MOTIVES FOR MANAGING EMOTIONS AT WORK

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Thesis

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ABSTRACT

Emotional labor theory suggests that individuals manage their emotions in customer interactions because they are paid to do so (Hochschild, 1983). However, recent theoretical work by Bolton (2005) suggests that individuals may have a variety of motives for managing their emotions in such interactions. The present study examined motives for managing emotions at work using Bolton’s (2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003) theory as a guide. In the process, this study created a measure to assess these motives, the Emotional Labor Motives Scale. A set of items was generated and distributed to a sample of service employees, along with other measures aimed at examining the antecedents and consequences of the motives. Factor analysis supported the existence of the four motives described by Bolton: pecuniary, prescriptive, presentational, and philanthropic; as well as two additional motives: to avoid punishment and for intrinsic reasons. In terms of antecedent conditions, autonomy orientation was positively related to the prescriptive, presentational, philanthropic, and intrinsic motives, controlled orientation was positively related to the punishment, pecuniary, and presentational motives, and O*NET job characteristics were not predictive of motive use. In terms of outcomes, the punishment, prescriptive, and intrinsic motives were related to the emotional labor strategies, whereas the punishment and intrinsic motives were related to well-being outcomes. Results
suggest that motives for performing emotional labor exist and are associated with unique antecedents and outcomes in the emotional labor process.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For over two decades, researchers have expounded upon Hochschild’s (1983) revolutionary work, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling*. Almost immediately after publication, her writings inspired researchers to consider the outcomes of expressing and suppressing emotions as part of the work role; however, little work has focused on identifying the different reasons why employees regulate their emotions at work. Hochschild (1983) assumed that all emotional displays were the direct result of an organization’s explicit intent to use employees’ emotions as part of the portfolio of company resources available to acquire a profit (Bolton, 2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003). According to Hochschild’s (1983) description, employees are motivated to express some emotions and suppress others only by the rules and guidelines set forth by the company; Hochschild did not consider that emotions could be displayed at work for reasons other than to maximize profits or financial gains (Bolton, 2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003).

One difficulty with this description is that it fails to explain all emotional displays at work; instead it focuses solely on those emotional displays performed strictly with a profit motive in mind (Bolton, 2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003). For example, according to Hochschild’s (1983) work, if two employees have a humorous encounter, we would have
to assume that this humor increases employee productivity and therefore, a company’s profit. Hochschild (1983) does not consider that humor between coworkers may serve a different goal, such as easing a difficult situation that a coworker is experiencing, and may have no effect on the company’s bottom line.

In response, Bolton (2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003) provides a more comprehensive typology of motivations to regulate emotions at work, as opposed to only considering emotion management as a response to the company’s explicit guidelines (Bolton, 2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003). Bolton (2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003) suggested that emotion regulation at work occurs for three types of reasons: commercial, professional, and social reasons. For example, a nurse may go beyond the minimum requirements asked of her in making a patient feel as comfortable as possible. Instead of showing the disgust she might feel at the sight of a patient covered in bodily fluids, she may show acceptance and understanding in order to ease the patient’s embarrassment. She may even go so far as to take a few extra minutes after cleaning up to talk with the patient and show empathy for his/her condition. In this case, she may be acting out of the kindness of her heart even though the guidelines set forth by her organization are simply that she should attend to the patient as necessary (Bolton, 2005; Lewis, 2005). Clearly the nurse is stepping outside of the requirements placed on her, but why?

The present study aims to further expand on the research inspired by Hochschild (1983) by examining the role of motives in the emotional labor process. By integrating motives into already existing models of emotional labor (e.g. Grandey, 2000), we may come to a better understanding of the emotional labor process and how it leads to different outcomes. For instance, the reason why individuals are managing their emotions
may influence how they do so and the outcomes that result from this relationship; that is, motives to perform emotional labor may act as antecedents of previously established emotional labor relationships. Bolton’s (2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003) typology provides a useful starting point for theorizing about these reasons, or motives, and drawing inferences about what their effects might be on emotional labor. The present research sought to develop a measure to assess these motives, to provide a framework for testing them empirically, and to incorporate them into Grandey’s (2000) model of emotional labor.

Emotional Labor

In order to fully understand the role of motives driving emotion regulation in the workplace, a brief discussion of emotional labor theory and research is necessary.

*Emotional Labor Theory*

As stated previously, *The Managed Heart* (Hochschild, 1983) is referenced as a significant inspirational work influencing research on emotional labor. Hochschild (1983) defines emotional labor as managing emotions for pay, which supposes that all management of emotions at work can be explained as a means to acquire financial gains and that there are no “unmanaged spaces” (Bolton, 2005, p. 102) where employees regulate their emotions for other reasons, such as showing empathy to a grieving coworker or customer when that emotion is not specified as part of the work role (e.g. O’Donohoe & Turley, 2006; Lewis, 2005).

Emotional labor includes all types of emotional regulation at work, such as exaggerating, expressing, faking, and suppressing emotions (Grandey, 2000; Diefendorff, Croyle, & Gosserand, 2005). For example, if a customer service representative is feeling
somewhat happy, he may want to exaggerate this good mood in order to serve his customers in the delightful way described by his supervisor. On the other hand, if a representative experiences a loss shortly before coming to work, he might have to fake a good mood when really he is filled with despair. In other occupations, more rigid emotions must be displayed in order to get the job done, such as in the case of a police officer or sports official. Regardless of whether organizational guidelines delineate specific emotions to express, exaggerate, fake, or suppress, all emotions expressed at work were thought to either be directed at the solitary goal of increasing the organization’s profits (Hochschild, 1983) or to be counter to that goal, such as when individuals “break character” (Grandey, 2003, p. 90) or engage in emotional deviance (Tschan et al., 2006) by expressing emotions they are not supposed to express.

Delving deeper into Hochschild’s (1983) research, she primarily examined the work lives of flight attendants on commercial airlines. She divided their emotional labor displays into two categories: surface acting and deep acting (Hochschild, 1983). Surface acting requires that employees merely change their outer expressions of emotion and not internal feelings. Deep acting requires employees to change their inner feelings to match outward displays of emotion appropriate for the work setting. In deep acting, the emotional display is more congruent with an employee’s inner emotions than in surface acting; however the emotional display is still disingenuous in the sense that it did not occur spontaneously. One way this change of internal feelings to match outward displays can be made is by viewing customers differently, such as when flight attendants were told to conceptualize their customers as needy children so as not to become frustrated when fulfilling the seemingly childish requests of grown adults (Hochschild, 1983). In this
case, the flight attendants’ emotional responses would be more in line with those expected when responding to needy children rather than immature adults, and customers would be more satisfied potentially.

Another important point of Hochschild’s (1983) work is that emotional labor can have unfavorable consequences for the emotional laborer (Grandey, 2000). Since Hochschild (1983) believed that the performance of emotional labor requires conscious effort, it has been proposed (e.g., Grandey, 2000) that this effort may lead to an increased risk of burnout, emotional dissonance, emotional exhaustion, or any combination of these outcomes in the laborer, along with other negative outcomes. For Hochschild (1983), employees have no room to express their true emotions; employees required to engage in emotional labor would only have the choice of whether to surface act or deep act, both of which require conscious effort to change one’s displays or feelings to meet organizational expectations. Use of the term “acting” denotes that the display is not spontaneous, and therefore, requires some form of conscious effort. It also is not authentic in that it does not represent the true self of employees. These factors combined can weigh significantly on an emotional laborer’s well-being.

Aside from Hochschild’s (1983) revolutionary perspective on emotional labor, other emotional labor theories have made important contributions to the field (e.g., Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Morris & Feldman, 1996; Grandey, 2000). For instance, Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) suggested that there may be a third means of performing emotional labor in addition to surface acting and deep acting, which is naturally experiencing and expressing emotion. Contrary to Hochschild’s (1983) view, or perhaps in addition to it, all emotional labor need not be a function of putting effort into an
emotional display; one may express emotions that spontaneously occur (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993), a view that has been supported in recent research (Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003; Diefendorff et al., 2005).

In a related sense, Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) also argued that some negative outcomes of emotional labor might be avoided if the laborer identifies highly with the role or perceives him- or herself as more authentic when in the role of laborer. For example, if a psychologist views herself as empathetic and has more of an opportunity to exhibit that empathy in therapy sessions than anywhere else, she might view herself as more authentic when in the role of therapist than at any other time and experience positive outcomes as a result. However, emotional exhaustion and burnout may not be avoided and, in fact, may be more pronounced in people who identify highly with their jobs, possibly because they have invested more in their roles from the start or because they are more heavily affected by successes and failures in the role as a result of their high identification (Maslach, 1982; Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993).

Building upon Ashforth and Humphrey’s (1993) suggestion that employees engage in three types of emotion management strategies at work (surface acting, deep acting, and displaying spontaneous emotions), Morris and Feldman (1996) argued that although at times emotions expressed may be the same as those spontaneously felt by an employee, the employee must still put effort into the emotional labor process in order to translate that sincerely felt emotion into an emotional display that is appropriate for the work setting. For example, the empathy one feels in the presence of a grieving customer may be very similar to the empathy felt in the presence of a grieving loved one, but the display of that emotion will be very different depending on the target of the interaction.
One may embrace a grieving loved one and allow himself to cry in the loved one’s presence, whereas one would not consider embracing or crying in front of a grieving customer or patient in order to maintain a certain degree of professionalism. Even though the emotion experienced is the same, the expression of that emotion is very different depending on knowledge of what is appropriate for a particular setting (e.g., display rules; Diefendorff, Richard, & Croyle, 2006).

Consistent with Hochschild (1983), Grandey (2000) defined emotional labor as surface acting and deep acting and developed a model that articulated the antecedents and consequences of these emotion regulation strategies. The antecedents in her model include interaction expectations, such as the frequency and duration of interactions and display rules; emotional events that might occur and influence the choice to surface or deep act; individual factors, such as gender, emotional expressivity, emotional intelligence, and affectivity; and organizational factors, such as job autonomy, supervisor support, and coworker support. The outcomes in her model include individual outcomes such as burnout and job satisfaction, and organizational outcomes such as performance and withdrawal behavior. This model has received the most attention in the emotional labor literature in recent years and portions of it will be adopted in the empirical part of the present investigation.

Summary of Empirical Findings

Although empirical work on emotional labor is still relatively sparse, there has been enough research to meta-analyze certain relationships depicted in Grandey’s (2000) model, which includes antecedents and consequences of emotional labor strategies as discussed above. Bono and Vey (2005) identified 18 articles in their meta-analysis of
emotional labor and found that emotional display rules, defined as explicit expectations for emotional displays (Diefendorff et al., 2006), were significantly correlated with deep acting \((r = .32)\) and surface acting \((r = .26)\). Additionally, deep acting, surface acting, and emotional dissonance were significantly related to emotional exhaustion \((r = .14, r = .36, \text{ and } r = .30, \text{ respectively})\) and surface acting and emotional dissonance were related to job satisfaction \((r = -.34 \text{ and } r = -.37, \text{ respectively})\). Emotional dissonance also was related to depersonalization \((r = .24)\) and physical complaints \((r = .36)\).

**Motives at Work**

Research on motives at work has increased in recent years (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Maertz & Campion, 2004), and self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000) provides a useful foundation for conceptualizing motives at work. Self-determination theory posits that even though motivation is often thought of as being either intrinsic (i.e., self-motivated) or extrinsic (i.e., coming from factors outside the self), extrinsically motivated goals vary in the extent to which they are self-determined, or intrinsically based (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Ryan and Deci (2000) theorized that there are four types of extrinsic motivation, ranging from the most to the least external: external regulation, introjected regulation, identified regulation, and integrated regulation. Externally regulated goals are those goals that people are motivated to attain in order to satisfy some external order, gain a reward, or avoid a punishment (Ryan & Deci, 2000). People strive to attain introjected goals in order to avoid feeling guilty by not attempting them or to gain some type of ego enhancement in reaching them, such as pride (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Introjected goals are more internalized than externally regulated goals, but they are not completely accepted as one’s own (Ryan & Deci, 2000). People seek to
attain identified goals because these goals hold personal importance for them by
reflecting their values (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Integrated goals are created after an
extrinsically derived goal has become fully assimilated to a person’s values and needs;
this is the most intrinsic type of motivation, with the least extrinsic motivation involved
(Ryan & Deci, 2000). Since these motives vary in their level of extrinsic focus, they also
vary in terms of how incorporated they are into the self. A key contribution of this theory
is in recognizing that different individuals can perform the same behavior but for
different reasons. Further, the reasons, or motives, that underlie behavior can impact the
quality of behavior and outcomes for the individual.

Building on self-determination theory, the self-concordance model of goals has
focused on the varying degrees of harmony between a person’s desires and the goals he
attempts to achieve (e.g., Sheldon & Elliot, 1998). Sheldon and Elliot (1998) supported a
division of goals and motivation into autonomous and controlled (Deci & Ryan, 1985),
similar to intrinsic and extrinsic goals (Ryan & Deci, 2000), respectively. Their research
suggests that autonomous goals are better achieved than controlled goals (Sheldon &
Elliot, 1998). These findings imply that an organization’s intent to control employee
goals is less effective than an employee’s intent to follow through with goals that are
intrinsically derived. This idea has important implications for organizations wishing to
motivate employee work behaviors.

Bolton’s (2005) Motives and Emotional Labor

After reviewing emotional labor research, Bolton (2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003)
concluded that the motives behind emotional labor are more complex than simply to
receive pay. Motivation stemming only from the desire to receive external rewards (i.e.,
external regulation) is described by Ryan and Deci (2000) as the most extrinsic type of motivation; and as discussed in the preceding section, goals that are pursued with external rewards and punishments in mind are not as well maintained and achieved as those goals that are pursued out of personal conviction (Ryan & Deci, 2000; Sheldon & Elliot, 1998). If we believe that Hochschild (1983) is correct in her assumption that the only motivation to manage one’s emotions comes from organizational pressures, and that organizational pressures reflect a type of extrinsic motivation, then a logical conclusion based on Sheldon and Elliot’s (1998) findings would be that emotional labor would not be a well-maintained activity of employees. How then has emotional labor become a phenomenon that not only persists in organizations, but, as argued by some authors (e.g., Cropanzano, Chrobot-Mason, Rupp, & Prehar, 2004), has increased in significance in recent years? Perhaps more complex motivations underlie why individuals manage their emotions as part of the work role.

Bolton’s (2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003) typology of motives for managing emotions provides psychological researchers with a starting point for incorporating motives into emotional labor research. Her classification system of motives includes three main categories, with an additional sub-category (Bolton, 2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003). The first motive in this typology is the pecuniary motive (Bolton, 2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003). The pecuniary motive most closely corresponds to Hochschild’s (1983) original proclamation of emotional labor. This motive suggests individuals to manage their emotions to receive pay or to comply with commercially-imposed feeling rules that demand certain displays (Bolton, 2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003). Emotional laborers who manage their emotions for pecuniary reasons must only provide certain displays and not
necessarily feel the emotions they are displaying, meaning that it is not necessary for people motivated by pecuniary reasons to deep act in order to comply with organizational display rules (Bolton, 2005). Consequences of the pecuniary motive can include alienation from one’s work, resistance to perform emotion management, and low satisfaction with one’s work (Bolton, 2005).

Bolton (2005) posits that people motivated by pecuniary reasons are motivated by organizational rewards and punishments rather than actual customer satisfaction and that they believe that emotional displays are a “profitable product” (Bolton & Boyd, 2003, p. 300) of the company. As a result, employees using pecuniary emotion management may be alienated from their emotional displays and more likely to engage in surface acting. Resistance to perform emotion management can occur in people motivated by pecuniary reasons because the extrinsic contingencies are not aligned with the person’s desires and, as a result, not as well maintained as intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000; Sheldon & Elliot, 1998). Furthermore, employees engaging in pecuniary emotion management may struggle to find a balance between trying to preserve their dignity and self-esteem while trying to obtain organizational rewards (Bolton, 2005). Since dignity and self-esteem have been linked to intrinsic motivation (Hein & Hagger, 2007), they can be expected to be better maintained than behaviors toward extrinsic goals, such as receiving a raise.

Additionally, employees motivated by pecuniary reasons are expected to experience lower job satisfaction than those who are motivated to manage their emotions for other reasons (Bolton, 2005). One explanation for this relationship might be that people who are motivated by pecuniary reasons are more likely to surface act, and surface acting has a somewhat strong negative relationship with job satisfaction ($r = -.34$; Bono & Vey,
2005); thereby implicating surface acting as a mediator of pecuniary motivation’s relationship with job satisfaction.

The second motive Bolton (2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003) described for managing emotions at work is the *prescriptive* motive. People who manage their emotions at work for prescriptive reasons attempt to comply with professional and organizational feeling rules, possibly to attain or maintain status (Bolton, 2005). For example, this type of emotion management can be seen when a university instructor displays enthusiasm for the subject he teaches, not because the university he works for explicitly requires it, but because that quality is consistent with the instructor’s vision of his professional role to engage students and disperse knowledge. Displays resulting from the prescriptive motive may be more sincere than those that are the product of the pecuniary motive (Bolton, 2005).

Generally, the consequences of the prescriptive motive are thought to be more positive than the consequences of the pecuniary motive (Bolton, 2005). Prescriptive emotion management motivates individuals to display emotions aligned with one’s professional identity (Bolton, 2005). A potential result of this commitment to being a “professional” is that the employees may be shielded from especially negative emotional demands of the job (Bolton, 2005) because they may view strenuous interactions as an expected part of the work role that they have chosen and be more motivated to genuinely feel the emotions they are expressing, or deep act. Although in Bono and Vey’s (2005) meta-analysis, deep acting was related to emotional exhaustion \( (r = .14) \), it was less so than surface acting \( (r = .36) \), suggesting that if people motivated by prescriptive reasons are likely to deep act, they will be less likely to experience emotional exhaustion.
Similarly, an employee motivated by prescriptive reasons may display certain emotions because they are important to his self-concept and career goals (e.g., being a “good nurse”). This is in contrast to an employee who manages her emotions for pecuniary reasons and sees management of emotional displays as an instrumental step toward receiving compensation. Employees utilizing prescriptive emotion management then can attain a new dimension to their identity by identifying with the professional role or occupation that they have chosen. However, Maslach (1982) cautioned that a heightened identification with a role such as in the prescriptive motive can lead to worse long-term outcomes because the employee may internalize failures and successes rather than attribute them to the organization.

An example of a way organizations attempt to instill prescriptive emotion management in their employees is through the creation and manipulation of corporate culture (Bolton, 2005). Organizations may create a corporate culture in which prescriptive feeling rules can become second nature to employees, making it easier for them to follow in the behaviors desired by the company although it is not something for which they are directly compensated (Bolton, 2005). For example, rather than instituting a company policy demanding that all customer service representatives serve customers with a smile or else risk losing a portion of their yearly raise, a company may make it more implicitly known that the company values cheerfulness and pleasantness in customer service representatives by encouraging quality initiatives and conformance to collective mission statements (Bolton, 2005). In this way, organizationally-imposed feeling rules may be internalized and even become a norm throughout the company without the company having to tie them to specific rewards and punishments. Although
not all employees may respond to this corporate culture favorably, Bolton (2005) states that displays that result from the prescriptive motive are much more likely to exemplify a genuine emotional performance because prescriptive emotion management is motivated by status or altruism versus pecuniary emotion management which serves as a step to achieve external goals, such as attaining a pay raise or promotion.

The last major motive described by Bolton (2005) is presentational emotion management. The presentational motive most closely corresponds to Hochschild’s (1983) concept of emotion work (Bolton, 2005), which is described as “the act of attempting to change an emotion or feeling so that it is appropriate for any given situation” (Bolton & Boyd, 2003, p. 292) as opposed to managing emotions strictly in an organizational setting. Performing presentational emotion management can best be described as representing “the basic socialized self” (Bolton & Boyd, 2003, p. 297) as employees who do so do not alter their general emotion management strategies to fit the specific organizational context. Displays that result from presentational emotion management can be said to incorporate all knowledge of appropriate social displays learned from culture and experience so that a person conforms to his/her conception of the display rules of society (Bolton, 2005). Examples of societal display rules may be that one should be happy at a wedding and somber at a funeral (Bolton & Boyd, 2003). In effect, individuals motivated by presentational reasons are managing emotions because they believe it is the socially appropriate thing to do; this is in contrast to doing it for money or as a way to conform to professional norms. Examples of the presentational motive given by Bolton and Boyd (2003) include showing a coworker a smile because he/she did something nice or helpful and showing interest in what someone else is saying.
by displaying emotions aligned with the nature of the conversation (e.g., joy when a coworker discusses a spouse’s promotion or despair when discussing a coworker’s loss).

Performing presentational emotion management can prepare an emotional laborer to perform pecuniary or prescriptive emotion management because conforming to societal display rules often is a prerequisite of interacting with others at work (Bolton, 2005). Displays resulting from the presentational motive may be genuine or fake, and a consequence of the presentational motive identified by Bolton (2005) is stability in displays throughout emotional interactions, as basic social display rules exist for and pervade all types of interactions. Furthermore, the presentational motive may be related to the display of spontaneously felt emotions (e.g., Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993) more so than surface acting or deep acting, as presentationally-motivated emotion management suggests that the only transformation spontaneously-felt emotions undergo is one to ensure they conform to the display rules of society. This notion is consistent with Morris and Feldman’s (1996) idea that all emotional displays require some type of effort if only to translate the felt emotion into an appropriate emotional display.

As previously described, the presentational motive stimulates persons to act as their socialized selves and to conform to societal display rules (Bolton, 2005). The philanthropic motive is a particular case of the presentational motive that occurs when an emotional laborer is motivated to give his/her emotion as a “gift” to a person with whom he/she interacts (Bolton, 2005, p. 93; Hochschild, 1983). Examples of the philanthropic motive in action would be when a nurse takes time to show empathy to patients who are going through a difficult time or when a funeral director shows compassion and caring for individuals who have lost a loved one. In both examples, showing more than mild
concern may not be a requirement of the job, or even expected as part of the work role, but rather the displays are given as gifts to people who are in need. The outcome of such emotion management might be a greater sense of accomplishment and satisfaction (Bolton, 2005) in knowing that one has truly helped another human being, even if in only a small way.

Bolton (2005) described the philanthropic motive as representative of the altruism that can occur regularly in the workplace. She described acting resulting from the philanthropic motive as the deepest form of acting that a worker can display, if it can be described as acting at all (Bolton, 2005). This idea suggests that people who manage their emotions for philanthropic reasons are likely either to spontaneously feel the emotions they are expressing or attempt to feel those emotions as best they can by deep acting. For example, O’Donohoe and Turley (2006) studied newspaper employees whose jobs were to take “In Memoriam” requests (p. 1430), which are spaces of newspaper that can be purchased to leave a memorial note honoring a deceased friend, relative, or loved one. Like any other business, the newspaper employees could simply ensure that customers receive the services they purchased and send them on their way; however, these employees often went out of their way to show empathy and respect to grieving parties (O’Donohoe & Turley, 2006). The empathy that the newspaper employees displayed was not a requirement of their job, their pay and professional status were not dependent on the emotions they chose to show or not show to customers; yet they chose to display emotions they felt showed proper respect to their customers as grieving human beings, giving empathy as a gift in response to customers’ suffering (O’Donohoe & Turley, 2006).
Furthermore, the newspaper employees were also philanthropically motivated when supporting each other in the workplace (O’Donohoe & Turley, 2006). Many times when an employee would deal with a particularly heart-wrenching transaction, such as when taking an In Memoriam request from the parent of a deceased child, the first thing she would do after the transaction is turn her chair around to face the other employees and discuss her feelings (O’Donohoe & Turley, 2006). In this case, emotional displays were used to show coworkers support and to comfort them when they were upset. Although these displays were not required by the job, supporting one another was seen by the employees as a vital piece of their emotional well-being at work (O’Donohoe & Turley, 2006). Clearly, these employees were not paid or rewarded tangibly in any way for coordinating their emotions to ensure a coworker’s peace of mind, yet they found these interactions to be an essential part of their line of work.

Since the philanthropic motive is the most altruistic motive for emotional displays at work, the resulting displays often illustrate sincerity and a strong commitment on the part of the employee to view interactions at work as more than opportunities to provide service to paying customers (Bolton, 2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003). Employees motivated by philanthropic reasons strive to view the customer as a person and to consider his/her unique needs. For example, Lewis (2005) explored nurses’ experiences in an infant ward of a hospital where severely ill and dying infants resided. Oftentimes in managing an infant’s ongoing illness, Lewis (2005) found that nurses relied on prescriptive emotion management guided by professional norms to effectively interact with the parents of an ill child. However, when a child was most certainly going to die, some nurses used philanthropic emotion management to interact with the parents (Lewis, 2005).
As evidenced by Bolton’s (2005) description and other examples (e.g., O’Donohoe & Turley, 2006; Lewis, 2005), philanthropic emotion management does not fall under the realm of emotional displays specified by management as part of a job’s requirements or part of a work role. The philanthropic motive encompasses all displays and interactions that occur as a result of the inherent human desire to do good unto others, including engaging in humor with coworkers, showing empathy to customers, and trying to comfort and prepare patients for the future of their treatment (Bolton, 2005; O’Donohoe & Turley, 2006; Lewis, 2005). Bolton (2005) recognizes one outcome of philanthropic emotion management to be job satisfaction, suggesting that emotional labor may actually have beneficial outcomes. This view contradicts Hochschild’s (1983) view that emotional labor outcomes are always negative for employees. The theorized alignment of Bolton’s (2005) motives with Ryan and Deci’s (2000) motives is presented in Table 1.

The Present Study

The primary purposes of the present study are to develop a measure assessing the motives that underlie emotion management at work and to examine the correlates and consequences of these motives. No measure of Bolton’s (2005) motives currently exists. As such, a multi-step process is used to generate items, starting with the construct definitions provided by Bolton, but also factoring in more general considerations, such as Ryan and Deci’s (2000) distinction between intrinsic motivation and the various forms of extrinsic motivation. As such, an attempt was made to cover the full spectrum of intrinsic to extrinsic reasons for expressing emotions at work.

<table>
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<th>Ryan &amp; Deci’s Motives</th>
<th>Ryan &amp; Deci’s General Causality Orientations</th>
<th>Bolton’s Motives</th>
<th>Emotional Labor Strategies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Extrinsic</td>
<td>High Controlled</td>
<td>Pecuniary</td>
<td>Surface Acting</td>
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<td>Introjected</td>
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<td>Integrated</td>
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After carefully reviewing the construct definitions, an initial set of items was generated and reviewed by graduate students in I/O psychology. One group reviewed the items for clarity and another group sorted the items into categories corresponding to those described by Bolton (2005), with two of the motives each having two subcategories (to be described in the “Method” section). Once an initial set of items was generated, it was administered to a sample of employed individuals and the resulting data was factor analyzed to derive scales. A four-factor structure was anticipated, though additional solutions were explored and hypotheses were tested using the factor structure discovered. Additionally, the reliabilities and nomological networks of the scales were examined.

To examine the nomological network of these motives, I collected data on dispositional and contextual factors that may impact the salience of each motive as a determinant of employee emotional displays. As mentioned above, an implicit idea underlying these four motives is that they vary along a continuum reflecting the degree of intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000), with the pecuniary motive being the most extrinsic and the philanthropic motive being the most intrinsic. As such, the individual difference and situational variables that I examined represent factors that may influence the extent to which intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation is operating as an influence on emotional displays. I also examined whether these motives differentially predicted emotional labor strategies and well-being outcomes. The nature of these expected relationships is described in detail below.

*Individual Difference Correlates*

The individual difference correlates I examined include the personality attributes of autonomy orientation and controlled orientation (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Autonomy
orientation refers to the tendency to direct attention toward environmental factors that inspire intrinsic motivation, are challenging, and offer substantive feedback (Deci & Ryan, 1985). People who are high in autonomy orientation have been shown to be high in self-esteem, self-actualization, and ego development (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Controlled orientation refers to individual differences in the tendency to be motivated by extrinsic factors such as rewards, deadlines, and other outside controls (Deci & Ryan, 1985). People high in controlled orientation have been shown to be high in Type-A personality qualities, behavior patterns that stress the heart, and public self-consciousness (Deci & Ryan, 1985).

The pecuniary motive, which reflects the desire to express emotions as a way to receive monetary gain and is an extrinsically based motive, should be positively related to controlled orientation and negatively related to autonomy orientation. Individuals who are predisposed to focus on extrinsic factors (high controlled orientation) should be more likely to report that their emotional displays are driven by the money they receive, whereas the opposite would be expected for individuals who tend to focus on intrinsic factors (high autonomy orientation). The prescriptive motive, while being primarily extrinsically based, may be better integrated with the self and more intrinsic than the pecuniary motive. Recall that the prescriptive motive is operating when individuals express emotions because of occupational norms (Bolton, 2005). Here individuals may be attempting to conform to a desired self (as characterized by the occupation) that is tied to long-term aspirations, such as a career. For example, an employee might hold a long-term goal of being a good nurse. In order to be a good nurse, she might manage her emotional displays in a way that would help her achieve her conceptualization of a good nurse.
Although explicit job requirements may not specify that nurses should express positive emotions and not cry in front of patients, the nurse may know through occupational norms that good nurses are positive with patients and do not cry in front of them. Doing so would be deemed unprofessional. As a result, I expected this motive to be positively related to controlled orientation and negatively related to autonomy orientation, but to a lesser extent than the pecuniary motive.

On the other hand, the presentational motive suggests that people are simply trying to conform to social norms and personal beliefs about what emotional displays are appropriate (Bolton, 2005). In order for someone to display emotions that are only transformed in the sense that they are aligned with what the person believes are the prevailing social norms, he/she would display emotions for more autonomous reasons and less controlled reasons. Individuals who are predisposed to focus on more intrinsic reasons for behavior (autonomy orientation) or less likely to focus on extrinsic reasons (controlled orientation) should be more likely to report displaying emotions for presentational reasons.

I expected a pattern of relations for the philanthropic motive similar to the presentational motive, but with the observed relationships being stronger in magnitude. The philanthropic motive is thought to be the most intrinsic motive, with individuals expressing emotions purely because they wish to positively impact another person (Bolton, 2005). Bakker (2008) found intrinsic motivation to be an important predictor of extra-role performance, and Bolton (2005) conceptualized the philanthropic motive as going above and beyond the emotional requirements of the job. As such, this motive should be positively related to autonomy orientation and negatively related to controlled
orientation as individuals with high autonomy or low controlled orientations should be more likely to report that they express emotions as a gift to others. Additionally, I expected the relationships between these orientations and the philanthropic motive to be stronger than the relationships for the presentational motive. Figure 1 displays the relationships suggested by hypotheses 1 and 2 graphically, while Figure 2 displays hypotheses 3 and 4.

Hypothesis 1: Autonomy orientation is negatively related to (a) the pecuniary motive and (b) the prescriptive motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for pecuniary than it is for prescriptive.

Hypothesis 2: Autonomy orientation is positively related to (a) the presentational motive and (b) the philanthropic motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for philanthropic than it is for presentational.

Hypothesis 3: Controlled orientation is positively related to (a) the pecuniary motive and (b) the prescriptive motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for pecuniary than it is for prescriptive.

Hypothesis 4: Controlled orientation is negatively related to (a) the presentational motive and (b) the philanthropic motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for philanthropic than it is for presentational.

Situational Correlates

I also expected that job characteristics would relate to the strength of these motives.
Figure 1. Relationships described by hypotheses 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14.
Figure 2. Relationships described by hypotheses 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 17, and 18.
Using the O*NET database of job information (National Center for O*NET Development, 2008), several recent studies have found that characteristics tied to the degree and type of interpersonal demands on the job are related to emotional labor variables (e.g., Glomb, Kammeyer-Mueller, & Rotundo, 2004; Diefendorff et al., 2006). For instance, Glomb et al. (2004) identified several O*NET job characteristics reflecting emotion management requirements; they were: establishing and maintaining relationships, communicating with persons outside of the organization, selling to or influencing others, performing for or working with the public, assisting and caring for others, dealing with external customers, dealing with unpleasant or angry people, providing a service to others, and engaging in conflict situations frequently. The authors found that these emotional demands were related to compensation levels (Glomb et al., 2004). Similarly, Diefendorff et al. (2006) found that the O*NET variables of dealing with external customers and contact with others predicted the extent to which employees considered display rules to be in-role versus extra-role. Grandey, Kern, and Frone (2007) found that employees in jobs identified in O*NET as having the potential for verbal abuse had higher levels of self-reported emotional labor.

It is anticipated that emotional job demands will be positively related to the pecuniary motive and the prescriptive motive since the more these demands are incorporated into the job, the more extrinsic forces may be motivating employees to manage their emotions. Also, Grandey, Dickter, and Sin (2004) found that individuals that dealt with aggressive or hostile customers were more likely surface act, and surface acting is expected to be positively related to the pecuniary and prescriptive motives (as described below). Thus, such emotional job demands may also positively relate to the
pecuniary and prescriptive motives. Individuals working in jobs that have low levels of explicit emotional demands are expected to report that they express positive emotions at work for presentational or philanthropic reasons. When employees working in occupations without high levels of emotional demands manage their emotions, it is likely that they are doing so for more intrinsic or autonomous reasons (O’Donohoe & Turley, 2006). Thus, such emotion management may reflect social or altruistic reasons that correspond to presentational and philanthropic motives, respectively. Further, research by Deci and colleagues (e.g., Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999) has shown that providing extrinsic contingencies for behaviors can actually decrease intrinsic motivation. In the present context, formal job demands may actually serve to decrease intrinsically based motives for emotional expression.

*Hypothesis 5:* Emotional job demands are positively related to (a) the pecuniary motive and (b) the prescriptive motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for pecuniary than it is for prescriptive.

*Hypothesis 6:* Emotional job demands are negatively related (a) the presentational motive and (b) the philanthropic motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for philanthropic than it is for presentational.

**Emotion Regulation Strategies**

As previously alluded to, the pecuniary and prescriptive motives were expected to be positively related to surface acting (Bolton, 2005), with the prescriptive motive demonstrating a weaker link than the pecuniary motive. Individuals who report expressing emotions primarily for extrinsic reasons should be more likely to report having to fake the desired emotions. These individuals may be more likely to go through
the motions in their emotional displays because they perceive that they are being forced to manage their emotions; thus, the activity of expressing emotions at work may not be well integrated with the self (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Consistent with this idea, Grandey, Fisk, and Steiner (2005) found that surface acting was associated with lower levels of autonomy.

In contrast, the presentational and philanthropic motives are expected to be negatively related to surface acting. Individuals reporting that they express positive emotions for intrinsic reasons may be less likely to use surface acting as a strategy to do so. Surface acting has been identified as “faking in bad faith” (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987, p. 32), and as such, may be seen by employees as an undesirable strategy for managing their emotional expressions at work. Because the presentational and philanthropic motives are presumed to reflect higher levels of intrinsic motivation for managing one’s emotions, I anticipated that these motives would be negatively related to surface acting. Consistent with the rationale presented for the previous hypotheses, I expected that this negative relationship would be stronger for the philanthropic motive than for the presentational motive.

The philanthropic and presentational motives suggest that people express emotions in order to give a gift to a customer or to comply with social norms. As such, I anticipated that these motives would result in more genuine attempts at expressing positive emotions along with attempts to “fak[e] in good faith” via deep acting (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987, p. 32). Emotional displays that are driven by philanthropic or presentational motives should be better aligned with employees’ natural tendencies for interpersonal interactions. As such, employees may be able to express their naturally felt emotions, or
in a situation where their feelings do not align with expectations, they may attempt to manage those emotions by altering their feelings to match expectations through deep acting. On the other hand, the prescriptive and pecuniary motives suggest external motivations behind the expression of positive emotions. As such, positive emotional displays for these reasons are less well-aligned with internal desires, resulting in individuals being less likely to deep act or express naturally felt emotions to meet expectations.

Diefendorff et al. (2005) found that employees high in agreeableness, who value positive interactions a great deal, were more likely to engage in deep acting. Additionally, situational factors that suggest more involved interactions (e.g., lengthy, less routine interactions) were associated with greater deep acting. Such situations may be more likely to activate intrinsic reasons for managing one’s emotions. This notion is consistent with qualitative research suggesting that the philanthropic motive is more likely to be aligned with sincere attempts at emotion management (e.g., Lewis, 2005; O’Donohoe & Turley, 2006). As a result, it is expected that the presentational and philanthropic motives will be positively related to deep acting (Bolton, 2005).

**Hypothesis 7:** Surface acting is positively related to (a) the pecuniary motive and (b) the prescriptive motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for pecuniary than it is for prescriptive.

**Hypothesis 8:** Surface acting is negatively related to (a) the presentational motive and (b) the philanthropic motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for philanthropic than it is for presentational.
Hypothesis 9: Deep acting is negatively related to (a) the pecuniary motive and (b) the prescriptive motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for pecuniary than for prescriptive.

Hypothesis 10: Deep acting is positively related to (a) the presentational motive and (b) the philanthropic motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for philanthropic than for presentational.

Hypothesis 11: The expression of naturally felt emotions is negatively related to (a) the pecuniary motive and (b) the prescriptive motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for pecuniary than for prescriptive.

Hypothesis 12: The expression of naturally felt emotions is positively related to (a) the presentational motive and (b) the philanthropic motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for philanthropic than for presentational.

Well-Being Outcomes

Job satisfaction (Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2004; Deci et al., 2001; Ilardi, Leone, Kasser, & Ryan, 1993; Kasser, Davey, & Ryan, 1992), emotional exhaustion (Wharton, 1993), and the experience of physical symptoms (Emmons, 1991; Greene, Walker, Hickson, & Thompson, 1989) have been identified as indicators of well-being. Job satisfaction has been defined as “the extent to which employees like their jobs” (Stamps, 1997, p. 13) and has been considered by many to play a role in turnover (e.g., Ma, Samuels, & Alexander, 2003) and to be related to job stress (e.g., Blegen, 1993). Emotional exhaustion reflects feeling burned out and emotionally drained from one’s work (Wharton, 1993) and has been negatively linked to autonomy, organizational justice, and coworker support (e.g., Ducharme, Knudsen, & Roman, 2008). Physical
symptoms are used as an indicator of psychological well-being and have been linked to negative life events (Greene et al., 1989). Previous studies have associated increased reporting of physical symptoms with stressors, such as unpredictable sound bursts (e.g., Weidner & Matthews, 1978), stressful life events in adolescents (Greene et al., 1989), and emotional dissonance (Bono & Vey, 2005).

Intrinsically motivated activities have been linked to greater well-being than extrinsically motivated activities in a variety of studies (e.g., Sheldon, Ryan, Deci, & Kasser, 2004). The reason for this pattern of relationships is that intrinsic activities are more likely to satisfy individuals’ psychological needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). Because employees engaging in philanthropic and presentational emotion management are doing so for more intrinsic reasons (Bolton, 2005), these motives were expected to be positively related to job satisfaction and negatively related to emotional exhaustion and physical symptoms, with the relationships being stronger for philanthropic than for presentational. Individuals who express positive emotions for philanthropic reasons do so as a way to altruistically impact another person’s day (Bolton, 2005), and an antecedent of altruistic behaviors has been shown to be intrinsic motivation (e.g., Tang & Ibrahim, 1998). Furthermore, Grandey et al. (2005) suggested that employees with greater emotional display autonomy would experience less emotional exhaustion by enhancing personal resources through positive affect and intrinsic motivation. Given the presumed intrinsic basis for the presentational and philanthropic motives (Bolton, 2005), I anticipated that they would be positively related to job satisfaction and negatively related to emotional exhaustion and physical symptoms.
The pecuniary motive reflects a greater level of extrinsic motivation and as such should be negatively related to job satisfaction (Bolton, 2005) and positively related to emotional exhaustion and physical symptoms. Goldberg and Grandey (2007) found that participants who were acting based on explicit organizational display rules, which may lead to a strong pecuniary motive, experienced greater emotional exhaustion than participants told to be themselves. Therefore, the pecuniary motive was expected to be negatively related to job satisfaction and positively related to emotional exhaustion and physical symptoms as this motive is extrinsically based (i.e., displays are aimed at receiving financial rewards) and extrinsic motivation has been shown to be negatively related to job satisfaction (Vansteenkiste et al., 2007).

The prescriptive motive for expressing positive emotions should be negatively associated with job satisfaction as well, as the prescriptive motive is expected to be a somewhat extrinsic motive although less so than the pecuniary motive. Maslach (1982) indicated that employees highly identifying with their work roles sometimes experience greater strain as a result of their high identification, suggesting that the prescriptive may be positively related to emotional exhaustion and physical symptoms. Individuals expressing positive emotions for prescriptive or presentational reasons are doing so to conform to either an occupational norm or to what they believe is a societal norm (respectively); as such, it is not guided by purely intrinsic reasons, though it is likely a mix of intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Hypothesized relationships are portrayed in Figures 1 and 2.
Hypothesis 13: Job satisfaction is negatively related to (a) the pecuniary motive and (b) the prescriptive motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for pecuniary than for prescriptive.

Hypothesis 14: Job satisfaction is positively related to (a) the presentational motive and (b) the philanthropic motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for philanthropic than for presentational.

Hypothesis 15: Emotional exhaustion is positively related to (a) the pecuniary motive and (b) the prescriptive motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for pecuniary than for prescriptive.

Hypothesis 16: Emotional exhaustion is negatively related to (a) the presentational motive and (b) the philanthropic motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for philanthropic than for presentational.

Hypothesis 17: Physical symptoms are positively related to (a) the pecuniary motive and (b) the prescriptive motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for pecuniary than for prescriptive.

Hypothesis 18: Physical symptoms are negatively related to (a) the presentational motive and (b) the philanthropic motive, and (c) the relationship is stronger for philanthropic than for presentational.
CHAPTER II

METHOD

Participants and Procedure

Surveys were distributed to participants electronically in two batches. The first batch was sent to 1500 participants, of which 266 completed the survey (response rate of 17.7%). The second batch was sent to 1200 participants, of which 198 completed the survey (response rate of 16.5%). After screening for incomplete and missing data, the sample size was 420. Of these individuals only 198 participants indicated that they worked with customers (7.3% of those contacted overall). These individuals represented the final sample. The mean age of this group was 42.36 ($SD = 11.11$). Ninety-one percent indicated their race as White/Caucasian, 4.0% as Black/African-American, 4.0% as Asian-American, and less than one percent as Hispanic or another race. Twenty percent had completed a graduate degree, 5.6% completed some graduate work, 22.3% had completed a bachelor’s degree, 38.6% had completed some college, 12.7% had completed a high school degree or equivalent, and less than 1% of participants had not completed high school. On average, participants worked 40.14 hours per week ($SD = 9.91$). They had spent an average of 7.57 years with their organization ($SD = 7.51$), 6.02 years in their current job ($SD = 6.60$), and 12.99 years in their current occupation ($SD = 9.61$). Due to a technical issue, gender information was only available for 134
individuals. Of those for whom gender information was available, 42.5% were male. Although data were collected regarding participants’ current positions, only about 60% of participants’ occupations could be effectively coded into an occupation in the O*NET database (coding procedures are described later). Of this group, the most frequently reported position was “customer service representatives” \((n = 6)\) followed by “executive secretaries and administrative assistants” \((n = 5)\). In total, 80 different occupations were identified from the O*NET database for 120 participants.

Participants were contacted through two data collection efforts through their affiliation with StudyResponse.com (Syracuse University, 2005; see Piccolo & Colquitt [2006] for further information on the use of this database), both of which took place in the fall of 2008. StudyResponse is an online database consisting of over 95,000 employed persons who have volunteered to be contacted to participate in research (Syracuse University, 2005) and was established in 2000 (Stanton & Weiss, 2002). I sampled from StudyResponse members as opposed to a typical undergraduate student population because the population of interest was full-time employees from a wide range of service occupations, characteristics that are not typical of employed undergraduates. Additionally, StudyResponse could provide the present study with a more representative sample of the overall service population, including those service jobs requiring an undergraduate or more advanced degree (e.g., registered nurses). Also, using StudyResponse provided participants with greater anonymity in that surveys are distributed to and data are collected from participants through the database, avoiding any direct contact between researchers and participants (Stanton & Weiss, 2002).
Measures

This section details the measures used to assess constructs of interest to the researcher.

Emotional Labor Motives

This measure was developed for the present study. Based on the motive definitions provided by Bolton (2005) and an initial set of items developed by Alicia A. Grandey, several items were written, numbering ten or more per motive (pecuniary, prescriptive, presentational, and philanthropic motives). These items were reviewed and revised by the author and James M. Diefendorff. They were then given to five upper level graduate students familiar with Bolton’s (2005) motives. These subject matter experts examined the items for clarity and participated in a discussion of the items.

After this initial distribution of the items, they were further revised and two of Bolton’s (2005) motives were split into two subcategories. Specifically, the pecuniary motive was divided into a “reward” scale and a “punishment” scale based on the belief that while both of these may reflect strong extrinsic factors tied to compensation, they may also differ based on their links to approach versus avoidance motivation or promotion versus prevention tendencies (Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Higgins, 1997). Further, the philanthropic motive was divided into a “gifts” scale, per Bolton’s (2005) definition, as well as a more generalized “intrinsic” scale based on the enjoyment individuals may experience from expressing positive emotions to others.

All items were then distributed to four graduate students familiar with Bolton’s (2005) typology who attempted to categorize them based on the motive each seemed to be assessing. Rater agreement was analyzed for each item, and items for which there was
no majority classification of the motive (i.e., two or fewer raters appropriately
categorized the item) were discarded. Items for which there was 100% agreement were
retained; and those upon which a majority agreed (i.e., three of four raters categorized the
item appropriately) were further scrutinized and either revised or deleted.

This process resulted in 21 final items, distributed across the a priori scales as
follows: six pecuniary items (four reward items and two punishment items), four
prescriptive items, three presentational items, and eight philanthropic items (four “gift"
items and four intrinsic enjoyment items). All of the items can be found in the Appendix.
The measure asks participant to consider the prompt, “I manage my emotional
expressions (e.g., smiling, not showing I’m upset) when interacting with customers
because…” and then to respond by rating various possible reasons on a 4-point scale
ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 4 (very true). Although Bolton and Boyd (2003) and
Bolton (2005) emphasized the point that emotion management at work does not occur
only in engagements with customers, in this preliminary stage of exploring the typology I
wished to focus on a particular target as a way to ensure that participants utilized the
same frame of reference. I thought it best to start with a measure assessing motives for
managing emotions with customers before moving on to other work targets. The term
“customers” in this measure refers to people not employed by an organization who solicit
services from the organization.

*Autonomy and Controlled Orientation*

The General Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS) 12-vignette version (Deci &
Ryan, 1985) will be used to assess the degree of two different motivational orientations in
individuals – autonomy orientation and controlled orientation. Twelve vignettes are
presented and a respondent will indicate how likely he/she is to engage in three behaviors presented after each vignette on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = very unlikely to 7 = very likely. A sample vignette is “You have been offered a new position in a company where you have worked for some time. The first question that is likely to come to mind is:” with the three behaviors presented as “What if I can’t live up to the new responsibility?”, “Will I make more at this position?”, and “I wonder if the new work will be interesting,” to which participants respond using the 7-point scale. Alpha for the autonomy scale was .87; alpha for the controlled scale was .65.

*O*NET Job Characteristics*

Differences in the interpersonal requirements across jobs were operationalized using the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) variables performing for or working directly with the public, assisting and caring for others, deal with unpleasant or angry people, frequency of conflict situations, contact with others, and deal with external customers. Replacing the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), O*NET is the product of job analysis techniques and multiple raters’ efforts combined to create a database of values assigned to descriptors of jobs (Peterson et al., 2001). Participants in the present study provided their job titles and descriptions of their jobs (i.e., by listing primary work duties in order of importance), and this information was coded into job titles in the O*NET database, similar to Diefendorff et al. (2006) and Diefendorff, Richard, and Gosserand (2006).

These specific variables were chosen to define emotional job demands based on empirical evidence provided by Glomb et al. (2004) and Diefendorff et al. (2006). Specifically, variables chosen based on Glomb et al.’s (2004) work include performing
for or working directly with the public, assisting and caring for others, deal with unpleasant or angry people, frequency of conflict situations, contact with others, and deal with external customers, as these researchers found these variables loaded on a similar factor which they dubbed an emotional factor. The variables deal with external customers and contact with others were chosen based on the work of Diefendorff et al. (2006) who found that these job characteristics predicted employee perceptions of display rules as in-role versus extra-role. These variables were available on the most current version of the O*NET website (http://online.onetcenter.org; National Center for O*NET Development, 2008).

Performing for or working directly with the public is defined by the O*NET website (National Center for O*NET Development, 2008) as the extent to which an employee within a given occupation does just that. Assisting and caring for others was defined by the O*NET website (National Center for O*NET Development, 2008) as “providing personal assistance, medical attention, emotional support, or other personal care to others such as coworkers, customers, or patients.” The O*NET website (National Center for O*NET Development, 2008) defines deal with unpleasant or angry people as the frequency that an employee has to deal with discourteous, unpleasant, or angry people as part of a job. Frequency of conflict situations encompasses how often employees must deal with conflict situations in a job (National Center for O*NET Development, 2008). Contact with others refers to the extent to which employees must be in contact with others through any media in order to execute a job (National Center for O*NET Development, 2008). The O*NET website (National Center for O*NET Development,
2008) refers to deals with external customers as the extent to which an employee must “work with external customers or the public in [a] job.”

As discussed previously, only about 60% of the sample’s responses to these items could be effectively coded according to an O*NET job code. Although some participants did not complete this measure, and thus could not be given a job code, others’ descriptions of their positions were not specific enough to determine an appropriate O*NET job code. In most cases this occurred because the description lacked information on critical variables (e.g., the age group of students for a teacher – elementary, secondary, or post-secondary). The coding procedure occurred as follows. The first author and a fellow coder trained on the coding procedure, independently coded participants’ self-reported job descriptions into O*NET categories. When these codes did not agree a third coder was asked to provide codes on these jobs. Jobs for which all three coders did not agree were excluded from the job characteristic analyses. This process resulted in the usage of 80 codes for 120 participant-reported position descriptions (i.e., many participants held the same position). A code could not be agreed upon for 78 participants.

Furthermore, a preliminary examination of the correlations among each of these six indicators suggested that they may form an overarching factor. To test this prediction, a principal components analysis was conducted. Results of this analysis indicated that a single construct adequately explained the data, forming an “emotional job demands” factor (eigenvalue = 3.239; factor loadings: .59-.82). Therefore, scores on each of these six variables, as ascertained from the O*NET database, were averaged in order to form an emotional job demands score for use in analyses. The internal consistency reliability for these six items was .80.
Emotional Labor Strategies

In order to measure surface acting, deep acting, and the expression of naturally felt emotions, the scales published in Diefendorff et al. (2005), based on the works of Brotheridge and Lee (2003), Grandey (2003), and Kruml and Geddes (2000), were used. The surface acting scale contains seven items, with a sample item being “I show feelings to customers that are different than what I feel inside.” The deep acting scale consists of four items with a sample item being “I try to actually experience the emotions that I must show to customers.” The expression of naturally felt emotions scale consists of three items with a sample item being “The emotions I express to customers are genuine.” All items on these scales will be rated on a scale of 1 = rarely or never to 5 = always or almost always. Alphas were .94 for surface acting, .89 for deep acting, and .92 for the expression of naturally felt emotions in the present investigation.

Job Satisfaction

Cammann, Fichman, Jenkings, and Klesh’s (1979) unpublished measure of job satisfaction was used in the present study. Three items were presented (e.g., “All in all I am satisfied with my job”) to which participants rated their agreement on a 7-point scale, with a response of “1” indicating that the participant “disagree[s] very much” with the statement and “7” indicating that the participant “agree[s] very much”. This measure’s alpha was .86 in the present study.

Emotional Exhaustion

Emotional exhaustion was measured using five items from Wharton’s (1993) Job-Related Exhaustion Scale. Items ask participants the degree to which they feel “emotionally drained,” “used up,” and “burned out,” for example. Responses were
expressed on a 7-point scale, ranging from 0 (“Never feel this way”) to 6 (“Feel this way everyday”). Responses to the items were summed to determine a composite emotional exhaustion score. Alpha was .94 in the present investigation.

Physical Symptoms

Emmons’ (1991) measure was used to assess physical symptoms. The measure consists of nine sets of symptoms that emerged when factor analyzed by Pennebaker (1982). The nine scales consist of one item each for headaches, stomachache or stomach pain, chest or heart pain, runny or congested nose, cough or sore throat, faintness or dizziness, shortness of breath, acne or blemishes, stiff or sore muscles, and other symptoms. Participants indicated how often they experience these symptoms from 0 (“Never feel this way”) to 6 (“Feel this way everyday”). The measure had an alpha level of .84.
CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Data were analyzed using a multiple-step process. First, confirmatory factor analysis was used to determine the factor structure of the newly created Emotional Labor Motives Scale. Next, hypothesis tests were conducted using two sets of analyses – bivariate correlations and path analysis.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Scale Items

Confirmatory factor analyses were performed using LISREL 8.3 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993). Two a priori factor structures were examined, as well as several more parsimonious models that combined the initially-theorized constructs. The first a priori model contained six factors (Model A), which included Bolton’s four factors (pecuniary, prescriptive, presentational, and philanthropic) as well as the two additional sub-factors identified in the pilot work (punishment, intrinsic). The second a priori model (Model D) corresponded to Bolton’s four factor structure by including the prescriptive and presentational motives and combining the pecuniary and punishment motives into one factor and the philanthropic and intrinsic motives into another factor. In addition, I also examined various alternative models that represented various degrees of simplification of both the 6-factor and 4-factor models. These included a five-factor model (Model B) that combined the philanthropic and intrinsic scales, but left the pecuniary and punishment...
scales separate as initial analyses indicated that they were not strongly related, and a five-factor model (Model C) that combined the presentational and philanthropic scales based on initial analyses indicating that these scales are related. Model E consisted of four factors and combined the presentational, philanthropic, and intrinsic scales into one factor, while leaving the other three (punishment, pecuniary, and prescriptive) separate. Finally, Model F consisted of one factor in which all motive scales were combined into one “emotional labor motives” factor. In each confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), individual items were permitted to load on one factor only and latent variables were permitted to freely correlate.

Several indicators of model fit were used to determine which model fit the data best. These indicators include the \( \chi^2 \) Goodness of Fit statistic, the Tucker Lewis Index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis, 1973), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990), the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), and the Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990). Guides for acceptable fit on these values are provided by Vandenberg and Lance (2000). They indicate that a RMSEA value of .08 and an SRMR value of .10 should be used as upper bounds for good fit, while a CFI and TFI values should use a lower bound of .90. Also, since models were nested, model fit could be compared using the \( \chi^2 \) difference test.

Initial analyses revealed that fit was not especially good for any of the models (see Table 2). Examination of the item statistics indicated that one pecuniary item (“Because I get paid to do so”) had a low factor loading.
Table 2. Summary of Fit Statistics for Confirmatory Factor Analyses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>SRMR</th>
<th>TLI</th>
<th>CFI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Set 1: 21 items</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. 6 Factor</td>
<td>398.05*</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. 5 Factor (Philanthropic &amp; Intrinsic combine)</td>
<td>1326.15*</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.250</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. 5 Factor (Presentational &amp; Philanthropic combine)</td>
<td>438.49*</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. 4 Factor (Pecuniary &amp; Punishment combine; Philanthropic &amp; Intrinsic combine)</td>
<td>615.20*</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. 4 Factor (Presentational, Philanthropic, &amp; Intrinsic combine)</td>
<td>504.65*</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>F. 1 Factor</td>
<td>1583.08*</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>.230</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.55</td>
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<td><strong>Set 2: 20 items</strong></td>
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<td>A. 6 Factor</td>
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<td>.056</td>
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<td>.95</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. 5 Factor (Philanthropic &amp; Intrinsic combine)</td>
<td>386.00*</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.060</td>
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<td>.93</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. 5 Factor (Presentational &amp; Philanthropic combine)</td>
<td>402.03*</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. 4 Factor (Pecuniary &amp; Punishment combine; Philanthropic &amp; Intrinsic combine)</td>
<td>560.46*</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. 4 Factor (Presentational, Philanthropic, &amp; Intrinsic combine)</td>
<td>445.01*</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.91</td>
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<tr>
<td>F. 1 Factor</td>
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<td>.230</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.57</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Set 2 and 2 sets of correlated uniquenesses</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>A. 6 Factor</td>
<td>289.74*</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* \( N = 198 \). RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; CFI = comparative fit index.  
*\( p < .05 \).
After removal of this item, fit improved for all models. However, Model A was the only model to achieve good fit on all indicators ($\chi^2 = 312.75$, $df = 155$, $p < .05$; RMSEA = .067; SRMR = .056; TLI = .94; CFI = .95). Also, this model fit significantly better than all other models, as determined by the $\chi^2$ difference test: Model A versus Model B ($\Delta \chi^2(5) = 73.25$, $p < .001$); Model A versus Model C ($\Delta \chi^2(5) = 89.28$, $p < .001$); Model A versus Model D ($\Delta \chi^2(9) = 247.71$, $p < .001$); Model A versus Model E ($\Delta \chi^2(9) = 132.26$, $p < .001$); and Model A versus Model F ($\Delta \chi^2(15) = 1174.78$, $p < .001$). Therefore, Model A with six factors was retained as the final model. This result suggests that Bolton’s (2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003) typology of motives accurately represented the factor structure of emotional labor motives, but also that two previously unidentified sub-motives were also present in reasons why employees manage their emotions with customers.

Modification indices indicated that a substantial increase in model fit could be achieved by permitting the residual error terms of certain items to freely correlate. Since the effects of such changes would improve all the fit of all models to a similar degree, this adjustment would not affect the decision to retain Model A as the final model, but would more accurately represent the data across all models. Items that were permitted to freely correlate included two items from the prescriptive scale (“Doing so is the professional way to act in this job” and “Doing so allows me to appear professional”) and two items from the intrinsic scale (“I am being myself” and “That is how I would act even if I weren’t at work”). This change resulted in a significant improvement in fit for Model A ($\Delta \chi^2(2) = 23.01$, $p < .001$) and very good overall model fit ($\chi^2 = 289.74$, $df = 153$, $p < .05$; RMSEA = .060; SRMR = .054; TLI = .94; CFI = .95). Allowing residual error terms to freely correlate suggests that a common secondary influence on these two
items exists. The items from the prescriptive scale are very similar in their wording, so the common secondary influence might be a wording effect. Also, viewing oneself as authentic (“I am being myself”) and consistent throughout interactions (“That is how I would act even if I weren’t at work”) might be indicative of a focus on oneself as opposed to customers, as indicated by the other items on the intrinsic scale. Therefore, allowing these terms to freely correlate made sense with the present data and represented the data more accurately. Primary factor loadings for Model A with two correlated uniquenesses are shown in Table 3.

Means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and bivariate relationships are shown in Table 4. As shown in Table 4, internal consistency reliability for each scale ranged from .72 to .93, with the presentational scale having the lowest and the prescriptive and philanthropic scales having the highest. All motive scales were positively correlated ($p < .05$) with each other with one exception: the intrinsic scale was unrelated ($p > .05$) to the punishment scale. As can be seen in Table 4, if the intrinsic scale represents the most intrinsic motive and the punishment scale represents the most extrinsic motive, the six motives roughly form a simplex structure. That is, the motives that are next to each other along the hypothetical intrinsic to extrinsic continuum are more strongly related to one another than are motives that are not immediately adjacent.

Additional findings of interest in Table 4 include that participants said they managed their emotions with customers less so for pecuniary reasons ($M = 1.87$) than any other reasons. The next least endorsed motive was the punishment motive ($M = 2.341$), followed by the presentational motive ($M = 2.717$).
Table 3. Emotional Labor Motives Measure: Scales and Item Factor Loadings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale and Items</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I manage my emotional expressions (e.g., smiling, not showing I’m upset) when interacting with customers because…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pecuniary</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Doing so improves my financial gains (e.g., sales, tips, commissions).</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Doing so helps me obtain organizational rewards (e.g., raises, promotions).</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Doing so means I make more money in my job.</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Punishment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I would get in trouble if I did not do so.</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. There are negative consequences at work if I don’t act that way.</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prescriptive</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Acting this way is part of my profession.</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Doing so is the professional way to act in this job.</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Doing so allows me to appear professional.</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. It is expected of people who work in my occupation.</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presentational</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. My culture values these expressions.</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. This is the appropriate way to interact with others, regardless of whether they are customers or other individuals.</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Doing so allows customers to see me as one of them.</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philanthropic</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. I don’t mind doing a little extra to make a customer happy.</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. It is something pleasant that I want to give to the customer.</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Doing so allows me to positively impact the person’s day.</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. It is an unexpected gift that improves their experience.</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intrinsic</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. That is how I would act even if I weren’t at work.</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. I enjoy interacting with customers.</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. It is important to me to have good interactions with customers.</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. I am being myself</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a^\)The error terms for these two items were allowed to freely correlate \(r = 0.08\).

\(^b^\)The error terms for these two items were allowed to freely correlate \(r = 0.14\).
Table 4. Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Correlations of Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Punishment motive</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Pecuniary motive</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Prescriptive motive</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Presentational motive</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Philanthropic motive</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.66**</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Intrinsic motive</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.63**</td>
<td>.77**</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Autonomous motivation</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Controlled motivation</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Surface acting</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Deep acting</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>.40**</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Expressing naturally felt emotions</td>
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<td>.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.28**</td>
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<td>.83</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.20**</td>
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<td>-.13</td>
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<td>-.18**</td>
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<td>.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
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<td>15. O*NET emotional job demands</td>
<td>58.88</td>
<td>20.16</td>
<td>-.22*</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.06</td>
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<td>.06</td>
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<td>17. Gender (1=male, 2=female)</td>
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<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<td>-.02</td>
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Note. Reliabilities are on the diagonal. Superscripts in the mean column reflect means that are not significantly different from each other.

*p < .05.

**p < .01.
Table 4. Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Correlations of Variables. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<tr>
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<td>.23**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
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<td>.04</td>
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<td>.01</td>
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<td>-.16*</td>
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<td>.01</td>
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<td>-.02</td>
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<td>.15*</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<td>.08</td>
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<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.02</td>
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<td>21. Job tenure (years)</td>
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<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.13</td>
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<td>22. Occupational tenure (years)</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Reliabilities are on the diagonal.  
*p < .05.*  
**p < .01.*
Table 4. Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Correlations of Variables. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14. Job satisfaction</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>15. O*NET emotional job demands</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td></td>
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<td>16. Age</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Gender (1=male, 2=female)</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18. Education</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Hours worked per week</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>20. Organizational tenure (years)</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>21. Job tenure (years)</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.81**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22. Occupational tenure (years)</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.67**</td>
<td>.61**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Reliabilities are on the diagonal.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
The most endorsed motives were the prescriptive ($M = 3.068$), philanthropic ($M = 2.958$), and intrinsic motives ($M = 2.908$), and participants endorsed them equally ($ps > .05$). These results suggest that individuals tend to manage their emotions in customer interactions for more intrinsic reasons than for extrinsic reasons. An alternative explanation is that these results may reflect the influence of social desirability in responding, in that to say one does something for monetary gain is generally seen less favorably than to say one does something as a way to make someone else happy.

Correlation Results

As discussed previously, two sets of analyses were used to test each hypothesis. In this section, I consider bivariate correlations (see Table 4). Because the punishment and intrinsic scales were not included in any hypotheses but have been retained as factors separate from the four motives hypothesized based on Bolton’s (2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003) typology, their relationships to variables in the nomological network will be discussed alongside the hypotheses that were proposed in the introduction.

The hypothesis that autonomy orientation would be negatively related to the pecuniary motive (Hypothesis 1a) and the prescriptive motive (1b) was not supported (pecuniary: $r = .06$, $ns$; prescriptive: $r = .40$, $p < .01$). In fact, being oriented toward autonomous environmental cues was positively related to the prescriptive motive ($r = .40$, $p < .01$). Hypothesis 1c predicted that the pecuniary motive would be more negatively related to the autonomy orientation than the prescriptive motive. While there was a significant difference between the correlations for these two motives with autonomy orientation ($t_{195} = 4.23$, $p < .05$), this result was not consistent with theory as neither motive was negatively related to the autonomy orientation. It is noteworthy that the
punishment motive’s relationship to autonomy orientation was nonsignificant as well ($r = .11, ns$), given that this motive is conceptualized as being more extrinsic. Thus, Hypothesis 1 received little support.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that autonomy orientation would be positively related to the presentational (2a) and philanthropic (2b) motives, but more so to the philanthropic motive (2c). Parts (a) and (b) of this hypothesis were supported (presentational: $r = .28, p < .01$; philanthropic: $r = .35, p < .01$), but part (c) was not ($t_{195} = 1.27, ns$). This result indicates that being oriented toward autonomous cues in one’s environment is positively and equally related to endorsing a presentational or philanthropic motive for engaging in emotional labor. Additionally, endorsing the intrinsic motive was positively related to an autonomy orientation ($r = .33, p < .01$) but not in a significantly different way than endorsement of the presentational ($t_{195} = 0.86, ns$) or philanthropic motive ($t_{195} = 0.44, ns$).

Hypotheses 3 and 4 similarly and oppositely predicted that a controlled orientation would positively relate to the pecuniary motive (3a) and the prescriptive motive (3b), and negatively relate to the presentational motive (4a) and the philanthropic motive (4b). Results showed that while a controlled orientation was positively related to the pecuniary motive ($r = .30, p < .01$) and prescriptive motive ($r = .25, p < .01$), supporting Hypotheses 3a and 3b, it also was positively related to the presentational ($r = .35, p < .01$) and philanthropic ($r = .26, p < .01$) motives, contrary to Hypotheses 4a and 4b. Furthermore, the difference between the pecuniary motive’s association with a controlled orientation and the prescriptive motive’s association with the construct and was not significant ($t_{195} = .61, ns$), as was the difference between the presentational and
philanthropic motives’ associations with a controlled orientation \( (t_{195} = 1.63, ns) \), failing to support Hypotheses 3c and 4c. Also, endorsing a controlled orientation was positively related to the punishment \( (r = .20, p < .01) \) and intrinsic motives \( (r = .20, p < .01) \). Possible reasons for the controlled orientation’s weakness in differentially predicting motives can be found in the discussion section.

Hypotheses 5 and 6 predicted that emotional job demands would be positively related to the pecuniary motive (5a) and prescriptive motive (5b), but negatively related to the presentational (6a) and philanthropic (6b) motives. Due to difficulties in coding the entire sample’s job descriptions as O*NET job codes, as discussed in the method section, Hypotheses 5 and 6 were only tested on a subsample of 120 participants for whom data on this variable was available. Supporting Hypothesis 5b, emotional job demands was positively associated with the prescriptive motive \( (r = .21, p < .05) \); however, this variable was negatively related to the pecuniary motive \( (r = -.22, p < .05) \). The difference between the pecuniary and prescriptive motives’ relationships with emotional job demands was significant \( (t_{195} = 5.28, p < .05) \). Emotional job demands was not related to any other motives (punishment: \( r = .00 \); presentational: \( r = -.02 \); philanthropic: \( r = .02 \); intrinsic: \( r = .04 \); all \( ns \)). In sum, Hypothesis 5b was supported whereas Hypotheses 5a, 6a, 6b, and 6c were not supported; furthermore, the test of Hypothesis 5c was significant but in the direction opposite my prediction.

Hypotheses 7 and 8 predicted that use of the emotional labor strategy of surface acting would be positively related to the pecuniary (7a) and prescriptive (7b) motives, and negatively related to the presentational (8a) and philanthropic (8b) motives. Results supported Hypotheses 7a and 7b (pecuniary: \( r = .22, p < .01 \); prescriptive: \( r = .18, p < .01 \)
.05), but not Hypothesis 7c ($t_{195} = 0.47, ns$) which suggested the difference between these two relationships would be significant. Also, endorsement of the punishment motive was strongly and positively associated with surface acting ($r = .41, p < .01$) and more so than the pecuniary motive ($t_{195} = 2.58, p < .05$). These results provide indirect support for Hypotheses 7a and 7c. Hypotheses 8a and 8b were not supported (presentational: $r = -.03, ns$; philanthropic: $r = -.13, ns$), and the difference between these associations was not significant ($t_{195} = 1.71, ns$) failing to provide support for Hypothesis 8c. Interestingly, however, surface acting was negatively related to the intrinsic motive ($r = -.32, p < .01$) and more so than to the philanthropic motive ($t_{195} = 4.21, p < .05$). Thus, the punishment motive was most positively related to surface acting, followed by the pecuniary and prescriptive motives; the intrinsic motive was most negatively related to surface acting, while the presentational and philanthropic motives were unrelated to this emotion regulation strategy.

Hypotheses 9 and 10 predicted that the emotional labor strategy of deep acting would be negatively related to the pecuniary motive (9a) and to the prescriptive motive (9b), but positively related to the presentational (10a) and philanthropic (10b) motives. Contrary to Hypothesis 9, deep acting was positively related to the pecuniary motive ($r = .15, p < .05$) and the prescriptive motive ($r = .29, p < .01$), and the difference between these associations was not significant ($t_{195} = 1.68, ns$). Furthermore, the punishment motive was unrelated to the strategy of deep acting ($r = .10, ns$). However, deep acting was positively associated with the presentational motive ($r = .32, p < .01$), the philanthropic motive ($r = .39, p < .01$), and the intrinsic motive ($r = .40, p < .01$); but the difference between associations with the presentational and philanthropic motives was
not significant \( (t_{195} = 1.29, \text{ ns}) \). Therefore, Hypotheses 10a and 10b were supported, but not Hypothesis 10c.

The expression of naturally felt emotions was expected to be negatively related to the pecuniary (Hypothesis 11a) and prescriptive (11b) motives, and positively related to the presentational (12a) and philanthropic (12b) motives. Hypotheses 11a and 11b were not supported, with both the pecuniary and prescriptive motives showing nonsignificant relationships with the expression of naturally felt emotions (pecuniary: \( r = .00 \); prescriptive: \( r = .07 \); both \( \text{ns} \)); and the difference between these associations was not significant \( (t_{195} = 0.81, \text{ ns}) \). However, the expression of naturally felt emotions was negatively related to the punishment motive \( (r = -.16, p < .05) \) and this association was significantly more negative than this strategy’s relationship to the pecuniary motive \( (t_{195} = 2.02, p < .05) \). On the other hand, the expression of naturally felt emotions was positively related to the presentational \( (r = .28, p < .01) \), philanthropic \( (r = .41, p < .01) \), and intrinsic \( (r = .56, p < .01) \) motives. Furthermore, the philanthropic motive was significantly more positively related to the expression of naturally felt emotions than was the presentational motive \( (t_{195} = 2.41, p < .05) \), and the intrinsic motive was significantly more positively related to this strategy than was the philanthropic motive \( (t_{195} = 3.72, p < .05) \). Thus, the punishment motive was negatively related to the expression of naturally felt emotions, while the pecuniary and prescriptive motives’ relationships with this strategy were nonsignificant; furthermore, the intrinsic motive was most positively related to the expression of naturally felt emotions, followed by the philanthropic motive, then the presentational motive.
Moving on to outcomes of the emotional labor motives, Hypotheses 13 and 14 suggest that job satisfaction will be negatively related to the pecuniary (13a) and prescriptive (13b) motives, and positively related to the presentational (14a) and philanthropic (14b) motives. Failing to support Hypothesis 13, job satisfaction was found to be unrelated to the pecuniary \((r = .00, \text{ ns})\) and prescriptive \((r = .01, \text{ ns})\) motives, and the difference between these two relationships was not significant \((t_{195} = 0.11, \text{ ns})\). However, in a pattern similar to that of these motives to other constructs, job satisfaction was found to be negatively related to the punishment motive \((r = -.14, p < .05)\). The difference between the punishment motive’s association with job satisfaction and the pecuniary motive’s association with job satisfaction was not significant, though \((t_{195} = 1.76, \text{ ns})\). Additionally, parts (a) and (b) of Hypothesis 14 were supported in that both the presentational motive and the philanthropic motive were positively related to job satisfaction (presentational: \(r = 16, p < .05\); philanthropic: \(r = .19, p < .01\)), as was the intrinsic motive \((r = .32, p < .01)\). Failing to provide support for Hypothesis 14c, however, the difference between associations with job satisfaction for the presentational and philanthropic motives was not significant \((t_{195} = 0.52, \text{ ns})\). Nonetheless, the intrinsic motive was found to be more positively related to job satisfaction than was the philanthropic motive \((t_{195} = 2.84, p < .05)\). Again, these findings provide support for viewing the punishment motive as the most extrinsic motive and the intrinsic motive as the most intrinsic form of motivation to engage in emotional labor; that is, if one views job satisfaction as being positively associated with intrinsic motivation and negatively associated with extrinsic motivation.
Hypotheses 15 and 16 predicted that emotional exhaustion would be positively related to the pecuniary motive (15a) and the prescriptive motive (15b), and negatively related to the presentational (16a) and philanthropic motives (16b). Contrary to predictions, emotional exhaustion was unrelated to the pecuniary motive \( (r = .13, ns) \) and the prescriptive motive \( (r = .07, ns) \), and there was no difference in the strength of these relationships \( (t_{195} = 0.69, ns) \). However, emotional exhaustion was positively associated with the punishment motive \( (r = .36, p < .01) \) and this relationship was significantly more positive than emotional exhaustion’s relationship with the pecuniary motive \( (t_{195} = 3.05, p < .05) \). Furthermore, while emotional exhaustion was not negatively related to the presentational motive as predicted \( (r = -.13, ns) \), it was to the philanthropic \( (r = -.15, p < .05) \) and intrinsic \( (r = -.36, p < .01) \) motives; and the difference between the philanthropic and intrinsic association with emotional exhaustion was significant \( (t_{195} = 4.74, p < .05) \).

Finally, physical symptoms were predicted to be positively related to the pecuniary (Hypothesis 17a) and prescriptive (17b) motives, but negatively related to the presentational (18a) and philanthropic (18b) motives. While physical symptoms were positively related to the pecuniary motive \( (r = .20, p < .01) \) and punishment motive \( (r = .28, p < .01) \), they were unrelated to the prescriptive motive \( (r = -.02, ns) \). The difference between this relationship for the pecuniary motive and the punishment motive was not significant \( (t_{195} = 1.04, ns) \), while the difference when comparing the pecuniary and prescriptive motives was \( (t_{195} = 2.58, p < .05) \). Additionally, Hypotheses 18a and 18b were not supported (presentational: \( r = -.13, ns \); philanthropic: \( r = -.09, ns \)), nor was Hypothesis 18c \( (t_{195} = 0.68, ns) \). However, the intrinsic motive was negatively related to reporting physical symptoms \( (r = -.18, p < .01) \) but not significantly more so than the
philanthropic motive ($t_{195} = 1.89, ns$) or presentational motive ($t_{195} = 0.82, ns$). This concludes discussion of hypothesis tests performed using bivariate Pearson correlations.

Path Analysis

In order to more comprehensively test the relationships of the emotional labor motives with the antecedents and consequences examined in this study, path analysis was employed. This approach allows for the simultaneous test of multiple relationships, as well as the potential for meditational linkages in a more fully explicated model. To do this, a series of models were tested based on the pattern of causality shown in Figure 3. As shown in Figure 3, autonomy and controlled orientations and O*NET job characteristics were considered to be antecedents of emotional labor motives. The most proximal outcomes of these motives were the emotional labor strategies of surface acting, deep acting, and the expression of naturally felt emotions. Finally, emotional exhaustion, job satisfaction, and physical symptoms were proposed as more distal outcomes of these motives, having their effects through the emotional labor strategies. In addition to testing this causal chain, I examined alternative models that included direct (i.e., unmediated) links of more exogenous variables with the more endogenous variables (e.g., autonomy orientation predicting surface acting).

All path analyses were performed in LISREL 8.3 (Jöreskog & Sörbom 1993) and the same fit indices used to assess model fit for CFA models were used to examine model fit for path analyses. Procedures specified by MacKinnon, Krull, and Lockwood (2000) for testing mediation were followed, including the use of the Sobel (1982) test to measure the strength of indirect effects.
Figure 3. Hypothesized relationships between individual differences and situational characteristics, emotional labor motives, emotional labor strategies, and outcomes.
Finally, two separate sets of models were tested: one excluding the emotional job
demands variable in which all participants were included \((n = 198)\), and one including the
emotional job demands variable in which participants without a value on this variable
were excluded \((n = 120)\). Fit indices for all models are presented in Table 5.

Path Models without Emotional Job Demands \((n = 198)\)

The first model tested was that suggested by Figure 3 (Model 1a). Autonomy
orientation and controlled orientation were allowed to predict emotional labor motives,
emotional labor motives were allowed to predict emotional labor strategies, and
emotional labor strategies were specified to predict outcomes in this model. This model
suggests a series of fully mediated relationships; for example, motives mediate the links
of autonomy orientation and controlled orientation with surface acting, deep acting, and
the expression of naturally felt emotions. Direct paths to distal variables were not
permitted (i.e., motives to outcomes, individual differences to emotional labor strategies
and outcomes). Fit indices indicated that this model fit the data moderately well \((\chi^2 =
69.05, df = 30, p < .001; \text{RMSEA} = .079; \text{SRMR} = .045; \text{TLI} = .89; \text{CFI} = .96)\).

In order to more fully represent the pattern of relations observed in the data, two
alternative models were also explored: one of which freed up all direct (unmediated)
links among variables earlier in the model with variables later in the model, and another
in which the significant paths from the unmediated model were retained and the
nonsignificant distal paths from the unmediated model were dropped. The model with all
paths estimated was fully saturated, and thus fit the data perfectly. Therefore, I focus my
attention on the subsequent model (Model 1b) in which non-significant paths in the fully
saturated model were dropped.
Table 5. Summary of Fit Statistics for Path Analyses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Model 1 (n = 198); no emotional job demands</th>
<th>Model 2 (n = 120; emotional job demands included)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>χ²</td>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a.</td>
<td>69.05*</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b.</td>
<td>20.47</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a.</td>
<td>54.00*</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b.</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; CFI = comparative fit index.  
***p < .001.  
*p < .05.
In this model, each of the variables in one set (e.g., motives, emotional labor strategies) were permitted to predict each of the variables in the set most proximal to it (e.g., motives to strategies; see Figure 3), but distal relationships were not specified if they were not significant in the fully saturated model. As might be expected, fit indices indicated that this model fit the data very well ($\chi^2 = 20.47$, $df = 20$, $ns$; RMSEA = .000; SRMR = .027; TLI = 1.00; CFI = 1.00), and significantly better than Model 1a ($\Delta \chi^2(10) = 48.58$, $p < .001$). Significant direct paths are displayed in Figure 4, with indirect paths displayed in Table 6.

Path Models Including Emotional Job Demands ($n = 120$)

The first model tested with this sample was identical to Model 1a, with the exceptions that only participants with values on the emotional job demands variable were included, and emotional job demands were entered as an antecedent along with autonomy orientation and controlled orientation. Fit indices indicated that this model fit the data well ($\chi^2 = 54.00$, $df = 36$, $p < .05$; RMSEA = .058; SRMR = .049; TLI = .92; CFI = .97). Like the previous set of models, a model with the emotional job demands variable estimating all unmediated paths was tested and was fully saturated. Nonsignificant paths were dropped from this model (Model 2b), similar to the previous procedure used to test Model 1b. Fit indices indicated that the model fit exceptionally well ($\chi^2 = 18.00$, $df = 29$, $ns$; RMSEA = .00; SRMR = .029; TLI = 1.06; CFI = 1.00), and significantly better than Model 2a ($\Delta \chi^2(7) = 36.00$, $p < .001$). Thus, Models 1b and 2b each significantly increased prediction over Models 1a and 2a, respectively.
Note. N = 198. Only significant (p < .05) direct paths are shown. Significant indirect paths are shown in Table 6. Dashed lines indicate non-hypothesized significant relationships.

Figure 4. Final path model.
Table 6. Significant Indirect Paths in Path Analyses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antecedent</th>
<th>Consequent</th>
<th>Deep Acting</th>
<th>Expression of Naturally…</th>
<th>Job Satisfaction</th>
<th>Physical Symptoms</th>
<th>Emotional Exhaustion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Model 1b</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Autonomy</td>
<td>Acting</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Punishment motive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Pecuniary motive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Intrinsic motive</td>
<td></td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Model 2b</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Autonomy</td>
<td>orientation</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Punishment motive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Pecuniary motive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Intrinsic motive</td>
<td></td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* All values significant at $p < .05$. 
Before proceeding to the discussion of specific path coefficients, it is useful to consider the relative advantages of the focusing on the model with the job characteristics and without. Table 7 reports whether each hypothesis was supported in the correlation analyses and the two sets of path analyses. Interestingly, for the model that includes the job characteristics, none of the job characteristics hypotheses were supported (i.e., Hypotheses 5 and 6). Additionally, testing this model required that 78 individuals be dropped from the analyses. Given these points and the fact that the vast majority of hypothesis tests resulted in similar outcomes across the two models, the following discussion is focused on the path analysis that excluded the job characteristics variable, Model 1b.

**Final Model Hypothesis Tests**

The final model showing all significant direct effects is presented in Figure 4, and significant indirect effects are presented in Table 6. Hypotheses 1a and 1b were not supported—autonomy orientation was not related to the pecuniary motive ($\gamma = -.09, \text{ns}$) and was positively related, opposite of predictions, to the prescriptive motive ($\gamma = .35, p < .01$). Hypothesis 2 was completely supported—autonomy orientation was positively related to the presentational motive ($\gamma = .17, p < .05$) and the philanthropic motive ($\gamma = .29, p < .01$) and this relationship was stronger for the philanthropic motive (when these two paths were constrained to be equal, $\Delta \chi^2(1) = 5.34, p < .05$). The pecuniary motive was positively related to controlled orientation ($\gamma = .34, p < .01$), as suggested by Hypothesis 3a, but controlled orientation was unrelated to the prescriptive motive ($\gamma = .10, \text{ns}$) contrary to Hypothesis 3b.
Table 7. Results of Hypothesis Tests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>PA without EJD (n = 198)</th>
<th>PA with EJD (n = 120)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 a. Autonomy (-) to pecuniary</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Autonomy (-) to prescriptive</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. (a) is stronger than (b)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 a. Autonomy (+) to presentational</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Autonomy (+) to philanthropic</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. (b) is stronger than (a)</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 a. Controlled (+) to pecuniary</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Controlled (+) to prescriptive</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. (a) is stronger than (b)</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 a. Controlled (-) to presentational</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Controlled (-) to philanthropic</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. (b) is stronger than (a)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 a. EJD (+) to pecuniary</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>b. EJD (+) to prescriptive</td>
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<td>c. (a) is stronger than (b)</td>
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<td>6 a. EJD (-) to presentational</td>
<td>NS</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. EJD (-) to philanthropic</td>
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<td>c. (b) is stronger than (a)</td>
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<td>7 a. Surface acting (+) to pecuniary</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<td>b. Surface acting (+) to prescriptive</td>
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<td>c. (a) is stronger than (b)</td>
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<td>8 a. Surface acting (-) to presentational</td>
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<td>b. Surface acting (-) to philanthropic</td>
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<td>c. (b) is stronger than (a)</td>
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<td>9 a. Deep acting (-) to pecuniary</td>
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<td>b. Deep acting (-) to prescriptive</td>
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<td>c. (a) is stronger than (b)</td>
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<td>10 a. Deep acting (+) to presentational</td>
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<td>b. Deep acting (+) to philanthropic</td>
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<td>c. (b) is stronger than (a)</td>
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<td>11 a. Expressing… (-) to pecuniary</td>
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<td>b. Expressing… (-) to prescriptive</td>
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<td>c. (a) is stronger than (b)</td>
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<td>12 a. Expressing… (+) to presentational</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<td>b. Expressing… (+) to philanthropic</td>
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<td>c. (b) is stronger than (a)</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 a. Job satisfaction (-) to pecuniary</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Job satisfaction (-) to prescriptive</td>
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<td>c. (a) is stronger than (b)</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 a. Job satisfaction (+) to presentational</td>
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<td>NS</td>
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<td>b. Job satisfaction (+) to philanthropic</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<td>c. (b) is stronger than (a)</td>
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<td>15 a. Physical symptoms (+) to pecuniary</td>
<td>NS</td>
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<td>b. Physical symptoms (+) to prescriptive</td>
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<td>c. (a) is stronger than (b)</td>
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<td>16 a. Physical symptoms (-) to presentational</td>
<td>NS</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Physical symptoms (-) to philanthropic</td>
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<td>c. (b) is stronger than (a)</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 a. Emotional exhaustion (+) to pecuniary</td>
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<td>Supported</td>
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<td>b. Emotional exhaustion (+) to prescriptive</td>
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Table 7. Results of Hypothesis Tests. (continued)

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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>a. Emotional exhaustion (-) to presentational</td>
<td>NS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b. Emotional exhaustion (-) to philanthropic</td>
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<td>c. (b) is stronger than (a)</td>
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*Note.* NS = not supported. PA = path analysis. EJD = emotional job demands.
The pecuniary motive was more positively related to controlled orientation than the prescriptive motive ($\Delta \chi^2(1) = 8.22, p < .01$), supporting Hypothesis 3c. Hypothesis 4 was not supported—controlled orientation was positively related to the presentational ($\gamma = .28, p < .01$) motive, opposite of predictions, and unrelated to the philanthropic motive ($\gamma = .14, ns$). Hypotheses 5 and 6 were not tested in the final model as they concerned relationships between the emotional job demands variable and motives, and emotional job demands were excluded from this model. However, inspection of these paths in Model 2b indicated that these hypotheses were not supported (see also Table 7).

Hypothesis 7a was not supported—surface acting was unrelated to the pecuniary motive ($\beta = .09, ns$)—but surface acting was related to the prescriptive motive, supporting Hypothesis 7b ($\beta = .17, p < .05$). Hypothesis 8 was unsupported—surface acting was unrelated to the presentational ($\beta = -.04, ns$) and philanthropic ($\beta = .10, ns$) motives. Hypotheses 9-12 were also unsupported by the final path model: deep acting’s relationships with motives were nonsignificant (Hypotheses 9 and 10; pecuniary, $\beta = .04, ns$; prescriptive, $\beta = .12, ns$; presentational, $\beta = -.01, ns$; philanthropic, $\beta = .14, ns$), as were expressing naturally felt emotions’ relationships with motives (Hypotheses 11 and 12; pecuniary, $\beta = -.05, ns$; prescriptive, $\beta = -.15, ns$; presentational, $\beta = -.02, ns$; philanthropic, $\beta = -.01, ns$).

In order to test Hypotheses 13-18, which suggest distal relationships between motives and outcomes, direct and indirect (i.e., through emotional labor strategies) effects were examined. Examination of the direct effects did not reveal any support for Hypotheses 13-18—job satisfaction was unrelated to the motives (pecuniary, $\beta = .04, ns$; prescriptive, $\beta = -.08, ns$; presentational, $\beta = .06, ns$; philanthropic, $\beta = -.13, ns$), as were
physical symptoms (pecuniary, $\beta = .01, ns$; prescriptive, $\beta = .00, ns$; presentational, $\beta = -.08, ns$; philanthropic, $\beta = .18, ns$) and emotional exhaustion (pecuniary, $\beta = .13, ns$; prescriptive, $\beta = -.08, ns$; presentational, $\beta = -.18, ns$; philanthropic, $\beta = .05, ns$).

Examination of indirect effects yielded the same results (job satisfaction: pecuniary, $\alpha\beta = -.02, ns$; prescriptive, $\alpha\beta = -.04, ns$; presentational, $\alpha\beta = .00, ns$; philanthropic, $\alpha\beta = .00, ns$; physical symptoms: pecuniary, $\alpha\beta = .03, ns$; prescriptive, $\alpha\beta = .07, ns$; presentational, $\alpha\beta = -.01, ns$; philanthropic, $\alpha\beta = .03, ns$; emotional exhaustion: pecuniary, $\alpha\beta = .03, ns$; prescriptive, $\alpha\beta = .06, ns$; presentational, $\alpha\beta = -.01, ns$; philanthropic, $\alpha\beta = .03, ns$).

Although support for the hypotheses may seem dismal, interesting results were obtained for the punishment and intrinsic motive. For example, autonomy orientation was positively related to the intrinsic motive ($\gamma = .30, p < .01$) and controlled orientation was positively related to the punishment motive ($\gamma = .18, p < .05$). Furthermore, the punishment motive was positively related to surface acting ($\beta = .28, p < .01$) and the intrinsic motive was related to all three emotional labor strategies in expected directions (surface acting, $\beta = -.43, p < .01$; deep acting, $\beta = .22, p < .05$; expressing naturally felt emotions, $\beta = .56, p < .01$). Also, the punishment motive related directly to physical symptoms ($\beta = .18, p < .01$) and emotional exhaustion ($\beta = .15, p < .05$) and indirectly to all three outcome variables (job satisfaction, $\alpha\beta = -.07, p < .05$; physical symptoms, $\alpha\beta = .10, p < .01$; emotional exhaustion, $\alpha\beta = .08, p < .01$). The intrinsic motive was directly related to physical symptoms ($\beta = -.20, p < .01$) and indirectly related to all three outcome variables as well (job satisfaction, $\alpha\beta = .21, p < .01$; physical symptoms, $\alpha\beta = -.20, p < .01$; emotional exhaustion, $\alpha\beta = -.15, p < .01$).
Other interesting findings include that autonomy and controlled orientation directly predicted emotional labor strategies (autonomy orientation predicted surface acting, $\gamma = -.15, p < .05$; autonomy orientation predicted expressing naturally felt emotions, $\gamma = .18, p < .01$; controlled orientation predicted surface acting, $\gamma = .16, p < .05$; controlled orientation predicted expressing naturally felt emotions, $\gamma = .12, p < .05$), and autonomy orientation indirectly predicted outcomes (autonomy orientation to job satisfaction, $\alpha \beta = .14, p < .01$; autonomy orientation to physical symptoms, $\alpha \beta = -.15, p < .01$). Emotional labor strategies also directly predicted outcome variables (surface acting to physical symptoms, $\beta = .32, p < .01$; surface acting to emotional exhaustion, $\beta = .23, p < .01$; expressing naturally felt emotions to job satisfaction, $\beta = .22, p < .05$).
CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY

Initial analysis of the Emotional Labor Motives Scale showed reason for optimism with regard to its utility. Specifically, factor analyses provided support for a six-factor structure suggesting that punishment, pecuniary, prescriptive, presentational, philanthropic, and intrinsic motives to engage in emotional labor are distinct constructs. These findings verify Bolton’s (2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003) typology, while suggesting the addition of two motives that perhaps represent the extremes on the intrinsic-extrinsic continuum: punishment and intrinsic motives. This result suggests that being motivated to manage emotions when interacting with customers because of the desire to avoid punishment is conceptually distinct from being motivated to do so to improve financial gains (i.e., pecuniary); also that the motive to give one’s emotions to others as a gift (i.e., philanthropic; Bolton, 2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003) is not the same as managing one’s emotions at work for personal enjoyment. Furthermore, results showed preliminary support for the criterion-related validity and nomological network of the Emotional Labor Motives Scale. Path analysis provided a test of the underlying theoretical model and generally supported the idea that stable individual differences are antecedents of the motives, and that the motives relate to well-being outcomes through the use of emotional labor strategies. The present research is the first attempt to quantitatively assess motives...
in the emotional labor process, and it seems there is reason to declare these variables are potentially valuable for understanding this process.

At a theoretical level, the present research has identified different reasons for managing emotions on the job. Although research has long recognized that employees must manage their emotions “to receive a wage” (e.g., Hochschild, 1983), little research has been devoted to uncovering other reasons why employees do so (Bolton, 2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003). The present research implicates a variety of motives as playing a role in this process and suggests that organizational interventions (e.g., provision of extrinsic incentives) or selection (e.g., hiring those with intrinsic desires to manage emotions) might be used to activate these motives. Furthermore, it might also be the case that certain motives, such as those with more extrinsic undertones (i.e., punishment and pecuniary), are more likely to cause individuals to “go through the motions,” resulting in less genuine emotional displays.

The results of this study suggest that while individuals’ overt behavior is important, the underlying reasons for engaging in such behavior can also be important. This point builds on that made by Deci and Ryan (1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000) in their explication of self-determination theory, in that while observing that individuals engage in certain emotional displays is important for predicting outcomes, knowing why individuals are doing so further enhances our understanding of the effects of this course of action. The present investigation examined only situations in which individuals were expressing positive emotions to customers, and revealed for instance, that having an intrinsic motive may lead to less surface acting, fewer physical symptoms and less emotional exhaustion, as well as more deep acting, expression of naturally felt emotions,
and job satisfaction. Although motives have been examined at work in other contexts (e.g., achievement), they have not been previously empirically examined in the emotional labor literature. The closest work may be that of Ashforth and colleagues (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Ashforth & Tomiuk, 2000) who considered the role of employee identity and its consistency with the emotional labor demands of the job as a predictor of well-being outcomes. However, this prior work did not implicate motives as an explanation. The following sections discuss the findings for each motive separately, starting with the most extrinsic motives and moving to the most intrinsic.

The Motives for Emotional Labor

Results showed that six distinct motives for emotional labor exist and can be differentiated as follows.

Punishment Motive

The punishment motive was measured as a counterpart to the pecuniary motive. However, factor analyses revealed superior model fit by keeping the punishment and pecuniary motives separate. While the motive to manage emotions at work to avoid punishment was not part of Bolton’s (2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003) original typology, it showed interesting relationships with antecedents and consequences. For example, Deci and Ryan’s (1985) controlled orientation was positively related to the punishment motive. A controlled orientation reflects a tendency to be motivated by extrinsic factors in the environment, such as rewards and deadlines (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Thus, results showed that people who are more in tune with extrinsic motivators were motivated to manage their emotions to avoid punishment.
The punishment motive also predicted use of the emotional labor strategy of surface acting positively, which is to change one’s outward expression of emotion without changing one’s inner feelings (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Grandey, 2000; Hochschild, 1983). Thus, a person who manages his or her emotions on the job to avoid punishment is likely to do so by using a shallow emotion management strategy, such as surface acting. The explanation for this relationship might lie in research showing that actions taken for autonomous reasons are better achieved than those taken for controlled reasons (e.g., Deci et al., 1999; Sheldon & Elliot, 1998), in that external punishments are extrinsic motivators and people are less motivated by actions taken for extrinsic reasons (Deci & Ryan, 1985).

Furthermore, endorsement of the punishment motive predicted the experience of physical symptoms and emotional exhaustion positively, both directly and indirectly, and job satisfaction negatively and indirectly. People who were motivated to manage their emotions at work to avoid punishment experienced more emotional exhaustion and physical ailments and less job satisfaction compared to individuals who reported low levels of the punishment motive. It seems that managing one’s emotions because of the desire to avoid negative consequences is stressful and relates to well-being-based outcomes both through greater surface acting as well as independent of the emotion regulation being conducted. Given the punishment motive’s alignment with controlled orientation, these findings are consistent with work showing that extrinsically motivated behaviors are negatively related to job satisfaction (Vansteenkiste et al., 2005). Also, Bono and Vey’s (2005) meta-analysis showed a moderate negative relationship between surface acting and job satisfaction and positive relationship between surface acting and
emotional exhaustion. Thus, the findings that the punishment motive is positively related to surface acting and emotional exhaustion and negatively related to job satisfaction is consistent with expectations that might be inferred from previous research.

Pecuniary Motive

The pecuniary motive suggests that employees manage their emotions at work to receive financial gains (Bolton, 2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003). This motive is the one most frequently recognized by researchers of emotional labor (e.g., Hochschild, 1983), yet it was the least endorsed of any of the motives. Furthermore, the only relationship this motive had with antecedents and consequences in path analysis was a positive relationship with controlled orientation. While several bivariate relations were found, these disappeared in the simultaneous analyses, primarily as a result of the inclusion of the punishment motive in the model. That is, it seems that the extrinsic motive reflecting the desire to avoid punishment is a more powerful and central determinant of surface acting and well-being outcomes than is the extrinsic motive reflecting the desire to receive compensation. One explanation for this effect is that individuals may not explicitly get paid for their emotional expressions, even though they may be required to manage their emotions for a wage (Hochschild, 1983). That is, the link between pay and expressions may be more tenuous in peoples’ minds than is thought to be the case by emotional labor researchers. Pending further investigation, it appears the pecuniary motive holds little weight in the emotional labor process. Null relationships may have been found, however, as a result of criteria selection, as Bolton (2005) suggests that the pecuniary motive would result in alienation from work and resistance to perform emotion management—two criteria which were not included in the present study.
Prescriptive Motive

The prescriptive motive holds that employees manage their emotions at work so as to maintain behavior congruent with the occupational role and appear professional (Bolton, 2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003). It was expected that this motive would show relationships similar to those expected for the pecuniary motive, but weaker in magnitude. Results obtained for the prescriptive motive, however, were dissimilar to those obtained for the pecuniary motive. For example, autonomy orientation positively predicted the prescriptive motive, opposite of predictions. Autonomy orientation indicates a tendency to be oriented toward factors that elicit intrinsic motivation and are challenging (Deci & Ryan, 1985). As a result of this motive’s focus on external factors such as the occupation and the work role, it was expected that the prescriptive motive would relate negatively to this orientation and positively to the controlled orientation; however it appears that this motive is more intrinsically aligned than expected.

Additionally, the prescriptive motive predicted use of surface acting positively—opposite of expectations (Bolton, 2005), which were that it would result in more genuine displays (i.e., deep acting and expressing naturally felt emotions). This finding indicates that although managing emotions in order to appear professional is somewhat intrinsically derived, it still results in increased use of the disingenuous strategy of surface acting. The prescriptive motive did not relate to the other emotional labor strategies or outcomes; therefore it seems that the prescriptive motive may be part of a process which results in increased use of a strategy that leads to negative outcomes (i.e., increased physical symptoms and emotional exhaustion), yet it is aligned with an individual difference variable that leads to positive outcomes (i.e., increased job
satisfaction and decreased physical symptoms). This result is not surprising given that the prescriptive motive was expected to align with Ryan and Deci’s (2000) concept of introjected motivation, in which one is motivated to avoid feeling guilt or to attain a feeling of pride, thus containing both intrinsically motivated and extrinsically motivated aspects.

*Presentational Motive*

Managing emotions at work for presentational reasons means that employees are complying with general societal norms about emotional displays, or display rules (Diefendorff et al., 2006), and not managing their emotions differently as a result of being in the work context (Bolton, 2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003). Bolton (2005) describes presentational emotion management as a prerequisite to all other emotion management in that societal display rules usually underlie all display rules, even in distinct settings. Thus, it might be expected that the presentational motive would be the most frequently endorsed of all motives; yet this was not the case. The presentational motive was the third least-endorsed motive (or fourth most-endorsed motive), preceded only by the punishment and pecuniary motives, respectively.

Furthermore, the presentational motive was the only motive to show simultaneous positive relationships with both autonomy and controlled orientations. The stability of these results is questionable due to the low reliability of the controlled scale and the high correlation between the autonomy and controlled scales (as discussed below), but it is nonetheless interesting to consider that this motive aligns with both intrinsic and extrinsic motivators. Extrinsic motivators regarding this motive might be captured by pressures to conform to societal display rules, and intrinsic motivators might be captured by
employees’ decisions not to alter their behavior simply because they are in a special setting (i.e., at work). Thus, this motive may fall somewhere near the center of the extrinsic-intrinsic continuum, representing both sources of influence.

Interestingly, the presentational motive did not exhibit any unique relationships with emotional labor strategies or outcomes, directly or indirectly. Accordingly, if people manage their emotions at work in a way that is consistent with how they would act in general, we cannot be sure of the strategies they will use to manage their emotions or the outcomes of such behavior—only that these relationships should be somewhat consistent over time. This finding and explanation are in line with Bolton’s (2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003) theorizing, in that she suggests that presentational emotion management is not tied to any specific emotional labor strategy.

Philanthropic Motive

The philanthropic motive was theorized to appear as a sub-motive of the presentational category (Bolton, 2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003). It is described as the desire to give one’s emotions as a “gift” (Bolton, 2005, p. 93; Hochschild, 1983) to a customer, without explicitly being required to do so by one’s organization. Accordingly, the philanthropic motive was highly correlated with the presentational motive ($r = .66$), but confirmatory factor analysis results determined that a model with the philanthropic and presentational motives as separate factors fit better than a model in which these two factors were combined. Thus, the philanthropic motive was retained as a separate motive.

As expected, the philanthropic motive was positively related to autonomy orientation, suggesting that being motivated to give emotions to customers above and beyond requirements reflects a tendency to direct attention toward factors that inspire
intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985). This finding is consistent with Bakker’s (2008) finding that intrinsic motivation was an important predictor of extra-role performance, and Tang and Ibrahim’s (1998) work showing that intrinsic motivation is related to altruism. Similar to the presentational motive, the philanthropic motive did not exhibit any unique relationships with emotional labor strategies or outcomes. Follow-up analyses indicated that the philanthropic motive’s predictive power might have been trumped by the inclusion of the intrinsic motive in the model. Thus, we know that employees who give their emotions as a “gift” (Bolton, 2005, p. 93; Hochschild, 1983) to customers are more intrinsically motivated, but current findings do not suggest they are more or less likely to use particular emotional labor strategies or experience positive outcomes above and beyond other motives, as might be expected (e.g., Bolton, 2005; Diefendorff et al., 2005; Lewis, 2005; O’Donohoe & Turley, 2006; Sheldon et al., 2004).

Intrinsic Motive

As mentioned earlier, the intrinsic motive was expected to be a counterpart to Bolton’s (2005; Bolton & Boyd, 2003) philanthropic motive. However, factor analysis revealed superior fit when the intrinsic motive was retained as a motive separate from the philanthropic motive. Thus the intrinsic motive was retained as a sixth factor in the typology for motives for managing emotions at work. Results from the path model indicated that this motive was positively related to the autonomy orientation scale, as expected. If employees manage their emotions at work because they enjoy doing so, they are more likely to be attentive to factors that inspire such intrinsic motivation. However, the only expected relationship with the intrinsic motive not to materialize was a negative relationship with controlled orientation. The intrinsic motive’s relationship with
controlled orientation was nonsignificant using path analysis and slightly positive using bivariate correlations, but as previously mentioned, the usefulness of the controlled orientation scale in detecting expected relationships is questionable.

Interestingly, the intrinsic motive was the only motive to exhibit all expected relationships with emotional labor strategies and outcomes. This motive was strongly and positively related to the expression of naturally felt emotions, positively related to deep acting, and negatively related to surface acting. Thus, employees who manage their emotions for intrinsic reasons are more likely to produce genuine emotional displays and to change their inward feelings to produce genuine outward emotional displays, and less likely to produce displays that do not reflect their inner feelings. This finding is consistent with Diefendorff et al.’s (2005) research showing that employees who value positive interactions are more likely to use genuine emotion management strategies, such as deep acting. Also, the intrinsic motive negatively predicted physical symptoms directly and indirectly and emotional exhaustion indirectly, and positively predicted job satisfaction indirectly; findings that are consistent with previous work linking intrinsic motivation to outcomes (e.g., Sheldon et al., 2004). These results suggest that an intrinsic motive is most desirable when organizations would like their employees to produce genuine displays, not to produce disingenuous displays, to experience positive outcomes, and not to experience negative outcomes.

Implications for Practice

The long-held assumption of emotional labor research that the only motive to perform emotional labor is for pay (e.g., Hochschild, 1983) does not seem to adequately represent the reasons underlying emotional labor. In fact, the present study provides
support for five additional motives to perform emotional labor in addition to that which suggests employees engage in emotional labor for financial gains. Furthermore, these motives can be predicted by individual difference variables and relate to emotional labor strategies and outcomes differently. Thus, one cannot paint the entire picture of the emotional labor process without including other motives to perform emotional labor.

While it is premature to make recommendations to managers in using the results of this study, several insights can be gained. Firstly, it should not be assumed that all employees are stimulated by the same elements of the emotional labor process. For example, some employees are more inclined to manage their emotions so they do not incur punishment, while others are inclined to do so simply because they do not feel like changing who they are simply because they are at work. Furthermore, these motives lead to differential use of emotional labor strategies. If an organization values the display of genuine emotions, for example, it would do well to inspire employees to manage their emotions for intrinsic reasons. Organizations might also wish to deter employees from engaging in surface acting or select employees who are less likely to surface act, as this strategy has been linked to costly organizational outcomes such as turnover (e.g., Chau, Dahling, Levy, & Diefendorff, in press). Finally, these motives lead to different outcomes. For instance, communicating to employees that they will be punished for improper emotional displays can be expected to lead to the greater likelihood of experiencing physical symptoms and emotional exhaustion, while employees who manage their emotions with customers because they enjoy doing so should experience greater job satisfaction. Thus, motives to perform emotional labor should be of interest to managers if they value outcomes like job satisfaction, which has been shown to predict
turnover (e.g., Beatson, Lings, & Gudergan, 2008). At this point, it is unclear as to whether these motives can be manipulated (i.e., by offering incentives) or whether they are more trait-like. However, future research might elucidate this distinction leading to insight as to whether interventions aimed at training or selection could be used to capitalize on these motives’ differential outcomes.

Limitations and Future Research

One limitation of the present study is that the controlled orientation scale of Deci and Ryan’s (1985) General Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS) exhibited an alarmingly low reliability (α = .65) and unusually strong positive relationship with the autonomy orientation scale (r = .42). Surprisingly, a reliability value of this nature for the controlled scale is not unusual based on other research (e.g., $\alpha = .69$, Deci & Ryan, 1985; $\alpha = .60$, Lee, Sheldon, & Turban, 2003; $\alpha = .64$, Sheldon, Turban, Brown, Barrick, & Judge, 2003; $\alpha = .70-.76$, Strauss & Ryan, 1987), while the high correlation with the autonomy scale is less frequently observed (e.g., $r = -.108-.296$, Deci & Ryan, 1985; $r = -.10$, Sheldon et al., 2003). Therefore, my ability to detect hypothesized relationships between these scales and emotional labor motives was limited and might constrain the stability of these results. Future research on the GCOS (Deci & Ryan, 1985) should be performed to determine how this scale might be improved.

Additionally, only 61% of participants who completed the measures supplied enough relevant information so that their jobs could be coded according to O*NET (National Center for O*NET Development, 2008) job codes. This forced me to decide between retaining this variable and losing almost half of my sample, or dropping the variable and retaining the entire usable sample. Thus, future research should pilot the
items used to obtain information to code jobs so that most, if not all, of participants’ provided job-relevant information may lead to the identification of appropriate O*NET job codes. The emotional job demands variable has been shown to predict emotional labor variables in previous studies (e.g., Diefendorff et al., 2006; Glomb et al., 2004; Grandey et al., 2004; Grandey et al., 2007), and thus should be pursued in future research.

Future research should also attempt to provide further clarification as to the stability of these motives, such as through the use of experience sampling methodology. Once the stability of emotional labor motives is known, researchers and practitioners might have a better idea of whether interventions aimed at enhancing states or those geared toward selecting for traits are more appropriate. Furthermore, the reasons why these motives differentially relate to other variables are discussed, but are not known. For example, it does not appear that more general scales of intrinsic or extrinsic motives (e.g., the GCOS, Deci & Ryan, 1985) are able to explain all of the relationships captured by motives’ associations with other variables, but it may be the case that the motives are simply a context-specific interpretation of Deci and Ryan’s (1985) extrinsic-intrinsic motivation continuum. Future research should attempt to further provide support for the distinction between these two sets of motives.

Additionally, future research should consider carefully the measurement of motives. The present study used only a retrospective explicit measure of motives, but researchers have suggested there is value in measuring motives at an implicit level as well (e.g., McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989). Recent work by Moon and Lord (2006) corroborates this suggestion by showing that emotional processes that occur
quickly (i.e., within milliseconds) are more important for predicting task performance than emotional processes that occur slowly. Thus, measuring motives only explicitly and consciously ignores the qualities of motives that operate implicitly and automatically.

Conclusion

Understanding the reasons why individuals engage in emotional labor with customers represents a potentially valuable contribution to the literature. The present research has clarified that six distinct motives do exist for performing emotional labor, as opposed to the original one theorized by Hochschild (1983), and that these motives are useful for predicting the use of emotional labor strategies and for predicting the experience of well-being outcomes. Future research would benefit from the inclusion of these motives in empirical tests of the emotional labor process, both as a way to articulate a more complete model of emotional labor and in an effort to increase the predictive power of such a model.
REFERENCES


APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

SCALES USED

_Emotional Labor Motives_
I manage my emotional expressions (e.g., smiling, not showing I’m upset) when interacting with customers because…
1. I get paid to do so.
2. Doing so improves my financial gains (e.g., sales, tips, commissions).
3. Doing so helps me obtain organizational rewards (e.g., raises, promotions).
4. Doing so means I make more money in my job.
5. I would get in trouble if I did not do so.
6. There are negative consequences at work if I don’t act that way.
7. Acting this way is part of my profession.
8. Doing so is the professional way to act in this job.
9. Doing so allows me to appear professional.
10. It is expected of people who work in my occupation.
11. My culture values these expressions.
12. This is the appropriate way to interact with others, regardless of whether they are customers or other individuals.
13. Doing so allows customers to see me as one of them.
14. I don’t mind doing a little extra to make a customer happy.
15. It is something pleasant that I want to give to the customer.
16. Doing so allows me to positively impact the person’s day.
17. It is an unexpected gift that improves their experience.
18. That is how I would act even if I weren’t at work.
19. I enjoy interacting with customers.
20. It is important to me to have good interactions with customers.
21. I am being myself.

_The General Causality Orientations Scale_ (Deci & Ryan, 1985)
1. You have been offered a new position in a company where you have worked for some time. The first question that is likely to come to mind is:
   a. What if I can’t live up to the new responsibility?
   b. Will I make more at this position?
   c. I wonder if the new work will be interesting.
2. You have a school-age daughter. On parents’ night the teacher tells you that your daughter is doing poorly and doesn’t seem involved in the work. You are likely to:
   a. Talk it over with your daughter to understand further what the problem is/
   b. Scold her and hope she does better.
   c. Make sure she does the assignments, because she should be working harder.
3. You had a job interview several weeks ago. In the mail you received a form letter which states that the position has been filled. It is likely that you might think:
   a. It’s not what you know, but who you know.
   b. I’m probably not good enough for the job.
   c. Somehow they didn’t see my qualifications as matching their needs.
4. You are a plant supervisor and have been charged with the task of allotting coffee breaks to three workers who cannot all break at once. You would likely handle this by:
   a. Telling the three workers the situation and having them work with you on the schedule.
   b. Simply assigning times that each can break to avoid any problems.
   c. Find out from someone in authority what to do or do what was done in the past.
5. A close (same-sex) friend of yours has been moody lately, and a couple of times has become very angry with you over “nothing.” You might:
   a. Share your observations with him/her and try to find out what is going on for him/her.
   b. Ignore it because there’s not much you can do about it anyway.
   c. Tell him/her that you’re willing to spend time together if and only if he/she makes more effort to control him/herself.
6. You have just received the results of a test you took, and you discovered that you did very poorly. Your initial reaction is likely to be:
   a. “I can’t do anything right,” and feel sad.
   b. “I wonder how it is I did so poorly,” and feel disappointed.
   c. “That stupid test doesn’t show anything,” and feel angry.
7. You have been invited to a large party where you know very few people. As you look forward to the evening, you would likely expect that:
   a. You’ll try to fit in with whatever is happening in order to have a good time and not look bad.
   b. You’ll find some people with whom you can relate.
   c. You’ll probably feel somewhat isolated and unnoticed.
8. You are asked to plan a picnic for yourself and your fellow employees. Your style for approaching this project could most likely be characterized as:
   a. Take charge: that is, you would make most of the major decisions for yourself.
   b. Follow precedent: you’re not really up to the task so you’d do it the way it’s been done before.
c. Seek participation: get inputs from others who want to make them before 
   you make the final plans.

9. Recently a position opened up at your place of work that could have meant a 
   promotion for you. However, a person you work with was offered the job rather 
   than you. In evaluating the situation, you’re likely to think:
   a. You didn’t really expect the job; you frequently get passed over.
   b. The other person probably “did the right things” politically to get the job.
   c. You would probably take a look at factors in your own performance that 
      led you to be passed over.

10. You are embarking on a new career. The most important consideration is likely to 
    be:
    a. Whether you can do the work without getting in over your head.
    b. How interested you are in that kind of work.
    c. Whether there are good possibilities for advancement.

11. A woman who works for you has generally done an adequate job. However, for 
    the past two weeks her work has not been up to par and she appears to be less 
    actively interested in her work. Your reaction is likely to be:
    a. Tell her that her work is below what is expected and that she should start 
       working harder.
    b. Ask her about the problem and let her know you are available to help work 
       it out.
    c. It’s hard to know what to do to get her straightened out.

12. Your company has promoted you to a position in a city far from your present 
    location. As you think about the move you would probably:
    a. Feel interested in the new challenge and a little nervous at the same time.
    b. Feel excited about the higher status and salary that is involved.
    c. Feel stressed and anxious about the upcoming changes.

*Emotional Labor Strategies* (Diefendorff, Croyle, & Gosserand, 2005)

23. I put on an act in order to deal with customers in an appropriate way.
24. I fake a good mood when interacting with customers.
25. I put on a “show” or “performance” when interacting with customers.
26. I just pretend to have the emotions I need to display for my job.
27. I put on a “mask” in order to display the emotions I need for the job.
28. I show feelings to customers that are different from what I feel inside.
29. I fake the emotions I show when dealing with customers.
30. I try to actually experience the emotions that I must show to customers.
31. I make an effort to actually feel the emotions that I need to display toward others.
32. I work hard to feel the emotions that I need to show to customers.
33. I work at developing the feelings inside of me that I need to show to customers.
34. The emotions I express to customers are genuine.
35. The emotions I show customers come naturally.
36. The emotions I show customers match what I spontaneously feel.

*Job Satisfaction* (Cammann, Fichman, Henkinds, & Klesh, 1979)
1. All in all I am satisfied with my job.
2. In general, I don’t like my job. (R)
3. In general, I like working here.

Job-Related Exhaustion (Wharton, 1993)
1. I feel emotionally drained from my work.
2. I feel used up at the end of my work day.
3. I dread getting up in the morning and having to face another day on the job.
4. I feel burned out from my work.
5. I feel frustrated by my job.
6. I feel I’m working too hard on my job.

Physical Symptoms (Emmons, 1991)
1. Headaches
2. Stomachache/pain
3. Chest/heart pain
4. Runny or congested nose
5. Coughing/sore throat
6. Faintness/dizziness
7. Acne/pimples
8. Stiff/sore muscles
9. Other
APPENDIX B

IRB APPROVAL

NOTICE OF APPROVAL

Date: July 23, 2008

To: Christina Saluan
   4175 Amelia Avenue
   Willoughby, Ohio 44094

From: Sharon McWhorter, IRB Administrator

Re: IRB Number 20080707
   “Motives for Managing emotions at Work”

Thank you for submitting your Exemption Request for the referenced study. Your request was approved July 23, 2008. The protocol represents minimal risk to subjects and matches the following federal category for exemption:

☐ Exemption 1 - Research conducted in established or commonly accepted educational settings, involving normal educational practices.

☒ Exemption 2 - Research Involving the use of educational tests, survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of public behavior.

☐ Exemption 3 - Research Involving the use of educational tests, survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of public behavior not exempt under category 2, but subjects are elected or appointed public officials or candidates for public office.

☐ Exemption 4 - Research Involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens.

☒ Exemption 5 - Research and demonstration projects conducted by or subject to the approval of department or agency heads, and which are designed to study, evaluate, or otherwise examine public programs or benefits.

☐ Exemption 6 - Taste and food quality evaluation and consumer acceptance studies.

Annual continuation applications are not required for exempt projects. If you make changes to the study’s design or procedures that increase the risk to subjects or include activities that do not fall within the approved exemption category, please contact me to discuss whether or not a new application must be submitted. Any such changes or modifications must be reviewed and approved by the IRB prior to implementation.

Please retain this letter for your files. If the research is being conducted for a master’s thesis or doctoral dissertation, the student must file a copy of this letter with the thesis or dissertation.

☐ Approved consent form/s enclosed

Cc: James Diefendorff - Advisor
Cc: Cecily Becker - Co PI
Cc: Rosalie Hall - IRB Chair

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