▼ Philosophical theories of warrant and justification are thought to answer the question of what makes some beliefs better to belief than others. Traditionally, philosophers have tried to find general qualities that beliefs share to get at the nature of warrant. Some of the most prominent theories based on these attempts are criticized. It is then suggested that what all of these theories miss is the fact that whenever the warrant of a belief is being evaluated, characteristics of the evaluator – not just the belief or the believer – affect the epistemic status of that belief. A pragmatist account of warrant is offered that takes into account the evaluator’s role in determining the epistemic status of a belief. Advisors/Committee Members: Ganson, Dorit.

▼ In his "Reference and Description," Scott Soames raises a number of objections against the two-dimensionalists and their analysis of the necessary a posteriori. Frank Jackson is just one of several two-dimensionalists whose analysis of the necessary a posteriori comes under attack from Scott Soames. This paper is meant as a defense of Frank Jackson from the objections of Scott Soames. It begins with a summary of traditional descriptivism and Saul Kripke's anti-descriptivist objections to that view, followed by a summary of Jackson's two-dimensional analysis of the necessary a posteriori. The paper then provides a summary of Scott Soames' objections to Frank Jackson's two-dimensional program, followed by responses to those objections. Advisors/Committee Members: Ganson, Dorit.

▼ This paper’s aim is to give an account of the distinctive ethical significance of the aesthetic experience of non-representational art. It demonstrates how perceptual skills necessary for such engagement prove to be ethical as well as aesthetic skills. First, some background on the nature of aesthetic experience, before Noël Carroll’s content-oriented account is adopted. After clarifying the notion of “aesthetic experience,” the paper’s focus on non-representational art is explained, illustrating the way in which it more accessibly fosters pure aesthetic experience, as opposed to art that is representational. By employing the terms ‘non-representational’ and ‘representational,’ paradigm cases of each sort of art will be referred to as a way of circumventing the need for an account of when and how art represents. Mitchell Green in “Empathy, Expression and What Artworks Have to Teach” asserts, “Some forms of engagement with works of art – either convey or activate a skill.” In light of this assertion, an analysis is given concerning how one’s aesthetic engagement with non-representational art distinctly cultivates the skill of sensitive perception, or, ‘delicacy,’ which allows one to perceive all of the aesthetically relevant features present in a work of art, no matter how subtle. By showing that many of these aesthetic features are also moral features, it is argued that the perception of such properties may aid in grasping moral knowledge and motivating ethical behavior. In this way, it is shown that the sort of delicate perception necessary for the aesthetic engagement with non-representational art is ethically significant. Advisors/Committee Members: Thomson-Jones, Katherine.