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Degree

Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Political Science, 2006.

Abstract

The study of Supreme Court decision making has been heavily influenced by the attitudinal model, which contends that justices’ decisions are dominated by their personal policy preferences. While scholars differ in their acceptance of the attitudinal model, most assume that policy preferences exhibit a uniform impact across all situations in which justices make decisions. This assumption has allowed scholars to make broad generalizations about justices’ behavior, but my dissertation argues that there exists systematic variation, or heterogeneity, in the impact of policy preferences that can be explained theoretically and tested empirically. The goal of the dissertation is to relax this uniformity assumption in order to identify and explain the extent to which the impact of justices’ policy preferences on their choices varies across different situations. Using a psychologically-oriented framework, I develop a theory specifying the mechanisms—-attitude strength and accountability—-that explain variation in the preference-behavior relationship. I posit that situational factors associated with each mechanism influence the magnitude of preference-based behavior. Employing a multilevel modeling framework, I execute three sets of empirical analyses. In Chapter 3, I test whether hypothesized case-level factors within the Court’s immediate environment have shaped preference-based behavior for portions of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts. The results provide uniform support for some of the hypotheses across all three Court eras, uniform rejection for others, and mixed support for others. In Chapter 4, I examine the degree to which external strategic considerations—-public opinion and the preferences of the other branches of government—-shape preference-based behavior. The results reveal that public mood exhibits an effect contrary to expectations and ideological consensus within Congress and between Congress and the President is capable, under certain conditions, of constraining the magnitude of preference-based behavior. In Chapter 5, I test the impact of precedent-related legal considerations on the preference-behavior relationship. The results reveal that legal considerations are capable of shaping the magnitude of preference-based behavior on the Court. The theory and findings contribute to the literature by underscoring the idea that the preference-behavior relationship on the Court is shaped by the varying situations that confront the justices.

Subject Headings

Political Science, General

Keywords

U.S. Supreme Court; judicial decision making; judicial behavior; law and courts; multilevel modeling

Advisor

Lawrence Baum

Pages

295p.

Document number: osu1148557321
Permalink: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1148557321

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