WEBERIAN BUREAUCRACY: A REQUISITE FOR THE
CONSOLIDATION OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

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ABSTRACT

Aspects of modernity such as liberal democracy, legal rational bureaucracy and socio-economic and political development usually go hand in hand. The development of liberal democracy is contingent upon the existence of a legal rational, merit-based bureaucracy. Although Max Weber was wary about the possible aberration that could result in bureaucracy taking over democratic institutions, he did concede that the two phenomena of mass democracy and modern bureaucracy develop in parallel. The concepts of individual liberty, delegated sovereignty, political legitimacy and equality are results of modern man’s ability to rationalize. To act upon the will of the majority in a modern mass-democracy, legal rational bureaucracy emerged as its necessary administrative tool.

This important facet of political modernity, however, has largely ignored by democracy and development experts. The profound “reassessment” of the role of bureaucracy in the hope of curtailing fiscal crisis has resulted in extensive cutback programs that have destroyed the core segments of bureaucracy. Despite billions of dollars pouring into regions of Africa and Asia, new democratic states have not been able to deliver "good governance." Technically liberal democracy should facilitate modern bureaucracy but that has not been the case as shown by so many studies in public administration. Instead, there has been a conscious effort to stifle bureaucratic development in the belief that bureaucracy acts as a hindrance to democratic development.
and economic growth. This “tampering” may have resulted in regimes that have either strong democratic regime traits with weak, formalistic administrative institutions; or relatively modern administrative institutions with weak democratic regime traits.

The study assumes that both modern bureaucracy and liberal democracy start from the nascent or under-developed state and proceed towards fully developed or consolidated state. Both these phenomena are offshoots of political modernity and are co-existent. The study explores the relationship between modern bureaucratic structures of government and liberal democracy. It focuses on contradicting the institutional imbalance thesis which says that if bureaucracy develops, democracy erodes, i.e., that developed, rational bureaucracy pose danger to budding, new democracy.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

...for in democracies which are subject to the law the best citizens hold the first place, and there are no demagogues; but where the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring up. Aristotle (2005; 1291b4, p.101)

Liberty depends incomparably more upon administration than upon constitutions. Niebuhr (1944)

Does bureaucracy help liberal democracy? Does bureaucracy hinder liberal democracy? Development specialists have been arguing over this for years. The current state of the art has two conflicting streams of thoughts. The first stream asserts that a well-developed bureaucracy in transitional regimes potentially hinders the growth of democratic institutions and subsequently impedes democratic development (Eisenstadt, 1963; Goodnow, 1964; LaPalombara, 1963; Pye, 1963). The second stream of thought argues that a developed bureaucracy facilitates political development (Heady, 2001; Sigelman, 1972; Weidner, 1964). One thing that has not been done so far is to compare data on “liberal democracy” and “modern, Weberian bureaucracy” to see if there is any kind of relationship between the two phenomena. This study seeks to find out the relationship between modern, legal-rational, Weberian bureaucracy and democratic development by correlating existing data on these two phenomena.
Statement of the Problem

Various fundamentals such as literacy rate, economic development, socio-cultural patterns, Judeo-Christian heritage, political systems and even institutional strength have been touted as inherent requisites for consolidating democracy. Except for fleeting mentions, bureaucracy does not fall under the popular “democracy requisites” category in mainstream political science. Studies that did mention bureaucracy in the context of political development were done largely under the auspices of Public Administration. Even when recent comparative theorists such as Diamond (2005) and Fukuyama (2004) talked about strengthening “institutions”, they meant the parliament; executive and the legislative bodies and political parties; not so much the administrative branch.

Although scholars such as Levitan (1942) believed that the nature of the administrative procedural machinery is seen as important as, if not more important than the nature of the philosophical principles of the government, and that democratic government means democracy in administration as well as in the original legislation, “democracy studies” hardly seem to give the structure and process of administration the kind of importance it deserves. This might be due to institutional imbalance thesis’ arguments against “strong bureaucracies” in under-developed democracies or it could be because of the neo-liberal wave that swept the post-World War II period. International financial institutions (IFIs) rallied for minimalistic governments and market economy, which they believed would spread and consolidate liberal democracy across the globe.

Reduced scope and function of the administrative structures emerged as a dominant theme at the time when most of the countries in the former Communist World, Latin America, Asia, and Africa were shedding the shackles of authoritarian rule and
opting for democracy, a trend defined as the “third wave” by Samuel Huntington (1991). Lipset (1960) and others stressed economic development for consolidating democracy, state institutions and administrative structures of the newer democracies saw much of the support from International financial institutions going towards building strong market economies. Left pretty much on their own to evolve administrative institutions started taking form of hybrids. These hybrid state and administrative institutions were subsequently termed “prismatic” by Fred Riggs (1964).

These bureaucratic structures, according to Riggs, function very differently from Weber’s modern legal rational bureaucracy. Under the façade of modern bureaucracy, non-merit bureaucrats belonging to traditional class and caste elites retained their bureaucratic status. They then formed a self-protecting network in order to safeguard their special interests, especially their right to stay in office, which subsequently resulted in increasing inefficiency (Riggs, 1994).

According to Weber (1978), development of democracy and bureaucracy is a parallel phenomenon. However, the process of this parallel development in the third world democracies has been tampered with. The IFIs’ immense faith in minimalistic governments was imported to these new democracies via aid packages (Badru, 1998). In the name of “development administration” during the ‘60s and the ‘70s and “public management” during the ‘90s the natural progression of modern bureaucracy as an offshoot of modernity and democracy was repeatedly intercepted and interfered with. The result was the rise of inept public institutions, which as Riggs (1964) described, were often prismatic and formalistic in nature.
Purpose of the Study

Due to the strong influence of the “institutional imbalance” theses in the area of comparative politics, bureaucracy as an instrument of positive political change has largely been ignored.

Although most concur with Almond and Powell (1966) that a political system cannot develop a high level of internal regulation, distribution or extraction without a modern governmental bureaucracy in one form or the other; there is an overall consensus about that the existence of a strong modern bureaucracy in developing nation-state with weak political institutions presents a major obstacle to political development. Also, there is a general agreement that in many developing nations, bureaucracy has gained ascendancy over other political institutions and that the number of such cases has increased resulting in current imbalance between bureaucratic and political development (Heady, 2001, p. 429). The question whether the presence of a fairly developed bureaucracy enhances or inhibits overall political development has been dealt with mostly by theorists who agree with the imbalance theory in one way or the other. One of these theorists, Fred Riggs (1964), opined that transitional societies frequently lack balance between political policy making institutions and bureaucratic policy implementing structures which leads to bureaucrats appropriating political functions. According to Riggs, if one is concerned with effective administration in the transitional societies, building political foundations for public administration is a prerequisite to erection of administrative superstructures complete with formally elaborated machinery for planning, staffing, budgeting, coordinating and all the other administrative refinements (Riggs, 1964, p. 262).
Here Riggs points out that “political foundations” are the necessary prerequisites for establishment of modern administrative structures. By political foundations, he means a broad modern, legal rational political base on which the administrative apparatus should be built. He indicates that the bureaucracies in transitional societies are “prismatic” in nature, i.e., those that are not fully developed nor modernized and are therefore incapable of performing as effectively or as equitably as their counterparts in modernized societies. According to Riggs, it is these “prismatic” bureaucracies that pose a danger to democratic institutions. If it is these prismatic bureaucracies that act as impediments to the democratic vitality of nascent liberal democratic states, how would modern, legal rational bureaucracies affect these polities? Do they also pose as great a threat as prismatic or formalistic bureaucracies or they do instead reinforce democratic governance? The study seeks to answer these questions.

Relevant Concepts

At issue is the question whether modern, legal rational bureaucracies over-participate and thus hinder democracy or do they in fact strengthen democracy. Weber’s theory of modern, legal rational bureaucracy and fundamentals of democratic liberalism provide theoretical background for this study.

Braibanti (1961) wrote that “a bureaucracy in which democratic patterns have been extended and fortified may not be the worst fate which might befall a developing nation.” He consistently maintained that a primary requisite for political development is a competent bureaucratic system. Few systems theorists like Braibanti have opined that a modern, competent bureaucracy facilitates the overall political development. However,
what exactly is modern bureaucracy and how is it connected, if at all, to furthering democracy? Why is bureaucracy seen as a threat to democratic development universally? To answer these questions one may first look at the historical development of the theories of modern bureaucracy and liberal democracy-how they both share the concepts of reason, legitimacy, neutrality and order.

Modern Bureaucracy

Modern bureaucracy is a component of political modernity. The word bureaucracy originated from the Greek for power (kratos) and from the French for office (bureau). Weber’s analysis of bureaucracy remains the theoretical framework within which most empirical research on this subject is pursued. To understand Weber’s idea about bureaucracy, it is necessary to begin with the framework of his political sociology in which the concept of bureaucracy finds its place. Weber felt that all power requires a belief in its legitimacy if it is to become stabilized (Constas, 1958). Accordingly, Weber set up his typology of the grounds on which a claim to legitimacy may be based.

Legitimacy can be claimed on a legal rational basis as the expectation that an order will be obeyed on different grounds of belief. There legitimacy rests on the belief in legality of normative rules and the right to issue commands on the part of those elevated to authority under those rules. In other words, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order (Contas, 1958). The second of the possible bases for legitimacy is traditional where legitimacy rests in the established beliefs on traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them. The third basis, for a belief in legitimacy is the expectation that an order will be obeyed is charismatic. Here
legitimacy rests on the devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity or heroism of an individual person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (Contas, 1958). The legacy of the modernity project was therefore carried on by Weber’s legal rational bureaucracy, which upheld reason as its core value.

According to Weber (1978, p. 217) legal authority rests on the acceptance of the validity of mutually inter-dependent ideas such as any given legal norm may be established by agreement or by imposition, on grounds of value rationality; every body of law consists essentially in a consistent system of abstract rules which have normally been intentionally established. The typical person in authority is himself subject to an impersonal order and orients his actions to it in his own dispositions and comments. The person who obeys authority does so only in his capacity as a “member” of the organization and what he obeys is only “the law” of an association, of a community, of a church, or a citizen of a state. Weber also stresses the fact that while members of the organization obey a person in authority, they do not owe this obedience to him as an individual, but to the impersonal order; therefore, “it is the rationally delimited jurisdiction which, in terms of the order, has been given to him” (Weber, 1978, p. 218).

According to Richardson (1997, p. 10), Weber argued that legal rational bureaucracy and democracy are at once inextricably linked and antagonistic and therefore must be a constant and inescapable source of tension and conflict. Weber theorized that democracy needs legal rational bureaucracy as an alternative to the rule of the dilettantes. The paradox here is that as a system brought about by a modern democratic egalitarianism and universalism which promoted professional, expert impartial
bureaucrats comes in constant clash with democracy, i.e., the “norms and desires of the masses.”

The property-less masses, especially are not served by the formal “equality before the law” and the “calculable” adjudication and administration demanded by bourgeois interests. Naturally in their eyes justice and administration should serve to equalize their economic and social life-opportunities in the face of the propertied classes. Justice and administration can fulfill this function only if they assume a character that is informal--. Not only any sort of popular justice-which usually does not ask for reasons or norms-but also any intensive influence on the administration by so-called “public opinions”-that is, concerted action born of irrational “sentiments” and usually staged or directed by party bosses or the press-thwarts the rational course of justice. (Weber, 1978, p. 980)

Richardson (1997) therefore writes that the highly rationalized bureaucratic apparatus of the U.S. administrative state that constantly comes under fire from a public that thinks it is incompetent and irresponsible would probably not surprise Weber at all. It has been accused of being too impersonal, rigid. Hummel (2008, p. 242) warns that bureaucracy is fast replacing society. Bureaucracy, according to Hummel following Weber, reduces individuality in society; breeds culture without values; and erodes human psychology, language, thought processes and politics. The arguments against strong bureaucracy are compelling; however, so are the arguments that the presence of a modern, legal-rational bureaucracy being vital for smooth functioning of liberal democracy.

Guy Peters (1992) gives a realistic view of the role of public bureaucracy as being a distinguishing feature of a contemporary government. According to Peters, the massive increases in the number and complexity of government functions since the end of World War II or even the mid-1960s have generated demands for governance that could only be
met through an increased capacity of public bureaucracy. He further argues that in the
contemporary welfare state, “public bureaucracy has achieved an importance that few of
the major theoreticians of public administration, or of democratic government could have
imagined or condoned” (pp. 308-309). Despite political pressure to minimize the policy
making role of the bureaucracy he believes that public bureaucracy remains in a powerful
policy making position. That power according to him may be the prerequisite of effective
government in contemporary society.

Goodsell (2004, p. 157), too, has argued that a good bureaucracy is indispensable
to a free society and to democratic polity. According to him, the ability to vote a
government out of office without disruption requires a reliable administrative apparatus.

Box (2007) quotes John Kirlin when he says that, “bureaucracy is a central part of
the grandest of human endeavors, shaping a better future for ourselves and those yet
unborn.” “Such institutions crafted to achieve human aspirations require administration”
(p. 8). Box also cites a comparative theorist, Ezra Sulieman, who writes that bureaucracy
is the instrument by which a democracy can strengthen or weaken its legitimacy. How
exactly does modern bureaucracy strengthen or weaken democracy’s legitimacy? How is
modern bureaucracy connected to liberal democracy?

Liberal Democracy

Today any critical examination of the term “democracy” immediately discovers
its ambiguity and the multiplicity of meanings which it carries. Etymologically
democracy translates to the rule of the people. To this original meaning, however, there
have been added extensions such as social and legal equality, individual liberty,
economic opportunity and equal rights of all (Shepard, 1935). To return to the original meaning: “democracy” was used by the Greeks in contrast with the two other primary forms of government; “aristocracy” and “monarchy.” The Greek attitude towards democracy was simply one of weighing the advantages and the disadvantages inherent in this type as compared with those inherent in the other two primary forms. They did not conceive of democracy as a final end and goal of human existence. Aristotle reached the conclusion that the best form of government was one, which embodied elements from all three of the primary types (Shepard, 1935). The principal reason might be because he knew that at the heart of democratic principle lies a tension, “evinced most forcefully in our practical struggle to reconcile equality driven majority rule with individual liberty” (Lindsay, 1992, p. 743).

The roots of modern, liberal, representative democracy can be traced back to the era of Enlightenment. Although there were many differences among the thinkers of the Enlightenment era, they shared a conviction that human rationality could discover universal principles, whether of nature, morality, or aesthetics – the belief in universal human rights arose during and as a consequence of the Enlightenment (Lakoff, 1990). The increasingly secular age relied upon recognition of the universal capacity for rationality. The new spirit found its expression in Francis Bacon’s experimental philosophy as well as in René Descartes’ rationalism, which proclaimed in his “Cogito, ergo sum” the sovereignty and maturity of the thinking individual (Kohn, 1966). Reason also became the core component of liberal democracy. The liberalism that started with placing the individual and his liberty as the core concern slowly started evolving with the rise of capitalism and laissez faire economy. As Sabine (1937) wrote, the
exploitation of women and children in coal mines and factories during the peak of industrial revolution gave rise to a trend of questioning the humanistic aspect of liberalism. According to Thomas Hill Green (1874), liberal policies had to be flexible in order to meet changes of circumstance and were an effort to open a humane way of living to a larger number of persons (Sabine, 1937). Consequently, he inferred that at the center of liberal philosophy is the idea of a general good, which is capable of being shared by everyone, and which provides a standard for legislation. He argued that this “standard cannot be individual liberty alone, or the least possible legal restriction of free choice, because free choice has always to be exercised in a situation, and some situations are such that they reduce choice to a mockery.” According to Green, it is impossible that a government should be liberal merely by standing aside and refraining from legislation, or that a liberal society should come into being merely, so to speak, by political inadvertence. The function of a liberal government is to support the existence of a free society.

Before him, Kant had argued that rational agents must agree to enter a social contract establishing a civil constitution—for only under a civil constitution can freedom be exercised. He concluded that,

--for any “state of nature”, any society imagined to be without a civil constitution, the danger is ever present that others may interfere with my free action with no judge set above us. This would leave me with no recourse besides force—a state of war holds. From this, it follows that as an *a priori* demand of reason that the state of nature must be abandoned. (Smith, 1985, p. 255)

This reverberates to some extent with Hobbes’, Rousseau’s, and other contractual theorists’ positions. According to Smith (1985, p. 256), “here the existence of coercive
laws enforced by a public authority ensures an approximation to a situation in which the exercise of one’s freedom is limited only by the freedom of others.” Therefore, a just system of institutions is the one compatible with the general will as the ultimate ground of the civil constitution. Sabine (1937) writes that according to Locke, a true state must be a constitutional state in which men acknowledge the rule of law for there can be no political liberty if a man is “subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man. Government must therefore, writes Sabine (1937, p. 452), be formed “by establishing standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decree.” This is an important attribute shared by both modern bureaucratic theory and democratic liberalism-autonomy of rationally agreed upon rules and equality before those sets of rules are some of the fundamentals that drive both of these phenomena.

The notion of adhering to institutional decree is further strengthened by Green’s point of view that even a free market is an institution and might require legislation to keep it free. Green’s liberalism was a “frank acceptance of the state as a positive agency to be used at any point where legislation could be shown to contribute to “positive freedom,” i.e., for any purpose that added to the general welfare without creating worse evil than it removed” (Sabine, 1937, p. 615). Green’s restatement of liberalism did away with the rigid line between economics and politics by which the older liberals had excluded the state from interfering with the operation of a free market (Sabine, 1937).

Modern day liberal democracy was thus born;-now it belongs to the sphere of the political in the broadest sense, defined as collectively binding decision-making, whatever the group may be, from the family to the state. Its basic principles are that such decision-
making should be controlled by all members of the group considered as equals—the principles in other words, of popular control and political equality. Beetham (1994, p. 159) writes, “A system of collectively binding decision-making can be judged democratic to the extent that it embodies these principles, and specific institutions or practices to the extent that they help realize them.” This was where modern bureaucracy stepped in. As Weber (1978, pp. 984-986) wrote, the democratic process of collective decision-making thus gets transformed into rational action via modern bureaucracy— it helps the state to administer its policies and to govern according to its wills. Despite this intrinsically close relationship, there is a great deal of skepticism about the role of bureaucracy in politics.

Theoretical Framework

As mentioned above and elaborated in the literature section, there is a distinct overlap of concepts of both liberal democracy and legal-rational bureaucracy theories. Both are offshoots of modernity. Both stand on the postulates of reason and equity (before the law). As democracy seeks to achieve equality and freedom, bureaucracy acts as a tool to achieve that end by exercising neutrality, order, and predictability. As described above, democracy and modern bureaucracy appear as two distinct yet complimentary concepts.

Likewise, Weber (1978, p. 986) has stated the progress of bureaucratization within the state administration is a phenomenon paralleling the development of democracy. However, there is also a general agreement that in many developing nations bureaucracy has gained ascendancy over other political institutions and that the number
of such cases has increased, at least until recently, with a resulting current imbalance in bureaucratic and political development (Heady, 2001, p. 429).

One argument of this “institutional imbalance thesis” is that the existence of a strong modern bureaucracy in a polity with political institutions that are generally weak presents itself as a major obstacle to political development. The counter argument is that a high level of bureaucratic development can be expected to enhance rather than hinder prospects of overall political development (Heady, 2001). According to Riggs (1964), the form of government usually found in nations generally regarded as modern is balanced whereas many developing nations have unbalanced polities. Riggs called the latter polities “bureaucratic polities” with the tendency to inhibit political development which he argued results from “premature or rapid expansion of bureaucracy when the political system lags behind.” Lucian Pye (1963, pp. 25-43) also argued that the greatest problem in nation-building is how to relate the administrative and authoritative structures of government to political forces within the transitional societies in the face of the usual imbalance between “recognized administrative tradition and a still inchoate political process.”

Countering this imbalance thesis, scholars such as Ralph Braibanti (1961) argued that a primary requisite for development is a competent bureaucratic system and assumed that the strengthening of administration must proceed irrespective of the rate of maturation of political process. He argues that administrative reform has permeative effects on other institutions and structures and may help generate growth of these sectors (Heady, 2001, p. 433).
Various other writers can be identified with the general proposition that the risk of jeopardizing a more balanced political equilibrium in the future does not justify a deliberate policy of stifling further bureaucratic development whenever current imbalance exists favoring the bureaucracy. As mentioned earlier, Lee Sigelman (1972) argued that evidence is substantial that “the presence of a relatively modern national administrative system is a necessary precondition of, not a hindrance to, societal modernization, including political development. Not only that, his study concluded that it was the under-developed bureaucracy that “tends to gain an overwhelming degree of influence over government policy,” not the modern developed bureaucracy.

Although Weber was wary of hyper-bureaucratization and of the influences of advancing bureaucracy on individual freedom, he himself conceded that as democracy levels the traditional power centers, modern bureaucracy helps dismantle the traditional administrative structures. It “inevitably accompanies modern mass democracy due to the abstract regularity of the exercise of authority, which is the result of the demand for ‘equality before the law’” (Weber, 1978, p. 983).

Based on the Weberian paradigm which states that the progress of bureaucratization within the state administration is a phenomenon paralleling the developing of democracy (1978, p. 984), this study proposes that the presence of a modern Weberian bureaucracy is a necessary condition for consolidation of liberal democracy (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Proposed theoretical framework.

This is an exploratory study, which, as mentioned above proposes that the presence of modern bureaucracy is a necessary condition for consolidation of liberal democracy. The study compares 26 developing democracies’ bureaucratic structures, their performance and democratic development. Two variables that are most often discussed in the study of democracy have been included in this study as “confounding factors.” The first one is economy. Economic development has been the most oft-quoted factor in democracy studies since Lipset mentioned it in 1959 (see also Dahl, 1971). The second confounding factor here is education. Education has consistently been found to increase political participation, electoral turnouts, civil engagement, political knowledge, and democratic attitude and opinions (Hillygus, 2005). Decades of political science research have concluded that education directly influences an individual’s proclivity to participate in the political realm (Hillygus, 2005).
In conclusion, consolidation of democracy has been attributed to everything from urbanization to industrialization; from economy to education; from religion to culture. However, one phenomenon that is the cornerstone of these entire occurrences – i.e., the development of modern bureaucracy and its potential influence on democracy consolidation has been sidelined. The study of public bureaucracy languishes in the backwaters of democracy projects. This dissertation explores the effect that modern bureaucratic presence has on the process of democracy consolidation among 26 developing democracies.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

After six decades and number of predictive models, democratic consolidation is still as uphill a task. The role of every variable in the enhancement of democratic development has been scrutinized and studied except for the role of bureaucracy. There is this seeming apathy that comparative political theorists have towards studying whether administrative apparatuses play a role in effective democratic governance.

Hostility towards bureaucracy has also been a durable feature, especially among political conservatives and economic liberals. They regard bureaucracy as a manifestation of big government and an instrument for governmental interference in the operations of the private sector. All who share this distaste believe that they are faced with some formidable problems through internal contradictions in the democratic political structure itself; especially created by the role of bureaucracy in it (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983).

Weber himself was concerned about the ultimate effects of growing bureaucratization on democracy and freedom. He believed that the capacities for bureaucracies to mute itself from means to an end, from efficient administrative apparatus for accomplishing goals into powerful organizations devoted to perpetuating themselves is a familiar pattern (Hummel, 2008). More often than not, academics and development experts see bureaucracy as a mechanism that acts against the spirit of democracy, a system that impedes the very process of democracy. This deduction has
been carried over to comparative administration studies, which have assumed that an apparatus, which has the potential to overwhelm well-developed political institutions of the Western World, is more than likely to completely overshadow those weak, under-developed political institutions of new democracies and hinder their democratic growth (Almond & Coleman, 1960; Eisenstadt, 1956; Riggs, 1964).

However, there are those who disagree. They argue that modern bureaucracy is a governing tool of a modern state. It has the ability to modernize society and facilitate economic growth (Sigelman, 1972; Weber, 1978, Weidner, 1964). Sigelman’s study on developing democracies show that modern bureaucracies do not “over-participate” in the political process as most of the “imbalance theorists” argue. To the contrary, his study proved that modern bureaucracy actually facilitates political development.

The Problem of New Democracies

The struggle to consolidate new democracies in the continents of Asia, South America, and Africa led to intensive study comparing polities, restructuring economic and political institutions as well as economic and social conditions (Diamond & Plattner, 1997; Held, 1995). The success of democratic consolidation in Germany, Italy, and Japan after the Second World War had convinced policy makers that consolidating democracies in the developing nation states would bear similar results. The optimism was further fueled by the second and third wave of democracy that came in during the ‘70s and the ‘80s respectively (Huntington, 1991). However most of those third wave democracies, especially in Asia and Africa have either relapsed into authoritarianism or have teetered
towards a state of anarchy. The cause is attributed mainly to the weak or failing character of state institutions (Diamond, 2006; Fukuyama, 2004).

According to Larry Diamond (2006), these countries, along with the classic facilitating conditions such as a more developed level of per capita income, civil society, independent mass media, political parties, mass democratic attitudes and values, also lack the more basic conditions of a viable political order. Consequently, before a country can have a democratic state, it must first have a state, i.e., a set of political and administrative institutions that exercise authority over a territory, make and execute policies, extract and distribute revenue, produce public goods, and maintain order by wielding an effective monopoly over the means of violence. However, for a state to exercise authority, it has to first have legitimacy.

As Morlino (2002) writes, the end of the 20th century was accompanied by various challenges to legitimacy. These challenges prompted scholars to speak of the “crisis of democracy” with particular references to distancing of citizens from political parties, the emergence of anti-party attitude, and a general dissatisfaction and anti-establishment attitude. Overall, scholars saw a general decline of confidence in public institutions. Morlino quotes Newton and Norris (2000) who made specific reference to parliament, the legal system, the armed and police forces, and public administration. According to him, there is a connection between “the absence of the guarantee of the rule of law and the incapacity of governments to respond to the demands of their citizens for whom the guarantee of law takes precedence over other needs.” Absence of the rule of law results not only in disorder, it also erodes institutional strengths. Without strong
democratic system of the rule of law in place, institutions as well as citizens are vulnerable to arbitrary actions of the leaders, political players as well as individuals.

Recently, it has been deduced, however, that threats to new democracies are likely to come, not from generals and revolutionaries according to Huntington (1997, p. 8) but rather from participants in the democratic process. These according to him are political leaders and groups who win elections, take power, and then manipulate the mechanism of democracy to curtail or destroy it. Unlike in the past when democratic regimes fell due to coups or revolutions, the third wave democracies according to Huntington are facing erosion, or the gradual weakening of democracies by those elected to lead them. A second potential threat comes from electoral victories of parties or movements apparently committed to anti-democratic ideologies. A third more serious threat to democracy is executive arrogation, which occurs when an elected chief executive concentrates power in his own hands, subordinates or even suspends the legislature and rules largely by decree (Huntington, 1997, pp. 8-9). In these new changed circumstances, Braibanti’s (1961) statements such as “possibility that bureaucracy may develop representativeness and responsiveness to the public comparable to that provided by a popularly elected legislature,” and “strengthening of administration must proceed irrespective of the rate of maturation of the political process,” might just have more takers now than when he made this claim almost half a century ago.

Related Theories and Concepts

Liberal democracy and Weberian bureaucracy are both modern phenomena. Both of these phenomena have their roots in the history of political development. Both these
concepts sprouted from the enlightenment period’s belief in reason. Both are supposed to be offshoots of modernity.

Political Development and Modernization

Political scientists have speculated and theorized various pre-conditions for democratic consolidation for over five decades now. The most agreed upon prerequisite is political development (Almond & Verba, 1969, Eisenstadt, 1992; Lipset, 1959). What then exactly is political development? How is it connected to modern bureaucracy and liberal democracy?

According to Almond and Powell (1966), political development is the response of the political system to changes in its societal or international environments and in particular, the response of the system to the challenges of state building, participation and distribution. In 1966 however, Lucien Pye compiled a list of 10 meanings attributed to the concept of political development such as the political prerequisite of economic development, the politics typical of industrial societies, political modernization, the operation of a nation-state, administrative and legal development, mass mobilization and participation, the building of democracy, stability and orderly change, mobilization and power, and one aspect of a multi-dimensional process of social change. He attempted to summarize the most prevalent common themes on political development as involving movement towards increasing equality among individuals in relation to the political system, increasing capacity of the political system in relation to its environments and increasing differentiations of institutions and structures within the political system (Pye, 1966).
Similarly, another effort to describe political development found four recurring themes: rationalization, national integration, democratization, and participation (Huntington, 1965, pp. 387-88). These were broad concepts which overlapped with concepts of modernity, modern political system, modern bureaucracy, etc. Modernity entailed more or less the same characteristics that defined political development. During this process of exploring what political development exactly stood for, political scientists were faced with a particular question: what then, is the difference between political development and political modernization?

According to sociologists, political modernization also entailed the process of rationalization, differentiation, and participation. They described political modernization as one element of the modernity theory; modernization, according to them, was an umbrella concept which included holistic development-socio-political, institutional and economic. As mentioned above, various components of political development overlapped with the components of modernity theory and as Lerner (1958, p. 438) wrote, these elements are highly associated with each other “because in some historical sense, they had to go together.”

What does a modern state look like? According to Held (1995, pp. 50-51), there are typically four forms of the modern state. The first one is the constitutional state, which has implicit or explicit limits on political or state decision-making, limits, which can be either procedural or substantive. The second is the liberal state, which is defined, in large part by the attempt to create a private sphere independent of the state and by a concern to reshape the state itself by freeing civil society and personal, family, religious and business life from unnecessary state interference and simultaneously delimiting the
state’s authority. Held maintained that the Western world was constitutional first and only later after extensive conflicts did it transform into liberal state. The third variant of the modern state according to Held is liberal or representative democracy where decisions affecting a community are taken not by its members as a whole but by a sub-group of “representatives” who have been elected by the “people” to govern within the framework of the rule of law. This category is the one that this study focuses upon. The fourth variant according to Held is the single party polity like the former Soviet Union although its legitimacy as a modern state is under question. The core idea of the modern state, however, is an impersonal and privileged legal or constitutional order, delimiting a common structure of authority, which specifies the nature and form of control and administration over a given community (Skinner, 1978, Vol. 2, p. 353). In other words, bureaucratic spirit is an inherent trait of a modern state.

In addition, modernization requires authority to change. Modern man believes in both the possibility and the desirability of change and has confidence in the ability of man to control change so as to accomplish his purposes (Huntington, 1971, p. 267). According to S. N. Eisenstadt (1992), the modern philosophical and political orientations, whose roots can be traced to the Renaissance, crystallized into the Period of Enlightenment and Rationalism around the ideas of “progress” and “reason.”

With the Enlightenment also came the first expression of the modern idea of progress. From the laissez faire perspective of Adam Smith, man progresses only if enlightened political action removes the underbrush of convention that hides nature and its laws (Bill & Hardgrave Jr., 1981, p. 46). Reason dominated almost all spheres of social and political life. As Eisenstadt (2001, p. 322) opined, the core of the modernity
project has been that the premises and legitimation of the social, ontological, and political order were no longer taken for granted and there developed a very intense reflexivity around the bases of social and political order of authority of society. The modern program according to him entailed a radical transformation of the conceptions and premises of the political order, of the constitution of the political arena, and in the characteristics of the political process.

More importantly, political modernization involved the rationalization of authority, where the replacement of a large number of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political authorities by a single, secular, national political authority took place. It involved the differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures to perform those functions, and it also involved increased participation in politics by social groups throughout society and the development of new political institutions such as political parties and interest associations to organize this participation (Huntington, 1966). The broadening of participation in politics came after the rationalization of authority and differentiation of structure, i.e., participatory democracy followed the general will (rationalization of authority) and political institutions, bureaucracies and their functions (differentiation of structure).

One marked characteristic of modernity, however, is the tussle between freedom and order. Therefore, a modern state carries forward not only its basic commitments but also these internal contradictions and anxieties – the tussle between freedom and order (Roelofs, 1976) which typically find expression in the modern state’s administrative machinery, i.e., bureaucracy (see Figure2).
Figure 2. Dichotomous character of the modern state administration.

*Modern State, Freedom, and Authority*

According to Huntington (1966, p. 378) political modernization involves the rationalization of authority, i.e., the replacement of a large number of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political authorities by a single, secular, national political authority. This implies that since the government is created by men, a well ordered society requires a definitive human source of final authority, obedience to positive law takes precedence over other obligations. Rationalization of authority, as described by Huntington means national integration and centralization or accumulation of power in recognized national law-making institutions.

Reason gave birth to the concept of rights and liberties (Kaufman, 1997). Forces of reason helped what Hobbes called the state of nature evolve into what we today know as political modernism. Collective reason was delegated to a Leviathan-like higher authority in order to avoid “war of every man against every man” (Hobbes, 1642). As Hummel wrote (2008, p. 2), it was then that the modern paradox of reason claiming both
freedom and authority began and therefore the tension between freedom and order was surrendered to state administrative control.

According to Preston (1987), the rational understanding of freedom retains the important liberal claim that freedom is a matter of individuals making decisions that are generally their own. At the same time, it avoids difficulties that occur when free choice is identified with the uncertain notion of “noninterference.” Why do liberals feel uncomfortable associating freedom with non-interference? The answer may be in Kant’s position regarding what freedom should mean. According to Immanuel Kant, right action allows the freedom of will of each to subsist together with the freedom of everyone (Kersting, 1992).

For Kant, freedom was mainly for the individuals to set standards for themselves; however, he was quick to assert that, side by side with freedom, the government could keep ready, “a well disciplined and numerous army to guarantee public tranquility” such as existed in Kant’s own country with Fredrick the Great (Hummel, 2008). At the administrative level, Kant proposed a use of “state machinery” without whose discipline the spirit of Enlightenment would fall apart. This “administrative mechanism, when delegated to citizens as an office must be obeyed,” he wrote. The administrative mechanism, i.e., the state, would then act as a legal arbitrator of force in order to protect the very freedom discussed above (see Figure 3).
According to Hummel (2008), modernity started out with a faith in freedom although there was an early compromise. True reason depended on public freedom and therefore it must be granted. However, “the advance to reason through freedom must be considerate of order on the way.” “The vehicle for advancing from order to freedom and reason,” Hummel wrote in speaking of Kant’s solution, “was to be the state bureaucracy itself.”

Modern bureaucracy, therefore, became an instrument of the state through which both freedom and reason could be achieved. For Weber, the most developed expression of legal-rational authority is the bureaucracy. Within modern Western civilization as a whole, bureaucracy is the means to assure the application of authority of law conceived as coherent systems of rules for which rational grounds can be given (Hummel, 2008, p. 123). This resonates with Kant’s writing that the paradox of organizing reason’s way into the world resides deep in the institutional carrier. Neither freedom nor order can be
avoided in any attempt at developing an enlightened citizenry, (Hummel, 2008, p. 322) that means of developing an orderly society with legitimate authority, and enlightened citizenry was modern bureaucracy. This is the foundation of democratic liberalism. The most characteristic element of liberalism is in the reality of a social conscience, which both regulates the law and is supported by the law (see T. H. Green). In other words, there is a strange interdependence between freedom and authority, between the state and its bureaucracy in a liberal world.

Authority and Liberal Democracy

The definition of the word democracy is wide and varied. While democracy has most often been used to mean simply the “majority rule,” all kinds of special meanings have arisen. The word can be used as Tocqueville used it as a synonym for equality or as Herbert Spencer used it to mean a highly mobile free enterprise society with great differences in station and in wealth. Or it may be seen as political system which places constitutional limitations even upon a freely elected government (Crick, 1962).

According to Aristotle (2005, 1291b4, pp. 100-101), politics that are based strictly on equality before the law, participatory governance and decisive majority are democracies. However, he admitted to various other forms and types of democracy such as one in which magistrates are elected according to a certain property qualification. He who has the required amount of property has a share in the government; he who loses his property loses his rights. Another form of democracy that Aristotle talks about is where “multitude” not law have the supreme power and “supersede the law by their decrees.”
According to Held (1995), a deeply rooted conflict about whether democracy should mean some kind of popular power, i.e., a form of politics in which citizens are engaged in self-government and self-regulation or an aid to decision making for those periodically voted into office gave rise to three basic variants or models of democracy: direct or participatory democracy; liberal or representative democracy; and democracy based on one party model. Direct democracy is the one Aristotle warns us about. Here the majority supersedes the law by their decrees; this according to him is a state of affairs “brought about by the demagogues.” He writes,

. . . for in democracies, which are subject to the law, the best citizens hold the first place, and there are no demagogues; but where the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring up. For the people becomes a monarch—at all events this sort of democracy, which is now a monarch, and no longer under the control of law, seeks to exercise monarchial sway, and grows into a despot; the flatterer is held in honor; this sort of democracy being relatively to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms of monarchy. The spirit of both is the same, and they alike exercise a despotic rule over better citizens. (2005, 1291b4, p. 101)

Recently transitioned democratic states at best resemble the chaotic democracy that Aristotle warns about. For several centuries, the history of political theory in the West, and particularly in the English speaking world, has nearly been coextensive with growth, consolidation and the subsequent transformation of liberal democratic theory. If the first liberals saw themselves as opponents of royal tyranny, at least so far as the property and its unimpeded accumulations were threatened by the power of the kings, “the tyranny of the majority” came to be seen very early on as equal if not a greater threat (Levine, 1982). Of Locke’s theory on liberalism, Goldstein (2001, p. 313) writes,

Governments exist for the purpose of securing to each member of society his life, liberty and estate. Humans have impulse of self-preservation as a matter of nature. . . . Liberty and property as the means
of preservation also belongs to the individuals, therefore as a matter of natural rights. But humans have a way of being biased by self-interest in judging conflicts over where their property ends and another’s begins. Therefore without government, people would be exposed to ‘continual dangers’ for their lives, freedom and possessions. So men compact, each with everyone, to form a society where they agree to put all their forces together under a government whose form will be chosen by the majority. This government will provide clear rules, independent judges for disputes, and executive force to back up judgments. The power of this government must logically be limited by the end for which it was formed - preservations of the lives, liberties and fortunes of society.

This preoccupation became the hallmark of modern liberal theory which constantly sought to justify the sovereign power of the state while at the same time justifying limits on that power (Held, 1995, p. 9). For liberal democrats, “representative democracy” constituted the key institutional innovation to overcome the problem of balancing coercive power and liberty. The liberal concern with reason, lawful government and freedom of choice was upheld, recognizing the political equality of all individuals whereby, such equality would ensure a secure social environment in which people would be free to pursue their private activities and interests at the same time, a state, which under the watchful eye of political representatives, is accountable to an electorate. It would do what was best in the general or public interest (Held, 1995).

Even during the colonial era, liberty was conceived as an exercise, within the boundaries of law, of natural rights whose essence was minimally stated in English law and customs. The British constitution was regarded as “a system of consummate wisdom” that provided an effective “check upon the power to oppress” (Bailyn, 1967). In other words, the history of liberal democracy is the history of the arguments to balance “might and right, power and law, duties and rights” (Held; 1995, p 9).
The building blocks of the early liberal state were constitutionalism, private property, and the competitive market economy. The early liberals regarded government as some kind of encroacher of individual freedom. After extensive conflicts, the West started moving towards the concept of liberal democracy, which upheld the principle of universal franchise. It allowed mature adults the chance to express their judgment about the performance of those who govern them (Held, 1995, p. 51). Soon the concept of liberal democracy became an established phenomenon among industrialized nations of the West. It was a concept that carried a certain amount of legitimacy the world over by the end of the Second World War.

Typically, legal rational authority is the cornerstone of liberal democracy. It was only when claims to “divine right” were challenged and traditional authority eroded, that it became possible for individuals to win a place as “active citizens” in the political order. The loyalty of citizens was something that had to be won by modern democratic states and the government was deemed legitimate only if it represented the views and interest of its citizens (Held, 1995, p.49).

Legitimacy is a much-needed factor for the survival of any kind of authority. According to Weber (1978, p. 953), in the state of nature, the individual fate of human beings is not equal because they differ in their health, wealth, and social status and in every situation he who is more favored feels the never-ceasing need to look upon his position as in some way “legitimate,” and his advantage as “deserved.” Such a situation, according to Weber, exists as long as the masses continue in that natural state. As soon as the class situation becomes openly visible as a factor determining “every man’s fate,” the
Weber (1978) further writes that the very exercise of authority strongly needs self-justification through appealing to the principles of its legitimacy. In a modern democratic state, the legitimacy of the power of command is usually expressed through a promulgated set of rational rules that reflect the views and interests of those governed. According to Weber (1978, p. 954), every single bearer of power is legitimated by the system of rules or rational norms and his power is legitimate insofar as it corresponds with the norm. This kind of rationally regulated association within a structure of domination, according to Weber, finds its typical expression in modern bureaucracy.

In legal rational authority, it is a matter of principle that the members of the administrative staff should be completely separated from ownership of the means of production or administration. There is also a complete absence of appropriation of his official position by the incumbent in this type of authority. Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded in writing, even in cases where oral discussion is the rule or is even mandatory (Weber, 1978, pp. 218-219).

*The Liberal Democracy and Weberian Bureaucracy Connection*

Although Max Weber warned about the “profound ambivalence” in the relationship between democracy and bureaucracy, he maintains that historically democracy has played a major role in the spread of bureaucratic authority through its encouragement of equal and impersonal justice. Functional competence has been substituted for personal characteristics and adherence to legally specified rights and
duties (universalism) have replaced personal and family loyalties (Weinstein, 1971). Therefore, as Weinstein writes, if a goal of democratic revolutions has been equality under the law, bureaucracy has been an important means to this end.

According to Vanhanen (2000), liberal, representative democracy is “a political system in which ideologically and socially different groups are legally entitled to compete for political power and in which institutional power-holders are elected by the people and are responsible to the people”.

Ted Gurr-initiated Polity IV Project (2005) has defined liberal democracy as the presence of institutions and procedures, through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders; as the existence of institutionalized constrains on the exercise of power by the executive; and as the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. The fusion of the concepts of equality, delegated authority and institutions, thus form the foundation of liberal democracy. As Held (1995) said, liberal democracy is distinguished by the presence of a cluster of rules and institutions all of which are necessary to its successful functioning. The rules and institutions according to Held are the constitutional entrenchment of control over governmental policy in elected officials; the establishment of mechanism for the choice and peaceful removal of elected officials in frequent, free and fair elections; the right to vote for all adults in such elections; and the right to run for public office.

As per Weber’s classic bureaucratic model, modern bureaucracy is usually defined as having distinct characteristics such as: political neutrality, hierarchical in composition, specialization of tasks and knowledge, having formal communication and
record management as well as objective standards and impersonal rules which would ensure organizational reliability and predictability (Weber, 1978).

According to Weber (1978, p. 984), modern bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern mass democracy. As it “makes a clean sweep of the feudal, patrimonial, and at least in intent, the plutocratic privileges in administration,” it is forced to put paid professional labor in place of the “historically inherited administration by the notables” he argues.

Within a democratic regime, bureaucracy is a means to assure the application of the authority of law conceived as a coherent system of rules for which rational grounds can be given (Hummel, 2000). Modern bureaucracy is therefore the most developed expression of legal rational authority (Weber, 1978).

Democracy requires that the projects of the majority’s representatives be realized as efficiently as possible. Bureaucracy, as the most efficient technique for realizing collective aims, becomes an instrument of democratic regimes (Weinstein, 1971). Modern constitutional democracies, according to Fred Riggs (1960), have two major components: a representative system focused on an elected assembly and an administrative system. While the former is needed to assure political responsibility, the latter fulfills managerial capability. Bureaucracy therefore, as Weber declared, can go hand in hand with democratic process.

Weber defined democracy as progressive equalization of power and popular control over public discussion or public manipulation of government. He interpreted democracy as a process of active control by the public over its conditions of life (Gerth & Mills, 1958). On the other hand, Blau and Scott (1962, p. 253) defined the democratic
state as a mutual benefit association which has the double purpose of remaining strong enough to survive and yet maintaining the freedoms that permit the democratic establishment of common objectives. Liberal democrats also believed that representative democracy constituted the key institutional innovation to overcome the problem of balancing coercive power and liberty (Held, 1995).

The liberal concern with reason, lawful government and freedom of choice could be upheld properly by recognizing the political equality of all mature individuals. Such equality would ensure not only a secure social environment in which people would be free to pursue their private activities and interests, but also a state, which, under the watchful eye of political representatives accountable to an electorate, would do what was best in the general interest (Blaug, 2002; Held, 1995).

While Weber stated that bureaucracy developed simultaneously with democracy and that democracy promoted the development of bureaucracy by its fight against the rule of traditional notables, he also talked about the tension between democracy and bureaucracy. According to Weber, democracy opposes bureaucracy as a caste of officials removed from the people by expertise. He was deeply concerned that those who staffed bureaucracy would themselves become the masters of the state. The official is an expert in relation to whom the politically elected representative finds himself in the position of a dilettante. A bureaucrat dominates through the knowledge that he has, giving him inequality in relation to elected representatives. The bureaucratic apparatus itself is hierarchic and therefore unequal in nature. In addition to this, a further threat for democracy lies in codes of bureaucratic secrecy (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983). This hierarchical and unequal dimension of bureaucracy has been perceived as being most antithetical to
democratic values. This very dichotomy is also the basis on which the imbalance thesis rests. The superiority that bureaucracy holds threatens the very existence of democracy and democratic institutions, especially if those institutions are weak like those of nascent democracies.

There are, however, those who question the norm of equality that is seemingly absent in bureaucracy. What exactly is the correct assessment of equality? Frank (1998) quotes Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and writes that distribution will be just when the difference in the amount allocated to each person is in proportion to some relevant difference between them, and the ratio between the persons and the ration between the shares is equal. Unlike the partial justice of oligarchies, which accommodates only inequality and unlike the partial justice of direct democracies which accommodates only formal equality, distributive justice properly understood simultaneously recognizes differences among people and it is able to compare these differences under a common measure. In other words, it accommodates both equality and distinction.

Given this postulate, equality thus becomes a relative concept. Also, as Lindsay (1992) writes, Aristotle warned us that passion for equality must be recognized as a perennial threat to the “very freedom it trumpets”. Tyranny, be it in its conventional or democratic manifestation, represents the working out the logic of license-seeking, selfish passions. The “tyranny of the majority” that the founding fathers of the United States were wary of, stems from this very rationale. The authority has to be given to a small minority even in a democracy, Weber conceded (1978). Moreover, the impersonality of bureaucratic rules does lead to impartiality, hence making it in line with the democratic ideal of equality before the law. It also brings about the leveling of the governed. Further,
it prevents the development of a closed, hereditary group of officials, in the interest of the broadest possible basis of recruitment (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983).

Bureaucratic Development, Development Bureaucracy, and Public Management

What then is bureaucratic development? What do modern bureaucracies have that traditional bureaucracies do not? How do these two bureaucracies differ? According to Weber (1978), demystification and rationalization are fundamental features that distinguish bureaucracy from a traditional one. Rational orientations towards goal attainment, hierarchy of authority, work specialization, professionalism, and systematic rules as a basis for operations are some of the features that separate modern bureaucracies from the traditional ones; however; legal rational aspect is the core-distinguishing element (Weber, 1978). In traditional bureaucracies, legitimacy is based on age-old rules and power centers. The masters are designated according to traditional rules and are obeyed because of traditional status. Likewise, obedience is owed not to enacted rules but to the person who occupies a position of authority by tradition or who has been chosen for it by the traditional master.

The commands of such a person are legitimized based on action, which is bound to specific traditions, or action, which is free of specific rules (Weber, 1978, p. 227). Modern bureaucratic administration, however, means domination through knowledge. This is the feature which makes it specifically rational. The technical knowledge it has ensures it a position of extraordinary power. According to Weber (1978, pp. 225-26), modern bureaucratic dominance has the tendency of “leveling” in the interest of the broadest possible basis of recruitment in terms of technical competence. Weber talks
about the dominance of a spirit of formalistic impersonality: “Sine ira et studio,” without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm. The dominant norms in bureaucracy are “concepts of straightforward duty without regard to personal considerations.” Everyone is subject to formal equality of treatment. According to Weber, the development of bureaucracy greatly favors the leveling of status. On the other hand, every process of social leveling creates a favorable situation for the development of bureaucracy by eliminating the office holder who rules by virtue of status privileges and the appropriation of the means and powers of administration. Likewise, under the concept of “equality” it also eliminates those who hold office on an honorary basis or as an avocation by virtue of their wealth. Everywhere bureaucratization foreshadows mass democracy.

Traditional authority and patrimonial motives are “survivals that will wither away as bureaucracy becomes fully developed by realizing its specific virtue” (Rudolph & Rudolph, 1979). Interestingly therefore, the premise of legal rational bureaucracy largely corresponds with fundamentals of liberal democratic theory. In addition, both operate under instrumental or purposive rationality (Cox, 2008; Strivers, 2008; personal conversation). Modern constitutional democracies, according to Fred Riggs (1960) have two major components: a representative system focused on an elected assembly and an administrative system. While the former is needed to assure political responsibility, the latter fulfills managerial capability. Bureaucracy is not imposed, nor is it exogenous; it is instead a creation of the polities in order to solve problems (Lynn Jr., 2006). In other words, bureaucracy is an integral part of modern governance, the elements of bureaucracy is interwoven with concepts of liberal democratic regime. As Crenson (1975,
p. x) wrote, “the American constitution may be said to have embodied certain bureaucratic elements” and one can say this of any contemporary democratic constitution, “where the ideals of the government of laws and not of men seems to have anticipated the organizational impersonality—the formal rules and regulations—of a bureaucratic order.”

When a liberal democratic state is established, the authority gets institutionalized; “informal” get replaced by “formal”; administrative jurisdiction and responsibilities get explicitly defined; activities of officials get carefully separated into public and private. This is how the state ensures democratic and administrative equity.

Development bureaucracy or development administration as it is called came into use in the 1950s to represent those aspects and those changes in public administration which are needed to improve social and economic conditions. Development administrations universally were instructed to encourage innovation and change where desirable or necessary and discourage adherence to traditional norms and forms for their own sake (Gant, 2006). Development administration, according to Fred Riggs, had to use large-scale organization such as governments to implement their policies and plans. Inadequate administrative capabilities inhibited development administration. Therefore administrative development was a necessary condition for effective development administration by definition (Loveman, 2006).

Development administration required increasing control over resources and human beings to shape the developing societies’ “physical, human and cultural environment” however, this stood in contrast to liberal democratic ethos. How could development in the third world be made compatible with “western political morality” was the question that was in the mind of members of the comparative administrative group
(CAG), a group of individuals who had spent time in various developing countries and had knowledge about the functioning of developing, transitional polities. However, for the CAG members and other social scientists who were interested in development and development administration, economic development was a priority (Loveman, 2006). This concern was founded upon assumptions that economic growth would not only reduce poverty; it would, along with rising average income, provide support for liberal democracy. These assumptions were compelling enough to support even the dictatorial and military administrations. This support was argued as a “means” to an end that was “development” which subsequently led to anti-Marxist, liberal polities. This support was justified by Lucien Pye’s paper that came out in 1963. Pye noted that in large measure the story of the third world is one of countless efforts to create organizations by which resources can be effectively mobilized for achieving administrative development. He added that the “acculturative process” in the army tends to be focused in acquiring skills that are of particular value to economic development. Pye concluded by stating that in a disrupted society, the military represents the only effectively organized element capable of formulating public policy and therefore the West should not let their values judge military as a “foe of liberal values” (Loveman, 2006).

This perception emerged despite warnings from other development experts that where goal setting and goal implementing bureaucracy is military, the prospects of democratic development are dismal. By the 1970s, administrative development and development administration had both become euphemism for autocratic rule that sometimes induces industrialization, modernization, and even economic growth but at the
great cost of the welfare of the poor and erosion of political freedoms associated with liberal democracies.

In the West, during the ‘60s and the ‘70s the interest in organization theory, policy analysis and management attempted to refocus the study of public administration on such issues as structures for strategic planning, policy implementation and policy coordination. As Gray and Jenkins (2006) write, the concern with strategic financial management also had a structural emphasis in its attempt to refocus and integrate hierarchical organizational structures. Undoubtedly, many of these reforms were driven by technocratic agendas and were based on perceived inefficiencies of political structures, however within the conventional study and practice of public administration, the role of the state was hardly questioned. During the ‘80s however, an emphasis of markets, flexible and responsible organizations and decentralization started surfacing (Gray & Jenkins, 2006). Slowly, the word “management” began to take over the word “administration.”

In March 1994, the American Vice President Al Gore presented a report to President Bill Clinton titled, “From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less”. The document, among other things stressed the need for the public service to adapt to a changing world characterized by a sharper focus on management and performance, new staffing procedures and an overall cut in total civil service size (Gray & Jenkins, 2006). Subsequently, in the field of administration, the talk throughout the world was of change. Existing administrative systems were perceived to be inflexible and insensitive to changing human needs and circumstances. The change and the reforms, according to David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1992) of the bestseller
“Reinventing Government” represented a paradigm shift. According to Lynn Jr. (2006) the withering away of “direct bureaucracy” in favor of “hollow state,” “virtual organizations,” “networked organizations,” and a “shift of power from bureaucrats to citizens” were celebrated. Among developing countries, its impact was also felt, on public institutions that hardly represented the modern impersonal, “unfeeling and insensitive” efficiency machine that the West constantly bemoaned. These metamorphosed bureaucracies of the transitional regimes with weak organizational structures were further encouraged to follow the directions prescribed by the New Public Management (NPM). Inspired by the NPM, the World Bank, in its 1991 report titled “The Reform of Public Sector Management” discussed various tasks that the Bank has undertaken in the past to reform public sector. The report talked about downscaling public sector by reducing overextended public sectors, doing away with bad projects in public investment programs, reducing the number and cost of overstuffed civil services, and selling or liquidating inefficient public enterprises. The underlying concept of this reform move, according to the report was that the typical developing country has tried to do too much through the public sector, or has assigned to public agencies tasks for which they are ill-suited.

Time and again, the World Bank and other international and regional financial institutions have imported theories and trends from the West in the form of aid packages, like the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) during the ’70s and Public Management during the ’90s. Donors such as the United States, the European Union and Japan agree on the fundamentals of free market and package their ideas and money together in the form of development aid (Gilbert & Vines, 1999). Through these aid-packages they
bargain with the recipient countries to get their chosen policies implemented. The concepts of limited government, sustainable development and free market enterprises which are the tenets of NPM get seeped into the policy process of the LDCs through these aid packages as these cash-strapped countries in need of economic aid to sustain their economies are most of the time, in no position to refute the conditionality placed by the World Bank on them.

Badru (1998) writes that, in spite of the optimism surrounding free market based development in the developing world, by the ‘70s, the economic crises in the least developed countries intensified. Market based development paradigms adopted by many developing nations in the ‘60s and ‘70s only complicated their development efforts.

By 1980s, several developing economies were at the verge of collapse as a result of debt payment on loans accrued from rural development (Sanford, 1989). Sensing a crisis the World Bank introduced its now infamous Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) to save these economies from total collapse. The focus of SAP was to eliminate “the waste in the public sector” and “the reduction of the role of government in the development process.” This policy led to the widening of the gap between the developed and least developed nations most of whom have adjustment-induced inflation as a result of the diminishing value of their national currencies (Badru, 1998). Internally, SAP clearly widened the income gap between the rich and the poor and between the rural and the urban sectors of the economy in countries that implemented the program (Dent & Peters, 1999).

The World Bank’s 1984, 1985, and 1986 surveys regarding its programs were disappointing (Sanford, 1989). According to Sanford, the “poverty sector” approach of
the SAP is of limited utility; firstly, because while the direct alleviation of suffering is an important concern, it is only one element of the development picture. In other words, it makes little sense for the development agencies to target their resources mainly on projects that help poor people directly while the overall socio-political and economic conditions in the recipients’ home countries decline.

This lop-sided view of development blatantly sidelined the role of government. Also, if modern bureaucracy and liberal democracy are parallel phenomena as Weber theorized, this process was intercepted time and again in forms of aids and reform policies which have resulted in bureaucracies looking and functioning nothing like bureaucracies of the West. With transmuted versions of bureaucracy which had an outwardly appearance of modern bureaucracies present in these countries, the relationship between these bureaucracies and democratic development was what got captured in the studies on bureaucracy and democracy.

Theoretical Framework: The Imbalance Thesis

A number of analysts have pointed to imbalance between political and administrative institutions as a basic feature of politics of the underdeveloped countries (Fukuyama, 2004; Heady, 1995; Riggs, 1964). Recently, Fukuyama (2004) stressed that strong vibrant state structures are necessary for political stability among developing countries. Although still under the influence of neoliberal concept that minimal bureaucracy is better, he pointed out that strong “institutions" help the stability and overall political development of new democracies. Central to this idea is the argument which suggests that in the absence of strong political institutions in a new democracy, a
developed bureaucracy presents a formidable obstacle to its political development (Almond & Coleman, 1960). However, there is little agreement among experts as to what the concept of “developed bureaucracy” entails. Not only that, some studies contradicted this position and suggested that modern bureaucracies may actually facilitate liberal democracy (Sigelman, 1972).

Sigelman (1974) writes that comparative politics and administration feature a continuing debate over the nature of the relationship between bureaucratic and political development. Some analysts contend that, since modern bureaucracy is a condition for societal modernization, a relatively high level of bureaucratic development in nations of the developing world will propel political development. Others, however, argue that, because of their tendency to dominate other political institutions, bureaucracies of high functional capacity inhibit the prospects for political development in these nations (Sigelman, 1974, p. 308).

The Arguments

According to the latter line of thinking, Fred Riggs (1964) presented his analysis in several versions but with the same basic theme; that transitional societies frequently lack balance between “political policy making institutions and bureaucratic policy implementing structures” the consequence being that the political function tend to be appropriated, largely by the bureaucrats. LaPalombara (1966) pointed out the difficulty of restricting bureaucracy to an instrumental role. According to him, there is a risk where bureaucracy may be the most coherent power center where the major decisions regarding national development are likely to involve authoritative rule making and rule application.
by governmental structures. This results in the emergence of overpowering bureaucracies. The growth of bureaucratic power can therefore inhibit, and perhaps preclude the development of democratic polities (Heady, 2001).

Generalizing about the power position of the bureaucratic elite in new states from his study of the civil service in Pakistan, Henry Goodnow (1964) reached the conclusion that the occupants of the higher civil service do exert prominent influence as to make the climate unfavorable for the development of democratic institutions. Eisenstadt (1963) too reviewed the extensive involvement of bureaucracies in the political process of new states, and has noted that they tend to fulfill functions that would more normally be carried out by legislatures, executives, and political parties, thereby impeding the development of more differentiated institutions (Heady, 2001, p. 432). Riggs’s underlying distinction between balanced and unbalanced polities rests on whether or not there is an approximate balance between bureaucracy and extra-bureaucratic or “constitutive system”.

Likewise, LaPalombara (1963) opines that if democratic development is to be encouraged, a separation of political and administrative roles is required; and this he says, calls for deliberate steps to limit the power of bureaucracies in many of the newer states. His study however does not elaborate on the characteristics of the bureaucracies. Pye (1963) too agrees with Riggs in saying that public administration cannot be greatly improved without a parallel development of the representative political process. He also disagrees with those who consider new states fortunate of they inherited the colonial administrative structures intact.
The Counter-arguments

Some think that the relatively high level of bureaucratic development in some developing nations will actually facilitate political development (Sigelman, 1974). This is so because, in the first place, modern bureaucracy is vital to the political development process. In the words of Almond and Powell (1966, p. 323), a system cannot develop a high level of internal regulation, distribution, or extraction without a “modern” governmental bureaucracy in place. In addition, the role of bureaucracy is so crucial in fostering socio-economic modernization and since socio-economic development is closely related to political development, bureaucratic development may exercise an important, if indirect, effect on political development (Sigelman, 1974). As Preston (1987, p. 774) writes, bureaucracies are necessary in our present age of social and technological complexity- an authoritative system of decision, a technical division of labor, and the predictability of established rules and procedures make it possible to direct the skills and energies of those with appropriate expertise towards the problem solving that is critical to meet our personal and collective needs.

Correspondingly, Heeger (1973, p. 602) writes that most studies show that the bureaucracies in the new states have been poorly organized, suffering from inexperience of personnel, and from poor facilities. Also, it has not always been true that in those states where bureaucracies have been politically weaker, their weakness is the result of the organizational development and strength of other political institutions.

The question therefore arises as to what would happen if these developing nations had modern Weberian forms of bureaucracy. According to Weber, unlike in modern bureaucracies, traditional or charismatic bureaucracies overshadow and sharply limit the
use of rationality. This results in the impairment of bureaucratic recruitment based on skill. Hence, purges, orthodoxy and hewing to the party line will inevitably arise at every level in charismatic bureaucracy (Contas, 1958; p. 402). This is parallel to what occurred during Hitler’s regime in Germany. Although Arendt’s criticism of Nazi bureaucracy assumes it to be modern in nature, the very arbitrariness by which it formulated and executed anti-Semitic policies makes one wonder about the level of legal, rational attributes it possessed. It is also parallel to what Riggs (1964) had to say about his formalistic, prismatic bureaucracies. This further fuels the question as to what exactly does the presence of modern, legal rational bureaucracy do for democracy; what role will modern bureaucracy play in democratic development?

David M. Levitan (1942 p. 9) answered these questions to some extent. According to him a liberal government has value only when based on liberal legislation supported by administrative machinery. He writes that democratic government means democracy in administration as well as in the original legislation. “It is of supreme importance that the administrative machinery established for the execution of legislation be permeated with democratic spirit and ideology, with respect for the dignity of man” he writes. He echoes Wilson and further states that no principle of government, however perfect and liberal, can give men more than a “poor counterfeit of liberty” if they are not implemented by democratic administrative machinery. This is in line with what Riggs wrote—that the fusion of modern and traditional, of democratic and dogmatic administration breeds a hybrid which functions nothing like their counterparts in the developed nations. The real protection of the citizen lies in the development of a high degree of democratic consciousness among the administrative hierarchy, writes Levitan (1942). Unwilling to
concede that a strengthening of the bureaucracy will necessarily deter parallel growth elsewhere, Weidner (1964) suggests that another possibility is that an enlightened and capable bureaucracy may be willing and able to take leadership in bringing along the lagging sectors in order to meet development objectives. Among these contentions, the question that surfaces then is about the actual role of bureaucracy in democracy consolidation process; does it really impede political development as Eisenstadt and Pye opine or does it facilitate political development?

The Popular Prerequisites

There are various factors that are regarded as pre-requisites to democracy. Among them, the most discussed are economy and education. As Lipset (1959) stated, the most widespread generalization linking political system to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development. Concretely this means that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chance that it will sustain democracy. Almond writes that the polity and economy interact with each other and transform each other in the process (1991).

Economy

The first cross-national studies on world democratization emphasized the conditioning effect of industrialization and economic development on a state’s democratic development, and these were followed by the additional analyses of the distribution of income, economic dependency, and economic growth (Wejnert, 2005). Lipset (1959), an early proponent of economy as one of the vital prerequisites for democracy, wrote that a society divided between large impoverished mass and small
favored elite would result either in oligarchy or in tyranny. According to Gill (2000), economic development brings higher levels of income and economic security to the masses; thereby lowering the intensity and stakes of class struggle and enabling the population to develop a longer time perspectives and a more complex and gradualist views of politics. Gill pointed out that authoritarian structure cannot accommodate the stresses created by the processes of economic development as it involves significant changes in class structure such as the growth of the middle class and of commercial and industrial bourgeoisie; and the growth, unionization and increased economic standing of the working class. In addition the migration of the rural poor to the cities recasts the class structure, breaking apart the feudal rural link typical of the old regime.

Likewise, economic development dominates the International Financial Institutions development agenda. A report that the World Bank published in 1991 on reforming public sector management stated that economic development and efficiency should be the end goal of the public sector. According to the Bank’s report, “good public sector management is a crucial ingredient in any development strategy based on markets and private initiatives.”

Since Lipset (1959) theorized that economic development positively correlates to democratic development, it has been widely perceived that in order to consolidate democracy, growth of the economy is a pre-requisite. Almond (1991) writes that the economy and polity are “the main problem solving mechanisms of human society,” each of them with their distinctive means and the goods or the ends and that “they necessarily interact with each other and transform each other in the process.” He quotes Joseph Schumpeter and writes that modern democracy rose along with capitalism and in causal
connection with it; modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process. According to Gill (2000), economic development reduces objective levels of inequality and thereby of class distinctions. It increases the size of the middle class which moderates conflicts by rewarding moderate and democratic parties during elections and rejecting radical groups. In this backdrop this study includes one of the measures of national income, i.e. Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita) as confounding variable of democracy consolidation.

Education

The conventional wisdom since the writings of John Dewey (1916) views high levels of educational attainment as a prerequisite for democracy (Acemoglu et al., 2005). It is argued that to promote democracy education is crucial both because it enables a culture of democracy to develop and because it leads to greater prosperity which is also thought to cause political development. According to Converse (1972, p. 324), “education is everywhere the universal solvent, and the relationship is always in the same direction.”

The notion that formal educational attainment is the primary mechanism behind many citizenship characteristics is largely uncontested. Many have suggested that the better educated the population of a country, the better the chances for democracy (Lipset, 1959). According to Lipset, the “more democratic” countries of Europe are almost entirely literate: the lowest has a rate of 96%, while the “less democratic” nations have an average literacy rate of 85%. In Latin America, the difference is between an average rate of 74% for the “less dictatorial” and 46% for the “more dictatorial”. Lipset (1959) further
writes that education presumably broadens men’s outlooks, enables them to understand the needs for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines, and increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices. Lipset further writes that if high level of education is not a sufficient condition for democracy, available evidence suggests that it comes close to being a necessary condition in the modern world.

Summary of the Literature

Weber’s discussion of the types of legitimacy corresponds with his description of the types of authority. Traditional authority is obeyed because it is rooted in usage; charismatic authority is obeyed because of personal devotion to the prophet; and legal rational authority is obeyed because it is constituted through recognized procedures and is deduced from the postulates of a rational ethics (Weinstein, 1971). During the advent of democracy, typically, traditional authority starts eroding and the leveling of traditional power centers takes place.

As Huntington (1997, p. 7) writes, democratization “involves the removal of state’s constraints on individual behavior” and by weakening state authority as it must, “democratization also brings into question authority in general and can promote a laissez-faire or anything goes atmosphere.” Therefore, if these newly liberalized nations are to “weather the storms of history and limit the self-aggrandizing impulses of human actors, they need strong and well-designed institutions” (Diamond, 1997, p. xxv).

Political scientists have conceded the fact that to consolidate democracy it is necessary to have a state of law which can effectively constrain the behavior of individuals via a “network of laws, courts, semiautonomous review and control agencies”
as well as a “usable bureaucracy,” i.e., a state that has administrative capacity to perform
the essential functions of government such as maintaining order, adjudicating disputes,
constructing infrastructure, facilitating economic exchange, defending national borders
and collecting the taxes necessary to fund these activities (Linz & Stephan, 1997).

The importance of state bureaucracy cannot be underestimated in a liberal
democracy. Liberal democracy is founded on certain distinct postulates such as: every
human individual is regarded as an “inexhaustible well of energy” and an active being
dominated by mundane interests and by ascendance of the rational element in human
nature (Lindblom, 1996). It is this faith in rationality that liberal democracy has in
common with modern legal rational bureaucracy. It is a generally agreed upon fact that
both are products of modernity and work best in conjunction with the other.

“Well developed” bureaucracies of developing nations are usually looked upon
with certain mistrust. Comparative theorists have rigorously argued that “stronger”
bureaucracies in developing nation-states overwhelm and take control of weak, partially
developed democratic institutions pushing democratic development of those states into
quandary. However, few of the others refute the well-established imbalance theory and
argue that a “well developed” bureaucracy has been proved to facilitate political
development. However, how does one determine the level of bureaucratic development?
How does one explain the characteristics of “strong” or “well developed” bureaucracy?

While studying bureaucratic structures of the developing world, it is important to
know however that there are numerous historical data on the growth of bureaucracies in
the developing states collected by bureaucracies themselves which tend to attribute to
those bureaucracies all the concreteness of their counterparts in the developed states; the
physical apparatus of buildings and files, the staffs, the hierarchies, and in theory at least the procedures (Heeger, 1973). This gives an impression that these bureaucracies are well developed. Fred Riggs (2002) termed these seemingly modern organizations “formalistic” or “prismatic” which according to him are common among transitional societies. These organizations do not facilitate modernity; neither do they encourage democratic development. Bureaucracy therefore should be studied in the context of governance. The rules that determine procedures in the bureaucracy, formal and informal, are especially important for public perceptions of how the state operates (Hyden et al., 2004).

Bureaucratic rules that are Weberian in nature and have legal-rational base have persisted as the universal norm. A modern, legal rational bureaucracy is a tool for dispensing efficient and effective as well as equitable administration. It can be the means for achieving the minimal equity and order that developing states lack but at the same time should not be allowed to transform itself as an end by itself (Hummel, 2008; Weber, 1978). This study focuses on particular traits of state bureaucracies of 26 developing countries and explores how these traits affect democracy consolidation process. The importance of the presence of modern, Weberian bureaucracy in the process of democracy consolidation among new democracies is what this study seeks to find out.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

This study proposes to look into the relationship between Weberian state structures and democratic development among 26 developing countries. Studies have shown that nascent democracies face more turbulent political atmospheres as they transcend their pre-modern political state (Held, 2005). In the midst of political instability the presence of strong bureaucracy is believed to be dangerous to democratic development. Although there have been various studies which have countered this thesis and have stated that modern bureaucracies in fact “facilitate overall political development,” there has been no research conducted on how modern bureaucracies exactly impact democratic development (Sigelman, 1972). This study examines various components of democracy and bureaucracy to find out if they share a parallel, symbiotic relationship.

Secondary Data Sources and Details

The study uses secondary data from Rauch and Evan (2008), The Freedom House (1997), Tatu Vanhanen’s Democratization Index and Polity IV Project (2005), and NationMaster (1990) to compare and evaluate democratic and bureaucratic scores of the state structures of 26 developing countries. Rauch and Evan’s dataset is used to derive...
data on bureaucracies of the 26 countries chosen for this study. Likewise, the other three datasets are used to obtain measures on democratic conditions in these countries.

**Rauch and Evan’s Weberian State Structure Data**

The data gathered by James E. Rauch and Peter B. Evan specifically measures “Weberian” traits of public bureaucracies among 35 developing countries. The authors were mainly interested in examining how these bureaucracies functioned and what they looked like in the years from 1970 to 1990. For the purpose of this study only 26 countries have been selected. The countries that have been selected for this study are those categorized as “free” and “partially free” by the Freedom House Index. A “free” country is one where there is broad scope for open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life and independent media. A “partially free” country is one in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties (FreedomHouse, 2008). Countries that are categorized as “not free” by the Freedom House Index have been excluded. Absence of democratic credentials disqualifies these countries for this study as the study is particularly interested in measuring the relationship between bureaucratic and democratic development.

The data are collected by asking specific questions based on Max Weber’s bureaucracy theory to 126 country experts. The questions asked address issues such as the extent to which recruitment is meritocratic at the entry level, the extent of internal promotion and career stability (see Appendix A). Countries that are chosen for this study are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Spain, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Israel, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Mexico, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey and Uruguay.

**Variables**

Bureaucratic Quality (BURQUAL) measures bureaucratic performance as well as elements of bureaucratic structure. High score indicates “autonomy from political pressure”; “strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services”; and indicates existence of an “established mechanism for recruiting and training”. Since the variable “burqual” was the most comprehensive variable that was computed by measuring fundamentals of Weberian bureaucracy such as merit based recruitments, neutrality, and autonomy from political pressures, it was chosen as the one to categorize countries into “high bureaucracies” and “low bureaucracies.”

Corruption (CORRUPT1) measures bureaucratic corruption. Low scores indicate “high government officials who are likely to demand “special payments” and “illegal payments” are generally expected throughout lower levels of government’ in forms of “bribes connected with import export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, police protection or loans.”

Merit (MERIT) addresses the extent to which recruitment is meritocratic at the entry level. It is an equal weight index of two questions on recruiting process where each question and the index itself have been normalized to lie in the range of 0-1.

Red tape (REDTAPE) measures the “regulatory environment the foreign firms must face when seeking approvals and permits; and the degree to which government
represents an obstacle to business. Lower scores indicate greater levels of regulation and/or government obstruction and therefore higher bureaucracy.

Bureaucratic Delay (BURDELAY) measures efficiency. High scores indicate “greater speed and efficiency of the civil service including processing customs clearances, foreign exchange remittances and similar applications”.

The Freedom House Data

According to the Freedom House website, the survey includes both analytical reports and numerical ratings for 193 countries and 15 select territories. Each country and territory report includes an overview section, which provides historical background and a brief description of the year’s major developments, as well as a section summarizing the current state of political rights and civil liberties.

Each country and territory is assigned a numerical rating—on a scale of 1 to 7—for political rights and an analogous rating for civil liberties; a rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom. These ratings, which are calculated based on the methodological process described below, determine whether a country is classified as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free by the survey (Freedom in the World, 2008).

Variables

Freedom Rating. The ratings process is based on a checklist of 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions. The political rights questions are grouped into three subcategories: Electoral Process (3 questions), Political Pluralism and Participation (4 questions), and Functioning of Government (3 questions). The civil liberties questions
are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief (4 questions),
Associational and Organizational Rights (3 questions), Rule of Law (4 questions), and
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4 questions). Raw points are awarded to each
of these questions on a scale of 0 to 4, where 0 points represents the smallest degree and
4 the greatest degree of rights or liberties present.

The highest number of points that can be awarded to the political rights checklist
is 40 (or a total of up to 4 points for each of the 10 questions). The highest number of
points that can be awarded to the civil liberties checklist is 60 (or a total of up to 4 points
for each of the 15 questions).

The raw points from the previous survey edition are used as a benchmark for the
current year under review. In general, a change in raw points is made only if there has
been a real world development during the year that warrants a change (e.g., a crackdown
on the media, the country’s first free and fair elections) and is reflected accordingly in the
narrative.

For states and territories with small populations, the absence of pluralism in the
political system or civil society is not necessarily viewed as a negative situation unless
the government or other centers of domination are deliberately blocking its establishment
or operation. For example, a small country without diverse political parties or media
outlets or significant trade unions is not penalized if these limitations are determined to
be a function of size and not overt restrictions.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ratings. The total number of points awarded
to the political rights and civil liberties checklists determines the political rights and civil
liberties ratings. Each rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom corresponds to a range of total points.

Status of Free, Partly Free, Not Free. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” Those whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered “Free”, 3.0 to 5.0 “Partly Free” and 5.5 to 7.0 “Not Free” (see Appendix B). For the purpose of this study, countries whose ratings average from 1 to 2.5 are considered as “liberal democracies” and those whose ratings average 2.6 to 5.5 are considered as “nascent democracies”.

Political Rights is measured by factors such as Fairness in Electoral Process; Political Pluralism/Participation; and Functioning of Government. Fairness in Electoral Process is measured by looking into whether the head of the government and other chief national authority and national legislative representatives are elected through free and fair elections and whether electoral laws and framework are fair.

The degree of Political Pluralism is determined by rights people have to organize competitive political groupings of their choice, by the presence of a significant opposition vote and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections. Likewise, freedom to make political choices without any kind of domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies or any other powerful group was also taken into account to measure political pluralism and participation.

Functioning of the Government, on the other hand, was accounted by factors such as transparency, elected representatives’ role in policy making process, corruption, socio-political representation, public discussion and people’s right to petition the ruler.
“Civil Liberties” is measured by the degree of Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law, Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights.

Freedom of Expression and Belief required presence of independent media and other forms of cultural expressions, free religious institutions and communities with freedom to practice their faith and express themselves in public and in private, academic freedom and absence of extensive political indoctrination. Under Associational and Organizational Rights, freedom of assembly, demonstration and open public discussion, freedom for non-governmental organizations, free trade unions and peasant organizations, free professional and other private organizations were looked into.

Rule of Law included the necessary presence of an independent judiciary, prevalence of the rule of law, police force that is under civilian control, protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile or torture, freedom from war and insurgencies as well as guaranteed equal treatment before the law. Likewise, freedom to travel, work, establish business, marry, raise family and reside according to one’s choice; the right to own property; presence of gender equality and equality of opportunity; absence of economic exploitation and undue influence by government officials, the security forces, political parties or organized criminal groups are seen as necessary conditions for guarantee of Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights. Since the variable “Freedom Rating” is painstakingly computed by incorporating all the elements of democracy, this variable is used to categorize countries into “high democracies” and “low democracies”.

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Vanhanen’s Polyarchy Data

The second dataset on democracy, i.e., Vanhanen’s Polyarchy Data includes 187 contemporary and former independent states. The term “polyarchy” was first used by Robert Dahl in 1971. According to him, democracy is an “ideal’ political situation which is hard to achieve. Dahl (1971, p. 8) believes that “no large system in the real world is fully democratized.” He therefore calls liberal political states where there are maximum opportunities for political competition and participation “polyarchies.” This dataset operationalizes democracy into two variables; “Competition” and “Participation” and uses them to calculate the variable Democratic Index. Vanhanen used secondary sources to collect his data. His sources are Arthur S. Bank’s “Cross-Polity Time Series Data-1971” and United Nations Demographic Year Books, 1970, 1979, 1986, 1995, and 1996.

Variables

Competition (COMP). This index used the smaller parties’ share of all votes cast in parliamentary or presidential elections, or both, to measure the degree of political competition. The value of (COMP) competition is calculated by subtracting the percentage of votes won by the largest party from 100. If the data on the distribution of votes were not available, the value of this variable was calculated on the basis of the distribution of seats in parliament.

Participation (PART). The percent of population who actually voted in these elections is used to indicate the degree of participation. Participation (PART) is calculated from the total population.
Democratization Index. COMP and PART are combined by multiplying the two given percentages and dividing it by 100. This combined index is then termed as Democratization Index.

Polity IV Project Data

The third dataset on democracy is the Polity IV Project dataset. Its users’ manual states that “a mature and internally coherent democracy might be operationally defined as one in which (a) political participation is fully competitive, (b) where executive recruitment is elective, and (c) where constrains on chief executive are substantial. The Polity I data were first collected in the mid-1970s by a single coder Erika B. K. Gurr who “worked with increasingly refined versions of category definitions and coding guidelines. Multiple historical sources were used for each country along with reference to a variety of standard sources. The first step was to identify historical and social science works for each country, then to compile from them a basic political chronology. Periods of substantial change were identified in this process and then examined in detail to determine whether events met the specified criteria of changes in and of polities. The same sources provided information for the coding of authority characteristics.

Variables

Institutionalized Democracy (DEMOC). This variable is conceived by measuring three essential and interdependent elements: i.e., the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders; the existence of institutionalized constrains on the exercise of power by the executive; and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and
in acts of political participation (Polity Index, 2005). Here the democracy indicator is an additive 11-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constrains on the chief executive.

Institutionalized Autocracy (AUTOC) here is defined as political system whose common properties are a lack of regularized political competition and concerns for political freedom. An 11-point autocracy scale is constructed additively. Here the operational indicator of autocracy is derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constrains on the chief executive.

POLITY. The polity score is derived by subtracting the AUTOC value from the DEMOC value. This procedure provides a single regime score that ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy). This variable gives the accurate score on the degree of democracy that states have (Marshall & Jaggers, 2005)

Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN). According to the Polity IV dataset users’ manual, the variable measures the “openness” of the chief executive’s recruitment to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle to attain the position through regularized process. Four Categories are used and coded accordingly. When chief executives are determined by hereditary successions who assume executive powers by right of descent, it is deemed “closed” and is coded as “1”. Hereditary successions plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister is looked is categorized as “dual executive designation” and is coded “2”. Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister is categorized as “dual-
executive election” and is coded “3”. When chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election, or transitional arrangements between designation and election is it categorized as “open” and is coded “4” (Marshall & Jaggers, 2005).

Executive Recruitment Concept (EXREC). This concept variable combines information presented in “regulation in executive recruitment” (XRREG), competitiveness of executive recruitment (XRCOMP) and openness of executive recruitment (XROPEN). It is measured in a 1 though 8 scale. “Ascription” is calculated by measuring the scores of the three above mentioned variables. When XRREG is regulated, XRCOMP has “selection” and XROPEN has “closed” scores then the executive recruitment concept (EXREC) gets “ascription” as its score. Ascription is coded as “1”. It is defined as “succession by birthright.” Likewise, when the combination of the three above mentioned variables are “regulated, “selection” and “dual executive destination” (with hereditary and elected or selected leaders co-existing) respectively, then EXREC is measured as “dual executive.” “Dual executive: ascriptive plus selection” is defined as ascriptive and designated rulers co-existing and is coded as 2. When the combination of the three above-mentioned variables are “transition”, “selection” and “open” respectively, then the result is for EXREC “designation.” “Designation” is defined as informal competition within an elite and it is coded as “3”. The combination of “unregulated”, “not appointed” and “not appointed” as results for the variables XRREG, XRCOMP, XROPEN respectively results in “self selection” for EXREC. Self selection is defined as “self selection by seizure of power” and is coded as 4. Likewise, “gradual transition from self selection” is coded as “5”, “dual executive: ascriptive plus election”
is coded as “6”; “transitional or restricted election” is coded as “7” and “competitive election” is coded as “8” (Marshall & Jaggers, 2005).

Executive Constraining Concept (EXCONST). This variable refers to the prevalent concepts about the extent of institutionalized constrains on the decision making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collective. A seven category scale is used. “Unlimited authority” where there are no regular limitations on the executive’s actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations) is coded as “1”. Intermediate category between “unlimited authority” and “slight to moderate limitation” is coded as “2”. Slight to moderate limitations on executive authority where there are some real but limited restraints on the executive is coded as “3”. Intermediate category between slight to moderate and substantial limitations is coded as “4”. Substantial limitations on executive authority where the executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constrains by them is coded as “5”. The intermediate category between this and executive parity or subordination is categorized as “6”. Executive parity or subordination where accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity is coded as “7”. Here a legislature, a ruling party or a council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation (Marshall & Jaggers, 2005)

Nation Master Dataset (1990). Both economic development and education are the two most oft-quoted variables in democracy studies. Huntington (1971) and others have written that modernization that involved educational and economic development helped in boost countries’ democratic disposition. To evaluate the effect of these two variables, they are included in the studies as confounding factors.
Confounding Factors

For this study gross domestic product (GDP per capita) and adult literacy rate are taken as extraneous variables that may correlate with both bureaucracy and democracy.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP per capita). It is calculated by approximating the value of goods produced per person in the country, equal to the country’s GDP divided by the total number of people in the country. The GDP per capita rate is used as one of the two confounding variables for this study.

Adult Literacy Rate. It is the total percentage of population aged 15 and above which is literate. Adult literacy rate is another confounding variable used for this study.

Timeline

The study used the data gathered up until the year 1990. As Rauch and Evan’s data was aimed at studying bureaucracies from 1970 until 1990, all other data referred to for the study were from the year 1990. The variable Freedom Rating which has been used to categorize the countries into high and low democracy group, is a measure of an average from the year 1980 to 1990. This was done in order to accurately evaluate the “democratic credentials” of countries.
Table 1

Table of Correspondence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Constructs</th>
<th>Research Variables</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Degree of Freedom</td>
<td>Freedom rate: (political development + civil liberties)/2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Competition</td>
<td>Competition (COMP)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Political participation</td>
<td>Participation (PART)</td>
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<td>Institutionalized Democracy</td>
<td>Democracy Score (DEMOC)</td>
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<td>Autocracy Score (AUTOC)</td>
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<td>Openness of Executive Recruitment</td>
<td>Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Executive Recruitment Concept</td>
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<td>Executive Constrains Concept</td>
<td>Executive Constrains Concept (EXCONST)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weberian Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Weberian Quality of bureaucracy</td>
<td>Bureaucratic Quality (Burqual)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bureaucratic efficiency</td>
<td>Bureaucratic Delay (Burdelay)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ethical Performance Scale</td>
<td>Corruption (Corrupt1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Level of Red Tape</td>
<td>Red Tape (Redtape)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Merit based selection</td>
<td>Merit (Merit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy (Confounding Factor)</td>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>GDP (per capita): Consumption + gross investment + government spending + (exports - imports). (Unit of measure: %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Confounding Factor)</td>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>Adult Literacy Rate: The proportion of adult population aged 15 years and above which is literate (%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data Analysis

This is an exploratory study which looked into 26 developing countries’ bureaucratic structures, their performances and democratic development. The 26 countries were categorized into four groups using variables “bureaucratic quality” (Burqual) and “Freedom Rating.” These two variables were chosen to categorize the countries as “high” and “low” democracies and bureaucracies as they measured the fundamentals of bureaucracy and democracy most comprehensively. Here “high” denotes higher number of traits of both liberal democracy and Weberian bureaucracy. “Low” on the other hand denotes fewer traits of liberal democracy and Weberian bureaucracy.

“Bureaucratic Quality” which was initially measured as a Likert scale with the scale of 0-6, 0 being the lowest, was recoded into a dichotomous variable for the purpose of this study. Scores ranging from 0-3 were coded as “0” denoting formalistic bureaucracy. Scores ranging from 3.1-6 were coded as “1” indicating “modern bureaucracies”.

The variable “Freedom Rating” is computed by averaging the variable’s rating for the years 1980 to 1990. This was done in order to get accurate democratic credentials for each country. “Freedom Rating”, with a scale of 1-5.5, 5.5 being the lowest was also coded into a dichotomous variable. Scores ranging from 1-2.5 were coded as “1” to indicate liberal democracy. Scores ranging from 2.6-5.5 were coded as 0 to indicate nascent democracy.

The countries were then grouped into four groups according to their bureaucratic and democratic scores. As per the theoretical framework (Figure 4), the study assumes that developing countries fall under four different categories; i.e., those that have modern
bureaucracy, nascent democracy, those that have modern bureaucracy and liberal democracy, those that have liberal democracy but formalistic bureaucracy and lastly those countries that have nascent democracy and formalistic bureaucracy. “Modern bureaucracy” here indicates merit-based, Weberian type state structures.

![Figure 4. Positioning of the four groups.](image)

The study assumes that both modern bureaucracy and liberal democracy start from the nascent or under-developed state and proceed towards fully developed or consolidated state. Both these phenomena are offshoots of political modernity and are co-existent. According to Weberian paradigm, development of democracy and bureaucracy is a parallel occurrence; however, in some third-wave and post third-wave democracies, this development has been tampered with, mainly by policies imposed by the IFIs and their regional subsidiaries (Abrahamsen, 2000; Badru, 1998). This “tampering” may have resulted in regimes that have either strong democratic regime traits with weak, formalistic administrative institutions; or relatively modern administrative institutions with weak democratic regime traits. There are also those countries that lack democratic spirit as well
as modern administrative institutions and those second wave democracies that have emerged as strong democracies with merit-based, modern administrative structures. To measure the bureaucratic as well as democratic credentials of the countries chosen, they are first grouped accordingly:

Group One = Nascent Democracy/ Modern Bureaucracy
Group Two = Liberal Democracy/ Modern Bureaucracy
Group Three = Liberal Democracy/ Formalistic Bureaucracy
Group Four = Nascent Democracy/ Formalistic Bureaucracy

“Nascent democracy” denotes those regimes that have weak democratic traits. “Liberal democracy” indicates stronger, more consolidated democracies. Likewise, “modern bureaucracy” indicates those administrative structures that display more Weberian traits, whereas “formalistic bureaucracy” indicates those bureaucracies that lack Weberian bureaucratic traits.

After the countries are grouped, average scores of every variable are compared across all four groups. Comparing mean scores of every variable for all four groups of countries displayed a certain relationship pattern between bureaucracy and democracy. Higher scores meant stronger relationship. Mean scores of confounding factors are also compared to see which group scores the highest on economy and education.

Further, to see the impact of Weberian bureaucracies on various aspects of democracy and to observe the validity of the imbalance thesis, these 26 countries are again grouped into four groups: “formalistic bureaucracies,” “modern bureaucracies,” “liberal democracies,” and “nascent democracies.” The mean scores of all the variables associated with liberal democracy are then compared between the two bureaucracy groups to see which group has higher scores. Likewise, variables associated with
bureaucracy are compared between the two “democracy” groups to observe which group has higher scores. Comparison of the scores shows a certain pattern that help assess if modern Weberian bureaucracy and liberal democracy share a parallel, symbiotic relationship.
CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH FINDINGS

Political modernization involves differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures whereby administrative hierarchies become more elaborate, more complex and more disciplined; and office and power are distributed more by achievement and less by ascription. (Samuel P. Huntington, 1971)

Liberal democracy and Weberian bureaucracy are both components of political modernization (Weber, 1922). This study explores if these two components of political modernity share a parallel, symbiotic relationship. The study also describes how these two are corresponding phenomena and that the presence of well functioning modern bureaucracy does not erode democratic development in new democracies.

Twenty-six developing countries were grouped into four different categories as per their democratic and bureaucratic scores. The study used Freedom House’s 10 years’ average “Freedom Ratings” of these 26 countries to categorize them into “liberal democracies” and “nascent democracies.” Likewise, drawing on the original insight of Max Weber’s concept of bureaucracy, the variable “bureaucratic quality” or “burqual” from Rauch and Evan’s study (1990) is used as a categorizing variable to group countries into “modern Weberian” and “formalistic” bureaucracies respectively.

The term “bureaucracy” or “bureaucratic” here represents public bureaucracies that have modern, legal-rational Weberian traits, including that there is a certain level of meritocratic recruitment; civil service procedures for hiring and firing rather than
political appointments; and where dismissals and filling higher levels of the hierarchy is done through internal promotion.

The first group consists of countries that are categorized as “nascent democracy/modern bureaucracy.” Countries that belonged to this group are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The second group has countries which have high scores on both democracy and bureaucracy and are categorized as “liberal democracies/modern bureaucracies”. They are Spain, India, Israel, and Portugal. The third group consists of countries that have high scores on democratic performance but low scores on bureaucratic performance. They are categorized as “liberal democracy/modern bureaucracy”; Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Greece fall under this group. The fourth group consists of those countries that have poor scores on both democracy as well as bureaucracy-this group is categorized as “nascent democracy/formalistic bureaucracy. The countries in this category are Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Uruguay (see Figure 5).
Part One

In the process of comparing average scores of different variables pertinent to democracy and bureaucracy across all four groups, the first variable whose means were compared is the level of corruption among higher government officials. This variable measures the prevalence of demand for “special payment” by higher bureaucratic officials (see Figure 6). Here the scale has been reversed and titled as “ethical performance” scale to make it more comprehensible.

![Ethical Performance](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(NascentD/ModernB)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(LiberalD/ModernB)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LiberalD/FormalisticB)</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NascentD/FormalisticB)</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. Ethical performance.
The graph shows that the group that has lowest level of ethical performance at the higher level of government is the fourth group, the group with nascent democracy and formalistic bureaucracy. Group four has a mean of 5.2.

Interestingly, the group of countries that are liberal democracies but have formalistic bureaucracies have lower ethical performance rating of 6.6 as compared to the group of countries with liberal democracy and modern bureaucracy which has an average score of 7. Comparing groups one and four is particularly important since the focus here is to find out if bureaucracy has any negative impact on democratic development. Both groups “one” and “four” are weak democracies, the only difference between these two groups is that the first group has modern bureaucracy while the fourth group does not.

The graph demonstrates that the presence of a legal-rational bureaucracy lowers the level of corruption in countries with weaker democracies. Countries in the second group, i.e., those that have liberal democratic and modern bureaucratic traits have the lowest level of corruption. This indicates that the level of corruption will be lowest in regimes that have modern bureaucratic and liberal democratic attributes.

The second variable whose mean scores were compared was “red tape.” “Red Tape” according to the dataset used here, accounts for stricter regulations and frequent governmental obstructions.”
Comparison of the mean scores for all four groups predicted that countries with modern bureaucracy and nascent democracy have the least instances of red tape (see Figure 7). Countries with nascent democracy and formalistic bureaucracy had the lowest rating of 4.5. Group “One” with modern bureaucracy and nascent democracy had least amount of red tape with the score of 6.5. This is interesting considering the fact that bureaucracy is synonymous to “red tape.” The group with liberal democracy and modern bureaucracy has an average rating of 5.3 which is slightly lower than group three’s rating of 5.6. This indicates that liberal democracies with weak formalistic bureaucracies; as well as modern bureaucracies with weak democratic polities have less red tape as compared to liberal democracies which have modern bureaucracies. This may subsequently mean that red tape in fact is not an exclusively “bureaucratic” attribute; that it is the result of an amalgamation of liberal democracy and modern bureaucracy.
While comparing statistical means of the variable “merit” of all four groups, the group with liberal democracy and modern bureaucracy had the highest rating of 0.84 in a scale of 0-1.

![Merit](image)

Figure 8. Merit.

The unexpected here was that the rating of the third group, i.e. the group of countries with liberal democratic polities and formalistic bureaucratic structures. The group scored lower with an average rating of 0.41 compared to the forth group, i.e. the group with formalistic bureaucracy and nascent democracy which had an average rating of scored 0.51 (see Figure 8).

Since bureaucracy typically follows tedious and rigid sets of rules and procedures for every action it executes, bureaucratic procedures are expected to be time consuming and cumbersome. To measure the level of bureaucratic efficiency among countries across all four groups, average scores across all four groups were compared. Countries that have
modern bureaucratic but nascent democratic attributes had the highest score of 2.6 in the bureaucratic efficiency scale (see Figure 9).

![Bureaucratic Efficiency Score](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureaucratic Efficiency Score</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(NascentD/ModernB)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LiberalD/ModernB)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LiberalD/FormalisticB)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NascentD/FormalisticB)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9. Bureaucratic efficiency score.

The difference among the average ratings of the four groups appears small here. This could be because of the limited number of cases included in this study. Here, countries with liberal democratic and modern bureaucratic characters have similar rating of 1.6 as those liberal democracies with formalistic bureaucratic credentials. According to this graph, merit-based bureaucracy seems to thwart bureaucratic inefficiency whereas democracy seems to insinuate bureaucratic inefficiency.

How is modern bureaucracy related to institutional democracy? Various studies have claimed bureaucracy to be an impediment to democratic development. The secretive, hierarchical and unequal dimension of bureaucracy and its superior position due to its technical expertise are perceived to be antithetical to democratic values. This
very contradiction is the basis of concern, especially when the regime in question is a nascent democracy with weak democratic institutions. Contrary to the established thesis on the subject however, the following graph demonstrates that nascent democracies with modern bureaucracies fare better on the institutionalized democracy scale as compared to nascent democracies with formalistic bureaucracies (see Figure 10).

![Institutionalized Democracy Score](image)

Figure 10. Institutionalized democracy score.

The point of interest here is that the first group, i.e., the group with nascent democracy and modern bureaucracy traits scored “5.8” in the 0-10 additive democracy scale while the fourth group, i.e., the group that has nascent democracy and formalistic bureaucracy had an average rating of 5.6. Likewise, the group that scored the highest with 9.2 on a 0-10 additive scale for “institutionalized democracy” is the one that has liberal democratic and modern bureaucratic traits. This suggests that the presence of developed, modern bureaucracy does not impede democratic development as the existing
imbalance thesis believes; rather it may encourage the development of institutional democracy.

Also, while comparing the second and the third; and the first and the fourth respectively, groups that have modern bureaucracies have higher scores on institutionalized democracy scale as opposed to the groups that have formalistic bureaucratic characteristics.

The next variable whose mean scores are compared is institutionalized autocracy. Existing imbalance thesis states that the presence of strong bureaucracy poses a threat to infant democracies. It is feared that the existence of a strong bureaucracy encourages autocratic trends. To test this existing thesis, mean scores of the variable “institutionalized autocracy” for all four groups were compared (see Figure 11).

![Institutionalized Autocracy Score](image)

**Figure 11. Institutionalized autocracy score.**
The operational indicator for autocracy was derived from the coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. The group with nascent democracy and modern bureaucracy has a mean score of 1 in an additive autocracy scale of 0-10, with 10 denoting full-fledged autocracy. The score of the third group with formalistic bureaucracy and liberal democracy is exactly the same as the score of the second group of countries that have liberal democracy and modern bureaucracy—both scored “0” denoting complete absence of autocracy. In the autocracy scale, the group of nascent democracies that have formalistic bureaucratic traits scored higher with a score of “1.5” on autocracy scale as compared to countries with modern bureaucracies and nascent democracies. This then suggests that the likelihood of nascent democracies with formalistic bureaucracies turning autocratic is higher than nascent democratic regimes with modern bureaucracies. In other words, modern, legal rational bureaucracies may have less autocratic tendencies than formalistic, under-developed bureaucracies.

The variable “combined polity” was compared next across all four groups. The combined polity score is 0-10 additive single regime score which was computed by subtracting the institutionalized autocracy score from the institutionalized democracy score. In other word, this variable is a measure of the regimes’ “democratic spirit” if one may say so. The variable may appear as a repetition here, since “institutionalized democracy score” discussed above already measures the democratic degree of the countries. The reason for including this variable is to measure the degree of “democratic spirit” of the 26 regimes studied here (see Figure 12).
The group which scored the most in this 0-10 point additive polity scale was the second group of countries with liberal democratic and modern bureaucratic traits. Group two had a mean score of 9.2 in this 0-10 point additive polity scale. Likewise the third group with liberal democracy and formalistic bureaucracy had a score of 8.4. The group that scored the lowest on polity scale is “group four” which had a score of 4. The third group, with modern bureaucratic and nascent democratic traits scored 4.8, higher than the fourth group of countries with nascent democracies and formalistic bureaucracies. This again suggests that bureaucracy does not impede democratic development among transitional, weak democratic regimes.

Another important variable is political competition. Political competition is an inherent trait of every vibrant democracy. The freedom and access, at least in principle to compete for any public office is a guaranteed right of every democratic country’s citizen (see Figure 13).
Figure 13. Political competition.

Here again, nascent democracies with modern bureaucracies have higher degree of political competition with a mean score of 47.2 as compared to fourth group of countries that are nascent democracies with formalistic bureaucracies. The fourth group had an average score of 39 in the political competition scale. Countries that have liberal democratic and modern bureaucratic credentials have the highest score of 59.4 in the political competition scale. The group with liberal democratic but formalistic bureaucratic attributes had an overall score of 54.3. The fact that countries with modern bureaucratic attributes have higher scores on political competition further suggests that bureaucracy does not deter or stifle political competition, an important ingredient in any democratic regimes.

Political participation is yet another important variable in the study of democracy. Various political scientists have written how the level of political participation is directly related to democratic credentials of a country. The very idea behind elections and voting rests on the postulate of political participation (see Figure 14).
As with all the other variables, mean scores for political participation were compared across all four groups. Here, the group of countries with liberal democratic and modern bureaucratic characteristics has the highest level of political participation with the score of 49.1. The third group of countries that have liberal democratic but formalistic bureaucratic traits have an average political participation score of 45.2. Likewise, nascent democracies with modern bureaucracies got a higher rating of 34.2 in the political participation scale compared to nascent democracies with formalistic bureaucratic traits. The fourth group has an average score of 25 (see Figure 14). Bureaucratic concept of impersonality and neutrality ensures equal access for all and this may be the reason why countries with modern bureaucratic traits show higher level of political participation. This again suggests that modern legal rational bureaucracy does not act as a hindrance to political participation and subsequently to democratic development.
Democratization index is a scale that has been originally computed by multiplying the total percentages of political competition and political participation and dividing it by 100. The graph below shows the mean scores of democratization index of all four groups.

![Graph showing Democratization Index](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(NascentD/ModernB)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LiberalD/ModernB)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LiberalD/FormalisticB)</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NascentD/FormalisticB)</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 15. Democratization index. Democratization Index: COMP and PART combined by multiplying the two given percentages and dividing it by 100.

The group that scored the highest in this scale is the second group, i.e., liberal democracies that have modern bureaucracies. The group with nascent democracies and formalistic bureaucracies scored the least here with 13.3. This may suggest that the fundamentals of democracy and bureaucracy complement one another. Democratization requires that the goals and aspirations of the majority be realized as efficiently as possible and bureaucracy becomes that instrument for efficiently realizing that end. This graph supports Weber’s claim that bureaucracy and democracy share a complementary and symbiotic relationship. This may mean that the presence of modern bureaucracy does not hinder democratic development. When one compares the rating of the first group, i.e.,
nascent democracies with modern bureaucracies, with the rating of group four, another set of nascent democracies with formalistic bureaucracies, the first group of weak democracies with strong bureaucratic traits fares better with an overall score of 16 in the democratization scale as compared to the fourth set of weak democracies with weak bureaucracies which scored 13.3.

Another variable that measures democratic characteristics of a regime is the openness of executive recruitment. In democracies, recruitment of the chief executive is typically open to the extent that all the politically active population has the opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process (see Figure 16).

Figure 16. Openness of executive recruitment.

Regimes with dual executives, hereditary chief executives that co-exist with elected chief ministers are labeled “dual executive designation” and are rated “3”. Countries that have low democratic and bureaucratic credentials have an average rating
of “3”. All the other groups have an average rating of “4”. Countries where chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election or transitional arrangements between designation and election, are labeled “open” and rated “4”. The other three groups, i.e. group one with high democracy and low bureaucracy, group two with high democracy as well as bureaucracy and group three with high democracy and low bureaucracy have an average rating of “4”.

Executive recruitment concept is measured on a 1 to 8 scale. Countries that have modern bureaucracy and nascent democracy have a 7.5 rating. According to the Polity IV data users’ manual, countries that have transitional or restricted elections to elect their chief executives are labeled as “7” (see Figure 17).

Likewise, countries that have dual executive system where there is a presence of a hereditary ruler and a chief minister who is elected have a rating of “6” and countries that
have competitive election as a method to recruit their chief executive are labeled “8”.
Here both the groups that have liberal democracy and modern bureaucracy as well as the group that have liberal democracy, formalistic bureaucracy are rated “8”. Countries with modern bureaucracy, nascent democracy have an average rating of 7.5 and countries that have nascent democratic as well formalistic bureaucratic credentials have an average score of 6.6.

As mentioned in Chapter III, operationally the variable “executive constrain concept” refers to the extent of institutionalized constrains on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Here a seven category scale is used (see Figure 18).

![Executive Constraint Concepts](image)

Figure 18. Executive constraint concepts.

Countries with modern bureaucracy and nascent democracy as well as nascent democratic regimes with formalistic bureaucracies have an average rating of “5” here. According to the Polity IV data users’ manual, countries where the executive has more
effective authority than any accountability group but is subjected to substantial constrains by them are rated “5”. Countries where accountability groups have effective authority, equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity are rated “7” in the dataset. Here, countries with modern bureaucracy and liberal democracy have an average rating of “7”. Likewise, countries that had common elements from both category 5 and 7 are labeled as an “intermediate category” and have a rating of 6 in the dataset. Here, countries with liberal democracy and formalistic bureaucracy have an average rating of 6.2.

Part Two

It has been repeated time and again how well developed bureaucracies pose a threat to democratic development in nascent democracies. Here, democratic status indicators are compared across bureaucratic levels. Various components of liberal democracy such as political competition, political participation, institutionalized democracy scores, institutionalized autocracy scores as well as democratization scores have been compared between the groups of countries that have formalistic bureaucracy and those that have modern bureaucracy.
Figure 19. Comparison of scores between modern and formalistic bureaucracy groups.

Each group’s average ratings on various aspects of democracy are compared to see if the presence of modern bureaucracy helps or hinders democratic development. While comparing “democ” or “institutionalized democracy” scores between the groups of countries which has strong modern bureaucratic credentials with the one that does not, one can see in the graph below that the group of countries with strong modern bureaucracies has a higher average rating of 7.2 for “institutionalized democracy” compared to the countries with weak formalistic bureaucracies that have an average of 6.4 (see Figure 19).

Institutionalized autocracy score (autoc) is higher with an average score of “1” in countries with weak, formalistic bureaucracies as compared to countries with modern bureaucratic traits which has an average score of 0.6. The polity score which was computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score is also higher (6.6) in countries with modern bureaucracies as compared to the average polity score of
(5.4) of the formalistic bureaucracy group. Likewise, average scores of political competition and political participation are higher in countries with modern bureaucratic characteristics. The mean score for the overall democratization scale is also much higher in countries with modern bureaucratic trends.

Comparing the “openness of executive recruitment” ratings, the group that has modern bureaucracy has the rating of 4 which according to Polity IV users’ data manual, signifies an “open” system of recruiting the executive where chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election or transitory arrangements between designation and election. Likewise, the rating “3” indicates “dual executive election” where there is a hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister (Marshall & Jaggers, 2005). The weak, formalistic bureaucracy group has an average rating of 3.6.

For the variable “executive recruitment concept” the modern bureaucracy group has the rating of 7.7 and formalistic bureaucracy group has a rating of 7. According to the Polity IV data users’ manual the rating “7” denotes transitional or restricted election whereas the rating “8” denotes competitive election. For the “executive constrain concept” modern bureaucracy group has a rating of 5.8 whereas the low bureaucracy group has a rating of 5.4. According to the Polity IV data users’ manual, the rating “5” implies substantial limitations on executive authority and rating “6” denotes an intermediate category between rating “5” and rating “7” which is labeled “executive parity or subordination”. This graph therefore displays that modern bureaucracies are more desirable in the context of democratic development than weak, formalistic bureaucracies.
Confounding Variables

As far as confounding variables are concerned, the study included two variables that are often found in democracy studies. Adult Literacy Rate and Gross Domestic Product (per capita) are the two variables that have been included as confounding variables in this study. GDP is the basic measure of a country’s economic performance and is the market value of all goods and services made within the borders of a country. Very often one finds it positively correlating with democratic development in various democratic studies. Likewise, ADL or Adult Literacy Rate is the proportion of adult population aged 15 years and above which is literate (see Figure 20).

![Average of GDP (per capita)](image)

Figure 20. Average of GDP (per capita).

All four group’s mean score for GDP has been compared. The second group with liberal democracy and modern bureaucracy has the highest average GDP per capita rate of $6,500 compared to other three groups. Countries with modern bureaucracy have
better GDP per capita rate as compared countries with weak, formalistic bureaucracies. This corroborates with the Rauch and Evan’s study (1990) which showed a distinct correlation between economic development and the presence of Weberian bureaucracy. Countries with nascent democracy and weak bureaucracy traits have the lowest average GDP per capita rate of $1,042. Nascent democracies with modern bureaucracy have an average of $3,218.30.

As far as adult literacy rate among all four groups of countries are concerned, the result is a little different (see Figure 21).

![Average Adult Literacy Rate](image)

- (NascentD/ModernB) 87.8
- (LiberalD/ModernB) 80.7
- (LiberalD/FormalisticB) 90.3
- (NascentD/FormalisticB) 68

Figure 21. Average of GDP (per capita).

Average adult literacy rate is the highest among the third group of countries with liberal democratic and formalistic bureaucratic traits. Countries with modern bureaucracy, nascent democracy fall not too far behind the third group with the mean score of 87.8%. Adult literacy rate is the lowest among countries that lacked liberal
democratic as well as modern bureaucratic credentials with an average of 68%. Here literacy does not appear to vary by either democratic status or bureaucratic level.

In order to find out how the confounding variables score between low and high bureaucracy groups, the variables were compared between these two groups (see Figure 22).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP (per capita)</th>
<th>ModernBureaucracyGrps</th>
<th>FormalisticBureaucracy Grps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$5,000</td>
<td>$4,531</td>
<td>$1,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 22. Average GDP (per capita) between modern bureaucracy and formalistic bureaucracy groups.

As shown in the above graph (Figure 22), modern bureaucracy group has a much higher average GDP per capita rate compared to the low bureaucracy group. The high bureaucracy group has an average rate of $4,531 compared to low bureaucracy group’s $1,415.
Likewise, the group with modern bureaucracy credentials displays a higher average adult literacy rate of 85% compared to the formalistic bureaucracy group’s average of 75% (see Figure 23).

Summary of Data

For almost every variable, “group two”, i.e., the group that has strong bureaucracy and well as democracy credentials displays high scores (see Table 2). This group had the highest score of 7 on ethical performance scale which measured corruption at the higher level of government.
Table 2

Comparison of the Mean Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Group One</th>
<th>Group Two</th>
<th>Group Three</th>
<th>Group Four</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Efficiency Score</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Red Tape</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Efficiency</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalized Democracy Score</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalized Autocracy Score</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Polity Score</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Competition</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political participation</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratization Index</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (per capita)</td>
<td>$3,218.30</td>
<td>$6,500</td>
<td>$2,235</td>
<td>$1,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALR (average)</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The presence of merit was also the strongest among countries in group two with a score of 0.84. “Group two” with its liberal democratic and modern bureaucratic traits scored the highest on political competition and participation scales. It had the strongest scores of 9.2 on institutionalized democracy scale as well as polity scale. Group two had the highest scores of 59.4 and 49.1 on political competition and participation respectively.

It is important to look at “group one” i.e., the group with nascent democratic and modern bureaucratic traits and group four which has nascent democratic and formalistic bureaucratic traits and both their overall scores to contest the imbalance theory (Table 2). “Group one has fared better on institutional democracy scale compared to “group four’s”,

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i.e. the group that has nascent democracy and formalistic bureaucracy traits. Likewise, “group one” has reduced institutional autocracy rate compared “group four’s”. This may suggest that a country which has weak democratic and bureaucratic attributes may be more prone to succumb to institutional autocracy compared to a weak democratic regime that has weak, formalistic bureaucracy. Likewise, various other democratic credentials such as political competition and participation, polity score and democratization trend are much stronger in countries of group one that have modern bureaucratic credentials and weak democratic precedent when compared to those countries of group four that have weak democratic as well as bureaucratic precedent.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION

This study investigates the validity of the argument that the presence of modern, Weberian bureaucracies in budding democracies threatens the development of democracy. In the process, core democratic credentials such as political competition and political participation of countries that have merit-based bureaucracies are compared with countries that lack Weberian bureaucracies. This study uses Weber’s “ideal type” of bureaucracy because as Briener (1996) pointed out, Weber’s ideal types serve to construct the contexts, the logics and consequences that one is exposed to in deciding on a course of social and political action. They also help clarify the meaning of the fundamental ends that one seeks and the necessary means and likely consequences of realizing them. It is, however, important to mention that Weber’s paradigms have been incorporated here as thoughts which stand more at the starting point than at the conclusion of a series of development in the theory and practice of liberal democracy and modern bureaucracy.

Chapter I introduces the problem with an explanation of the developing countries’ mostly formalistic bureaucracies that lack core Weberian traits; along with the descriptions of relevant concepts on bureaucracy and liberal democracy. Chapter II reviews literature pertinent to this study and tied the concept of bureaucracy with the concept of political development and subsequently with liberal democracy. Chapter III
describes the secondary data and the methodology used in this study. Chapter IV presents the data and the analysis.

This final chapter presents the summary of the findings along with the discussions of significant results and relevant concepts. It addresses the limitations present in this study and makes recommendations for future research.

Implications of Data

Analysis of available secondary data on democracy and modern Weberian bureaucracies supported the position taken by this study. Brief discussion on some of the countries’ political past to substantiate the categorization of countries here is necessary. Most of the countries chosen for this study had colonial pasts except for few such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal. However, even these European nations did not have liberal polities at least until a decade or two after the end of World War II.

Group one, which had a combined presence of weak democracy and modern bureaucracy, is comprised of countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Brazil is today the most influential country with a vibrant democracy in South America (BBC, Country Profile: Brazil, 2009). During the decade of the ‘80s, however, its political and economic status was a little different. During the ‘90s, it had to be bailed out of economic crisis. The drive to move settlers into the Amazon basin during the military rule in the ‘70s was controversial to say the least. There was a wide gap reported between the rich and the poor, with much of the arable land controlled by a handful of wealthy families (BBC, Country Profile: Brazil, 2009). The political history of Colombia is grimmer. Fraught with civil wars, internal political conflicts and drug
cartels, Colombia had a difficult route to present day economic progress and curbing the enormous problem of drug trafficking. Since 1984, there have been substantial efforts to curtail drug traffickers following the assassination of the justice minister (BBC, 2009). A former colony, Lee Kwan Yu’s Singapore was an epitome of economic progress and modernization, which boasted of a high living standard. However, it had rigid penalties even for misdemeanors. Any “unlawful” act was looked upon as offenses perpetrated against the state and punished with rigor. Thailand during the ‘80s transformed itself from a mainly agrarian nation-state to an industrialized one with the economic boom of the era. Revered monarchy, religion and military have helped to shape its society and politics (BBC, 2009). Repeated military coups however marred the fragile democracy of the country. Likewise, Malaysia boasts South-East Asia’s most vibrant economy due to decades of industrial growth and political stability. Its human rights record, however, evokes international criticism (BBC, 2009).

Group Two on the other hand had regimes with modern bureaucratic and liberal democratic characteristics. The countries that belong to this group are India, Israel, Portugal, and Spain. The most important factor for consolidating democracy in India could be the presence of the structure of governance and administration, which it inherited from the British (Zakaria, 2007). The British built and operated most of the crucial institutions of liberal democracy such as the courts, legislatures, administrative rules and a quasi-free press on which the Indians built their democracy.

Group Three has countries that have strong democratic credentials with weak bureaucratic structures. Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Greece belong to this group. Argentina overthrew the military dictatorship in 1983;
however, its legacy from 1976 until 1983 still haunts many Argentines. Tens of thousands of people were killed in the seven-year "dirty war" and the bodies of those taken away by the former junta have never been found; however, many military leaders were pardoned during the trials in 1980s and 1990s (BBC, 2009). Nepotism is said to be rampant in these countries (Hyden, Julius, & Mease, 2004). Popular leaders like Carlos Menem bypass their parliaments and rule by presidential decree, eroding basic constitutional practices. In other words, unbridled democracy has overshadowed constitutionalism as well as liberal democracy which modern bureaucracy helps administer therefore one can say that democracy has surpassed bureaucracy, the trend which early philosophers such as Socrates saw among the sophists and which reflects the concern behind the “tyranny of the majority” paradigm and the rise of “illiberalism” of late.

Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Uruguay were categorized as the fourth group with weak democratic and weak bureaucratic credentials. In 1996, Guatemala emerged from a 36-year-long civil war, which pitted the leftist, mostly Mayan insurgents against the army. The army waged a vicious campaign to eliminate the guerrillas. According to BBC News (Country Profile: Guatemala, 2009), more than 200,000 people - most of them civilians - were killed or disappeared. Sri Lanka has a similar history. The growth of aggressive Sinhala nationalism created ethnic division between minority Tamils and majority Sinhala population until civil war erupted in the 1980s with the Tamils pressing for self-rule. BBC (2009) reported that the war between the ethnic Tamil separatists and the Sinhalese government killed more than 60,000 people, damaged the economy and harmed tourism in one of South Asia's potentially prosperous societies. Civilian politics in Pakistan in the
last few decades was also tarnished by corruption, inefficiency and confrontations between various institutions according to BBC (2009). Alternating periods of civilian and military rule have not helped to establish stability either. Do these shortcomings have any connection with the absence of merit-based modern, legal rational administrative apparatus? This study probes this issue.

The data used in the study project a common pattern among countries that lack either modern bureaucratic structures or strong democratic credentials. Countries that had modern bureaucratic structures like Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand were criticized about their human rights situations and their tough sanctions, whereas democracies like Argentina and Greece bore the brunt of political instability and weak precedents of the rule of law during this era as discussed earlier. Modern, merit-based bureaucracy levels traditional hierarchies while vibrant democracy propels societal equality. However, with an absence of one of these two phenomena, the process of democracy consolidation, as the study shows; seems to get impeded and/or flawed.

In this study, comparison of ethical performance ratings among four groups suggests that the group that has strong democratic and bureaucratic credentials is the least corrupt. Higher public officials in this type of regime are less likely to demand “special payments” or bribes. The variable “corrupt1” measures ethical performance at the higher level of bureaucracy where higher government officials demand bribes. As democracy stipulates accountability through the precedents of the rule of law, and bureaucracy functions according to rigid bureaucratic codes, it is difficult for higher government officials to demand bribes by frivolously dismissing potential legal actions unlike in regimes where the rule of law is overshadowed by traditional norms and rituals. Lack of
merit-based bureaucratic recruiting trends also increase instances of bureaucratic corruption. Fred Riggs (1994) has discussed this trend at length.

According to Riggs when non-merit appointees are able to retain their status as bureaucrats, they typically become a powerful political force that can impose obstructions and regulations according to their whims. Due to the lack of proper rules and laws, they escape prosecutions. Compounded by their want of administrative qualifications, they start forming self-protective networks in order to safeguard their special interests, especially their right to stay in office. Riggs calls these bureaucrats “retainers” and goes on to explain that after these retainers have held office for a long enough time, they become so well entrenched that they can successfully resist all efforts to accomplish significant reforms. Riggs’ thesis explains why the group that has low democratic as well as bureaucratic credentials has highest level of corruption.

When the average ratings of the variable “Redtape” for all four groups were compared, the group that had the least amount of red tape was the one that had the combination of weak democratic and high modern bureaucratic credentials. Red tape here is described as the “regulatory environment the foreign firms must face when seeking approval and permits.” It was interesting how weak democracies with strong bureaucratic traits had lower account of red tape, especially since red tape is often used interchangeably with “bureaucracy” itself. The prevalence of red tape was low among regimes that lacked one of the two, i.e. a strong bureaucracy or a vibrant democracy. This indicates that red tape is more a product of democracy-bureaucracy symbiosis than of bureaucracy alone.
“Merit” is an important variable for both institutionalizations of democracy as well as bureaucracy. One of the fundamental dilemmas confronting modern government is how to balance partisan politics and the institutions of the state. It was concluded long ago that merit has the potential to offset the “evils” of politics although debates about its legitimate authority still rage (Ingraham, 1995). Moreover, merit is directly related to the concepts of neutrality and accountability, which in turn, overlap with the fundamentals of institutionalized democracy. The rules guiding recruitment have long been regarded as a key issue for successful policy implementation, regulation and provision of services (Hyden, Julius, & Mease, 2004). In most developing countries, political interference sidelines the system of merit. In the Philippines, having the right personal connection was important; in Argentina most experts conceded that there was no merit-based system for recruitment into the civil service; and in Chile there was the need to reduce politicization of appointments (Hyden, Julius, & Mease, 2004).

However, merit also introduces hierarchy; it distinguishes and separates those with merit from the rest. According to classical democracy theories, the notion of merit is antithetical to the fundamentals of equality. This may explain why the group of countries that had higher democracy and weaker bureaucracy scores had low merit rating compared to all the other three groups (see Figure 8 in Chapter IV). The group that had strong democratic as well as bureaucratic credentials had the highest merit rating compared to all the other three groups. This indicates that unbridled democracy erodes merit. Regimes that have robust enough democracy but weak bureaucratic credentials might have active patronage system that regards loyalty to a particular political party a more important attribute for hiring than merit. The Greeks did not regard democracy as the best possible
form of government precisely because it lacked best citizens in authority. This may also explain the skepticism that the founding fathers of the United States had about unbridled “democracy” as a system of governance. Weber’s theory of democracy too was distinctive both in the character of his justification for universal suffrage and his insistence that its introduction did not change but only reinforce what he called the “law of the small number”; the law that politics was controlled by small groups or elites from above (Beetham, 1974). Interestingly, according to David Beetham (1974, p. 103), the involvement of mass politics was not regarded by Weber as modifying the fact of oligarchy but rather the methods by which the few were selected, the type of person who reached the top and the quality necessary for the effective exercise of power. Merit seemed to play an important role in modern liberal democracy. This therefore might explain why countries with high levels of liberal democratic and bureaucratic attributes had highest average rating on the merit scale compared to the other three groups.

The next variable compared between the four groups was “institutionalized autocracy.” The imbalance thesis shows a distinct connection between autocracy and strong bureaucracy. According to this thesis, as bureaucracy consolidates itself in a nascent democracy, it starts overshadowing the bumbling new democracy through its organizational skills, knowledge and expertise and soon dominates the newly established political institutions. Weber also described bureaucrats as caste of officials removed from the people by expertise and was deeply concerned that those who staffed bureaucracy might themselves become masters of the state since they can dominate through their expertise (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983). He, however, was quick to admit that political democracy did not bring any diminution or diffusion of power, but rather a shift in its
location from the local notables to a new set of roles, which demanded different qualities, and different patterns of recruitment (Beetham, 1972; pp. 106-107). Bureaucratic elitism and autocracy was a concern for Weber only if it tried to deviate from its course to usurp political powers.

As far as institutionalized autocracy was concerned, countries with strong democratic and modern bureaucratic attributes were devoid of any kind of institutionalized autocratic trends such as lack of regularized political competition and concerns for political freedom. However between the two groups of weak democracies, the group that has high level of modern bureaucratic attributes had lower autocratic tendencies compared to the group that lacked modern bureaucratic attribute (see Figure 10 in Chapter IV). This again suggests that merit-based legal, rational bureaucracies may not act as autocratic forces in nascent democracies. On the contrary, it may act as an agent to check the autocratic trends of elected leaders in unfettered democracies as Zakaria (2007) opined.

For every variable describing democracy, the second group, i.e. the group with strong democratic and bureaucratic characteristics had higher ratings than any other group (see Figure 19). Group Two also had highest ratings for two important variables that define democracy; political competition and political participation. Equal access and opportunity for all to compete for public office is the cornerstone of democracy theory. Robert Dahl (1971) in his famed “Polyarchy” writes that democratization involves two main functions, public contestation and the right to participate. According to him classical liberal freedoms that are a part of the definition of public competition and participation are: opportunities to oppose the government, form political organizations,
express oneself on political matters without fear of governmental reprisal, read and hear alternative points of view, vote by secret ballot in election in which candidates of different parties compete for votes. This is only possible if there is a mechanism in place for maintaining and safeguarding these rights, for overseeing that the instruments of political competition and participation such as elections take place in a fair, free and timely manner. A legal, rational, merit-based bureaucracy ensures proper administering of democratic goals and aspirations of the citizenry. It is not surprising therefore, that the mean score for political competition was the highest for the second group, i.e., the group of countries with high democratic and bureaucratic attributes. Between the two groups comprising of weak democracies, the one with strong bureaucratic presence had higher scores in political competition than the group that had weak bureaucratic presence.

By eliminating existing pre-modern hierarchies, Weber (1978) had theorized that bureaucracy increases political participation. The neutral, impersonal aspect of bureaucracy enforces a certain political equality in society. This political leveling may then be the cause for increased political participation because the groups with strong modern bureaucratic credentials had higher participation ratings compared to the groups that lack modern bureaucracies (see Figures 13 and 19 in Chapter IV).

Education and economic development are the two factors that are believed to accelerate democratic growth (Huntington, 1971). According to Gill (2000) increased wealth and education increase the exposure of the working class to a wide range of different influences and pressures and thereby make them less susceptible to the appeals of radical, anti-democratic ideas. It is therefore important to know the scores of these variables in various regime types. While comparing average GDP per capita rate and the
adult literacy rate among four groups, Group Two, i.e., the group of countries with strong presence of modern bureaucracy and liberal democracy scored the highest on the GDP scale. Weak democracies that had modern bureaucracies had the next highest rating. This implied that modern bureaucracy propels economic development.

The result was a little different while comparing the average adult literacy rate. Liberal democracies with weak bureaucratic characteristics had the highest average adult literacy rate, followed by the group of countries with strong bureaucratic attributes. There was therefore no particular pattern that was detected as far as education is concerned.

As far as confounding factors like economy and education are concerned, it is important to point out here that Rauch and Evan’s study (2008) has already demonstrated that the presence of Weberian state structures positively correlate with economic development. If one is to concur with Lipset (1959) that economic development helps consolidate democracy, then bureaucracy becomes that element which bolsters economy, which in turn helps consolidate democracy. From this aspect also, one can deduce that strong, merit-based bureaucracy theoretically should not pose a danger to budding democracies.

Implications of the Literature

Jon Pierre (1995, p. 1) wrote, it is no exaggeration to state that the past twenty years or so have seen a profound reassessment of the role of public administration in modern society. Citizens have, to an increasing extent come to question the legitimacy of bureaucratic decisions and actions and policy makers have forced public administration to implement extensive cutback programs dismantling core segments of the bureaucracy in
order to ameliorate the fiscal crisis of the state. With an overall internationalization of
society, transnational bureaucracies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank have rapidly expanded and confronted national bureaucracies with a
completely new set of demands and adaptive measures. These organizations believe that
they are incapable of offering public services at low cost; that they are major obstacles to
socio-economic changes; and that they are essentially antithetical to anti-collectivist
sentiments coupled with a belief in the market as an ultimate criterion of efficiency, skill
and professionalism (Pierre, 1995). The crisis of democracy, as to Abrahamsen (2000)
summarized a bizarre logic on the part of the International Financial Institutions. They
posit that developing countries lack development because they lack free market, lack of
free market is fueled by the lack of “good governance” and lack of good governance in
turn is brought about by the lack of democratic institutions, therefore promoting
democracy for these institutions is ultimately about promoting free market capitalism.

While the above mentioned logic is still prevalent among “development experts,”
the West however is pondering over capitalism and how it must evolve: Time Magazine
of May 25th 2009 carried first of its 100 roundtable series which reflected the views of
various “honorees” to ponder about the future of capitalism after the global economic
meltdown that exacerbated 2008. One of the discussant opined that left on its own,
capitalism does not move along smoothly, nor does it treat everyone fairly and that in
order to grow up to be free and productive, it needs someone to look over its shoulder
(Time, 2009). Another respondent rejoined that the system as a whole is working;
however, for capitalism to have future, it needs to survive and that there needs to be a
regulatory mechanism that will ensure that in 100 years there is still a system. The Bernie
Madoff and the Satyam frauds that rocked the international financial arena between last year and early this year provide ample reason why a regulatory apparatus needs to be in place in order to restrain the unbridled market from encroaching upon individual rights. If capitalism, which has been perceived as an all-encompassing cure for every socio-political and economic malaise is increasingly seen as wanting an agent to “look over its shoulder” the purely economic cornerstone that the IFIs stand on might need an overhaul soon. As Zakaria (2007) opined, getting the theory wrong means getting the practice wrong as well. The literature and the data used in this study shows that with decades of policy-making and billions of dollars poured into these developing regimes, things have not really changed for the better.

Likewise, electoral victories of the Hamas and Hezbollah in the Middle East and similar victories in Peru, Sierra Leon, Slovakia, and the Philippines have proved that exclusively majoritarian democracy can bring those opposed to the very tenets of liberal democratic spirit, to the seats of power. This disturbing phenomenon which Fareed Zakaria (2007) called “illiberal democracy” has taken root in most of the nascent democracies of Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and South America. According to Zakaria (2007, p. 240), the “deregulation of democracy” has gone too far. What therefore is the antidote for this increasing “illiberalism”?

Political democracy for Weber flowed from the formal equality presupposed by the institutions of modern society, which was necessary if the masses were to be involved in an orderly way in the political process, rather than by spasmodic and “irrational” intervention (Beetham, 1974). This study indicates Braibanti (1961) to be correct when he wrote that bureaucracy might not be the worst fate that might befall a developing
nation. Despite Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore’s poor human rights and democracy records, these countries have much more impressive human development index ratings than countries in Group Four that have poor democratic as well as bureaucratic attributes.

Weber had theorized that mass democracy needs legal rational bureaucracy as an alternative to the rule of the dilettantes and that the democratic process of collective decision-making gets transformed into rational action via modern bureaucracy. Bureaucracy helps the state to administer its policies and to govern according to its will (Weber, 1978; pp. 984-986). The very fact that India, Israel, Spain, and Portugal, autocracies and a colony just a couple of decades ago have been able to turn around their political and economic stature in the international arena suggests that a competent and efficient bureaucracy helps govern a country according to its will and achieve the goals it sets for itself. It is also interesting to observe that all these three countries started their political journey with strong faith in public institutions. Nehru’s decision to retain the pre-independence modern, merit-based bureaucracy that India inherited from the British proved to be the biggest boon to the country’s democratic and economic development. Salazar’s Portugal from 1930 to 1960 saw its evolving economy adopt two distinct economic features; that of an extensively regulatory state with private ownership of the means of production. Likewise, under Franco’s rule post-World War II Spain had to endure political and economic isolation, which forced economic and political self-sufficiency on the country. The country had no choice but to build strong public institutions in order to take care of its social, economic and political matters.

The institutional imbalance portion of the literature discusses how in 1964, Henry Goodnow, after studying civil service in Pakistan had reached a conclusion that the
occupants of higher civil service exert prominent influence as to make the climate unfavorable for the development of democratic institutions. Pakistan is an interesting case to discuss here. The data used in this study categorize Pakistan as a country with weak, formalistic bureaucracy. The evolution of Pakistan as a state has been different from that of its democratic neighbor, India. Pakistan was conceived on religious lines unlike India, which opted for secularism during its inception. The focus of early leaders in Pakistan was to create a homeland for South Asia’s Muslims. With remote and extremely rural areas in Sind, Baluchistan, and North Western Frontier Province, the newly migrated Pakistani political elite had to rely on local chieftains and feudal warlords to administer the area. With the continuance of feudalism in these areas, the population largely remained largely oblivious to political modernism and democratic development. Oblivious to fundamental of rational ethics, and amidst want of a legal rational or even a charismatic authority after Jinnah’s death in 1948, traditional authority that were held by their tribal and rural chieftains as well as migrant elites continued enjoying political legitimacy. The bureaucracy that developed in Pakistan therefore had strong traditional characteristics.

The distinction that Weber (1978) drew between modern and traditional bureaucracies explains the Pakistani case well. Rationalization and demystification are fundamental features that distinguish traditional bureaucracy from a modern one. Reason is the main distinguishing element. As discussed in the literature portion in previous chapters; in traditional bureaucracies legitimacy is based on age-old rules and power centers where the “masters” are designated according to traditional rules and are obeyed because of traditional status. Obedience is owed, not to enacted rules but to the person
who occupies a position of authority by tradition. In the absence of legal rational bureaucracy, the process of socio-political “leveling,” i.e., a major democratizing function that Weber attributed to modern bureaucracy is impeded. Democratic development in Pakistan seems to have stunted similarly.

Another important argument that surfaced repeatedly in pertinent literature is that bureaucracy threatens and even destroys individualism. Arendt’s thesis that emerged from the infamous Eichmann trial (1963) brought forward the notion of a mass-man who conceives himself as a cog in the machine (Fine, 2004). Her portrayal of Eichmann as a “conformist”, an ardent bureaucrat whose first duty was to follow the orders of the state might resonate with Weber’s concept of bureaucratic impersonality and rule-bound disposition. However, the Nazi bureaucracy did not possess neutrality, the distinct modern, Weberian bureaucratic trait. For Weber, chief attribute of modern society as well as the state was the replacement of patriarchal and patrimonial systems of administration by the bureaucratic, of traditional authority by the legal-rational authority (Beetham, 1974, p. 67). Bellowing the supremacy of the Aryan race and of the Vaterland could be termed as nothing but patriarchal. As Cesarini (2004) wrote, Eichmann’s Nazi superiors recognized in him the right objective; problem solving managerial outlook combined with fierce German nationalism grounded in racial pride (p. 46). Like in any traditional or charismatic bureaucracies, loyalty and deference for Nazi ideology were strong albeit tacit considerations during the recruitment process. Nazi bureaucracy functioned along strong anti-Semitic lines, which stemmed from Hitler’s charismatic influence. According Gerth and Mill (1977, p. 220), Weber upheld that when acceptance or rejection of an aspirant to an official career depended upon the consent of the members of the official
body as was the case with the German army, such phenomena, which promoted guild-like
closure of officialdom, are typically found in patrimonial officialdoms of the past. As
discussed in earlier chapters, traditional or charismatic bureaucracies according to Weber
overshadow and sharply limit the use of rationality, which results in the prerequisites for
strictly bureaucratic recruitment getting impaired. Purges, orthodoxy and hewing to the
party line are some of the typicality of charismatic bureaucracy (Constas, 1958).
Bureaucracies in developing countries mostly mimic traditional and charismatic traits.

The notion that the ‘development community’ has about bureaucracy has been
most pervasive in molding the perception of bureaucracy among policy makers, non-
governmental organizations and pressure groups all over the world. IFIs have been
pressurizing public institutions of the developing world to become leaner and more
accessible at the same time. Often in the name of “Structural Adjustment Program,” there
have been pressures to reduce the role of state in relation to the market and to cut civil
service by reducing the number of civil service employees and wages despite various
studies depicting no relation between larger bureaucracies and weaker development
performances (Hyden, Julius, & Mease, 2004). From the late 1970s onwards, the policies
of IFIs were increasingly shaped by a free-market ideology that easily generated into
“economist” (de Alcantara, 1998). Armed with the capacity to provide desperately
needed capital to the developing countries, these development specialists have been
insisting on “progressive liberalization” which further reduces the scope of the state. This
position relegates socio-political issues to a secondary status within the developmental
debate. However, as the experiment in the free-market reforms progressed in Africa and
Latin America, it became clear that no economic project was likely to succeed unless
minimum conditions of social order and institutional efficiency were met (de Alcantara, 1998).

The development experts’ position has also weakened by the debate over the reasons for success in rapidly growing Asian economies, which could hardly be considered free-market archetypes. In addition, the recent research done by Rauch and Evans (2008) proved that merit-based modern bureaucracy boosts economic development. Interestingly however, there has been a tendency among policy makers to increase political control over bureaucracy. On one hand policy makers use administrative reform to displace accountability for public policy and on the other, the same policy makers try to increase their control over the bureaucracy (Pierre, 1995, p. 3). This reflects a general desire among elected politicians to increase influence over bureaucracy while at the same time avoid responsibility for bureaucracy’s actions. Thus, as Pierre (1995, p. 215) writes, the main problem for developing countries seems to be to create institutions which are sufficiently autonomous and insulated from a variety of different socio-political pressures to be able to implement public policy efficiently. Strong politicization of the civil service in some countries however has prevented the development of such institutions. In other words, neutral, legal rational, Weberian bureaucracy is probably the antidote for the rising “illiberalism” among new democracies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Weberian bureaucracy may then be that factor which can consolidate liberal democracy.
Theoretical Implications

After a thorough analysis of the four different regime kinds, this study concludes that the “concern” the prevailing institutional imbalance thesis voice about strong bureaucracies in nascent democracies, is invalid.

Invalidation of the Imbalance Thesis

The imbalance theorists’ arguments about the difficulty of containing bureaucracies to an instrumental role in nascent democracies lack supporting data. Although Weber himself had acknowledged the phenomenon, which was central to conservatives like Gustav Schmoller and Hegel’s view of bureaucracy; i.e., the ability of bureaucracy to become a separate force, he had however criticized this phenomenon as an “aberration” (Beetham, 1972, p. 67). Weber had insisted that bureaucracy should be perceived strictly as a technical instrument, an administrative apparatus increasingly prevalent in all aspects of modern life and at the same time had stressed that it is a phenomenon, which grew in parallel with modern mass democracy.

This study demonstrated that in nascent democracies where there is a presence of legal, rational, merit-based bureaucracy; instances of institutionalized autocracy are less compared to similar budding democracies that lack modern bureaucracies. Contrary to what the institutional imbalance theory believed, weak democracies that had weak modern bureaucratic presence had the highest level of institutionalized autocracy score (Table 3). This suggests a thorough revision, if not an outright invalidation of the institutionalized imbalance theory.
Table 3

Invalidation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>(Nascent Democracy/Modern Bureau)</th>
<th>(Liberal Democracy/Modern Bureau)</th>
<th>(Liberal Democracy/Formalistic Bureau)</th>
<th>(Nascent Democracy/Formalistic Bureau)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethical Performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of Red Tape</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Merit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Efficiency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inst. Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>Inst. Autocracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Polity</td>
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<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Competition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratization Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
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*The Liberal Democracy-Bureaucracy Symbiosis Theory*

The major concern about bureaucracy has always been its “undemocratic” character. Its composition of experts makes it elitist in nature. However, liberal democratic theory as opposed to the classical democratic theory, according to Levine (1981, p. 31) takes no direct concerns with patterns of distribution. Its commitment to majority rule flows from an aggregative considerations. Levine (1981, p. 31) also writes that in functioning liberal democracies, people do not legislate directly but through representatives who are vested with considerable power to determine social choices,
sometimes in complete independence of the views- explicit or implicit, of the people they represent. Weber was concerned with the question that is at the heart of all theories of democracy: who within the business of everyday politics is to exercise political judgment and responsibility? According to Weber, citizens can be educated to accept certain political forms but he did not think that collectivities could exercise the requisite responsibility to make adequate judgment (Breiner, 1996).

It is, therefore, unfair to castigate only modern bureaucracy with “paradox of reason” paradigm. Technically, constitutional or liberal democracies that function under the auspices of “delegated sovereignty” “separation of powers” and “checks and balances” carry similar paradox although its existence rarely exudes the kind of disdain that bureaucracy’s does. Liberal democratic theory presupposes a historically and conceptually distinctive framework of moral and political notions. The core concepts of liberal democracy, very similar to that of modern bureaucracy, rest ultimately on a very particular notion of practical reason or rational agency therefore a condition for the possibility of a workable liberal democracy is a much attenuated and even ambivalent commitment to democracy (Levine, 1981; pp. 6-7). This shows that although many believed bureaucracy to be adversative to classical democracy, liberal democracy as a philosophy and as a system is not antithetical to principles of modern bureaucracy.

Although Weber had warned that the deviations from ideal types were not accidental but systematic, he had also conceded that the degree of advance towards bureaucratic officialdom provides the decisive yardstick for the political modernization of a state. His theory of bureaucracy forms a central part of his account of modernization,
involving an explicit contrast with the traditional systems of administration (Beetham, 1972, p. 67). Political modernity, liberal democracy and bureaucracy develop in parallel.

The data used in this study supported the above-mentioned deduction, that countries with strong modern bureaucracies have stronger institutional democracy and higher ratings on political participation and political competition compared to countries that lack modern bureaucratic attributes (See Table 4).

Table 4

Symbiotic Relationship Matrix

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<td>Hi DEMO C</td>
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Here, strong, merit-based bureaucracy (Hi Bureau) is not seen to be discordant with various aspects of democracy. Liberal democracy, as it is understood today is a system of governance that is marked not only by free elections but also by the rule of law, which protects basic liberties and insinuates institutional checks and balances. Adherence to the “rules” is its most prominent feature. It is this feature of liberal democracy that overlaps with the fundamentals of modern, Weberian bureaucracy. The data used in the study demonstrate that countries that have high democracy and bureaucracy credentials have complimentary ratings for all the variables depicting democratic and bureaucratic
attributes (Table 4). Countries that have high democracy scores also have higher scores on ethical performance, the overall quality of their bureaucracy is better, they have less instances of red tape and their institutions adhere more to merit-based standards for recruitment compared to countries that have low democratic attributes.

In conclusion, it is important to include two perspectives on institutions and democracy here. The first perspective is that of John Rawls (1993, pp. 4-6) who proposes two principles of justice to serve as guidelines for how basic institutions are to realize the values of liberty and equality. According to his first guideline, “each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties.” His second guideline talks about social and economic inequalities which should satisfy two conditions; “first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of the society.” Modern Weberian bureaucracy fits Rawls’ prescription for institutions within the scope of constitutional democracy. With its neutral impersonality, it upholds equality of treatment, even to the least advantaged members of the society. It endorses merit as opposed to privileges acquired during birth and due to lineage.

The second perspective is that of Fareed Zakaria, the editor of Newsweek and CNN’s political analyst who believes that while constitutionalism is about the limitation of power; democracy is about its accumulation and use. According to Zakaria (2007, p. 102), the tendency for a democratic government to believe it has absolute sovereignty and power can result in centralization of authority, often by extraconstitutional means. This is interesting because according to him untempered democracy, not bureaucracy has the
capacity to threaten liberty and constitutionalism. This gives us the flip-side of the imbalance thesis; i.e., like bureaucracy, democracy too can threaten liberty if left unchecked. According to Zakaria, the purpose behind many of the non-elected institutions of the liberal democratic system according to him is to “temper public passions, educate citizens, guide democracy and secure liberty.” His position is endorsed by this study as it demonstrated institutional autocracy to be higher in democracies that lacked modern bureaucratic presence. Likewise, democratic attributes are highest among countries that have strong modern bureaucratic attributes.

Limitations

There are certain limitations of this study that cannot be overlooked. Standard structured questions as well as coding processes do not capture full complexities of either of the two extremely broad and varied phenomena such as bureaucracy and democracy. Variables such as political rights and civil liberties, political participation and competition as well other institutional measures that have been used to measure democracy are also extremely broad and subjective. There is an element of subjectivity inherent in the survey findings, although the ratings processes are said to “emphasize intellectual rigor and balanced and unbiased judgments.”

Another limitation that needs to be mentioned is the grouping procedure. The difference between democracies with scores of 3.0 and 3.1 is probably not that much in actuality. However, for the purpose of this study, countries that scored 3.0 are grouped as “liberal democracies” and those that have scores of 3.1 are grouped as nascent democracies. Yet another limitation is the number of cases. The study just has 26
countries and a group has a maximum of eight countries as cases. This limits the validity of this study. Yet another shortcoming of this study is the small number of cases or countries used. The study is limited to 26 regimes and the nature of their polities and bureaucracies. A larger number would give substantive results.

Recommendations for Future Research

There have been very few studies to test the impact of modern bureaucratic presence in the process of democracy consolidation; therefore, specific research may target bureaucracies of all developing democracies to measure their legal-rational traits as defined by Weber and test the impact they have had on democratic governance. Increase in the number of cases will also increase the validity of the study.

A time series analysis looking at bureaucratic and democratic development of nascent democracies over a period can further consolidate the symbiotic relationship theory. This way a researcher can actually record symbiotic development of both the phenomena. Targeting a particular regime that has recently experienced political overhaul like Iraq and Afghanistan and observing its democratic and bureaucratic development over a period also allows validating the bureaucracy-democracy symbiosis and contending the imbalance thesis. Instead of choosing a handful of top brass bureaucrats from few developing democracies to derive the data, targeting a larger group of public servants of all strata would give a much more holistic picture of bureaucracies of these regimes.
Conclusion

Aspects of modernity such as liberal democracy, modern bureaucracy and socio-economic and political development usually go hand in hand. The development of liberal democracy is contingent upon the existence of a legal rational, merit-based bureaucracy. The concepts of individual liberty, delegated sovereignty, political legitimacy and equality are results of modern man’s ability to rationalize. To act upon the will of the majority in a modern, mass democracy, legal rational bureaucracy emerged as its necessary administrative tool. Alternative for this was the rule of the dilettante, which would produce not only technical inefficiency, but also irregularities and anti-democratic tendencies. Modern bureaucracy therefore developed on democratic principles such as equality before the law and the principles of “rational administration”.

Although Weber was wary about the possible aberration that could result in bureaucracy taking over democratic institutions, he did concede that the two phenomena of mass democracy and modern bureaucracy develop in parallel. This important facet of political modernity however, is largely ignored by democracy and development experts. The profound “reassessment” of the role of bureaucracy has resulted in extensive cutback programs that have destroyed the core segments of bureaucracy in the hope of curtailing fiscal crisis of states. Transnational bureaucracies like the IMF and the World Bank who believe that public bureaucracies are incapable of offering public service efficiently and cost-effectively mostly initiate these types of cutbacks. These organizations operate with a strong belief in the market as an ultimate measure of equity, efficiency and an overall development. Scholars like J Pierre believe that these cutbacks have intercepted and weakened the development of public bureaucracy of developing democracies.
Weberian bureaucracy, like liberal democracy, stands on the foundation of instrumental reason. Like liberal democracy, the rules and principles that modern bureaucracy adheres to, have modern, legal rational base. If kept in check from transforming itself into a political end, there is no alternative to bureaucracy for achieving the minimal level of political equity, equality and order necessary for consolidation of liberal democracy. Lack of strong merit-based modern bureaucracy definitely impedes democratic progress among nascent democracies.
REFERENCES


APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

BUREAUCRATIC STATE STRUCTURES QUESTIONNAIRE

Recruitment and Careers:
[In answering the following questions, assume that "higher officials", refers to those who hold roughly the top 500 positions in the core economic agencies you have discussed above.]

4. Approximately what proportion of the higher officials in these agencies enter the civil service via a formal examination system?

Codes:
1 = less than 30%
2 = 30 - 60%
3 = 60% -90%
4 = more than 90%

Variable Name: SQ4 - Country Average on Q4

5. Of those that do not enter via examinations, what proportion have university or postgraduate degrees.

Codes:
1 = less than 30%
2 = 30 - 60%
3 = 60% -90%
4 = more than 90%

Variable Name: SQ5 - Country Average on Q5

6. Roughly how many of the top levels in these agencies are political appointees (e.g. appointed by the President or Chief Executive)

Codes:
1 = none.
2 = just agency chiefs.
3 = agency chiefs and vice-chiefs.
4 = all of top 2 or 3 levels.
Variable Name: SQ6 - Country Average on Q6

7. Of political appointees to these positions, what proportion are likely to already be members of the higher civil service?

Codes:
1 = less than 30%
2 = 30 - 70%
3 = more than 70%

Variable Name: SQ7 - Country Average on Q7

8. Of those promoted to the top 2 or 3 levels in these agencies (whether or not they are political appointees), what proportion come from within the agency itself or (its associated ministry(ies) if the agency is not itself a ministry)?

Codes:
1 = less than 50%
2 = 50 - 70%
3 = 70% - 90%
4 = over 90%

Variable Name: SQ8 - Country Average on Q8

9. Are the incumbents of these top positions likely to be moved to positions of lesser importance when political leadership changes?

Codes:
1 = almost always
2 = usually
3 = sometimes
4 = rarely

Variable Name: SQ9 - Country Average on Q9

10. What is roughly the modal number of years spent by a typical higher level official in one of these agencies during his career?

Codes:
1 = 1-5 years
2 = 5-10 years
3 = 10 -20 years
4 = entire career

Variable Name: SQ10 - Country Average on Q10
11. What prospects for promotion can someone who enters one of these agencies through a higher civil service examination early in his/her career reasonably expect? Assuming that there are at least a half dozen steps or levels between and entry-level position and the head of the agency, how would you characterize the possibilities for moving up in the agency? [NB. more than one may apply.]

1. in most cases, will move up one or two levels but no more.
2. in most cases, will move up three or four levels, but unlikely to reach the level just below political appointees.
3. if performance is superior, moving up several levels to the level just below political appointees is not an unreasonable expectation.
4. in at least a few cases, could expect to move up several levels within the civil service and then move up to the very top of the agency on the basis of political appointments.

Codes:
  =2, if 3 and/or 4 are circled, but not 1 and not 2
  =1, otherwise

Variable Name: SQ11d - Country Average on Q11d

12. How common is it for higher officials in these agencies to spend substantial proportions of their careers in the private sector, interspersing private and public sector activity?

Codes:
  1 = normal
  2 = frequent but not modal
  3 = unusual
  4 = almost never

Variable Name: SQ12 - Country Average on Q12

13. How common is it for higher officials in these agencies to have significant post-retirement careers in the private sector?

Codes:
  1 = normal
  2 = frequent but not modal
  3 = unusual
  4 = almost never

Variable Name: SQ13 - Country Average on Q13
Salaries:

14. How would you estimate the salaries (and perquisites, not including bribes or other extra-legal sources of income) of higher officials in these agencies relative to those of private sector managers with roughly comparable training and responsibilities?

Codes:
1 = less than 50%
2 = 50 - 80%
3 = 80% - 90%
4 = Comparable
5 = Higher

Variable Name: SQ14 - Country Average on Q14

15. If bribes and other extra-legal perquisites are included what would the proportion be?

Codes:
1 = less than 50%
2 = 50 - 80%
3 = 80% - 90%
4 = Comparable
5 = Higher

Variable Name: SQ15 - Country Average on Q15

16. Over the period in question (roughly 1970-1990) what was the movement of legal income in these agencies relative to salaries in the private sector?

Codes:
1 = declined dramatically.
2 = declined slightly.
3 = maintained the same position.
4 = improved their position.

Variable Name: SQ16 - Country Average on Q16

Civil Service Exams:

[NB: These questions refer to the higher Civil Service more broadly, not just to the top 500 officials in the core agencies.]
17. Since roughly what date have civil service examinations been in place?

Codes:
1 = Pre-1900
2 = 1900-1949
3 = 1950-1969
4 = 1970-1979
5 = 1980-1989
6 = 1990-

Variable Name: SQ17a - Country Average on Q17A

In the aggregated country-level data set, an additional variable was added, based on experts' answers to Q17 and Q18:

Variable Name: Q17B

Codes: 0 = No civil service exams, or exams are of trivial importance
1 = Ambiguous based on experts' responses
2 = Civil service exams are an important component of entry to the bureaucracy

18. Roughly what proportion of those who take the higher civil service exam pass?

Codes:
1 = less than 2%
2 = 2-5%
3 = 6 - 10%
4 = 10% -30%
5 = 30-50%
6 = more than 50%

Variable Name: SQ18 - Country average on Q18

19. Among graduates of the country's most elite university(ies), is a public sector career considered:

Codes:
1 = the best possible career option.
2 = the best possible option for those whose families are not already owners of substantial private enterprises.
3 = the best option for those who are risk averse.
4 = definitely a second best option relative to a private sector career.
Variable Name: SQ19 - Country Average on Q19

20. Among members of the educated middle class who are not in a position to attend the most elite universities is a public sector career considered:

Codes:
   1 = the best possible career option.
   2 = the best possible option for those whose families are not already owners of substantial private enterprises.
   3 = the best option for those who are risk averse.
   4 = definitely a second best option relative to a private sector career.

Variable Name: SQ20 - Country Average on Q20

The individual responses to the above questions were aggregated to create a country-level data set, in which each country received a score equal to the average of the responses of all experts answering each question for that country.
Each numbered checklist question is assigned a score of 0-4 (except for discretionary question A, for which 1-4 points may be added, and discretionary question B, for which 1-4 points may be subtracted), according to the survey methodology. The bulleted sub-questions are intended to provide guidance to the writers regarding what issues are meant to be considered in scoring each checklist question; the authors do not necessarily have to consider every sub-question when scoring their countries.

Political Rights Checklist

A. Electoral Process

1. Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?
   - Did established and reputable national and/or international election monitoring organizations judge the most recent elections for head of government to be free and fair? *(Note: Heads of government chosen through various electoral frameworks, including direct elections for president, indirect elections for prime minister by parliament, and the electoral college system for electing presidents, are covered under this and the following sub-questions. In cases of indirect elections for the head of government, the elections for the legislature that chose the head of government, as well as the selection process of the head of government himself, should be taken into consideration.)*
   - Have there been undue, politically motivated delays in holding the most recent election for head of government?
   - Is the registration of voters and candidates conducted in an accurate, timely, transparent, and nondiscriminatory manner?
   - Can candidates make speeches, hold public meetings, and enjoy media access throughout the campaign free of intimidation?
   - Does voting take place by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure?
   - Are voters able to vote for the candidate or party of their choice without undue pressure or intimidation?
• Is the vote count transparent, and is it reported honestly with the official results made public? Can election monitors from independent groups and representing parties/candidates watch the counting of votes to ensure their honesty?
• Is each person’s vote given equivalent weight to those of other voters in order to ensure equal representation?
• Has a democratically elected head of government who was chosen in the most recent election subsequently been overthrown in a violent coup? (Note: Although a peaceful, “velvet coup” may ultimately lead to a positive outcome—particularly if it replaces a head of government who was not freely and fairly elected—the new leader has not been freely and fairly elected and cannot be treated as such.)
• In cases where elections for regional, provincial, or state governors and/or other subnational officials differ significantly in conduct from national elections, does the conduct of the subnational elections reflect an opening toward improved political rights in the country, or, alternatively, a worsening of political rights?

2. Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
• Did established and reputable domestic and/or international election monitoring organizations judge the most recent national legislative elections to be free and fair?
• Have there been undue, politically motivated delays in holding the most recent national legislative election?
• Is the registration of voters and candidates conducted in an accurate, timely, transparent, and nondiscriminatory manner?
• Can candidates make speeches, hold public meetings, and enjoy media access throughout the campaign free of intimidation?
• Does voting take place by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure?
• Are voters able to vote for the candidate or party of their choice without undue pressure or intimidation?
• Is the vote count transparent, and is it reported honestly with the official results made public? Can election monitors from independent groups and representing parties/candidates watch the counting of votes to ensure their honesty?
• Is each person’s vote given equivalent weight to those of other voters in order to ensure equal representation?
• Have the representatives of a democratically elected national legislature who were chosen in the most recent election subsequently been overthrown in a violent coup? (Note: Although a peaceful, “velvet coup” may ultimately lead to a positive outcome—particularly if it replaces a national legislature whose representatives were not freely and fairly elected—members of the new legislature have not been freely and fairly elected and cannot be treated as such.)
• In cases where elections for subnational councils/parliaments differ significantly in conduct from national elections, does the conduct of the subnational elections reflect an opening toward improved political rights in the country, or, alternatively, a worsening of political rights?
3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair?
   • Is there a clear, detailed, and fair legislative framework for conducting elections? 
     (Note: Changes to electoral laws should not be made immediately preceding an 
     election if the ability of voters, candidates, or parties to fulfill their roles in the 
     election is infringed.)
   • Are election commissions or other election authorities independent and free from 
     government or other pressure and interference?
   • Is the composition of election commissions fair and balanced?
   • Do election commissions or other election authorities conduct their work in an 
     effective and competent manner?
   • Do adult citizens enjoy universal and equal suffrage? (Note: Suffrage can be 
     suspended or withdrawn for reasons of legal incapacity, such as mental incapacity 
     or conviction of a serious criminal offense.)
   • Is the drawing of election districts conducted in a fair and nonpartisan manner, as 
     opposed to gerrymandering for personal or partisan advantage?
   • Has the selection of a system for choosing legislative representatives (such as 
     proportional versus majoritarian) been manipulated to advance certain political 
     interests or to influence the electoral results?

B. Political Pluralism and Participation

1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other 
   competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the 
   rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?
   • Do political parties encounter undue legal or practical obstacles in their efforts to 
     be formed and to operate, including onerous registration requirements, 
     excessively large membership requirements, etc.?
   • Do parties face discriminatory or onerous restrictions in holding meetings, rallies, 
     or other peaceful activities?
   • Are party members or leaders intimidated, harassed, arrested, imprisoned, or 
     subjected to violent attacks as a result of their peaceful political activities?

2. Is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic possibility for the opposition to 
   increase its support or gain power through elections?
   • Are various legal/administrative restrictions selectively applied to opposition 
     parties to prevent them from increasing their support base or successfully 
     competing in elections?
   • Are there legitimate opposition forces in positions of authority, such as in the 
     national legislature or in subnational governments?
   • Are opposition party members or leaders intimidated, harassed, arrested, 
     imprisoned, or subjected to violent attacks as a result of their peaceful political 
     activities?

3. Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign 
   powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any 
   other powerful group?
Do such groups offer bribes to voters and/or political figures in order to influence their political choices?

Do such groups intimidate, harass, or attack voters and/or political figures in order to influence their political choices?

Does the military control or enjoy a preponderant influence over government policy and activities, including in countries that nominally are under civilian control?

Do foreign governments control or enjoy a preponderant influence over government policy and activities by means including the presence of foreign military troops, the use of significant economic threats or sanctions, etc.?

4. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and electoral opportunities?

Do political parties of various ideological persuasions address issues of specific concern to minority groups?

Does the government inhibit the participation of minority groups in national or sub-national political life through laws and/or practical obstacles?

Are political parties based on ethnicity, culture, or religion which espouse peaceful, democratic values legally permitted and de facto allowed to operate?

C. Functioning Of Government

1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?

Are the candidates who were elected freely and fairly duly installed in office?

Do other appointed or non-freely elected state actors interfere with or prevent freely elected representatives from adopting and implementing legislation and making meaningful policy decisions?

Do nonstate actors, including criminal gangs, the military, and foreign governments, interfere with or prevent elected representatives from adopting and implementing legislation and making meaningful policy decisions?

2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption?

Has the government implemented effective anticorruption laws or programs to prevent, detect, and punish corruption among public officials, including conflict of interest?

Is the government free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration requirements, or other controls that increase opportunities for corruption?

Are there independent and effective auditing and investigative bodies that function without impediment or political pressure or influence?

Are allegations of corruption by government officials thoroughly investigated and prosecuted without prejudice, particularly against political opponents?

Are allegations of corruption given wide and extensive airing in the media?
Do whistle-blowers, anticorruption activists, investigators, and journalists enjoy legal protections that make them feel secure about reporting cases of bribery and corruption?

What was the latest Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index score for this country?

3. Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate with openness and transparency?
   - Are civil society groups, interest groups, journalists, and other citizens able to comment on and influence pending policies of legislation?
   - Do citizens have the legal right and practical ability to obtain information about government operations and the means to petition government agencies for it?
   - Is the budget-making process subject to meaningful legislative review and public scrutiny?
   - Does the government publish detailed accounting expenditures in a timely fashion?
   - Does the state ensure transparency and effective competition in the awarding of government contracts?
   - Are the asset declarations of government officials open to public and media scrutiny and verification?

Additional Discretionary Political Rights Questions:

A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for genuine, meaningful consultation with the people, encourage public discussion of policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler?
   - Is there a non-elected legislature that advises the monarch on policy issues?
   - Are there formal mechanisms for individuals or civic groups to speak with or petition the monarch?
   - Does the monarch take petitions from the public under serious consideration?

B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?
   - Is the government providing economic or other incentives to certain people in order to change the ethnic composition of a region or regions?
   - Is the government forcibly moving people in or out of certain areas in order to change the ethnic composition of those regions?
   - Is the government arresting, imprisoning, or killing members of certain ethnic groups in order change the ethnic composition of a region or regions?

Civil Liberties Checklist
D. Freedom of Expression And Belief

1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (*Note:* In cases where the media are state controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the survey gives the system credit.)

- Does the government directly or indirectly censor print, broadcast, and/or Internet-based media?
- Is self-censorship among journalists common, especially when reporting on politically sensitive issues, including corruption or the activities of senior officials?
- Does the government use libel and security laws to punish those who scrutinize government officials and policies through either onerous fines or imprisonment?
- Is it a crime to insult the honor and dignity of the president and/or other government officials? How broad is the range of such prohibitions, and how vigorously are they enforced?
- If media outlets are dependent on the government for their financial survival, does the government withhold funding in order to propagandize, primarily provide official points of view, and/or limit access by opposition parties and civic critics?
- Does the government attempt to influence media content and access through means including politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies and newspaper registrations, unfair control and influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selective distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery?
- Are journalists threatened, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed by government or nongovernmental actors for their legitimate journalistic activities, and if such cases occur, are they investigated and prosecuted fairly and expeditiously?
- Are works of literature, art, music, and other forms of cultural expression censored or banned for political purposes?

2. Are religious institutions and communities free to practice their faith and express themselves in public and private?

- Are registration requirements employed to impede the free functioning of religious institutions?
- Are members of religious groups, including minority faiths and movements, harassed, fined, arrested, or beaten by the authorities for engaging in their religious practices?
- Does the government appoint or otherwise influence the appointment of religious leaders?
- Does the government control the production and distribution of religious books and other materials and the content of sermons?
- Is the construction of religious buildings banned or restricted?
- Does the government place undue restrictions on religious education? Does the government require religious education?
3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive political indoctrination?
   - Are teachers and professors free to pursue academic activities of a political and quasi-political nature without fear of physical violence or intimidation by state or nonstate actors?
   - Does the government pressure, strongly influence, or control the content of school curriculums for political purposes?
   - Are student associations that address issues of a political nature allowed to function freely?
   - Does the government, including through school administration or other officials, pressure students and/or teachers to support certain political figures or agendas, including pressuring them to attend political rallies or vote for certain candidates? Conversely, does the government, including through school administration or other officials, discourage or forbid students and/or teachers from supporting certain candidates and parties?

4. Is there open and free private discussion?
   - Are people able to engage in private discussions, particularly of a political nature (in places including restaurants, public transportation, and their homes) without fear of harassment or arrest by the authorities?
   - Does the government employ people or groups to engage in public surveillance and to report alleged antigovernment conversations to the authorities?

E. Associational and Organizational Rights

1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?
   - Are peaceful protests, particularly those of a political nature, banned or severely restricted?
   - Are the legal requirements to obtain permission to hold peaceful demonstrations particularly cumbersome and time consuming?
   - Are participants of peaceful demonstrations intimidated, arrested, or assaulted?
   - Are peaceful protestors detained by police in order to prevent them from engaging in such actions?

2. Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations? (Note: This includes civic organizations, interest groups, foundations, etc.)
   - Are registration and other legal requirements for nongovernmental organizations particularly onerous and intended to prevent them from functioning freely?
   - Are laws related to the financing of nongovernmental organizations unduly complicated and cumbersome?
   - Are donors and funders of nongovernmental organizations free of government pressure?
   - Are members of nongovernmental organizations intimidated, arrested, imprisoned, or assaulted because of their work?
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?
   • Are trade unions allowed to be established and to operate free from government interference?
   • Are workers pressured by the government or employers to join or not to join certain trade unions, and do they face harassment, violence, or dismissal from their jobs if they do?
   • Are workers permitted to engage in strikes, and do members of unions face reprisals for engaging in peaceful strikes? (Note: This question may not apply to workers in essential government services or public safety jobs.)
   • Are unions able to bargain collectively with employers and able to negotiate collective bargaining agreements that are honored in practice?
   • For states with very small populations or primarily agriculturally-based economies that do not necessarily support the formation of trade unions, does the government allow for the establishment of peasant organizations or their equivalents? Is there legislation expressively forbidding the formation of trade unions?
   • Are professional organizations, including business associations, allowed to operate freely and without government interference?

F. Rule of Law

1. Is there an independent judiciary?
   • Is the judiciary subject to interference from the executive branch of government or from other political, economic, or religious influences?
   • Are judges appointed and dismissed in a fair and unbiased manner?
   • Do judges rule fairly and impartially, or do they commonly render verdicts that favor the government or particular interests, whether in return for bribes or other reasons?
   • Do executive, legislative, and other governmental authorities comply with judicial decisions, and are these decisions effectively enforced?
   • Do powerful private concerns comply with judicial decisions, and are decisions that run counter to the interests of powerful actors effectively enforced?

2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control?
   • Are defendants’ rights, including the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, protected?
   • Are detainees provided access to independent, competent legal counsel?
   • Are defendants given a fair, public, and timely hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal?
   • Are prosecutors independent of political control and influence?
   • Are prosecutors independent of powerful private interests, whether legal or illegal?
• Is there effective and democratic civilian state control of law enforcement officials through the judicial, legislative, and executive branches?
• Are law enforcement officials free from the influence of nonstate actors, including organized crime, powerful commercial interests, or other groups?

3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurrections?
• Do law enforcement officials make arbitrary arrests and detentions without warrants or fabricate or plant evidence on suspects?
• Do law enforcement officials beat detainees during arrest and interrogation or use excessive force or torture to extract confessions?
• Are conditions in pretrial facilities and prisons humane and respectful of the human dignity of inmates?
• Do citizens have the means of effective petition and redress when their rights are violated by state authorities?
• Is violent crime either against specific groups or within the general population widespread?
• Is the population subjected to physical harm, forced removal, or other acts of violence or terror due to civil conflict or war?

4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?
• Are members of various distinct groups—including ethnic and religious minorities, homosexuals, and the disabled—able to exercise effectively their human rights with full equality before the law?
• Is violence against such groups widespread, and if so, are perpetrators brought to justice?
• Do members of such groups face legal and/or de facto discrimination in areas including employment, education, and housing because of their identification with a particular group?
• Do women enjoy full equality in law and in practice as compared to men?
• Do noncitizens—including migrant workers and noncitizen immigrants—enjoy basic internationally recognized human rights, including the right not to be subjected to torture or other forms of ill-treatment, the right to due process of law, and the rights of freedom of association, expression, and religion?
• Do the country’s laws provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and other regional treaties regarding refugees? Has the government established a system for providing protection to refugees, including against refoulement (the return of persons to a country where there is reason to believe they fear persecution)?
G. Personal Autonomy And Individual Rights

1. Does the state control travel or choice of residence, employment, or institution of higher education?
   • Are there restrictions on foreign travel, including the use of an exit visa system, which may be issued selectively?
   • Is permission required from the authorities to move within the country?
   • Does the government determine or otherwise influence a person’s type and place of employment?
   • Are bribes or other inducements for government officials needed to obtain the necessary documents to travel, change one’s place of residence or employment, enter institutions of higher education, or advance in school?

2. Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, political parties/organizations, or organized crime?
   • Are people legally allowed to purchase and sell land and other property, and can they do so in practice without undue interference from the government or nonstate actors?
   • Does the government provide adequate and timely compensation to people whose property is expropriated under eminent domain laws?
   • Are people legally allowed to establish and operate private businesses with a reasonable minimum of registration, licensing, and other requirements?
   • Are bribes or other inducements needed to obtain the necessary legal documents to operate private businesses?
   • Do private/nonstate actors, including criminal groups, seriously impede private business activities through such measures as extortion?

3. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?
   • Is violence against women, including wife-beating and rape, widespread, and are perpetrators brought to justice?
   • Is the trafficking of women and/or children abroad for prostitution widespread, and is the government taking adequate effort to address the problem?
   • Do women face de jure and de facto discrimination in economic and social matters, including property and inheritance rights, divorce proceedings, and child custody matters?
   • Does the government directly or indirectly control choice of marriage partners through means such as requiring large payments to marry certain individuals (e.g., foreign citizens) or by not enforcing laws against child marriage or dowry payments?
   • Does the government determine the number of children that a couple may have?
   • Does the government engage in state-sponsored religious/cultural/ethnic indoctrination and related restrictions on personal freedoms?
• Do private institutions, including religious groups, unduly infringe on the rights of individuals, including choice of marriage partner, dress, etc.?

4. Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?
• Does the government exert tight control over the economy, including through state ownership and the setting of prices and production quotas?
• Do the economic benefits from large state industries, including the energy sector, benefit the general population or only a privileged few?
• Do private interests exert undue influence on the economy through monopolistic practices, cartels, or illegal blacklists, boycotts, or discrimination?
• Is entrance to institutions of higher education or the ability to obtain employment limited by widespread nepotism and the payment of bribes?
• Are certain groups, including ethnic or religious minorities, less able to enjoy certain economic benefits than others? For example, are certain groups restricted from holding particular jobs, whether in the public or the private sector, because of de jure or de facto discrimination?
• Do state or private employers exploit their workers through activities including unfairly withholding wages and permitting or forcing employees to work under unacceptably dangerous conditions, as well as through adult slave labor and child labor?