the common phenomenon in the contemporary public administration is the enactment of additional laws and regulations with respect to public service ethics. There is a continuing fear that
any ethical slip can have overbearing negative consequences on both the political and professional actors in government (Bruce, 1994). The literature is replete with instances of unethical behaviors including corruption, conflict of interest, political partisanship, nepotism, and wrongful judgments among public officials which appear to sustain the need to apply rules and procedures in place of discretion (Frederickson and Frederickson, 1995). Frequent occurrences of unethical behaviors in government have given credence to the need to redefine the existing rules and the processes to make them stricter to prevent recurrence of such events (Frederickson and Frederickson, 1995; Bowman, 1990). Scandals such as the Watergate, Iran contra, and savings and loans scandals of Department of Housing and Urban Development, among several others at both the federal and state levels have given impetus to restrict managerial discretion (Frederickson and Frederickson, 1995; Bowman, 1990).

Diver (1982) identifies two different models of public management namely “engineering” and “entrepreneurial”. The “engineering” deals primarily with supervision whereas the “entrepreneurial” deals with definition (Diver, 1982). Arguing on these scores, Behn (1995) indicates that in reality the “engineering” model does not exist or apply in its ideal sense. The real case scenario, and which the current reforms seek to appropriately manifest, is the “entrepreneurial” model when it comes to the functions of career public managers in policy formulation and implementation (Behn, 1995). However, the preference or emphasis is always placed on the “engineering” because of the inherent paradoxical implications that the “entrepreneurial” model poses to democratic accountability and ethics (Behn, 1995; Bowman, 1990). Frederickson (1996) observes that the intent of the New Public Management is to repose enough trust in the
bureaucrats so that they can exercise maximum professional discretion with common sense and ethics. There is a call therefore to cut red-tape and minimize the elaborate processes and procedures (Frederickson, 1996). Frederickson (1996) argue that this effort present a paradoxical situation because it has become difficult to cut red-tape and eliminate procedural due process without compromising democratic accountability. According to Zajac and AL-Kazemi (1997), the reinventing government’s “treatment of authority within public organization has misapprehended the political, legal, and constitutional context of public sector management reform” (p. 379). As noted by Cox, Buck, and Morgan, (2011) “[w]hile the necessity of the exercise of discretion is not disputed, there is little agreement on the normative foundation” (p. 31).

Feeney and Rainey (2010) and Moynihan (2006) implore scholars to find answers to the apparent persistence of red tape and constraining rules in public service in spite of the various reforms. Brudney, Herbert, and Wright (1999) for instance urge scholars to examine the extent to which the “upper level executives limit the flexibility of those at lower level” (p. 21). Bataglio and Condrey (2009) contend that it will serve a good course to examine whether the various reforms have created different organizational environment with implications on managerial discretion and employee empowerment. And if the environment counts, the key determinants need to be identified and examined (Bataglio and Condrey, 2009). Selden, Brewer, and Brudney (1999) argue that public administrators usually craft and exercise their responsibilities or roles depending on the environmental realities but not the specificities of a particular reform paradigm. Therefore in examining the dynamics of the relationship between elected officials and public administrators, it is imperative to ascertain from the bureaucrats how they perceive
and interpret their environment relative to their roles (Selden, Brewer, and Brudney, 1999). Without such an approach there could be no easy way to link theory to practice, or identify avenues of consensus among scholars relative to issues bothering on political overhead control and discretionary powers of bureaucrats (Selden, Brewer, and Brudney, 1999).

There appears to be an overwhelming consensus that the questions regarding managerial discretion cannot be answered without looking at the issue of trust (Battaglio and Condrey, 2009; Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998). Often questions on who is permitted to be the entrepreneur, who is the entrepreneur, and what is expected of the entrepreneur are a contention of ethical boundaries and political philosophy which are aptly moderated by trust (Behn, 1995). An environment that exudes trust and enables greater autonomy, flexibility, and enlarges the frontiers of discretionary powers serves as a catalyst in anchoring entrepreneurial management approach towards effective and responsive administration (Yang and Pandey, 2009; Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998; O’Toole and Meier, 1999; Franklin and Long, 2003). Ruscio (1999) argues that “trust in the modern administrative state is the product of a tension between the managerial imperative of discretion and the political imperative of accountability” (p. 641). Central to the creation of elaborate measures which advertently or inadvertently constrain the flexibility of discretion of the bureaucrats is the lack of trust among the key political and policy players (Ruscio, 1999).

Bozeman and Kingsley (1998) posit that exercise of discretion entails risk taking therefore trust is the key moderator. When exercise of discretion is perceived to be an extreme risk venture many public managers would rather prefer to follow the laid down
procedures (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998). In a perceived constraining environment, bureaucrats are more likely to be risk-averse. Thus, in pursuant of pressured accountability, they would embrace rigid bureaucratic procedures rather than applying professional judgment (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998; Pandey and Wright, 2006; Behn, 2001). Davies (1981) argues that managers usually avoid errors of commission so as to avoid sanctions such as demotion, transfer, dismissal, or any other punitive measures that can jeopardize their tenure and for that matter their incomes. Down (1967) describes risk-averse managers whose primary concerns are their present authority, income, and prestige as “conservers”. Such managers tend to rigidly apply the rules in order to minimize the inherent risk associated with decision making (Downs, 1967). Public managers who work in a perceived precarious organizational environment always exercise extreme caution in their actions, and may even prefer staying aloof of a particular action to avoid possible undesirable ramifications (Bardwick, 1995). Perry and Porter (1982) argue that expectation that employee’s good performance will be rewarded and bad performance punished is critical in understanding motivation behind employees’ behavior. In an event that efforts gone bad would attract sanctions, the individual is likely not to take risk (Perry and Porter, 1982). In much the same way, when good efforts are not rewarded, there will be no incentive to take risk (Perry and Porter, 1982).

Trust is cardinal in building an environment that channels the vigor to exercise discretionary ethics (Bowman, 1990; Menzel, 1995; Bryer, 2007). In fact ethics and trust have a bidirectional relationship in that where ethics is rigorously pursued trust is developed (Bowman, 1990; Menzel, 1995). Hosmer (1995) examines the various approaches with which trust is conceptualized in the literature and argues that the
fundamental root of organizational trust is the inherent moral responsibility. Rules and laws or code of organizational ethics may become common features in an effort to promote ethical behavior but the most important thing is the environmental signals that help to actualize the intentions. Kernaghan (2000) for example argues that public servants place premium on “examples of valued-based leadership” (p. 102). Understanding ethics is understanding public service motivation, and as Brewer and Selden (1998) indicate, it links attitudes to “actual behavior” (p. 418).

Brewer and Selden (1998) find that whistle blowers attached significant value to the success of their actions, and that they would be prepared to repeat their actions if there is ample demonstration that their actions would lead to organizational changes. Invariably, an organizational environment that exudes trust of this nature is paramount (Brewer and Selden, 1998). When trust exists that a good behavior would yield a response that satisfies the motive behind it, the individual is more likely to continue (Brewer and Selden, 1998). Organizational climate that exudes fear and threats comes across as recipe for unethical actions (Berman and West, 1998). Adams and Balfour (2009) review that the organizational culture created at the Marshall Space Flight Center that tacitly sanctioned cover ups and openly encouraged intimidatory tactics against those who dare a disclosure that the leadership felt might delay shuttle launching was partly the cause of the O-Ring failure and the subsequent disaster.

The trust questions relative to managerial discretion are worth perusing (Adams and Balfour, 2009; Bowman, 1990, Menzel, 1995; Bryer, 2007; Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998; Pandey and Wright, 2006; Behn, 2001). This is primarily because there is lack of absolute consensus among pundits that trust is salient to entrepreneurship behavior in
public management (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998). The empirical understanding and consensus regarding entrepreneurship behavior in public management is not solid due largely to the multifaceted approaches with which it is considered (Moon, 1999). Theorists have variously looked at it from different perspectives such as outcome expectation, administrative process, and ethics, leading to lack of clarity (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Moon, 1999). For some pundits entrepreneurship behavior which ostensibly entails flexibility of discretion does not necessarily rest on risk-taking (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Drucker, 1985). Osborne and Gaebler (1993) posit that “…entrepreneurs do not seek risk, they seek opportunities” (p. xx). However, Moon (1999) counters that the undercurrent of opportunity seeking is risk-taking. Entrepreneurship behavior can be feasible but not in all circumstances (Moon, 1999).

Obviously, theorists are yet to fully advance a theoretical model that would inform and actualize efforts to enhance and encourage entrepreneurship in public management (Moon, 1999). This observation underscores the essence of the present study. The study therefore examines the level of discretion that managers have and the relationship that such levels of discretion have with interpersonal trust. Moreover, it tries to ascertain the true impacts that the various approaches to reforms by the states have on professional public managers’ attitudes towards exercise of discretion.

**Trust and Participative Management**

The significance of participative management manifests in strategic planning, strategic human resource planning, bottom-up budgeting, management by objectives, total quality management, and participative standard setting (Kim, 2005; Biaman and Evans, 1983). The contemporary public management paradigm underscores the
The imperativeness of participative management (Wright and Kim, 2004; GAO, 1999). The theoretical assumptions relative to the efficacy of participative management are in two folds (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Balfour and Wechsler, 1996; Rainey, 2009). First, it facilitates maximum utilization of the available human resource to meet organizational needs. Second, it anchors the needed motivation and commitment among employees (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Balfour and Wechsler, 1996; Rainey, 2009).

Most organizational theorists argue that centralization of decision making and strict adherence to hierarchy are a recipe for higher transaction cost and poor productivity (Kearney and Hays, 1994). Therefore it is important to develop a strategy that facilitates the contributions of all employees particularly those who are closer to the organizational problems (Kearney and Hays, 1994). Participative management is considered a helpful mechanism to channel all the requisite ideas and information towards organizational problem solving (Frost, Wakeley, and Ruh, 1974). Shields and Shields (1998) find in their study that in the environment of uncertainty participation becomes paramount in planning and goal setting; when there is task uncertainty it becomes useful to motivate subordinates; and when there is task interdependence it becomes indispensable to coordinate interdependent relations.

Moreover, opportunities for effective participation at all stages of the policy process, including problem identification, program design, implementation planning, and program implementation, help to shape the behaviors of the employees to accomplish organizational goals and objectives (Senior, 2002; Paton and McCalman, 2000). O’Brien (2002) posits that organization’s ability to adapt to the dictates of the environment depends on the level of receptiveness of new ideas among its rank and file. When
members are effectively involved in organizational change decision making process, it is unlikely they would resist its implementation (O’Brien, 2002). Thus, given the opportunity to participate, the employees can have the motivation to carry on additional responsibilities outside the usual routines and make contributions that are necessary for organizational change and goal attainment (O’Brien, 2002).

The resources, experiences, and the knowledge that the bureaucrats have are crucial when contemplating on any administrative reforms (Gruber, 1987). Heclo (1977) has noted that bureaucrats are capable of withholding information, advice, and resist compliance. Career bureaucrats who are uncertain about the possible impact that a particular organizational change can have on their job security would capitalize on the short tenures of political appointees to resist change until new administration takes office (Warwick, 1975). Kearney and Hays (1994) asserts that this mode of strategic resistance could be avoided if bureaucrats are actively involved from the initial stages to the implementation levels of the policy processes. Kim (2002) for instance indicates that the success of strategic planning in most local and state governments was tied to effective employee participation.

Denhardt (1993) has emphasized that the mechanism to derive employees’ productivity does not reside in enforcement of compliance or ensuring alienation but rather the involvement of the employee in key management decisions. Participation provides employees with the necessary feedbacks about their competencies, self-significance, and opportunities which serve as primary sources of motivation for greater performance (Rainey, 2009; Wright and Kim, 2004; Perry and Wise, 1990). Argyris (1976) and Levinson (1976) indicate that individual’s complete engagement and self-identification with the core values of organization depend on the extent of his or her
involvement in the decision making process. Waldo (1987) and Sashkin (1984) also share similar sentiments regarding the essentiality of participatory management. Sashkin (1984) for instance finds that participatory management essentially satisfies certain human needs and motives such as autonomy, solidarity, and self-esteem and self-confidence. Slate and Vogel (1997) find significant relationship between increasing job participation and reduction in job related stress in seven different correctional institutions that they studied.

In spite of its significance, participative management in public management is problematic due largely to the persistent influence of the traditional civil service personnel system and the growing uncertainties and tensions that have characterized the recent reforms (Wright and Kim, 2004; Bozeman and Straussman, 1990). Participatory management overlooks the traditional hierarchical arrangement. It focuses on balancing the power and influence between organizational leadership and their subordinates regarding information management, decision-making, and problem identification and solution (Wagner, 1994; Bennis, 1993). The creation of the Senior Executive Service at the federal level under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, for instance, was to ensure a shared leadership between the political executives and the career executives. However the achievement was far below the expected outcome (Ingraham and Ban, 1986). Ingraham (1997) has argued that even though the managerial reform affected several aspects of the traditional civil service system of the United States including the abolition of the Civil Service Commission, the fundamentals such as centralization, strong hierarchical structures, and rigid procedures were left almost intact. The implication is that the reforms have not been able to diminish the politics-administration tensions and
mistrusts to any significant extent (Ingraham, 1997). There is rather persistent power
struggle and imbalance of power between political officials and career managers
(Kearney and Hays, 1994; Ingraham, 1997).

Kearney and Hays (1994) cite the Title 7 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,
section 7106 which among other things, focuses on performance standards, reduction in
force, contracting out and budget cut backs as sources of the persistent tension. Kearney
and Hays (1994) review that for some theorists the “American style labor-management
relations may be so ingrained with adversarialism that sustained collaboration is virtually
impossible” (p.48). A GAO (1988) study confirms that the collaboration between
political appointees and career managers were significantly low and that accounted for
the increasing attrition rate among the career executive members. Peters and Savoie
(1996) indicate that the government of the United States continues to contend with
centripetal and centrifugal forces. The centripetal forces advance the reinventing
government agenda of decentralization, entrepreneurship, participation and
empowerment of the frontline employees. On the other hand, the centrifugal forces
emphasize the need to strengthen the capacity of the center or the political authority as
privileged under the traditional administrative structure to ensure effective monitoring
and coordination of policy making and implementation (Peters and Savoie, 1996). The
inevitable paradox is that attempt to adopt one form over the other becomes a barrier to
good management or proper administration (Peters and Savoie, 1996). Therefore most of
the reform measures particularly those seeking to promote employee participation remain
largely a lip service (Peters and Savoie, 1996). Moynihan (2005) equally argues that the
New Public Management doctrine has not been able to dismantle the classical modes of
control and centralization. As a result, both the old and the new doctrines are concurrently in practice leading to constant conflicts of administrative and political values (Moynihan, 2005). According to Moynihan, the key challenge to the smooth implementation of Managing for Result in Alabama, Vermont, and Virginia was that efforts were not made to expand the involvement and authority of operation managers on a number of issues.

Tjosvold and Sun (2006) describe organizational power relations from two perspectives namely “fixed sum” and “expendable”. If managers perceived organizational power as “fixed sum”, they become reluctant to facilitate the process to enhance employees’ involvement in the decision making. This is premised on the assumption that sharing powers with subordinates would reduce the powers and authority of the managers. But when power is considered “expendable” managers tend to believe that their power could be enhanced through greater performance and that ceding power to the employees enhances greater performance of employees and for that matter the powers of the managers (Tjosvold and Sun, 2006; also in Denhardt, Denhardt, and Aristigueta, 2013). Though a preferred practice is the one in which power is perceived as “expendable”, the common practice has largely been based on power perceived as “fixed sum” (Denhardt, Denhardt, and Aristigueta, 2013; Block, 1987). Block (1987) has argued that the classical model of administration tends to create a mentality that places values on compliance and strict supervision, or as Denhardt, Denhardt, and Aristigueta, (2013, p. 262) put it “patriarchal supervisory styles and narrow self-interest”. Spreitzer and Mishra (1999) attest to the fact that most organizational leaders do not fancy subordinates’ involvement in decision-making primarily because of fear of relinquishing power and
authority. Thus, in most cases ceding authority which hitherto was in the domain of only the leader is perceived to be a risk venture (Donaldson, 1999; Pfeiffer, 1994; Spreitzer and Mishra, 1999).

In public management the fear of the political leadership is that career managers may behave opportunistically when they are allowed to be actively involved in the major decision-making process (Eisenhardt, 1989; Simons, 1995; Creed and Miles, 1996). For instance, the advent of Reagan administration and the subsequent administrative reforms rather strengthened the political power over the bureaucracy and alienated career civil servants from active participation in the policy process (Ingraham, 1997). Pfeiffer (1987) describes the approach adopted to isolate career civil servants by Reagan’s political appointees as “jigsaw puzzle management” (p. 59). Meaning, career managers would only be required to provide information but would not be made privy to policy goals or make any meaningful inputs into the major policy formulations. Similarly, the rigorous reforms under the reinventing government of President Clinton could not deal with the fundamentals of the old personnel system as managers kept complaining about the rigid chains of command and centralization as major hindrances to their efforts at change (Ingraham, 1997; Thompson, 1996).

Largely, it is assumed that the relationship between political appointees and career bureaucrats does not exude the requisite trust to enhance participative management as envisaged by the proponents of the new reforms (Kearney and Hays, 1994; Ingraham, 1997; Pfeiffer, 1987; Kellough and Nigro, 2006; Dirks and Ferrin, 2002). For many analysts, if the recent administrative reforms have achieved anything, it is the growing tension and the mistrust in the administrative system, the consequences of which include
isolation of careerists from major policy decision (Ingraham, 1997; Thompson, 1996). Many career managers do not only feel alienated but more so feel reluctant to take active roles in implementing government programs (O’Brien, 2002; Nigro and Kellough, 2008). Nigro and Kellough (2008) find that the at-will recruitment to the civil service introduced in the states such as Florida and Georgia significantly alienated civil servants from participating in the policy debates and formulations.

However, it is also argued that what can militate against successful implementation of participative management may not solely be as a result of lack of interpersonal trust (Collins, Ross, and Ross, 1989). In other words, there may be a significant level of mistrust yet that may not affect the level of participation on the part of the top careerists in government. Heclo (1977) observes that “very little information is available about the working world and everyday conduct of the top people in government” (quote from Dolan, 2000, p. 573). Because career managers and political executives have different tenure, skills, and perspectives, there is the likelihood that their responsibilities may be different (Dolan, 2000; Michaels, 1997). For instance, contrary to the sustained view that career bureaucrats in the SES class were virtually sidelined on major policy decisions, Dolan (2000) finds that it is actually not the case. On more technical issues such as personnel management and budgeting, Dolan (2000) finds that career managers reported equal or greater responsibilities as compared to their counterpart political executives. The only responsibilities that the career executives reported low were those involving political liaison. Whereas an overwhelming majority (82 percent) of political executives reported active engagement in political liaison, only few (43 percent) of career executives reported that they were actively involved. Perhaps
the alienation of career managers manifests more on political issues than technical issues regarding policy formulation and implementation (Dolan, 2000).

Moreover, for many scholars, several contextual variables count when it comes to the issue of participative management (Sheilds and Shields, 1998). Locke and Schweiger (1979) have noted that there are different dimensions, meanings, and purposes regarding participative decision making in the organizational literature. Spreitzer and Mishra (1999) identify two sets of variables that can substitute interpersonal trust when it comes to effective participative management. These are the ability of the leadership to obtain information necessary to evaluate performance and also the ability to assign reward based on goal accomplishments (Spreitzer and Mishra, 1999). When the imperativeness of participation is established and the framework of operations determined, organizational leadership may be less concern about the volatility of the organizational environment when involving employees in the decision making process. This is because system trust rather than interpersonal trust becomes the primarily determinant (Spreitzer and Mishra, 1999). Moynihan (2005) observes that the Management for Result initiative was embraced by political officials because it was perceived as the appropriate mechanism to monitor and curb any possible bureaucratic infractions that may have negative political implications. On the other hand, career managers were also willing and able to get involved in some of the key policy issues without being skeptical (Moynihan, 2005).

Furthermore, even when trust is considered as the underlying factor of participative management, the referents in question and the level of analysis cannot be overlooked (Rosen and Jerdee, 1977; Huang et al, 2010). Usually, employees who occupy management positions are deemed to have the indispensable competencies and
experience that the organizational leadership cannot overlook (Rosen and Jerdee 1977). Therefore, irrespective of the level of interpersonal trust they cannot be alienated from the major organizational decision making process. This cannot be wholly true about the lower level employees (Rosen and Jerdee 1977). Leavitt (1972) asserts that participative management systems have not been manifested at the lower levels of organizational hierarchy as compared to the upper echelons. The attribution and information processing theorists also underscore the fact that managers and employees may perceive, interpret, and react differently to the same organizational practices because of their differences in work-related needs and values (Huang et al, 2010; Cha and Edmond, 2006).

Given the variety of perspectives, it serves the purpose of the present study to explore further the dynamics of participative management in public administration from the perspectives of the career managers whose positions in the organizational ladder may manifest a different dimension. Dolan (2000) implores scholars to continue to explore and possibly focus on different levels of the bureaucracy. The present study explores the perceived level of participation management among career managers; the relationship between participative management and interpersonal trust; and the implications of the reforms on participative management.

**Trust and Interpersonal Communication**

Pandey and Garnet (2006) underscore the enduring theoretical support regarding the role of effective communication in public management. Barnard (1938) looks at communication as the first responsibility of the executive. Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson (1950) indicate that impediments to communication channels are a recipe for poor organizational performance. Communication facilitates innovation, good leadership,
and effective management of organizational challenges (Guy, 1992; Gardner, 1990). Guy (1992) alluded to the fact that “communication channels that work and stay open and provide free and easy access up and down the chain of command are as important as blood vessels are to the human body…” (in Pandey and Garnet, 2006, p. 39). Nadler (1979) and Larson (1989) also argue that feedback is one of the essential elements that promote group effectiveness. Feedback is a powerful mechanism for “error-correction” since it helps to facilitate problem identification and problem solutions (Nyhan, 2000, p. 92).

Responsive organizations are “knowing” and “learning” organizations (Argyris and Schon, 1978). As Bennis and Nanus (1985) put it, organizational learning has to do with the “way the corporation increases its readiness to cope with new challenges and opportunities” (p. 75). Ventriss and Luke (1988) reiterate that organization’s capacity to adapt, grow, innovate, and become responsive to its constituents depends on how it is able to create, transform, and utilize its information. Organizations learn from their successes and failures (Choo, 1996). Therefore, their abilities to build, nurture, and effectively utilize their tacit and explicit knowledge is crucial (Smith, 2001; Cox, Hill, and Pyakuryal, 2008).

Explicit knowledge is the knowledge that can be objectively codified, stored, and transferred over time (Lam, 2000; Nanoka, 1994). Explicit knowledge comes from logical deductions and formal study (Lam, 2000; Nanoka, 1994). In contrast, tacit knowledge is intuitive, and constitutes the skills acquired through practice and experience (Polanyi, 1966). Selznick (1957) observes that the tacit aspect of organizational knowledge infuses meaning into organization’s activities beyond its normal functions.
The tacit knowledge is cultivated from the failures and successes of the organization’s activities and then natured into explicit knowledge (Choo, 1996). Thus, tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge compliments each other to facilitate organizational effectiveness (Choo, 1996).

The tacit knowledge of the individual members of organization forms part of the collective organizational memory which is stored, memorized, shared, and transmitted to the new participants of the organization (Zack, 1999; Nanoka and Tekeuchi, 1995). Cox, Hill, and Pyakuryal (2008) argue that “knowledge in organizations moves from individually attained knowledge to organizationally attained (learned) knowledge” (p.152). Polanyi (1966) indicates that the greater chunk of human knowledge is in the form of tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge bridges the gap between organization’s “know-what” and “know-how” (Brown and Duguid, 1998). It is considered as the missing link between the organizational leadership and the subordinate members (Lawson and Lorenzi, 1999). It is argued that the technical employees in the subordinate positions are more endowed with the organizational tacit knowledge and as such, are more knowledgeable regarding the actual work of the organization (Lawler, 1986). However, these categories of employees are in most cases oblivious of the organizational goals and objectives (Lawler, 1986). It takes effective communication strategies by the organizational leadership to tap into and effectively utilize the tacit knowledge of those subordinate members to accomplish organizational goals (Lawson and Lorenzi, 1999).

Career bureaucrats per their expertise and long employment experience, are exposed to greater practical experience and are therefore in control of a great deal of organizational memory (Wolf, 2004). They have traversed through the lower ranks to the
top management positions, and therefore carry with them a great depth of knowledge regarding program management, effective decision making, personnel issues, and budgeting. Pfiffner (1987) describes the careerists as “repositories of organizational memory”, inferring from the career bureaucrats’ ability to identify the past and present allies from adversaries and to navigate the appropriate channels of lobbying. As quoted in Pfiffner (1987), Elliot Richardson who served under Nixon’s administration as Secretary of Commerce, Defense, HEW, and Attorney General, attested to the fact that “people who had devoted a lifetime or significant part of it to expertise in their field are entitled to be listened to with respect...”

In spite of the overwhelming acknowledgement that career bureaucrats are the repositories of organizational tacit knowledge, how to tap into their rich knowledge and experience remains one of the basic challenges to effective public management (Zack, 1999). Lam (2000) has observed that the public bureaucracy consistently utilizes its “embrain knowledge” or explicit knowledge more than its tacit knowledge because of the precarious nature of the public policy environment (p. 496). The bureaucracy continues to find itself in an uncertain and turbulent environment which should have made organizational learning and communication an imperative objective (Beniger, 1986; Dery, 1998). However, it continues to rely on written records, routines, formalization, and standardization as ultimate means of dealing with the uncertain environment and ensuring bureaucratic predictability (Beniger, 1986; Dery, 1998). As Dery (1998) puts it, in an environment where written records are the norms “what does not show on paper does not count” (p. 683). This situation impedes sharing and transferring of non-routine or tacit knowledge (Dery, 1998).
Dery (1998) observes that what runs today’s world is not the written records but more importantly “the social interpretation, negotiation, and definition…” (p. 682). Therefore prioritization of explicit knowledge over tacit knowledge in the bureaucracy is deficient. This is because in the uncertain environment of democracy where values differ and are also mediated from different perspectives, no desirable organizational outcome could be achieved by solely relying on formalized means of information acquisition, transmission, and utilization (Choo, 1996; Simon, 1946). Most often, material and time resources would have to be spent to reinvent the wheel because the formalized approach does not facilitate timely access and utilization of expert knowledge during challenging times (Choo, 1996). Pandey and Garnet (2006) reiterate that red tape or rigid rules and procedures can restrict avenues of communication and thereby stifle effective flow of information. Moreover, Scott and Pandey (2005) report in a study that excessive formalization blocks the informal channels of communication and that can impact negatively on organizational performance. In a similar perspective, Cox, Hill, and Pyakuryal (2008) reiterate that informal dimension to the organizational process are effective means of channeling tacit knowledge from the more experienced personnel to the less endowed ones.

Simon (1957), based on the bounded rationality model, argued that humans are unable to comprehensively acquire and transmit information and knowledge at a given time frame. This is because the cognitive capacity such as mental skills, reflexes, and habits are very limited (Simon, 1957). In this instance the organization becomes instrumental in finding solutions to this human limitation by altering and conditioning its environment so that information acquisition and transmission could be done effectively.
(Simon, 1957). Organizations solve the bounded rationality puzzles by reducing or simplifying the multiplicity of goals and value conflicts through informal and formal communication channels (Mcphee and Zaug, 2001).

Argyris (1994) argues that tools such as “focus-group”, “organizational surveys”, “management-by-walking-around and others” are woefully inadequate to meet the 21st century challenges of organizations (p. 77). Usually the types of information obtained through those methods are not insightful enough to facilitate the appropriate appreciation of the behaviors of employees relative to productivity and product change (Argyris, 1994). Argyris argues that in the contemporary organizational setting the double-loop learning is imperative because unlike the single-loop, it provides the valid feedbacks. People in the single-loop situation tend to develop defensive tendencies and thereby reduce information sharing (Argyris, 1976). What is important therefore is the environment that empowers employees to take active responsibility of their actions, and develop and share the essential job information with others (Argyris, 1994).

Broadnax and Conway (2001) recount in their study conducted on Social Security Administration that personal interactive communication strategies were more effective and acceptable to employees than any other means including e-mails, newsletters, and memos. Berry, Brower, and Flowers (2000) in a case study of Florida, observe that organizational leadership exert effective influence largely through personal interactive discussions about organizational mission and goals. Moreover, employees develop positive attitudes to identify with the goals of the organization when such goals are clearly communicated to them and are made to contribute in shaping the goals (Berry, Brower, and Flowers, 2000).
In both theory and practice, it is broadly acknowledged that the traditional system of hierarchy, top-down communication, written records, formalization and standardization stifle effective communication (Kettl, 2012). The current public management paradigm seeks to reverse the classical mode of information acquisition, information sharing, and information transmission (Yan and Pandey, 2006; Nyhan, 2000). It recognizes strongly that organizational performance, accountability, and responsiveness can be realized largely through effective communication among the key organizational actors (Yan and Pandey, 2009; Diefenbach, 2009). Essentially, efforts to enhance organizational citizenship behavior among employees through empowerment and participation accentuate the critical role of effective communication (Young, Worcel, and Woehr, 1998; Box, 1999). Primarily, the current reform is focused on altering and relaxing the organizational environment such that formal and informal means could be utilized for effective communication (Yang and Pandey 2009). Yang and Pandey (2009) review that the introduction of feedback loops and performance measurement under the Management for Result initiative, for instance, were to counteract the excessive hierarchy and the manifestation of distrust, information retention, and misunderstanding within public agencies.

The extent to which interpersonal communication has improved as envisaged under the current public management paradigm is yet to receive adequate empirical explorations (Yang and Pandey, 2009; Garnett, Marlowe, and Pandey, 2008). The few studies that find positive relationship between the reforms and interpersonal communication are unable to draw solid conclusions. For instance, Yang and Pandey (2009) measured managers’ perception about internal communication adequacy and find
that a properly implemented Management for Result initiative was perceived to have had positive influence on communication adequacy. However, they indicate that their findings may not have presented the actual situation relative to the reforms. This is because Management for Result excludes certain propositions including privatization and contracting out which are key components of the overall reforms. Yang and Pandey (2009) argue that different sets of the New Public Management related reforms may give different results from the result obtained in their study.

Largely, both anecdotal and empirical accounts indicate that interpersonal communication between the bureaucrats and political officials is woefully adequate (Berman and Wang, 2000; GAO 2004). The literature has it that many career managers in federal and state governments often complain that the political officials have not backed their words with actions to eliminate the persistent bureaucratic rigidities relative to communication (GAO 2004; Yang and Pandey, 2009; Moynihan 2006; Berman and Wang 2000). Behn (2006) has argued that it is always the system questions that are being asked instead of leadership questions, and that is the reason why the objectives of the reforms relative to interpersonal communication are not being realized. What is prevalent is that many of the reform initiatives are being implemented using the old or traditional administrative framework (Moynihan and Landuyt, 2009; Van Dooren, Bouckaert, and Halligan, 2010). Nufrio (2001) find that most of the values espoused under the reinventing government reforms particularly those that sought to promote effective communication failed to place premium on the need to change the existing organizational culture and practices. Evidence is found in the continuing existence of formalized structures and specified routine of interactions (Lam, 2000).
It is believed that instead of establishing and sustaining the communication link between the political officials and the career managers as anticipated, the reforms have further worsened the situation (Moynihan 2006; Berman and Wang 2000). Thus, the disposition of both career bureaucrats and political officials to go beyond the formalized procedure in terms of communication has significantly declined (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998). Pllite (2008) for instance reports that recent reforms have created fragmentations and shortened the careerists’ tenure such that organizational knowledge and memory have been seriously undermined. A case in point, as cited by Pllite (2008), is the poor management of the Hurricane Katrina disaster which witnessed limited utilization of expert knowledge and institutional memory. Garnett and Kouzmin (2007) observe that in the event of Katrina disaster, poor interpersonal relationships between the technical personnel and political appointees accounted for information distortions and information withholdings, the consequence of which was the poor management of the disaster.

For some scholars, the communication barrier between the political authority and the career managers persists because the questions related to trust has not been answered. That is, the pervasive lack of trust in public organizations, particularly between political representatives and top career managers, accounts for the persistent dependence on formalized and rigid channels of communication (Dery, 1998; Pandey and Garnet, 2006; Zammuto and Krakower, 1991; Cohen and March, 1974). Kaufman (1977) posits that had there been mutual trust “we would not feel impelled to limit discretion by means of lengthy, minutely detailed directives and prescription” (p.58). Dery (1998) posits that “[o]rganizations necessarily depend on the written word because, as systems of interpersonal relations they harbor and manage distrust” (p. 678). Bozeman and Kingsley
(1998) find that organizational risk culture has significant relationship with organizational mission ambiguities and managers’ willingness to trust. Downs, Clampitt, and Pfeiffer (1988) find that interpersonal variables including trust and openness have significant relationship with internal organizational communication. It is often argued that hierarchical controls and formalization usually decouple subordinates from major organizational goals; lead to distortions in communication; and deprive employees of making meaningful contributions to organizational decision-makings (Downs, Clampitt, and Pfeiffer, 1988). Zamuto and Krakowa (1991) find in their study on the dynamics of higher education culture that trust, morale, and leadership credibility correlates negatively with hierarchical and rational forms of organizational system.

In the views of Geyelin (1966) and Halberstam (1974), top officials are often prone to read motives into actions of subordinates, a situation which influences the type of information they provide or receive. It is the same reason that explicit knowledge continues to be the ultimate focus in decision making (Dery, 1998; Pandey and Garnet, 2006). Information sharing hardly goes beyond the formalized channels because of mistrust, threats, and fear of uncertainty (Dery, 1998). The key problem in administrative decision-making process has always been how to control the power of the experts. According to Kettl (2012), this problem has always been the source of dilemma between neutral competence and political accountability.

Information is accepted as factual, accurate, and dependable only when the individual in the relationship associates honesty, trustworthiness, and integrity with the source of the information (Luke, 1998). The motivation for leaders to actualize the interpersonal dialogue and for the employees to be willing to contribute into shaping the
goals of organization is trust (Dery, 1998; Pandey and Garnet, 2006). Career bureaucrats working under a perceived distrustful or hostile environment may develop certain defensive tendencies or mechanism to limit the volume of communication or communicate in a certain pattern (Yang and Pandey, 2009). When career bureaucrats perceive that political officials approve of and encourage organizational mission they develop the necessary trust to transmit or make available the necessary information towards the accomplishment of the organization’s mission (Yang and Pandey, 2009). In a hostile political environment, concerns, disagreement, and misdeeds get blocked from receiving the necessary attention and redress (Yang and Pandey, 2009). In a study, Tompkins (1977) finds that the hostile organizational climate at Marshall Space Center led to communication deficiencies including secrecy of lateral communication, information retention, and information competition.

When information sharing is perceived as a mechanism to learn and improve organizational activities, employees will be willing to share the needed information than when information is obtained for the purpose of reward and sanctions (Meyer, 1991). Thus employees would be prepared to share information when they are certain that such actions do not pose any risk to their job conditions (Pllite, 2008; Moynihan, Pandey, Wright, 2012). Similarly, leaders will be prepared to activate the upward and downward information flow when there are clear indications of trust and goodwill from the employees (Meyer, 1991). This is more the case when the information solicited and shared is meant to alter program management, allocate resources, and manage the personnel system (Pllite, 2008; Moynihan, Pandey, Wright, 2012).
Suffice it to say, in a situation where there is adequate communication, trust is deemed significantly present. Lorentzen (1985) observes that effective communication is critical to offset preconceived suspicions and mistrust that have always been a common phenomenon in the contemporary public organizations. Lorentzen cites the outcome of a workshop organized in 1982 by Federal Executive Institute in Charlottesville, Virginia, for 37 political appointees and 143 career personnel to illustrate the relationship between trust and effective interpersonal communication. Utilizing intergroup interactive mechanism consisting of perceptual mirror and joint problem-solving among people who did not have any prior knowledge about each other, the project yielded a significant positive outcome. Lorentzen (1985) reports that 92 percent of the participants surveyed reported that their deeply held apprehensions and mistrusts before the workshop had significantly waned as against 8 percent who reported a confirmation of their negative apprehension. The key factor in this outcome was the utilization of informal interactive communication among the participants (Lorentzen, 1985).

Though interpersonal trust is considered critical to effective communication, the extent to which such relationship manifests in public organization remains understudied if not contentious (Garnett, Marlowe, and Pandey, 2008). This is particularly so when the relationship between trust and communication are linked to organizational culture and climate (Garnett, Marlowe, and Pandey, 2008). Most studies on the role of trust in intraorganizational communication often fail to consider the differences in organizational culture (Lewis, Cummings, and Long, 1982). The type of organizational climate or culture is instrumental in acquiring, nurturing, organizing, and transmitting information for the accomplishment of goals and objectives of the organizations in question (Simon,
Garnett, Marlowe, and Pandey (2008) identify two sets of organizational cultures namely “mission oriented and “rule oriented”. Communication strategies such as upward and feedback have significant implications on “mission oriented” organizational cultures whereas strategically directed and downward communications fit in the “rule oriented” organizational cultures (Garnett, Marlowe, and Pandey, 2008). In a “mission-oriented” organizational culture, interpersonal trust and openness are imperative to yield effective communication outcomes than in the “rule oriented” organizational cultures (Garnett, Marlowe, and Pandey, 2008). For instance, what works in the military establishment (rule-oriented) in terms of communication strategy is unlikely to work or be entertained in other organizational settings. Therefore, as trust becomes the primarily determinant of communication in a particular organization, it may be considered secondary in other settings (Lewis, Cummings, and Long, 1982; Garnett, Marlowe, and Pandey, 2008).

Moreover, it is contended that the perceived levels of trust and the accompanying work attitudes are to some extent referent contingent (Frazier, 2010). Frazier (2010) finds that both informational and interpersonal justice perceptions influence perception of trustworthiness but their significant relationship is dependent on the referent subject. Some pundits argue that not much is known about how bureaucracy and hierarchical controls influence organizational activities and outcomes (Stazyk and Goerdel, 2010). Even for others the organizational hierarchy facilitates efficiency and effectiveness in terms of communication strategies and outcomes than any other organizational model (Brewer and Selden 2000; Selden and Sowa 2004). It is argued that in a goal ambiguous and uncertain organizational settings, the formalization, centralization, and hierarchical
controls enable the organization to buffer its technical core functions and assign same to its technical managers (Stazyk, and Goerdel, 2010). Usually in such situations it is only the lower level employees who will find their opportunity to contribute to the decision making process restricted (Stazyk, and Goerdel, 2010). Thus, the upper level managers will maintain greater levels of flexibility in terms of their access to information and contributions to the decision making irrespective of the level of trust among the leadership (Stazyk, and Goerdel, 2010).

Based on the preceding discussions, deductions can be made that though trust and communication are largely perceived to have positive relationship, the extent of such relationship when it comes to the relationship between political appointees and career managers requires further and rigorous explorations. Stazyk and Goerdel (2010) for instance, implore scholars to conduct further studies on the relationship that communication, culture, and hierarchy have. The present study therefore attempts to address the following questions: Do career managers perceive interpersonal communication in their relationship with political appointees? Does the level of trust as perceived by career managers reflect the level of communication? Do the various approaches to reforms at the state levels have implications on the extent of communication between career managers and political appointees?

**Trust and Commitment**

Organizational commitment has received greater attention in the literature albeit varying perspectives (Moon, 2000; Angle and Perry, 1981; Crewson, 1997; Balfour and Wechsler, 1990; Rainey, 1997). Invariably, studies have always underscored the importance of employee commitment in respect of organizational goal attainments.
Commitment indicates the psychological bond between the employees and the organization (Romzek, 1989). Employees with strong sense of commitment give their best in the interest of the organization and also tend to eschew all work related negative tendencies including absenteeism and turnovers (Meyer and Allen, 1997; Nyhan, 1999). Organization’s capacity to achieve its long term objectives largely rests with its ability to retain its top quality personnel (Romzek, 1989). However, the retention of the quality personnel is predicated on the organization’s ability to enhance and sustain higher commitment levels among those employees (Romzek, 1989; Steers, 1977). Steers (1977) has indicated that the desire and intent to maintain organizational membership is an outcome implicit in the definition of commitment. In a study, Steers (1977) finds an inverse relationship between commitment and employee turnover and turnover intentions.

Nyhan (1999) posits that the problems of budget constraint and the consistently rising expectations of citizens make the issue of commitment very pertinent in public management. Haas and Wright (1989) emphasize the need for stable career personnel at the top management positions of agencies to ensure stable and effective public policy implementation, particularly at the state levels where legislative turnover is rampant. O’Toole and Meier (2003) conclude in a study on some Texas school districts that public personnel stability at both managerial and other front-line levels are essential to organizational performance.

Issues such as motivation, job satisfaction, and commitment are central to the contemporary public management reforms (Moon, 2000). Federal Office of Personnel Management in its 2006 report echoes that it was important to build a satisfying work place to attract energetic candidates and retain experience managers through
enhancement of commitment levels. This was premised on the assumption that many executives would leave the public service in the foreseeable future (OPM, 2006). Frey, Homberg and Osterloh (2013) assert that the introduction of performance measures and reward mechanisms under the New Public Management reforms are meant to boost the motivation and commitment levels among public employees. Nyhan (2000) describes the current public management model as an antithesis of the classical public administration model relative to the relationship between supervisors and workers. The classical mode of personnel management focuses on appropriate rewards, incentives and control mechanisms to sustain and direct employees’ commitment towards organizational goal attainment (Miller, 1999). Goud-William (2004) indicates that the classical human resource management approach in the public sector has considerably been “paternalistic” and ineffective. The contemporary public management paradigm therefore places value on the psychological factor, and assumes that commitment is achieved through an enhancement of the work environment (Nyhan, 2000; Miller, 1999; Balfour and Wechsler, 1996). Invariably, the emphasis is on the intrinsic variables that define and influence affective organizational commitment (Romzek, 1985; Nyhan, 1999).

Though the current public management paradigm focuses on enhancing affective commitment, scholars contend that the achievement so far is inadequate. This is because the classical approach which emphasizes extrinsic variables for commitment building remains very predominant in the public sector. Crewson (1997) maintains that monetary incentive and threats of sanctions continue to be the primary mechanisms of shaping the motivation and commitment levels of public employees, though its efficacy is in doubt. Moreover, it is argued that the greater recourse to economic rationalism and neo-
liberalism as pertains to the New Public Management paradigm manifests varying dimensions of commitments which are fundamentally based on utilitarian values instead of egalitarian values (Virtanen, 2000). The emotional and psychological bond necessary to derive employee loyalty, obligation, and solidarity have given way to contractual, group-specific interest, and individual self-interest (Virtanen, 2000). Virtanen (2000) argues that the performance-based reward system which is basically tied to and forms the basis of public service commitment contrasts the underlying assumptions of affective commitment. Frey, Homberg, and Osterloh (2013) describes the pay-for-performance model for instance as “self-interested homo oeconomicus”, to mean that cash incentives and extrinsic motivators are the primary determinants of reward and sanctions (italics in the original p.951). But unlike the private sector where such approaches have proven to be effective, the public sector does not have what it takes to accomplish same (Francois, 2000; Doolin, 2002; Moynihan, 2010). Nyhan (1999) has indicated that rewards and incentives such as job status, pay, promotion, and other fringe benefits are extrinsic triggers of “calculative commitment”. However, in the public service “calculative commitment” does not reflect very much on employee retention, employee productivity, and employee’s identification with organizational goals (Nyhan, 1999). Several other empirical findings support the argument that the ultimate source of motivation and commitment among career public managers are prestige, self-efficacy, and accomplishment (Crewson, 1997; Rainey, 1997). Romzek (1985) posits that while not suggesting interchangeability of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, it is reasonable to focus more on intrinsic rewards given the unrelenting efforts to limit public sector budget.
Perry (2004) argues that a decline in affective commitment can impact negatively on the organization’s capacity to operate or function effectively.

The less emphasis on intrinsic variables to build affective commitment is believed to be a manifestation of lack of interpersonal trust between the political authority and the career bureaucrats ((Nachmias, 1985; Nyhan, 1999). Credence to affective commitment and therefore interpersonal trust is the proposition emphasizing managerial values necessary to empower employees (Nyhan, 1999; Romzek, 1985; Luhmann, 1979; Perry, 2004). Pundits are of the view that certain basic human needs including self-value, self-efficacy, autonomy, and sense of belonging are enhanced when opportunities exist for greater participation, communication, and discretion (Sashkin, 1984; Nachmias, 1985; Allen, Shore, and Griffeth, 2003). The opportunities to participate in program formulations, fulfill ethical obligations, and receive the deserving recognition are fundamental to public service motivation and affective commitment among public servants (Perry and Wise, 1990; Balfour and Wechsler, 1996; Allen, Shore, and Griffeth, 2003). Allen, Shore, and Griffeth, (2003) find that human resource practices that embrace employee participation, growth opportunities, and fair reward practices correlate positively with perceived supportive human resource practices and perceived organizational support. And that the elements of perceived supportive human resource practices correlate with affective organizational commitment (Allen, Shore, and Griffeth, 2003). Perceived organizational support plays mediatory role relative to commitment. Moreover, certain work related tendencies such as intention to turnover and actual turnover are mediated by affective commitment (Allen, Shore, and Griffeth, 2003).
Trust is vital because it holds the key to trigger the levers of affective commitment (Nyhan, 1999). Thus, it moderates the willingness of the organizational leadership to facilitate and condition the process that can lead to greater affective commitment (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Odom, Boxx and Dunn, 1990; O’Brien, 2002). On the part of the subordinates, trust becomes the yardstick to determine the appropriateness of the environment and also the value of their contributions (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Nyhan, 1999; Odom, Boxx and Dunn, 1990). It is deemed that a mistrustful organizational environment decreases employee commitment with severe consequential costs (Battaglio and Condrey, 2009; Choudhury, 2008). Nachmias (1985) posits that trust is a “source of legitimacy and diffuse support” capable of engendering affective commitment because it addresses issues of uncertainty and apprehension which are common to the bureaucratic settings. Park (2012) draws a distinction between cognitive trust and affective trust. Whereas the cognitive trust aligns with the rational mechanisms including downward communication, technical guidance, and the extrinsic economic incentives, the affective trust is linked primarily to the intrinsic incentives that influence emotional and psychological dispositions of the employees (Park, 2012). Park (2012) reviews that employee turnover increase when there is distrust. He argues that certain antecedent conditions such as motivational incentives and leadership are crucial management tools for enhancing trust and affective commitment in federal bureaucracy. Public managers who facilitate effective interpersonal working relationship through trust building are the “microlevel-change levers” (Park, 2012, p. 563). Trust, procedural justice, and interactional justice have been found to play significant moderating role
between organization inducement systems and employees’ organizational citizenship behavior (Robinson and Morrison, 1995; Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler, 2000).

Critics argue that the contemporary radical reforms have created a perception of vulnerability, the consequences of which include poor work attitudes, apathy, alienation, and low affective commitment (Park, 2012; Goud-Williams, 2004; Perry, 2004). Measures such as at-will employment, reorganization, layoffs, and budget cutbacks are perceived to have created an uncertain environment for career bureaucrats, particularly those who harbor long term public service aspirations (Perry, 2004; James and Tang, 1996). However, the extent to which the issue of trust vis-à-vis the reforms have impacted career bureaucrats’ commitment to public service is inconclusive in the literature.

Goud-Williams (2004) argues that in spite of the empirical support for commitment-based human resource management reforms, little is known about their impact on the individual public employees’ work related attitudes and outcomes. Park (2012) has argued that efforts to improve employee commitment in the public service are largely focused on macro level changes. Allen, Shore, and Griffeth (2003) review that there is a likelihood of “ecological fallacy” to link organizational level human resource practices to how such practices are perceived at the micro-individual levels (p. 102). Some scholars argue that employee’s faithful compliance and effort towards organizational goal attainments may not necessarily be premised on certain interactional exchange framework. Rather it may be based on certain public service ethos that the employee feels obliged, or it may be an adherence to the guiding norms of public service delivery (Coyle-Shapiro, 2000).
Perry (2004) argues that empirical findings on measures to increase organizational commitment is less clear, even though there is an overwhelming empirical support for the necessity of employee commitment in public service. The difficulty, according to Perry (2004) may emanate from lack of clarity in conceptualizing commitment and trust, and also the varying object of reference in the empirical studies. The relationship between trust and commitment has been examined in reference to a direct supervisor, top executives, and even the organization as whole but with different results (Perry, 2004). Moreover, there are several possible scenarios relative to the relationship between trust and commitment (Perry, 2004). For instance, employees may express a considerable level of trust in the organizational leadership yet lower organizational commitment. This is possible when employees perceive the organization negatively but do not identify the leadership with the organization (Perry, 2004). The reverse also holds that there may be higher commitment yet lower trust in the supervisor (Perry, 2004). In this case the employee may perceive their organization rather than the supervisor as good organization to work for (Perry, 2004).

Perry (2004) finds in a study comparing public and private sectors that a more stable public institution characterized by employee empowerment, participation, feedback, and secured job tenure and position engender employee trust and commitment. But on a more rigorous statistical analysis, Perry concludes that trust in supervisor per se has no strong relationship with affective organizational commitment, not even in the private institutions. This contrasts Nyhan’s (2000) and several other findings which indicate a significant relationship between interpersonal trust and organizational commitment (Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler, 2000; Turnley and Feldman, 1999; Robinson,
In a situation where the utilitarian principles dictate the exchanges and reciprocities, trust may be a desirable condition but not the indispensable prerequisite (Carnevale and Wechsler, 1992).

The varying empirical dimensions and the seemingly contradictory findings regarding the dynamics of trust and commitment provide ample justification for more exploratory studies. As such, this study explores the commitment levels of career managers. It examines the relationship between levels of commitment and trust among career managers. Moreover, it relates the levels of commitment to the varying approaches to administrative reforms.

**Length of Service and Job-related Values**

Employees’ personal characteristics including length of service may have implications on job related attitudinal variables such as job satisfaction, commitment, and trust (Gould-Williams, 2003; Angle and Perry, 1981; Meyer and Allen, 1984; Yang and Kassekert, 2009; Downs, 1967). Given the direction of the current civil service reforms vis-à-vis the movement toward declassification of most senior positions and reduction in issues of grievance, there is the likelihood that career managers with different employment history are harboring different perceptual cues that can inform their actions and inactions differently (Yang and Kassekert, 2009). From Down’s (1967) theoretical postulations, career managers with greater number of years in the civil service may constitute the conserver class who are likely to perceive the current environment as precarious. There is the possibility that the radical change have substantially fueled their apprehensions, particularly in respect of the possible reincarnation of the spoil system.
Thus, there is the tendency for them to adopt a more risk-averse culture to preserve their job. From another perspective, people with relatively limited years in civil service management positions constitute the zealots who desire for change, innovation, and opportunity to aspire to higher positions (Downs, 1967). Such cohort may perceive the radical change as an opportunity rather than a hindrance. For their innovative tendencies, they may be more inclined to focus on performance and risk-taking than to preserve the status quo for the sake of their current positions (Downs, 1967).

Other school of thought has it that there are several benefits that come with long service, therefore, the individual may tend to prioritize those benefits and stay committed to the wellbeing of the organization. Gould-William (2003) has indicated that personal characteristics including length of service constitute “side-bets” which sustain and motivate employees to contribute positively to their organizations. These “side-bets” are the specific organizational benefits that employees received including employment status, company mortgages, and pensions. Balfour and Wechsler (1996) describe them as “exchange commitment, and maintain that longevity of service increases the cost of leaving a job. Career managers with relatively greater number of years in civil service are presumed to be nearing their retirement. Therefore, future job security may not be of primary concern to them to warrant avoidance of risk taking. They may rather tend to focus more on the system trust than the interpersonal variables. This may not hold in the case of managers with longer year ahead in their career (Hays and Sowa, 2006).

Besides the job security and all the benefits that come with longevity of tenure is the issue of experience-based capacity. It can be assumed that career managers with long civil service experience have over time developed the capacity to appreciate the
intricacies that entail in the political-bureaucratic interactive discourses, and that they are either more bothered or less bothered about the potential dangers posed by the political appointees (Yang and Kassekert (2009; Hays and Sowa, 2006). In a situation where they are less bothered because of their experience, there is greater tendency for them to overlook the implications of interpersonal trust on their job when questions in relation to that are posed to them (Yang and Kassekert, 2009). However, it may also be that with time, they have come to terms with the realities pertaining to the ramifications of political influence on their wellbeing, and are therefore likely to report more of job related dissatisfactions than people with less experience.

Empirical studies pertaining to the implications of years in employment on job related attitudes are not only limited but also inconclusive and sometimes contradictory (Yang and Kassekert, 2009). Battaglio and Condrey (2009) for instance find that respondents’ characteristics including length of service play no role in predicting trust. Similarly, Balfour and Wechsler (1996) find that the disposition of public employees regarding commitment to job is not contingent upon personal characteristic including longevity of tenure. Rather, such disposition is mediated by job related experiences, organizational arrangements, and the nature of the job itself. These findings contradict a lot of findings in the literature which suggest that personal characteristics are elements of job satisfaction, trust building, and commitment (Gould-Williams, 2003; Angle and Perry, 1981; Meyer and Allen, 1984). Given the exploratory nature of the present study, the issue of length of services relative job related outcomes such as those outlined in the present study is considered worth examining. Moreover, considering it as control variable
may provide more insight on the dynamics of interpersonal trust and its predictive variables (Battaglio and Condrey, 2009).

**Research Hypotheses**

Given the research questions outlined in the introductory section of the study and the varying perspectives in the literature regarding the relationships among the variables and the possible implications of the reforms, the following hypotheses are examined.

**H1.** There is positive relationship between interpersonal trust and managerial discretion, participative management, communication, and organizational commitment in the political appointee-career manager relationship.

**H2:** Managerial discretion, participative management, communication, and organizational commitment are significant predictors of interpersonal trust in the political appointee-career manager relationship.

**H3:** The length of years in career management position significantly predicts interpersonal trust in the political appointee-career manager relationship.

**H4:** Neither *Pro-radical business-oriented model* nor *Pro-traditional oriented model* significantly predicts interpersonal trust.

**H5:** There are no significant differences of interpersonal trust, managerial discretion, participative management, interpersonal communication, and organizational commitment regarding *Pro-radical business-oriented model* and *Pro-traditional-oriented model*. 
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

A mixed method approach is applied in the present study. Mixed or multiple method is defined simply as utilization of two or more research methods in studying a phenomenon (Singleton and Straits, 2005; Creswell, 2003). In the context of the present study, it is explained as combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to understand the dynamics of interpersonal relationship between career managers and political appointees. A mixed method consisting of quantitative and qualitative methods has several merits in social science studies. By combining quantitative and qualitative methods, researchers are able to draw more accurate conclusions from analyzing different sets of data on the same phenomenon being studied (Singleton and Straits, 2005; Creswell, 2003). That is, it offers a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the dynamics of the subjects or units being studied (Jick, 1979; Morgan, 1998). Singleton and Straits (2005) have indicated that because of the inherent challenges in all research methods, it is imperative that research topics are studied via a combination of methods. In this regard, the inherent challenges of one method can be counterbalanced by the inherent strength of the other (Jick, 1979; Singleton and Straits, 2005; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2007). In essence, mixed method approach is critical in ensuring that there is a reflection between the variance and the traits rather than the method (Jick, 1979). Central to social
science enquiries are the issues of validity and reliability which can be addressed by using multiple methods (Singleton and Straits, 2005).

In spite of its strength, multiple method approach in social science research has certain shortcomings including replication difficulties, time consumption, and budgetary constraints (Sale, Lohfeld, and Brazil, 2002; Greene, Caracelli, and Graham, 1989). Beyond those limitations, there is also the risk of premising its designs as well as purpose on wrong or unclear assumptions (Greene, Caracelli, Graham, 1989; Sale, Lohfeld, and Brazil, 2002). For instance, a phenomenon being studied may be subjected to similar labels in both qualitative and quantitative methods but the actual meanings and references of the label may differ (Sale, Lohfeld, and Brazil, 2002). In this instance, it may be difficult to uphold the assumption of triangulation or validity (Sale, Lohfeld, and Brazil, 2002). Sale, Lohfeld, and Brazil (2002) argue that in reality mixed method approach does not have what it professes to offer in social science research. This is because researchers using such approach usually tend to simplify the phenomenon being studied to synthesize the results (Sale, Lohfeld, and Brazil (2002).

However, Sale, Lohfeld, and Brazil (2002) accept the usefulness of combining quantitative and qualitative methods for complementary purposes. They argue that “…the fact that the approaches are incommensurate does not mean that mixed-method methods cannot be combined in a single study if it is done for complementary purposes” (p.50). This position supports the utilization of mixed method in the present study. It is envisaged that the quantitative data could be complemented with the qualitative data to provide an elaborate understanding of the phenomenon under study. Pandey, Coursey, and Moynihan (2007) for instance, used qualitative procedures consisting of semi-
structured interviews protocols with probes to triangulate the findings from the quantitative components of their study.

Measures

The study explores the dynamics of the relationship between political and career managers in public service. Theoretically the study has argued that political appointees and career managers complement or harmonize their roles in order to facilitate competent, responsive and accountable government (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002; Svara, 2001; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981). It is also argued that interpersonal trust between the political and the bureaucratic leadership determines the extent to which certain managerial values deemed imperative for the expected complementary relationship could be triggered. Thus, trust as underpinning variable has positive relationship with those key managerial variables. Therefore, the perceptions and interpretations of the organizational environment relative to those key variables may indicate the extent of interpersonal trust between the referent subjects.

How employees correspond their work related behaviors to their interpretations of the organizational environment has been measured in several studies (Yang and Pandey, 2008; Nyhan, 2000; Battaglio and Conkey, 2009; Pandey, Coursey, and Moynihan 2007). Often archival or perceptual data are used in such scholarly endeavors (Yang and Pandey, 2008). These approaches have their respective pros and cons (Yang and Pandey, 2008). The archival approach offers impartial and accurate results as compared with the perceptual approach (Andrew, Boyne, and Walker 2006). However the archival approach may not be able to appropriately link what is intended to measure to what is actually measured since the available data may have been collected for a research founded on
different theoretical assumptions (Boyd, Dess, and Rasheed 1993; Yang and Pandey, 2008). The perceptual approach, on the other hand, may suffer from biases and errors since what people perceive are sometimes different from the realities on the ground (Yang and Pandey, 2008; Pandey, Coursey, and Moynihan 2007).

However, Yang and Pandey (2008) have posited that the issue is not about which of the approaches is suitable but rather under what circumstance does a particular approach become relatively viable. Moreover, some studies have even found consistency between archival and perceptual measures (Wall et al., 2004; Walker and Boyne, 2006). Yang and Pandey (2008) indicate that some studies comparing objective and perceptual measures have found consistency in terms of “convergent validity, discriminant validity, and construct validity across a wide range of independent variables” (p. 338).

Perceptual measures are used in the present study for a number of reasons. First, access to the available data is difficult. Second, and more importantly, given the variables under consideration and the overwhelming support in the literature, perceptual approach is considered very appropriate (for example, Pandey and Wright, 2006; Yang and Pandey, 2008; Waterman, Rouse, and Wright, 1989; Pfiffner, 1987; Ingraham and Ban, 1992; Aberbarch and Rockman, 1997). Perceptual measures, as argued by Yang and Pandey (2008), are effective in exploring the “psychological process salient to the analysis of decision making and individual behavior” (p. 338). Perceptual measures are considered important in bridging the research gap in social sciences, particularly in public administration and political science where perceived political environment is considered to have significant implications on the behaviors of professional bureaucrats as well as agency operations (Whicker, Strickland, and Olshfski, 1993; Yang and Pandey, 2008;
Boyd, Dess, and Rasheed, 1993). Simon (1954) argues that “environmental forces mould organizations through the mediation of human minds” (p. 236). Yang and Pandey (2008) point out that the actions entailing political control such as “restrictions of mandates, budget, cutbacks, and curtailment of discretion are difficult for public managers to misperceive” (p.338).

**Survey Instruments**

The study measures perceptions of trust, professional discretion, participative management, communication, and commitment among career managers. It also measures demographic variables namely, gender and the length of employment in public service. These variables are measured using 14 items from a variety of sources but modified for the purpose of this study (Appendix A). Twelve of the items deal specifically with the main variables, and are measured based on a 7-point likert-type scale. The variables were measured on scales such as strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), somewhat disagree (3), neither disagree nor agree (4), somewhat agree (5), agree (6), and strongly agree (7). The respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their affirmation to specified statements based on the above listed scales. Likert-type scale is a frequent feature in social science studies that rely on survey questionnaires (Cook, Hepworth, Wall, and Warr, 1981; Hinkin, 1998; Dawes, 2008). But the key contention with respect to the Likert scale is the number of appearing intervals or response categories (Hinkin, 1998; Dawes, 2008). The original Likert scale consisted of five appearing intervals or response categories with a neutral point (Hinkin, 1998). However, subsequent research experience has necessitated the use of more than five point scales (Hinkin, 1998; Dawes, 2008). Hinkin (1998) argues
that accurate benchmarks to maximize the derived variance are obtained by maximizing
the response range.

Issues bothering on the relationships between politicians and professional
bureaucrats can be sensitive and may be characterized by suspicion, tension, and
apprehension (Freedman, 1978; Dresang, 2009; Lewis, 2008). Because of this reason,
there is often the likelihood of response biases when perceptual elements of such
relationships are subjected to empirical assessment. Singleton and Straits (2005) indicate
that one key weakness of standardized survey questionnaire is the tendency of the
respondents to construct answers that are socially desirable, particularly when the
questions seek to elicit sensitive information. To offset the possible response biases in
this study, the questions are framed in an impersonal format. The respondents are asked
to relate their responses to general experience including that of their current job or unit of
work. This is to indicate that they or their organizations or units of work are not the major
reference of the study. Madison et al (1980) have argued that where research can be
structured in “an impersonal and nonthreatening frame of reference, it may not be
necessary to cloak the term in some euphemism to avoid harsh reactions or stereotypical
answers when a research question is posed to practicing managers” (p. 83).

Two items deal with individual respondents’ demographic characteristics such as,
gender and length of public service employment. All these variables are assumed to play
indirect roles in one’s perception and interpretations of organizational climate and
relationship (Crewson, 1997; Moon, 2000). With respect to the length of public service
employment, two categories are created, namely “less than 15 years” and “more than 15
years” of public employment. Respondents are asked to indicate which of these two categories describes how long they have worked in the civil service.

**Trust**

Several theoretical assumptions underpin the operationalization and measurement of trust (Nyhan and Marlowe, 1997; Nyhan, 1999; McAllister, 1995; Dirks and Ferrin, 2002). In measuring trust, Nyhan and Marlowe (1997) developed what they refer to as Organizational Trust Inventory (OTI). According to Nyhan (1999) the OTI was “specifically designed to reflect the dichotomy of system and interpersonal trust…” (p.62). It consists of an 8-item scale with four items measuring interpersonal trust (trust in supervisor). The other remaining four items measure trust relative to the organization as a whole. Given the focus of the present study, items in OTI specifically dealing with interpersonal trust are considered. These items are; confidence in technical competency of supervisor; reliability of the words of supervisors; belief in the defense of supervisors, and willingness to tell supervisor everything without any fear.

The first item dealing with technical competencies of supervisor is discarded because the issues under consideration are not about career managers’ perception of the technical capacity of political appointees. After all, technical and professional capacities are not the primary reference points in making political appointments (Thompson and Riccucci, 1998; Heclo 1977; Cohen, 1998). The last three items are considered but modified for the purpose of this study. These items inherently conform to the broadly accepted definition of interpersonal trust and also meet the conceptualization of trust per this study (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995; Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis, 2007; Park, 2012; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009). The fundamental assumption of trust is
willingness to take risk or willingness to render one’s self vulnerable in organizational relationship (Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis, 2007; Nyhan, 2000; McAllister, 1995; Dirks and Ferrin, 2002). In a supervisor-employee relationship, trustworthiness counts in risk taking behavior (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995). The elements of trustworthiness are reliability, integrity, and benevolence (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995). Therefore interpersonal trust is measured by combining risk-taking disposition and the items measuring trustworthiness (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995). Career managers are asked to affirm statements such “career managers do not believe there will be repercussion in risk-taking”; “career managers can count on political appointees to defend them”; and “career managers can rely on the words of political appointees”.

Discretion

Managerial discretion is operationalized by looking at the latitude that managers have in exercising their professional authority over their work, given the rules and conditions imposed and enforced in their organizations (Nyhan, 2000; Bozeman and Kinsley, 1998). Two items are used in measuring the latitude of professional discretion of career managers. The first question asks respondent to indicate the extent to which they disagree or agree that “career managers are not restricted by enforcement of unnecessary rules and practices imposed by political appointees.” The second question asks respondents to indicate the extent to which they disagree or agree that “career managers are allowed by political appointees to exercise authority to determine how they get their jobs done to the best of their ability.” The two items are taken from the Federal Employee Attitude Survey (1983). Similar items are also used by Nyhan (2000). The items are, however, reformulated for the purpose of the present study.
Participative Management

Participative management is construed or operationalized as the career managers’ perception about their levels of involvement in decision making and how their inputs in the decision making are considered important (Wright and Kim, 2004; Nyhan, 2000; Nachmias, 1985). Two survey items from a study conducted by Wright and Kim (2004) are used. Wright and Kim (2004) focus on management and the lower ranking employees, and ask the respondents to rank how their opinion and thoughts counts. It also asks respondents to indicate their levels of freedom in making open suggestions for organizational change relative to their relationships with their supervisors. These items are reformulated to commensurate with the subjects under study. The first item asks career managers to indicate the extent to which they disagree or agree that “career managers are free to suggest changes in their organization to political appointees”. The second item required respondents to indicate the extent to which they disagree or agree that “the opinions and thought of career managers are considered important by political appointees”.

Communication

Measuring organizational communication and how it affects work attitudinal variables is difficult (Garnett, 1997; Garnet and Marlowe, and Pandey, 2008). This difficulty may be due to lack of a single dominant theoretical paradigm (Pandey and Garnet, 2006). However, there are key variables that often feature in the construct and operationalization of organizational communication, particularly interpersonal communication (Pandey and Garnet, 2006). These variables include feedback, upward communication, lateral communication, and goal clarity (Pandey and Garnet, 2006).
These variables are often measured based on the subjective views of the target respondents (Dillman, 2000; Pandey and Garnet, 2006). For the purpose of the present study, interpersonal communication is measured based on the subordinates’ (professional bureaucrats) subjective assessment of the extent to which organizational goals are clearly specified by superiors (political leadership), and the extent to which superiors seek information from the subordinates.

These items satisfy the goal clarity and upward communication elements of organizational communication (Federal Employees Attitude Survey, 1983; Yang and Pandey, 2008). They are deemed very important under the present study considering the underpinning orientations of the current reforms which include mission driven and share leadership (Garnett, Marlowe, and Pandey, 2008). Moreover, these measures properly define the relationship between career managers who are expected to cooperate to offer immediate technical advice and the political appointees who are expected to facilitate cooperation and seek technical advice to accomplish policy goals (Heclo, 1988; Svara, 2001; Fernandez and Pitts, 2007). The question on “goal clarity” asks respondents to indicate the extent to which they disagree or agree that “career managers are clearly informed about the goals and objectives of their organizations by the political appointees”. The second question also asks respondents to indicate the extent to which they disagree or agree that political appointees always seek information from the career managers when taking major organizational decisions”.

**Commitment**

Commitment is operationalized using three indicators such as a sense of belonging, personalization of organizational goals, and happiness or resolve to remain a
member of an organization till retirement (Moon, 2000; Crewson, 1997). Three questions are posed to the respondents in reference to these key indicators. The first question asks respondents to attest to the fact that “career managers feel happy to work in their organizations until their retirement”. The second question asks respondents to affirm the extent to which they disagree or agree that career “managers have strong sense of belonging to their organization”. The third question seeks from respondents the extent to which they disagree or agree that “career managers take organizational problems as their personal problem”. Similar questions are utilized in the Federal Employee Attitude Survey (1983) and also in a study done by Yang and Pandey (2008).

**Data Collection**

**Sampling**

Drawing a perfect sample from the states to conduct public management studies is a cumbersome task (Hays and Sowa, 2006). This is largely because the civil service system at the state levels manifests a complex heterogeneous scenario, a situation equally present under the current approach to administrative reforms (Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson, 2001). This notwithstanding, there are certain fundamental features of the civil service system under which the states can be categorized, at least for the purpose of scholarly exploration (Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson, 2001; Ingraham and Selden, 2002; Hays and Sowa, 2006; Selden, 2006). Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson (2001) identify three categories of civil service systems based upon the states’ approaches to public management reforms. The first of these categories are the states that have entirely abolished the traditional merit system (Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson, 2002). The second category comprises of the states that have reduced the size and scope of the civil
service. States under this category have limited the automatic job entitlement and recruitment, and have also made dismissal and disciplinary actions flexible (Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson, 2002). The third category are the states that have tended to stress administrative flexibility, delegation, decentralization, and performance incentives, yet maintained the core values of the merit system (Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson, 2001; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009). In much the same way, Hays and Sowa (2006) use elements such as centralization, decentralization, at-will employment system, and grievance procedures to categorize the state civil service systems. Hays and Sowa (2006) examine the extent to which the states have adopted these elements.

Using the themes and classifications espoused by Hays and Sowa (2006) and Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobsen (2001), eight categories of personnel management systems are developed, out of which two models are formed for the purpose of the present study (Appendix C). The first of these two models consists of states that have radically tempered with the traditional merit system. Going by Hays and Sowa’s (2006) categorizations, these are the states that have decentralized their personnel management systems, expanded at-will employment system, and restricted employee grievance procedures. These descriptions also fit Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson’s (2001) second category. For the purpose of the present study, the model created under the preceding descriptions is described as Pro-political-oriented model. Using the same procedure, and in reference to Hays and Sowa’s (2006) and Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobsen’s (2001) works, the second model is created comprising of the states that have centralized their personnel management system, limited at-will employment system, and expanded the grievance procedures. This category is described under the present study as Pro-
traditional-oriented model. These models are used in relative terms since none of them exists in its ideal sense. Indeed, almost all the reforms occurring at state levels come under the New Public Management paradigm which is broadly understood in the literature as more of private sector business model (Frederickson, 1996; Thompson and Riccucci, 1998; Lynn, 2000; Hood, 1995).

In regards to the Pro-political-oriented model, fourteen states were selected. However, only four states satisfied all the three specified conditions under the Pro-traditional-oriented model. In order to expand the scope and also to get considerable sample size, states that met two of the conditions in either case were selected and placed accordingly, with specific reference to the issues of “at-will employment” and “grievance procedures”. These two issues have significant implications on the organizational environment in public service vis-à-vis the tempering of the traditional merit system (Kellough and Nigro, 2005; Selden, 2006; Bowman and West, 2007; Verhoest, Verschuere, and Bouckaert, 2007). Kellough and Nigro (2006) have posited that “when job protections are abolished, a historic pillar of traditional merit system, that is, the relative security of tenure in public employment is abandoned” (p. 448). This approach increased the number of states from fourteen to sixteen in the case of Pro-political-oriented model. In the case of the Pro-traditional-oriented model, the number increased significantly from four to fifteen. The overall number of states considered for the study amounted to twenty-eight with fourteen states for Pro-political-oriented model and fourteen states for the Pro-traditional-oriented model (Table1).

The sampling of the target respondents (career managers) was equally a challenging task. The challenge emanated from the identification of the career managers
from the non-career managers (Kellough and Nigro, 2010; Hays and Sowa, 2006). Recent reforms in the states, particularly in reference to job classifications, are not specific on who can be described as professional bureaucrats and who cannot be described as such (Hays and Sowa, 2006). In the traditional frame of public employment, the career managers are placed under the classified category, and are therefore subjected to the merit system employment conditions (Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson, 2001). The non-career managers are also placed under the unclassified category, and are therefore not covered under the merit system conditions of employment (Selden, Ingraham, and Jacobson, 2001). However, under the current dispensation these assumptions do not apply in all cases (Kellough and Nigro, 2010; Ohio Civil Service Revised Code, 2006). Sometimes the situation becomes murkier such that employees themselves may not be sure about their job classifications status (Kellough and Nigro, 2010). Hays and Sowa (2006) observe that among the fifty states surveyed in their study, majority of them were unable to account for the number of employees who are subject to direct gubernatorial appointment or removal.

To be able to generate a valid sample, directors and deputy directors of the executive agencies were excluded. Generally the executive agencies in the states are headed by directors who are mostly gubernatorial appointees (or secretaries in some states). The next in line to the directors are the deputy directors. In most of the states the deputy director positions are assigned fiduciary functions and as such, are placed within the unclassified division to serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority (Hays and Sowa, 2006). Invariably, the deputy directors qualified to be described as political appointees rather than career professionals. Hays and Sowa (2006) indicate that the
difficulty of “veteran” or senior managers to proceed further in their career ladder to
deputy director position or its equivalent is that such positions have been unclassified and
subjected to political appointment (p.116). By extension, the assumption here is that the
top-most hierarchy of state agencies is filled with perceived political affiliates. Below
the deputy directors are the managers of the technical or professional divisions. This
segment serves as the sample population. To be sure of the respondents, the questionnaire
specifically stated the referents, and required those who are not career managers to
exempt themselves.

A carefully design database consisted of 5000 career managers, their names,
agencies, positions, and contact information was developed. Out of this, a sample size of
1000 was generated (Pro-political-oriented model =500; Pro-traditional-oriented model
=500). A larger sample size would have been preferable (Singleton and Straits, 2005).
However, given the availability contact information of the respondent, purpose of the
study, and time challenges, what was obtained is considered viable (see for example
Singleton and Straits, 2005). The respondents were randomly selected. However, in cases
where a randomly picked respondent lack complete contact information, particularly e-
mail address, that respondent is dropped for another. Attention was also paid to ensure a
relative fair representation of the selected public agencies.
Table 1: Selected States for the Study (Categorized According to Their Personnel System)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pro-traditional-oriented model</th>
<th>Pro-political-oriented model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Restricted at-will system of employment</td>
<td>1. Expanded at-will system of employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Expanded grievance issues</td>
<td>2. Restricted grievance issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. New Mexico
2. South Dakota
3. Maine
4. California
5. Connecticut
6. Illinois
7. Maryland
8. Michigan
9. Minnesota
10. Nevada
11. New Hampshire
12. New York
13. Wisconsin
14. Pennsylvania

1. Arizona
2. Mississippi
3. West Virginia
4. Wyoming
5. Ohio
6. Arkansas
7. Colorado
8. North Carolina
9. Oklahoma
10. South Carolina
11. Vermont
12. Washington
13. Nebraska
14. Indiana

The respondents were selected from agencies and departments including human services, emergency management, human resource, and budget and finance. These agencies and departments were selected not for any apparent fundamental reason other than the fact that their specific functions and organizational structures appear relatively the same across the states (National Governors’ Association, 1976; Waugh, 1994; Waldfogel, 1997; Agranoff, 1991). Also some of these agencies have provided enough grounds for concerns relative to the political appointment and effective management (Waugh, 1994; Waugh and Streib, 2006; Garnett and Kouzmin, 2007). Human resource
department and department of budget and finance of central agencies of the states were included because personnel in these agencies were believed to be well placed to appreciate the experiences and work attitudes of employees in regards to organizational reforms (Condrey and Battaglio, 2007). For instance, issues of finance and budgeting are central to the incessant quests by the political leadership to exert control over the bureaucracy (Moe, 1985). Ironically, finance and budgeting processes require professional skills rather than political skills in most cases (Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen, 1987). Therefore, it is envisaged that professional managers in those departments are better placed to offer valuable information relative to their relationships with the political authorities.

**Survey Administration**

A good response rate to survey questions is paramount in social science research, particularly when the research in question is judged from scholarship perspective (Baruch and Holtom, 2008; Rogelberg and Stanton, 2007). Baruch and Holtom (2008) reiterate that higher response rate ensures larger data sample, statistical power, and small confidence interval around sample statistics. These elements underscore the credibility and validity of the research (Baruch and Holtom, 2008). Over the years good response rate in survey studies relating to management has been a great challenge (Baruch and Holtom, 2008). Cycyota and Harrison (2006) find a decline in response rate in survey studies that target organizational leadership. Factors such as disinterest, fatigue, and busy schedules among top executives come across as the explanatory factors of the difficulties in obtaining greater response rate (Baruch and Holtom, 2008; Cycyota and Harrison, 2006; Weimer and Dalessio, 2006). It is imperative that the researcher adopts effective
means of administering the questionnaire to offset these challenges (Singleton and Strait, 2005). Experience has shown that to elicit greater response rate, particularly among executives or managers, the researcher should pay special attention to issues such as topic salience, consent pre-screening, management of length of survey, and appropriate networking (Barruch and Holtom, 2008).

Mechanisms for administering survey questionnaire in social science come in varying forms. They include face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews, and self-administered mail and electronic questionnaires (Singleton and Strait, 2005). All of these approaches have their respective strengths and weaknesses (Singleton and Strait, 2005; Lavrakas, 1997). Sometimes, relying on a single mode of survey administration could lead to lower response rate (Singleton and Strait, 2005). Cycoyota and Harrison (2006) for instance find that the traditional or conventional mail survey administration have become ineffective. Studies have found that different strategies or modes adopted sequentially can significantly improve survey response rates (Shettle and Mooney, 1999).

Premising on the above and several other assumptions, the current study adopted several approaches in administering the survey questionnaire. Primarily, it utilized the cross-sectional approach, and combines multiple but sequential procedures consisting of web-based and telephone interviews. However, the predominant procedure used in the present study was the web-based survey administration (Appendix A2). It required respondents to voluntarily complete the survey questions. Estimated time for completion was put at 5 minutes. With the assistance of a web manager at University of Akron Webmaster’s office, a web link was developed using the Qualtrics Software. Among others, the software enables the researcher to email survey invitations. It also records the
responses automatically and provides tools including SPPS and Excel to download the data (for more information, Qualtrics.com). The contact emails of the respondents were categorized into two groups in accordance with models under study. The web link containing the questionnaire and response specifications were sent to the groups through their respective emails.

In order not to create technical difficulties for the respondents, the questionnaire was structured to fit one page with the submission button clearly identified just below the last question. Though prior consent of the respondents was not sought, the questionnaire was sent with a cover letter indicating the objectives of the study and the assurance of protection of privacy. The cover letter also provided contact information such as telephone, mail, and email with which respondents could use to seek clarification or ascertain the authenticity of the survey. This was quite helpful given the fact that a number of respondents called or sent emails to find out more about the exercise.

The survey administration was undertaken within a period of over two and half months (from July 8, to September 30, 2013). Prior to that, IRB certification was obtained in fulfillment of requirement of the studies pertaining to human subjects (Federal regulation for the protection of human subject 45CFR 46). Three follow-ups were undertaken to increase the initial limited response rate. The Qualtric software made it possible to exclude the respondents who have already completed the questionnaire. The last follow-up was mainly done through telephone contacts. In some instances, some of the respondents provided the answers after the questions had been read to them on phone. Dillman (2000) has indicated the usefulness of this approach when dealing with coverage difficulties associated with web-based surveys.
In-depth Interviews

Advocates of qualitative research methods assume that social science entails subjectivity, and it is through the subjective views and accounts of individual subjects that a phenomenon under study is best appreciated and understood (Crotty, 1998). The strength of using qualitative approach in studying a phenomenon is the enrichment of the capacity of the researcher to explore further and provide rich explanation rather than simplistic presentation of the facts (Ospina and Dodge, 2005; Hamersley and Atkinson, 1996). Brower, Abolafia, and Carr (2000) have argued that the attraction of qualitative research method in social sciences is its ability to account for the issues that quantitative approach is unable to account for. Jick (1979) has noted that surveys are more meaningful when “interpreted in light of critical qualitative information…” (p. 606).

As already indicated, in the field of public administration, practitioners’ experiences and actions are often not based on rational or clear cut models (Brower, Abolafia, and Carr, 2000). Rather, they are often contingent upon intangible or latent organizational environmental elements that systematically mould perceptions and therefore the subsequent actions (Brower, Abolafia, and Carr, 2000). Brower, Abolafia, and Carr (2000) observe that public administration promote “positive professionalism”, however it has a challenge “facing its backstage realities” (p. 384). The reality lies in the researchers’ ability to capture both the official and unofficial versions of accounts in their studies (Brower, Abolafia, and Carr, 2000). Ospina and Dodge (2005) have argued that narrative enquiry can stimulate higher research standards and establish strong connections between theory and practice in public administration.
Among other methods, in-depth interviews as a component of qualitative research method is broadly acknowledged as effective means to unravel the hidden realities of social or organizational dynamics (Kvale, 1996; Brower, Abolafia, and Carr, 2000; Ospina and Dodge, 2005). In-depth interview comes in different forms, and are underpinned by different theoretical assumptions (Kvale, 1996). Kvale (1996) identifies two major modes of in-depth interviews, namely “miner metaphor” and “traveler metaphor”. The “miner metaphor” looks at the researcher as a miner of the necessary information to establish a reality. The underlying assumption is that knowledge is as “given” by the subject under study (Kvale, 1996). The “traveler metaphor” on the other hand assumes that knowledge is not only given but negotiated and created (Kvale, 1995). The researcher is presumed to be on a journey of knowledge acquisition together with the subject under study. In this instance the interviewer’s role is to interpret the stories developed and articulated by the interviewee (Kvale, 1995). The interviewer probes the interviewee to provide more information that can offer an insightful understanding of the phenomenon being studied (Kvale, 1995).

The current study approached the issues from the “traveler metaphor” perspective. The objective is to capture the narratives and stories to collaborate the simplified facts stated by public managers. Five major questions were posed to the respondents (career managers). These questions have sub-questions that probed the issues further (Appendix B). The first question asked respondents whether they believe that there is greater level of interpersonal trust between career managers and their counterpart political appointee managers. It probed further to find out if the respondents believe career managers are likely to take risks. The second question sought from the respondents whether they would
confirm that career managers have greater latitudes to exercise professional discretion. The third question sought whether respondent believe that career managers feel involved in major agency decisions to the extent that their opinions are always sought by the political leadership in making such decisions. The fourth and the fifth questions respectively require respondents to confirm the levels of upward communication and commitment of career managers. Each of the questions required the respondents to elaborate the rationale behind their answers. The questions were in open-ended and semi-structured format. This mode of framing the questions was imperative to elicit more information that would help in understanding the already stated facts (Pandey, Coursey, and Moynihan, 2007; Miles and Huberman, 1994).

Respondents to this component of the study were randomly selected from the already developed sample frame for the quantitative component. Each of the models (Pro-political-oriented model and Pro-traditional-oriented model) was represented by 10 respondents. The questionnaire was administered via emails, and was accompanied by a cover letter. The cover letter indicates to the respondents that their views were being solicited as a follow-up to their responses to the previously administered questionnaire that required them to rank their responses based on a scale.
The study looked at four fundamental questions on interpersonal trust regarding the relationship between political appointees and career managers in state government organizations. The first question sought to determine whether career bureaucrats in management positions generally perceived their relationship with their counterpart political appointees as trustful. The second question sought to establish whether the perceived interpersonal trust among career managers has direct relationship with key managerial values such as flexibility of professional discretion, participative management, communication, and commitment. The third question explored further by examining the extent to which those key managerial values predict the existence of trust among career managers. Given the variations of public management reforms across the states vis-à-vis the contentions in the literature on the issue of trust and its related variables, the study compared two categories of public management system. These two categories were described as Pro-political-oriented model and Pro-traditional-oriented model. As already indicated in the previous chapter, the first category consisted of states that have significantly tempered with the core values of the traditional merit system by expanding at-will system of employment and limiting issues of grievance. The second category on the other hand consisted of states that have adopted relatively more
traditional civil service human resource management principles of limited at-will system of employment and expanded issues of grievance.

**Analytical Approach**

The data analysis was done in reference to the research objectives, questions, and the accompanying hypotheses. To this effect, different quantitative analytical approaches were employed. To establish the relationship between interpersonal trust and managerial discretion, participative management, interpersonal communication and commitment, a bivariate analysis was performed using Pearson’s Correlation coefficient (r). Pearson’s Correlation remains the commonly used statistical technique to establish the relationships between two quantitative variables (Mertler and Vannatta, 2010). How interpersonal relationships affect work related attitudes and behaviors in organizations are assumed to be referent contingent (Dolan, 2000; Perry, 2004; Stazyk, and Goerdely, 2010). Therefore, given the referent subjects in the present study, the Pearson’s Correlation was considered the appropriate tool to establish whether what is commonly known in the literature among other ranks will be the same among the top career managers.

To address the questions regarding the extent to which interpersonal trust could be predicted using discretion, participative management, communication, and commitment, a multiple linear regression analytical technique was used. This approach was deemed useful because it furthers the understanding from just establishing the direction of relationship among the variables and the extent of influence that the individual predictor variables have on the dependent variable. In studies involving more independent variables and one dependent variable, the technique helps to determine the best combination of the independent variables to predict the dependent variable (Mertler and
Vannatta, 2010; Steven, 2001). To compare the impact that the different approaches to public management reforms (Pro-traditional oriented and Pro-political-oriented) have on trust and the related variables, a t-test statistical analysis was performed. This statistical approach is a basic tool to ascertain the significant differences between group means. It is considered appropriate when the independent variables consist of two categories and the dependent variable is quantitative (Mertler and Vannatta, 2010; Steven, 2001).

Mertler and Vannatta (2010) posit that “…the results of any statistical analysis are only as good as the data analyzed” (p.25). Thus, true conclusions can be made from statistical analysis only when there is accuracy and reliability in respect of the data. Given the imperativeness of this assumption, data cleaning was done to address issues of non-usable responses, missing data, and wrong coding. The non-usable responses included questionnaires which were returned with no responses and those which were returned but the respondents indicated they did not fall within the career manager category. Those questionnaires were eliminated from the total number of returned responses. A negligible missing data was identified and appropriately addressed. In much the same way, checks were done to ensure that certain underlying assumptions of multivariate analysis were not breached.

As already indicated, a multiple-item index was used to measure each of the variables. Interpersonal trust was measured using a three item index; managerial discretion with a two item index; participative management with a two item index; communication with a two item index; and commitment with a three-item index. A Cronbach’s alpha reliability test was performed to establish the internal consistency of these multiple items. Test of reliability becomes fundamental when multiple but
interrelated items are put together to measure certain underlying constructs. The reliability test helps to ascertain the consistency or the predictability of the items to illicit similar responses when administered repeatedly (Cronbach, 1951). Gender, length of civil service employment, and approach to reforms were coded into dichotomous variables (male=1, female=0; less than 15 years=1, more than 15 years=0; Pro-political oriented model=1, Pro-traditional oriented model=0).

The present study underscored the importance of complementing quantitative data with qualitative data in the analysis. In this regard, the qualitative data was analyzed using content analytical technique. Content analysis is important and the most frequently used technique in qualitative data analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). The data was systematically coded into themes and analyzed together with the result from the quantitative data analysis. Thus, in addressing the research questions, patterns of words and phrases were identified and examined to establish the relationships pertaining to the variables as established via the quantitative data analysis. This approach was deemed imperative considering the fact that the qualitative analysis and findings was to offer elaborate understanding of the results from the quantitative findings.

**Results**

**Descriptive Statistics**

Out of the total number of 1000 questionnaires sent out, 323 were returned. In the case of the *Pro-political-oriented model* a total number 181 responses out of 500 were received. In that of the *Pro-traditional-oriented model*, the total number of responses received amounted to 142 out of 500. On the overall basis the total response rate in the two categories came to 32.3 % (*Pro-political-oriented model* and *Pro-traditional-oriented model*).
oriented model). The response rates were deemed substantial given the facts available in the literature, particularly relative to studies that focus on top managers or executives (Baruch, 1999; Cycyota and Harrison, 2006; Baruch and Holtom, 2008). Of the total number of respondents completing the survey, 60% were males and 40%, females (n=323). In regards to the length of civil service employment, 35.3% reported less than 15 years and 64.6 % more than 15 years (n=323).

The results of the preliminary data analysis are illustrated in Table 2. The obtained Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient in respect of the main variables are respectively reported as follows; interpersonal trust (α = 0.79), discretion (α =0.71), participative management (α = 0.81), communication (α = 0.72), and commitment (α = 0.64). The table also illustrates the mean and standard deviation of interpersonal trust (mean= 9.93, SD=3.98); discretion (mean=7.40, SD=2.87); communication (mean=7.38, SD=2.99); participation (mean=8.94, SD =3.01); and commitment (mean=14.13, SD =3.37). Multicollinearity diagnostics were performed to check if the independent variables correlate with each other at significant level. In a multivariate or multiple regression analysis, the collinearity test is important to prevent increase in the variance of regression coefficient that can undermine the predictability of the independent variables (Mertler and Vannatta, 2010). The results indicate that all the independent variables met the underlying assumptions with adequate tolerance coefficients exceeding 0.1, and variance inflation factor (VIF) of less than 5 (Stevens, 2001; Mertler and Vannatta, 2010) (see Appendix D).
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Interpersonal Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Taking</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Discretion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Participative Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom to suggest change</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thought/Opinion Consideration</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Interpersonal Communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal clarity</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upward communication</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Commitment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happy to maintain membership</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of belonging</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalization of organisational</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Overall Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Trust a</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>9.98</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discretion b</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative Management c</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>8.04</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Communication d</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>7.38</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment e</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>14.13</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>323</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These are original variables some of which were used to create indices for continuous measurement

a: Interpersonal index; responses to three variables
b: Discretion; responses to two variables
c: Participative Management; responses to two variables
d: Interpersonal Communication; responses to two variables
e: Commitment; responses to two variables
(see Data and Methods for the creation of the continuous variables)

Bivariate and Multivariate Models

In respect of the relationship between the variables, the study outlined the following hypothesis;

**H_1.** There is positive relationship between interpersonal trust and managerial discretion, participative management, communication, and organizational commitment in the political appointee-career manager relationship.

Table 3 illustrates the results from the Pearson’s correlation statistical model run in that respect. The results confirmed the stated hypotheses. Interpersonal trust positively
correlated with managerial discretion (r=731, p<001), participative management (r=539, p<001), communication (r=523, p<001), and commitment (r=0.32, p<0001).

Table 3: Correlation Between Interpersonal Trust and Discretion, Interpersonal Communication, Participative Management, and Commitment Level (n=323)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Discretion</td>
<td>7.40 (2.87)</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Interpersonal Communication</td>
<td>7.38 (2.99)</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Participative Management</td>
<td>8.94 (3.01)</td>
<td>0.539</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sample Size 323

*p<.001, p<.01, p<.05, p<.10

Mean (SD): Individual Means and their Standard Deviations
R: Pearson's Correlation
P: Significance Level (2-tailed)

On the impact of the reforms on interpersonal trust and the other related variables, the following hypothesis was considered;

\[ H_0: \text{There are no significant differences of interpersonal trust, managerial discretion, participative management, interpersonal communication, and organizational commitment regarding Pro-political-oriented model and Pro-traditional-oriented model.} \]

The results from the 2-tailed t-test statistical model to this effect are illustrated in Table 4. The results supported the hypotheses relative to only two of the variables namely professional discretion (t (321) = 1.575, p<116) and commitment (t (321) = .532, p<.595). There were significant differences in terms of interpersonal trust (t (296) =2.48,
p<.014), participative management (t (314) =2.84, p<0.38), and communication (t (282) =2.84, p<0.005).

Table 4: Comparison of Pro-Business and Pro-Traditional on Discretion, Interpersonal Communication, and Participative Management (n=181 Pro-Business and 142 Pro-Traditional)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Interpersonal Trust</td>
<td>10.4144</td>
<td>3.86000</td>
<td>2.483^a</td>
<td>296^a</td>
<td>.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Political</td>
<td>9.3099</td>
<td>4.05141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Traditional</td>
<td>7.6188</td>
<td>2.86036</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Discretion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.575</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Political</td>
<td>7.1127</td>
<td>2.87345</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Traditional</td>
<td>7.8011</td>
<td>2.77973</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Interpersonal Communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.841^b</td>
<td>282^b</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Political</td>
<td>6.8451</td>
<td>3.16518</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Traditional</td>
<td>7.8011</td>
<td>2.77973</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Participative Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.088^c</td>
<td>314^c</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Political</td>
<td>9.2486</td>
<td>3.10717</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Traditional</td>
<td>8.5563</td>
<td>2.83475</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Commitment Levels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.532</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Political</td>
<td>14.2155</td>
<td>3.29528</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Traditional</td>
<td>14.0141</td>
<td>3.48041</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sample Size 323

^a, ^b, ^c: The t and df were adjusted because variances were not equal

On the prediction of interpersonal trust between political appointees and career managers, the study looked at the following hypotheses;

**H2:** Managerial discretion, participative management, communication, and organizational commitment are significant predictors of interpersonal trust in the political appointee-career manager relationship.

**H3:** The length of years in career management position significantly predicts interpersonal trust in the political appointee-career manager relationship.

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H4: Neither *Pro-political-oriented model* nor *Pro-traditional oriented model* significantly predicts interpersonal trust.

Table 5 illustrates the results from the multiple linear regression model.

Table 5: Interpersonal Trust Regressed on Exploratory Variables (Multiple Linear Regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th>Model III</th>
<th>Model IV</th>
<th>Model V</th>
<th>Model VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exploratory Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Discretion</td>
<td>3.988****</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.835***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Interpersonal Communication</td>
<td>0.696****</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.161**</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Participative Management</td>
<td>0.713****</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Commitment Levels</td>
<td>0.377****</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Pro-Political (1=Pro-political; Ref: Pro-Traditional=0)</td>
<td>1.105****</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Gender (1=Male; Ref: Female=0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Tenure of Service (1=15yrs &amp; Less; Ref: 16yrs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-Square</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.625</td>
<td>4.792</td>
<td>3.553</td>
<td>4.599</td>
<td>9.310</td>
<td>2.628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** *p<.001, ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Model I: Discretion only
Model II: Interpersonal Communication Only
Model III: Participative Management Only
Model IV: Commitment Levels Only
Model V: Pro-Political-oriented Only
Model VI: Full Model

Reported coefficients for all variables are both unstandardised (b) and standard Error.

The variables were entered individually as other variables were controlled. Given this approach, the variables were found to be significant predictors of interpersonal trust as expected (professional discretion $b=0.988$, $p<.001$; interpersonal communication, $b=0.696$, $p<.001$; participative management, $b=0.713$, $p<.001$; commitment, $b=0.377$, $p<.01$). Holding *Pro-traditional-oriented model* and other variables constant, *Pro-political -oriented model* predicted interpersonal trust ($b=1.105$, $p<.001$). Though the length of employment in the civil service has significant implication on interpersonal
trust, the influence shows negative. However, in the overall regression model three variables namely discretion (b=0.835, p<.01), interpersonal communication (b=0.161, p<.05), and length of tenure (b= -0.612, p<.10) explained the variance relative to the level of interpersonal trust with Adj.$R^2=0.52$. Thus, the hypotheses relative interpersonal trust prediction was supported in the cases of communication, discretion, and length of civil service employment.

**Analysis**

The descriptive statistical analysis showed low interpersonal trust level when it comes to the relationship between political appointees and career managers in state government (Table 2). Most career managers somewhat disagreed that they could rely on the words of political appointees or count on them for defense in the discharge of their (career managers) duties. Many of them also disagreed that risk-taking is the venture they were likely to engage themselves in. These observations equally resonated in the results contained in the qualitative data analyses.

The randomly selected respondents for the qualitative component of the study gave collaborative accounts that could, to the larger extent, be described as deep seated apprehension, and in some cases cynicism (Appendix E). This worrisome development of limited interpersonal trust found expression in the following accounts of some of the respondents:

“…career managers are careful to check and recheck decisions because they fear being thrown under the bus to preserve someone else[‘s] political aspirations”.

“No, in the current climate there is absolutely no trust between career public servants and elected officials”.

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“Career Managers are very cautious and very conservative. Additionally, political appointees have neither a good history of defending their career manager peers/subordinates nor the desire to take up unpopular positions since they are political animals by nature”.

“No, I don’t think career managers willingly would discharge their duties assuming that political appointees can defend them…”

The preceding quotations and several others from the respondents demonstrate a deep seated risk-averse culture among professional bureaucrats in government. The perceptions translate into a situation where some career managers believe that politicians, unlike career managers, seek only their partisan interests without recourse to public service responsibility. A respondent recounted that;

Career public servants have committed their life's work to serving their fellow citizens with little appreciation or reward. Elected officials serve only for reward and recognition with little or no commitment to the needs of their fellow citizens or the general public. On what basis could these [two] groups find common ground or trust?

This observation is collaborated in the accounts of another respondent who appeared to pontificate that the current public management dispensation seeks to undermine the professional personnel in government for political objective.

I think it is harder and harder to stay on the right course as a career manager given the treatment by the political appointees (especially of this current administration) and given the climate for career managers where there have been deep cuts in positions, little to no pay raises, extreme inequity with the rank and file employees as well as those appointed (generally way above the minimum) due to their political connections into management level positions. The unfairness, coupled with their unreasonable expectations is staggering.

Fairness counts when analyzing a trustful interpersonal relationship, therefore, perception of unfair treatment in respect of compensation and remuneration go to buttress the appalling nature of interpersonal trust between political appointees and career managers.
Most of the respondents attribute the limited interpersonal trust to the limited capacity of the political appointees to properly appreciate the work of the career bureaucrats because of frequent turnover. In the accounts of the respondents,

\[ \text{the turnover in appointees is too frequent for one of them to really understand the intricacies of our business to the point where you can count on them to defend uncomfortable decisions [most] of the time.} \]

I have observed less trust in recent years. With the political pendulum swinging back and forth in national politics, it is perceived that political appointees won’t ever be around long. The assumption then on my part would be there is less risk taken, because career public managers could be left holding the bag.

The initial distrust, suspicions, and hostilities between political and career executives wane when there is an opportunity for the two to work together for a substantial period of time. Therefore, the constant in and out of political appointees pose a challenge to developing mutual understanding, respect, and trust between them and the career bureaucrats.

As hypothesized, interpersonal trust was found to be positively related to the key managerial values such as professional discretion, participative management, interpersonal communication, and organizational commitment. In the bivariate analysis, interpersonal trust highly correlated with managerial discretion \((r=0.713)\); correlated moderately with participative management \((r=0.539)\); and moderately with interpersonal communication \((r=0.523)\). However, in regards to organizational commitment, the relationship was low though positive \((r=0.320)\). What this means is that career managers who report of greater latitude in discharging their professional mandate will report greater interpersonal trust with political appointees. In much the same way those reporting greater participative management and communication will report of greater interpersonal trust. The reverse also holds in all the cases.
Similar to the bivariate analysis, the variables were found to have significant influence on interpersonal trust when they were individually introduced into the multiple regression models. However, on the overall basis, variables that significantly count in predicting interpersonal trust were professional discretion ($b=0.835$, $p<.01$) and interpersonal communication ($b=0.161$, $p<.05$). By inference, one can say that at the management level the significant underlying factors of interpersonal trust are professional discretion and interpersonal communication. Given that interpersonal trust level among career managers was found to be low, and that interpersonal trust has positive significant correlation with professional discretion and communication, it may not be farfetched to expect lower levels of discretion and communication among career managers. Moreover, the results from the analysis of the qualitative data greatly supported this conclusion (Appendix F). On the question of professional discretion most respondents indicated that the restrictions imposed on career managers are pervasive. A respondent had this to say;

No, I do not agree that career civil servants have the latitude to exercise their [discretion] as they wish. First we are constrained by legislation and regulation. Then we are constrained by legislative oversight, advocacy organizations and media. And then, of course, there is the "real [constraint]"—funding, or rather the lack of it.

Another respondent collaborated this account with an observation that;

Career civil servants have little latitude to interpret and implement policy to the best of their ability … in light of their knowledge and expertise.

The preceding accounts give some hints of the overbearing influence of the political authority, the result of which is minimal level of professional discretion among the career managers. This overbearing influence can lead to frustrations. A respondent demonstrated this situation with accounts that;
The entrenched plodding nature of government does not move quickly or nimbly to either improve procedure/practice nor does it reward innovation or embrace change. It’s just so damn hard, it wears you down.

For some of the respondent, the political appointees are the power players who can place restrictions or ask the rules to be circumvented to meet political aspirations. A few quotations from the respondents attested to this;

No, true authority generally is only vested in appointed positions because career staff are distrusted as being not as bright, competent or loyal to the current party as appointees are seen.

Generally, only limited authority is given to career managers and the[n] only with the “be sure to keep [me] updated” cautionary on every move.

Changes in the direction of policy level decisions [are] limited more by senior appointee’s philosophy than operational efficiency or practicality”.

Appointees tend to think of “good customer service” as never saying “no” to anyone for any reason and career managers are criticized for trying to maintain operational control of any process or procedure regardless of how valuable the procedure may be.

[Political] appointees hold higher positions of authority and can overrule our decisions/guidance and do what they like.

Similar sentiments were expressed in regards to inadequacy of communication. Most career managers did not attest to the fact that given their closeness to major organizational decision making, they have clarity in respect of organizational goals and mission. A respondent’s accounts summed the level of communication inadequacy between appointees and career managers;

Communication can always be better

On whether upward communication could be rated as adequate, most of the responded sounded more cynical than mere expression of reservation.

We are presumed incompetent and disloyal. How do we [then] contribute or know what’s going on when even lower levels [of the hierarchy] are occupied by people who think they know it all?
Careers [managers] are only consulted to provide information when there is the
need to determine if policy decisions are logistically feasible or operationally
achievable.

Who will let you know what is going on so that you can tell the liberal
congressmen? That’s what they believe, all the appointees.

Participative management has implication on interpersonal trust but the influence
was relatively marginal. In the descriptive analysis, career managers expressed a
moderate level of participative management (Table 2). Similarly, in the bivariate analysis
interpersonal trust has positive but moderate relationship with participative management
\( r=0.539 \). In the overall model of the multiple regression analysis, the influence of
participative management in predicting interpersonal trust was not significant as
compared to professional discretion and communication (Participative management,
b=0.032). Impliedly, a considerable number of career managers did not attribute their
participation to trust in their relationships with their counterpart political appointees.
Career managers agreed that they have opportunity to make inputs to their organizational
decision making process. A respondent indicated that;

I believe career public managers in my particular agency do have a voice in major
decision making … which even extends to the political arena in some instances,
depending upon the issue and how loud the political voice is screaming.

However, it is important to be mindful of the nature of participation when looking at the
overall levels of participation among career bureaucrats. It appears that the moderate
level of participative management that career managers experience is explained by the
technical aspect of the organizational decision making. The following accounts are ample
testimonies to this assertion;

Policy decisions are made by appointees either after consultation with the
Governor’s office or in a very clearly known direction. What career officials do is
to provide the technical advice.
Career [managers are] only consulted to determine if policy decisions are logistically feasible or operationally achievable.

Other respondents, though a small fraction, indicated that their involvement in major policy decision was below expectation. For instance, a respondent disagreed that career managers are effectively engaged and pointed out that;

No, I don’t believe we do feel involved in most major agency decisions. We seem to be the minions who just implement the new policies.

Similarly, another respondent agreed that;

I still provide my guidance when asked but I do not feel that I am “sitting at the table” as much as I was in the past.

In some instances also, the extent to which career managers are made part and parcel of the decision making process rest on the management style of the incoming political appointees. For instance, a respondent indicated that;

I personally was more involved in a prior administrations but that is mostly a choice/style issue of each Executive Office and the administration that is currently in charge. I still provide my guidance when asked…

This accounts and similar others indicate that some level of trust is still important to facilitate participation.

Instructively, organizational commitment among career managers was found to be high (Table 2), in spite of the low trust levels. This is also revealed in the Pearson’s correlation model and the multiple regression analysis. In the overall model of the multiple regression the influence of commitment on interpersonal trust was found to be less significant (b=0.020, p<.7).

The commitment of employees, particularly those in the leadership positions, can be predicated on variables including opportunity to involve in organizational decision making; opportunity to fulfill ethical obligation; and motivation to serve public interest.
These observations resonated in the accounts of many respondents. For instance, a respondent recounted that commitment levels among career managers is fairly high particularly in fulfillment of professional responsibility. Therefore, the primary concentration of the career managers irrespective of the dynamics of their relationship with the political appointees is, as recounted by a respondent,

[t]o implement “best practices” of their particular career field or area of specialty and to [embrace] the idea of “change” as defined by the …administration.

A respondent expressed his indignation about the unfair treatment by some political appointees but attested to the fact that

… there are many career managers that are very dedicated and committed [to their work].

Similar accounts are captured in the following quotations from the respondents;

Regardless of the political appointees or the political climate, I find that career public managers are still highly committed to their jobs, the policy that they implement, and the public that they serve.

Career public managers truly are public servants who have chosen to work to improve their communities and the lives of their fellow citizens. Really good ones do this by leading by example.

One key concentration of this study was to determine the implications that the various approaches to public management reforms have on interpersonal trust and other related variables. The findings here suggest that the career managers in the states that have adopted more radical changes (Pro-political-oriented model) reported relatively greater levels of interpersonal trust, participative management, and interpersonal communication than their counterparts in the states that have adopted less radical approach (Traditional-oriented model: interpersonal trust: mean=9.3099, SD=4.05141; interpersonal communication: mean= 6.8451, SD=3.16518; participative management:
mean = 8.5563, SD=2.83475). There was no significant differences in terms of professional discretion (p<0.116), and commitment (p<0.595).

In the regression model, the *Pro-political-oriented model* significantly predicted interpersonal trust when the *Pro-traditional-oriented model* was held constant but the effect size was very marginal (Adjusted R-Square=0.02). In the overall regression model, the *Pro-political-oriented model* expectedly did not predict interpersonal trust. It is worth noting that this finding has some logical basis. This is on the account that professional discretion (the highest predictor of interpersonal trust) among career managers in *Pro-political-oriented model* was not high, and indeed not significantly different compared to their counterparts in the *Pro-traditional-oriented model*.

The finding relative to the implications of length of service on interpersonal trust confirms the hypothesis. The negative value obtained in the final regression model (b= -0.612, p<.10) when the category of “less than 15 years in civil service” was introduced in the regression model while controlling for the category of “more than 15 years in civil service”, indicates that the less years of career experience, the more likely one is expected to express less trust. Thus, career managers who have spent longer years in civil service express relatively greater levels of interpersonal trust in their relationships with political appointees than their counterpart with relatively short period of time in civil service employment.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION

Under the theoretical framework of complementarity, the present study has argued that political and administrative values reconcile themselves in a common process to accomplish effective, accountable, and responsive governance. And as a result, the key protagonists who represent political and administrative interests need to develop interpersonal relationships that could facilitate and sustain that process. Indeed, this has been the fundamental objective of the recent public management reforms at both the federal and the state levels (Svara, 2001). The study has reiterated that in the realm of scholarship there have been relentless efforts as well to identify and examine the variables deemed to be the underpinning elements of this collaborative and complementary engagement among the key actors in government (Moynihan and Pandey, 2010).

As part of the efforts, this study has taken a look at interpersonal trust as the prerequisite element to reconcile political and professional values. It was observed that though trust is imperative, the deserving attention is missing in the literature. In reference to the observations that the trust question relative to effective management has different but important dimensions, the present study focused on the top management levels of public
organizations, and specifically looked at the relationships between political appointees and career managers. It was reviewed that the dynamics of the relationships at the top management positions of organizations often manifest different but valuable angles to the organizational literature. This notion was considered very important given the fact that in public organization the top echelon of the hierarchy epitomizes the reality regarding the politics-administration relationships. Moreover, sometimes issues pertaining to the lower ranks relative to the bureaucratic system may be different, and therefore, may fall short of providing the full and accurate accounts. In addition, the study focused on the state governments. The choice to focus on the state governments was on the assumption that the states are often considered as incubators where new ideas and innovations are generated and applied nationwide. Therefore, any new information regarding effective and efficient management systems resulting out of the present study was to be deemed important to serve that purpose.

In regards to the preceding background discussions, the study has outlined and examined questions in respect of the level of interpersonal trust and the relationships between interpersonal trust and the underlying managerial values such professional discretion, participation, communication, and commitment. Fundamentally, it has examined the extent to which those variables predict interpersonal trust in the political appointee-career manager relationships. Given the different approaches to administrative reforms, particularly in regards to human resource management systems, the study has undertaken a comparative analysis of the dynamics of interpersonal trust and its related variables in the states that have adopted radical approach to reforms and those that have adopted moderate approach to reforms.
The first part of the exploration was to establish the extent of perceived level of interpersonal trust among career managers. Invariably, and consistent to both anecdotal and empirical accounts in the literature, the study has found inadequacy of interpersonal trust between political officeholders and career bureaucrats in government organizations. Nigro and Kellough (2008) have maintained that interpersonal trust building remains the least attended to among the other propositions that were expounded under the recommendations of the Winter Commission. Thompson (2002) has equally indicated that in spite of the efforts over the years at trust building, career public managers continue to harbor a considerable level of apprehension in their work places. Per the dictates of democracy, some level of mistrust is essential to sustain the monitoring processes to ensure more accountability and responsiveness (Christensen and Legreid, 2005). However it becomes an impediment when it persists and grows in strength (Behn, 1995; Christensen and Legreid, 2005). Nyhan (2000) has established the role of trust in public organizations, and argued strongly that public management cannot escape the question of trust given the rapidity with which the public sector environment is changing.

On the implications of interpersonal, it was hypothesized and established that interpersonal trust correlates positively with professional discretion, participative management, communication, and commitment. Therefore, it is not out of place to suggest that the perceived low level of interpersonal trust among career managers has implication on those variables. In the Pearson’s correlation model, trust correlated strongly with managerial discretion more than any of the variables ($r=0.731$, $p<0.001$). This was virtually the same in the multiple regression model ($b=0.835$, $p<0.01$). This is an indicative of the fact that the entrepreneurship culture which is the focus of contemporary
public management reforms remains woefully below the expectation. The analyses of both quantitative and qualitative data revealed that imposition of more rules and political pressure account for the limited professional flexibility on the part of the career public managers. Rules and legislations as external and internal controls are a known phenomenon in public service (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998). Bozeman (1989) is of the view that the “publicness” of public organizations explains the reason and in fact justifies the impositions of restrictions on career bureaucrats. Meyer (1979) has found that as a result of legal and political pressures, state bureaucracies have had to rely on restrictive management and personnel systems.

However, the present study did not find imposition of excessive rules on bureaucrats as the only source of impediment to managerial discretion. The key issue rather is the high tendency on the part of the career managers to refrain from engaging in actions perceived to be inimical to their future wellbeing. Most career bureaucrats believed that they were unlikely to take risk because they cannot count on the words and defense of their counterpart political appointees. In most instances, career managers envisaged the possibility of the political players to even circumvent the existing procedures and possibly victimize them for political partisan purposes. Davis (1981) has argued that often public managers tend to avoid errors of commission rather than errors of omission in order to protect themselves from job related tragedies. Moynihan (2005) observes that the unfavorable political climate in public organizations is a significant challenge to managers to exercise professional discretion in performing their tasks. Bozeman and Rainey (1998) conclude in their study that public managers rather prefer to follow strict rules and controls in order not to attract sanctions. Block (1987) has argued
that employees’ disposition to exercise professional authority is predicated on nonthreatening and trustful political environment. Nyhan (2000) finds that employee empowerment including flexibility to exercise professional discretion significantly relate to trust.

Moreover communication levels between political appointees and career managers in terms of goal clarity and upward communication was found to be less substantial. This finding affirmed the notion in the literature that public organizations continue to wallow in ineffective intra-organization communication (Thompson, 1967; Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998). The present study attributed this phenomenon to lack of interpersonal trust between political appointees and career managers, given the significant correlation between communication and interpersonal trust. Bozeman and Kingsley (1998) argue that risk-taking, clear communication, and interpersonal trust are positively related. Dery (1988) and Meyer and Allen (1991) agreed that upward communication in organization signifies the existence of interpersonal trust. Lorentzen (1985) indicates that effective interpersonal communication removes misperception and builds trust. Pandey and Garnet (2006) attest to the fact that it requires informal means of interpersonal communication to clarify organization goal ambiguities, and that trust is the necessary condition to facilitate informal interpersonal communication. Downs, Clampitt, and Pfeiffer (1988) conclude that trust and openness have significant relationship with interpersonal communication. Pandey and Garnet (2006) found that organizational goal clarity depends on the level of trust. Similar findings and observations are reported in the works of Moynihan (2005), Nyhan (1999), Battaglio and Condrey (2009), Ruscio (1999), Dirks and Ferrin (2002), Friedlander, (1970), and Carnevale and Wechsler (1992).
The limited trust, and for that matter, limited professional discretion and communication adequacy can somehow be explained from the perspective that both political appointees and career managers lack the opportunity to work or interact together for a considerable period of time to nurture, develop, and sustain mutually reinforcing behaviors and understanding. This connection was demonstrated in the accounts of the respondents for the qualitative component of study when follow-up questions were put to them to explain the reasons for their answers. Fesler (1983) has noted that political appointees take their office with initial distrust of their counterpart career managers. Therefore, the cycle of frequent in and out appointees consistently deprived the experienced career managers from making meaningful contributions to public policy because of continuous perpetuation of mistrust. By inference, it can be argued that experience counts when it comes to the behaviors and work related attitudes of employees. That is, it can be assumed that over time employees gather data in respect of organizational values, principles, and interpersonal relationships, and as such, are able to cultivate mechanisms to address issues pertaining to trust (Carnevale and Wechsler, 1992). Pfiffner (1987) has found that in spite of the “initial distrust of career executives, political appointees usually develops over time a trust for the career executives who report to them” (p.60). By simple logic, career managers can also cultivate trust for their counterpart appointees over time or develop the mechanisms in which trust may not be the primary consideration in dispensing their professional mandates. This observation can be extended to the issues of long civil service employment experience and cultivation of interpersonal trust. In the regression model, it was found that career managers who have had more years in civil service tended to express more trust in their relationship with
political appointees than those with relatively fewer years. Thus, somehow it can be argued that career managers with longer experience with political appointees have been able to build the professional capacity to withstand the potential risks entailing in the politic-administration discourse. In other words, they may have come to terms with the reality that often the mistrusts are born out of misperceptions.

From another perspective it can be contended that the greater trust level among career managers with long civil service experience may be attributable to their less concern about job security as most of them are nearing their retirement. Moreover such cohorts may be deriving great sense of job satisfaction and commitment on the accounts of benefits that come with long service including good pension packages. Yang and Kassekert (2009) find similar trend in their study and argue that older employees tend to have high job satisfaction and commitment, therefore, given the positive relationship between trust and variables of job satisfaction, the argument relative to the linkage between long service and trust can be sustained. Career managers with relatively fewer years in civil service may be concerned about their job future and therefore may tend not to engage in any risk venture. In the estimation of Hays and Sowa (2006), managers who are not close to their retirement are apprehensive about their job future, and are unlikely to roll “the professional dice” (p.115). Downs (1967) has argued that people who are zealots or climbers today may eventually become conservers particularly when avenues to aspire to higher positions appear blocked.

The moderate relationship between interpersonal trust and participative management and organizational commitment is somewhat revealing given the enormous theoretical and empirical support in the literature regarding the significant relationship
among those variables (Nyhan, 2000; Ingraham, 1997; Duncan, 1992; O’Brien, 2000; Dirk and Ferrin, 2002; Kearney and Hays, 1994; Pfiffner, 1987; Kellough and Nigro, 2006; Savery and Waters, 1989; Perry, 2004). The marginal influence of participative management on interpersonal trust in a way contradicts some of the findings in the literature. For many pundits, there is constant growing tension and mistrust between the political authority and career managers and that account for continuous isolation of career managers from participating in major organizational decision making process (Ingraham, 1997; Duncan, 1992; O’Brien, 2000; Dirk and Ferrin, 2002; Kearney and Hays, 1994; Pfiffner, 1987; Kellough and Nigro, 2006). But rather than considering the present finding as a strange contradiction, it can be looked at as significant dimension to the realities of politics-administration relationship. Career managers agreed of the presence of considerable level of participation in organizational decision making given their relationship with the political appointees, even though such participation is more limited to the technical areas. Dolan’s (2000) findings regarding the specific roles of career and political executives revealed similar trend. According to Dolan, the career managers are more often engaged in technical functions including personnel management and budgeting. The finding in the present study buttresses the assumption of Heclo (1977) and Dolan (2000) that the working relationship between political and the bureaucratic leadership is not clear. This is more so when the two have different tenure, skills, and perspectives. For many administrative researchers, trust may not be the only variable to determine employee participation in decision making (Collins, Ross, and Ross, 1989; Vroom and Yelton, 1973; Sheilds and Sheilds, 1989). Even when trust counts in facilitating participative management, its effects at the top management levels are less
significant (Rosen and Jerdee, 1977; Huang et al, 2010). Moreover, when trust is built on the organizational system rather than individual levels, interpersonal trust may not be the significant precondition for participative management (Moynihan, 2005; Kotter, 1996). Moynihan (2005) finds that the Management for Result initiative was embraced by the political and career managers because it enabled both to effectively engage in organizational policy decisions without much concern about potential negative ramifications.

Significantly, the findings in the present study underscore the fact that the values that informed the framing of politics-administration relationship as dichotomous are still pervasive. The study has established lack of interpersonal trust, limited professional discretion, and top-down approach to communication. Therefore, coupled with the nature of participation among career managers, it is not out of place to agree somehow that the politics-administration relationship continues to maintain its dichotomous posture as against the much desired complementarity. Overeem (2005) maintains strongly that once the political neutrality of the administration continues to be the cherished value, critics cannot dispute the politics-administration dichotomy model.

The relatively high commitment levels among career managers can be explained by factors other than interpersonal trust (Perry and Wise, 1990; Balfour and Wechsler, 1996; Allen, Shore, and Griffeth, 2003; Collins, Ross, and Ross, 1989; Vroom and Yelton, 1973; Sheilds and Sheilds, 1989). As recounted by most career managers, the need to fulfill professional responsibility and serve the public interest was the fundamental pillar of their commitment rather than any form of interpersonal relationship with the appointees. But the fact must not be lost that there are several dimensions to
organizational commitment (Perry and Wise, 1990). Employees may express greater level of commitment when they have trust in the organization as a whole rather than the leadership. In much the same way they may express less commitment even though they have greater trust in the leadership (Perry, 2004). This is when other organizational variables are perceived to be unsatisfactory. Moreover, the study looked at the affective side of commitment and enquired if career managers nurse the tendency to quit job; take organizational problems as personnel problem; and incline to contribute more to their organizations. First of all, most of the career managers are close to retirement, therefore, the tendency to quit job because of perceived bad interpersonal relationship with political appointees is a bit farfetched. Gould-William’s (2003) “side-bets” argument that employees with greater length of service tend to prioritize organizational benefits including job status and pension packages more than any other considerations may hold in this case. The greater commitment in this case can be attributed more to what Balfour and Wechsler (1996) describe as “exchange commitment”. As a matter of fact several studies have established positive relationship between managerial position and higher job satisfaction and commitment (Yang and Kassekert, 2009). Perhaps the significant relationship between trust and commitment may be a reality at the lower level of the organizational hierarchy than the top management levels.

The study underscored the fact that the recent public management reforms sweeping across the states intrigues a lot of varying concerns relative to how such reforms have impacted on the organizational environment and for that matter the level of interpersonal trust on the part of the career managers in government. Consistent with the hypothesis, in the overall multiple regression model, a specific approach to reforms
played no significant role in predicting interpersonal trust. However when one reform model (*Pro-traditional-oriented*) was held constant, the other (*Pro-political-oriented*) significantly predicted interpersonal trust. Thus, in relative terms, the career managers in the more politically guided reform states reported greater levels of interpersonal trust than their counterparts in the more traditional oriented reform states. Given the positive relationship between interpersonal trust and variables such as participation and communication, and the fact that career managers in the Pro-political environment score high on those variables, the findings on trust relative to public management reforms cannot be overlooked. This finding is revealing considering the popular notion in the literature about the negative implications of the radical personnel management reforms (Rubin, 2009; Crowell and Guy, 2010; Kellough and Nigro, 2002; Condrey, 2001; Battaglio and Condrey, 2009; Nyhan, 2000; Nigro and Kellough, 2008; Thompson, 2002; Hays and Sowa, 2006). Most often, the concern about the political-oriented approach to reform is that it affects job security and thereby exacerbates the trust challenge (Battaglio and Condrey, 2009). Nigro and Kellough (2008) have observed that the fundamental problem of trust building is the radical reforms that have negatively affected job security and motivation in the public service. Battaglio and Condrey (2009) equally conclude in their study that radical personnel management reforms may have negative implication on “trusting workplace relationships” (p. 703).

Instructively, the available literature indicate that there is no solid evidence in support of those assumptions relative to the reforms and declining interpersonal trust since many civil servants have survived in their professions notwithstanding the changes in the laws governing the employees property rights at a particular point in time (Hays
and Sowa, 2006). Moreover, consistent with the present findings, West (2002) and Coggburn (2006) concluded in their study on Georgia and Texas respectively that there was no evidence to suggest that the radical reforms in those states have precipitated any political and partisan manipulations of the personnel management system. To the contrary, the radical reforms have rather encouraged trust building among the leadership of public organizations (West, 2002; and Coggburn, 2006). Yang and Pandey (2008) for instance found that among other things, the result oriented reform initiatives have helped to build interpersonal trust as a result of improved organizational goal clarity, interpersonal communication, and organizational commitment. Furthermore, the observed discrepancy by Yang and Kassekert (2009) that Title 5 exemptions implied negatively on job satisfaction, yet its equal counterpart dubbed Management for Result rather improve job satisfaction gives credence to the empirical argument that radical approach to reforms may have certain valuable attributes to public organizational outcomes including job satisfaction and positive employee attitudes if properly packaged.

However, the finding in the present study relative to the implications of the reforms does not relegate the concerns in the literature regarding the impact of the radical reforms on other public service values. The present findings which appear to somewhat contradict the common notions in the literature regarding the politically guided reforms come with a caveat premising on the significant relationship between interpersonal trust and professional discretion. When professional discretion is factored into the equation, the implication of the Pro-political-oriented model played no significant role on trust. It can therefore be argued that a mere reporting of relatively higher participation and communication does not assume positive implications of Pro-political-oriented model
particularly so when career managers in that jurisdiction did not report significant difference in terms of professional discretion compared to those in the *Pro-traditional-oriented model*. Issues regarding government efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and responsiveness are explained by several other factors particularly those that underline public service motivation and retention and attraction of competent energetic personnel (Perry and Wise, 1990). Therefore, in promoting mechanisms of interpersonal trust building, the fact should not be lost on how such relationship impact on other organizational outcomes. Gregory and Hicks (2002) has pointed out that it is important to “mount a constructive dialectic between two different paradigms of administrative reforms, to ensure that the benefits of the changes have not been at a cost of lowering standards of ethical probity in public service” (p. 3).

**Study Limitations**

The study focused on career managers in state government organizations. The primary difficulty in that regard was how to draw the distinction between the careerists and their counterpart non-careerists for the appropriate sampling. This limitation is well acknowledged in the literature (see for example Nigro and Kellough, 2010; Hays and Sowa, 2006). To mitigate this problem, the cover letter to the questionnaire clearly identified the target population and exempted those not in that category. However, the likelihood that some of the responses came from non-career managers or careerists below management positions cannot be entirely ruled out.

Questions could also be raised about the validity of the findings particularly in reference to the sampling method and the response rate. The respondents were selected from different agencies with different organizational culture and functions. However, the
result did not identify or tie the respondents and their responses to their respective agencies. Therefore, there is a room to speculate in terms of possible bias since respondents from particular agency could provide answers based on their peculiar experience.

Moreover, the questionnaire was administered largely via electronic means (Web-based). Though convenient and less costly given the scope and timeframe of the study, the challenges that are associated with the web-based approach cannot be ruled out in the present study. A number of questionnaires were returned with no answers, and this may be attributable to lack of clarity in terms of response entry and submission on the part of some of the respondents (see for example Schleyer and Forest, 2000). Thus, a number of non-usable responses were generated which could have been avoided if face-to-face interviews were carried out. There was also limited opportunity to probe the respondents further for more information. This was a challenge to the qualitative component of the study.

Two categories of public management models such as Pro-political- oriented and Pro-traditional oriented were created for comparative analysis. These two categories were based on the work of Hays and Sowa (2006). Basically, they do not exist in their ideal sense, and also a lot may have changed over time since Hays and Sowa’s study. Therefore, it becomes a bit problematic to draw a solid conclusion regarding the implications that each of them has on the variables under study. Moreover, a lot of factors come into play to determine the work conditions and work environment of the career civil servants. Among these are the presence and strength of labor unions and the political dynamics at a given time period (Ingraham, Selden, and Moynihan 2000; Goldsmith
These and other variables did not factor in the present study.

**Implications**

The findings in the present study have several implications for the future direction of public management. Fundamental among these implications is the issue of interpersonal trust relationship between the political appointees and the career public managers. From all indications, interpersonal trust remains low, yet an unavoidable element regarding the efficacy of public management to confront the realities of the contemporary policy environment. Public managers need to be versatile and be responsive to the public they serve. This cannot happen when they are confronted with restrictions and alienations. It is imperative that all stakeholders including practitioners, policy makers, and scholars adopt purposive approach to cultivate and nurture the appropriate environment for trust building for effective public service delivery.

Fundamental to public management reforms is the enhancement of public sector motivation. The path to this is to allow career bureaucrats to exercise greater professional responsibility, to be adaptive, and innovative. In addition, the incentive systems are to be improved to retain and attract competent people to the public service. Indeed these have been the justifications among the advocates of the radical or the politically oriented public management reforms. Juxtaposing the *Pro-political-oriented* and *Pro-traditional-oriented models*, it can be argued to some extent that the former offers some hope in term of trust, participation, and communication adequacy per the findings of the present study. However, in the two cases the latitude of professional discretion which invariably constitutes the lynchpin of trust building did not show significant difference. And indeed,
among other variables, the radical changes indicated no or limited influence on interpersonal trust. Therefore, it merits admonishing those incessantly advocating such radical approach as panacea to government challenges to tread cautiously.

If the answers to the myriad of challenges confronting the state public management systems do not rest with the radical changes, then it is important to critically look at the potential negative implications that such radical changes can bring about. This is particularly so when most states government are heading towards that path. Indeed one can argue that public service motivation or job satisfaction stand to be undermined by the radical or politically minded public management changes. The issues of job security and job advancement cannot be discounted. Considering the fact that career managers with limited tenure in public service tend to express more distrust, it can be argued that the long term implications regarding retention and attraction of energetic and competent people into the public service appear shaky. Several studies report of employees apprehensions with regards to the politically focused changes. Battaglio and Condrey (2006) cited the examples of Georgia to buttress the fact that the “politically motivated reforms are met with resistance, skepticism, and fears” (p.135). The reorganization and reactivation of AFSCME Chapters to re-strategize to protect employees’ conditions of service following Florida’s “Service First”, speaks volumes of the increasing apprehension among career bureaucrats relative to the administrative changes. Therefore, the seemingly tidal wave of politically motivated radical reforms across the states requires reconsideration to safeguard the civil service system from partisan manipulations. Evidence at the federal level where increasing partisan appointments
precipitated government inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and scandals should guide the states against falling into a similar quagmire.

Neither the traditional merit system nor the politically oriented changes has the efficacy to confront the public policy environment of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. The way forward is therefore the enhancement of the mechanisms that can promote public service motivation and job satisfaction rather than pursuing a partisan or politically guided paradigm. The focus should rather be on limiting the restrictions that tend to undermine flexibility of exercising professional responsibilities. That is, it is important to activate the key elements that can galvanize innovation, and positively influence organizational processes and behaviors founded on trust. This would require the relaxation of the rigid rules, regulations, and excessive hierarchy in public organizations. Excessive red-tape sends negative signals to the bureaucrats, and often leads to unfairness and miscommunication. Likewise, excessive hierarchy stifles mutual cooperation and informal interactions.

By building trust among career bureaucrats through flexibility of professional discretion, the risk-averse culture in public service can be reduced. Managers will be willing to engage in proactive actions, and will also refrain from adhering to strict routines. When professional public managers are allowed to think independently and explore diverse and innovative ways in performing their tasks, they develop high moral and build the necessary trust to complement the efforts of the political decision makers (Argyris, 1976; Nyhan, 2000). It is on this note that job security and potential job advancement cannot be overlooked. Exercising professional discretion in a politically charged environment entails risk taking on the part of career managers. Therefore,
elimination of job security pursuant to greater responsibility or exercise of flexible professional discretion could have paradoxical implications.

The limited goal clarity and upward communication as reported by career managers is an unhealthy development in public management. To address the problem, efforts should be made to promote a double-loop communication which is deemed to be critical for trust building in organizations. This will require less emphasis on hierarchy. As Moon (1999) noted, excessive “hierarchy may result in lower organizational sensitivity to product quality because of extra communication burdens between the product-units … and top management” (p.33). Career managers will be able to share their concerns and ask pertinent questions about organizational decision making. Moreover, the mutual mistrust between them and political appointees can be waned through openness in explaining why certain actions were or were not countenanced.

Barriers to trust building in organization may sometimes be the result of cultural differences. Psychological theorists argue that social categorization as an aspect of the cognitive processes may be a fundamental source of distrust and suspicion regarding the relationship between individuals or groups of different background within an organization (Kramer, 1999). Since politicians and bureaucrats often have different organizational cultural background and experience, it is imperative to encourage lateral communication. In this regard, face-to-face interactions or communication should be prioritized more than other means including electronic communication. Face-to-face communication, particularly those entailing informal settings, will help to decode certain social cues which are instrumental in trust building between career managers and political appointees. Such an approach can also bring about interpersonal relationships that are
often carried over into other social lives outside the organizational settings. This development is quite essential to trust building.

Orientations have been found to be effective tools to limit the deeply held suspicions and apprehensions between the political leadership and the career managers. The Charlottesville workshop example cited by Lorentzen (1985) in which political appointees and career managers came to appreciate the position of each other through perceptual mirror and joint problem-solving could be emulated by the states to improve the relationship between the incoming political managers and the incumbent career bureaucrats. It is also important to revisit and pay deserving attention to the 1984 recommendations made by the various professional associations in public administration in respect of trust-building orientations for political appointees and career managers (see Lorentzen, 1985, p. 412).

Ethical responsibility and accountability remain the primary levers to activate the mechanisms of trust building. Often times, the strict rules, centralization, and adherence to hierarchy are preferred because answers to the questions of ethics and accountability have not been found yet (Hosmer, 1995; Cox, Hill, and Pyakuryal, 2008). The continuous manifestation of government scandals such as conflict of interest, corruption, and abuse of office give credence to external controls over the tasks of public officials. Stakeholders will be willing to facilitate the appropriate environment necessary for trust building when reports of the scandalous occurrences are reduced. Therefore, through policies, concerted efforts could be initiated to re-orient public officials on their ethical obligations. Bowman (1990) finds in a study that among other things, it is believed that ethical behavior among public employees could be enhanced when genuine codes of ethics are developed and
facilitated through continuous training. In this regard professional associations can play crucial role by engaging in advocacy, orientation workshops, and other training programs.

**Future Research**

As an exploratory endeavor, the present study creates an opportunity to delve deeper into the dynamics of the relationship between the political and career leadership in government. It is important that cross sectional studies are conducted to establish the changing trend of the reforms and how they have affected intraorganizational relationship over time, particularly in reference to the political appointees and the career bureaucrats. Effort in that direction, coupled with more data, would help to draw a more valid conclusion.

The fundamental objective of examining trust and its related variables is to appropriately understand the contributing factors to effective, efficient, responsive, and accountable public service delivery. However, the present study left that important question unanswered. Therefore, future research could look at the relationship between interpersonal trust and organizational responsiveness and performance with specific reference to the relationship between political managers and career managers. This is very important considering the fact that the present study found no significant relationship between interpersonal trust and organizational commitment. Given that the relationship between employee commitment and organizational performance is well rooted in theory, further studies as suggested would enrich the scholarly literature.

Given the limitation that the respondents were selected from different agencies with different cultures, future studies could be focused on comparing two or more
agencies. This will help to ascertain how organization culture rather than specific paradigm influence the dynamics of the relationships between professional bureaucrats and political appointees. The other area of concentration regarding future studies may be the relationship between politicians and professionals at the metropolitan and municipal government levels, and how such relationship impact on urban land use and fiscal policies. By such endeavor we can extend the literature to cover the impact of politics-administration relationship on public policy. Concentrating future studies on local government is essential given the persistent tensions in the intergovernmental relationship (Miller and Cox, 2014). The perspectives of career bureaucrats could be examined in respect of how the political tensions impact on the dynamics of the interpersonal relationships in agencies whose functional jurisdictions extend beyond a specific boundary.

Moreover, the present study created two models of public management reforms by focusing primarily on certain key internal organizational variables. Given the impact that the external environment has on the internal dynamics of public organizations (Mooney and Lee, 1995), future research could validate the conclusions drawn from the comparative analysis by considering the external environmental variables in addition to the internal organizational variables. In this regard, key variables such as the strength of labor unions, voter participation, and political party in power as accordingly patterned among the states could be considered for comparative analysis.

**Conclusion**

The new path for public management in the contemporary policy environment is articulated under several theoretical models including new managerialism (Pollitt, 1992),
post-bureaucratic paradigm (Barzley, 1994), new governance (Ingraham and Ramzek, 1994), trust-based organizational paradigm (Nyhan, 2000), and hybrid image (Aberbach and Rockman, 1997). Like the theoretical framework adopted for the purpose of this study (Complementarity model), all the aforementioned public management models attest to the interdependent, collaborative, cooperative, and complementary nature of the relationship between the political authority and the administrative leadership. It is acknowledged that rational for political control cannot be prioritized over professional imperatives. It takes the two values to accomplish efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and accountability in public management. Central to this relationship is trust. The need to build a trustful working relationship between career bureaucrats and political officeholders was one of the prioritized recommendations of the Winter Commission and other subsequent public management reform initiatives.

The extent of success relative to trust building remains unimpressive in the literature. The manifestation of minimal trust is the continuing bashing of the bureaucracy and its leadership by politicians. Most politicians have assumed office with preconceived negative impression about the bureaucratic personnel. According to Garret et al (2006) “bureaucracy and bureaucrat “bashing” are standard fare in campaign rhetoric” (p.228). The outcomes of these incessant attacks have been the constant promulgation of more rules, steady recoiling of the bureaucrats into their secured spheres, frequent turnovers, emotional frustrations, and more importantly the sustained mistrust. Indeed, the present study has confirmed this situation. Interpersonal trust between political appointees and career managers remains low, at least from the perspectives of career managers. In essence, the prerequisite anchors of the complementary relationship
such as flexibility of discretion, participation, and communication remain low and ineffective. There appears to be a persistency regarding strict adherence to rigid rules, ineffective communication, alienation, and risk-averse culture in public organizations as a result of lack of interpersonal trust. One may wonder if indeed the politics-administration dichotomy assumption was a myth. Kaufman (1956) has postulated that no paradigm exists in its absolute terms at a particular point in time rather it is the emphasis of particular values. Suffice to say that a lot remain to be done in order to transition from the dichotomy model to the complementarity model since most of the elements of the former are very active and continue to be values of emphasis in today’s environment.

The way forward does not require mere rhetoric and political gimmickry. It calls for concerted and strategic efforts to enhance the capacity of the bureaucratic leadership to dispense its professional responsibilities with vigor, zeal, and adequate authority. To this effect, structural and cultural changes are imperative so that strict hierarchy and paternalistic approach to decision making could give way to equal collaboration, active participation, and information sharing. Per the findings of the present study, answers are not found in the politically guided reforms, neither do they rests with the traditional civil service system. Concerns about the potential paradox regarding the radical reforms are legitimate. It is important not to overlook job security whilst pursuing measures pertinent to trust building and public service motivation.

This study was dubbed exploratory, and as such, offers enough basis to appreciate the issues further. What is of essence is that the 21st century challenges can only be confronted when political appointees forge effective collaborations with their counterpart career managers. A significant manifestation of interpersonal trust is required to cement
the complementary engagements and dialogue between the political and career managers so that political imperative could optimally be reconciled with administrative values. But as it stands now, particularly given the levels of interpersonal trust, professional discretion, participative management, and communication, there appears to be more room for improvement.
REFERENCES


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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES

Survey questions measuring interpersonal trust, managerial discretion, participative management, communication and organizational commitment.

The following statements are about how you, as a career public manager, perceive your relationship (and that of your peers) with political appointees and how such relationship impact on their regular tasks in their agencies or units of work. As a career public manager or senior civil servant, you are asked to share your general experience including your experience at current organization regarding your relationship with political appointees on a scale of 1-7. Confidentiality is completely assured.

On a scale of 1-7 please respond to the following statements.

1-Strongly disagree
7-Strongly agree

A. Interpersonal trust

1. In general career managers do not believe there will be repercussions from political appointees when the careerists take risks in performing their tasks.

2. In general career managers believe they can count on their counterpart political appointees to defend and protect them.

3. In general career managers can rely on what political appointees in their organization tell them.

B. Managerial discretion

4. In general career managers feel their ability to manage is not restricted by enforcement of unnecessary rules and practices imposed by political appointees.

5. In general career managers are allowed by political appointees to exercise authority to determine how they get their jobs done to the best of their ability.

C. Participative management
6. In general career managers are free to suggest changes in their organization to political appointees.

7. In general the opinions and thoughts of career managers are considered important by political appointees.

8. In general career managers feel involved in major decision making in their organizations given their relationship with political appointees.

D. Communication
9. In general career managers are clearly informed about the goals and objectives of their organizations by political appointees.

10. In general political appointees always seek information from career managers when taking major organizational decisions.

E. Commitment
11. In general career managers feel happy to work in their organizations until their retirement.

12. In general career managers have strong sense of belonging to their organization.

13. In general career managers take organizational problems as their personal problem.

Gender
1. Male
2. Female

Years spent in Civil service
1. Less than 15 years
2. More than 15 years
The following statements are about how you, as a career public manager, perceive your relationship (and that of your peers) with political appointees and how such relationship impact on their regular tasks in their agencies or units of work. As a career public manager or senior civil servant, you are asked to share your general experience including your experience at current organization regarding your relationship with political appointees on a scale of 1-7. Confidentiality is completely assured.

On a scale of 1-7 please respond to the following statements.
1. Strongly disagree
2. Strongly agree

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<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
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<td>1. career managers do not believe there will be repercussions from political appointees when the career managers miss deadlines in performing their tasks.</td>
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<td>5. career managers are allowed by political appointees to exercise authority to determine how they perform their duties to the best of their ability.</td>
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<td>8. career managers are clearly informed about goals and objectives of their organization by political appointees.</td>
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<td>9. political appointees always seek information from career managers when making major organizational decisions.</td>
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<td>10. career managers feel happy to work in their organizations until their retirement.</td>
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<td>11. career managers have a strong sense of belonging to their organization.</td>
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<td>12. career managers take organizational problems as their personal problem.</td>
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Gender:
☐ Male
☐ Female

Years spent in Civil service:
☐ Less than 15 years
☐ More than 15 years
APPENDIX B

QUALITATIVE MEASURES

Survey questions measuring interpersonal trust, managerial discretion, participative management, communication and organizational commitment for the qualitative component.

| Trust                           | 1. Would you say that there is greater level of interpersonal trust between career public managers and their counterpart political appointees? Why/why not?  
|                                | 2. Are career managers willing to take risk in discharging their duties given their relationship with the political appointees? Why/why not? |
| Managerial discretion          | 1. Would you agree that career public managers have greater latitude to exercise their professional discretion as best as they would wish? Why/why not? |
| Participative management       | 1. Would you say that career public managers feel much involved in major agency decision making process given their relationship with the political appointees? Why/why not? |
| Communication          | 1. Would you say that upward communication between the political leadership and career managers is as best as expected? Why/why not?  
|                       | 2. Are career managers clear about the goals of their organizations given their relationships with the political appointees? Why/why not? |
| Commitment            | 1. What is your opinion about the commitment levels of career managers? |
CATEGORIZATION OF STATES ACCORDING TO PERSONNEL SYSTEM

Categorization of states according to their approach to personnel management system: Formulated from the findings of Hays and Sowa (2006). These categories were used to create the two models (*Pro-traditional-oriented* and *Pro-political-oriented reforms*) for the comparative analysis.

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## APPENDIX D

### COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTIC TEST

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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Collinearity Statistics</th>
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**p<.001, ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10**

**Model I:** Discretion only  
**Model II:** Interpersonal Communication Only  
**Model III:** Participative Management Only  
**Model IV:** Commitment Levels Only  
**Model V:** Pro-Business Only  
**Model VI:** Full Model
# APPENDIX E

**LEVENE’S TEST FOR EQUALITY OF VARIANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Samples Test</th>
<th>Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>Test for Equality of Means</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
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244
## APPENDIX F

### RESULTS FROM THE QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

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<tr>
<th>Model 1: Pro Political-oriented Model</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>No of Respondents</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variables (Codes)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Trust</strong> (Do career managers trust political appointees and willing to take risk in discharging their duties?):</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Response code:</strong> Being cautious and recheck actions for fear of political victimization.</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Prof-discretion:</strong> (Would you agree that career public managers have greater latitude to exercise their professional discretion as best as they would wish?)</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response code:</strong> Minimal flexibility to exercise professional discretion as expected as a result of restrictions.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Participative Mgt.</strong> (Would you say that career public managers feel much involved in major agency decision making process given their relationship with the political appointees?):</td>
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<td><strong>Response code:</strong> engagement or involvement is more on technical and operational feasibilities of programs.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Comm.</strong> (Would you say that career managers experience adequate upward communication and or. Goal clarity?):</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Response code:</strong> Communication is inadequate, there is always room for improvement</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commitment</strong> (What is your opinion about the commitment levels of career managers given their relationships with political appointees?):</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Response code:</strong> Remain and stay committed to jobs, committed to the policy that they implement, and the ‘public that they serve.</td>
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<td>Model 1: Pro Traditional-oriented Model</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
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